The Current Picture

This map represents Ripon's current assessment of the race for the Republican Presidential Nomination in 1968. This is the first of a series of reports to appear regularly in the Forum as the convention approaches. Reports on the primaries and delegate-selection contests in critical states will accompany the map survey in future issues. The findings presented here are based on information received from correspondents throughout the country, informal discussions with political leaders, and press reports.

Delegates have been allocated to candidates wherever a strong preference exists within a state party and its leadership. The indications of "second-choice" potential are of varying significance. In some states "number-two" may indeed eclipse the current favorite by convention time, while elsewhere the second choice has but a rather remote chance of winning a state's delegation, should voting at the convention polarize around two candidates to the exclusion of the present front-runner. We believe the "first-choice" totals for each candidate represent the solid base of support for each. The combined totals are offered as a rough estimate of potential strength without regard to dramatic shifts of support unpredictable at this time.

(continued on page three)
THE RIPON SOCIETY, INC.
National Governing Board

1430 MASS. AVE.: Ripon 'Take-Over'

Our friends to the right of the Republican party, the American Conservative Union, this month appealed for funds to stop what they called a liberal drive to take over the Republican Party. In the fund-raising appeal the Ripon Society was described as "the 'nerve center' of the Eastern liberal establishment."

According to the appeal our alleged effort to take over the Republican Party was "exposed" earlier this year in an ACU study about the Society. Senator Strom Thurmond, racist Democrat turned Republican from South Carolina, wrote the ACU chairman to say that he "was interested in the fine report on the Ripon Society published recently by the ACU. More of this type of effort should be made, and I just wanted to take this means to advise you of my appreciation for your help in keeping the record straight."

The Society's National Governing Board held its fall meeting in the Faculty Lounge of Yale's Law School on November 4. At the meeting, past president Dr. John S. Saloma, III analyzed Republican prospects for the next six years, and the Society laid plans for its activities over the coming months. Ripon's Washing-
The Current Picture
(continued from page one)

THE NIXON-REAGAN BLOC

Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan are paired in varying order of preference as the first or second choice of the delegates in 18 states. These 36 delegates comprise the “Nixon-Reagan bloc.” Presumably, if either of these candidates is eliminated, the survivor will be able to combine the bloc with his support from other areas to approach or exceed the magic number (667) required for nomination. A second possibility does exist, however. A Nixon-Reagan struggle for the backing of this predominantly conservative, Western-Southern bloc might develop, leaving a way open for a third, moderate candidate to pick up substantial support elsewhere.

THE PRIMARIES

No attempt has been made here to predict primary winners. Obviously, the outcome of the primary contests will have a profound effect on the candidacies of Richard Nixon and George Romney. With a string of clear-cut victories, Nixon could temper the Reagan groundswell and perhaps win the nomination on the first ballot. Romney needs very much to win some key primaries to turn Eastern eyes away from Rockefeller or Percy and to present himself as a winner when seeking the votes of the large, uncommitted delegations in Ohio, Illinois, and Pennsylvania.

FAVORITE SONS

Major-state favorite sons may decide the outcome unless a sure winner appears on the second ballot. Some are more “brokers” of their delegations than others. Governor Kirk of Florida is considered a Reagan man, although his Vice-Presidential ambitions could lead him elsewhere. The support of Senator Tower and the Texas delegation will be much sought after. Tower appears to be leaning toward Nixon. Some doubt exists about Governor Rhodes ability to command the votes of the entire Ohio delegation. The Ohio delegation will be manned chiefly by professionals and party stalwarts seeking a winner; their choice of a candidate in the early going at the convention could signal his nomination. Pennsylvania is counted as firmly “moderate” behind Governor Shafer, who does not, however, seem to be greatly enamored of Romney’s candidacy. The Illinois delegation appears likely to split along conservative-moderate lines after the first ballot.

THE OVERVIEW

Gov. Ronald Reagan today stands the nearest step away from the 1968 Republican nomination while he does little more overtly than acknowledge his status as a favorite-son candidate. Richard Nixon, too, has widespread if potentially less loyal support. A moderate standard-bearer — George Romney, Nelson Rockefeller, or Charles Percy — can also command several hundred votes, but the moderates have the problem that their candidates must work much harder than their opposition to increase their support to a winning number of convention votes. In order to capture the nomination, the moderates must overcome the handicaps of party history and regional rivalries and sell their candidate as a general-election winner to the party professionals of the Midwest and Border States.

DELEGATE PROJECT: 1968, A Replay of 1964?

The convention that nominated Barry Goldwater for the Presidency in 1964 was described as an unorthodox, perhaps even revolutionary, event in modern Republican history. Not since the 1920’s had the Party chosen as its standard-bearer such a frankly conservative candidate, and certainly not since the beginning of the postwar era was a convention won by such a large number of delegates who had never attended a convention before.

With many of these Goldwater partisans still controlling their state parties, and with Goldwater himself proudly asserting that they will control next year’s convention, the critical question will be their role in the future of the Republican Party. Our projection attempts to answer this question.

One way to consider the breakdown is to compare it with the breakdown at the 1964 convention. For Nixon, Romney, and Reagan, let us take their first-ballot potential (their first-ballot votes plus the votes which they would pick up from favorite sons) and see how that vote was distributed in 1964:

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<th>PRO-GOLDSWATER</th>
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<tr>
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<td>ROMNEY</td>
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This projection clearly indicates a kind of replay of the 1964 coalition, with almost all of the moderate votes of 1964 going to Romney and the Goldwater vote divided almost evenly between Nixon and Reagan. Specifically, Romney’s strength comes from the liberal Republican heartland of the Northeast and Great Lakes region; Reagan’s is found in the Far West and Deep South; Nixon’s support comes from the Great Plains and Border States.

The division of Goldwater’s supporters between Nixon and Reagan demonstrates the dual nature of the Goldwater movement. The hard core of Goldwaterites, concentrated in the Southwest and Deep South, were conservative ideologues whose dream was that a “real conservative” would win the Presidency. Their concern was with policy, not politics, and now they see in Reagan the man best equipped to implement this policy with a minimum of compromise.

The Goldwater movement was rounded out by the vast number of moderately conservative Republican professionals, the heirs of Senator Taft. Their major concern is the Party, and when it became apparent that Goldwater was filling the vacuum of Republican leadership in the spring of 1964, they joined his bandwagon and made his nomination inevitable. At no time was this union better symbolized than by the Taft lieutenants.

(continued on page five)
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Total, after distributing second choices of miscellaneous states among major contenders:

- **NIXON**: 324
- **ROMNEY**: 406
- **REAGAN**: 276

Each Man’s Total of his “First-choice” and “Second-choice” States:

- **NIXON**: 518
- **ROMNEY**: 430
- **REAGAN**: 518

Needed to Nominate: 667
ant, announced that he would place Goldwater's name in nomination: "This thing has gone too far; it can't be stopped."

These conservative Party workhorses, disillusioned by their faling with the far right, want a candidate who will be neither too far to the left nor too likely to destroy the Party. Situated in the Republican citadel that stretches from the northern Rockies to Ohio, and dipping into parts of the South, they want a man who is "safe" in several ways. And in Nixon they think they have found him.

For all of the characterizations of Richard Nixon as a man of inconsistency and expediency, his career is a straight line with regard to his allegiance to his party. In the late 1940's, when Republicans were making political hay out of the issues of "Communists in government," it was Nixon who went after Alger Hiss; in 1952, when Eisenhower needed a running-mate who could symbolize the healing of the Party's wounds, Nixon was there; throughout the 1950's, it was Nixon who was sent out to mend the fences and preach the gospel of modern Republicanism. By 1956, when Harold Stassen tried to have him ejected from the ticket, the party faithful sprang to Nixon's defense; and by 1960, he had the party orthodoxy sewn up so tightly that he could afford to woo liberals with a platform and running-mate from the moderate wing of the party. In 1964 and 1966, Richard Nixon again served his party well by unflagging work on the campaign trail.

To those who suggest that in 1968 Richard Nixon simply cannot win the Presidency, the professionals reply that he will do well enough at the head of their state tickets, and that he will be a unifying force within the party. It is this kind of logic that gives impetus to the Nixon candidacy today.

But Nixon does help the moderates, too, for he is splitting the old Goldwater coalition and keeping it from falling into Reagan's hand. What the moderates must do is to hold on to their 1964 strength and pull enough professionals away from Nixon to secure a majority. It will he a hard, uphill fight.

—Howard Reiter

GUEST EDITORIAL: Free Speech in the Armed Forces

In retrospect the ill wisdom of our role in Vietnam may well be overshadowed by the questionable manner in which the war is being conducted and defended. The inflexibility of the present draft law has led some young opponents of the war to put expedience before principle and submit to induction. What we must regard with at best mixed feelings the Administration naturally sees as a stirring expression of loyalty.

The military has never been unduly scrupulous about avoiding political issues. Although General Edwin Walker was eventually discharged for circulating right-wing propaganda among his troops, no such disciplinary action was taken several years ago when it was discovered that Air Force manuals alleged left-wing or communist leanings on the part of several churches. Similarly little was done, at least publicly, when R.O.T.C. students in the Midwest were warned not to join a number of campus political organizations on the grounds that, although the groups were not yet on the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations, it was likely that they would be so in the future.

Whatever scruples the Administration has against letting the military play and teach politics seem to be limited to playing and teaching politics inconsistent with those of the President. What might have appeared a year or two ago to be a minor deviation seems to be becoming a major theme under the pressure of opposition to the war. The form of the armed forces' political role has changed: in place of occasional political propaganda or warnings, opponents of the war are being court-martialed for daring to criticize our policy in Vietnam.

The most egregious case yet to come to light is that of Lieutenant Henry Howe. For thirty off-duty minutes in November of 1965 Lieutenant Howe, dressed in civilian clothing, participated in a public demonstration against the war. He carried a sign which read "Let's have more than a choice between petty ignorant fascists in 1968" and "End Johnson's fascist aggression in Vietnam." One can hardly imagine a more obvious exercise of the free speech and right to dissent, which the President has said we all have. Not quite all of us it seems. Lieutenant Howe was court-martialed for conduct unbecoming an officer and for using contemptuous words against the President. He was convicted, subjected to dismissal and forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and sentenced to confinement at hard labor for one year. His case was affirmed August 4, 1967 by the U.S. Military Court of Appeals.

Any hope that this was a unique case has been ended in the last few months. Among those awaiting court martial is Private Andrew Stapp, a draftee who regards himself as a socialist. In September of 1965 he had a large number of his political books and pamphlets confiscated by his superiors. Last May his commanding officer returned for more. When Stapp refused to open his locker to facilitate the confiscation, the commanding officer had it opened with a pick axe and the books inside seized. Now, rather than being prosecuted for actually saying or reading anything, Private Stapp has been charged with willfully disobeying an order.

More publicized was the case of Captain Harold Levy who was charged, among other things, with trying to promote "disloyalty and disaffection" by making "in­temperate, inflammatory, provoking, and disloyal statements." At issue was an anti-war letter to a Sergeant in Okinawa and a verbal comparison of President Johnson to Hitler and the Green Berets to the S.S. Levy was convicted of "culpable negligence" in making the statements and writing the letter, but the charge was ultimately dismissed by the presiding judge. In Fort Hood, Texas, Private Howard Petrick was grilled for hours and threatened with prosecution because he had attended during his off-duty hours a convention of the Trotskyite Young Socialist Alliance. The case was dropped, tentatively, only after the intervention of civil rights lawyer Leonard Boudin.

Consensus finds its victims on both sides of the
RONALD REAGAN: Favorite Son

Ronald Reagan’s public rationale for offering himself as a favorite son is simple, direct, and plausible. GOP unity in California is still threatened by lingering factionalism from the gubernatorial primary of 1962 and the Goldwater-Rockefeller Presidential primary of 1964. Further, 86 delegates, 13% of the 667 total needed for the nomination, give California’s delegation leader a significant role in the choice of a Presidential nominee. The exercise of that voice in behalf of any particular candidate can reap such practical benefits as influence over the Party’s national campaign in 1968 and Presidential patronage if the GOP ticket wins.

Campaign costs in California and Reagan’s popularity in the polls make it unlikely the Governor will have to face out-of-state candidates in his stronghold. There is also the likelihood that a challenger would not only lose all 86 votes, because of California’s winner-take-all primary, but also preclude any chance of negotiating for them on later ballots.

ROCKEFELLER-REAGAN

Going beyond his favorite-son status, the press has widely speculated about the governor’s teaming up with Nelson Rockefeller. But when asked about a potential Rockefeller-Reagan combination for the 1968 GOP ticket, Rockefeller replied he couldn’t envision it “because I am not a candidate.” When Reagan was questioned about a Rockefeller-Reagan ticket at his last regularly scheduled news conference for 1967 in Sacramento, his reply was blunt: “I’m just not interested in such a proposition.”

It appears the proposition Governor Reagan does prefer was discussed at a series of summer meetings with noted political leaders. Sacramento press corps were recently angered when a Reagan aide explained that a September meeting with retired Lt. General James M. Gavin, increasingly mentioned as a darkhorse possibility for the GOP nomination, was not announced because the Governor’s staff did not deem it “newsworthy.” Similarly, unpublicized were Reagan’s several meetings in Washington with Congressman Melvin Laird, an influential Goldwater strategist of 1964. Predictably, however, much of Reagan’s attention has been directed toward Southern political leaders.

As reported in the Congressional Quarterly, the eleven Confederate states plus Kentucky and Oklahoma will have 356 delegates at the 1968 convention, nearly 27% of the 1,333 total and the largest bloc of delegates at the convention. Barry Goldwater’s base of convention support in 1964 was the South and Reagan appears to be the logical heir to that support. A Louis Harris Survey has determined that Reagan runs ahead of all other Republicans in the South and is the only Republican to run ahead of Johnson there. Consistent with his popularity among Southerners, Reagan draws more support than any other Republican from small towns, rural areas, and from followers of Goldwater. At a South Carolina rally, former Democrat Reagan praised Senator Strom Thurmond and Representative Albert Watson as politically “courageous.” Both Thurmond and Watson are Goldwater supporters and segregationists.

Senator John Tower, Texas’ 1968 favorite son, has been urging other Southern Republican leaders to use the favorite-son vehicle to obtain more bargaining flexibility for the entire Southern bloc as well as to enhance his own chances for the Vice-Presidential nomination. (To this end he has been in close contact with Richard Nixon.) Another Goldwater supporter of 1964, Howard “Bo” Callaway, said he and Reagan had a “very intimate discussion” during July in Los Angeles concerning the California Governor’s Presidential chances in Georgia. Reagan has vigorously denied claims he has discussed his strategy for seeking Southern votes with Mississippi Governor Paul Johnson, although the national reporter who broke the story steadfastly maintains it obtained the information directly from Johnson.

Florida’s Governor Claude Kirk, along with Senator Tower, met with Reagan in July at Bohemian Grove near San Francisco, the same weekend Reagan met with Nixon at the same place. Reports surfaced about a month later, all vehemently denied by Reagan, that the California Governor had asked Kirk and Tower to withhold support from Nixon. The loss of the Texas and Florida delegations, 56 and 34 delegates respectively, could severely weaken Nixon’s early ballot strength, since his own Presidential strategy requires establishing a base in the South. Even a small number of southern votes split off from Nixon could increase the possibility of a deadlocked convention and further Reagan’s chances as a stampedede choice in Miami Beach. Governor Reagan does not have to risk the wrath of the Nixon wing by wooing all the Southern leaders so long as a few of them will come to him of their own accord.

REAGAN’S KITCHEN CABINET

The people around Reagan include several of California’s wealthiest conservative Republican businessmen. This so-called “Kitchen Cabinet” acts as a sounding board for the Governor, but most of the individuals are eager to emphasize, as does Henry Salvatori, “Ronnie makes up his own mind.” Oil millionaire Salvatori is considered one of the men closest to the Governor and was among the first back in 1965 to promote Reagan for the 1966 gubernatorial ticket. More recently he has been suggesting Reagan as the choice of a deadlocked Presidential convention. During the uproar generated by Reagan’s cuts in the University of California budget, Salvatori dismissed a hundred years of educational accomplishment with, “All those Nobel prize winners don’t do any teaching anyway.”

Holmes P. Tuttle, a wealthy Los Angeles auto dealer, has known Reagan since the 1940’s and the Screen Actors’ Guild days. Tuttle, Salvatori, and others, such as Jacqueline Hume, a San Francisco industrialist and 1964 Goldwater delegate, approached Reagan after the 1964 elections and financed a series of appearances for the actor around California to test the political winds prior to the gubernatorial primary. Two more members of the California shadow administration are Leland M. Kaiser, a member of the GOP national finance committee, Goldwater supporter, and now chairman of a businessman advisory group reporting economy recommendations to the California Finance Director, and Edward Mills, an organizer of the original “Friends of Reagan”

Mills, now Treasurer of the Republican State Central Committee, is reportedly one of the trustees of a trust called "GOP No. 1" set up to receive a percentage of funds raised at Reagan's appearances within California. According to a Los Angeles Times report, another trust called "GOP No. 2" was created to receive fees from out-of-state fund-raising affairs. The purpose of the trusts is to finance travel expenses for Reagan and his staff and to avoid any apparent compromise of the funds should charges be brought that Reagan is collecting the money for his personal use in a Presidential campaign.

The man with the job of negotiating the fees for GOP No. 1 and No. 2 is Thomas C. Reed, 33, Reagan's appointments secretary in Sacramento for a few months and unofficial patronage secretary for the "Kitchen Cabinet" during the same period. Now an officer of the State Central Committee, Reed screens out-of-state speaking invitations for the Governor and generally acts as a political pulse-taker. "When Reed leaves a conference," said one Eastern Republican leader, "you know everything important has already happened." At the time of his resignation, Reed had indicated he was returning to his considerable mining and other business interests. The Governor's out-of-state appearances also underwent the scrutiny of Senator George Murphy and Congressman Robert Wilson, both of California. Murphy and Wilson are chairman, respectively, of the Republican Campaign Committees in the Senate and the House.

Franklyn "Lyn" Nofsiger, Reagan's "Communications Director," is responsible for the Governor's image and related strategy. Advising on legislative issues and public appearances, Nofsiger also arranges priority half-hour interviews with the Governor for national media representatives. He was delighted over the CBS-TV program on the "Reagan Phenomenon" aired in November and projected special telecast featuring Mrs. Reagan as the First Lady of California. There is also the important presence in Reagan's "Kitchen Cabinet" of two moderates, Arch Monson, Jr., campaign manager for George Christopher in the primary and Leonard Firestone, former Southern California Chairman for Rockefeller in 1964.

REAGANISM IN ACTION

When Reagan took office, the California budget had two principal items, higher education and mental health care, and several smaller, varied expenditures. He proposed a cut of 25%, more than $80 million, from the University's record budget request and suggested unprecedented tuition charges and the use of Regents' special funds to supplement the State's reduced contribution. The Governor had already made it clear that Reaganism prefers the business to the academic community and his opposition to student activism at Berkeley was an effective issue with the voters. The basis for the cuts in the University budget, however, were scrupulously kept in the economic sphere. He rescinded his campaign promise for an "investigation" of the University and restored $35 million to the higher education budget when the Regents refused to support tuition charges for the present academic year. It was a dubious victory for the University, however, as the Regents have since bowed to unyielding Reagan pressure and agreed to increase student "fees" for next year.

In the second largest budget area, the Department of Mental Hygiene, the Governor proposed an $18 million saving through elimination of over 3,000 jobs, closing eight outpatient clinics and turning over certain work to patients deemed able to handle it. California's hospitalized mental patient population had actually declined over the years by 40%, but hospital personnel had not been reduced. Yet, the State outpatient clinics Reagan proposed to close were credited with much of the decrease in hospitalized patients. Reagan aides recommended county-operated facilities paid for 75% by the State and 25% by the counties, but the Administration failed to increase state funds to support such community-level services.

Many mental health authorities speculate Reagan has been susceptible to the "anti-mental health" ideas of the ultra-conservatives in the medical profession and business, but so far, the Governor has moved strictly on the basis of economy and even compromised by delaying the closing of five outpatient clinics. He also announced a half in the budget cuts "if at any time it appears that patient care will suffer." A heavy cutback in "Medi-Cal" medical benefits for the aged poor has been halted by court decisions, but Reagan has indicated he plans to enforce the reductions, in defiance of the courts if necessary.

Reaganism is thus facing a fundamental test illustrated by a recent statement from a prominent Los Angeles psychiatrist: "It is a pity that a major step toward social progress must be sacrificed for the sake of exhibiting figures on a piece of paper showing how much was saved at the cost of human suffering."

THE CONSERVATIVE CANDIDATE

According to the September 1965 Harris Survey, Reagan's conservative background, political philosophy, and programs have identified him as a conservative to 51% of the American People. More significantly, only 12% of the electorate sampled called him a radical, as opposed to the 45% who so labeled Goldwater in 1964. Reagan is clearly identified with predominant conservative power in the GOP, while his approach to the governorship has opened the door to future support from GOP moderates, Democrats, and Independents.

The more support Reagan receives from outside California the less he can be classified a "favorite son." Yet the continued maintenance of such a candidacy should result in steadily increasing national attention and enviable maneuverability at convention time. And if all those good people out there in Milwaukee and Houston decide to take it upon themselves to convince him that he should have the nomination, by George, it would be disrespectful not to think it over.

-Melvin H. Bernstein

The Ripon Society extends its sincere wishes for a joyous holiday season to its members, Forum subscribers, and readers.

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People have an apparently ineradicable tendency to credit movements they dislike with prodigies of efficient organization. The Communists have a file card on every incipient homosexual in the State Department; the Jews have every bank president under continuous surveillance; the Pope has spies everywhere. So with somewhat more justice it is claimed for Clifton White, the hapless prime mover of Barry Goldwater's candidacy, that he built from a tiny conspiracy of 22 men the massive juggernaut that deserted Rockefeller and Scranton in the San Francisco Cow Palace. It is even widely rumored that the Black Caucus at this year's New Politics convention studied White's tactics before dispossessing their opponents. Clif White, one hears, is the new Mao or Che of democratic politics, and Suite 3505 is his tactical handbook.

But the book unhappily holds no promise of deliverance for America's frustrated minorities: they will not get to the throne this way. Suite 3505 (so called after White's New York headquarters) says little about preconvention politics that Hess and Broder, Novak, and Theodore White don't say, and says it worse. Its author suffers gravely from a malady perhaps first spread by William Manchester: a lurid obsession with irrelevant detail. We know White's taste in cars, the hours of his shuttle flights, the geography of his hotels, above all the name of his hundreds of volunteer workers, listed with as little pity for his readers as the 17th speech in an interminable testimonial dinner. More important, although he relates who met with whom and for that purpose, he usually leaves out the meat: it is left obscure what his agents actually said to the precinct and district chiefs they recruited, what, as representatives of a small organization with little cash and a reluctant candidate, they had to offer. White has turned the sound off the TV: his ghostly actors play without scripts.

A few interesting remarks do struggle into concreteness. White makes clear that the main ambition of his movement was to weld grass-roots volunteers into an artificial equivalent of the Democratic big-city machines, a secret hand that could, when the right moment arrived, subtly and gently remove from Eastern interests the leadership of the Republican Party.

CANDIDATE SECONDARY

The choice of a candidate was always secondary; the important business was to organize an alliance of all the aggrieved Americans who felt consensus politics was squeezing them out. The effort prompted him to develop some useful precepts, which he passes on to the reader, and a few are worth repeating.

Don't, White says, pay much attention to polls; attend to organizing at precinct and district levels first, and this four years, if possible, before the convention. Don't stake too much on primaries, but concentrate on building delegate strength. On the level of tactics he adds: you can build a powerful organization without money by depending on volunteer help. (This is a key point, and it leads one to wonder if this tactic is only applicable to situations in which a powerful ideological appeal can be made. People will work for free for a Resistance movement sooner than they will for an established machine.) Furthermore, don't traffic with delegates whose votes are for sale, somebody else can buy them back; master well in advance all rules for selecting delegates; and travel instead of telephoning. To White's credit, he does not try to make it sound as if Goldwater's triumph at San Francisco resulted from the smooth and orderly working out of these strategic principles. As a friend of mine likes to point out to those who seek more order in campaign planning, the best way to simulate an organizer's position is to spend three successive sleepless days travelling back and forth across the country and daily trying to sit down and figure out your strategy. The fatigue, bad temper, and chaos of this appalling work come through in White's book and make it on the whole a more honest job than most post-mortem campaign literature. All he really claims for his strategy, in the end, is that if you can get a candidate and if the candidate gets some breaks, you will be able to supply him with an organization's solid support.

The trouble, in this particular case, was that White's organization only functioned efficiently so long as it had no candidate. This cripples the book's usefulness as a minority's manual. White naturally enough attributes Goldwater's stunning defeat largely to the Arizona Mafia — Denison Hitchel, William Baroody, Edward McCabe, and Dean Burch — that cut off the Suite 3505 group's access to the Senator after he had declared himself. He is filled with resentment at their incompetence, and no wonder; whether or not he could have done better, it is hard to imagine anyone doing worse.

GOLDWATER'S SHOW

After Goldwater decided to run, the campaign was no longer Clif White's show, Nor was it really Hitchel's and Baroody's. It was altogether too much Goldwater's, White, and his devoted band of volunteer ideologues across the country, possessed a strategy; what they really wanted was not a breathing candidate, but an appropriate delivery system for that strategy. Goldwater would have served them better had he looked sincere, projected integrity and responsibility, and kept his mouth shut. But Goldwater opened his mouth all too often; and in a few blundering, arbitrary, careless sentences radicalized the campaign and wrecked the strategy.

White and his friends kept trying to shut him up, to tone him down, to keep him out of debates, out of New Hampshire and Oregon, in fact, out of action as anything but a symbol. They recognized perfectly clearly that he could talk only to those who agreed with him, and that only his manful silence could push him beyond the fringes of the frustrated who built his organization, and enable him to eat into suburban voting strength.

But a radical movement got what it deserved: not a symbol but a radical candidate. White clearly held off recognizing the dreadful fact as long as he could. He never really caught on until Goldwater told the delegates whom the draft movement had assembled with such pains that extremism in the defense of liberty was no vice. The floor of the Cow Palace went wild with applause, but White and his friends nearly wept with the knowledge that they were lost. Their nominee turned out to be as fanatic as those who made him one.

—Robert W. Gordon
ANALYSIS: Election '67

The 1967 elections were a stew of municipal and county races seasoned lightly with several state legislative contests, three Southern gubernatorial contests, a congressional by-election, and a pair of referenda on Vietnam. To filter out the effect of local issues and personalities in an attempt to ascertain general trends or to plan future strategies from such a small and indirect response of the total electorate is obviously difficult.

To conclude from the almost universal Democratic victory in the cities that John Lindsay is a political freak, or for the White House to take comfort from the defeat of the two immediate-withdrawal referenda on Vietnam is superficial at best. Republicans must carefully analyze the returns if blueprints for 1968 are to be drawn from the data of 1967.

CLEVELAND

The mayoralty contest which pitted Carl B. Stokes, the great-grandson of a slave, against Seth C. Taft, the grandson of a President, lured the greatest attention, including that of two Swedish newsmen.

Having lost in 1965 a four-way contest for the same post by 2000 votes as an independent, State Representative Stokes this time defeated the incumbent in the Democratic primary. With Cleveland's Negroes representing 39% of the registered voters (they went for Stokes almost unanimously), Stokes campaigned exclusively in the white wards while emphasizing his experience and moderation in an attempt to convince the white community that a Negro was capable of responsibility sitting in the mayor's chair.

An unknown political amateur moving from the suburbs to help the city, Seth Taft ran an excellent campaign based on the issues of crime, urban blight, joblessness, and city unresponsiveness. He judiciously shunned a racist appeal and fired two campaign workers when they misrepresented him on civil rights. Yet no Republican had been mayor of Cleveland in 26 years and the resulting legacy of an incompetent city party left Taft to rely mostly on non-professional assistance.

Taft ran well ahead of Stokes in the white wards (3:1), probably as a result of voting along racial lines. Yet Stokes' large majorities in the Negro districts carried him into office by 1600 votes. The Republicans selected an excellent candidate and ran a thorough campaign, but if they are to win in 1969 or even run as well (the racial issue will certainly be dilated by then) they will have to cultivate an urban party neglected for 26 years.

GARY

Richard G. Hatcher's 1400 vote victory over Joseph B. Radigan is significant not so much for the fact that another Negro won the mayor's office as for the blatant attempts at registration fraud which left a bad taste in the mouths of most Americans. The vote split even more along racial lines than in Cleveland with Hatcher taking 96% of the Negro vote and 11% of the white vote.

Radigan's candidacy was boosted almost to victory by the backlash and the assistance of city Democratic chairman, John G. Krupa, who doubled as secretary of both the Election Board and the County Board of Canvassers. Pro-Radigan pressures even included harassment and physical assaults on voters and Hatcher workers, many of which were unreported in the press.

Certainly, the circumstances which almost gave Republican victory should not be cultivated and the security of Gary, Indiana as a one-party town will never be seriously challenged until the Republican Party offers a blend of both attractive candidates and party organization.

PHILADELPHIA

With his victory in 1965 in the District Attorney's race, Arlen Specter was placed (along with New York's new mayor John Lindsay) on that lonely pedestal of Republicans who can win in the city, and immediately labeled as the candidate to beat the Democratic Machine in 1967's mayoralty race. Thus, Specter's defeat by incumbent Mayor James H. J. Tate was viewed with dismay by Republican moderates who had counted on this sole warrior to continue the slow process of rebuilding the urban party.

Yet Tate's plurality was less than 11,000; compared with Tate's 68,000 vote win in 1963, and the Democrat's 188,000 voter registration advantage, Specter's showing was not an insignificant accomplishment.

Tate relied heavily on 1) the 30,000 city employees who had just been given generous pay raises and some new and liberal pension benefits, 2) the united backing of labor leaders and their unions which provided financial aid and poll workers, and 3) the heavily Catholic and Negro districts in the city. (Specter failed to carry a single ward which was predominantly Negro.)

Specter's emphasis on the issues, including his high caliber series of research papers, "Blueprints for a Better Philadelphia," never caught fire. On conceding defeat he commented, "Perhaps we will live to fight another day." At 37, he should.

BOSTON

Louise Day Hicks has long been an issue in Boston; her slogan, "You know where I stand," left no doubt in the minds of Bostonians. Her 12,000 vote defeat at the hands of Secretary of State Kevin H. White was far from the decisive one predicted by many in September. White had a reputation as a bland candidate and did little to dispel the image as he refrained from attacking the school committee woman who carefully promoted herself as the anti-establishment, underdog candidate.

The small margin of victory left many concluding that Mrs. Hicks' promise to raise police salaries by almost 35% to $10,000 and her subsequent "storming" of Washington to get the money was the determining factor. The large discrepancy between her story that federal money was on the way for the police salaries and the one that filtered back from Washington cast a shadow on her ability to be mayor.

White and Hicks ran close in most of Boston's wards except for those in the Negro ghetto; one went for White 2495 to 490, another 5402 to 317. The Negro turnout was probably enhanced by the candidacy for city council of Harvard Law School student Thomas Atkins, the first Negro to win since Boston's counselors have been elected at-large.

To Republicans who usually do not participate in this "non-partisan" contest, the significant event occurred last September when State Representative John Sears finished third in the primary which selected White and Hicks for November's finale. Finishing slightly ahead of Boston Redevelopment czar Edward Logue, the Boston Brahmin captured the two Yankee wards on Beacon Hill and in the Back Bay, plus one in Negro... (continued overleaf)
Roxbury and the one in the blighted ward of Allston. His issue-oriented campaign was based not so much on policies developed for this race, but on positions already taken in the wealth of bills Sears had previously submitted in the state legislature.

**BALTIMORE** Last spring's decision by the immensely popular Republican mayor, Theodore R. McKeldin (twice mayor and twice Governor of Maryland), not to seek reelection left a political vacuum and foretold the obvious. On November 7, it happened: the Democratic candidate Thomas J. D'Alesandro walloped Republican Arthur W. Sherwood, 5 to 1.

**LESSON I** The role of the Negro in the above four races was unmistakable; in Cleveland, Gary, Philadelphia, and Boston, Negroes voted as a block and in each case this block was essential for victory.

The blacklash, too, was present in Boston, Cleveland, and Gary, although it was not decisive. In the future, as Stokes, Hatcher, and others demonstrate that the Negro too can govern, it will crack even less sharply.

The attempts of Republicans to attract the Negro from his traditional, though often irrational, home in the Democratic Party, if existing at all, have been uncoordinated. Clearly, 1967 demonstrates that the Republican Party will be unsuccessful in its attempt to reverse its fortunes unless it specifically and unequivocally seeks to improve the lot of this minority. America's Negroes have seen their political power demonstrated in a most dramatic fashion; as their political sophistication grows, their ability to reward and punish at the polls will become the bane of those who care little for the ghetto or its people.

**LESSON II** In 1965, the victories of John Lindsay in New York and Arlen Specter in Philadelphia ended the myth of Republican political sterility in the cities. Yet, only two years later with the nation's focus on a series of significant municipal elections, the Republicans were unable to implement a single major coup. Taft, Specter, and Sears all represented the ultimate in a candidate; aggressive, intelligent and attractive, they worshipped at the political altar of John Lindsay.

Yet, even had they won, the victories would have been less than complete — unless they carried with them enough Republicans on their coattails to successfully govern the city. (No Republican ran for city council in Boston.) And unless they had used their term in office to construct a political organization, not only personally loyal but with deep Republican roots, such a victory would have been but a brief intermission in the long story of Democratic rule.

That the Republican party can contest the cities with bright candidates is obvious; that they can win has been proven also. But if our party is to be a permanent and meaningful force in urban politics, it must build a party structure that can elect candidates to office at all levels even without stunning qualities of personality. Until then, the Republicans, with the exception of the rare instances when they do nominate a John Lindsay or a Theodore McKeldin, must abdicate the rule of the cities to the Democratic party.

**KENTUCKY** The battle for Kentucky's Governorship by two segregationists, Louis B. Nunn (R) and Henry Ward (D) inspired little enthusiasm for the future. College Democrats, trying to rationalize their support for Ward, coined the phrase: "Half an Oaf is better than Nunn."

The bitter primary in which Nunn defeated Jefferson County (Louisville) Judge Marlow W. Cook for the Republican nomination left Senator John Sherman Cooper infuriated with Nunn's anti-Negro, anti-Catholic (Cook was a Catholic), and anti-Semitic appeals. The resulting party split was so wide that ex-national committee official Hal E. Short had to be called in to smooth some feathers. This worked, and by the end of the campaign Cooper and Congressman Tim Lee Carter, both supporters of Cook, were working for Nunn.

Campaigning in the general election strictly against LBJ, Nunn employed the slogan "Tired of the War? Vote Nunn." and brought in Senators Dirksen, Tower, and Murphy, along with Governors Reagan and Kirk, for assistance. A Reagan fund-raising dinner grossed almost $100,000 and the role of the candidate's brother, Lee Nunn, as executive director of the Senatorial Campaign Committee, opened the door to more. The colorless Henry Ward relied heavily on an entrenched organization, but failed in his attempts to force the discussion of local issues.

The Republicans took the Governor's office for the first time in 24 years, picking up nine seats in the House and four in the Senate. This does not; however, leave Nunn with a majority in either house, compounding the obstacle presented by the Democrats who were elected to the top four cabinet posts, including that of Lieutenant Governor.

**LOUISIANA** Commented Governor John J. McKeithen as he easily defeated arch-segregationist Congressman John R. Rarick in the Democratic primary, "This is the first time that a Governor has won without taking a big stand as a conservative." McKeithen based his campaign on a more moderate appeal; he faces no Republican opposition in February's general election.

**MISSISSIPPI** In the only statewide contest challenged by the GOP, Democratic Congressman John Bell Williams handily defeated Rubel Phillips by capturing 70% of the vote. After his primary victory, Williams refused to campaign directly against Phillips, even spending the two weeks directly prior to the election being treated in the hospital for complications of an old World War II injury. Campaigning mostly as a congressional martyr in the battle for states' rights (Williams lost 20 years of House seniority for backing Goldwater) he asserted that "I want to come back to the Bible Belt which the liberals make so much fun of."

Phillips had run for Governor before; as a segregationist in 1965 he received 38% of the vote in the wake of the Goldwater movement. This year Phillips realized that he could not win with the old platform of out-segregating the Democrats. Consequently he drastically altered his position, stating flatly that Negro and white must work together if the state was to become economically viable: "The great majority of Mississippi's white people are going to have to help the Negro improve himself and increase his income." Party regulars, initially quite apprehensive as to the consequences of Phillips approach, soon saw the visions of future victory; commented State Party Chairman Clarke (continued overleaf)
Phillips was endorsed by the Freedom Democratic Party and brought in Winthrop Rockefeller to speak on his behalf. Failing, however, to draw Williams into a serious discussion of the issues, Phillips lost by an even greater margin than in 1965. This defeat was considered a result, not of Phillips' new position, but rather of the lack of a clear Republican sentiment.

The GOP lost the 22 legislative seats it contested, including the three incumbents. Meanwhile, the Freedom Democratic Party had 32 Negro candidates on local ballots; the seven victories garnered included the first Negro legislator since Reconstruction.

LESSON III

The three Southern contests demand careful scrutiny if the Republican Party is to plot a victorious course for the future. Certainly, Governor-elect Nunn represents little progress in the Kentucky of Senators John Sherman Cooper and Thruston Morton. Neither his leadership nor his campaign against LBJ and the Vietnam war were able to carry into office a Republican legislature. (Compare this with the GOP's victory in New Jersey on basically the same platform.) And it appears doubtful that Nunn laid any foundation for either a Republican legislature or a new majority party.

Contrast Nunn's leadership with Rubel Phillips in Mississippi. Phillips recognized that the segregationist theme was thoroughly patented by the Democrats in the South; it left him no margin for maneuvering or even victory. Consequently, Phillips called for cooperation between the races in working for the economic prosperity of Mississippi. His new stance may not have won the race, but it laid a solid foundation for the Mississippi Republican Party and the state's growth as well.

Such a theme also appears to be the key if the Republicans are to ever challenge in Louisiana.

NEW JERSEY

Under the leadership of Senator Clifford P. Case and State Party Chairman Webster B. Todd, New Jersey's Republican Party captured the year's most stunning political victory. The state legislature was turned upside down as the Republicans erased 19-10 and 41-19 Democratic majorities in the State Senate and the General Assembly, respectively, replacing them with a 31-9 and 58-22 Republican control, more than enough to override lame-duck Governor Richard Hughes' veto. Simultaneously, the party took over five previously Democratic-controlled court houses and with them approximately 3500 additional patronage jobs.

This victory, which reversed Republican fortunes that had reached a low ebb with the 1965 disaster which accompanied an ill-advised gubernatorial campaign, resulted from a combination of factors. The GOP promised to repeal the Democrat's recent hand-out to labor. In the last legislative sessions they had extended unemployment compensation to strikers, and also claimed that the newly appointed State Commission of Education intended to bus children from the suburbs to the cities. Senator Case quickly disavowed the latter tactic, campaigning heavily on the theme "Why Wait Till '68?" Case attributed the Republican landslide to overall dissatisfaction with President Johnson and his handling of the Vietnam war.

The big margins in both houses of the legislature gives the Republicans the opportunity to write a clear record of progress and to set the stage for a gubernatorial victory in 1969. However, rumors of a power struggle between the new suburban legislators and the down-state incumbents may foreclose on any aggressive leadership the party may attempt to take.

VIETNAM REFERENDA

The defeat of the two nationally watched municipal referenda brought cheers, although somewhat hollow from the White House. Proposition P, which called for "an immediate cease fire and withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam," captured only 37% of the vote in San Francisco. Across the continent in Cambridge, Massachusetts, a similar proposal which urged "the prompt return home of American soldiers from Vietnam," was approved by an insufficient 40% of those voting, prompting presidential aide and ex-A.D.A. chairman John Roche to comment that he was "delighted."

SAN MATEO

The death of eight-term Republican Congressman J. Arthur Younger opened the door for a wild 10-candidate special election. California law required an open primary on November 14, to be followed — if no candidate cornered 50% of the vote, as was the case — by a run-off on December 12 between the Republican and Democrat with the highest vote.

The national headlines were captured by Mrs. Shirley Temple Black as she attempted to follow Governor Ronald Reagan and one-time dancing partner, Senator George Murphy, from screen to politics. Yet, for all her ability to make news, Mrs. Black ran a full 18,000 votes behind the winning plurality of 52,878 captured by Marine Corps Korean veteran Paul N. "Pete" McCloskey.

McCloskey first took public notice with his unsuccessful defense of Woodside, California's unmarred natural beauty against the invasion of the A.E.C.'s power lines to feed Stanford University's electricity-guzzling linear accelerator. Contrasted with the three hawkish Republican candidates (Mrs. Black advocated giving more discretion to the military) he campaigned unabashedly as a dove, though he carefully eschewed advocating immediate withdrawal. McCloskey successfully articulated the need for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam in arguing that it is against our interest to be embroiled in the current war.

McCloskey's victory left him opposing San Mateo city councilman Roy Archibald who ran fourth in the primary with less than 10% of the vote. His win on December 12 climaxed a well thought-out and executed campaign.

LESSON IV

Despite the fact that McCloskey's victory and Vietnam stand received only a small fraction of the national press response that accompanied Mrs. Black's candidacy or the defeat of the San Francisco and Cambridge referenda, there is no doubt that the election was not overlooked in the White House. Similarly, Republicans must not ignore it while preparing for 1968.

Neither Vietnam resolutions were worded to attract broad-based support from those who opposed President Johnson's policy in Vietnam; both sought to promote one specific and quite drastic alternative to the current military operation. That over one-third of the voters
Election '67

in both cities supported such a proposal — either because they agreed with the position, or because they felt strongly enough about registering disapproval with the current administration to overlook their distaste for the alternative advocated — certainly indicates widespread disenchantment with LBJ.

The success of those opposed to the Vietnam war was, however, realized when a more moderate and broader stance was combined with a personality capable of articulating and defending his view. Paul McCloskey was able to explain his position in a manner no referendum could do, thereby attracting wide support from those who were not only comfortable with his stand but impressed by his capabilities.

1968 can be a Republican year. The key for the party lies in harvesting wide support by adopting a Vietnam position of deescalation and disengagement and by nominating candidates who can convincingly and persuasively articulate such a policy. The public's disfavor with the failures of President Johnson — so well documented in both New Jersey and Kentucky — will do the rest.

—R.D.B.

Free Speech in the Armed Forces

(continued from page five)

political spectrum; in May a Navy Board was set up to investigate the sanity of Lieutenant Commander Lawrence Baldauf after he publicly charged that the United States was not escalating the air war fast enough.

The charges being used are varied: conduct unbecoming an officer, using disloyal words about the President, willful disobedience of orders, promoting disloyalty and disaffection. The message is the same: active opposition to the war is off limits. It is hard to say how often illegal or informal sanctions are used against members of the armed forces for expressing opposition to the war. It is less difficult to guess whether military personnel will be more influenced by the vague assurances of the President or the fate of Lieutenant Howe. For both officers and men the well-publicized acts of courts martial across the country carry more weight than a few soothing words from the White House, and the fear of prosecution or less overt punishment is little assuaged by an occasional acquittal.

One cannot but recall now the wisdom and vigor of past Washington attacks on political indoctrination in Communist armies as anti-democratic and totalitarian, as a technique aimed at turning thinking, critical human beings into enthusiastic automatons. In an American context the argument carries more weight, since we purport to adhere to those democratic and individualistic values which are thus being trampled underfoot, and since the votes of three million men in uniform are important in a country where elections are often decided by a few election points. Free speech in the armed forces, let alone free speech for off-duty military personnel, entails none of the dangers which could come close to justifying its suppression. Certainly one little dermatologist at Fort Jackson is not going to cripple the United States war effort. A concerted attempt by a large number of soldiers to encourage disobedience and mutiny might present a serious problem, but no one has been seriously charged with trying to incite that sort of action. In the final analysis Lieutenant Howe was convicted of saying that the President was wrong, and Private Stapp is about to be tried for reading books which said much the same thing. If such speech is dangerous, it is no less so on the tongue of a civilian than on that of an off-duty soldier; if such reading is a crime, we should all be glad to plead guilty. Surely here, as in most if not all instances, any harm occasioned by free speech is far outweighed by the importance of the right which the First Amendment was intended to protect.

It is at best inexcusable that the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces on the one hand publicly recognizing the constitutional rights of all Americans should on the other authorize or even tolerate any form of sanction against servicemen for merely adhering to or expressing anti-Administration views. The practice is unnecessary, unjust, and in view of the Supreme Court's decisions in Burn v. Wilson and Reid v. Covert clearly unconstitutional. Equally without excuse would be a White House decision to permit or seek the delay which would probably precede the inevitable Supreme Court action on this problem or to countenance uncertain enforcement of such action when it finally occurs. The Department of Defense can and should direct that all members of the armed forces are entitled to hold and, in unofficial capacities, express views inconsistent with or antagonistic towards the President's policies. Any attempt by superior officers to intimidate personnel for holding or expressing such beliefs should be reported to the appropriate commanding officers and be subject to disciplinary proceedings. Our boys in Vietnam, as well as those stationed in the United States, should be given the basic rights for which, it is alleged, they are risking their lives.

—Eric Schnapper

Mr. Schnapper is a third-year law student at Yale and Articles Editor of the Yale Law Journal. — Ed.

Connecticut

Reports coming out of Connecticut indicate that a tacit agreement has been entered into by the backers of Governors Romney, Reagan, Rockefeller, and of Mr. Nixon not to publicly canvass for support. Supporters of Governor Rockefeller are privately predicting that they will win control of the Connecticut delegation to the Republican National Convention at the district caucuses and state convention next spring.

Oregon

If the Oregon primary were held today, close observers say, Ronald Reagan would run ahead of both Nixon and Romney. It will, they say, take hard campaigning in the state to reduce Reagan's lead among Republican voters.
PROFILE: The Texas Yankee

The accusation was damning. The handsome ex-district attorney who made it, now the Democratic candidate for Congress in Houston's new Seventh District, charged that whereas he was a third-generation Texan (roughly akin to Mayflower stock elsewhere) his opponent was not even a native of the Lone Star State — in fact, he was a Connecticut Yankee.

Tall and equally handsome, a resident of Texas for a mere eighteen years, the Republican candidate absorbed the attack and proceeded to set the record straight. "Actually, I'm a native of Massachusetts," he said. "I would have liked to have been born in Texas, but you see, I wanted to be with my mother at the time."

The Republican was George Herbert Walker Bush, son of former Senator Prescott Bush of Connecticut and grandson of the patron of golf's Walker Cup. On November 8, 1966, the voters of the Texas Seventh — 40% of whom, like him, were born outside the state — made him their Representative by a margin of 15,000 votes.

WATCH THE ACTION

Bush had conducted an impressive campaign which put him across the television screens of Houston at least as often as the Dodge Rebellion Girl. In slickly-produced, Lindsay-style spots he was shown driving a Suburban street, coolly slung over his shoulder, while an announcer stressed the theme, "Elect George Bush to Congress — and Watch the Action."

It was not an idle claim. Eleven weeks after his election Bush made Congressional history by becoming the third freshman of either party in the 20th century to be named to the House Ways and Means Committee, perhaps Congress' most powerful and coveted panel. In February, in the time between the two Adam Clayton Powell votes, he introduced an ethics and disclosure resolution which was quickly adopted by several other Republicans of the Class of 1966 as their own. Bush later obtained a one-hour special order to present the proposal before the House, also an unusual feat for a newcomer. In the aftermath of the summer riots, he teamed up with Charles Goodell of New York and fellow freshmen William Steiger of Wisconsin and William Cowger of Kentucky to introduce legislation for a "Neighborhood Action Crusade" wherein unarmed citizens from affected neighborhoods would be recruited to patrol the areas to spot and then stave off possible trouble. In September, Newsweek cited him (along with Michigan's Marvin Esch) as "sensitive to the problems of the cities and slums and determined to deal with them in their own way."

But Bush represents more than a Congressional District. He represents an entire new breed of Texans, Easterners for the most part, who have come to the state since World War I to take advantage of its burgeoning prosperity. A decorated Naval aviator and a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Yale (1948), Bush moved to West Texas to become an oilfield supply salesman. In ten years he had become president of his own oil company, Zapata Off-Shore, and had settled in Houston. He began to dabble in Republican politics and was named chairman of the Harris County GOP in 1963, the same year his father left the Senate. The following year, 1964, Bush attempted to return one of his name to the Upper House.

He entered the Republican senatorial primary and won out over a field of four opponents (one of whom, Jack Cox, had scored a 45% vote against Gov. John Connally eighteen months earlier), going on to face liberal Democratic Senator Ralph ("Smilin' Raff") Yarborough. Bush's campaign, despite the burden of Barry Goldwater, whom he backed for the presidential nomination, gathered momentum, and on the eve of the election polls and observers rated him an excellent chance of toppling Yarborough. But the Johnson juggernaut crushed him; the Senator won 56% of the vote against his challenger. It was small comfort that he had won more votes than any other Republican in history or that he had run 400,000 votes ahead of Goldwater.

POLITICAL COMEBACK

But like Robert Taft, Jr., and Charles Percy (a close friend of the Texan, Bush attempted a political comeback in 1966. In February of that year he sold Zapata Off-Shore and entered the race for Congress in the recently-formed Seventh District, an enviable Republican bailiwick comprising the affluent western suburbs of Houston. But the race was not an effortless one. Bush's opponent was Frank Briscoe, a dashing former D.A. who had built up a reputation as a powerful prosecutor, a solidly conservative Democrat, and a powerful vote-getter. The fight became a classic battle of the year, singled out by Evans-Novak and Alan Otten as typical of races in the South in which the Republican candidate was considerably more moderate than his Democratic counterpart. Briscoe lambasted Bush as "the darling of the Lindsey(sic)-Javitz crowd" — a comment which never failed to produce a wry grin from Bush, who remembered Yarborough's claim only two years before that he was an "extremist." But Briscoe's "more-conservative-than-thou" tactics proved a flop, as witnessed by an ad placed in Houston papers shortly before the election by the "Send a Texan to Congress Committee." It was a cartoon of a group of smiling, waving, look-alike men — each with his jacket slung over his shoulder — labeled "Liberal Moderate," "Conservative Liberal," and even "Liberal Liberal." The legend ran: "Will the real George Bush please stand up?" But the ploy backfired. Large numbers of voters thought that Bush had run the ad and one previously-undecided voter wrote him to announce she planned to vote for him "because we need someone who will represent all viewpoints." His share of the vote was 57%.

NEW TEXAS REPUBLICANS

George Bush also represents a new type of Texas Republican, who, with Senator John Tower, has come to realize that the Party must tackle the problems of the urban areas and the poor if it is to survive. As such, the freshman Congressman from Houston stands as the Texas GOP's strongest hope for statewide office — probably Yarborough's Senate seat in 1970. In the turmoil created by Gov. Connally's announcement on November 10 that he would retire, it became a possibility that Yarborough might once more seek his old dream, the governorship. Should he be successful, his seat would be up for grabs in 1969.

In any event, the articulate and capable "naturalized Texan" has already proven himself a credit to the still-growing Texas Republican Party. If the Party turns toward vigorous campaigns and 20th century platforms aimed at winning the support of those who have suffered most under the long night of the Texas Courthouse Democracy, it will be due to a considerable extent to the efforts of George Bush — and a bit of Yankee ingenuity.

—Charles G. Untermyer
PRIVATE CAPITAL AND HUMAN INVESTMENT

The idea of meeting some of the needs of our cities and the poor people living in them by attracting private capital appears to have become something of a fad. As with most fads it has some good features and some bad ones.

One group of plans along this line would encourage poor people to own their own homes by making mortgage loans available at extremely low rates of interest. There is no doubt that people who own the houses they live in invest in those houses, even if only by contributing their own labor for maintenance. Home owners also gain a stake in their communities and greater control and security in their own lives.

The chief limitation of loan plans for poor people is that a loan only shifts income from the future to the present, and many poor simply can't afford a lifetime of decent housing out of their lifetime income. Lowering mortgage interest rates will extend the middle-class privilege of home ownership deeper into the ranks of the poor, but there will still be people with incomes too low to buy housing that is not overcrowded, dilapidated, or substandard.

Another much-publicized proposal is for generous tax incentives to firms for investment in ghetto and slum areas. The purpose of this investment is to bring jobs to the ghettos. But here we should be very careful. When people in the ghettos complain of a lack of jobs it may or may not be a problem of geography. There are other barriers to the employment of slum dwellers besides the distance from the job to the ghetto or slum: prejudice, lack of training, ignorance of job possibilities, and union exclusion come to mind. The geographical problem may be important in some places, but there are numerous ways of improving physical access of workers to jobs which don't involve the very expensive process of physically moving industry into the slums.

I think we pay too much attention to the physical side of poverty, the crumbling houses and trash-filled alleys, and not enough to the human side. The problem of poverty has basically to do with old, unemployable, unskilled, uneducated, illiterate people who are left out by the rest of society. In our anxiety to erase the physical signs we ignore certain fundamental facts about poor people. It may seem ridiculously obvious, but poor people live badly because they can't afford to live better. Good housing, for example, is costly to build and maintain. Whoever lives in the housing has to pay, except for government subsidies, for building and maintaining it. There is no magic gimmick that will provide decent housing for poor people without giving them the money to buy it. But poor people are not productive enough to earn that money in our competitive society.

We are very impressed by our factories and trains and highways and houses, and we may attribute our relative comfort to them. But another immensely important part of our wealth is the human capital we have accumulated over the years: know-how, literacy, skills of all kinds. The slums clearly lack the physical capital to provide a decent life for the people who live there, and we rush to provide it. We call into service all the techniques we know to encourage the accumulation of physical capital: low interest rates, tax credits. But the real shortage for the poor is of human capital. How important it is we can realize from the fact that ownership of our physical wealth is concentrated overwhelmingly in the hands of the very rich. The great, comfortable middle class has been created and maintains itself primarily through human investment.

There is an important difference between human and physical capital. The returns from physical investment go to the person who owns it, but the return to investment in a human being under our Constitution belong only to that individual. It is easy to get people to put money into a factory because they know they will get out the profits. But how can private capital be attracted to human investment? A company that trains skilled workers has no guarantee that they will not go to work for its competitors. Human investment does take place, of course, and some of it is in the form of training programs, but most comes through government support of education, through individuals saving to go to school or college, or to educate their children. This is the saving that the poor can barely afford. We can depend on them to accumulate the needed human capital unaided, but it will be a painfully slow process.

People participate in economic life as consumers and as producers. The poor are excluded on both counts. To consume, a person needs income, and probably the most efficient way to raise standards of living among the poor is through direct transfers, like rent subsidies or the negative income tax. Subsidies attract private capital to earn the dollars the poor spend. To participate as producers the poor need skills, training, and information. Until someone comes up with a way to mobilize private capital for investment in people, governments will have to do the job directly.