

Limiting Public Strikes

Labor relations in the public sector are in as primitive state as they were in the private sector some sixty years ago. Since the conditions for bargaining are different, distinctive new rules of the game will have to be worked out. But a blanket ban on strikes for all public employees is not the place to begin. On page 3 William J. Kiberg suggests what procedures can be developed if one adopts a calm, problem-solving approach.

Should We Back Black Power?

Well, perhaps we had better call it Neighborhood Power to purge any hint of violence. But however you slice it, the Black Power movement contains some age-old American themes that Republicans can and should support. The first article in a special section on "Neighborhood Power and the GOP" tells what these themes are. Then John McClaughry reports on recent discussions between GOP and black leaders. An inside political analysis of New Haven, Connecticut, describes a city that is ripe for a progressive GOP coalition to answer the needs of the ghetto. Finally, Congressional candidate Malcolm Peabody contributes a think piece on new housing programs that will build self-reliance and community spirit in slum areas. See pages 7-12.

Issues, Issues, Issues

Any state party that wants to build a dynamic base, recruit young people and tap the best talent would do well to imitate the Massachusetts GOP by holding a state issues convention. On page 13 Robert D. Behn explains how Massachusetts organized such a convention and how it drafted a progressive platform that infused new blood into the state party.

Vietnam Peace Program

Mr. Romney is dead as a presidential contender, but his program for peace in Vietnam lives on in a guest editorial on page 24. Republicans should not let the peace issue slip from their party with Romney's withdrawal from the race.

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14a ELIOT ST: 5th Anniversary

On January 30th the Ripon Society celebrated its fifth anniversary with a banquet at the Harvard Faculty Club. Governor John Chafee of Rhode Island, Chairman of the Republican Governors Association was the principal speaker. Society members came from as far as Los Angeles to attend and were joined by Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor Francis Sargent, Republican State Chairman Josiah A. Spaulding, New Hampshire National Committeeman Perkins Bass and a number of Massachusetts state representatives. The Society received scores of congratulatory telegrams and messages from Republican governors, senators and congressmen, but the most impressive testimonial, after that of Governor Chafee, came from Republican Chairman Spaulding who spoke of the invaluable assistance rendered to the state party by Ripon and who then backed up his kind words by making a personal financial contribution to the Society.

● In early February Ripon's New York chapter co-sponsored an Urban Leadership Symposium with the New York Young Republican Club, the New York County Republican Volunteers and New Yorkers for Political Action. Senator Jacob Javits, Congressmen William Steiger, Charles Goodell, Clark MacGregor and Albert Quie, and Deputy Mayor Robert Sweet, and other political and academic and ghetto leaders participated.

● The New Haven Chapter had an off-the-record session with Edwin H. May, Jr., the probable opponent of Senator Abraham Ribicoff this November, to discuss approaches to likely campaign issues. The chapter also met during February with Congressman Robert Taft, Jr., Professor Henry Wallich, formerly of President Eisenhower's Council of Economic Advisers; and with General James M. Gavin, who discussed the war in Asia and his own preferences for political action.

● Robert B. Campbell, FORUM Correspondent from Texas, will run for the State Legislature the 43rd Legislative District, an area that does not usually have a Republican nominee. He is the second Texas correspondent to beg off from Ripon FORUM duties to devote full-time to the State GOP. Terry Ellsworth is working with the State Committee. Our new man in Texas will be Neil D. Anderson an attorney with the firm of Wynne, Jaffe and Tinsley in Dallas and a moving force in the building of the Dallas Chapter.

LETTERS: Defense Spending

Dear Sirs:

Mr. Foley's article, "Spending for Security", in the November 1967 issue of the FORUM is an unhappy example of the right goal combined with the wrong methods. The defense and aerospace "establishment" has many faults but, rather than actually pointing them out, Mr. Foley has spent his time in attacking strawmen.

Mr. Foley takes issue with the types of contracts and the cost-accounting methods used. He criticizes cost-plus, fixed-fee contracts, which were an important and necessary type of arrangement in the late 50's, but have declined from a high of 38% of total contract awards in 1961 — the peak of the Polaris and Minuteman research and development—to 9.9% at mid-1966. Fixed-fee and incentive-price contracts have been used in their place.

Nor should it be assumed that cost-plus, fixed-fee contracts were wasted then. No one can guarantee that research will result in a final usable weapon system any more than a doctor can guarantee that every operation will result in a complete cure. In the same manner no one can set, with certainty, the cost necessary to reach a satisfactory solution of a new problem. Without such an incentive there would be little hope of having a profit-oriented company carrying out such work on its own. The research that went into developing today's rocket propulsion is a good example of a costly but necessary use of cost-plus, fixed-fee contracts.

A comment on overhead is also required. Expenditures can be handled, basically, in one of two ways: they can be carried as a direct charge against a given contract or they can be written up as an overhead expense. In either event, they still represent money spent. In the aerospace industry such items as security administration,

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Limiting Public Strikes

If one were to divide the sweep of American labor history into eras, this would most certainly be the era of the public employee. In 1956, 915,000 government workers at all levels of government belonged to unions. That figure reached 1.22 million by 1962 and was 1.45 million in 1964, an increase of almost 60% from 1956. While the proportion of union members in the whole economy declined during these eight years from 25% to 22%, the percentage among government employees rose from 12% to 16%. In 1955, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) had 99,000 members; in 1966, it claimed 288,000. The American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) increased its membership in the same period from 47,000 to 180,000; the American Federation of Teachers from 40,000 to 115,000 members. The overwhelming bulk of public employees are employed at the local level — 60% of all government workers.¹

Municipal employers, unlike their state and federal compatriots, are more accessible to their employees; they are also more vulnerable to political pressures. Name any governmental function, and a cursory glance at the past year's newspapers will detail the labor strife which surrounded our schools, transportation services, medical services, refuse collection, police and fire protection — the list can go on ad infinitum. All this while political leaders decry long hot summers, air pollution, crime in our streets. The siege of the public sector grows stronger while the need for the services of the public sector grows greater.

POLITICAL BALANCE

The view from the offices of any public employee union is a bitter one: wages and benefits in the private sector are increasing while those in the public sector fail to keep pace; at a time when control over the work place and the co-opting of management "prerogatives" reach greater and greater heights in the private sector, the public employee finds himself more entangled in bureaucratic red tape than ever before. And so it is that the public employee feels left out of the mainstream and sees himself as the forgotten man.

Thus, on one horn of the dilemma, the public employee demands that he be given the rights and opportunities of collective bargaining and the strike weapon long ago accorded all other employees; on the other hand, our cities find themselves unable to afford new economic demands: they are hard-pressed to raise taxes or to divert scarce resources from already underfinanced programs. The need is for a political solution; a balancing of labor's desires and power with the needs of the body politic. It will take time to work out balanced procedures, just as it did in the private sector in the first third of this century. But the process will go faster once we appreciate the uniqueness of collective bargaining in the public sector.

1. See "Trends & Changes in Union Membership," *Monthly Labor Review*, May 1966, pp. 510-513. See also, Jack Steber, "Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector" in *Challenges to Collective Bargaining*, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 66.

Collective bargaining is new to the public sector. It is being embraced by novices on both sides of the table. Whereas a city like New York has met with representatives of its employees for many years, never before has it faced a situation where it had to bargain with 35 to 40 different unions in 200 different bargaining units in order to settle 350 different contracts. Agency heads, totally inexperienced in dealing with union leaders suddenly find themselves meeting with representatives of newly formed groups — representatives who themselves are often uncomfortable, overly aggressive and not sure of their ground. Indeed, the argument has been made that negotiations in the public sector would proceed much more smoothly if city bargaining representatives would be more open to the idea that public employees do have the right to organize and make their demands known at the bargaining table.

BURSTS OF EMOTION

As things now stand, public employees often suffer from a "breaking the dam" syndrome. Municipal employees tend to have had a peculiar psychological attitude toward their employer — that the employer is a sovereign, be he mayor or school board. The city employee may have pent-up frustrations collected from years of obsequiousness. These can burst forth as from a dam, when a union leader appears on the scene. Often the leader is not even needed. Witness what happened when John J. DeLury, president of the Uniformed Sanitationmen's Association in New York, counseled moderation to his men and urged a strike ballot by mail from the steps of City Hall. "An egg whizzed through the air — it hit a reporter — and caustic remarks followed, sending Mr. DeLury hurrying into City Hall. When he came out, it was with the words 'Go-go-go!' which meant 'strike-strike-strike!'"²

While we cannot exactly say that collective bargaining in the public sector is *sui generis*, we can note that it is still in the early stages of growth — either at the organizational or contract settlement stage — and will be subject to strong emotional pressures for some time to come.

In addition to the differences in the psychology of collective bargaining in the private and public sectors, there are important differences in the economic and political environment.

NO PROFIT MOTIVE

First, there is no profit motive in the public sector. Goods and services are supplied free of price, their cost being borne by taxes levied upon the citizens of the community. Most services provided by a city are general services — i.e. services provided to the public in general with little or no relationship between the services received and the amount of the cost borne by the recipient. Fire and police protection are prime examples. An exception where pricing prevails is to be seen in the area of specific services — e.g. government-operated utilities like transit, water, port and highway facilities.

2. *New York Times*, February 7, 1968, p. 355.

Even here, however, recourse to tax subsidies is common. In the private sector, the profit motive imposes some discipline over management's bargaining team. There is incentive for unity and centralized decision-making.

In the public sector, this control is lacking. As a result, the criteria for an optimal settlement are in dispute. The mayor and city council usually are guided by strict criteria, as determined by the ebbs and flows of community opinion; the agency head, by contrast, is likely to be concerned with efficiency, costs and the power to manage. As described by political scientist Theodore Low:

The modern city has become well-run but un-governed because it has . . . become comprised of "islands of functional power" before which the modern mayor stands denuded of authority. No mayor of a modern city has predictable means of determining whether the bosses of the New Machines—the bureau chiefs and the career commissioners—will be loyal to anything but their agency, its work, and related professional norms. Our modern mayor has been turned into the likes of a French Fourth Republic Premier facing an array of intransigent parties in the National Assembly."³

The lack of market and profit standards makes the bargaining process in the public sector more of a political than an economic struggle. Increasing labor costs mean increased taxes rather than an increased price. With more and more services being demanded of the central city and the tax-paying middle class fleeing to the suburbs, most cities are seriously strapped for money. A city mayor is faced with the equally disagreeable alternatives of cutting back on services or raising taxes. Small wonder that he succumbs to the temptation to play politics with the bargaining process. If he can use public pressure to reduce the demands of public employees, he will.

OBSTACLES TO NEGOTIATION

Second, public strikes are further complicated by the city negotiator's inability to make a final agreement. George W. Taylor, labor expert and author of New York State's "Taylor Law" has remarked: "One of the vital interests of the public which should be conserved in the government-employee relationship is the ability of representative government to perform the function of levying taxes and, through the budgeting of governmental resources, of establishing priorities among the government services desired by the body politic."⁴

It is the fact of representative government that makes life so difficult for the city's negotiator. He must always gain the consent of higher levels of authority — both of the executive and, finally, of the appropriate law-making body, presumably a city council. In the private sector, authority may be granted in advance or quickly obtained. The power structure there is a tight knit one; the profit motive operates to provide unity of interest. In city employment, the timing of budgets and tax levies adds an extra complication to an already unwieldy bargaining situation.

Collective bargaining in the public sector, then, is not quite the same thing it is in the private sector. The political process, the economic and psychological milieu, and the nature of the services generated are its basic distinguishing characteristics. This does not mean that

there cannot be collective bargaining in city employment; it merely means that collective bargaining will have to take on a different form in the public arena than that it has traditionally embraced in the private.

RIGHT TO STRIKE

The right to strike has never been allowed in public employment. Writing to a group of federal employees in 1937, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a friend of organized labor, put it this way: "Since their own services have to do with the functioning of government, a strike of public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part to prevent or obstruct the operations of government until their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking toward the paralysis of government by those who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable and intolerable."

Two arguments are most often made to justify banning the strike from public employment. The first is an argument of sovereignty. The law, those who make it and those who enforce it are sovereign, their will cannot be challenged. If this argument were taken to its logical conclusion, collective bargaining in the public sector would be banned entirely, or at least severely limited. The fact that it is only recently that public employees have been gaining the right of representation, is an indication of the wide acceptance of this line of reasoning.

There is indeed good cause to be concerned that the power of cities to manage themselves might become too diffuse if every decision had to be approved by every employee. Collective bargaining, however, does not envision such a radical change in our political structure. The proper aim of union organization and representation is to provide each employee with an opportunity to effectively participate in the affairs of the work place. This is an elementary exercise of the democratic process, not a lesson in anarchy. It is unfortunate that we have so often replied by harking back to the powers of the sovereign, as though George III were still ruling over the colonies.

The second argument emphasizes the special character of government services. It is contended that the public has a right to the continuous provision of services that supersedes the right of organized employees and public managements to resort to economic warfare. (The services lost in a strike in the public sector are thought to be so great as to make their uninterrupted provision essential to the health and well-being of the community.) But this contention proves too much. A city does provide essential services, but it also provides some rather unessential ones. It is peculiar logic that refuses to let the woman who cleans the mayor's desk at night go out on strike but allows the drivers of a private bus company to have that right, only because the city does not own the bus line. Moreover, it is a near impossibility to define what is an essential service. Jack Stieber writes:

"School teachers? Professor Myron Lieberman points out that; schools are closed for summer, Christmas, Easter, and Thanksgiving vacations, for football games, basketball tournaments, harvesting, teachers conventions, inclement weather, presidential visits, and for a host of other reasons without anyone getting excited over the harm done to the children.' Why not for strikes to protest teacher grievances or to achieve legitimate demands in collective bargaining "⁵

3. "Machine Politics—Old and New," the Public Interest (No. 9) Fall 1967, p. 87.

4. "Public Employment: Strikes or Procedures?" ILE Review, Vol. 20, No. 4, July 1967, p. 819.

5. "Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector," in *Challenges to Collective Bargaining*, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 81-82.

The problem is, however, that school children are harmed by long teacher walk-outs and that the health and safety of a city is endangered when its sanitation men refuse to collect the garbage. When policemen and firemen failed to report to work in Youngstown, Ohio, that city was literally blackmailed into granting pay increases. A municipality, unlike a corporation, cannot close its plant; it cannot stockpile in advance of a strike, and it cannot move across the river to another state. No good mayor can allow his city to be forced into bankruptcy or worse by acceding to demands of the city's employees holding the blackjack of a strike over the heads of the community.

UNWORKABLE BANS

Leaving the equities of the situation to one side for the moment, the next rational question is, can the strike be banned? The answer is, I am afraid, unreservedly, No. The Taylor Law in New York is almost a model bill; combined with New York City's Office of Collective Bargaining, it provides the necessities for an honest trade-off to eliminate the strike. In return for a no strike promise, public employee unions are given three inducements to labor peace. They have the right to collective bargaining — a right which is still not universally granted in the public sector; they have an agency for the handling of election and representation questions and a means through which recognition can be gained and enforced; a workable method for dealing with impasses is provided. And, still, New York is a strike-prone city.

Psychologically, public employee unions are geared to strike. Their members have felt harassed too long and they are too anxious to redress past grievances in one fell swoop. Moreover, they see what a strike can bring — the teachers' strike in New York this past fall netted an average increase of well over 20 per cent in pay and benefits in a 26-month contract, a settlement three times larger than anything granted before. Unions in most major cities are a potent political force, and the newly organized public employee organizations are all too willing to share in the power without yet having to taste some of the responsibility. Besides, public unions have a need to strike. The municipal political process is a slow one, and there are functional distinctions between it and the private economy which prevent a government from acting with the speed and efficacy with which a corporation may act. A strike can prod a lethargic bureaucracy to action.

As it now operates, the ban on strikes is, in itself, an inducement to strike. The pressure of the strike mechanism is reintroduced by the threat of unions to violate it. Theodore W. Kheel, perhaps the East Coast's most overworked mediator has asked: "Is it socially desirable to create a circumstance in which the wish of the union to bargain collectively is achieved through the threat of a violation of the law rather than the prospect of a legal strike?"⁸ The time may have come when it is wiser to abandon the strike ban lest it become such a popular bugaboo that will contribute to a disrespect for the law by providing an incentive to law violations. If sanctions are imposed too harshly on a striking union, they become ineffective — one cannot throw an entire employee organization into prison; if they are imposed too mildly, they are avoided. Albert Shanker, President of the United Federation of Teachers in New York boasted that the Taylor penalties amounted to 20¢ a day per member of his union. The solution is not to forbid all

strikes but to give a public employee union a way to demonstrate its grievances without endangering the entire fabric of a metropolitan community.

NEED FOR PROCEDURES

Aids to contract settlement have slowly been evolving in the private sector since the turn of the century. Fact-finding, mediation, voluntary and compulsory arbitration are all common mechanisms for labor peace in the industrial world. In the public sector, however, only a handful of states have seen fit to provide their state and local officials with the means to preserve labor tranquility. New York, Massachusetts, Michigan and Wisconsin come to mind as examples of progressive pace-setters in public collective bargaining. Most states simply forbid strikes by public employees and are then powerless when they occur. Any collective bargaining scenario envisioned for the public sector must, therefore, provide for adequate procedures to aid the parties in reaching agreement.

New York City is currently experimenting with compulsory arbitration as a final stage in the bargaining process. This is, to be sure, a "noble experiment," but it ought not to be viewed as a panacea. There are serious questions as to the legality of a procedure which forces a settlement upon a city government. Labor relations experts, moreover, have warned against a procedure which allows collective bargaining participants to forego good faith bargaining in the expectation that a third party will settle their disputes for them. Labor negotiations in America ought to reflect the free enterprise principles upon which this country is based. A dictatorial approach will never yield a solution acceptable to both parties; indeed, it is likely to yield one acceptable to neither.

Mechanisms for the resolution of collective bargaining impasses, however, are not enough. As we have seen, there is lacking in the public sector the discipline which the profit motive supplies to the bargaining process in the private sphere. Some means must be developed to unify the municipal bureaucracy into a bargaining force which can approach the union's demands with acceptable counter-offers. The union must be given a legal weapon which will impress all city officials with the importance of reaching a settlement. Moreover, there is a need for political confrontation in the public sector which is lacking in the private. The voting public is a more potent force in municipal bargaining than it is in corporate negotiations. Any weapon which the union is given must allow it to bring its case to the public. The danger, of course, is that of a crippling confrontation. Too much power in the hands of a striking union may endanger the health and safety of the city; too little power in the hands of an employee organization forces it to take extra-legal methods which result in the city using repressive measures such as the jailing of union officials and the calling out of the National Guard.

LIMITED STRIKES

I would propose that in the case of vital employment areas — to be determined by each city individually, hopefully through the use of a committee made up of representatives from government, labor and the general community — no strike would be permitted. Two such areas, of course, would be the police and fire departments. In all other sectors of city government, a restricted strike schedule would be devised. This schedule would set a number of hours that a union would be allowed to strike once a contract deadline

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TAX SHARING

The early part of the last session of Congress seems to have been the high-water mark of enthusiasm for programs to distribute Federal tax receipts directly to State governments. Republican congressmen especially were second only to governors of both parties in supporting these plans. The idea was particularly popular because it appeared that the Federal government would be persistently embarrassed by collecting more in taxes than was good for the health of the economy. This "fiscal drag", as Walter Heller called it, arises because Federal tax receipts grow steadily and predictably with the growth of output, while the growth of Federal expenditures is much less automatic and regular. Tax sharing provides an outlet for these surplus funds and guarantees that the growth of the economy will not be choked off by the super-efficiency of the tax system.

This kind of reasoning seems today to be a reminiscence of paradise. Federal expenditure programs by heroic efforts managed to eat up the revenue surplus chiefly because of our rapidly enlarged commitment in Vietnam. We have spent \$100 billion on Vietnam in the last few years. This money would have been the natural fund for tax sharing.

I think this brief history illustrates how unwise it is to base long-run policy proposals on short-run economic conditions. Tax sharing is a good idea, and it deserves a prominent place in the Republican platform this year. It is a good idea because it is an almost foolproof operational way to achieve a shift in our priorities in spending. The Republican issue this year should be the crisis in our priorities. We have needs that are growing and neglected in our own cities and towns. Tax sharing is an excellent, practical way to meet some of these needs, and a good symbol for Republican recognition of their existence.

A central principle to keep in mind in deciding between tax sharing and a tax cut, or between any two ways of distributing spending decisions is that different spending units regularly tend to buy different things. The Federal government has spent between 70% and 80% of its actual purchases of goods and services on Defense for the past several years. The State governments make their largest purchases for the sake of highways, which in 1966 used up 28% of State funds net transferred to localities. The second biggest State purchasing category is 25% for education, mostly going to support of State universities and colleges. Local government, as might be expected, devotes its largest effort to education, about 48% of its expenditures, and this is mostly primary and secondary education.

These figures are only a rough guide, but they probably reflect the priorities of the spending units. The chief distortion is the fact that the Federal government makes substantial grants-in-aid to the States, and the States to the localities, which do not count as pur-

chases. These grants-in-aid generally have the specific aim of changing the spending priorities of the lower level government. Federal grants-in-aid amounted to 17% of State revenues and 9% of local revenues in 1966. State payments to localities presented 27% of the local revenues.

The point is that if the Federal government makes unrestricted grants to State or local governments, the money will probably be spent by those governments in the proportions just mentioned. In deciding which government unit will have control over the funds, we also determine what the funds will be spent for. Shifting dollars from Federal to State governments probably shifts resources from Defense to state universities and highways; giving the dollars to local governments will mean spending a lot of them on primary and secondary education.

This is also an instructive way to look at tax cuts, or other programs like the Negative Income Tax which shift spending power back to the people. In this case the recipients decide what to spend the money for.

An obvious and hoary fact is that people tend to spend for personal wants, and governments exist largely to provide for collective needs. I think there is strong reason to believe that the closer the decision to spend is to the people who are supposed to benefit, the more likely is the spending to accomplish its goals. If too few resources are being devoted to the needs of poor people, the poor people should get the spending power to meet their needs. Any governmental unit is likely to be more clumsy and less effective in meeting an individual's needs than the individual himself. The same reasoning leads to the conclusion that a city's collective wants are best met by the city's free control over money, and that State needs will be best recognized by the States.

The present Federal appropriations process gives a large advantage to Defense and Aerospace programs. In the competition for growing tax revenues from a growing economy the Defense bureaucracy shows no signs of falling behind. The Congress feels comfortable appropriating funds for Defense and uncomfortable appropriating for other functions. In this situation a very helpful step is to bypass the Congressional appropriations machinery and shift the responsibility to people who must react to local expenditure needs to get re-elected, the state governors and legislators. The States may be the only institutions politically powerful enough to compete successfully for Federal tax revenues on a large scale.

The Republican platform should guarantee that a Republican President and Congress will take immediate steps to shift resources on a large scale to human and urban problems inside our country. The amount should reach \$30 or \$40 billion within five years, and tax sharing should represent between \$5 and \$10 billion of that total, a negative income tax about \$20 billion, and regional and federal agencies should get the remainder.

Neighborhood Power and the GOP

With the following four articles we begin an exploration. The goal: to discover the terms on which the Republican Party can build a new coalition in the nation's predominantly Democratic—and increasingly Negro—urban areas. In the first article, Howard Reiter shows how Black Power leaders have been singing variations on old Republican themes. Then John McClaughry describes how GOP leaders are developing a political vocabulary for talking to Negro militants. The third article presents a case study of a Democratic coalition in dissolution. Finally, Malcolm Peabody discusses the need for new housing programs to develop self-reliance in slum areas. What this all adds up to is summarized in the slogan of Neighborhood Power, which embraces such familiar principles as self-help, home rule and local initiative.

IN THEORY

Common Themes

Perhaps no political term since "Communism" has aroused as much fear and confusion in this country as "Black Power". Whether it is interpreted as violence, as Negro domination of our politics, or as greater concessions to the civil rights movement (if it can still be called a movement), the phrase has become a rallying cry for black militants and evidence to many whites that "they've gone too far." And what makes the matter worse is the wide variety of leaders who employ the term.

The man who has done the most to advance the slogan is, of course, Stokely Carmichael, former head of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee. In an attempt to dispel some of the wild myths surrounding his cause, Carmichael has co-authored with a Negro political scientist, Dr. Charles V. Hamilton, a book entitled *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America*.^{*} Like Adam Clayton Powell's recording "Keep the Faith, Baby," the book will be a disappointment to those expecting a call to arms or radical proposals. Instead, after being fed on the mass media, which prefer to leave a metaphor dangling innuendoes rather than explain its meaning, the reader may find *Black Power* surprisingly tame. But if it is not revolutionary, its dogma is at least innovative, and indicative of the thinking of black militants and of the entire New Left as well.

RACE PRIDE

The first element of Black Power is pride of the Negro in his race. In effect, it means that a new ethnic minority group is to be created, as close-knit and chauvinistic as the traditional ghetto inhabitants were. Social scientists agree that a critical obstacle to Negro self-improvement has been the lack of a group consciousness and confidence which served Irish, Italian, and Jew so well. Ironically, the blunt treatment of this problem by Daniel P. Moynihan in the report named for him made him persona non grata in black circles; yet Carmichael addresses the same issue. After centuries of

* Vintage Books, New York, 1967. \$1.95. 198 pp.

bowing and scraping and self-effacement, he says, the Negro must act like a man, the equal to the white. If this new-found self-reliance frightens many whites, then so be it.

One of the more intriguing forms that this takes is the search for tradition, a necessity for any ethnic consciousness. The Black Power advocate turns to Africa as the European immigrant identified with "the old country" — names are changed to African equivalents, dress and hair are worn African-style, and parents lobby for the teaching of Swahili in the schools. We might balk at this: only a tenth of Africa speaks Swahili, and it may seem incongruous for American Negroes to turn to an area to which they have no direct cultural ties. Furthermore, many Americans of European descent can tell you the country, or even the village, of their forebears. But African culture was forgotten by slaves centuries ago, and the great amount of mixed blood and ante-bellum miscegenation makes regional identification impossible. What seems even less logical is the feeling of kinship between black militants and Arabs (which explains their feelings about the Middle East war last June). After all, Arabs have traditionally been great enslavers of Negroes. Why all this cultural mythology?

The answer is that there is precious little in American history in which the Negro can take pride. His American existence has been centuries of slavery followed by decades of oppression. While that history is studded with various slave revolts, massive labor crucial to American progress, and the achievements of individual Negroes who have excelled in their fields, it is not the kind of history to swell a man's chest with pride. It is a rare man who can take pride in an accomplishment of whose fruits he is unjustly deprived. So the Negro militant goes a step back in history, to the great black civilizations of pre-colonial Africa. (After all, his feeling for Africa is to some extent comparable to that of many American Jews for Israel.) And the condescension of American diplomacy toward Africa, the Middle East, and Asia seems remarkably analogous to race relations here

at home; so the black militant feels kinship with the have-nots abroad. He sees this analogy in our role in Vietnam, and may even side (as Carmichael does) with the Viet Cong.

This, then, is one facet of Black Power, which involves more vigorous personal and artistic expression by Negroes. It may be repellant to some whites, and may cause others to re-examine their own feelings. But the demand for respect is a natural outgrowth of the demand for Constitutional rights, and it is a healthy development for a people too long submerged in a culture which assumes their inferiority.

NEGRO BLOCS

Once self-reliant, says Carmichael, the Negro must organize himself into black organizations to demand equal rights. This plank in the program is the result of a profound disillusionment with traditional methods. Specifically, it is alleged that Negro leaders are tinged with compromise and opportunism. Black Congressmen, for example, are thought to be sops to their race; the white Democratic boss carves out a district or two to let the Negroes play with. Even Adam Clayton Powell got his start that way. With this method, the reasoning goes, the Negroes will be placated. Yet this token of accommodation is inadequate, for the Negro usually receives fewer districts than he is entitled to.

In general, Black Power advocates contend that the white-dominated groups which bargain in the political arena have not served the real interests of the Negro. Despite Walter Reuther and A. Philip Randolph, the labor movement has too often excluded Negroes from membership and jobs, and the rank and file are the major force in the white backlash. Big business has paid insufficient attention to hiring Negroes or aiding indigenous ghetto enterprises. Worst of all, the political parties have failed the Negro. The Democrats, aside from being represented by Wallace in the South and Johnson abroad, deserted racial equality at a dramatic moment in the history of the civil rights movement: at the 1964 Democratic National convention, when the Mississippi Freedom Democrats (MFDP) were given only "symbolic" representation in the Mississippi delegation. Carmichael and Hamilton retort:

But the MFDP did not go to the Convention as a symbolic act; it went in a sincere effort to become part of the national Democratic party . . . If anything was a symbolic act, it was the stand taken by the national party: a stand which clearly said "betrayal" and clearly symbolized the bankruptcy of the Establishment.

(Pp. 92-93)

As an alternative to these traditional forms, Carmichael proposes all-Negro blocs for political and economic measures. One of the most controversial aspects of Black Power is this expulsion of whites, which is often called racism in reverse. Such accusations confirm Carmichael's suspicions that the white liberal is unconsciously racist, like James Baldwin's whiteman who instinctively protects his wallet when passing through a Negro neighborhood. For example, Carmichael asks, did the Sons of Italy recruit non-Italians, or the B'nai B'rith accept Christians? He discerns no logic in requiring that organizations established to fight for Negro rights include whites. White betrayal is too frequent in the history of the Negro for the black militant to trust any outsider.

REPUBLICAN THEMES

What forms do these organizations take? Politically, they include third-party movements, partisan factions similar to the MFDP, and groups demanding home rule for the ghetto. The demand for home rule involves neighborhood control of the schools and the exclusion of white policemen from black areas. Objections to these demands are seen as racist paternalism: why must whites think that Negroes are unable to run their own community affairs? Why must they feel that *white* policemen are needed to maintain law and order? Economically, the Black Power program calls for indigenous enterprises, including cooperative businesses and consumer groups, and boycotts of white enterprises which charge exorbitant prices in the ghetto.

It is clear that this program could result in a transformation of the ghetto, one whose ultimate results cannot be foreseen. Yet it may offer an opportunity to the Republican Party, if urban Republicans would take the trouble to study the proposals with understanding and a minimum of emotion. There is nothing in most Black Power themes that necessarily contradicts orthodox American notions of home rule and free enterprise.

If, for example, the virtually defunct Republican organization in Harlem were to serve as an instrument for those political objectives, an urban rejuvenation of the party might occur that would help the entire ticket. All talk about a Republican urban resurgence must take into account the fact that by 1970, at least fourteen of our major cities will be at least 40% Negro. If the vanguard of Negro leadership is to be militant, then Republican leaders must strive for a dialogue that has been all too infrequent in the past.

Indeed, we can generalize this to all whites. If Black Power is appraised dispassionately, there is much in it for all Americans to accept. In fact, it might be seen as the acknowledgment that full-scale integration may not be possible at the present time, and therefore Negroes should at least be masters in their own house. When Black Power is seen not as synonymous with violence, but as an alternative to rioting, perhaps then it will be more widely accepted.

CROSSROADS APPROACHING

After all, the Black Power program outlined above falls within the bounds of the American ethic. If it remains there, it has a chance of success which depends on how willing white America is to take it seriously. But if Carmichael and his associates develop a new violent black ethic, and reject the program of pride and self-sufficiency within a political framework, they may run up against the wall of hostility and suspicion with which Americans have greeted Marxism and fascism. The great crossroads of Black Power is approaching, and one path leads to possible fulfillment while the other must inevitably encounter frustration and fear. If a positive Black Power program succeeds, Negro militants will have no reason to go against the American grain.

And so the ultimate course of the civil rights movement lies, as it always has, with the whites. If Black Power is given an opportunity to flourish, it will give white America the opportunity to live in domestic harmony. Republicans, by taking up those themes of Black Power that coincide with their own Party's traditions, can build a new urban coalition and become a force for progress and peace in our nation's cities.

—HOWARD REITER

New Dialogues

Not often, alas, does one see black faces at Republican gatherings. Even less often does one see the Chairman of the 1967 Newark Black Power Conference addressing a ballroom crowded with Republicans, including two Lieutenant Governors, a Congressman, and at least five members of the Republican National Committee. Yet that is exactly what happened in Detroit on January 19.

The Detroit Metropolitan Seminar, sponsored by the Republican Party of Michigan, was the first such gathering ever sponsored by a Republican State Committee, and probably by any political party. Chaired by Michigan's dynamic Lieutenant Governor William G. Milliken and backed strongly by State Chairman Elly Peterson, the Seminar sought to bring together typical Republicans, typical people from the slums, and a number of expert speakers on housing, welfare and education.

For its principal speaker the State Committee got Dr. Nathan Wright, Jr., who chaired the Black Power Conference and authored *Black Power and Urban Unrest*. (Curiously, Wright is a registered Republican — and would like to vote Republican if only the Party would let him.) He is a forceful and engaging speaker. The message was simple: the solution to the human problems of urban America — particularly those of black, urban America — is to empower people to shape their own environments and to fulfill their own potential as human beings.

The point was advanced again on the pragmatic level the next morning when New York's Deputy Mayor Bob Sweet told how the Lindsay Administration is engineering the decentralization of city government, so that every citizen may have the opportunity to participate in ordering the affairs of his neighborhood and community.

IDENTICAL PLEAS

Strangely — or perhaps, not so strangely — the country club conservatives and black power militants seem to be saying the same thing but in quite different vernacular. Stripped of the peculiar rhetoric of each, their pleas are virtually identical: self-reliance, opportunity, local government, individual liberty, the chance to own, the chance to make a profit, the right to be free.

The Michigan Seminar, by bringing Republicans and slum militants together on common ground, is a historic first step in effecting a mutual translation. It was clear, from the participants' reactions (they came from 16 states), that the well-planned event had a profound impact.

A week later, under the sponsorship of the New York Ripon Society and a number of other independent Republican groups, an Urban Leadership Conference was held at Columbia University Law School. The all-day affair was designed as a professional society meeting, with papers by experts and commentaries by panelists.

The subjects were similar to those of the Michigan Conference, and the participants, if anything, more distinguished. Unfortunately there were so many on the program that each had but a few moments to present his views, and no apparent effort was made to incorporate

lower income Negroes and Puerto Ricans into the panels or the audience.

Nonetheless the New York conference was an unquestioned success. Its best moments came during its panel on the guaranteed annual income and negative income tax and the debate between Ken Marshall of the Metropolitan Applied Research Center of New York, a Negro-run R&D outfit for ghetto improvement programs, and Dr. Marshall Clinard, a white sociologist from the University of Wisconsin who has specialized in the culture of slums and slum people around the world. (Marshall said the problem of poor people is that so many of them are black; Clinard said that the problem of black people is that so many of them are poor.)

The Michigan and New York seminars will undoubtedly inspire others. The Michigan GOP has had so many requests for the transcripts of their seminar that they are rushing it into print as rapidly as possible. (404 E. Michigan St., Lansing). While it is early to claim a wholesale change in Republican understanding of and attitude toward the problems of the central cities and their people, it is not too much to predict accelerated motion in that direction.

— JOHN McCLAUGHRY

IN A 'MODEL CITY'

A Coalition Dissolves

Democratic Mayor Richard C. Lee's New Haven — where the Ford Foundation fathered antipoverty programs later adopted by the national War on Poverty, and where the mayor has hauled in more federal redevelopment funds per capita than any other American city — is in deep trouble.

The most serious trouble is that the city's growing black community is becoming bitter with the suspicion that they are looked upon by the city as objects to be manipulated, as political pawns, as citizens who are not really given a chance to help run the city they live in. Many whites in the city not familiar with the history of the blacks ask with increasing agitation why Negroes should get any preferential treatment. This backlash problem compounds a second problem — a feud in the Democratic organization between Lee on one hand and Democratic Town Chairman Arthur T. Barbieri and U.S. Congressman Robert N. Giaimo, on the other.

The mayor's redevelopment and antipoverty programs have drawn heavy criticism on both racial and political fronts. The blacks charge the redevelopment program has been directed at their homes and that the antipoverty agency is autocratic and unsympathetic toward developing grass-roots leadership.

BLACK DISCONTENT

Black leaders say that redevelopment projects have shunted their families around the city and often out of it entirely. Not enough low-cost housing has been built to replace buildings razed by redevelopment. The redevelopment people answer that 34% of the housing it has helped put up is low-cost housing. If low-cost housing for the elderly (at rents of \$45 a month) is excluded, the figure becomes 19%. The city claims that since Lee took office 14 years ago, redevelopment has helped 10,000 homes to meet tough-

ened housing code requirements. The city also claims that a "substantial number" of low-income families live in such housing. Further, redevelopment officials say, they have placed about 200 low-income families in scattered-site leased housing. Even so, supply has failed miserably to keep up with demand.

During most of Lee's administration, his master plan for redevelopment has been to level the worst slums, to build up the commercial heart of the city and so build up the tax base, to improve downtown accessibility by designing highways, to remove factories from residential areas, and to rehabilitate as much housing as possible.

The roads, both built and announced, have taken a tremendous toll of available housing. Project delays caused in large part by fiddling in Washington have held down the tax revenue rise anticipated earlier. Property values in the vicinity of the planned roads have plummeted because of the uncertainty of the land acquisition and construction schedules. Flocks of small businessmen have been driven out of business even with relocation payments, because they are not able to build up a clientele quickly enough at new locations to stay in business. And finally, the exhaust fumes from the roads and highways menace everyone in the city.

But the turmoil into which the blacks have been thrown is the most pernicious by-product of redevelopment so far. Though their numbers have increased rapidly, their political power has remained practically nonexistent. Lee is now trying to correct the low-cost housing shortage, but further trouble is likely because of the newly appointed director of the city's Housing Authority. Though Lee appoints members of the authority, he has been unable to bring it under full control. The new director is Emmett Burke, former head of the Yonkers N.Y. Housing Authority and unsuccessful Democratic candidate for mayor of Yonkers last fall. He ran on a platform of opposition to scattered-site housing, turn-key housing and rent-certificate or leased-housing programs, all aimed at providing more housing for low-income families.

New Haven's housing shortage has intensified Lee's unpopularity among a large part of the blacks. It will take many years for the housing supply to even approach the demand and more years for the lost good will to return to the city administration. New Haven had four days of disturbances in predominantly black areas of the city last summer and has not yet relaxed. With every angry summer Lee gets more vulnerable politically.

Though he has made money from redevelopment, real estate broker Barbieri gripes that it has cut into his power base among Italian-Americans. Highways have destroyed Italian-American neighborhoods nearly as much as black neighborhoods. Also, Barbieri does not get the patronage he would like from the redevelopment and antipoverty bureaucracies, which have gained increasing power as Lee has used them to bypass traditional city offices (and Barbieri patronage) in the governing of the city.

The most recent and most visible focus of the city's problems is the city's school system. During the 14 years of Lee's administration the school plant has been nearly entirely rebuilt, often with the help of noted architects. But the building is not always the school. Parents, teachers and students alike are upset. Black enrollment has increased so that there are now more black pupils than whites. The white flight to the

suburbs has carried away with it much of the middle class which Lee has been struggling to keep in the city. Black students say guidance counsellors guide them into menial jobs and economic slavery. White ethnic groups complain that blacks are given special treatment.

Increasing friction between black and white students just before Christmas vacation led to a series of disorders at Hillhouse High School, which has a black majority of 60%. Unrest spread to the other two high schools, and incidents occurred in February at Hillhouse and at Lee High (45% black).

Last fall Congressman Giaimo attempted to turn dissatisfaction with city school conditions against the Lee administration by publicly blaming the Mayor for the problems. What was publicly polite criticism was privately a bitter power struggle between Lee and his town chairman Barbieri. Cut off from city patronage in redevelopment and poverty programs by the mayor Barbieri has turned to Giaimo. Their interests have meshed nicely as Barbieri would like to replace Lee's ally John Bailey as Democratic State Chairman and Giaimo would like to beat Lee to Thomas Dodd's Senate Seat.

GIAIMO'S Giaimo's denunciation of the
CONSTITUENCY city's schools, his successful leadership in the House against the labor-backed Dickey-Lincoln power bill in Maine, and his vote to cut Office of Economic Opportunity funds resulted from a major decision he made last year to cut loose from his traditional support from labor and the cities and to adopt for his major constituency the business community and the suburbs. His decision came at about the same time a special census was announced showing New Haven had about 152,000 persons in 1960 but only about 139,000 in 1967, while the suburban towns which make up the rest of his district had gained population rapidly.

Giaimo sought to fortify his position with the suburban dwellers and the business community by a series of shallow but widely publicized attacks on the city's anti-poverty agency for being mismanaged and for spending too much money with too little results. Giaimo's own stake in attacking the local version of the OEO is his position on the appropriation committee for the Department of Housing and Urban Development. He is committed to the HUD Model Cities and rent supplement plans that blacks attack for their paternalism.

Democrats have a masterful ability to unite at election time. But New Haven's uneasy coalition of labor, university people, and urban poor is rapidly deteriorating. In 1967 Lee managed to hold enough elements together to gain a 10,000 vote plurality over a lackluster Republican opponent.

NEED FOR A Given a strong voter registration
PROGRESSIVE drive among New Haven blacks in 1968 and solid support from the labor community deserted by Giaimo, an imaginative and progressive candidate for Congress could break the old New Haven alliance permanently. Without Giaimo's source of patronage, Barbieri would lack the muscle to cop the state chairmanship. The Democratic Party would lose a good percentage of the support it retained in 1967, making a Republican mayoralty victory possible in 1969.

Meanwhile there is New Haven to worry about, and Lee does not shrink from worrying. Most of all he is worrying about what the summer may bring. The

trial in February of five New Haven blacks and a white man from nearby Guilford charged with conspiracy to destroy public buildings and injure policemen will probably aggravate racial uneasiness, regardless of its ultimate outcome.

Lee, under pressure from Giaimo and Barbieri, has taken a rigid public stance toward the blacks. This will not help to keep open the mutual communication necessary to encourage the ever-growing number of blacks to participate more deeply in city life.

Republicans ran on a progressive platform in the 1967 city election, emphasizing grass-roots autonomy and a departure from Lee's commercially-oriented renewal policies. But their mayoral candidate declined to press these issues. In future elections Republicans need an imaginative and progressive candidate who has the courage to readily expose the appeals to racial prejudice and fear from Barbieri and his allies. Republicans need a candidate with the force of will to break through the type of mutual uneasiness and suspicion which has existed between Lee and the blacks and to encourage Negroes — behind their own leaders — to come forward into the mainstream of the city's political, economic and social life, to make it a more humanly satisfying place to live for everybody.

As Lee is realizing now, money from Washington hasn't saved New Haven. Redevelopment can't save New Haven. An antipoverty agency can't save New Haven. Highways from the suburbs to downtown can't save New Haven. The people of New Haven must save the city. Lee, who wants to save New Haven, has found himself alienated from very large groups of people whose help he needs, and they aren't listening to him anymore.

IN HOUSING

Community Cooperatives

The basic premise on which we have built our national housing goals is that if you improve housing, you improve people. In 1937 the basic catch word of our urban planners was "safe, sanitary housing," and from that theory sprang our public housing program. By 1949 it was clear that good housing alone was not enough, and thus "a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family" became our national goal, and this theory launched the urban renewal program. Urban renewal however, has also failed to interrupt the poverty cycle because although the scope of the program was broadened to treat whole neighborhoods. The basic impression that by producing better housing conditions you produce better people remains unchanged.

We are coming to realize that it is more accurate to say that poverty causes slums, rather than that slums cause poverty. We are also coming to realize that poverty results, in part, from the powerlessness of the poor to influence their environment — powerlessness to influence the people who directly affect their lives, such as the police captain, the school superintendent, the welfare director, the project manager or the sanitation department director. The human response to powerlessness is either resignation or frustration which leads to dependency, or a feeling of rage which can erupt in riots. Poverty can

also result from illness and age, but the poverty which is handed from one generation to the next results to a great extent from the inability of the poor to control their environment.

BUILDING SELF-RELIANCE The converse of this theory is that any program that heightens the ability of the poor to control their environment will relieve their frustration and will energize them towards independence and self-improvement.

If the theory is correct, as I believe it is, one can better understand why present government programs in housing have failed to produce improvement. Public housing by putting families under the control of housing authorities and project managers and by subjecting them to countless petty regulations enforced by the threat of eviction has actually increased the sense of powerlessness. The urban renewal program drawn up and executed by city authorities with little effective participation of the poor has further increased this feeling.

Based on this same concept, it is also clear that any future policy affecting the poor must be based on increasing the sense of personal control and independence rather than vitiating it. In the field of housing there is enormous potential for accomplishing this goal not by merely producing more housing but through the management and ownership of housing by the poor themselves.

The best vehicle, in my opinion, to realize this potential is cooperative housing. In a housing cooperative each tenant owns an individual share of the development in which he is located and has one vote in electing the board which controls the development. The board in turn generally selects a manager to do the day-to-day operation. Ordinary home ownership is even preferable to cooperative ownership but is less practical in cities where population densities require apartments and town houses.

Cooperative housing is not a new idea. It has been the basis of housing policy in Sweden, a country which more nearly than any other has solved its housing problem. It is also used extensively in England. There are thousands of cooperative apartments in New York City, and there are many successful examples of cooperatives surrounding Detroit.

Perhaps the best example of how a good cooperative can work is found in San Francisco where there exists a cooperative of 299 units designed for families and meticulously maintained despite large numbers of children. Rentals are above what families in the poverty scale can afford, but a subsidy greater than that which the federal government now makes available could reduce these rents to where poor as well as moderate income families could afford them.

TENANT PARTICIPATION The unique feature demonstrated by the San Francisco cooperative is the deep involvement of the tenants in maintaining their housing and the control they have developed over the city institutions and services which control their environment. The manager who was selected by the tenants can turn out 60-80 persons on a weekend to weed lawns, paint fences or repair buildings, something a manager of rental units could never achieve. The tenants have launched several self-improvement programs for both children and adults.

More impressive still is their ability to get city cooperation. When the manager calls City Hall, he is not an absentee landlord; instead he represents 600 taxpaying tenants thus will not basically change existing conditions.

voters who are aware of their power and are prepared to use it. During the past three years they have used pressure to keep their tax assessments low, to get better police protection and to gain improvements in their schools. The cooperative form of ownership teaches its members how the democratic process works at a level where they can clearly understand it. In addition, it gives economic control over expenditures for heat, fuel, insurance and repairs in the hands of local people who can use it to build up and patronize local businesses instead of having such funds drained off to persons outside the community.

The key factor to note is that the relationship of the coop owners to those around them has been changed. They now have increased power to influence those who

control their environment — their police captain, their mayor, and their school committee — and it is my belief that their awareness of this power to control their own lives, more than anything else, is responsible for stimulating their urge to self-improvement, self-reliance and independence. These are the human forces which must be harnessed if the poverty cycle is to be broken. Present housing policies which still emphasize rental housing and public housing do nothing to harness these forces and

—MALCOLM E. PEABODY, JR.

Mr. Peabody is Director of the Interfaith Housing Corporation of Roxbury, builders of low and moderate income housing. He is a Republican candidate for Congress from the Third District in Massachusetts.

POLITICAL CALENDAR March 1 - April 30, 1968

(compiled from materials supplied by the Republican National Committee — Presidential nomination data in bold face type)

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| M
A
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C
H | <p>March 1 WASHINGTON, D.C.: End of five-day Young Republican National Leadership Training School, Sheraton Plaza Hotel, Washington, D.C.
Closing of two-day meeting of Republican National Committee on the Conduct of Foreign Relations, Sheraton-Carlton Hotel.
Republican National Committee Task Force Meeting on Problems of the Aging: Statler Hilton Hotel. Lasts through March 2.
ALASKA: Filing deadline for candidates in May 7 primary.</p> <p>2 NORTH CAROLINA: State Party Convention (through March 2)
ALABAMA: Candidate filing deadline for state and local officers.
WISCONSIN: Filing deadline for April 2 presidential primary.</p> <p>4 PENNSYLVANIA: Voter registration deadline for April 23rd primary.
ILLINOIS: State Legislature's 1968 session convenes.</p> <p>5 WASHINGTON D.C. "Salute to Republican Leadership" dinner sponsored by Senate and House GOP Campaign Committees; International Ballroom, 7 p.m.</p> <p>6 FLORIDA: Filing deadline for May 28 Presidential Primary.
MASSACHUSETTS: Annual meeting of Boston Chapter of Ripon Society at Harvard Faculty Club. Governor Volpe to speak.</p> <p>8 OREGON: Regional YR Leadership Training School, Hilton Hotel, Portland. Lasts until March 10.</p> <p>9 TENNESSEE: "Opportunities Unlimited," GOP show at Vanderbilt U., Nashville.</p> <p>11 ILLINOIS: Filing deadline for Gubernatorial, Senatorial and Congressional candidates in the June 11 state primary.</p> <p>12 NEW HAMPSHIRE: Presidential Primary (1964 results: Lodge write-in 35.5%, Goldwater 22.3%, Rockefeller 21%, Nixon write-in 16.8%.)</p> <p>15 NEBRASKA: Filing deadline for May 14 Presidential and state primary.</p> <p>16 WYOMING: "Opportunities Unlimited", University of Wyoming, Laramie.
MASSACHUSETTS: Regional YR Leadership Training School, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge.
IOWA: State convention.</p> <p>18 WASHINGTON D.C.: Republican Coordinating Committee Meeting, Mayflower Hotel.
ILLINOIS: Filing deadline for Presidential primary.</p> <p>19 OREGON: Filing deadline for May 28 presidential primary.</p> <p>22 CALIFORNIA: Filing deadline for state candidates in June 4 primary.</p> <p>27 OHIO: Voter registration deadline for May 7 primary.</p> <p>28 INDIANA: Filing deadline for May 7 Presidential and Congressional Primary.</p> <p>30 COLORADO: "Opportunities Unlimited", University of Denver, Denver.
INDIANA: Regional Young Republican Leadership Training School, Hotel Stauffer, Indianapolis.
KENTUCKY: Voter registration deadline for May 28 primary.</p> <p>30 SOUTH CAROLINA: State party convention</p> | <p>April 1 MAINE: Filing deadline for candidates in June 17 primary.</p> <p>2 WISCONSIN: Presidential Primary (1964 results: Rep. John W. Byrnes ran unopposed as favorite son. All delegates supported Goldwater.)
FLORIDA: Candidate filing deadline for state and local officers.</p> <p>4 KENTUCKY: Filing deadline for candidates in May 28 primary.</p> <p>5 CALIFORNIA: Filing deadline for June 4 Presidential primary.
MISSISSIPPI: Filing deadline for June 4 primary.</p> <p>6 WASHINGTON D.C.: Filing deadline for Presidential primary.
FLORIDA: Voter registration deadline for the May 7 state party primaries.</p> <p>8 INDIANA: Voter registration deadline for May 7 primary.</p> <p>10 VIRGINIA: Filing deadline for July 9 primary.</p> <p>11 CALIFORNIA: Voter registration deadline for June 4 primary.</p> <p>13 WEST VIRGINIA: Voter registration deadline for May 14 primary.</p> <p>18 RHODE ISLAND: Vote on new state constitution.</p> <p>20 SOUTH DAKOTA: Filing deadline for June 4 Presidential and state primary.
NORTH CAROLINA: Voter registration deadline for May 4 state primary.
KENTUCKY: State Convention.</p> <p>22 WASHINGTON D.C.: 18th Annual Republican Women's Conference, Washington Hilton Hotel, through April 24th.</p> <p>23 PENNSYLVANIA: Presidential and state primary (1964 results: Scranton 58.3%, Lodge 21.1%, Nixon 9.7%, Goldwater 8.5%).</p> <p>25 NEW JERSEY: Filing deadline for June 4 Presidential primary.
MONTANA: Filing and voter registration deadline for June 4 primary.
NEVADA: State Party Convention (through April 27.)
MICHIGAN: State Party Convention (through April 27.)</p> <p>28 ALASKA: Voter registration deadline for May 7 primary.</p> <p>27 CONNECTICUT: "Opportunities Unlimited", University of Connecticut, Hartford.
OREGON: Voter registration deadline for May 28 primary.
ALABAMA: State primary.
ARIZONA: State convention.
KANSAS: State convention.</p> <p>30 MASSACHUSETTS: Presidential Primary (1964 results: Lodge 79.3% Goldwater 10.5%).
MISSOURI: Filing deadline for candidates in August 6 primary.
DELAWARE: State convention.</p> |
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MASSACHUSETTS

Issues, Issues, Issues

In Massachusetts, the Republican party has undergone in recent years something of a revival. At the state level, the GOP has been able to dominate attractive candidates and elect them. In 1966, the party swept the top offices: the Governorship with John A. Volpe; retiring U.S. Senator Leverett Saltonstall's seat with Edward W. Brooke; the Attorney General spot with Elliot L. Richardson; and the Lieutenant Governorship with Francis W. Sargent. Yet the GOP was unable to even contest over a hundred seats in the state legislature, and now, with only 14 of 40 Senate seats, can barely muster the one-third vote necessary to sustain Governor Volpe's veto in the State Senate. It has almost no influence in the House, with only 71 of 237 seats.

The 1968 elections pose a problem for the state party, for it is the first year in which there will be no candidates for state-wide office. (Under the recently amended Massachusetts Constitution, those elected to constitutional office are now holding office for four years. Nor is either seat in the U.S. Senate up in 1968.) The GOP must field not only more but better legislative candidates if it is to have any success in the absence of the coattail effect which helped those few victors in 1966.

OUTFLANKING DEMOCRATS

Towards this end the Republican Party of Massachusetts held, last November, its first off-year Party Convention. At stake was not the nomination of candidates but rather a party platform to be used by Republican legislative candidates in 1968. The goal was to place the party on record — in a unique way — as supporting major progressive legislation for improving Massachusetts. The implication was that such legislation would be enacted if there was a Republican majority in the state house.

A platform was needed to give the electorate a reason for voting for the Republican party despite the effect of familiar local personalities and past habits. The aim was to find a primary reason — a Republican Platform — for the voters to go with the GOP.

First suggested by Edward Brooke when he was Massachusetts Attorney General, the idea for the Conference of the party faithful devoted to issues was revived by a young Boston attorney, Michael W. Christian. Together with State Representatives Francis W. Hatch, Jr. who became the Conference Chairman, and Martin A. Linsky, newly elected State legislator and a Ripon Society leader, Christian sold the conference to the party leadership, state Chairman Josiah A. "Si" Spaulding and Governor Volpe.

The conference was boosted as a method for outflanking the Democrats on the issues front. The Democrats had been parading their much-heralded but rather unproductive Democratic Advisory Council (the body from which General Gavin resigned over Johnson's Vietnam policy). Formed by Senator Ted Kennedy in the wake of the Democratic disaster of 1966, the Advisory Committee was to be a political "think-tank" composed of the best Democratic minds in the state. However, the Democrats who controlled the state legislature resented having policies forced upon them, and

consequently the Democratic state Chairman kept the reports secret — obviously negating any public impact.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

In contrast, the Republican Party Conference was to draw its issues and position from the grassroots. Administratively, the Conference was divided into six Task Forces (see box) with each Task Force further subdivided into committees, which held hearings across the state in an attempt to feel the pulse of local sentiment and to publicize the Conference and the Party. Unfortunately, the Conference machinery was not functioning properly in time to implement completely the public hearing stage. Those hearings that were held were often attended by thoughtful people — both those with reputations in the field and those without — but the absence of proper liaison with the press kept the pre-Conference publicity to a minimum. Commented one newsman from WHDH when informed of those to testify at a hearing that evening, "If we'd known 24 hours ago, we'd have had T.V. cameras there."

This disorganization at the public hearings stage led many in the party and press to doubt whether the Task Forces and Committees were capable of offering a good platform and of boosting the party image. But, fortunately, the personnel who took on committee as-

CONVENTION TASK FORCES

- | | |
|-------------------|--|
| Task Force No. 1: | STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT |
| Committees: | Constitutional Reform
Civil Service
County Government
City Government and Local Affairs |
| Task Force No. 2: | LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE |
| Committees: | The Administration of Justice
Law Enforcement |
| Task Force No. 3: | THE PUBLIC WELFARE |
| Committees: | Education
Youth and Recreation
The Elderly
Health |
| Task Force No. 4: | PROBLEMS OF AN ADVANCING SOCIETY |
| Committees: | Housing and Urban Development
Environment
Transportation
The Ghetto |
| Task Force No. 5: | ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT |
| Committees: | Taxation and State Finance
Business
Public Utilities
Consumer Protection |
| Task Force No. 6: | PARTIES AND POLITICS |
| Committees: | Elections
Financial Contributions
The Role of City, Town and State Committees in the Community
Communications |

signments were well-acquainted with their respective subjects and able to ascertain both the real problems of Massachusetts and imaginative solutions.

The Conference steering committee approved a formula for grass-root representation at the conference: Town and Ward committees were charged with electing delegates to the conference. Those elected were assigned to committees, according to their preference.

300 PLANKS

The results of the hearings and research were compiled by the individual committees into a series of short planks (to be included in the party platform) and lengthier reports. In the hectic week before the conference these reports were edited at the Task Force level. A preliminary draft of the platform was duplicated and mailed to the delegates prior to the convention.

The actual conference deliberations were crammed into 24 hours at the Worcester Auditorium, located in the center of the state and easily accessible for all delegates. Friday night was devoted to celebrating and politicking, with Governor Volpe hosting a "champagne hour" followed by a banquet and dance.

Unfortunately, the theme of the conference — that the Republican Party must offer constructive programs if it is to return to majority status in the state — was missed by the two banquet speakers. Congressman Daniel E. Button of New York commented that "no issue was ever elected to anything" while Congressman Donald W. Reigle from Michigan offered the observation that Republicans sometimes "are so busy philosophizing that the Democrats go out and win elections." Neither understood the reason for holding the conference; both would probably be surprised at the tidal wave of favorable publicity which the new platform produced. The Boston press, in particular, would describe the occasion as the moment in which the GOP finally proved for all to see that it had become the party of progress and excitement in Massachusetts.

Saturday morning consisted of Task Force meetings which approved, rejected and altered the various planks put forward by their member committees. Committee chairmen were questioned by the delegates and issues debated on a more informal and personal basis than was permitted on the convention floor that afternoon.

In a long stretch from 1:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. the conference considered and debated over 300 planks. The "Pass" system was used to permit those planks which were not opposed by a minimum of 20 delegates (who shouted "Pass" when the plank was read) to be automatically approved without a vote. This probably prevented the conference from dragging on for a week.

Many issues were hotly debated. Birth control, auto insurance, county government, and the 18 year-old voting age produced the biggest controversies. The Task Force and Committee chairmen were usually successful in defending their recommendations against the attacks of the party old-timers and the special interest groups.

PROGRESSIVE PROGRAMS

The document that resulted from the afternoon of debate and voting had two distinguishing characteristics. First, the party was set on record as favoring substantial programs to improve the welfare of the underprivileged. The pertinent planks of the committees on Housing and Urban Development, and on the Ghetto numbered over 100 and certainly gave a new image to the Grand Old Party in Massachusetts.

Small wonder that some conservatives immediately attempted to pin the platform with the tag of fiscal irresponsibility.

Yet the platform was widely recognized to have included almost every desirable change in the structure of the governmental apparatus which had been suggested in recent years. Abolition of the inefficient and corrupt county governments; reduction of the size of the legislature; a constitutional convention to offer some badly needed reform; terms of office for department heads which are coterminous with the governor's — all these were reforms sorely needed in Massachusetts. All have been opposed by special interest groups which have demonstrated a vice-like grip on the often incompetent legislature. Yet, all these proposals would result in a more efficient and economical state government.

Over all, the conference was a great success. The flavor and excitement of a political conclave was strongly felt, with such party leaders, Richardson, Sargent, Hatch, and even a very spry Senator Leverett Saltonstall wielding the gavel. Members of the press who had cynically derided the conference throughout the summer and fall went away enthusiastic, though perhaps a trifle baffled. Commented one previously dubious correspondent: "It was really a swell convention, and there never — literally — has been one like it. . . . People in the hall thought it was all for real. People got mad at each other over ideas."

But the success was not merely superficial. The day after the convention the state committee received 40 phone calls inquiring about running for the state legislature. And the Democratic party chairman was left mouthing some unconvincing derisions, and the excuse that his party had rejected the idea.

ENTREE FOR LEADERS

The most significant aspect of the conference, was probably not the progressive platform itself nor the fact that the GOP was willing to adopt it. It was the infusion of new people — men and women concerned with ideas — into the regular party apparatus.

Today's academicians and young professionals are concerned with issues — and strongly feel the need to discuss them. Too often they are alienated by the regular party apparatus. They shun the political value-structure which calls the mediocre excellent, and the excellent unrealistic; they are repulsed by the incompetence of the political hack and his cronies in the state legislature. Consequently, those who offer new ideas must too often withdraw into their own worlds where the standards of quality have not decayed but where — unfortunately — there is little relation with real politics. The Issues Convention gave people of high calibre an entree into state politics, and both they and the Massachusetts GOP are richer for it.

The conference also attracted community involvement with the GOP: such familiar Massachusetts GOP figures as Dr. John Knowles of Massachusetts General Hospital to chair the committee on Health; George Lodge, now at the Harvard Business School, to head the Problems of an Advancing Society Task Force. There were some new faces too: Edward J. Breck, the shampoo king, who as chairman of the Springfield Redevelopment Authority was well qualified to serve in the same capacity on the Housing and Urban Development committee; Dr. John S. Gibson, director of the Lincoln Filene Center for Citizenship and Public Affairs at Tufts University, who headed the Task Force on Law Enforcement

and the Administration of Justice; Father Seavey Joyce, Vice-President of Boston College, who chaired the Task Force on Structure of Government.

Yet, even these men were not the real leaders of the conference. Already burdened with both personal and public commitments, most of the Task Force and Committee chairmen had little time to direct research or even to approach the correct people to gain valuable testimony. Rather, it was often the young professionals and the students who — functioning as executive directors on every Committee and Task Force — made the conference work.

YOUNG BLOOD

The press almost discovered this fact but they fell short of the real implications. In a column titled "GOP attracting young people," Timothy Leland of the *Boston Globe*, cited: Christian, the father of the conference; Lewis Crampton, who while only a conference delegate was able to attract attention because of his divergent character as consultant to the RAND Corporation, hippie leader, possible candidate to the state legislature, and Ph.D. candidate; William Bailey, brother of criminal attorney F. Lee Bailey; and William Cowin, Assistant to Senator Brooke. The press was already familiar with these men. Their inquisitiveness simply was not strong enough to discover the new faces who directed every committee.

No one ever saw the Harvard Law School student huddled on the conference floor with State Representative John Sears guiding the many planks of the Ghetto committee through for passage; or the young Boston lawyer who burned the midnight oil with Harvard Trust President Thaddeus Beal in the latter's board room as they put together the report of the Economic Development Task Force. Nor did the newspapers know that two assistant professors from Boston University and Boston College had managed the Task Forces on Problems of an Advancing Society and Public Welfare Task Forces. This was the real story of the conference

Many of these people had been engaged in political thinking before, as members of such organizations as the Ripon Society. Now they were working to improve the party from within. They had been granted a voice, a public platform as an official in the party, and they used it with skill and intelligence.

The conference itself ended four months ago; many resulting bills have been filed for the 1968 legislative session by proponents of the conference and its program. In mid-January newspaper columns were still marveling on how the Republicans had stolen a march on the Democrats and taken the lead in attracting new voters and workers. The reason—"the most progressive platform document in state history."

The Issues Convention has helped to reshape the Republican party and its image in Massachusetts.

● Though it took some courage for Volpe to permit the party to hold a conference which might contradict his programs, it would have taken little political imagination to recognize that the conference was an excellent vehicle to higher office: a Madison Avenue creation for giving the party a new image; a device for building a Republican legislature; a loudspeaker for proclaiming to the nation the progressive nature of the Massachusetts Republican party — and, oh yes — the creative leadership of Governor John A. Volpe. But the Governor failed to build on the "spirit of Worcester" in his opening message to the State Legislature.

Volpe's skill as a politician has been well documented by his campaign victories that joined majorities from both the cities and the suburbs. Yet in his quest for the party's Vice Presidential nomination, the Governor must prove that he is capable of exciting political leadership that will filter down to the victories of local candidates. He has yet to establish this image in his home state.

—ROBERT D. BEHN

Mr. Behn, Research Director of the Ripon Society, was a member of the Steering Committee of the Massachusetts Issues Convention.

Below are just a few of the more than 300 planks adopted by the Republican Party Conference. Copies of the Platform can be obtained from the Massachusetts Republican State Committee, 146 Bowdoin Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02108.

● The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts should be amended in respect of the General Court by reducing the size of the House of Representatives.

● The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts should be amended in respect of the Executive Branch of State Government by: Making the terms of office of Department Heads coterminous with that of the Governor and providing that each of them shall serve at the pleasure of the Governor.

Abolishing the Executive Council and vesting the power of confirming judicial appointments in the State Senate.

● The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts should be amended in respect of elections by lowering the voting age to eighteen.

● A space must be available in a public institution of higher education for every qualified Massachusetts high school graduate.

● Wives should not be required to sue their husbands for non-support in order to qualify for aid to dependent children.

● We must strengthen our birth control law to permit registered physicians to prescribe drugs and devices for any person who in their professional judgment, they determine is in need of such devices and drugs.

● Earnings limitations on Social Security recipients should be substantially increased so that retired persons will not be penalized for contributing to their own economic security through significant employment.

● (To combat air pollution) tax incentives should be used to encourage conversion of low sulphur content fuels and the installation of air filtration systems.

● The Department of Natural Resources should plan utility corridors on a long range basis for multiple use by utilities, considering not only the convenience of the utilities involved but also conservation values.

● Delegates to national conventions should be elected on the basis of their support for presidential candidates.

● The Legislature should study the problem of airport and airplane noise, with particular attention to proposals to place ceilings on permissible noiselevels for planes in takeoff, for aid to insulate schools and other building against noise from airplanes.

● Housing courts specializing in landlord-tenant problems should be established in large urban areas.

MILITARY PERSONNEL

The Reserves Folly

The Sisyphean war in Vietnam grows even better — and worse — and the Administration policies in response to it grow more neurotic as the Presidential election draws closer. The activation of 14,787 Reservists after the Pueblo incident was probably intended more to facilitate a troop boost in Vietnam than to “show our determination” to the North Koreans. In either case it was a mistake.

As a show of determination it seems to have been ignored by the Koreans, since, understandably, 15,000 civilian-soldiers mobilized in mainland America can hardly frighten a nation that already is standing up to an army of 50,000 Americans south of its border and well-knows the total strength of the U.S. — 3,400,000. Calling up the Reserves has become nothing more than a mid-20th century equivalent of saber-rattling. Show the flag, and all that.

If the Reservists, most of them Air Reservists to date, really were activated in order to boost our Vietnam troop levels, the President and Pentagon were deceiving the public and the Reservists themselves. Worse, the call-up indiscriminately activated cooks, clerk typists and supply personnel, when lack of these among the regular forces is not notable. To ease the shortage of pilots and maintenance crews would have required only an activation of about 2,000 individuals. Indeed, a few days after the call-up the Pentagon indicated that future activation would be according to specific skill needs, but that leaves doubtful the fate of the 15,000 already processed into the regular ranks. Will they be kept on active duty until, say, October, when they can be released as part of a pre-election peace stunt?

Compounding the questionable manpower action is the presence of several Airlift Groups among the units called, organizations which even before the call-up were flying C-124 Globemasters full of cargo for the Far East. The Reservist pilots were keeping the planes in the air almost full time anyway. How they are going to do much better now is a mystery.


Meanwhile the spectacle of waste evidenced in the Berlin call-up of 1961 is reappearing. People in support and supply functions have little to do. Time-killing emerges as the normal day's activity. Resentment among many troops increases as they realize how the ephemeral “show of determination” has wrecked personal plans. Despite the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act, and other legislation that supposedly guarantees the activated Reservist his previous civilian job once he is released from active duty and allows him to delay payments to creditors, hardships are inevitable. Most students have lost credit, self-employed persons are irreparably hurt and a number of men began contemplating application for public welfare only a week after they went “active.”

The common reply to complaints raised by activated Reservists is that, after all, they asked for it, they “volunteered.” But in fact, most of the enlisted men were coerced into joining by the draft and, indeed, the Pentagon now has authority to use the draft directly to fill the Reserve unit ranks. Furthermore, the pay of enlisted men, particularly in the lower ranks, is as low as that of the regulars, and just as exploitative in effect, making the reservist pay a double sacrifice. An

Airman, for example, is paid \$102.00 a month, plus \$30 for food and \$60 if he has a family to support. Since he has been a civilian and may be returned to civilian status soon, he probably wants to keep his automobile, house, and other property. True, he can postpone payment of the principal on his house mortgage, but he still must pay the interest, and many young men's monthly installments represent only the interest anyway, for their houses are newly purchased. Very soon one can expect valid news stories of economic tragedies, accompanied by the absurdity of the victims' lack of use in their military jobs.

The Reserves situation is one more result of the nation's backward military manpower policies. An all-volunteer military, well-trained and highly paid, would include a professional Reserve that could be activated without severe dislocations to the civilian sector and to the lives of the individuals concerned. But like virtually every other reform in America, this one awaits the resolution of the most backward national policy of all, that which embroils us in Vietnam.

— I. M. HATCHED



“We are not going to send American boys 9000 or 10,000 miles away to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves”

—LYNDON JOHNSON (1964 campaign)

STATE BY STATE

Arkansas

The discovery of three skeletons in unmarked graves at the Cummins Prison Farm has drawn national attention to the brutal penal practices which have continued in Arkansas for decades. Reports in recent months have described forced homosexuality, primitive living conditions, disappearances of convicts and a bizarre form of electrical torture.

The history of these excesses is long, and the political roots are deep. The solidly Democratic state legislature has consistently supported the prison system, although the state's Republican governor has continuously attacked it. Former Governor Orval Faubus, who is believed to be planning a political comeback, had become

deeply implicated in the operations of the prisons before he left office. When it was disclosed that the then Prison Superintendent Dan Stephens had been lending convict labor to outside employers, Faubus refused to criticize his former administrative assistant. State legislators were equally reluctant since it was revealed that some of their colleagues were among the beneficiaries of the free convict labor.

The initial response of the Democratic lawmakers to the recent scandal was to pass without a dissenting vote a Senate resolution expressing the need to replace "hysteria and emotionalism" with "sober thinking and the real truth." This resolution was passed in response to a speech by an ex-convict and prison employee who predicted that the Arkansas penal system would be imitated by others within a few years. It is doubtful that further contemplation of the "real truth" will suggest the need for extensive prison reforms.

In addition to these obstacles, Governor Winthrop Rockefeller is faced with other political difficulties in developing an effective program of prison improvement. The state's worsening financial troubles are already being raised by Democrats as a major campaign issue for 1968. Rockefeller is now projecting a state deficit, and is being called incapable of managing the state on a sound fiscal basis. Increased spending on the state's prisons would confront the governor with the alternatives of a greater deficit or higher taxation. Either would be politically dangerous, particularly if caused by expenditures on a penal system which has always showed a profit.

Rockefeller's political strategy for re-election has also restricted his ability to effect needed reforms. The governor has been laying his groundwork in two directions. Viewing Orval Faubus as the only candidate who would be a serious challenger, Rockefeller has continued to publicize scandals and abuses of the former governor's administration. This approach has sustained Governor Rockefeller's popular support, but has also impeded the development of a good working relationship with the many Democrats who were responsible for legislating the Faubus programs.

Also, the governor has implied that the failure of his administration to meet prior expectations is the result of the legislative intransigence of the Democratic representatives. This has led many Democrats to believe that the governor will use the two special sessions of the legislature as springboards for his 1968 campaign by blaming his opponents for the sessions' lack of productivity. The lawmakers are likely to counter by refusing the governor his program and waiting for him to stumble.

Under these circumstances the problems of prison reform are being lost in the politics of self-preservation.

Connecticut

Members of the two major alliances in the Connecticut Republican Party took a deep breath and climbed together into the same boat in February after a period of cautious dickerings. Leaders of the two groups have agreed publicly that they all might get somewhere by rowing in the same direction. Unfortunately, each group doubts that the other agrees in which direction the boat should really go. The two groups have been battling steadily for the last ten years.

Apparently safe at the helm for a little while longer is State Chairman Howard Hausman of New Britain, leader of the alliance often considered the more politi-

cally conservative of the two. He has agreed to support insurance executive John Alsop of Avon, the leader of the other group, as national committeeman to succeed Theodore Ryan of Sharon, who resigned a month ago and backed Alsop as his replacement. Alsop is allied with former State Chairman A. Searle Pinney of Brookfield.

The *quid pro quo* which the Alsop group has accepted is that Edwin H. May, Jr., of Wethersfield get the GOP nomination for the U.S. Senate seat now held by Democrat Abraham A. Ribicoff, who is up for re-election this year. May helped Hausman knock Pinney out of the state chairmanship a year ago after a severe loss by a Pinney-picked candidate for governor, E. Clayton Genras, another insurance executive.

Boat-rocking could erupt anew, however, since the agreement did not include such lesser party posts as members of the state central committee and left proponents of various GOP presidential hopefuls in an edgy state of self-imposed silence. Finally, there are reports that moves to oust incumbent members of that committee are under consideration in several senatorial districts. The committee elects the state chairman. Since Hausman's control of the committee is less than overwhelming, the decapitation of only a few of his committeemen could overturn the boat.

New Hampshire

New Hampshire voters have voted for the "wrong" Republican presidential candidate in their first-in-the-nation primary only twice—in 1920 when Warren Harding emerged late in the game and, again, in 1964 when Ambassador Lodge won over Senator Goldwater. Although the prescience of New Hampshire voters in 1968 will not be determined until the convention in August, the results of the March 12 primary will receive the immediate attention of the press and public as the first indication of voter sentiment in the presidential race. The following is a guide for interpreting the New Hampshire returns.

There exists a clearly identifiable voting bloc numbering about 21,000 which can be counted upon to vote for the "conservative" candidate. Evidence of this bloc vote appears from the nearly identical totals recorded for Senator Goldwater in the 1964 presidential primary and for General Thyng in the 1966 senatorial primary. Both received 21,000 plus votes. William Loeb, publisher of the Manchester *Union-Leader*, the state's major newspaper, backed Goldwater and created Thyng. Loeb then can presumably designate the choice for the conservative faction. Loeb supports Richard Nixon this year. Score 21,000 for Nixon.

Candidate Nixon himself has shown substantial strength in past New Hampshire primaries. He won almost 90% of the vote in 1960 running unopposed on the ballot. In 1964, Nixon received 15,736 votes without campaigning in the state. This solid support coupled with the votes of the conservative bloc provide Nixon with an expected minimum of 37,000 votes or about 40% of the 1964 total.

A GOP moderate may also count upon an element of basic support. About 10% of the voters cast write-in ballots for Rockefeller, John F. Kennedy and unknowns in 1960. This 10% might be characterized as hard line liberal or at least anti-Nixon. A moderate may also get support among the nearly 20,000 votes accorded

Governor Rockefeller in the 1964 primary. In any event, the Romney-Rockefeller base of support should total 20,000 to 25,000 votes or about 25% of the total.

The real contest in New Hampshire is for the remaining 35%, the non-ideological, image vote. This grouping of voters seems to respond directly to the candidates as personalities in the context of each particular election. The wary independence of this group was demonstrated in 1964 when 33,000 voters rejected the declared candidates to write-in the name of a respected political figure from neighboring Massachusetts, Henry Cabot Lodge. Romney's handshaking tours and Nixon's presentation of his refurbished image of experience and competence were aimed directly at impressing this segment of the New Hampshire electorate. By factoring out each candidate's base of support Nixon 40%; Romney-Rockefeller 25% — it may be possible to determine from the results which candidate has succeeded in winning over the uncommitted image vote in the 1968 New Hampshire primary. Young suburbanites in the southern part of the state seem to be the key to this group.

It is this 'swing' segment that party professionals will be watching as the real touchstone to the 1968 nomination. For the pros, Nixon's break-even number will be 57.5%, which represents his solid support of 40% plus half of the uncommitted 35%. He must capture 57.5% of the vote or more to reestablish himself convincingly as a winning candidate in national terms. Romney-Rockefeller, on the other hand, must win 42.5% or more of the total to show that the Republican 'image' vote prefers a less conservative candidate. This, of course, assumes that the confusion caused by Romney's withdrawal will be minimal among voters in the Romney-Rockefeller camp.

There is, of course, also an independent swing vote that is essential for Republican victory in presidential elections. This vote will not be tested in the New Hampshire primary, which is open only to registered Republicans. Beyond New Hampshire, comes the open primary in Wisconsin, where Nixon will have a chance to demonstrate his appeal to independent voters. Should he get the Republican 'image' vote in New Hampshire and attract independents in Wisconsin, he will have gone a long way to meeting the standard he has set himself: the use of primary victories to demonstrate to the delegates his ability to win the big prize, the 1968 election.

New York

In Nassau County, a million person-plus suburban area near New York City, local Republican leaders have finally capitulated to pressures generated by New York's Conservative Party. What State Senator Edward Speno, while County Chairman, struggled for but failed to do, his successor, Joseph Margiatta, has consummated.

Last year, during an important county-wide campaign by Sol Wachtler against Democratic County Executive Eugene Nickerson, Speno tried to prevent a Conservative Party candidacy for County Executive by offering to run a Conservative Party member, Mason Hampton, for County Clerk. Hampton was the Conservative candidate in 1962 for Attorney General of New York. Speno did not even consult the Republican candidate before offering the position to the Conservative. The 1967 deal fell through, and a Conservative candidate, Werner Pleus, drew a large bloc of votes, which many think helped defeat Wachtler's bid.

Hampton figures again in the 1968 deal. This time, he is to run for Congress as a Conservative in the 5th Congressional District, but with the Republicans running no candidate and endorsing Hampton's bid. In return for this surrender to the Conservatives, who so recently did their best to undermine the Nassau Republicans, the Nassau leaders have gotten the Conservatives to agree to endorse the Republican incumbent District Attorney in Nassau, William Kahn. The Executive Committee of the Conservative Party voted the endorsement on February 21st. Preserving Kahn has become the supreme goal of Nassau Republican leaders. A considerable amount of patronage—including over thirty Assistant District Attorneyships and supporting staff jobs—is at stake.

But worrying the leaders even more is the fear that a newly elected Democratic D.A. would unearth and expose what is rumored to be widespread abuse of public positions, especially in the Town of Hempstead, by Republican politicians.

This preoccupation with covering up alleged irregularities has had an impact as well on the maneuvering for the Republican nomination in the 3rd Congressional District, the so-called "Gold Coast" of north shore Long Island. Represented by Republicans as far back as living memory extends, the 3rd District was lost in 1964 by Steve Derounian, the incumbent Republican who had been an early and ardent supporter of Goldwater, a line of thinking very much out of step with population increases and shifts in the District.

The 3rd District is still held, though precariously, by Lester Wolff, a Democrat, who beat Derounian in a return bout in 1966. The Republican Congressional campaign committee, headed by Bob Wilson of California, had felt that the District was one of the closest in the country, and dispatched a staff member to see if the Campaign Committee could help Republicans recapture the seat.

To his surprise, the staff member found the local leadership taking a very nonchalant view toward the race, and concentrating all their attention on clinching the deal with the Conservatives on endorsement by the latter of the District Attorney's re-election drive. The staffer was reportedly told by one leader that "there are other things more important to worry about" and "what does one more Congressman matter?"

The present favorite of the organization for the Congressional nomination is a luckluster former Assemblyman, Abe Seldin. Although Senator Javits has already gone on record as opposing any deal with the Conservatives, it is unlikely that either he or Governor Rockefeller will intervene in the two Congressional races in Nassau County.

Yet state-wide GOP officeholders should consider that the Conservative Party was formed in 1962 with the avowed purpose of defeating liberal Republicans. Conservatives have run candidates in all state-wide races. Their first success came on a local level with the narrow defeat of Wachtler in Nassau county last November. Only three months later the local Republican organization has jumped into bed with the Conservatives. Thus while their confreres in control of the GOP machinery in other states preach GOP Party unity, the right-wingers in New York use their secession to blackmail the local party.

If the New York GOP does not draw the line in

Nassau the Conservative Party members will try to expand its role on a state-wide basis. In the end, succumbing to its demands can only mean the extinction of the New York GOP, which can thrive only by appealing to the uncommitted independent vote—a vote that is repelled by any hint of backroom deals with the Conservative Party.

Ohio

Remembering how Goldwater's candidacy affected their state ticket in 1964, Ohio Republicans will be wary about whom they select in Miami this summer, unless they subconsciously harbor a death wish.

A recent poll of Ohio's Republican county chairman reveals that a majority of these leaders favor Richard Nixon's nomination. Governor James A. Rhodes, however, plans to hold a tight rein on Ohio's delegation until at least the convention's second ballot. Informed sources indicate that Rhodes now leans toward Nelson Rockefeller.

On the Democratic front, Senator Stephen M. Young, the favorite-son candidate on the May 7th primary ballot, will attempt to solidify feuding factions of Ohio Democrats. Party leaders hope that Young, both a critic of the Vietnam War and a supporter of President Johnson's re-election, can smooth over differences between Johnson Democrats and those who work for Senator Eugene McCarthy's nomination. McCarthy's candidacy appears to attract few rank-and-file Democrats, but he gains support from those lawyers, professors and clergymen who often provide expertise and leadership for Democratic campaigns.

Another Democrat, former Alabama Governor George Wallace, believes he possesses sizable backing in Ohio. Nonetheless, a state law that requires third party presidential candidates to file petitions with over 400,000 signatures will probably prevent Wallace from getting on the ballot. The filing date for such petitions was February 7th, but Wallace lieutenants could challenge this law in the courts.

A divisive force among Ohio Democrats exists in the primary struggle between Senator Frank J. Lausche and former First District Congressman John J. Gilligan. When Ohio's Democratic Executive Committee voted 45-14 to endorse Gilligan for Senator instead of incumbent Lausche, it knew that it was rejecting the greatest vote-getter in the state. But Lausche's very apparent age has weakened his appeal, and the Senator's conservatism coupled with his aloof posture toward Ohio's Democratic leadership has always made him the bete noire of party chieftans in this state. It is too early to predict the winner in the Democratic primary. Many Republicans, who accept Lausche as one of their own, could be tempted to vote for the Senator this May but the prospect of registering Democratic might deter life-long Republicans from taking such action.

Attorney General William B. Saxbe, a Republican candidate for the Senate who faces only token opposition in his party's May primary, must relish this vendetta among Ohio Democrats. If Saxbe runs against Lausche, the Attorney General will campaign as a progressive running against a reactionary. If Gilligan should be his opponent, Saxbe can stand as a moderate Republican who offers alternatives to LBJ's Great Society Legislation. Saxbe might find it difficult to convert those thousands of Republicans who believe in Lausche. Gilligan's

close affiliation with the Johnson Administration could hurt the Cincinnati councilman badly if LBJ's ratings continue to remain low. However, should he emerge victorious from the primary, Gilligan would wage a colorful and vigorous campaign that Saxbe could not take lightly.

● The slogan of law and order seems to enchant Ohio Republicans. A Republican-dominated State Legislature rammed through a highly punitive anti-riot bill by a vote of 74-12 on February 6th. The Senate must still consider this legislation. In Cincinnati four Republican members of City Council's Crime Committee drafted and recommended an anti-riot ordinance which launched a heated debate about the law's constitutionality and the Councilmen's motives. Two Republicans (Gradison and Ruehlmann), two Charterites (Taft and Bush), and the lone Democrat on Council (John J. Gilligan) will probably comprise a majority that will reject this ordinance by a 5-4 margin. Opponents of the law find a clause that allows citizens to be deputized to be particularly repugnant, while vague language defining sweeping powers to be held by the mayor and city-manager during a riot conjures up images of a police state to many critics.

Oregon

Campaign organizations for Nixon, Romney, Reagan and Rockefeller are now working toward the May 28 Presidential Primary Election.

The Nixon campaign, under the direction of former Secretary of State, Howell Appling, Jr., seems well organized and financed but has apparently decided not to surface until later in the campaign. The "new" Nixon has impressed many of the more conservative Republicans, as well as some moderates.

Governor Romney's staff, even with such advantages as Travis Cross, (former Governor Hatfield's press secretary and campaign director), face a hard fight in Oregon. Many of the important moderates had already gone over to the Rockefeller camp, before Romney's withdrawal from the presidential race. Now they should all go to Rockefeller, though Travis Cross' choice is anybody's guess.

Reagan's campaign, though more limited than the others, is fairly well organized and financed. Reagan will allow his name to appear on the Oregon ballot, and his supporters appear ready to fight for at least a part of the conservative vote, thus probably hurting Nixon and helping Romney or Rockefeller. It is significant and somewhat surprising to note that Reagan's public relations campaign is being directed by Fred VanNatta (former assistant to the Speaker of the Oregon House) from the Salem office of Travis Cross and Associates, while Cross is in the East on Romney's staff.

The Draft Rockefeller Committee, which announced the start of a petition campaign several weeks ago, is now actively campaigning throughout the state. Built on a base of the 1964 Rockefeller organization, plus much of the party leadership, the Committee is receiving strong support.

Governor Nelson Rockefeller's public support and organization now surpasses that for any other candidate in the race. In 1964 he won easily, (Rockefeller, 94,000; Lodge 79,000; Goldwater, 50,000; Nixon 48,000), but some of that support was due to the fact that he alone of all the candidates "cared enough to come" and campaign extensively in the state. At this time, even if Nixon

wins the early primaries, Rockefeller could probably win the primary if he leaves his name on the ballot, and indicates that he is a candidate. If he has his name removed, the Committee, at present, plans a write-in effort, but that would be difficult and have much less chance of success. Not taking public stands on the issues has helped Rockefeller's popularity, but people seem afraid to support a candidate who, for example, doesn't even have a recognizable policy toward Viet Nam. He has the image that the Oregon voters seem to be looking for, but they still want to see specific positions on the issues.

On the Democratic side of the fence, supporters of Senator Eugene J. McCarthy have set up a limited but highly dedicated organization. In the 1966 senatorial primary, Howard Morgan got 35% of the vote against a stronger candidate, Bob Duncan, primarily on the Vietnam issue. With the present mood of many Oregon Democrats, McCarthy could give Johnson a good fight. Duncan, who later lost to Hatfield in the '66 General Election, will also have a close primary race against incumbent Senator Wayne Morse.

Washington

With this item we begin what will surely be a long and dreary account of delegate-rigging in the state named for the father of our country. The State Central Committee has adopted rules which provide that county strength in the state convention will be determined in part by whether the given county has met its financial quota. Since King County (Seattle and suburbs), Spokane, Pierce (Tacoma) and Snohomish (north Seattle suburbs and Everett) have withheld funds from the State Committee, they will drop in representation from 1964. The four county committees, therefore, are suing the State Committee on the grounds of 'one man one vote.'

But in King County, at least, the selection of county delegates is so rigged at the precinct and legislative district levels as to make the state's rules seem like direct democracy exemplified. The County Chairman has refused to let the news media publish the meeting places for precinct caucuses and has announced that he expects most precinct committeemen to admit to the caucuses only those persons they know to be "good Republicans." "Good Republicans" apparently does not mean active moderate Republicans who are being given the run-around when they call county headquarters for information about caucuses. To top it off, the County Committee has just decided to appoint some 450 automatic delegates to the legislative and county conventions—about 20% of the total. The precinct committeemen, meanwhile, most of them appointees of the County Chairman, will also get automatic representation, so that each precinct will have one elected delegate plus its loyal committeeman.

The pro-Rockefeller people in the county will sue after the precinct caucuses are held (at various times) on March 5.

West Virginia

An uncommonly interesting political year is shaping up in West Virginia. Since the New Deal days, the Democratic nominees for governor have been with few exceptions handpicked by the Charleston establishment and routinely elected. The organization has placated

potential rivals of their candidate by assigning them a place in line to wait for a chance at the nonsuccessive job of governing the state for a term. For example, John D. Rockefeller IV, a Democratic candidate for Secretary of State, is apparently the newest entry to the gubernatorial queue.

It does not appear, however, that the traditional arrangement is working this year. Trial balloons were lofted for three candidates—Attorney General Donald Robertson, Party Chairman James Sprouse and State Senator Paul Kaufman—with mixed results. Now all three are entered in the May 12 primary. The divisive primary fight will not help the Democratic Party which is already rocked by a recent federal grand jury indictment of three officials of the present administration and a former governor. These developments could make 1968 unusually tough for the Democratic nominee.

West Virginia Republicans are far from certain to take advantage of their rare opportunity. The state's two strongest Republicans have determined to contest the gubernatorial nomination in the primary. Cecil Underwood, one time governor (1956-60), has become a perennial challenger. Underwood's chances appeared bright for a time in 1964 but he was defeated easily by Democrat Hulett Smith. His rival is six-term Congressman Arch A. Moore, Jr., who has been the lone exception to the Democrats' control of major state offices since 1960. Moore, whose aggressive, person-to-person campaigns cut across party lines, won a remarkable 61% of the vote in his district amid the Johnson landslide (69%) in 1964. The possibility that Moore will lead the ticket in November is regarded as a source of considerable discomfort to the Democrats.

No differences over presidential contenders have yet appeared between the candidates. Although Moore is the national committeeman, Underwood may have more allies among the money men at the top of the state's thin party structure. Two recent polls yielded opposite indications as to which candidate is leading among Republican voters. The outcome of the primary will probably hinge upon the extent of Moore's success in the southern part of the state, where he has never before appeared on the ballot except as a member of the national convention delegate slate.

CLASSIFIED ADS

(\$3.00 for up to 50 words; \$1.00 to Ripon Chapter members, contributors and National Associates. Extra forwarding charge for use of Ripon Box numbers.)

HARVARD law student seeks summer internship with GOP congressman. Resume on request. Box 1.

RESEARCHER for a leading Republican seeks literary quotations and anecdotes to dramatize major issues in 1968 campaign. Send your suggestions to Box 3.

JAVITS admirers can get discounted copies of the Senator's book, *Order of Battle*, 50c each; 10 for \$3.00. Robert Gulick, 19 Healey Street, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

DIGIULIO SPEAKERS Service has recently sent young, articulate and occasionally handsome Ripon speakers to speak to oldish Philadelphians on Vietnam; to youngish Episcopalians on GOP politics; to sweetish Wellesley students on whatever they asked to hear. Inquire Box 6 for your group's needs.

SWARTHMORE FRESHMAN with impressive record in Teen-Age Republican organizations in a western state wants campaign experience this summer in East or Mid-West. Low pay, hard work. Write Box 9 for resume.

AUTHOR'S ASSISTANT wanted to revise and reorganize book on a theory for the two-party system. Some publication experience necessary. Summary of the book will be sent on request. Write Charles V. Laughlin, Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia.

AUTHOR'S ASSISTANT for a book on money any politics. Good pay for a man of highest writing ability and knowledge of American politics. Send resume to Box 8.

Politics of Pulchritude

"The modern Republican party is probably the handsomest political party in American history," wrote Mike Royko in the *Chicago Daily News* just after the 1966 elections. It was an important point, and analysts who later sought a common denominator in the incredible variety of GOP successes last year inevitably wound up talking about "attractiveness" and "style." It is entirely understandable, therefore, that *The Republican Establishment*,* a book that tries to describe today's Republican party in one grand sweep, should produce a similar emphasis.

The major thesis of authors Stephen Hess (a former White House aide and political historian) and David S. Broder (nationally syndicated reporter and columnist for the *Washington Post*) is that the GOP now enjoys the "luxury of choice" among "a wealth of candidates" who represent "an embarrassment of riches."

They document this conclusion impressively with a mass of information about a host of politicians. Better than anything attempted in years, the book presents a lively and colorful party portrait; it is highly readable, well organized, and masterful in the use of telling detail. The book is mandatory reading for anyone who wants to understand the Republican party today. It will be a valuable source book for historians for a long time to come. But when the authors generalize about their highly complex subject it often seems there is little more to say than that the Republican picture is — quite literally — good looking.

HANDSOME NEW BREED The work begins and ends with Washington's Governor Daniel J. Evans, who authored the "luxury of choice" comment. Trained as a civil engineer, Evans is a pragmatic man who presumably rejects the importance of political philosophy; this makes him the archetype of the new-breed Republicans and, as much as anyone, the hero of the Hess-Broder story: "Daniel Jackson Evans, just forty-two now, slim, handsome, athletic, with an attractive wife, three young sons, and a sincere, effective speaking and television style, is almost everything an up-and-coming young Republican should be." On the final page Evans' somewhat issue-oriented campaign strategy is presented, then dismissed: "The clue to victory was not in his words but in Evans himself. Thirty-nine years old, handsome, smoothly articulate, Evans did not have the answer; he was the answer."

That closing passage echoes the theme of the introduction: "In 1966, the GOP did not give the voters something to be for, but it did give them someone, namely a set of intelligent and appealing candidates. By and large they were young and good-looking."

ARRAY OF EPITHETS Between the two passages we meet a wide array of "bright and attractive new faces": "handsome, fleshy" Claude Kirk; "tall and powerfully built" Robert Taft; "good-looking forty-four-year-old Paul Laxalt"; "tall, handsome" John Love; "youthful-looking" Mark Hatfield. Pennsylvania's Governor Raymond Shafer is introduced as "a brawny, ruggedly good looking man with prominent blond eyebrows, a firm jaw and cleft

chin." "Tall" John Lindsay has "dirty-blond curls and a chiseled nose." "Tall, lean" John Chafee has a "boyish cowlick, heavy black eyebrows and the great Saltonstall nose." Charles Percy is "short, hard-muscled with a square jaw and hair dark blond and razor cut." Wisconsin's Governor Warren Knowles is listed as a Vice-Presidential prospect, in part because he "has a clean-cut face, curly silver hair and an attractive wife."

But first prize must go to the portrait of Edward Brooke: "an articulate, well modulated speaker; wearer of finely-cut conservative suits . . . with his blue green eyes, his finely arched eyebrows, his slightly Nixonian nose, his thin cupid lips, and his skin the color of an early summer sunburn . . ."

Some of this is good, vivid reporting; physical appearance is a critical consideration in an age of politics by television. Unfortunately, though, this absorption with style and appearance leaves too little room for talking about anyone's programs or ideas. And at several points the decision to exclude issues is made quite explicit.

YEARS OF BLISS

The central focus of *The Republican Establishment* is the amazing GOP recovery from 1964. The authors see it as a recovery from too much ideology and credit it in large part to party chairman Ray Bliss and his abhorrence of issues. The era of Bliss is an era of tolerance, of don't rock the boat, of live and let live, of bland but unifying compromise. Ideologists are viewed as dangerous if they get near power, and important largely because they build up each other through continued intramural sniping. The authors contend that the professionals, who test everything by its ability to bring in votes, will control the Presidential nomination.

There is a great deal of truth in this view, of course, and for scientific corroboration, Hess and Broder cite the famous University of Michigan Survey Research Center study of 1960, *The American Voter*, which concludes that "who" is far more important to most voters than "what," thus discouraging an ideological view of American politics. What is not said is that the study has been continually attacked and reinterpreted since its publication, that other investigations have produced different results, that analyses of both the 1960 and 1964 elections (at the Presidential level at least) showed issues to be quite important, and that surveys this year indicate matters such as race relations and Vietnam will have an enormous impact on the next election.

IDEOLOGY IMPORTANT Moreover, as the authors themselves note, it was only three years ago that far-right ideologists *did* control the Republican party. But *The Republican Establishment* sees the Goldwater nomination as a one-shot happening unlikely to be soon repeated. This leads Hess and Broder to underrate Ronald Reagan's strength, in my opinion, and to underestimate the importance of the conservative ideology in his current plans to sweep the country "like a prairie fire." Extreme conservatism is still a powerful influence, one which presently threatens, for example, to exclude charismatic Dan Evans from membership in his own state's delegation to the national convention.

Such reservations notwithstanding, *The Republican Establishment* is an important and fascinating book, - a road map, an encyclopedia, a primer. The first of its three major sections discusses "the Power Center," including the Congress, the state houses, the National

Committee. It tells of unofficial kingmakers, of the financiers, of men who deal in newsprint and in ideas. It provides a particularly perceptive analysis of a newly emerging managerial class of professional campaign strategists and technicians.

The last third of the book presents current leaders and recent party history on a state-by-state basis. The condition of Southern Republicanism, torn between a moderate past and segregationist temptation, is very cogently described; tightly written portraits of men like Rhodes, Tower, Hatfield, and Brooke are well done and extremely valuable because they offer much material that cannot be conveniently obtained elsewhere.

CANDIDATE PROFILES

The bulk of the work, over 200 pages, is devoted to "The Candidates": Romney, Nixon, Percy, Reagan. Reflective and probing, each of these essays advances our understanding of its subject in important new ways, better than anything else now available. The Romney essay, for example, explores very skillfully the personal and political implications of his Mormonism. The Percy chapter (in the end, perhaps the most favorable to its subject) emphasizes his Horatio Alger past and the impact of his faith in Christian Science. The most complex personality, Richard Nixon, produces the most psychologically sophisticated and memorable essay.

Only in the case of Reagan do we feel we have not "gone inside" the man, though this problem is offset in part by a discussion of the Reagan phenomenon as it relates to the alienated voter and especially to California's very weak party system. Each chapter also discusses the candidate's staff personnel and his current strategic considerations. All of this is done with objectivity and discipline, the aim being to understand rather than advocate, to describe rather than criticize or guide.

'NEW' GENERATION

Only in the 20-page conclusion do the authors speak for themselves, and here, it must be acknowledged, they briefly praise the intellectuals' increasing influence while displaying a vague progressive bias. They argue, forcefully, that the GOP may have no ideal candidate for 1968, not even a Wendell Wilkie (who lost, after all, as they sensibly remind us).

Hess and Broder seem to be looking beyond 1968 when they speak — in a four-page peroration of "a new generation of voters," "new faces" and "the new alignments," "new issues," "a new power group," "a new generation of voters," "new faces" and "the new politics." The "politics of innovation" will be the work of "younger men" operating "in a young country growing younger" — men like John F. Kennedy, "the youngest elected President," and Daniel J. Evans, identified on three separate occasions as "the youngest Governor in the history of Washington State." As the authors put it in their earlier description of the Ripon Society, "Underlying these new clichés is a strong identification with their own age group . . ."

The new generation of leaders does promise the GOP an exciting future — on this point Hess and Broder are most persuasive — but what is worrisome is the implication that "the luxury of choice" somehow obviates "the necessity to choose." In 1966, the authors observe, the whole party could celebrate the success of Rockefeller and Laird, Brooke and Kirk, Tower and Volpe. Nevertheless, in Presidential years, at least, and often in between, Republicans must decide between men and between ideas.

STANDS ON ISSUES

Like it or not, Ray Bliss' party will have to say Yes or No to open housing, to escalation in Vietnam, to freer trade, to Federal aid for urban innovations. As they nominate a single candidate and write a single platform, the Republicans cannot avoid formulating some kind of answer to these troublesome questions.

The nature of that answer may well determine who wins the next election and who attracts that new generation of voters. More than that, what the book calls "ideological freight" will inevitably shape the decisions of our attractive leaders, whatever their strategies of election. Even if the Michigan study is right and the voters could not care less, the ideas and programs and performance records of the Republican establishment are still worth more study — and more worry. The problem in 1964 was not that the party took firm positions on issues, but that it took the wrong ones.

—LEE W. HUEBNER

(Printed by arrangement with the New Leader)

Limiting Public Strikes

(Continued from 5)

was reached without agreement. The independent committee might, for example, settle on four hours a week as allowable strike time, to be used when and how the union sees fit. Transport workers might then choose to go out on Friday evenings from 3 to 7 p.m. This would produce great public inconvenience and would give the union the attention it needs to put pressures on a political entity like the city government. But it would not entirely paralyze the community.

With a restricted strike schedule in operation, the city would be under pressure to settle—but the pressure would not reach crisis proportions. The Sanitation strike in New York is a fine example of union irresponsibility, an attempt by one group in the metropolis to exert its control over a specific service in order to bludgeon the rest of the citizenry into submission on its terms. Were the union allowed to carry out its strike warfare on a limited basis, the city would suffer, but that suffering would not have reached the point where the mayor felt compelled to ask the governor to call out the state's National Guard.

CRISIS-FREE CONFRONTATION The argument may be made, of course, that a one-day strike by sanitation employees would not be enough to impress the city negotiators with the union's legitimate claims. If this were the case, the independent commission which has been recommended might allow a longer walk-out period. It seems to me, however, that this would not be necessary. The point of the restricted strike schedule is one of inconvenience — it is to inconvenience the public enough that a union feels that its claims will be heard: the news media detail the issues of a collective bargaining dispute only when there is a confrontation between the parties.

Inconveniencing the public is the only way this confrontation may take place in the public sector. Where there is no profit motive, the parties cannot hope for a long strike which would provide a test of economic strength. The cab drivers in New York City made this plain when they staged a one-day work stoppage in

(Continued on next page)

LETTERS: (Continued from page 2)

guard services, libraries, depreciation, rent, and facilities are generally carried as overhead rather than being prorated against individual contracts. If too much money is being spent, there is a valid complaint. Attacking a bookkeeping technique seems rather an ineffective method of reducing costs.

Like Mr. Foley I, too, have reservations about the light anti-ballistic missile system. I do, however, recognize that it provides some protection against accidental or small-scale attacks as well as indicating to China, if not the Soviet Union, that it cannot become a true superpower on the cheap. I also recognize that protection against nuclear attack means more than an ABM system; it has involved a bomber defense and an active anti-submarine warfare capability (a point Mr. Foley neglects when he mentions experts who worry about Chinese submarines carrying bombs into American harbors).

I believe the Soviet Union is unlikely to resort to military means on a wide-spread scale only so long as it is clearly against their own interests. Building aircraft carriers and developing orbital weapons do not indicate to me an overwhelming desire for lessening the unhappy world arms situation. Finally, technology increases resulting in ever changing offense-defense capabilities lead me to believe that dollars spent on carefully considered weapon systems — the majority, I believe — are dollars well spent.

The cause of realistic economy in defense spending is a cause well worth fighting for but it requires more than broad generalizations and half-true or historical arguments. Hopefully, Mr. Foley's later articles will deal with these serious needs in a more positive manner.

KENNETH B. BLEY
Los Angeles, California

(Continued from preceding page)

order to influence the city's decision to raise cab fares. Politics is power and collective bargaining on the municipal level is a political struggle. It is not the use of the power to strike, per se, that should be objected to; it is its wanton destructiveness that ought to be deplored. The restricted strike schedule is a means of halting that destructiveness.

A restricted strike schedule is a weapon that can be accepted by the cities because it would allow for normal negotiations to continue and the bureaucratic process to work out its internal complexities without the structure of society becoming unglued. For the union it presents a step forward, a legal means for bringing grievances to the public without facing fines, jail sentences or worse. Were the union to take undue advantage of the restricted strike schedule and attempt to make of it a complete right to strike, strong sanctions would be called for—including suspension of the union's certification as a representative of its members.

Yet one would expect public employee unions, once their right to strike is accepted, to obey the limitations on this right, much as unions in the private sector obey artificially contrived limitations on picketing and boycott procedures. The trick in the field of labor relations is to develop rules that permit struggle but do not let it get out of hand. A restricted strike schedule may be such a rule.

— WILLIAM J. KILBERG

Mr. Kilberg, a graduate of the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University, was Executive Director of the Labor and Employment Sub-committee of the Massachusetts Republican Issues Convention. He is consultant to Labor Relations Associates, Boston, and a second year student at the Harvard Law School.

MR. FOLEY REPLIES:

I appreciate Mr. Bley's concern for economy in Defense spending, and I hope he someday enlightens us as to the real faults of the "establishment." The effect of fixed-fee and incentive contracts has been vitiated by Defense willingness to renegotiate these contracts frequently on the basis of costs. Overhead accounts are not merely "a bookkeeping technique" when a producer can use his cost figures in fixing his price, or when it serves as a vehicle for generating unnecessary expenditures or shifting non-Defense costs on Defense accounts. I think the column adequately rebuts Mr. Bley's other criticisms. My point was not that all security spending was bad, but that Congress has applied significantly less stringent tests to proposals for defence system in terms of costs and benefits than it has to other areas of public expenditure, and that this has produced inefficiency and waste.

RIPON REALISTS

Dear Sirs:

The Ripon Society is to be congratulated upon its Fifth Birthday and its vigorous and healthy growth curve to date. There are many Americans (I among them) who feel that Ripon may well be the most important instrument currently available to inject intelligent and sensible views and policies into the body politic.

I am disturbed about one aspect of your public image, however. Political commentators and the Ripon Society itself talk of the "Voice of Moderation" — implying that the Society speaks for the "young moderates" in the Republican Party.

It is difficult to become excited over "moderate" or "middle-of-the-road" ideas or policies; yet, I am excited over the positions taken by the Ripon Society in its White Papers! This is probably because for me the Society speaks not for the Moderates but for the Realists who are concerned about our domestic and international political problems.

I would, therefore, suggest that you give thought to calling yourselves the "Realist Wing" of the Republican Party. Thinking people can become excited over and fight for a group that will try to substitute hard-line, intelligent thought and action for the visionary promises and policies so typical of many of today's breed of politicians.

H. THOMAS BALLANTINE, JR., M.D.
Boston, Massachusetts

Dear Sirs:

Although I have been a Democrat as long as I have been an American, which is about twenty years, I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that at least under the leadership of President Johnson the Democratic Party has exhausted its evolutionary potential and that there is really no chance of reforming it. I am not by nature a very politically minded man. Nevertheless, I have come to believe that the struggle within the Republican Party between the forward looking wing such as the Ripon Society represents and the hawks, know-nothings, and paranoids which seem to dominate it at the moment, is perhaps the most important political struggle going on in the world today.

KENNETH E. BOULDING
Boulder, Colorado

Professor Boulding is President of the American Economics Association.

REAPPORTIONMENT

Dear Sirs:

Just a few words of encouragement to keep up the good work. As a Republican active at the state and local level, I find the FORUM most helpful.

At this past legislative session, I was able to help defeat a "Dirksen" petition for a Constitutional Convention. As a matter of great significance nationally with roots at the local level, the Ripon Society might do well to take up more discussion of this effort to "solve" our reapportionment problems.

JON LUND, Senator
State of Maine

VIETNAM PEACE PROGRAM

(Though the National Governing Board of the Ripon Society does not necessarily endorse opinions expressed in guest editorials, it hopes the position on Vietnam developed by Governor Romney will be strongly represented in the Republican Party, despite his withdrawal from the presidential race.)

I have recently visited twelve countries in five subcontinents representing more than one billion of the world's population. Wherever I went, the single most consuming problem was Vietnam.

I believe the Republican party must face this issue responsibly and directly.

Let me make clear where I think we stand today, and what we must do.

First, the United States relies too much on the military effort in Vietnam.

There are uncertain and even ominous factors on the military side. The enemy is now engaged in an aggressive military campaign to destroy U.S. units and inflict high casualties. While we have won important victories and maintain the upper hand, the other side has wone some, too, and its aggressiveness has not yet abated. So far the enemy has matched our escalation. I believe that the enemy can continue to put in more troops and more sophisticated weapons.

As recent developments in Vietnam indicate—the build-ups in Khesanh, the attacks on populated areas throughout the South and on the U.S. Embassy in Saigon itself, are striking examples—there is certainly no lessening of the military conflict. It does not appear that we can effectively reduce the military threat and capacity of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong for some time.

While the military effort is important, we should not expect that there can be a purely military solution to what is basically a political-guerrilla conflict, and we should conform our military activity to a sound overall policy.

Second, not enough attention is paid to the social and political effort to build a nation. Given the limitations on the effectiveness of military power, the offensive must be mounted on the political side.

It is in the villages and hamlets, and in the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese people, that this conflict will really be wone or lost.

We cannot hand the South Vietnamese a nation. They must do more. There must be a way to make certain that they play more of a part.

In addition to strengthening the contribution of the South Vietnamese Army, I believe that we should bring greater pressure to bear on the South Vietnamese to improve the amount and effectiveness of their contribution to the social and economic effort in the countryside. I believe we should as well apply greater pressure on the South Vietnamese to improve their self-government, eliminate corruption, and broaden political participation at all levels.

Third, we should be more creative and more credible

in our diplomatic efforts to pursue a peaceful solution.

I believe we must have a positive program for peace. That's why I have proposed the guaranteed neutralization of the area.

By guaranteed neutralization I mean that North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia would be de-fused from cold war conflict, liberated from the destructive presence of so-called "wars of national liberation," and relieved of the use or threat of force as a way of resolving disputes on their territory.

There would be a removal of foreign military troops or bases in the area and there would be no alliances by nations in the area with outside blocs, either eastern or western. The principle of self-determination would govern internally. The nations concerned would be free to pursue and should be assisted in economic development through cooperation on a regional basis.

There are three integrally related steps necessary to bring about guaranteed neutralization.

1. An internal settlement in South Vietnam, to come about by talks between Saigon and the Viet Cong to bring about cease-fire and disengagement and agreement on procedure and participation for elections in the South; and then actual free and open elections to determine the government of the South. The international community can help by providing the encouragement of an eventual guaranteed neutralization and by providing resources to help with the implementation, but those living in within South Vietnam must work out the internal arrangements.

2. An agreement among the great powers. This could be accomplished under the auspices of the Geneva Conference co-chairmen, perhaps with the help of a specially appointed committee of the Geneva Nations.

3. A carefully coordinated system of international community supervision, control, and implementation. This could be planned and assigned by a special international commission, sponsored, perhaps, by the U.N.

The U.S. cannot dictate the terms of an overall settlement. The conditions must be worked out by the principal protagonists, ourselves included, with help from the international community. But the U.S. should suggest the scope and general criteria for a settlement that is fair to all, express the crucial need for cooperative international support, and pledge its own sincere and serious backing for such an approach. The U.S. should serve as a leader and a catalyst.

My proposal counts on nations urgently motivated by the common revulsion to war and desire for peace. Despite the differences of the great powers, I believe there is also a common interest in ending destruction and the danger of wider war. I believe there is also an overriding interest in stability and order. This common interest must be identified and common cooperation to exploit it galvanized by pointing the way toward peace.

I believe that new Republican leadership can work more effectively for such a peace.