Can We Bridge the Ideological Gap?

Across the country this spring, at party rallies and conventions and banquets, Republicans have been continually exhorted to remember that in "unity" lies their salvation. What is often missing in these pleas is an answer to the questions: "Unity for what?" "Unity on what terms?" "Unity to what purpose?" As one reporter remarked after one such harmony-oriented rally: "Everyone's afraid to mention issues!"

The Ripon Society believes that meaningful unity requires that issues be mentioned, that these questions be answered. For issues, not personalities, are what really obstruct or create party harmony in the long run. There can be no effective reproofement based merely on an empty call for cooperation or a candidate's good looks. Nor does such a strategy attract Republican votes. People in politics and people who vote are just not that shallow.

Unhappily issues, particularly positive initiatives, are not popular topics at party gatherings these days. Many are afraid that a candid discussion of ideology will expose differences too wide for compromise. There is a real and often understandable temptation to sweep issues under the rug, to see that splits are papered over and the delicate balance of factions maintained.

We believe that the Republican party can do better than this. Where real divisions exist the party is strong enough to frankly acknowledge its internal differences rather than letting the call to unity be a public shield behind which factions maneuver. And where agreement is possible, and we believe there are important areas where it is, that agreement will be stronger and more productive if it is based on a full understanding of its ideological foundations.

Accordingly we suggest that the party use the next few months, before political competition again absorbs its energies, to at least talk more objectively and more candidly about its internal divisions. If we are trying to span an intra-party gulf, then let us first map its outlines. In what area is it widest? Where does it narrow? Where can it most effectively be bridged? This statement is intended as a contribution to that discussion.

Let us begin by looking at the issues of the '64 convention. To many they already seem just slightly distant. The platform debate, it will be remembered, centered on extremism, civil rights in public accommodations, and the proposal for giving the NATO commander control over nuclear weapons. None preoccupy us presently, though the basic differences underlying each have by no means disappeared.

One reason the extremism issue has been somewhat muffled is the behavior of the 1964 candidate. Senator Goldwater asserted after the election that he had not seen the Romney plank on extremism or he would have backed it. He did back nearly identical wording when it was approved by the Republican Coordinating Committee in 1965 and today, in Arizona, Senate candidate Goldwater is himself struggling against the John Birch Society. Extremism, at least in the pursuit of Goldwater, may be a vice, after all. Like other conservatives who have come under the radicals' guns (Karl Mundt and Milton Young are recent examples), Goldwater is no longer sanguine about the dark passions that pound in some of the old hearts that "knew he was right."

The extremists are still around in 1967, and the Wallace candidacy will tempt the party to compromise them again in 1968. But the Republican will resist extremists in a little stronger now, and there is always the happy possibility the extremists will desert the GOP for the former Alabama Governor who solicits their support.

A similar pattern emerges in the second area, that of civil rights. The public accommodations act has now been written into law, and most conservatives have had little to say about it, pro or con. There remains, however, an important civil rights division in the party. Progressives support some kind of open housing law, and conservatives oppose it, for example. The Southern Strategy and the lure of the backlash still prevent the party from making a wholehearted shift toward an aggressive metropolitan and minority group appeal. Yet some GOP rightists and moderates have at least renewed their dialogue on the party role in civil rights, a dialogue interrupted about 1962. Moreover, many Republicans from both camps are going one step farther, arguing that legal protections alone will never better the lot of Negroes in America sufficiently, that something more is needed. They thus focus on fundamental questions of ghetto life and the psychology of individual improvement. Here are opportunities for creative and unified Republican initiatives. The muting of the Democratic commitment makes it all the more imperative that Republicans take advantage of these opportunities.

The third issue, that of the NATO commander's prerogatives, or detente, is not presently an important factor in party struggles, though the general question could be raised again by Vietnam. Its importance three years ago resulted because it was the focus of the nuclear irresponsibility fear, one which arose out of Senator Goldwater's peculiarly careless rhetoric. But it also was...
intra-party shorthand for a more fundamental and lasting party split — that between “confrontation” and “trente” — between those who emphasize military intervention as the most useful of American policies and those who believe our strongest weapon is peaceful economic competition. One strategy may not preclude the other (each international situation calls for a unique response), but the party does presently divide on the matter of priorities and emphasis. The recent Morton-Dirksen confrontation on East-West rapprochement is just one manifestation of this division. In Vietnam, those Republicans who see salvation in increased force will disagree with increasing sharpness from moderates who emphasize the desirability of negotiations and the dangers of war with China.

It is true that the desire of progressives to promote more foreign aid through private channels often divides them from liberal Democrats and allies them with conservatives. However, prospects for united GOP initiatives seem most promising in domestic affairs. They are particularly promising in new areas of concern which have not received significant attention three years ago. Life goes on and our world changes with astonishing speed. Remarkably, since 1964, the party’s ideological factions have been surprising each other with agreement on a number of issues that are relatively new. We would list eight examples of issues and programs where wide ranging Republican agreement seems to be developing:

(1) Opposition to the conduct and administration of many poverty programs, support for “structural-economic” alternatives and complements and for programs like the Prouty-Curtis Human Investment Act.

(2) Enthusiasm for expanding home ownership among the poor through programs like the Percy plan, a proposal which boasts backing from all 35 GOP Senators. Like issue 1, this program treats one aspect of the key political problem facing the GOP today, that of the cities.

(3) Wide support for the principle of federal revenue sharing with the states and localities, and for its corollary, progressive and innovative government on the state and local level.

(4) Wide and growing recognition of the inequity and inefficiency of the present draft and the equally objectionable LBJ lottery. A preference is emerging for an all-voluntary military, a program consistent with the libertarian position of a Taft and a Vandenberg, and now the program of Senator Goldwater, Senator Hatfield, and the Ripon Society.


(6) Agreement on the need for more problem solving by volunteer organizations as a complement to and in some cases a replacement for governmental or even business efforts. Both our leaders and our laws create a climate which encourages such volunteer responsibility. A Republican President could demonstrate and inspire such a new attitude, and otherwise foster more reflection upon and more public recognition for the potential of the independent sector.

(7) Party-wide recognition of the problem of de-personalized government and its impact upon the way a citizen perceives his rights and powers and responsibilities. This problem is understood more clearly than it was, and the proposed solutions — neighborhood mayors, ombudsmen, and so on — are growing ever more specific. Senator Scott has presented one outline of the matter in his introduction to the Ripon Society’s recent book.

(8) A recognition by conservatives and progressives alike of the growing burden of educational costs and the consequent inability of private colleges to maintain their relative standing in the total educational picture. Many Republicans see an answer to these and associated programs through direct federal aid to college students, (either through tax credits or outright grants) as a way of stimulating private education while avoiding governmental controls.

All of these issues and programs represent positive attempts to deal with the dehumanizing or inefficient consequences of centralized power. But on each of the above issues, many conservative and progressive Republicans agree. Interestingly, they do not attract support from all in either camp, which raises the question of how much the conservative-liberal definitions explain. It is curious, for example, that a proposal like the volunteer army has received precious little support or even attention from the party’s Congressional leadership, despite its endorsement by the 1964 platform.

Certainly sensitive progressives need not celebrate party leaders just because they call themselves “moderates” when they sedulously avoid creative stands on one major issue after another. Nor need they castigate all conservatives when some conservative thinkers contribute to their own political guidance. If there is an ideological split between progressives and conservatives, then there is also a real split between those who want to use principles to solve public problems and those who do not. The rightist obstructionists and moderate do-nothings are together in the latter camp and their number is legion.

PERSONALITY

Thus in one respect thoughtful progressives may have more in common with their counterparts on the right than with the personality cultists of all factions, the superficial many for whom the final mark of all that is good is its ephemeral popularity. And certainly those from either wing who seek new answers to perplexing problems will make a greater contribution than those whose ultimate litmus test is “Where did you stand on Goldwater?” or “What do you think of Rockefeller?” Ripon’s ideological premises may not be those of a libertarian-conservative like Milton Friedman, let alone a traditionalist-conservative like William Buckley (and it’s time we learned to distinguish the two varieties), but we can at least grant that some intellectuals on the right are thinking.

If we find that in some areas their thinking and ours coincide, greater is the chance for bringing the rest of the party around to the position in question.

Consequently, we submit that there is a need for greater intra-party examination of where Republicans stand on issues. The hope for some common ground which is expressed in the list cited earlier is only a hope. Such hopes have been held in the past, but they have
THE MYTH OF BIPARTISANSHIP

A Call For a Republican Initiative

United States foreign policy in 1967 is a muddled and meandering mess. A mere glance at the headlines reveals that crisis after crisis has caught the Johnson Administration unaware. American troops continue to flow to Southeast Asia as the President drifts along in a tragic, seemingly aimless policy to fulfill a “commit­ment” to South Vietnam. Across the world, war breaks out in the Middle East, exploding in the faces of Admin­istration officials frantically searching for a way to avoid fulfilling the U.S. “commitment” to Israel. During the war’s early hours, a confused State Department publicly debates whether the U.S. is a “neutral” or a “concerned non-belligerent” in the conflict. In a time of high tension, American policy-makers, unguided by principle, are prisoners of events.

The Republican leadership in Congress, however, offers the public little edification and no alternative. Those G.O.P. leaders, most critical of alleged “me-tooism” among party progressives, prove to be the worst “me­ttooers” on issues of foreign policy. A penetrating and thoughtful study of Vietnam issued by the staff of the Senate Republican Policy Committee is hastily repudiated by an opposition leadership which eagerly proclaims that “standards” are a “false” concept. American foreign policy, they say, must remain bipartisan; politics must stop at the water’s edge.

Two decades ago Republican statesmen, in a time of external threat, formulated the concept of “bipartisanship” in foreign policy. Exhibiting a highly praised sense of responsibility and restraint, they were able to achieve some remarkable successes. Yet, shortly afterward, as the actors on the stage of “bipartisan politics” were replaced by those elected to different elective offices, the original techniques of genuine bipartisanship were forgotten. But, the label has remained, sadly distorted, a “sacred cow” which has masked a desire for unity for unity’s sake alone.

Today, the opposition party too rarely questions the policies behind which it is asked to unite. Are they really the rational and effective policies required in the nuclear age and on which the original adherents of bipartisanship insisted? As President Kennedy argued:

“In an age of permanent international crisis, the danger is simply that we may drift to disaster through a chain of uneasy compromises and misguided policies that are protected from effective criticism by the umbrella of bipartisan cooperation.”

The Ripon Society calls on Republican leaders in Congress and on the Republican Coordinating Committee to take responsibility for American foreign policy, to contribute to the political debate which produces successful international policies.

I. The Dilemma of Foreign Policy

In 1835 Alexis de Tocqueville, the perceptive French observer who offered so many profound insights into American society, wrote:

“It is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies appear to me decidedly inferior to other governments... A democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles.”

Though well over a century has passed since de Tocqueville confessed his misgivings about the ability of democratic governments to conduct an effective foreign policy, his observations are still relevant. America has emerged from a long tradition of isolation to take her place in the “four-square” behind the President’s policies as the world greatly more charged with danger and difficulty.

Never before have the results of foreign policies been so intimately linked with the possibility of instant death and destruction. Consequently, never before have the precious luxuries of democratic control of foreign relations been so seriously challenged.

America’s alliances have mushroomed in the past two decades, greatly increasing the need for a dependable and continuous foreign policy; yet in a democracy the opposition can swiftly and legally overturn established policies. Developments in communications and weapons technology make speed and secrecy in the execution of foreign policy even more essential; yet in a democracy both time and knowledge are required for rational deliberation and widespread consent. America’s adversaries will seek to blunt effective countermeasures by provoking disunity within the West; yet in a democracy the requirements of unity can seriously hamper the performance of the necessary functions of an opposition party.

Such is the nature of the dilemma facing the Repub­lican Party today. In the nuclear age the require­ments of speed and unity in a foreign policy present a strong challenge to the requirements of deliberation and formulation of alternative policies which are the hallmark of the party system of a democracy. The need to engage in criticism and inquiry seem to run counter to the need for national unity in a time of crisis.

II. The Origins of Bipartisanship

The origins of modern bipartisanship can be traced back almost 50 years to a period of acrimonious part­isanship in foreign policy which has been unequalled in its fury: the fight over the League of Nations. Forging the Atlantic Treaty, was the result of fortuitous circumstances. The widespread recognition of the grave crisis which faced America after the “hot war” had ended, and the determination that this country should be equal to the challenge was not confined to men of one party. Nonpartisan understanding of the need for cooperation was supplemented by constitutional requirements: the elections of 1946 left Republicans in control of both houses of Congress, and cooperation was essential if the nation were to have any foreign policy at all.

NATIONAL INTEREST

Nor should it be forgotten that there existed the indispensable catalyst, the element of national­ity: men of outstanding vision, most notably Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and George Marshall, the Secretary of State, who were able to work together in a nonpartisan spirit to achieve policies in the national interest. The goal of this cooperation was expressed by Vandenberg:

“An unpartisan American foreign policy — not Republican, not Democratic, but American — which substantially unites our people at the water’s edge in behalf of peace.”

What did the Senator from Michigan understand by an “unpartisan” policy? Was he urging unity as the overarching goal, to the exclusion of debate, a passive acquiescence by the opposing party to the policy of the Administration? Vandenberg’s own words are an emphatic “No”:

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A Ripon Research Paper

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"It does not involve the remotest surrender of free debate in determining our position. On the contrary, frank cooperation and free debate are indispensable to at least unity. In a word, it simply seeks the national security ahead of partisan advantage. Every foreign policy must be totally debated ... and the 'loyal opposition' is under special obligation to see that this occurs.

Bipartisanship, as advocated and practiced under Republican foreign policy of the 1940's, was not a label which was applicable to every diplomatic strategy nor even to all those to which the opposition had given formal sanction. Certain conditions had to be met for the "bipartisan" label to be applied. Vanden Berg himself stressed that bipartisanship referred only to those policies on which the Republicans had been thoroughly consulted before decision had been reached. Bipartisanship had been confined to the United Nations and European treaties of the Formosa crisis of 1947, requiring legislation, such as the Marshall Mission to Europe. Bipartisanship did not imply its applicability was limited. Bipartisanship implied a true "meeting of the minds." That this could not be the case with every decision, Republicans fully realized.

In situations of crisis, such as the Greek-Turkish crisis in 1947, requiring a swift response, there could be little time for consultation and compromise and thus, no bipartisanship.

2. With respect to diplomatic maneuvers not requiring legislative authorization, such as the Marshall Mission to Europe, prior consultation would have only made Republicans responsible for decisions whose implications they would have had little effective control. Vanden Berg noted that, "it is a fantastic unreality to think that there can be cooperation ... in any such specific detail."

3. Most important, as Vanden Berg observed, bipartisanship did not imply "me-tooism" — a shutting off of debate and criticism in the name of "a fake 'unity' devoid of popular consent."

Consultant architects of genuine bipartisanship recognized that its applicability was limited. The label did not apply to all policies endorsed by both parties, but only to those to which both parties had genuinely contributed.

**EXTERNAL**

Many events in American foreign policy over the past two decades have been labeled examples of bipartisanship, instances in which the majorities of both parties have been united behind particular policies. Examples are the foreign policy of the Roosevelt Administration in 1943, the Formosa Straits resolution of 1955, and the Eisenhower Doctrine in the Middle East in 1957. But more often than not, this unity has been the result of external crisis or itself rather than of genuinely bipartisan procedures.

In the absence of the architects of genuine bipartisanship — a myth which identifies bipartisanship with unity itself, rather than with the procedures used to attain such unity. The semantic difficulty is great; there exists a drastic difference between the bipartisanship as formulated by Arthur Vandenberg and the type more prevalent today. Two years ago Senator B. B. Hickenlooper, the senior Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sought to explain this: "There is no such thing as bipartisanship, which denotes universality of opinion in both political Parties, and unpartisanship which can well mean, and often does, substantial support from members of both Parties, but can also mean, and often does, opposition within both Parties to programs, as understood by the Administration in power."

The time is past due for Republicans to expose the fallacy of mythical bipartisanship, for it is this — not genuine bipartisanship — which exists today.

**III. A Balance Sheet**

Genuine bipartisanship in the Vandenberg era was and could be again only in a limited range of issues. Within that range, it resulted in some brilliant successes. Yet some observers have sought to generalize from the peculiar circumstances existing in that day in order to advance the claim that all issues of foreign policy should receive "bipartisan" support. There are four assets which are commonly claimed for the blanket application of such "mythical bipartisanship."

1. Bipartisanship is said to ensure that policies in the national interest, the most effective policies from the standpoint of the nation's values and security, as opposed to policies furthering only partisan interest, are achieved.

2. Proponents cite the necessity of bipartisan consultation during times of divided control of the national government: when one party holds the Presidency, and the other controls Congress. Obviously the constitutional requirement that a 2/3 vote of the Senate is necessary in order for a treaty to be ratified, a case which occurs more frequently. The implication is that, because of bipartisanship, it is desirable in these cases, it is desirable that bipartisanship be practiced as a general rule.

3. Bipartisanship, its adherents argue with considerable force, produces unity, stability, dependability, and continuity in the face of the totalitarian threat. If it is argued that bipartisanship educates the members of the minority party to the realities of world politics and tends to reduce irresponsibility and extremism.

Undoubtedly, something can be said for each of these arguments. If the balance sheet on "mythical bipartisanship" contained only these positive entries, then the case could be decided with relative ease. But, as is usual in this kind of political debate, the"bipartisan" label is the coin of the realm. For grave objections exist to "mythical bipartisanship" — objections which are all too frequently overlooked.

1. Adherents of the "national interest" argument usually fail to explain how the national interest is determined, for a party identifies its own policies with those of the national interest. The objection is simple: without full and searching debate, there is simply no guarantee that the so-called "bipartisan" policy is the most effective policy, the policy that is truly in the national interest. This is the chief dilemma discussed above: the requirements of a responsible party system in a democracy, which often seem to hamper an effective foreign policy.

2. If an entire range of increasingly vital issues is declared to be beyond politics, if politics is said to stop at the water's edge (and there is an increasingly blurred line between domestic and foreign policies), then the party system has lost one of its most crucial functions.

**JOIN**

Responsibility is said to be divided when genuine bipartisan can be effected, it should be. But, as shown above, there are limitations to genuine bipartisanship: there is often no time for genuine consultation in time of crisis. In situations such as the Middle East, and the assumption that its policies automatically represent a sort of grand consensus. Opposition criticism is said to create disunity — where in fact no unity ever existed in the first place. And this criticism, it is charged, necessarily derives from purely partisan (or worse, unpatriotic) motives.

Passive bipartisan acquiescence in matters of foreign policy not only shuts off consideration of alternative approaches, but it blurs the lines of responsibility for a decision. The diplomatic failures can be excused as "bipartisan" — though rarely are the successes so labeled.

3. The third asset of mythical bipartisanship asserts that even though there is no guarantee that the bipartisan policy will be the best policy, unity has been achieved and that unity in the face of totalitarian threat is therefore desirable.

It should first be made clear that the claimed assets — unity, stability, dependability and continuity — result
chiefly from the appearance of bipartisian unity, rather than from the procedures of genuine bipartisan consultation which produce true unity. The uncritical search for the appearance of unity overlooks the fact that unity may or may not be a virtue, depending upon whether in any particular situation the policy behind which it stands actually advances the nation’s interest in world affairs.

Bipartisan unity in foreign policy lends an aura of unchallengeability to the resulting policies; an aura which prevents the search for alternatives, thus leading only to rigidity and to apathy.

4. Does “mythical bipartisanship” produce more responsible parties? Unfortunately, such unity as may be achieved behind a “bipartisan” policy may not be lasting. An Administration must set forth its position in the face of the opposition and criticism by capturing its leadership, but in the long run such situations lead either to the devitalization of the opposition party or to intensified intra-party divisions. Unrealistic hopes may be generated behind a policy which seems to be sanctioned by both parties. The failure of such a policy often leads to furious acrimony directed not at the policy itself but to those (perhaps “dialogual”) individuals charged with its execution. The McCarthy era, fed by the failures in China and Korea, is unfortunately replete with such instances.

A temporary unity between the two major parties in an area of vital and intense national concern might, indeed lead to the semblance of the two-party system itself, as third parties arise to exploit the public confusion and concern on the “silenced” issues of foreign affairs. Finally, the silencing of direct discussion through ideological or “political bipartisanship” permits the Executive to undertake rash, ill-considered adventures which rational and length deliberation could have prevented.

In conclusion then, it must be argued that the assets claimed for mythical bipartisanship are by no means automatically achieved. The ideological or “political bipartisanship” which gives the Executive the power to make and enforce unified party support behind a partisan foreign policy, reminiscent of the furious conflict on the same lines as domestic deliberation could have prevented. An Administration may do with its policies, with a party that has no principles and policies does it have a scale against which to measure the performance of the Democrats.

PRINCIPLED PARTISANSHIP

Responsible and principled partisanship does not entail an exchange of ideological or “mythical bipartisanship” for the Administration’s policies. It must be based on the broad foreign policy consensus in this nation regarding both goals and means. At the same time, it must base disagreement on constructive principles which, without which the United States will find itself constantly acquiescing in the status quo or extemporizing when it changes.

Senator Jacob Javits has written:

“We would deny ourselves the vitality of debate that gives strength to our democracy if we claimed that because a President of one party and his Secretary of State have made a policy proposal, the members of the opposition party must approve of nothing but it. Policies that extend “beyond the water’s edge” are too crucial in the twentieth century to be declared off-limits for responsible debate. Without rational deliberation, vital problems often have been neglected by the Administration will continue so until they explode in the faces of policymakers; courses of national policy which have been poorly charted by Administration planners will lead, if not criticized and corrected, to sure disaster. Bipartisanship in its mythical form is a luxury which this nation can ill afford. It is not merely the right but the clear duty of the Republican Party to employ all its available resources in the responsible study and debate of the pressing issue of foreign policy.”

1. When opportunities for genuine bipartisan cooperation are available, they should be pursued diligently. Collaboration between the Administration and the opposition should not be ruled out, but it must be limited to those areas in which such cooperation is meaningful.

2. Republicans must demand that the G.O.P. should not acquiesce in the application of the mythical label of bipartisanship to mere briefings. In seeking explanations and clarifications of the Administrations policies, the opposition forces the Administration to examine its positions anew. It gives the Republicans an opportunity to explore and to formulate the Administration’s policies. The American public must be kept aware of the facts, alternatives and issues involved as the administration makes decisions behind doors which mock the true meaning of bipartisanship. As President Dwight D. Eisenhower remarked during the Cuban Crisis of 1962:

“A foreign crisis must not become an excuse for silence or submission by us Republicans.”

4. Finally, the Republican party must debate and resolve its own foreign policy, that policy the G.O.P. would employ were it in control of the White House. The hope that the vote of discontent will return to power a party which remains silent while the great international issues of the day are being debated by the party in power is based on the naivete of the Administration but on that of its advocates. The electorate is not in the habit of replacing a governing majority, despite obvious weaknesses in its policies, with a party that has no policies at all. Only when the G.O.P. has established its own principles and policies does it have a scale against which to measure the performance of the Democrats.

IV. The Republican Responsibility

What then is the Republican alternative to this “mythical bipartisanship”? Is it a return to a purely partisan foreign policy, reminiscent of the furious conflict of the era?

For a number of reasons, a purely partisan policy is unworkable. First, there is simply no basis, in the American political system for a neat cleavage between two disciplined, responsible parties on foreign policy issues on the same lines as domestic issues. Second, American parties are not disciplined parties; there is no way of enforcing unified party support behind a partisan foreign policy (not to speak of the questionable desirability of doing so). Finally, there are still those instances in which it is constitutionally necessary for there to be two-party support on some foreign policies, as in the case of treaties and legislation those times when control of the national government is divided between the parties. Straight partisanship is clearly not the answer.

RESPONSIBLE PARTISANSHIP

If neither irresponsible partisanship nor a continuation of the Democratic “mythical bipartisanship” which has simply served as an excuse for the lack of thought is the solution, it must lie somewhere in that vast gray area in between. No radically new approach is needed but basically a return to the spirit and realities of "genuine bipartisanship." Matters which are left unclarified, however, if that misused label were abandoned. The Republican approach to foreign policy must be one of responsible and principled partisanship. Such a Republican position assigns to the party a few basic roles.

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5. David B. Vandenbe!'9, Ir., The PriVClle Papem, Boston, 1947.
8. Ibid., p. 6.
11. The paper was prepared from an original draft written by Robert H. Donaldson of the Boston Chapter and reviewed by a com­ mittee composed of the following members: Robert D. Hehn, Research Director, Bruce K. Chapman, Howard F. Millette, Jr., and David R. Young.
George Wallace and the Southern Strategy

George Wallace is running for President. Though currently he claims only to be "testing his voter appeal," the annals of Presidential politics list few who, once bitten by the "bug," have found a sufficiently unsympathetic public.

Touring Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Ohio and Indiana, the former Governor of Alabama has shown little inclination to change the political style which brought him and his wife their past political successes. He simplifies the issues, cockily dodges the most direct questions, declares that his "Stand Up for America" party is for the "little folks," and derides the Supreme Court as "a sorry, lousy, no-account outfit."

The "Stand Up" issues are "big government" and the "bearded bureaucrats" in Washington, "crime in the streets" and the "coddling of criminals." The Stand Up solutions: morality and a rip-snorting inaugural address. The Stand Up sentence: "If I were President, the first thing I would say in my inaugural address is that I give my moral support to the police of this country."

At times Wallace claims that he "can be elected," but in his more realistic moments he agrees with political commentators that he is merely a "spoiler." The first thing he may spoil is the possibility for meaningful debate on the real issues of 1968. Wallace's demagogic style and his irresponsible charges may lead the major parties away from a reasoned treatment of Vietnam, creative federalism, and the problems facing the cities, low income families, the mentally ill, and all areas which so sorely need sophisticated attention. No one disputes the need for better police protection, though some may disagree on means, but in so many other fields, particularly foreign policy, there is real disagreement on what ends we are seeking. Wallace's success in forcing debate away from these issues would represent a national tragedy and shame.

THE "SPOILER" It is too early to estimate just how large the Wallace vote may be: the severity of summer riots in major cities and Congressional handling of open-housing legislation will be keys to its magnitude. Wallace likes to point to his "success" in the 1964 Democratic primaries. But while protest votes are common in the primaries, it seems doubtful that a large percentage of Americans will be willing to waste their vote on a mere "spoiler" in the real contest.

In the deep South, however, it is a different story. Few politicians of any political coloring doubt the Wallace potency at home. "We will get a lot of prospective Republican votes in the South," Wallace himself contends. Former Governor of Georgia Carl E. Sanders feels that in Georgia "He (Wallace) might splinter the Republican Party and the Democratic vote could easily be 52%."

And William F. Buckley, Jr. states that "Wallace would split the Republican vote, and inevitably the Democrats would prosper, save possibly in one or two states in which Wallace so devastated the Republicans as to take all their votes, permitting him a narrow victory over the Democrats."

The "Southern Strategy" of 1964, therefore, is worthless to the Republican Party in 1968. The only hope for the die-hards is to nominate a candidate who — like Goldwater in 1964 — can convince George Wallace to withdraw. But the Alabaman has raised his price to complete surrender. Not even the nomination of Ronald Reagan will placate him. He demands not only a candidate to his liking, but an entire party platform bearing the Wallace mark. But no Republican, regardless of his ideological belief, will permit his party to be blackmailed by a Democratic demagogue.

CRUMBLING COALITION It is vital for Republicans to note therefore, that the South is only one of the many groups who comprise the old and worn Democratic coalition. Labor, the minority groups in the cities, the Negro, the small farmer, can all be won by the right Republican candidates, as Governors Rockefeller and Romney, Senators Percy and Brooke, Congressmen Taft and Cowger and Mayor Lindsay have shown. Yet, advocates of the Southern Strategy feel that the key to Presidential victory lies in ignoring all of the members of this coalition save the South. With the success of this tactic completely doomed by the Wallace candidacy, the Republicans must look elsewhere for votes and victory.

This does not mean that the Republican party should neglect the South. But the South is changing, and the GOP must prepare for the future rather than rely on the old positions which are contributing to the downfall of Democratic dominance. This future is with men like Governor Winthrop Rockefeller in Arkansas, rather than Georgian gubernatorial candidate Howard Callaway, who could not conceivably build a more segregationist image than the ax-handle-wielding Lester Maddox. It is with men like Senator Howard Baker, Jr. of Tennessee rather than with senatorial candidate John Grenier, who tried to convince the Alabama voters that Senator John Sparkman is too liberal.

Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater has shown that the "Southern Strategy" cannot win the North, while gubernatorial candidate James Martin, in his race with Lurleen Wallace, has shown that it will not win the South. The Republicans must offer the Southerner more than the obstructionist policies of the Democratic party. Until there is an identifiable difference between the two parties, Republicans will find it impossible to pry the South loose from its Democratic tradition.

How then should the Republicans prepare to do battle with Johnson in 1968? They must find a candidate who will run well in the cities, in the Midwest, in the West, and in the Border states, which are sophisticated enough to see through the Wallace rhetoric. They must find a candidate who wants to solve the problems of the cities, who appreciates the need for federal-state cooperation. Above all they must find a candidate who is not blinded by the hawk-dove debate in Vietnam, one who will bring fresh perspectives and new initiatives to the conflict.

On this point, it is important to note that the left has indicated its reluctance to run a peace candidate. The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. has declined to form a ticket, preferring to use his prestige to influence one of the major candidates. More significantly, the A.D.A., while indicating that it is willing to support a Republican if his views on Vietnam are appropriate, has publicly stated that it will not run its own slate and has privately discouraged King from running.
Wallace

Perspective on Commitments

By nominating a candidate who appreciates the need for keeping American overseas commitments in proportion to their importance and who recognizes the uselessness of continued escalation which only hardens the enemy and threatens a larger conflict, the Republican Party stands to pick up the votes of those discontented with the President’s war policies.

This does not mean that the Republicans need advocate unilateral withdrawal in Vietnam or other policies demanded by the far left. But there is much room to the left of Lyndon Johnson, while his right is cluttered by the candidacy of the ex-Governor of Alabama. The American public is frustrated by the ineffectiveness of U.S. firepower in the guerilla war, and the President has failed to articulate the dangers and irrelevancy of continued escalation. If the Republican party rejects meaningless bipartisanship and accepts the responsibilities of leadership in international affairs, it can isolate both Wallace and Johnson on the irresponsible right and capture the middle and the Presidency.

George Wallace’s candidacy has destroyed any lingering validity to the “Southern Strategy.” The Republicans must now nominate a candidate who will capture the votes of the other straying members of the old Democratic coalition, a candidate who can win in the cities and the suburbs. Victory can be ours in 1968, but only if the GOP learns the lesson of 1964.

—R.D.B.

Can We Bridge the Ideological Gap?

(Continued from page 2)

faded in the lights of personal campaigns. This present expression may not survive next spring’s primaries and the subsequent convention; to become a reality it needs encouragement from all points of view within the GOP. But it must be given substance in a positive manner, not in compromising differences, not in seeking a lowest common denominator by chopping off the sharp corners and offensive edges from factional positions. What the party needs today is a quest for ideological consensus based on a common search by all segments for new and bold programs which need no such whittling down. There are many opportunities for such agreement, particularly on the domestic scene. The way to realize them is for serious thinkers on all sides to sit down independent of political motivations and begin intensive and honest communication with one another.

Increased communication can clear up misunderstandings as to where we differ. Clearly there are important — perhaps fundamental — differences, but it will hurt no one to examine them, and it may increase the respect of each side for the views of the other. On the other hand, communication will help the party to better appreciate the extent of its common ground.

‘68 Platform Now? A number of Republicans have suggested that work be done ahead of time on next year’s GOP platform. This would mean assembling committees and subcommittees to work out various planks; it is hard to know what lowest-common-denominator proposals such a system would produce, or what political pressures would distort the findings. Undoubtedly, a platform written at some leisure COULD be modulated to accommodate a wide range of Republican opinion. Whether it would or not is far from certain and, at any rate, this is scarcely the way to build long-range harmony or to attract new voters.

But the Ripon Society would submit this proposal as an amendment to such an arrangement. Let a committee of Republican thinkers not identified with current political campaigns gather to seek some unity through creativity rather than through mere accommodation. Let it be small enough to prevent posturing and let it represent a broad cross-section of ideological viewpoints. Rather than calling on active politicians, let it bring together thinkers of the right and left (writers, scholars, representatives of idea-oriented groups like the Ripon Society). Too often such people who could help the party to appreciate the overall application of its philosophy have been relegated to the periphery of politics, when as in British and European life they should be utilized at the very center of action. The Coordinating Committee or the Congressional leadership could sponsor such meetings, which should be private and involve no formal votes. The goal would be educational not political. The mandate would not be to write a compromise program for the party. That starts at the wrong end and accomplishes nothing. Instead let such a committee seek first to understand and better articulate areas of disagreement, second to probe for coinciding objectives, and finally to propose ways in which a unified, creative program might be realized.

Let us begin Let it be perfectly clear that the Republican split will not be healed by means of the project suggested here. No single party in a two-party system will ever be perfectly harmonious, and the current GOP split is more serious than most. But the proposal is a start, and the differences will never be diminished if they are not confronted. Because both parties are necessarily coalitions, and because coalitions thrive best when a common cause motivates its member factions, such a conversation could help the Republican party. At the very least it would improve the level of intra-party debate.

Last January Barry Goldwater was sent a copy of the Ripon Society’s paper on the draft. In his reply he said, “Some time it might be to the mutual advantage of all Republicans to sit down and explore in detail just how close this party is together and how drastically separated the opposition has become.” Later (in correspondence with a member) he explained that while he thought it a good idea for the “liberals” and the “conservatives” to get together “to find out where their thinking is different,” he felt “the real effort of unity must come from the so-called liberal side.” This proposal represents such an effort.
The 'Ripon Candidate'

"The left wing of the Republican party under the leadership of the current governor is committed to capturing the Washington State delegation to the Republican National Convention. Their end objective is to secure the nomination of the Ripon Society candidate." Thus opens a more-or-less public letter circulated by a more-or-less Young Republican in the Seattle area, the sort of amazing, unintentional flattery we enjoy every once in a while.

But to put matters straight, if the Republican governor of Washington has as his "objective" the "capture" of his state's Presidential delegates to support the "Ripon candidate", we wish he would tell us. Also, please, we would like to know the identity of that candidate.

As for the letter-writer, he should know that his expose has caused great intra-Society suspicion around here. One office, a former speechwriter of Mr. Nixon's, is casting a squinty eye at the member who's a consultant to Governor Romney, who in turn is leveling a burning brow in the direction of the Washington member who works with Senator Percy. And all three have their doubts about the head of the New York chapter.

- Henry Paolucci, the New York State Conservative who was a Senate candidate against Kenneth Keating and Robert Kennedy in 1964, argues in a recent National Review article that the Democratic coalition is breaking up. What will happen to its constituent parts? "Southern segregationists," he says, "will vote for Wallace, the Northern die-hard working class Democrats will split with Kennedy or vote conservative, Negroes north and south will return to the party of Lincoln, which is now also the party of Senator Brooke of Massachusetts, and the Democratic intelligentsia will funnel its skills through the A.D.A. into the Ripon Society of the Republican Party. Ripon, one should recall, is the name of the town in Wisconsin where, it is claimed, dissident Northern Democrats merged in 1854 with the newly formed Republican Party that went on to elect Lincoln and crush the South."

Paolucci believes that these new Republican adherents would not insist on a "Ripon candidate," so anxious would they be to defeat President Johnson. Thus even a moderate conservative, according to his thesis, could run with the support of a united Republican Party and a considerable Democratic defection. Does this make Paolucci happy? Not at all: "In the event of a passive coalition of liberal Democrats, Ripon Republicans and libertarian conservatives against Johnson in 1968, the conscience of this conservative nationalist would require him to stick with the appalling man whom the internationalist liberals helped to elect but failed to educate."

1430 MASS. AVE: Petri Appointed Full-Time Director

The Ripon Society is pleased to announce the appointment of its first full-time executive director. Thomas E. Petri, a charter member of the Society, assumed the new position on June 19. Petri is a native of Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, and a graduate of Harvard College, Class of 1962, and the Harvard Law School, Class of 1965. He edited the Ripon Society's Election '64 report and its book From Disaster to Distinction.

Since 1965, Petri has served as law clerk to Federal District Judge James Doyle of Wisconsin and later, in the Peace Corps, as legal advisor to the government of the Somali Republic. He has most recently been employed in the Somali Republic by the United States Agency for International Development.

In establishing the post of executive director, the Ripon Society recognizes that its responsibilities as a creative Republican voice and rallying point require the services of a full-time coordinator. The Governing Board believes the Society cannot maintain the present pace of activity, much less accelerate it, if it continues to rely solely upon volunteer efforts. The officers stressed that only the pledges of confidence and generous contributions of hundreds of Ripon supporters across the country have made expanded operations possible.

"Thomas Petri is the ideal person for this position," Ripon President Lee W. Huebner commented on the appointment. "His decision to accept it is great news for all of us and will make possible many new breakthroughs for the Society. The group has grown faster over four and one-half years than any of us expected it to. Every month has brought new surprises, but this step is clearly one of the most significant in Ripon's history."