On Fighting Poverty
A Dialogue Between a Republican and an Economist

by Duncan Foley

REPUBLICAN: There's one thing that puzzles me about the poverty problem. We've always had poor people in this country, and by and large they've always managed to work their way up. My grandfather, for instance, was very poor, but he left the family farm and worked. He worked because he had to.

ECONOMIST: You say he worked his way up not because of any threat of starving, but because he had opportunities and the eventual reward was worth it. He took the initiative himself, and in making himself richer he made everybody else a little richer. That is the process that has always tended to eliminate poverty in America. Poor people have exploited their own opportunities to get jobs, and to train themselves, to become a part of the society.

REPUBLICAN: What does the government have to do except let people alone?

ECONOMIST: In many ways it can accelerate the process or impede it.

REPUBLICAN: I hate to say this, but I think the present welfare system whatever its humanitarian goals, is an obstacle to eliminating poverty. Poor people just don't have to work the way my grandfather did.

ECONOMIST: I agree that it is an obstacle, but you're looking at the wrong side of things. Your grandfather had the family farm to fall back on, even immigrants had the advantages of a close-knit community, just as the poor today have unemployment insurance, relief and welfare. But these programs are administered in a way that removes the incentive for the poor to take the first step of getting low paying jobs. At present a mother with two children may be getting $3,000 a year in relief, but she has to get a job paying more than $3,000 before her income rises by a single penny.

REPUBLICAN: Can't she get a part-time job earning less?

ECONOMIST: I: the social workers find out that she is earning, say, $600, they will take away $600 of her relief payments, leaving her income exactly the same. She is asked to work for nothing.

REPUBLICAN: It sounds like the high brackets of the income tax.

ECONOMIST: Furthermore, if her husband lives with her and the social workers find out they will cut off her aid-to-dependent children allowance. We employ an army of bureaucrats to prevent the poor from working and husbands from living with their wives, in fact, to run every aspect of a poor man's life.

REPUBLICAN: I see.

ECONOMIST: When you objected to the government running peoples' lives, what were you thinking of?

REPUBLICAN: You're not suggesting that we drop these welfare programs, are you?

ECONOMIST: Yes.

REPUBLICAN: But people might starve. Things are not so good now, but I think they'd be worse if people had no security at all. In fact, I'd be scared.

ECONOMIST: What we should do is recognize in principle as we have in fact that American society is not going to let anyone starve, that every American has a right to a minimum income.

REPUBLICAN: How is that going to give people an incentive to work?

ECONOMIST: We'll administer this minimum income on the income tax principle, as a negative income tax, as many economists, Republicans included, have advocated. The government would pay some percentage of the difference between their earned income and some standard.

REPUBLICAN: If they earned nothing they'd get only some percentage of the standard, and as earned income increased the negative tax would decrease gradually? If they earned the standard they'd get nothing and pay no tax?

ECONOMIST: Yes. Suppose the standard were $3,000 per adult and $1500 per child and the percentage were 50%. Then the mother with two children would still get exactly $3,000, that is, 50% of $6,000, which is her family's standard, if she earned nothing. If she earned $1,000 a year, her negative tax would be reduced $500, so her after tax income would go up to $3500. She would be free to keep $500 out of every $1000 she earned, until she were earning $6000 when she would start paying in taxes to the government at the normal rate.

REPUBLICAN: It sounds pretty expensive.

ECONOMIST: It wouldn't be. We need a careful study to estimate costs of different proposals. But since the growth of the economy leaves us every year with several billion dollars more than the year before, the negative income tax would probably involve no increase in personal tax rates. There are savings to be taken into account as well.

First, our present welfare programs could shrink and the social workers released to perform more valuable work than they are doing; helping people with specific problems no matter what their income. There may be a severe shortage of social workers in the suburbs. Second, the welfare elements of the farm price support program could wither away, since incomes of poor farmers would be maintained by the negative tax. Third, the release of ambition and energy among the poor once welfare co-
Focus On Youth

At a December 10th rally at the University of Wisconsin National Chairman Ray Bliss kicked off a drive aimed at college youth. As Mr. Bliss states, the number of young people "represents a vast reservoir of potential leaders and candidates for our party and we must get to them first to convince them that we want and need them as active participants in the Republican Party." A recent Gallup poll indicates the task is great. According to the sampling, thirty-five per cent of college youths prefer the Democratic Party, twenty-six per cent prefer the Republican party, and thirty-nine per cent have no preference.

A sure-fire method to win young people will soon be put into practice by the Young Republican National Federation (Tom R. Van Sickle, Chairman). In their annual progress report, they call it the "Young Republican Cavalcade of Stars."

"The concept of the Cavalcade of Stars program," the report explains on page 17, "is to go on the college campuses with professional entertainers, such as Oscar Peterson and Charlie Byrd, charge a small admission fee, and present them with a full evening of entertainment. There would be no political speeches, but we would distribute a printed program for the evening which would contain a soft sell on the Republican party. A thorough follow-through program would be devised by using names and addresses from raffle ticket stubs. This program has been extremely successful for the Ford Motor Company in their overall objective to build a new image for their company."

The Young Republican National Federation has budgeted $91,000 for implementing the Cavalcade project, thirty-eight per cent of its total 1967 budget of $235,000. This sum will pay for ten one-shot shows on college campuses. Half the expense, $45,000, goes for "talent."

With all due respect to Mr. Oscar Peterson and his jazz band, may we suggest that there may be a more effective and economical way to interest college students in the Republican Party? For instance, what about bucket seats? That is what young college-educated people are really interested in today. That is what really remade the image of the Ford Motor company.

For $90,000 the Republican Party could distribute 20,000 serviceable plastic bucket seats (at $4.50 apiece) to as many undergraduates as are likely to be reached by the ten concerts. And whereas a concert is only seen once, a bucket seat has a life-long value. Every time a student sits down in his plastic Republican bucket seat, he will think of voting for the party of Lincoln, John Wayne and Oscar Peterson. This could do for the GOP what the Mustang did for Ford and what Romney did for American Motors.

Amidst talk of party unity, the executive committee of the Young Republican National Federation attacked both the Ripon Society and Senator Hugh Scott in a resolution passed at its November meeting. The statement, introduced by a regional director from Alabama, charged: "It is clear that the Ripon Society-Scott axis has embarked on a campaign of rule or ruin in the Republican Party and has sought to make the Young Republican National Federation the whipping boy for its attacks." The resolution charged Senator Scott with "smears of every sort in a steady campaign of vilification" against the YR's. Then the group blasted Senator Scott and Ripon for their "attacks on other Republicans."
The Dilemmas of Three Factions

One can probably not find a more stark confrontation of East and West than the line that runs through Colorado where the Rocky Mountains rise abruptly from the Great Plains. This is the country of the Big Sky which has bred a proud individualism and a reverence in generations of Americans. It is a land rich in the legend of the great Indian god Manitou, of the conquistadores and their search for a mythical city of gold, of Spanish traders, silver miners, and gunmen.

The Republican Governors, newly acclaimed leaders of their rejuvenated party, selected the Broadmoor, at the foot of Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado Springs, as the scene for their dramatic December post-election meeting. Perhaps symbolically, the center of activity was the plush Broadmoor Golf Club, a gambling casino at the turn of the century. It was not at all surprising that a smooth-talking, fast-drawing gunman out of the West would pick up most of the cards.

POINT OF DECISION

Colorado Springs represented a point of decision for the Republican leaders where directions are set and where both the national press corps and professional pulse-takers of the Republican Party attempt to divine the political future. The last comparable meeting of Republican Governors was in Los Angeles this past July at the National Governors' Conference (see FORUM, July, 1966).

The contrast in political landscape and mood between the two meetings was instructive. The sands of American politics had shifted once again and the Republican Party in the estimate of most party leaders present, now found itself in the best competitive position it had enjoyed in over twenty-five years. For a season, at least, a mood of optimism and unity overshadowed the party, eclipsing the separate interests and problems of the three major Republican factions.

I. The Assumption of Unity

The dominant theme of Colorado Springs was "Republican unity." Republican National Chairman, Ray C. Bliss, set the tone in an opening press conference. Observing that "nothing builds success like success," Bliss eulogized the unity building function of the Republican Coordinating Committee: "we know what the winning formula was."

Governor-elect Ronald Reagan, the leading, self-advertised "unity" candidate, escorted by California Republican Chairman Gaylord Parkinson, brought the Governors the California-grown variant of the Bliss formula, the now famous "Eleventh Commandment" or Parkinson's Law: "Thou shalt not speak ill of a fellow Republican." In a gesture of togetherness the newly elected Chairman of the Republican Governors' Association, Governor John Love of Colorado, asked Reagan to recite the commandment for the press. The final statement of the conference and a resolution pledging continued support for Ray Bliss consummated the vow of unity.

DISTURBING ASPECTS

Yet there were disturbing aspects to the unity proclamation. First, there was the problem of forgetting 1964. Could or should Republicans forget the traumatic experiences of the fateful months that preceded the Goldwater nomination and defeat? In fact, fear appeared to be the real basis of the brotherhood at Colorado Springs — fear rooted in the memories of 1964. It was an uneasy and not altogether happy unity.

Second, there was the question of unity on what or whose terms? (Unity is not an impartial posture.) As a strategy, unity normally works to strengthen the dominant element in a coalition by assimilating the elements of opposition. As the front runner in a potentially bitter primary campaign, Reagan used it effectively in California. One would have expected the dominant moderate Governors to have used it in Colorado Springs to consolidate their new strength in the party. Instead, in an inexplicable move, they yielded control of the important five-man executive committee to three Governors (including two freshmen) prominently identified with Goldwater in 1964.

Finally, the unity formula suggested that open primary competition for the 1968 nomination would be sharply curtailed. Reagan stated that he might become a favorite son in California "to avoid divisiveness and factionalism." One national news source reported that Ray Bliss was quietly lining up favorite son candidates in an effort to head off a left-right confrontation wherever possible. And there was considerable talk about "a brokered convention" selecting the nominee.

Whatever the defects of unity as a strategy, nobody was ready to challenge it. The three major Republican factions — the moderates, the conservatives, and the professionals — were cautiously assessing their resources and anxiously considering the hard choices on candidates and strategy that lie ahead.
II. Moderate Dilemma:  
The "Inevitability" of Romney

As had been anticipated in Los Angeles, George Romney emerged from the November elections as the moderates' leading candidate, holding the clear advantage of position. His Michigan sweep exceeded the most optimistic estimates of his staff, overfulfilling the "pull effect" quota of Congressional seats. House Republican Conference leader Melvin Laird had gratuitously set as the test for Romney's acceptability for the nomination. Buttressed with the latest national polls already showing him ahead of President Johnson, Romney arrived in Colorado Springs with a full bag of chips to an expectant full house at the Broadmoor casino. But he left both his admirers and those who came to be impressed wondering.

Romney deliberately chose to play the occasion in low key. He told the press that the Governor's Conference had not been called to decide on a Republican candidate in 1968 and that he would not use it for that purpose. He declined to line up in private conference several Republican Governors who came to Colorado Springs willing to be courted. His top political advisors, Robert "Jack" MacIntosh and former Republican National Chairman Len Hall were conspicuously absent. Romney pointedly denied that they were even on his staff.

Instead, he was content to leave the press with the proclamation that he was in "quite a different position" than he had ever occupied before. "Never before have I indicated that I am in the process of exploring the possibility of being a candidate for the presidency," he said.

UNPREPARED  A certain indirectness can be expected in any candidate for the Presidency, but some of Romney's backers, notably Governor William Scranton of Pennsylvania, were concerned with the crawling start of the Romney campaign. Once again the press corps found Romney unprepared and wanting in substance. Before his campaign had officially begun, he was losing key reporters and columnists. The level of press criticism was sure to escalate. Romney, himself, may have unwittingly invited future confrontations by announcing that he was not going to take a position on Vietnam until he had studied the problem and prepared "specific proposals" for dealing with the "fateful, far-reaching complex character of that conflict." The press, the most critical audience in American politics, is likely to call him on his proposals before long.

While some were worried by Romney's continued problems with the press, the professionals were more concerned with the governor's organizational efforts and by some subtle changes in political climate. Romney's backers were slowly putting together a national staff. But it still lacked depth and breadth, and some early appointments had come as genuine surprises to the governor's well wishers.

COOLING SUPPORT?  More important, Romney support was "cooling." One prominent Republican governor suggested it was "too early to crystallize" support for a single candidate. The overriding tone of the Colorado Springs meetings was one of "reserve" and of "wariness" toward early support for Romney. The Governors' own stance completed the circle. The decision "not to decide" meant that the campaign for the Republican nomination had entered a new and uncertain phase. The pros did not yet see Romney's problems as "insurmountable." Some coalescence would inevitably take place. How much and at what rate would depend however on the Governor's continued popularity in the polls and his performance in the presidential primaries. Meanwhile some moderates were already considering the fallback positions of Chuck Percy or Nelson Rockefeller. The next move was up to George W. Romney.

III. Conservative Dilemma:  
Nixon or Reagan?

It took the finality of a million vote plurality in California to convince most Americans that Ronald Reagan was a real possibility for the Presidency in 1972 if not 1968. Even now many refuse to take him seriously and counsel that the best strategy for countering his ambitions is to ridicule his qualifications. The veteran of "Death Valley Days," wearing a white hat, six shooters in hand, showed the sophisticates and hardened pros at the Broadmoor casino that he was in the game for keeps. And he had more potent ammunition than party unity or the "long hard look."

LAST WORD  The Saturday morning Reagan press conference capped the Colorado Springs meetings, leaving the freshman Governor from California with the last word over the former greats of the stop-Goldwater era. If unity had submerged their past differences, it was no bar to Reagan's fiery call to the Goldwater rank and file. After stressing that his problems in California were "the biggest of them all," Reagan easily responded to foreign policy questions on Vietnam that other governors, including Romney, had studiously avoided for three days.

In what must be considered the most hawklike recent statement by a potential candidate for the Presidency Reagan called for an "all-out and total effort" for victory in Vietnam. "I don't recognize that a nation of our size can choose between a big war and a little war," he said. He found it hard to believe that America with its enormous resources must tolerate ten years of attrition. Disagreeing with Johnson only that "more could be done," Reagan urged that we "go in and get it over with."

On nuclear weapons, Regan stated: "The one person who should never know whether you are going to use them is the enemy. He should go to bed every night wondering if you are going to use them." In reference to student protests against the war in Vietnam, Reagan called for action, short of a declaration of war, that would draw "a clear line between dissent and lending aid and comfort to the enemy."

RAW MEAT  "He's throwing them 'raw meat.'" Nixon can never go that far," volunteered one pro. The press were similarly impressed. "A superb press conference," noted one top reported. "He has something Goldwater never had: 'plausibility.'" "The review was nearly unanimous: Ronald Reagan in any capacity would be a force to reckon with at the 1968 Republican National Convention. Would he be the candidate of the conservative wing? Some thought that he would be, inevitably.

At this point, however, uncertainty extended into the conservative camp as well. There was no clear evi-
idence of a Goldwater-type grass roots movement. F. Clifton White, very much present at the Broadmoor, appeared to have no candidate. The Goldwater high command, risking a split with its rank and file, was preparing to deliver its support to Richard Nixon, reluctant to project Nixon onto the national scene prematurely.

With Romney in the lead, albeit shakily, and with the lurking suspicion that Nixon is a "loser", the Conservative strategists face perhaps the most difficult choice of all — whether to take the safe "unity" strategy with Nixon as their candidate or to throw caution to the wind and risk an emotional Goldwater delegate strategy to draft Reagan. Reagan's coup at Colorado Springs enhances the probability of the latter alternative. The conservatives would be hard pressed to find a candidate who better combines evangelical appeal and articulate style than the California Governor. For the moment, however, conservative leaders were not eager to push for a confrontation.

IV. Professionals' Dilemma: The Feasibility of Brokerage

A third, and perhaps pivotal group, watched the developments at Colorado Springs carefully: the Republican professionals — Taft-conservatives at heart but pragmatic in political strategy. Ray Bliss, the self-declared "win-oriented" chairman of the Republican Party, was the archetype of "the Republican broker" at the Broadmoor casino.

While Romney and Reagan drew the public attention, there was steady talk that 1968 would be a "brokered" convention more like 1940 than the Eisenhower-Taft confrontation of 1952. Unity would mute ideological warfare; favorite son delegations led by a host of Vice-Presidential hopefuls would arrive in the convention city, and the nomination would be decided on the floor. This forecast, reportedly circulated by figures close to Richard Nixon, fit the mood a Colorado Springs surprisingly well. How feasible it would be in mid-1968, was another question.

OBSTACLES

If the Republican professionals have set a brokered convention as an objective, they have formidable obstacles ahead. The success of such a strategy is in large part contingent on the choices, initiative, and relative success of the Republican moderates and Goldwater conservatives. The strength of the Romney drive and the efforts to draft Reagan can have an overriding effect on the delicate balance necessary for a brokered convention. Once before, in 1964, the professionals made a basic miscalculation that temporarily destroyed their influence within the party. They may again overestimate their ability to control events in a Republican Party that has experienced fundamental shifts in power since the Eisenhower years.

Perhaps a more important limitation to the broker strategy is the revolutionary impact of modern communications on Presidential politics. Presidential nominating conventions have undergone radical innovation since 1940; the preconvention strategy itself largely a phenomenon of 1960 and 1964.

THE NEW PROFESSIONALS

A new generation of political professionals, skilled in public relations and communications, may yet have an important role in the Republican convention of 1968. Of the three Republican camps, however, only the former Goldwater-Reagan cadres of Clif White, the Young Republican "syndicate," and Spencer Roberts in California appear at this time to have the training for such a public relations convention game.

If the Republican Party finds itself in a slick convention and if the new professionals stick with their current allegiances, the odds would favor a conservative-oriented outcome. The full muscle of the Clif White-Goldwater convention machinery, never tested in 1964, might prove decisive.

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—J.S.S.

Behind the Chafee-Love Split

Early this fall Governor John Chafee of Rhode Island conceived the inconceivable idea of campaigning for the chairmanship of the Republican Governors' Association. Said urbane, articulate Governor Robert Smylie of Idaho as he turned over to post to the new chairman and conference host, John Love of Colorado, "Two years ago they almost had to pay me to be chairman."

The multitudinous press-corps at Colorado Springs did not seem particularly interested in the rivalry between Chafee and Love, partly because speculation about presidential candidacies seemed more relevant, partly because the campaign, like the election, took place behind closed doors and over telephone wires. But there is a story to be told, and, perhaps, some relevant conclusions to be drawn.

Some commentators, most of them indigenous to Colorado, smelled vice-presidential ambitions in the Broadmoor's corridors. Both Chafee and Love, they reasoned, could use the national exposure. Yet Robert Smylie, who took the post in 1964, got little publicity as chairman despite his considerable talents, and lost the 1966 Idaho primary race to one Donald Samuelson, whom the same commentators dubbed a "blockhead."

Chafee's own plans for the Republican governors (Love made no specific proposals) called for little allegiance, the odds would favor a conservative-oriented outcome. The full muscle of the Clif White-Goldwater convention machinery, never tested in 1964, might prove decisive.

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humble theory. The young governor from Rhode Island realized what marvellous works a strong Republican Governors' Association could do in 1967 and 1968. He sensed public uncertainty about the Democratic administration's policies; he saw labor and small business chafing under poorly conceived and ineptly applied federal regulations. As governor of an industrial state he had experienced the frustration of municipal, county and state governmental authority caught in the tangled skein of federal welfare administration. Like many others, he wondered whether Mr. Johnson understood fiscal and monetary policy, whether the President had the courage to enforce civil rights legislation. He sensed unusual vulnerability.

But he also sensed challenge. Chafee saw his Party at the fork in the road to power. Viable as ever loomed the negativistic, soulless attitude of those who conceived the Southern Strategy of 1964, who in fact cleared the 1964 Republican Civil Rights plank with the Dixiecrats. But in the wind was a new conservatism, captured by a few imaginative Republican candidates in the 1966 campaign: a Kennedy style of politics colored by the realization of what reformed municipal, county and state government could achieve.

PROGRAM FOR GOVERNORS  John Chafee saw his peers as comprising the front-line of American government, as the "problem-solvers." He stressed in his memorandum to them that they were their Party's only majority. He asked them to do more; to demand increased representation on the Republican Coordinating Committee; to build, in deeds and in the writing, a progressive 1968 Republican platform; to seek new initiatives in domestic and foreign policy through Republican Congressional leaders; to take a new and positive Republican case to the American people through bi-monthly, televised press conferences.

Chafee implicitly rejected the idea that the National Committee should dictate strategy to the Governors he called instead for close cooperation not only with Ray Bliss but "with a number of idea-generating Republican citizens' groups spread across the ideological spectrum." He said, "We should draw on the resources of the academic community, private business enterprise, labor organizations. . . ." He wanted an adequately staffed Washington office, including a full-scale research and policy operation financed not only by the National Committee but by individual states.

THIRD FORCE  Outgoing chairman Smylie later articulated this same concern in his prepared statement to the Conference: "Unless far more adequate support for the Association is forthcoming from the National Committee on a voluntary and unfettered basis. . . .then I would suggest to you in all sincerity that you go it alone." Smylie suggested that the Governors demand at least $339,000 — the amount he said was requested for 1967 by the Young Republican National Federation. (The actual sum was $235,000, plus an additional $104,000 for the teen-age division.)

Chafee, keenly aware that the Association had played no role in 1964 platform-drafting let alone in the selection of delegates and candidates, saw the Governors as a third force in Republican politics — perhaps as the dominant force.

The intriguing question is to what extent John Chafee's novel, refreshingly candid campaign for the chairmanship failed. Despite the fact that his colleagues gave him the vice-chairmanship and the second half of a split term (to run from December 1967), his aides were disconsolate; the young governor himself looked unhappy as new executive committee members Tim Babcock (Montana), Claude Kirk (Florida), Ronald Reagan (California), and first-term chairman John Love gathered around the rostrum for a unity-minded post-session press conference.

BACKSTAGE CAMPAIGN  Chafee had called each governor the week before. His candor was charming, his enthusiasm contagious. He thought he had commitments from several young western governors, including Dan Evans of Washington. Others chatted amiably and said they'd keep an open mind. The Easterners were uniformly enthusiastic.

Chafee gave a reception Thursday evening, breakfasted with Claude Kirk of Florida Friday morning, chatted knowledgeably with newsmen, and button-holed all the governors he could. But others were busy too. Robert Carter, Goldwater's sergeant-at-arms at the 1964 convention, now working with Len Hall for George Romney, actively sought out governors — especially westerners — and lobbied for Love. Rumors spread that Evans of Washington — whom many had expected to nominate Chafee, had changed his mind and was using his influence to produce a Love victory.

Behind closed doors Friday afternoon the governors agreed to split the term despite arguments that the Association would thereby weaken itself. The touchstone was not to offend, the mood conciliatory. Tim Babcock of Montana, a Goldwater conservative, nominated John Love. Their common western neighbor Norbert Tiemann of Nebraska, a moderate businessman who refused to run on an anti-Federal government platform, seconded. Civil-rights conscious John Volpe of Massachusetts nominated Chafee; Raymond Shafer, a Scranton-protege, seconded. An unconfirmed yet reliable source indicates that Chafee received only five votes in the secret ballot that followed. As the only other candidate for the job, he took the vice-chairmanship and a second half term in a compromise agreed to prior to the secret ballot.

What had happened?

WESTWARD  It is hardly conceivable that the Love tide was caused by the identity of the principals. Both John Chafee and John Love are young, popular, bright and handsome men. Both are labeled "moderate" and "pragmatic." Both actively supported William Scranton in 1964, Love despite the opposition of his delegation. Both are mentioned as vice-presidential candidates. Clearly, their ideological leanings and their personalities had nothing to do with it.

Perhaps a better explanation has to do with geography. The atmosphere at the Broadmoor was noticeably Western, with Reagan performing brilliantly in the shadow of Pike's Peak. Love has five immediate neighbors — Bartlett in Oklahoma, Tiemann in Nebraska, Hathaway in Wyoming, Cargo in New Mexico, Williams in Arizona. Chafee has only John Volpe. Only four of the twenty-five Republican-governed states are "Eastern", and Chafee is a Yankee.

George Romney must have felt the west wind blowing. Eastern establishment identification is, of course,
the last thing Romney needs: witness his too-well publicized Caribbean tiff with Nelson Rockefeller. In Love, a moderate, Romney and the progressive western governors could have their cake and eat it too. As for the staunch western conservatives, they got their frosting in the executive committee: Babcock, a state's righter; Kirk, who picked up George Mahone's slogan, "Your Home is Your Castle", in the final weeks of his gubernatorial campaign (managed by Robert E. Lee, former Denver county Republican Chairman); Reagan, who wants a "speedy", "total", "military" victory in Vietnam.

LOVE'S PROBLEMS

Ironically, the factors that probably gave Love the chairmanship may tend to undercut his effectiveness as a spokesman for the governors in much the same way as they did Smylie's. First, Colorado is remote from both Eastern and Western centers of political, corporate and opinion-making power. Love's access to national news media is limited.

Second, the very problems of which the governors declared themselves "keenly aware" and best-equipped to solve — urban sprawl, job opportunities and training, air and water pollution, racial discrimination, mass transportation, economic deprivation — hardly touch Colorado to the extent they pervade Rhode Island. Love governs a blue-skied, mountain-studded paradise; Chafee a populous, polluted, slum-ridden industrial complex. His are the focal problems.

And finally, it is not to the Republican-dominated West but to the great Democratic cities of the Midwest and East that the GOP must address itself to win in 1968. Chafee is situated to do so; Love, despite his many talents, is not.

To the extent that Love is in a less strategic position to chair a positive assault on Washington, Chafee's campaign for a stronger Republican Governors' Association did not succeed. He will, of course, take the chairmanship in 1967. But the Governors themselves regarded the first term as the plum, probably because by December 1967 Republican presidential politics may totally eclipse the role of the Republican Governors' Association.

MACHINERY NEEDED

Others, however, suggest that early 1968 could be the Governors' moment of maximum collective impact on the platform, on candidate and delegate selection, and on a tired Democratic administration. But then the question of adequate machinery is raised — will Love have built it for Chafee in the first year? 1968 would be almost too late for the governors to begin with a new staff and new research operation to establish working press relationships and open lines of communication to labor, business, the Negro community and the universities.

The Governors' own internal procedures may be disrupted by shifts in a majority of executive-policy committee seats. To the extent that the split-term weakens the Association, Chafee also lost his campaign.

He also lost on the merits of his plan for a revitalized Republican Governors' Association. Although chairman Love said the group would "probably" take a Washington office, its operations will be financed (to some unspecified extent) by the states' conventions. The Governors' staff will continue in Washington under Ray Bliss's wing. Since controversy — especially on the issues — is the bane of the GOP National Chairman's political existence, it is difficult to believe that the Governors will articulate relevant new policies under such tutelage. For to do so would be to create controversy, and perhaps to step on the leader feet of some Republican Congressional leaders. Significantly, Chafee's proposal for bi-monthly issue-oriented press conferences was dropped.

PARTIAL SUCCESS

Yet the Rhode Island governor — whose campaign did succeed to some extent. His colleagues will get increased representation on the Republican Coordinating Committee (in which, according to Ray Bliss, "a harsh word has never been spoken"). And the post-conference statement, drafted by Romney aide and Detroit attorney Richard Van Dusen, was progressive in tone. It talked a new pragmatic language; it called for a Republican drive for reform of municipal and state government, for a positive Republican response to social and economic problems. And the Governors passed a resolution calling for federal-state revenue sharing — the subject of their only research paper (issued jointly with the Ripon Society in 1965).

A cloud of "unity" hung over Colorado Springs. Ronald Reagan floated on it in his boyish recitation of the California GOP's "Eleventh Commandment": "Thou shalt not speak ill of a fellow Republican." Its corollary according to Reagan: contestants in a Republican primary should not wage war on the issues; presumably he sees primaries solely as popularity contests — with good reason. Chafee and Love reported "no blood on the floor."

UNITY ON WHAT?

What the Republican governors might have forgotten is that "unity" is a rather empty concept if it is about nothing. It is like George Romney's gall in pounding the rostrum emphatically as he told the press he had not made up his mind about Vietnam. The big question is whether the Republican Governors will pound away at saying nothing, and if so, for how long. They certainly ignored Chafee's suggestion that they speak out on "world issues."

Given the first-term composition of the policy committee (which can only act unanimously) it is also difficult to conceive how the Association will move aggressively in key domestic areas like civil rights and urban renewal, mental health and pollution, state constitutional reform and education. Kirk campaigned on white backlash; Babcock on an unregenerated states' rights platform. These men have manifested concern not with private and local initiative, but rather with private and local rights. Reagan, who moved center in his campaign, mouthed platitudes at Colorado Springs, except, significantly, in the one area where others feared to tread. There the hawk, he flew the coop of unity.

USEFUL DEBATE

The great lesson of 1964 was that Republicans who seek to govern rather than to win ideological converts must take their case to the people through their party's organization, part of which is the Republican Governors' Association. But the people won't listen to platitudes. Debate, ferment over issues, is useful. Unity without substance is void. Can a Republican now differ with the Governor of California over Southeast Asian policy without violating his Eleventh Commandment?

One can but wonder how individual Republican Governors will answer this. Their Association, it would seem, prefers neutrality. At Colorado Springs, it might as well have been a second National Committee.

—W.S.P.
In the release following their final executive session at Colorado Springs, the Republican Governors recognized that "our first responsibility is to the people of our States and to solution of the problems that confront them." They continued, "We find the guide for such actions in essential Republican philosophy and in the recent dynamic progress made in the States governed by Republican administrations."

In saying this, the Governors were not simply echoing the chant that Republicans should be elected because they can do the same jobs better than the Democrats. Instead, they were committing themselves to what is both a technical and a popular approach to government.

Just as John Kennedy's press conferences were often larded with detailed analysis of national problems, Governors Romney and Rockefeller are legendary with the press for their indefatigable discussions, showered with data of the problems of their States, and their own programs to deal with them. The Governors were pledging themselves to follow this problem-solving style, and with the prospect of greater success than Kennedy ever had.

TECHNICAL ATMOSPHERE

This technical atmosphere was not only dominant at the recent conference — it was the thread which seemed to tie virtually all of the Republican Governors together. Yet it should not be taken to mean that the Governors are visifilly recalling Herbert Hoover's pre-depression reputation as the great "Social Engineer."

Rather, as Governor Dan Evans of Washington State, himself an engineer by training, put it, "It is time for the American people to come to grips with the issues which have substance and meaning for the future, and it is time for the Republican Party, so long dormant and too long defensive, to thrust itself to the forefront of this effort."

The Republican Governors can have an enormous impact both on the handling of current social problems and by the force of their numbers, on national politics. If they lay siege to problems, their numbers will expand and their political influence will increase. They will be saying and doing the things most relevant in the changed politics about to burst upon us.

The nature of the issues selected for their attention is crucial. For one thing, as they all realize, their energy can not be dissipated; they must choose, and make the right choice. Statistics and sense tell them that the problems of the future are urban in character, and that the time is short in which to shape institutions and opinion in a way that will withstand the onrush of those problems.

TAX-SHARING URGENT

The Governors have already staked out one important area for action. As they anticipated in their joint study with the Ripon Society a year and a half ago, the need for a tax-sharing plan of federal revenues with the States has mounted to the point of urgency. At the same time, they see the importance of using this time when public attention is fastened on the plight of local government, to restructure and modernize institutions, almost all of which are 19th century in origin.

The Governors as Republicans have an important stake in using this opportunity to revive respectable local government. A rationalized local government, with more meaningful boundaries, increased legal powers, and with a consequent attraction for more capable people to run it, means returning much of the initiative on local problems to the localities. If the current situation of confused taxing districts, overlapping functional authorities, and poor leadership continues, the federal government will continue as it has for years to fill the vacuum.

URBAN INITIATIVES

Another arena in which Republican principles could lead to important gains is that of handling the problem of the "strip cities." Recent proposals for the creation of semi-publicly held, Comsat-style corporations, to deal with urban renewal, should be closely studied by the Governors. Similarly, the lead should be taken by Republican Governors in finding the way to show clearly the interdependence of the troubled core cities with the "strip cities" or suburbs in our growing metropolitan areas.

The future of the Republican Party lies in its answers to these and comparable questions. The Governors' attempt to escape from platitudes is promising. If they now prove to have neither the sense to find their way toward the answers, nor the courage to implement them, the Republican Party has no reason for being as a national force. But, then, the Governors might prove to have both.

—J.R.P.

BOOKSHELF: Southern Study

White segregationists in the South are more "liberal" than racial moderates on non-racial, domestic issues, according to the results of a six-year, eleven-state study by two professors at the University of North Carolina, Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro.

The professors' findings, published in Negroes and the New Southern Politics, indicate that the southern Republican party will have to propose several new domestic programs to counter Democratic appeals to whites and Negroes on the non-racial issues.

Other conclusions of the survey, which was largely conducted by questionnaires and processed by computers were:

— That Southern Negroes now vote at about half the rate of Southern whites but discuss politics, join political organizations, and contribute money for political purposes more frequently than their white neighbors.

— That the Negro students who began the "sit-in" movements came from more advantaged homes, attended better colleges, and had a more generally favorable attitude toward white Southerners than their fellow Negro students who did not "sit-in".

— That clashes over desegregation of Southern schools will continue and perhaps intensify because Negroes expect the changeover to be accomplished within a few years, while Southern whites expect the shift to take generations.

The survey was published in late November by Harcourt, Brace and World Publishers.
DRAFT CONFERENCE

The Ripon-endorsed call for an all-volunteer military received the support of a majority of participants at a National Conference on the Draft held at the University of Chicago last month and attended by 120 professors, students, Congressmen, Senators, journalists, and representatives of the Departments of Defense, Labor, and the Selective Service.

Presented to the conference along with Ripon's proposal were plans for a lottery draft, an alternative "national service", and a revamped Selective Service. Almost all conferees agreed that the present draft needed changing. The conference did not officially vote on any resolutions, but a petition favoring a volunteer Armed Forces, sponsored by Ripon/Northwest member Bruce K. Chapman, gained the signatures of more than half of conference participants.

Co-sponsoring the petition with Chapman were Donald Rumsfeld (R-Ill.) and Robert Kastenmeier (D-Wis.), the two congressmen in attendance. Other supporters included economists Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago and Walter Oi of the University of Washington.

Chapman presented Ripon's paper — Politics and Conscription: A Proposal to Replace the Draft — to the conference and led off the three-hour debate on the volunteer military with a discussion of its economic, military and social advantages. Opposition to the volunteer system was limited almost entirely to the representatives of the Department of Defense and the Selective Service.

Many of the other conferees expressed surprise that a volunteer military was feasible at an additional budgetary cost of only four to eight billion dollars—about the cost of four months of the Vietnam war. At the close of the four-day meeting, Chapman was asked to appear on television to explain the merits of the volunteer system.

—T.A.B.

POLITICAL NOTES

Wisconsin GOP Governor Warren Knowles says he will not run as a favorite son in the state's presidential primary in 1968. This despite suggestions that the state's congressional leaders would like to avoid a primary battle (as they did in 1964 when Representative John Byrnes was the favorite son stand-in for Barry Goldwater).

An open primary could involve two Republicans who are very popular in the Badger state. Richard Nixon carried Wisconsin in 1960 by a comfortable margin and has returned frequently since. Neighbor George Romney's successes have been highly visible across Lake Michigan. Moreover, his Wisconsin-based American Motors plants once brought a good deal of prosperity to much-impressed Wisconsinites.

Few would now bet on the outcome, particularly since George Wallace can be expected to return to court both the state's conservative Republicans and the backlash Democrats who gave him his first taste of northern success in 1964. The state has no registration by party; a high percentage of voters decide which primary they will vote in on the basis of which has the most important races. Where this highly independent swing vote might go in a projected four-way struggle is a fascinating question. Will liberals, who could hurt Nixon, care more about rebuking Wallace? Will conservatives prefer blocking Romney to embarrassing the President or his stand-in? Tune in one year from now, when the campaigning will be launched.

POLLS: Gallup on preferred Presidential nominee of rank-and-file Republicans: November, 1965: Nixon, 55 per cent; Romney, 38 per cent — May, 1966: Nixon, 55 per cent; Romney, 40 per cent — November, 1966: Romney, 50 per cent; Nixon, 43 per cent.

Human Events poll of delegates to 1964 Republican convention. Their preferences: Nixon, 38 per cent; Romney, 25 per cent. The strongest candidate: Nixon, 30 per cent; Romney, 34 per cent. Will be nominated: Nixon, 44 per cent; Romney, 35 per cent; Would not support a candidate who did not support Goldwater in 1964: 27 per cent.
P. O. BOX 138: The Postman Cometh

There was a time not so long ago when a Ripon volunteer trudged one day each week to the Cambridge Post Office to pick up a few letters and periodicals. The founders gathered over a beer in Cronin's to read it, then filed it in somebody's desk drawer.

This week (the second in December) over one hundred pieces of first class mail were processed by two full time secretaries who entered each sender's name on a master chart, then routed the correspondence to executive board members for information or reply. There were twenty new subscriptions—a bit below the average; thirty-two orders for various Ripon publications; four letters inquiring about chapter organization in Atlanta, Miami Shores, Columbus, Durham and Holland, Mich.; two obscene postcards, a letter from a man in Nebraska who told us that his ancestor had guarded the door of the Republican, Wisconsin, cabin where the Republican Party was organized in 1854; a blank subscription form with the words “diary Communists” (sic) scrawled all over it; three letters from Hill staffers who wanted position memoranda prepared.

Among other things received were: twelve friendly letters from people who wanted to know more about us; an invitation from a local radio station to appear on a talk show; two applications from mid-western university professors for national associate membership; and numerous inter-chapter communications. It's a delight to read. Next month: the telephone.

VISITORS

Al Abrahms, Executive Director of Republicans for Progress was the Ripon Society's guest of honor at a small Ripon dinner given in Boston by Dave Murdoch recently. The conversation strayed from the effect of Ripon and RFP endorsements to Republican presidential politics, from 1968 delegate selection to Ripon's expanding research efforts. Al had the usual string of delightful anecdotes.

Emmett John Hughes (Ordeal of Power) was the Boston chapter's guest at a small reception in Dunster House.

DISCUSSION

The Boston chapter recently held an academically violent meeting on its “strike paralysis” paper with several members, Abraham Siegel (M.I.T. labor-economist), the four draftsman and a practicing labor lawyer in attendance. Jack Saloma (Boston), John Price (New York), and Stuart Parsons (Boston, Milwaukee) attended the Republican Governors Association meeting in Colorado Springs; their analysis comprises a large part of this FORUM. As provocative as the conference was a side trip and meeting with an impressive group of twenty Denver attorneys, businessmen, clergy and university professors regarding chapter organization there.

NEW YORK

The New York chapter held a lively discussion meeting with Senator Jacob Javits in December. The free-wheeling session touched on such topics as the role of the Republican Governors, Presidential politics, and legislative initiatives. Chapter members are planning a similar discussion meeting for the month of February on problems of constitutional revision in New York State. The group has also begun work on a new research project on Government Service Centers. —W.S.P.

FROM OUR READERS

MR. GOLDWATER WRITES

Gentlemen:

What Republicans generally are now beginning to find out is that there has never been any great division in our Party over basic fundamentals. For instance, you who represent supposedly the liberal side of our Party agree with the conservative side that the draft can be replaced. (“Politics and Conscription”, FORUM, December, 1966.)

The whole Party is now beginning to rally behind a proposition first made by Mel Laird in '62 and later reiterated by me in my campaign and now advocated by most Republicans in the house: share the income tax with the states with no strings attached.

There certainly are great areas of common interest in preventing the slide of centralized federal power, but in this area I think we have to go a bit further before we can reach a working understanding and that is because most of this power has been given the Executive through measures which do have a political appeal and an understanding appear to the conscience, such as medicare, federal aid to education, etc., etc., all of which carry vast power from the Legislative Branch over into the Administrative Branch.

Some time it might be to the mutual advantage of all Republicans to sit down and explore in detail just how close this Party is together and how drastically separated the opposition has become.

BARRY GOLDWATER
Scottsdale, Arizona

FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

Gentlemen:

There is a considerable flood of Birch Society literature in many of the small town variety stores in this area. Paperback from the American Opinion Press (Belmont, Massachusetts) sometimes are the only reading material offered by local merchants. One notices far right materials in the local barbershops and other places where people would be expected to have some time to sit and read. One wonders if this form of background material helps to explain the recent Republican ticket in the state — a collection of essentially negative, mostly unrealistic groups who failed to make a very favorable impression on the electorate, as the “results suggest.

If we hope to see young men and women interest themselves in a rejuvenated Republican Party, Republican leadership will have to avoid the cynicism-inducing attitude of “as long as I am taken care of, the devil with everyone else.” We need the Ripon Society to remind us there are some Republicans, at least, who do care.

RUSSELL E. WARNER
Center Harbor, N.H.

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