Senator John Sherman Cooper

VIETNAM TALKS

John McClaughry

BLACK POWER

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RESERVES FOLLY

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MOTHER GOOSE

Here's the rest of him

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THE RIPON SOCIETY, INC. is a Republican research and policy organization whose members are young business, academic and professional men and women. It has national headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts, chapters in six cities, National Associate Members throughout the fifty states, and several affiliated groups of sub-chapter status. The Society is supported by chapter dues, individual contributions, and revenues from its publications and conduct work. The Society offers the following options for annual contribution: Contributor $25 or more; Sustainer $100 or more; Founder $1000 or more. Inquiries about membership and chapter organization should be addressed to the National Executive Director.

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EDITORIAL POINTS

Last September, when it was clear to some in Republican political circles that Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign was being prepared in earnest, the Ripon Society initiated a study of the California Governor's record in office. We did not delve into Mr. Reagan's personal history, but simply into his public record as a candidate and office holder. Since that record is short, our conclusions must be tentative. But since Governor Reagan, having carefully timed and planned his presidential campaign, has projected himself onto a national forum, we feel these conclusions should now be stated firmly.

Our first conclusion concerns the Governor's administrative ability. Ronald Reagan has spoken frequently on the dangers of big government, the need for lowering taxes, the desirability of cutting budgets, and the importance of private initiative. He has preached these themes forcefully, illustrating his points with engaging anecdotes and well-turned phrases.

But in the actual conduct of government, he has not been able to match his words with performance. Instead of using his first year of office to lay the ground for better management, for more efficient provision of public services, and for the gradual transfer of some governmental activities to the private sector, Governor Reagan has wielded a crude meat cleaver. He has attempted dramatic budget cuts and drastic cutbacks in existing programs. But foolish economies have often produced greater expenditures and many of the cutbacks have been untenable. While the attention of the Reagan Administration has been focused on these token issues, California has had the biggest budget in its history. The Governor, after taking well-publicized but shortsighted stands on such issues as taxes, mental health, poverty programs, open housing and education has been forced to back-peddle, to issue contradictory public statements that have compromised his credibility within the state. We are forced to conclude that at this early stage in his public career Ronald Reagan has not developed the managerial skills to control, guide and limit effectively a large governmental bureaucracy.

Our second conclusion concerns Ronald Reagan's views on international affairs. Foreign policy is an area in which the Governor's better instincts as a public speaker often desert him. Usually he has a healthy skepticism of "expert advice," but when the "experts" happen to be right-wing military men he endorses their every word. Usually he shuns labels and strives for an approach which sounds both "moderate" and full of "common sense." Not so on an issue like Vietnam, where, alone among the candidates, he labels himself a "hawk" and where his approach is shrill and uncompromising. Reagan on Vietnam sounds like "common sense" only to those who think that conducting a foreign policy is like winning a football game. We conclude that Governor Reagan is today unsuited for major responsibility in any area bearing on diplomacy or the conduct of foreign policy.

Finally, let us emphasize our assessment of Ronald Reagan as a public figure. He is most certainly not, as some have charged, a puppet on a string, an actor who cannot think for himself, a man who should not be taken seriously. On the contrary, he has shown a capacity to make his own decisions, to write his own lines, to speak his own mind effectively. He has developed a political style that is well suited to an age of mass media, and he has a way of stating the issues that is unfailingly newsworthy, if not new. But his lack of experience in the craft of government often shows through his polished platform style. When in the midst of an unexpected crisis, he reverts to doctrinaire prejudices. For example, he invariably perceives a Munich analogy in issues involving force. He detects a conspiracy of evil behind unfamiliar opponents. When on unaccustomed ground, he lapses into a simplistic philo-
Governor Reagan could deliver more than a small Rockefeller-Reagan ticket, though it may legitimize Ronald Reagan's presidential aspirations among the public at large, will only drive Reagan's own right wing supporters to Nixon. For it is not clear that Governor Reagan could deliver more than a small fraction of his delegate support to Rockefeller. Leaving aside a few members of the California delegation, most of Reagan's delegates will be the ideologues who find Nixon too liberal and who booed Rockefeller for 15 minutes at the Cow Palace. It is unlikely that they will vote for Rockefeller in 1968 no matter what Reagan does. If Rockefeller is to win the nomination, he will have to attract the support of pragmatic and victory-oriented conservatives, most of whom will cast their first ballot votes for Nixon or for favorite sons. To win such support, he should keep his vice-presidential options open, work to hold his poll ratings high, and treat a convention deal with Reagan as a last resort.

As an electoral strategy, a Reagan vice-presidential candidacy might not improve the chances for Republican victory in November. When the "dream ticket" strategy was first considered, it seemed that Republicans would be facing President Johnson, and that anti-administration Democrats and Independents could be easily attracted to any ticket headed by Rockefeller. This is no longer the case, and Rockefeller would lose favor with important groups of Democrats and Independents by choosing Ronald Reagan. While such a ticket might "unite" Republicans, the simple fact is that the GOP is the third party nationally, with fewer adherents than both the Democrats and Independents. Governor Rockefeller's appeal to swing voters is precisely what makes his candidacy attractive to realistic Republicans. Reagan's presence on the ticket could diminish this appeal without pulling enough Southern votes away from Governor Wallace.

We must also consider the effect of a Reagan vice-presidency on the country. The modern vice-president has important opportunities to mold public opinion and to shape the course of his party, as the Nixon and Humphrey tenures demonstrate. Moreover, the chance that the vice-president will succeed directly to the Presidency is always an important consideration. If Ronald Reagan is unqualified to be President, he is unqualified to be vice-president.

Even as this is written, Governor Reagan's comments continue to confirm our assessment of him. Late in May he announced that the answer to America's problems at home and abroad was to realize that they were not as complex as we believed and could be solved through the application of a few simple maxims. And he suggested that if peace talks were not successful by a certain date, the United States should invade North Vietnam. Such comments confirm our judgment that Governor Reagan should not accede to the highest national office, a judgment with which the people of California agree, according to polls taken there. The nation cannot afford to ignore that conclusion at this critical time. The stakes are too high.
n our April issue we criticized Mr. Nixon for not having responded constructively to the Report of the President's Commission on Civil Disorders. The Report endorsed private sector initiatives in the cities, the use of tax credits and the need for community programs. These things, we said, surely reflected Mr. Nixon's thoughts. Why didn't he say so?

Well, on April 25 and May 2 he did say so. In two radio speeches entitled "Bridges to Human Dignity," he urged black capitalism, private sector involvement and a new economic program for the nation's ghettos. He followed with a speech calling for a "new alignment" in American politics that would include, among others, "black militants" and "new liberals." This trilogy of speeches, coming in the wake of Mr. Nixon's strong behind-the-scenes stand in favor of the open housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, gave the former Vice-President's campaign the intellectual spark and the appearance of social concern that it had sorely lacked.

Regrettably, the speeches place disproportionate emphasis on tight spending limits; it is unlikely that our cities can be saved at the rock-bottom prices which Mr. Nixon advertises. Nor should speeches on "human dignity" ignore the importance of more adequately enforcing civil rights laws now on the books. But these points notwithstanding, the Nixon speeches do point to important forces for change both in the ghetto and in the business community.

The ghetto is beginning to be affected by a new breed of leaders, often well-educated and well-employed, but still imperfectly accepted in the white world. In disillusionment they have turned back to their own communities, where they now perceive superior opportunities for leadership, for investment and for service. They will soon be joined by the veterans of Vietnam and by an increasing number of black college graduates, all of whom will provide the ghetto with grassroots leadership that did not exist at the beginning of this decade. Republicans who want to build a new coalition in the nation's predominantly Democratic—and increasingly Negro—urban areas can ally themselves with the new black leaders by offering them the chance for ownership and self-help in the ghetto.

In the business community, meanwhile, there is a growing desire to do something about the cities. Some firms—notably in law, banking, finance, insurance, communications and advertising—are locked into the central cities by the nature of their business. Others see in the challenge of the urban crisis a way to improve their recruitment of young executive talent, to refurbish their corporate images and to reassert the social role of the private sector. American business is beginning to see its stake in improving the lot of the urban poor.

The ground has thus been prepared for a new partnership between resourceful black militants and enlightened white executives. Mr. Nixon is not the first to point this out, but he is the first to say it big on a national platform. For this he deserves high praise.

Would that Mr. Nixon's other recent statements were equally astute and judicious. But on what evidence did he base his contention that student demonstrations at Columbia were part of a radical battle plan to take over the nation's universities? The Dean of Columbia took time out from counteracting the demonstrations to brand Mr. Nixon's version of the events as know-nothing and irresponsible.

And surely, Mr. Nixon cannot expect "new liberals" and "black militants" to applaud his attempt to link the rise in the crime rate with recent Supreme Court decisions protecting individual rights in criminal proceedings. As a lawyer, he must know that other factors are responsible for increased crime: more autos, for instance, have meant more auto theft; lavish merchandizing displays have meant more shoplifting; a shift in the population structure toward arrest-prone groups—youth, urban non-whites—have meant a natural increase in crime; a lack of gun and weapons control has enabled the level of violence to escalate; more effective changes in procedures for reporting crimes since 1959 have somewhat inflated statistics; and surely a few long-term social forces are at work. Why pin the rap for all this on the Supreme Court?

A note on page 35 of this issue describes how a group of lawyers, by guaranteeing the kinds of police procedures that Mr. Nixon attacks, actually helped to reduce the level of violence in Philadelphia slums last summer. They showed how procedures that safeguard the rights of the individual may well have the effect of improving police-community relations in urban ghettos (where 90% of male Negroes are arrested at one time or another).

Mr. Nixon should take pains to revise his statements on the Supreme Court well before the nominating convention in Miami. For if nominated, he cannot expect his Democratic opponent to be as respectful of his lapses as Governors Romney, Reagan and Rockefeller, who have been loath to scratch the icon of party unity. Nor can he expect "new liberals," "black militants," "new Southerners" or even "old Republicans" to join a "new alignment" whose leader cannot decide how closely to align himself with his own better instincts.
NOTES FROM WASHINGTON

One of the ways to lay claim to national leadership is to build a solid record of commitment, initiative, and program. There are some Republicans in Washington who have been doing just that — and in a manner which the national constituency can hardly ignore. This column, from time to time, will look at that record.

- Probably one of the most remarkable efforts, by a group of nine Republicans, has been the development of the "Gradual Reciprocal Identifiable De-escalation" plan — offering a means by which steps toward de-escalation can be taken slowly and with complete verification — thereby building confidence on each side in the word and credibility of the other, and thus, eventually leading to the negotiating table. Congressmen F. Bradford Morse (Mass.), John R. Dellenback (Ore.), Marvin L. Esch (Mich.), Frank Horton (N.Y.), Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (Md.), Joseph M. McDade (Pa.), Charles A. Mosher (Ohio), Richard S. Schweiker (Pa.), and Robert T. Stafford (Vt.) presented the plan to Averell Harriman in April of 1967. In June, however, because the President and Secretary Rusk were not interested in their plan, the Congressmen were advised to present it to the public. McNamara, though, was intrigued by the GRID plan and ordered a study to determine the military feasibility of dropping the bombing by parallels.

- Editorial response to the GRID proposal was overwhelming — some 90 editorials appeared, 85% of which praised the idea. Columnist Holmes Alexander called Johnson's March 31 telecast a "transparent plagiarism." "In every important particular," he said, "Mr. Johnson's offer to restrict bombing and to hope for reciprocal de-escalation by Hanoi was similar to GRID." In April 1968, Under Secretary of State Katzenbach recognized in an interview with the Harvard radio station WHRB, the relevance and importance of Morse's proposals.

- More recent in the area of foreign affairs is a measure to establish a "peace by investment corporation" introduced by Senator Javits to create a public/private corporation which would funnel foreign aid to developing nations. Suggesting that "our future is intimately tied to the underdeveloped world, containing two-thirds of humanity — 2 billion people," Javits proposed that "Government and private enterprise cooperation would enable US investors, particularly small investors to participate in the growth of effective private enterprise in developing nations now heavily dependent on US governmental and official aid." His program is designed to expand the flow of US private investments by $1.25 billion. Other Republicans participating in the proposal were Senators Brooke, Dominick, Percy and Scott.

- Returning to the House side, over 70 Republican Congressmen led by Charles Goodell (N.Y) have endorsed the "Human Renewal Fund," a proposal that calls for establishing priorities of Federal spending. The program earmarks some $2.5 billion directly for human problems, especially in urban areas. The recommendations of the Congressmen list 23 items in the current budget which could be reduced, including deferral of supersonic transport development, reductions in European military personnel, and reductions in the civilian space program.

- Another group of 53 House Republicans filed the Manpower Act of 1968 along with Senators Javits and Protsy. The legislation would "assist private employers to hire and train 220,000 hard-core unemployed in 1969, as contrasted with only 70,000 under the Administration's present program." Four points are of particular interest:
  1) an immediate enactment of a Federal tax credit for employers hiring the hard-core unemployed for specified time periods;
  2) initiation of community service programs to provide work and training opportunities with both public and private employers in public service job fields;
  3) establishment of a Federally-chartered corporation providing technical assistance to employers of the hard-core unemployed;
  4) and a revised statement of purpose and direction to the Secretary of Labor to use high-speed job data systems.

- Senator Brooke has taken the initiative in an important field: the introduction of a number of bills implementing the Riot Commission recommendations. Provisions included in bills Brooke introduced are:
  1) application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to State and Federal employers;
  2) amendment of the Small Business Act to apply an acceptable credit risk standard for loans to small business concerns in certain high-risk areas;
  3) funds to be used toward ending de facto segregation as well as de jure;
  4) alteration of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act to distribute Title I funds more in line with the needs of the disadvantaged;
  5) establishment of a Joint Committee on Social Welfare.

- During the passage of the Civil Rights Bill of 1968, a small group of Republicans accomplished something that was not easy; the Goodell-Quie effort to save the Republican Party an embarrassment might never live down. As Evans and Novack put it, "The Republicans have been saved from the ignominy of defeating a civil rights bill." John Anderson, Clark MacGregor, Howard Robison, and Paul Findley led the search for 73 other Republican Congressmen who ultimately voted for the Bill. It is a shame that it was, in effect, an anti-leadership drive, but its success may provide a note of cautious hope that the House Republicans will contribute constructively to the national welfare and to their Party.

- On May 21, the Senate passed the most comprehensive Housing Bill of this decade. The central element of the bill is extensive new provision to make home ownership possible for low income families. The thrust for this new program came from the determined efforts of Senator Charles H. Percy, who in his freshman year as a Senator achieved the unprecedented feat of securing the co-sponsorship of all Republican Senators for a major GOP initiative, the National Home Ownership Foundation Act.
Vietnam: the Talks and the Lessons

Last month’s report of casualties, the greatest we and our North Vietnamese opponents have suffered to date, bitterly contrasts with the hopes that lie in the discussions now under way in Paris. This paradox of continued war in Vietnam, with its casualties and cost, while the world watches and hopes for peace to come about in Paris, is what we must expect for the months to come. The process of negotiation will very likely be long, complicated and frustrating, like the three negotiations we have previously conducted with Asian Communists in Korea, Indo-China and Laos. In each negotiation, in the end, hostilities did cease and a political settlement was achieved. Assuming that a cessation of bombing is agreed to and negotiations begin, we have reason to expect that there will be a solution to the war in Vietnam. The important question is whether the peace will be durable and in what ways our future foreign policy will be affected by the outcome of negotiations.

The Korean talks began on July 10, 1951, and did not end until two years later on July 27, 1953. Fifteen open sessions were held in Geneva and 575 meetings in Panmunjom, and hundreds of unrecorded private meetings. That portion of the Geneva Conference concerning Indo-China began on April 26, 1954, and ended on the 21st of July 1954, after over 30 meetings. The Loas conference began on May 16, 1961, ending over a year later after 87 meetings were held. I think it is clear from these three conferences that we cannot expect a speedy resolution of the issues that we are now being discussed by the negotiators from the United States and North Vietnam. The leaders and the people of this country must be aware of what the issues are and what we can achieve through negotiations.

If the opening statements of both Xuan Thuy, the leader of the North Vietnamese delegation, and Mr. Averell Harriman are carefully examined, we can see in outline the basic problems that are at issue. Both the statements of North Vietnam and the United States I believe to be consistent expressions of the respective viewpoints. The manner of expression and rhetoric are of course different, reflecting ideological and cultural differences. But it is vital to understand what the essential differences are in order to come to a solution.

First, the historical perspectives and philosophical understandings of the purposes of the conflict held by the two parties—the U.S. and North Vietnam—are at odds. To the North Vietnamese, the United States is aggressing on the soil of Vietnam. As they view it, the Vietnamese are not attacking American soil. They are not launching attacks on Hawaii and California. The North Vietnamese dismiss the United States’ contention that it is because of the aggression on South Vietnam by North Vietnam that the United States has had to bring its troops to safeguard the freedom of South Vietnam in accord with its commitment to the Saigon government. The North Vietnamese expressed their view on May 13 in the following way:

In fact, Vietnam is a unified country of some thousand year old history, the Vietnamese are a diligent people who deeply love freedom and peace and are endowed with a tradition of heroic and undaunted struggle against foreign aggression. Vietnam is one, the Vietnamese nation is one. It is the United States that has, from the other shore of the Pacific, brought its expeditionary troops to South Vietnam to invade it and prevent the re-unification of Vietnam. The Vietnamese people are thus forced to struggle against U.S. aggression for national salvation.

Mr. Harriman stated the objectives of the United States Administration:

“Our objective in Vietnam can be stated succinctly and simply—to preserve the right of the South Vietnamese people to determine their own future without outside interference or coercion . . . North Vietnamese military and subversive forces have no right to be in South Vietnam.

This is the basic difference: North Vietnam does not recognize the existence of two separate Vietnams. The United States does not recognize on its part the claim of North Vietnam that the division of Vietnam is without legality. In essence, what the negotiations will decide is whether there will be in time a unified Vietnam or whether there will continue to be a divided Vietnam. The issues of de-escalation of hostilities, such international peace-keeping arrangements as may be set up and such political and economic agreements as may be made for the future will be shaped and conditioned by how the basic issue of whether there shall be one Vietnam or two Vietnams is finally resolved. Whether a settlement of the war in Vietnam will be lasting will depend upon how the United States decides to exercise its role of world leadership.

SELF-IMPOSED LIMITS

And it is upon the nature of our world leadership—our foreign policy after the Vietnamese settlement—that I would like to focus my attention. The agonizing and bitter experience of Vietnam has had disturbing effects upon the United States and people throughout the world. We have learned that having more power—more military force and economic
strength—than any other nation in the world cannot of itself shape the world as we would like to have it. This inability is largely due to the principles and traditions of the kind of nation we have become—a nation that believes in the rule of law and the settlement of disputes through reason—a nation that is reluctant to use violent means except in an act of self-defense.

We have discovered in Vietnam that despite all our power is limited. We have discovered that the limitation of power is largely self-imposed. We have come to recognize that, unless the United States is directly threatened by an enemy whose objective is the destruction of the United States, we will not use our power in ways that would assure military victory through all-out war that would lead to the complete destruction of the enemy. Therefore, the first lesson we have learned from Vietnam is the limitation of our great power.

MORE TROOPS NEEDED?

The implications of involvement in conflicts anywhere in the world cannot be isolated to that area. The implications of action even in the most remote corners of the globe can affect our relations with other countries in serious and damaging ways. Actions taken 11,000 miles away can, as we are so painfully aware, affect the domestic affairs and tranquility of our own country. So a second lesson we have learned from Vietnam is that acts of intervention—particularly military intervention—must be considered in the light of our overall domestic and international priorities. Clearly, one effect of our tragic involvement in Vietnam has been that we have failed to consider with a balanced perspective the problems that most demand our attention. Because of Vietnam, the problems of our cities, of our minority groups, of education and health, not to mention important security alliances, have not received the attention they deserve. Of this need to reassess our national priorities we have become aware—hopefully not too late.

Of course, troubled conditions in Southeast Asia and in other regions of the world could confront the United States with new dilemmas of the kind we faced in Vietnam. Already, in Thailand and Laos and Cambodia there are serious problems of insurgency. And for the past few years, the American military presence and/or influence in these countries' affairs has grown, largely as a result of the war in Vietnam. The United States will be faced, and I believe in the very near future, with the necessity to make decisions whether to send more troops, more military equipment and more economic aid, so that these countries may meet the challenges made by insurgent groups supported by outside forces. In Thailand, for example, in 1960 after 10 years of assistance, the U.S. had only 500 advisors; in 1962, 8,000; in 1965, 25,000—we now have 47,000 men based in Thailand. It is my hope that new decisions to send additional troops will not be made without careful attention to our national priorities and with full consultation with the Congress and the full awareness of the people of the United States.

A third lesson we have learned from Vietnam is that unless the government of a nation we are trying to help has the will and capacity to meet the aspirations of its people and their demands for greater justice, no amount of military assistance to these governments will be able to achieve the goal of creating a strong and stable country. There are many responsible leaders who have maintained that our security was never importantly threatened in Vietnam, and that no matter what the outcome of the conflict between the governments of Hanoi and Saigon, American security interests would not have suffered. On the other hand, there are many who believed with the Administration and continue to believe that American security is very much involved in the outcome of the struggle in Vietnam. We are all aware of the gradual and almost imperceptible way in which the United States became more deeply involved in Vietnam. In the early stages of our involvement, United States security interests were not importantly involved. Because of the growing scale of our involvement—an involvement whose larger implications we did not conceive of—our security interests in time became an issue of overwhelming importance.

In view of the problem that such involvements as Vietnam create, the Tonkin Gulf hearings held by the Senate during the past year served a constructive purpose. What the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was attempting to do in its hearings was not to place blame; rather it attempted to discover if orderly and workable decision-making procedures could be identified and institutionalized, so that those who have the responsibility to make basic decisions concerning the security of the United States can have the time, the understanding and the full knowledge of the facts of a situation required to make a fully deliberate and rational decision as to whether involvement is in the overall interests of the United States. The need for effective decision-making procedures is the fourth lesson we have learned from Vietnam.

CREATIVE DIPLOMACY

Finally, I believe it has become clear that we have placed too much stress upon the use of military force as a means to organize the peace. It will, of course, continue to be necessary to maintain our pre-eminent military strength. In the future, there will undoubtedly be occasions when the forces of the United States will have no other recourse but to fight in order to defend its basic security interests. We must find new ways usefully to assist the creative and positive social and political forces in the emerging nations. A greater emphasis on creative diplomacy than is now the case—on international organizations, on economic assistance and on the interchange of the business, trade, technical and cultural activities of nations—would do more, in my view, to promote durable peace than a continued reliance and emphasis on military security arrangements so dominant during the past ten years. So this is a fifth lesson of Vietnam: that we must make greater efforts to use peaceful means of organizing the peace than we have
forced to ask where we have failed and what we must do in order to succeed. I have always had confidence in the purposes of our nation, and I continue to believe these purposes are just. Our failure in Vietnam has not been one of our national integrity. Let us be grateful rather than despondent, for the harsh and bitter experience of Vietnam has given the people and leaders of the United States the opportunity to re-examine our principles, to reorder our priorities with reason and justice, and as a result, I believe we will be able to unite and strengthen our country and re-establish our position of moral leadership in the world.

THE CITIES

Black Power Progress Report

At last, Republicans are coming to understand the true meaning of constructive Black Power. The consequences of this new understanding—not all limited to the liberal wing of the Party—can be a near-fantastic revolution in the American political system. It could gain for black Americans a full chance to share in America's prosperity and wealth. For Republicans, it could mean the allegiance of a majority of American voters.

The underlying thesis is simple. Black people do not want an upholstered poorhouse. They want to own their share of America and to control their own communities. What did the Pilgrims of the Massachusetts Bay Company want? Nothing more, nothing less.

Partial recognition of this by Republican conservatives came as early as July, 1966, in the newsletter of the Goldwaterite Free Society Association. In a feature entitled "Black Power — It's Gonna Be a Long Hot Decade," FSA said:

Black Power—leaving to one side its uglier form—has at least the one virtue of calling upon the Negro to think and do for himself. It could provide the stimulus for independent thought and grassroots problem solving—maybe even the nucleus of responsible political organization in Negro ghettos.

Jump ahead to July, 1967, and to the black side of the developing alliance. The speaker is Bill Mercer, now chief of a businessman-Negro effort to produce jobs for black people in Newark. The forum—the National Conference on Black Power; the audience—heavily sprinkled with black revolutionaries. His message:

I happen to believe capitalism is a pretty good thing . . . The big hangup is that up to now the US has not included black people (in it). I say that we make the great attempt now, along with all the other efforts to achieve black power, to get our just share—a piece of the action so far denied; and then if rebuffed, and only then, join in the overthrow of the present capitalistic system.

Again a Republican speaks: Senator Charles Percy, addressing Chicago's Community Renewal Society on November 27, 1967:

We must work to create a working alliance between conservatives and the people of the ghettos. For in truth, they are saying the same things, but each in language only slightly comprehensible to the other. I am convinced that if the way could be found to convert the language of the country club in to the language of (Chicago's West Side), and vice versa, conservatives and militant slum dwellers alike would realize their common goals: individual liberty, equal opportunity, self-reliance, independence, local initiative and responsibility. This is emphatically not the language of many who have for years served as the self-anointed interpreters for the urban poor.

Finally the Negro and Republican streams merge—at the Michigan GOP's Seminar on Metropolitan Problems in Detroit on January 19, 1968. The speaker is Dr. Nathan Wright, Jr., who had chaired the Newark Black Power Conference the previous summer. Said Dr. Wright:

Black Americans . . . are largely conservative . . . They want to see the life of this Nation fulfilled . . . The basic tenets of the Nation provide ample room for well-nigh radical realignments within the frameworks of the preservation of the self-interests of us all.

April 5, 1968: a black legislator from Watts, Los Angeles, is approvingly quoted in a major speech as saying, "One thing California and the nation have to realize is that the black community and the conservative community are coming much closer together. Liberals tend to intellectualize the question out of existence." The man who quoted him — Governor Ronald Reagan, before the Women's National Press Club in Washington!

The same day as Reagan’s speech, the Times reported from Cleveland that Floyd McKissick, director of CORE, had urged American business to set up
factories in Negro areas and sell them off to black organizations. "Our intention is not to establish a new welfare burden for present property owners and wage earners," said McKissick: "Our intention is to establish a series of economic institutions whereby black residents of Cleveland can be owners of capital instruments and wage earners, rather than welfare recipients.

Richard Nixon has also added his endorsement to this growing consensus. In two powerful and persuasive national radio addresses entitled "Bridges to Human Dignity" (April 25 and May 2), the GOP presidential frontrunner outlined a philosophy and a program for helping the black man gain a real share in America. Build bridges between the ghetto and American business. Develop black capitalism.

In order to have human rights, people need property rights—and never has this been more true than in the case of the Negro today . . . he must have the economic power that comes from ownership, and the security and independence that comes from economic power. What most of the militants are asking is not separation, but to be included in—not as supplicants, but as owners, as entrepreneurs to have a share of the wealth and a piece of the action. . . . [Our new approach] must be oriented toward more black ownership, for from this more can flow the rest—black pride, black jobs, black opportunity and yes, black power, in the best, the constructive sense of that often misapplied term.

A week later, in the second address, Nixon came out squarely and with specifics for black home ownership and tax incentives and capital for black-owner business and industry.

As if echoing the Nixon statements, CORE, on May 8, issued a statement announcing the preparation of just such a program for presentation to the Congress and the Nation.

Ownership and control—there is where black militants and Republicans are finding common ground. After all, who in our society subscribes to the thesis, "Black is beautiful?" Black militants and businessmen regarding the balance sheet.

The striking thing is that the most perceptive of black people are rapidly coming to understand that endlessly multiplying dole programs will perpetuate them in economic serfdom. Programs to help them gain the ownership and control of wealth will get them out of dependency and into the American system. And they realize that Republicans—not Democrats—are ripe to advance this cause. Will Republicans, conservative and liberal, recognize these truths in time? Or will some aspiring Democrat abandon the last thirty years of his Party's tradition and get there first? Let us fervently hope that Republicans will quickly move ahead with this cause, for the sake of the Party and of the nation. And of our economic soul brothers in the ghetto.

—JOHN McCLAUGHRY

Mr. McClungbry was one of four authors who launched the discussion "Should We Back Black Power?" in the March 1968 Ripon FORUM.

CAMPAIGN MANAGEMENT

A Happier Red

D. Martin Wolf, one of several Ripon members at the Republican National Committee's Campaign Management Seminar (Ray Humphreys, Director), has waived his right to privacy and given us access to his confidential diary:

—May 3

The Eastern States Republican Campaign Management Seminar began today at Princeton University. The brochure for the seminar announces that:

How to do it is the question of every campaign.
How to research the issues, raise the money, and talk to the voters—all part of the big "how to" question . . . HOW TO WIN!

Still more pastoral retreat than engaged university, Princeton seems an ideal place to be asking such rah-rah questions.

—May 4

Amidst the mass of materials handed to us there is a letter from Ray Bliss which states:

For many years my creed has been that once a candidate is nominated on our ticket he is our Republican nominee, and we should all join together and go out and do the job of electing him.

This veiled reference to recent history seems superfluous in the context of the seminar—the issue which we constantly debate is not ideology but the relative merits of political organization versus mass media advertising as a means of winning elections. Respectful attention is given the pros who speak about the importance of such things as scheduling, precinct organization, the use of volunteers, fund-raising, and how to get out the vote, but the most vocal enthusiasm is reserved for the media men, particularly Robert Goodman, an advertising agency head specializing in TV spots.

Goodman shows a series of spots designed to promote candidate images. With various subtle differences, they all show men on the move, with appropriate musical backgrounds and close-ups of clapping hands and vigorously striding feet. Goodman tells us that the goal is not to show the candidate's position on various issues—"positions lose votes"—but to demonstrate "sensitivity to problems." From the commercial he shows us, it is impossible to distinguish between Agnew in Maryland and Gardner in North Carolina. Such distinctions do not seem to trouble Goodman who advises us that he generally allot one minute to project a personality and twenty seconds for an issue. Most of the spots he shows us are imaginative and effective.

The most lighthearted presentation of the day is offered by Murray Roman, who specializes in the gadgetry of political campaigning. He sells everything from headquarters decorating kits to ingenious play-tape machines to life-size cardboard cut-outs of the
prospective candidate. One of his more interesting pieces of intelligence is the fact that a customer is using one of Campaign Communications Institute of America's light-weight projector devices to put his beaming face on the side of the Houston Astrodome, after baseball games. The seminar members eagerly line up to pay $2.50 for Mr. Roman's catalogue.

During dinner we are treated to a beautifully constructed speech on the necessity of developing themes during a campaign. The speech is given by Ike's speechwriter, Bryce Harlow, a man with a strong intellect and an impressive, rare talent for talking about politics without mangling the English language. The old pros pay only perfunctory attention, their minds busy conjuring up pictures of themselves as life-size cardboard figures.

The evening concludes with a session on budgeting led by Lee Nunn, who finds time to warn that the Republican Party is the only defender standing between this nation and Socialism. Nobody reacts or really hears this element in his presentation. Ray Bliss can sleep peacefully. —May 5

The morning session is short. We write notes to prospective members of future seminars in other sections of the country.

As we prepare to leave, Princeton men and their dates sun themselves on the thick grassy lawns which give the campus the appearance of a well-groomed golf course. Others play touch football, in which the important thing is to win, win, win. —May 6

Back in Boston, browsing through the mass of literature we accumulated over the weekend we find the following account of campaign techniques by a gubernatorial candidate: "As far as devices are concerned we came to the conclusion that people get an impression whether you're a dull, stolid, issue type or whether there's a little bit of fun involved in your campaign ... ."

In 1966, I decided that this campaign was going to have a happier feel. We would transmit this with PR devices, more imaginative visual designs and more appealing colors, warmer colors. We looked for example for a happy red, a nice happy red, as distinguished from a serious, unhappy red.

Hubert Humphrey may yet find he has no monopoly on the politics of joy. He certainly has no monopoly on the joys of politics.

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**NOMINATION GAME**

**Which Way Finch?**

Nixon can't win it, not on the first ballot. He's said as much himself. The reason—a plethora of favorite sons, some looking for publicity, others to be brokers and still others running as favorite sons to consolidate support in their state for one or another of the real presidential contenders. As a group, the favorite sons will receive enough votes on the first ballot to deny Nixon the nomination.

The real Nixon push will come on the second ballot. Then he will try to take Ohio away from Rhodes, Texas from Tower and a good part of Michigan and New Jersey away from Romney and Case.

How will Nixon stampede these delegations from their leaders? One guess is by undercutting Reagan in the California delegation. If part of the California delegation breaks to Nixon on the second ballot, panic will sweep opposition camps, Nixon will look irresistible, a rout will ensue.

The key man for such an operation: former Nixon campaign manager, now California Lieutenant Governor, Robert Finch. To win a piece of the California delegation from Reagan, Nixon must persuade Finch that he should undercut Reagan, much as Nixon himself led a bloc of California delegates out from under Governor Earl Warren at the 1952 convention to give the nomination to Eisenhower.

Will Finch do it? Not if he behaves like a professional and keeps his own career in mind. For those who follow Republican affairs closely see big things ahead for Robert Finch—California's governorship, even the Presidency. Right now his star is smothered by Reagan, as Lindsay's of New York is by Rockefeller. To shine, Finch must get Reagan out of California and the best way for him to do that is to promote Reagan onto a winning national ticket.

McCarthy backers and Rockefeller fans have a common problem—their men are relatively unpopular with party members but very popular indeed with independent-minded voters and those in the opposition party. In New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Indiana, McCarthy lost the big cities and the knee-jerk Democratic vote but made big inroads in Republican areas—the farms, small towns and suburbs—swing areas in a general election. McCarthy trails in the polls among Democrats but is the strongest Democratic candidate when pitted against any Republican. So if they're interested in victory in November, rather than popularity in their own factional tent, the Democrats will nominate McCarthy.

Rockefeller's situation is the mirror image of McCarthy's. He's popular with labor and in the big city, normally Democratic areas where the usual Republican fares poorly, but he is less strong in traditional Republican areas. Like McCarthy, Rockefeller trails in polls of Republicans but is the strongest Republican in polls of the electorate at large. Rocky is thus not most popular among Republicans, but he is the most popular Republican.

The Nixon camp's private response to the Massachusetts primary—a slap at Governor Volpe's ill-concealed hope for second spot on a Nixon ticket. The word in the Nixon camp: "Thank God we got Volpe off our back." Massachusetts observers now concede that if any Bay Stater will find a place on the national GOP ticket, it will be Ed Brooke, who was the greatest beneficiary of Rockefeller's write-in victory.

—JESSE BENTON FREMONT

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They also serve who only sit on their hands

Patrick Nugent, now loading bombs in Vietnam, is one of the few Air Reservists called up during the Pueblo incident in January who is contributing very much to America's military efforts. The public seems to assume that the 14,700 airmen called up in January and the 24,000 Reservists activated by the Army, Navy and Air Force in April were desperately needed. Yet, with the possible exception of the 10,000 in the later call-up who are slated for Vietnam (the dark side of President Johnson's quest for peace), few of the men seem to be very busy.

The Pentagon will tell you otherwise. When a Wall Street Journal article by Norman Sklarewitz revealed in March that most of the activated reservists were spending their duty-time reading the newspapers and worrying (the FORUM had reported the same thing earlier), an order came down from Air Force headquarters to compile a list of the “excess” personnel in each unit. Some units, correctly concerned that their men would be sent away on extended “temporary” duty elsewhere, listed few as excess; others listed many. Later, another request came down to do the same checking over again and this time to be accurate. In one unit, the final list of “excess” personnel reached a total of nearly three-fourths.

What, then, will happen to these men? It is possible, though unlikely, that they'll be released. More probable is that they'll be sent on temporary duty of up to six months at a stretch. The law does not allow a permanent change of station for an activated Reservist, but temporary duty, which can be extended indefinitely merely by sending the man on repeated tours to the same place, is a way of circumventing the law.

Meanwhile, some 1200 Air Force support troops activated in April and told to report in May were released before they even got on base; they were not “necessary” after all. Apparently the Air Force wants to limit the number of men it doesn't know what to do with.

Yet confusion prevails about the men still being kept. Even those on temporary duty report a dominant routine of inactivity. And life for the personnel listed as “essential” to their home units is not much busier. One such airman, salaried by the taxpayer since last January, gives this account of a typical week’s activities:

**Monday:**
- Typed 1 1/2 page report—25 minutes
- Typed letter to all sections—45 minutes
- Picked up mail and emptied wastebasket—10 minutes

**Tuesday:**
- Filing—6 minutes
- Trip to headquarters building for a form—10 minutes
- Discussed training with NCO — 8 minutes
- Picked up mail and emptied wastebasket—10 minutes

**Wednesday:**
- Revision of files system—45 minutes
- Typed letter—30 minutes
- Picked up mail and emptied wastebasket—10 minutes

**Thursday:**
- Attended Commanders Call briefing & films—1 1/2 hours
- Picked up mail and emptied wastebasket—10 minutes

**Friday:**
- Put return addresses on blank envelopes—30 minutes
- Filing—5 minutes
- Picked up mail and emptied wastebasket—10 minutes

Similar reports come in from airmen in other activated units. To kill the time not spent in busywork, some former junior bank executives, lawyers and teachers in one outfit published a secret newsletter, The Underground Airman, for two weeks before the brass cracked down. Others write their Congressmen; one writes a different Representative and Senator each day. A man in a Western unit, whose low military pay and high civilian debts had forced him onto public welfare, attempted suicide.

Financial problems are a source of lesser concern to perhaps a majority of men, and unfortunately, the military has been reluctant to grant hardship discharges. Family problems are also a strain, not ameliorated much by the permission granted to the men to commute daily to their homes, a 100-mile-a-day trip, or more, for many.

Many of these sacrifices are endured as S.O.P., of course, by men in the regular forces, and the Reservists (excluding 10,000 of those called up in April) are grateful, at least, that they're not going to Vietnam. But the questions persists, “Why are we here?” and “When will we be released?” The Sergeant Major of the Air Force has requested the airmen to stop sending such questions to Congress and ask them instead of their NCO's, which is a source of general mirth. But the Sergeant Major has a point: Congress has been just as vague about the call-up as the military.

One occasional answer that makes partial sense is that the men are the back-up for the depleted strategic reserve. Their high calling, it seems, was expressed by Milton: “They also serve who only stand and wait.”

But the enlisted men, who were fully mobilized from training status to active duty in only 24 hours last January, reply, why can't we wait just as well at home?
Though he had been an extremely liberal Democrat and an extremely conservative Republican, when Ronald Reagan became a candidate for Governor of California he did not sound like an extremist. Eschewing labels, calling for party unity and effectively capitalizing on anti-Brown feeling among Democrats and Independents, Reagan turned a simple and straightforward appeal for “common sense” solutions into a monumental rout of the hapless Pat Brown. It is this “new” Reagan who remains such a mystery to those who would evaluate his record as Governor or predict his political fortunes. As Governor he has developed a distinctive approach to administration; he has evolved an effective political style that is in itself a formidable innovation in American politics; and he has staked out positions on the issues in deeds as well as words. Hence this special report is devoted not to the distant past but to the recent Reagan record.

Illustrating the report are cartoons by Paul Conrad of the Los Angeles Times.

I. The Will Not to Govern

If there was a major theme in Ronald Reagan’s Inaugural Address, it was his call for a Creative Society in almost Kennedyesque fashion:

The path we will chart ... demands much of those chosen to govern, but also from those who did the choosing. (It) turns away from any idea that government and those who serve it are omnipotent. It is ... impossible to follow unless we have faith in the collective wisdom and genius of the people ... Government will lead but not rule, listen but not lecture. It is the path of a Creative Society ... If this is a dream, it is a good dream ... Let this day mark the beginning.

But what is this “Creative Society?” Unlike the New Frontier or Great Society, it is not primarily a legislative program. It appears rather to be a spirit in the statehouse, a quality of leadership — featuring blue ribbon commissions, task force reports, voluntarism and reliance on private enterprise. The actual intricacies of government seem to play a very small role in it. There is very little evidence that Governor Reagan conceived of the legislative process as having a function to perform, and certainly the Governor’s lack of interest in legislation soon became evident in his weekly press conferences.

In his weekly press conference held on March 14, 1967, excerpted at length below, Governor Reagan demonstrated this attitude:

Q. Do you think that you’ll have the rest of your program ready to present to them (the legislature) by that time (April 11), such things as air pollution control programs?

A. Well, I haven’t talked since then to my legislative task force on this, so I don’t know the state of their preparations. I’ve often wondered why there are so many laws that have to be passed and maybe we should try to see how many we could do away with. I’ll check on the task force and I’ll have to find out where we stand. There are only a few more things in keeping with the promises that I made during the campaign that I feel a necessity to introduce.

Q. What are they, Governor?

A. Oh, I’m trying to remember now: agriculture, crime, budget and the tax program (these were programs already introduced). I’m going to have to check up on this and find out what still remains. Well, oh, I do know one particular is with regard to the judges, the appointment of judges, the merit plan. And I could take some coaching from the sidelines if anyone can recall any legislative program.

Mr. Beck (Press Sec.): Reorganization; I think.

A. (continuing). Oh, reorganization; that’s right. That hasn’t gone in yet. Those are the two main ones. (Preliminary transcript, Press Conference of March 14, 1967, provided by the Office of the Governor.)

In view of the Governor’s well earned reputation as a man who does his “homework” and has an impressive capacity to retain and recite long lists of facts and figures, his unfamiliarity with his own legislative program is striking. An explanation for his vagueness may lie in an observation made to us by a Republican state legislator, who said “Reagan just doesn’t like to govern.” That is to say, Governor Reagan sees himself as the public man, the communicator of ideas, the man responsible for setting the basic thrust and direction of
government, but he would rather forget the details of government. As such, he feels more comfortable making a public appeal for more responsible and efficient government than he does spending the tedious hours of labor required to make government actually work.

The legislator described a minor incident which he felt typified this attitude. He had gone to the Governor’s office to discuss the details of a bill in which they both had an interest. The Governor was courteous and gracious in receiving him, he said, but throughout their conversation Reagan displayed the annoying habit of glancing out the window of his first floor office and waving and smiling to school groups passing by on their tours of the Capitol. It seemed clear that the Governor placed far more emphasis on his role as a public figure than on his function as a problem-solving draftsman of legislative programs.

Reagan’s personal disposition against any intricate involvement in the processes of government roughly parallels his vision of the limited role government itself should play in the lives and environment of the people. Voluntarism, free enterprise, the independent sector, these are the forces he conceives as best able to solve social problems, with government’s role limited to the establishment of commissions and task forces. For those who believe governmental intervention or planning is necessary for progress, his response is a characteristically simple one: “The West was built without any area redevelopment, and cities destroyed by flood and fire were rebuilt without urban renewal.”

A newspaper account of Reagan’s views expressed late in the gubernatorial election stresses this theme. Describing the Republican candidate’s views on disaster relief and state’s rights, the report said:

He added that even in flood disasters, such as the ravaged part of Northern California two winters ago, greater efforts should be made to provide aid from just within the state without calling on the federal government for help.

Reagan said if the governor, after such a disaster, would name a California citizens committee to organize local help for disaster areas, “we could solve the problems without having to set foot across the borders of the state.” (Sacramento Bee, Aug. 6, 1966)

Implicit in these remarks was an attack on intellectuals and others who insisted that modern social problems were complex and difficult.

Reagan’s view was strikingly apparent in his Inaugural when he said, “For many years now, you and I have been shushed like children and told there are no simple answers to the complex problems which are beyond our comprehension. Well the truth is, there are simple answers—those just are not easy ones.”

There can be no question, in carefully scrutinizing Mr. Reagan’s record as Governor—both his public statements and his administrative actions—that this brief, declarative statement forms a fundamentally important plank in his philosophy of government.

There is, indeed, a recurrent principle in Reagan’s public statements that does really seem to reduce social problems to a simple proposition. It may roughly be summarized as follows (although Reagan himself has never expressed it precisely this way): evil, pain and suffering exist in the world because there are evil forces at work in the world; it is therefore the task of the statesman or public servant to identify, define and isolate that evil force and confront it, or root it out, with power. This simple confrontation theory of politics is applied with as much fervor in the case of campus demonstrations (student militants are the evil force; prompt calling in of police is the solution) as it is in the case of the Vietnam War (the international Communist movement is the evil force; invasion of North Vietnam, threat of nuclear attack, and generally unlimited military pressure is the solution). Fight fire with fire; confront evil with a show of force; that’s the only thing these people understand—regardless of whether the enemy is Mario Savio, Stokely Carmichael or Ho Chi Minh. And in all cases, compromise is unthinkable. Reagan tends to see a Munich analogy behind every issue—domestic and foreign.

Hence, Reagan’s dichotomy between what is “easy” and what is “simple” seems eminently sensible to him. To suggest that there may be a multiplicity of causes for a given problem, or that the complexity of a situation may make precise solution difficult, is an elaborate heresy promulgated by foggy intellectuals who have not the courage or decisiveness to isolate and destroy the evil force primarily responsible.

MINI-MEMOS

For Governor Reagan, there is usually a fairly obvious “right” way to accomplish a given social or governmental goal (it may not be easy to accomplish, of course, but that is because of the difficulty in overcoming the opposing forces, not because the solution is somehow obscured from view)—and just as certainly there is a wrong way. The consequence is that in several instances, (e.g. the mental retardation and mental health crises, described below), Governor Reagan has appeared to be willing to dismantle a governmental program, if it is going about its goal the “wrong” way, even before a properly functioning program can be devised to take its place. He seems convinced that private enterprise or a citizens commission can be relied upon to fill the gap without prior encouragement or planning by government.

Governor Reagan’s preference for the simple approach can be seen not only in the decisions and statements he has made but also in the very decision-making process by which he arrives at them. Newsweek described it as follows:

The Cabinet secretaries produce one-page memoranda in which problems for the Governor’s eyes are rigorously boiled down to four paragraphs headed “issue,” “facts,” “reasoning” and “conclusions and recommendations.” Reagan aides are a little bit sensitive about the mini-memos, but Cabinet secretary William P. Clark, Jr. stoutly insists: “It has been found that almost any issue can be reduced to a single page.” (Newsweek, May 22, 1967, p. 30)

These “mini-memos,” as Newsweek called them, are a carryover from the gubernatorial campaign, when Rea-
gan issued a series of "position papers" somewhat shorter than some found in other campaigns (John Lindsay's often ran to over 100 pages on a single issue). Every single issue to which Reagan addressed himself in the campaign was boiled down to a single page — in simple, straightforward, easily readable but vague language — and mimeographed under the billing, "Ronald Reagan Speaks Out On the Issues."

Reagan has frequently translated his preference for the simple into open hostility with the intellectual community — although more often by action than by word. Occasionally, however, he lapses into language more typical of George Wallace than of himself, such as in the following excerpt from a speech delivered in South Carolina:

... The philosophy of the New Deal, the New Order or the Great Society would take us back to the nineteenth century, to the rule of the many by the few, even if the few are a so-called intellectual elite in the nation's capital. (Oakland Tribune, Sept. 30, 1967)

Whatever one's view of the "so-called intellectual elite" (a favorite Wallace phrase) there is no denying that Governor Reagan understands and articulates with great insight the debilitating effects of a huge unwieldy bureaucracy — the dead weight, the buck passing, the waste and inefficiency. This is for him one of the "simple issues." But his lack of interest in the details of administration coupled with his preference for confrontation politics has made him peculiarly unable to bring his own bureaucracies under control. Reagan consistently opts for the meat cleaver approach. He cuts back programs, without having adequate replacements for them. Bureaucracy may be a "simple evil" but getting rid of it takes great patience for detail. Ronald Reagan seems to lack this patience. At a time when people in California and throughout the Nation are increasingly looking to Republicans to bring rational and efficient administration to the bureaucratic jungles in statehouses and in Washington, California's governor has displayed neither the skills nor the inclination to succeed in this area. He talks simply and well, about government but in the last analysis — "He just doesn't like to govern."

II. The Reagan Style

Though the Governor often handles crises in a way that emphasizes confrontations with evil and the rooting out of conspiracies, in advocating his positions he displays none of the doctrinaire clumsiness of a Barry Goldwater. He has evolved a number of techniques for presenting his opinions smoothly, so that they fire up the right wing without alienating others.

One favorite technique is using the code words of militant conservatives without advocating their positions. For instance, at the summer meeting of the Young Republican National Federation in Omaha, Governor Reagan, interpreting the 1966 election results, accentuated the negative. The 1966 electorate, he said, voted against a war on poverty which poverty is losing.

And because most people believe in reward for productive labor, they voted against giving that reward to those who are able but unwilling to work.

In rapid fire, the Governor cited four more examples of what "they (the voters in 1966) voted against." The largely conservative YR's loved it, and yet despite the negative thrust, the average "moderate" would find it hard to pin down any negative statement that unambiguously represented Reagan's own views.

It's not that Governor Reagan is against the poor — the trouble with the poverty program is that it is losing the war. And as he said, most people do, in fact, believe in rewards for productive labor (who doesn't?) — Governor Reagan's quarrel with welfare is that it rewards some who are "able but unwilling to work" (about 5% of the rolls in California, according to most estimates), not that it should necessarily be abolished. In this manner, the Governor frequently touches on code-words (such as "law and order" or "able but unwilling to work") which have great appeal on the right, without committing himself to an unequivocal trap that will antagonize the middle.

Another of the Governor's effective techniques is the destruction of a "straw man" to establish a moderate tone while still exciting the Right. For example, when asked about his frequent criticism of the United Nations, the Governor explained gratuitously that he does not want to blow the UN up (an unassailably moderate position), but that he thought some structural changes were overdue. "We made the mistake," he added, "of putting United States foreign policy at the service of the UN."*

One of the most effective components of the Reagan style is his capacity to answer questions — no matter how difficult — with an appropriate analogy, childhood story or other "common sense" example. He does not appear to be ducking the question, but then again he doesn't really answer it directly either. He succeeds in giving a vivid impression of his view without pinning himself down unequivocally.

Examples:

On Urban Renewal:

The West was built without an area redevelopment plan, and cities destroyed by flood and fire were

*(Look, November 1, 1966)
rebuilt without renewal (cited earlier)

On East-West Trade:

If the Russians want us to send them wheat, it would be a lot easier if we didn't have to go through the Berlin Wall. (to a Yale student during his recent Chubb Fellowship)

On "Building Bridges" with the Communist Bloc:

A bridge has two ends, and we seem to be the only ones building. This country should be willing to coexist, but not on the basis that we wake up each morning to see if the Russians are smiling or frowning. We must show that there's a price we will not pay for peace and they better not cross the line. (Hartford Times, December 8, 1967, p. 6B.)

In each of the above instances, the Governor has gotten his point across with a simple and understandable analogy or image and with an ample supply of that priceless political commodity, ambiguity. His observation about urban renewal is indisputably true—but of marginal relevance. He's not really against going soft, they'd better not cross that line!

In areas where Reagan feels inexperienced he often states his own position by attributing it to someone else (usually quite well respected) and then agreeing with him.

Examples:

Reagan said he agreed with Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State, that there is no possibility of negotiating our way out of Vietnam. He said the only way to get the North Vietnamese to the conference table is to make them hurt too much not to. (Hartford Times, December 5, 1967.)

* * *

Reagan reminded newsmen that he agreed with Ike on the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam: "The last person in the world who should know we wouldn't use them is the enemy. He should go to bed every night afraid that we might." (Newsweek, May 22, 1967, p. 30.)

Governor Reagan also wins his audience with a masterful arsenal of well-turned phrases and humorous quips. At virtually every high-priced GOP fund-raising dinner, for example, he apologizes to the audience for making them pay so much just to hear him, but then adds, "The only thing I can say is, if the Republicans don't get into office pretty soon this will be the regular price for dinner."

Other examples of the Reagan wit:

We are told God is dead. Well, He isn't. We just can't talk to him in the classroom any more.

* * *

Our Governor has a native capacity for using the microphone as a shoe horn to get his foot in his mouth. (referring to Brown)

*cf. The Republican Establishment, by Hess and Broder, p. 273.
prised observation that he wasn't "as bad as we'd thought." Pat Brown went after Reagan with both feet, and tried to brand him an extremist of the Barry Goldwater ilk. But it failed, as one audience after another went away with the feeling that he just wasn't a "kook." Whatever his common ideological bond with Goldwater, Ronald Reagan just doesn't sound like an extremist.

Reagan's handling of press conferences is usually quite good, and the reporters can generally get a good story out of them. The Governor, perhaps with an assist from his Hollywood background and familiarity with the publicity process, is neither stiff nor hostile with the working press, as were Goldwater and Nixon in the past. His "Communications Director" Lyn Nofziger is generally respected as a hard-working pro (though his reputation was considerably damaged by his blabbermouthing in the Drew Pearson incident). Reagan's press conference performances, always well attended by both the newspapers and TV, go off smoothly, the Governor very rarely stumbling during the Q. and A. When he does, surprisingly, a headline rarely results. Reagan is not reluctant to say, "Well, you've got me there; I'll have to check that one out," and if he does inadvertently say something damaging, a quick "Oops, I've written somebody's lead for him already" brings a laugh, breaks the ice and buries the story.

On the other hand, in moments of stress, Reagan's relations with the press, both state and national, show some signs of deterioration. When questioned at great length on matters that involve his integrity, sincerity or consistency, the Governor can lose his temper and lash out at the questioner.

During the 1966 campaign, for example, Reagan had one particularly bad day with the press. He was still smarting from a gaffe the previous day in which he had misplaced a northern California River by several hundred miles, and was being pressed for his views on open housing legislation. Having stated that he was opposed to the controversial Rumford Act as the wrong way to accomplish the right goal, he allowed that other open housing legislation, differently constructed, might be acceptable. When asked by Paul Beck (then of the LA Times; now, ironically, the Governor's Press Secretary) what such legislation should include, his suggestions bore a marked resemblance to the Rumford Act which he opposed. "Isn't that just what Rumford does?" Beck asked. Reagan is reported to have flushed and sternly cautioned, "You fellows are boring in on me." He then explained that it was late and he wasn't thinking very clearly—which struck most of the reporters as odd, since it was only three o'clock in the afternoon. For several days after that, Reagan kept his distance from the press, much the way Richard Nixon did when he felt they were "after him" in the 1960 Presidential campaign.

PROPENSITY TO DENY

When under intense fire by the press, Reagan tends to issue a flat denial, much the way the State Department will blatantly disavow knowledge of an intelligence agent apprehended in a foreign capital. Reagan, like the State Department, has accordingly developed a credibility gap.

There is, for instance, the case of Marianne Means' Hearst-syndicated column, which described a meeting between Governor Reagan and Mississippi Governor Paul Johnson, in which elaborate Presidential strategies were said to have been discussed. Miss Means has repeatedly stated that she got the story directly from Governor Johnson.

Reagan heatedly denied that the meeting ever took place. "Furthermore," he declared, "I have never met Governor Johnson. She must have been talking to the hippies at Haight-Ashbury." He also said he had a wire of confirmation from the Mississippi Governor and demanded a retraction from Miss Means.* (According to one Sacramento reporter who has seen the telegram from Governor Johnson, it denies vehemently the Means story, and questions her veracity by charging that the last time he saw the Hearst columnist, to put it politely, her vision was impaired by a lack of sobriety.) By claiming that he had "never met Governor Johnson," Reagan left himself wide open. Miss Means produced a photograph, published in the San Francisco Hearst outlet, showing Governors Reagan and Johnson posing together (with others) at the National Governors Conference. Reagan's mild rejoinder: "So maybe I said hello to him."

The source of Reagan's "credibility gap" with the

*In a press conference on April 2, 1968, Reagan reversed his opposition to Rumford, a turn-about that presaged the beginning of the public stage of his campaign for the GOP presidential nomination.
press differs from that of President Johnson. The President has often used deception offensively—that is, as part of the arsenal of weapons at his disposal to accomplish various goals. But Reagan tends to use deception defensively—when he is trapped or embarrassed and must find a way out of a ticklish situation.

Throughout the fall campaign against Governor Brown, Reagan contended that he was being quoted out of context on his position regarding tuition at the University of California. Accused of supporting the tuition idea (much as Barry Goldwater was accused of supporting the use of tactical nuclear weapons to defoliate Vietnam), Reagan consistently explained that he had only said he would consider it, and decide on it only after careful study (just as Goldwater insisted he’d only said use of such weapons was “being considered”). What Goldwater would have done with nuclear weapons if elected is now academic. But Reagan’s actions are not: within a matter of weeks after his inauguration, tuition was being pushed as one of the new administration’s first major proposals.

A related incident was more closely akin to LBJ’s habits of deception. Within two weeks of the inauguration, Reagan’s Finance Director Gordon Smith informed the University Regents that the Governor would ask for the imposition of tuition. When the story leaked out to the press, the Governor was furious, and he evoked the very Johnsonian view that, in effect, it’s not-true-until-I-announce-it. Six weeks later, of course, the Governor announced that he would in fact seek tuition for the University.

Governor Reagan has also displayed some familiarity with the art of juggling semantic niceties. In an editorial criticizing the Governor’s lack of candor with the press, the Sacramento Bee on Sept. 22, 1967, listed several instances of position-switching or deception, including the following:

At one time he (Reagan) said there would be no mass firings (of state employees). Shortly thereafter 216 staff workers of the Department of Mental Hygiene were let go and 407 more are scheduled to go next month. This was not mass firing, he said.

The above is more than a little reminiscent of President Johnson’s insistence that he was never “escalating” the war in Vietnam. The same editorial continued:

At the time he announced the massive staff cutbacks at the mental hospitals he said there would be no impairment of services to the patients.

Since this promise, hot meals for the patients have been reduced; once open wards have been closed: a multi-million dollar training program for psychiatric technicians has been grossly weakened; important mental health experts have resigned and started the whole mental health system on a cruel decline.

**TEMPER TANTRUMS**

One of the most curious aspects of the Reagan style is his behavior when he really loses his temper. Surprisingly, it has only happened twice with any intensity—in both cases where his own integrity was questioned. The first such instance took place before a meeting of the National Negro Republican Assembly in Los Angeles during Reagan’s primary campaign. Paul Beck, now the Governor’s Press Secretary, filed the following report with the Los Angeles Times:

Ronald Reagan stalked out of a meeting of Negro Republicans Saturday after bitterly assailing those who “imply I lack integrity.”

An audience of about 100 sat in shocked silence as Reagan, asking for a point of personal privilege shouted in a voice cracking with emotion:

“I resent the implication that there is any bigotry in my nature. Don’t anyone ever imply I lack integrity.

“I will not stand silent and let anyone imply that—in this or any other group.”

As Reagan left the meeting room . . . he slapped a clenched fist into his own palm and muttered inaudible words. He appeared ready to return to the room when aides escorted him outside the hotel.

No one at the convention of the California unit of the National Negro Republican Assembly (NNRA) was sure to whom Reagan was referring—including the two other Republican candidates for the gubernatorial nomination who had been engaged with the actor in a small-scale debate. (George Christopher and William Penn Patrick—ed.)

However, during the course of questions submitted by those attending, it appeared Reagan became increasingly angry by a question on the Civil Rights Act and the answers given by Patrick and Christopher.

A delegate asked Reagan how Negroes could explain to their own people Reagan’s statement that he would not have voted for the Civil Rights Act if he had been in Congress.

Reagan also defended his support of Barry Goldwater in the 1964 Presidential race and said, “If I didn’t know that Barry Goldwater was not the very opposite of a racist I could not have supported him.” (sic)

Patrick . . . said, “It’s very difficult to defend an indefensible position. Let the dead be buried.”

At that point Reagan’s face flushed and he flipped a card he had been holding onto the floor.

Christopher, in his turn, said, “The position taken by Barry Goldwater did more than any other thing to harm the Republican Party. ‘We’re still paying the bill for that defeat.”

“This situation still plagues the Republican Party. Unless we can cast out this image we’re going to suffer defeat now and in the future.”

George Smith of San Diego, prefacing a question on the candidates’ views on education, said, “If it grieves me when a leading Republican candidate says it (the Civil Rights Act) is a bad piece of legislation.”

Christopher and Patrick gave their views on education and Reagan then took the podium saying, “I want to make a point of personal privilege.”

His voice rising, he then launched into his out-
spoken remarks which led to his walking out.

(Los Angeles Times, March 6, 1966, p. B26)

Significantly, nothing the candidate said, even in the height of his fury, was damaging to him. For a short time, the memory of the incident may have been harmful to Reagan, but with no quotation quote to hang it on (such as Romney's "brainwashing"), the public quickly forgot. And also significantly, the candidate never did answer the question fully—that is, why did he oppose the Civil Rights Act; or whether he is a bigot. Reagan chose to answer the latter, unasked question, with a show of apparently sincere outrage rather than stay around to be quizzed at any greater length on this obviously emotional (for him) issue.

In particular, it is odd that his anger did not erupt while under direct questioning on the matter, but rather apparently festered until another whole round of questions on another issue has passed. Some skeptics have therefore suggested that it was all an act, designed to demonstrate Reagan's sincerity, since he had been unable to win many converts on the actual issue itself. Another interpretation—more complimentary to the Governor's character than to his capacity to govern dispassionately—is that Reagan does not see any difference between the two questions: i.e., the personal question of how you feel about discrimination and the public question of what you will do about it. In other words, if a man holds no conscious bigotry or racial prejudices, that is enough—he should not be quizzed or criticized on his program or lack thereof to combat such bigotry.

The only other incident on record of Governor Reagan blatantly losing his temper took place in the midst of the turmoil over Drew Pearson's charges about homosexuality on his staff. A visibly disturbed Governor Reagan faced a packed press conference and a battery of network TV cameras the day after Pearson's attack. Television audiences around the country watched the Governor respond with fierce but controlled anger to a barrage of newsmen's queries regarding the controversy.

Reagan's response to the predictable first question about Pearson's charges was characterized by the politically valuable attributes of both ambiguity and apparent straightforward sincerity and self-righteousness. In classic Reagan style, the Governor quoted "three Presidents" as calling Pearson "a liar" and added that he saw no reason to disagree with them. Reagan thus got across an implicit denial, with appropriate fury, without committing himself to a provable position—except that he agrees with three distinguished former Presidents. Throughout the press conference, he pointedly avoided specifically saying that Pearson was lying in every detail of his recent charges—although he certainly conveyed the impression that such was the case. Eventually, when pressed, Reagan did say "He's lying," but even then in a sufficiently vague context that it was not absolutely clear which part of the charges he was referring to.

The reporters then began to zero in on specific portions of the Pearson column, especially the charge that Lyn Nofziger, Reagan's "Communications Director," had leaked the story aboard the Independence—which most of the reporters knew to be true. Reagan's response was an example of extremely careful wording—much more so than most press reports of it indicated:

"I am prepared to say that nothing like that ever happened. I've even heard rumors also that behind closed doors I gave statements to the press and this is just absolutely not true. Want to confirm it, Lyn?"

Nofziger then waved his hand and said, "confirmed." (Sacramento Union, November 1, 1967).

According to Martin Smith of the Sacramento Bee, when Nofziger raised his right hand, he looked very pained and said "confirmed" very reluctantly. This is understandable in view of the fact that the clear implication was that Nofziger was confirming as "absolutely not true" the story which Nofziger knew to be true—that he had started the whole controversy by briefing reporters on the Independence.

But a careful reading of Reagan's statement indicates that this was only an implication—since, technically, the absolutely-not-true remark can be applied to the straw-man assertion that Reagan had even heard rumors that he himself leaked the story.

ALWAYS IN CONTROL

The press conference continued in a similar manner for some time, with the Governor fielding smoothly a host of dangerously barbed questions designed to draw more specific answers. He was in control at all times, although one sensed that he was aware of the untenability of his position (apparently denying what most of the press knew to be true).

And then something happened. Most of the intense questioning on the specifics of the Pearson charges—questions which would have seemed most likely to induce a loss of temper if one was to take place—had already passed. One of the reporters was inquiring about why so few California newspapers had carried the column (for reasons of decency and libel, most responsible newspapers refused to print the column). The Governor mentioned something about most newspapers "agreeing" not to print it, and an enterprising reporter asked if that meant Reagan had extracted such an agreement from the publishers in advance.

Reagan blew up. As Time put it, he was "gesticulating, thumping the lectern and mangling his syntax." But despite his arm-waving and his flushed face, the Governor said nothing at all either incriminating or even mildly damaging. While his gestures and appearance suggested loss of control, his words did not. The full import of his statement during the lectern-thumping amounted to a kind of boyish "C'mon now, fellas!" The entire incident was reminiscent of the Governor's appearance as candidate before the National Negro Republican Assembly. In each case, Reagan was
The Governor's forte appears to be neutralizing hostile audiences, even of intellectuals, and stirring up the Party faithful. His most successful techniques are his common sense approach and his talent for the persuasively ambiguous statement. But in a homecoming speech at his alma mater, on September 28, 1968, he used a different approach: he tried to be deep, perceptive and intellectual. And as Mary McGrory put it in a Washington Star article a couple of days later, he was a bomb.

The build-up for the speech had been tremendous—not necessarily by any design of the Governor's, but because the press loved the idea. Political pundits found humor in the fact that the Governor, known for his militant stance against the Berkeley demonstrators, was returning to the campus where, as an undergraduate, he himself had led a student strike that toppled the President of the College. His defenders saw the occasion as proof that the Governor was not, as he had so often been charged, anti-intellectual—he was to dedicate a new library at his own alma mater. News-starved political columnists detected the aroma of Presidential intrigue, with both Senators Percy and Dirksen to be in attendance. Dirksen himself had hinted the week before that his introductory remarks "would sound like a nominating speech." Throngs of townsmen and academicians were expected to cheer the return of their most famous alumnus.

But the turn-out was disappointing. As for Dirksen's introduction, the closest it came to attributing Presidential qualifications to the California Governor was an observation that his birthday was in February—the same month as that of Lincoln and Washington.

Reagan must have been determined to destroy his reputation as a shallow thinker. As nearly as a close reading of the text can determine, the topic appeared to be the generation gap; or perhaps it was alienation in the ghetto. It really wasn't clear. There were none of the clever remarks, colorful quips, or historical analogies that had marked so many of his previous and successful speeches. It read as if a busy staffer had taken a Reaganesque first draft and then translated it all with a thesaurus, following no particular theme, except that it had to sound sociological and political science-like. In an attempt to sound intellectual, it failed to convey either intellect or common sense. The following sentence is typical:

This horizontal stratification has led to lateral communication and it is highly essential that we restore vertical dialogue if not an outright recognition of the naturalness and rightness of a vertical structuring society. (Official advance text of the speech, delivered by Governor Reagan at Eureka College, Illinois, September 28, 1967).

The problem was that the speech was not only dull (which is unusual for the Governor), but meaningless (which is not)—since he never did explain what he meant by "horizontal stratification," "lateral communication," or a "vertical structuring society."

Unquestionably, the Eureka speech was the exception, not the rule. The Governor does not usually fall into the trap of trying to shed new light on problems or of concentrating on substance and deep issues. Usually Reagan sticks to the superficial, and his poise, presence, and superb style give his commonplaces stunning effect. Yet some have also noticed that his performances often lack long-range staying power.

At Yale, for example, a host of embarrassing questions failed to unsettle him. But the one time he was caught speechless came when a mild-mannered student asked him quietly, away from the glare of large audiences, about civil rights. The student observed that whenever the Governor was asked about his position on civil rights, he would respond with stories about Jackie Robinson and Willie Mays, or about Negroes he had appointed to certain boards. But what substantive program, the student asked, did the Governor recommend as a solution? Reagan's silence in response gave listeners the impression he really hadn't given that too much thought.

In Connecticut, some listeners impressed with Reagan's platform style, began to have second thoughts later, as they sought to separate the substance from the glitter.

One observer in Hartford compared a Reagan speech to a Chinese dinner—"It tastes good, but an hour later, you suddenly realize you're empty."


* * *

"You ask him a question, and he responds, and then ten minutes later you suddenly realize he didn't answer the question," said a Yale student.

(A.P. December 8, 1967)

But perhaps former GOP State Chairman A. Searle Pinney said it best:

He certainly had all of the charm and glamour that he was billed to have, but I was disappointed that he didn't offer more solutions to the problems of the day. We don't solve the problems by a recital of what they are. The poor don't go away, you know.

(Hartford Times, December 8, 1967, p. 2).
III. Reagan on Selected Issues

THE BUDGET: cut now, ask questions later

"The time has come for us to decide whether collectively we can afford everything and anything we think of simply because we think of it. The time has come to run a check and see if all the services government provides were in answer to demands or were just goodies dreamed up for our supposed betterment. The time has come to match outgo to income, instead of always doing it the other way around." — (Governor Reagan's Inaugural Address)

During its fledgling year, nothing has been more characteristic of the Reagan Administration than its relentless repetition of the need to cut costs and reduce the state budget from its huge pre-Reagan size. Yet the Governor has been far more successful at cutting the scope of state services than he has been at cutting costs, per se. He can recite an impressive list of seemingly insignificant savings that add up to something approaching $23 million — and that is to his credit. But while office costs, typewriter allowances and phone bills have been trimmed down to manageable size, somehow the rest of the state government is still on a runaway course.

A month after his inauguration, he submitted a $4.6 billion budget to the Legislature, a cut, he estimated, of $250 million in the annual expenditures of his Democratic predecessors. In March, he raised the figure to $5.06 billion, $184 million higher than any previous budget and increased taxes nearly a billion dollars.

"I will tell you now," he told the voters in July, "this tax bill, like the budget, does not represent my philosophy." (Murray Kempton, Article III, New York Post, Jan. 31, 1968).

The New York Times (Feb. 11, 1968) reported that the Governor's budget for fiscal year 1969 climbed even higher, to the unprecedented level of $5.7 billion. This in no way undermines the validity of the Governor's claim to have saved $23 million by cutting and trimming "fat" from various budget requests — but it does bring into question its significance.

There are several possible explanations for the disparity between the Governor's stated goals and his accomplishments in this field.

Perhaps the most plausible is suggested by the theme developed above, that the Governor doesn't really like to govern, to get tied down in the nitty gritty, in the operative level of government. Thus, while the Governor frequently launches into verbal frontal assaults on the scope of services provided by the state (such as in mental health and Medi-Cal), proposals showing how the same level of services might be retained but delivered more efficiently receive scant attention.

A businessmen's task force report, for example, was delivered to the Governor in October 1967 suggesting ways in which the Medi-Cal program could be administered more efficiently without substantially cutting back services. Yet by mid-December, the report still lay dormant on the Governor's desk while he conducted an embarrassingly confused attack on Medi-Cal, contending its deficits approached $200 million or more. The Governor insisted that at least $200 million worth of services had to be cut (the Legislature, estimating the deficit at a fraction of that figure, refused) instead of trying to make the program more efficient. Critics were led to believe, in the context of Reagan's long-time opposition to the concept of any kind of Medicare, that the Governor actually wanted to cut back the Medi-Cal program drastically for philosophical rather than economic reasons.

Another plausible hypothesis is that many of the Governor's cuts are counter-productive and approach being short-sighted — that is, in the long run, they cost more than the savings they generated. Two examples suggest that this may often be the case:

Reagan relishes telling audiences about how he used up old stocks of official stationery rather than ordering anew, which had all his administration's secretaries x-ing out Pat Brown's name and typing in his. But his detractors also like this tale of frugality: wasting all that time and effort seems such false economy in place of a two-penny printing bill. Equally diverting was the administration's decision to stop the state justice department's consumption of the lined yellow tablets which are, by some academic alchemy, an absolute necessity for the pencilling of legal thought. Some attorneys proposed instead a supply of rulers and a new civil service category for someone to draw lines on plain paper. (Atlantic, Feb. 1968)

Even more disconcerting than the "savings" whose costs show up immediately, however, are those whose costs are hidden until future administrations and future generations are forced to pay.

One such "saving" may have come in the area of agricultural research. An article in the Sacramento Bee early last year reported that "agricultural research scientists fear that Governor Ronald Reagan's 'fat-free' budget might injure California's $4 billion farming industry." In a two-article series examining the benefits of agricultural research and the dangers of its curtailment, the Bee found that the pink boll-worm (the eradication of which it had previously reported as part of the Governor's 9-point agricultural program — Feb. 9, 1967), posed a severe new threat to the state's $258 million cotton crop, and quoted University of California Agricultural School Dean Peterson as saying "research on a statewide basis is essential."

"The pink bollworm is a pest which will require research dollars to control," the article continued, "the kind of dollars not available in a tightened budget such
as that proposed for the University of California by Governor Reagan.” Dean Peterson was also quoted as asserting that such research is tax earning, not spending. (Sacramento Bee, March 10, 1967)

In the fall of last year, Governor Reagan’s “economies” handed Assembly Democrats an even more attractive issue — a cutback in the program to aid crippled children. Democratic Assemblyman Robert Crown introduced legislation to appropriate an additional $750,000 to allow an estimated 5,000 to 7,000 children to continue Crippled Children’s Service care — children whose ailments, such as cross-eyes, mild deafness, drooping eyelids, lop-ears and club feet, were not considered severe enough by the Administration to justify the budgetary strain of continued treatment. When asked about this, Governor Reagan responded:

“I have a question whether there has been a cut-back. This is a program that could be as open-ended as you want it to be. It would simply be where do you draw the line, at what is a disability on the part of a child. “And there has been to my knowledge no cutback in this program and there was no reduction in the program. But as the state continues to grow, you may find that some — that lines are drawn.

“What lack of ability, what physical defect do you constitute as a disability that requires special treatment or care?” (Sacramento Bee, Feb. 29, 1967)

To some bewildered listeners, the distinction between a cutback or reduction in the program and simply “drawing the line” so as to exclude children with cross-eyes, mild deafness, drooping eyelids, lop-ears and club feet, seemed spurious, if not incomprehensible.

In an angry editorial the following day, the Sacramento Bee contended that such cutbacks were not only inhumane, but also uneconomical — since a partially crippled child unable to reach the line drawn by the Governor may well become a fully dependent cripple (for whom state services would then have to be provided) if proper medical service is not provided early enough to prevent a worsened condition.

Within a couple of days, therefore, the administration was to be found deftly changing the thrust of its “no cutback” contention from the line-drawing distinction to a more palatable argument. Edwin W. Beach, chief of the budget division of the State Department of Finance, denied there was a program “cutback.” Instead he argued that the Crippled Children’s Service would cost less because of an overlap with the Medi-Cal program (which the Governor has also labored arduously to cut back). He added, however, that more certain financial information would be available in January. Other administration officials, while echoing the Medi-Cal overlap argument, consistently avoided any specific assurances that no youngsters would suffer permanent damage without augmentation of the program. (Sacramento Bee, Dec. 1, 1967). This seemed to be an example of distinct tendency on the part of the Reagan administration to cut first, ask questions later.

Oddly enough, Governor Reagan does not think that all governmental services should be reduced or eliminated: rather, he focuses largely on those such as the poverty program or medical services. While the Governor fought tooth and nail with the Office of Economic Opportunity, for example, over what he considered to be wasteful OEO grants to California, the same attitude did not prevail when it came to roadbuilding. In a March 17, 1967 press release, the Governor pointed himself on the back for mobilizing intensive support in Congress for federal highway money and offered great kudos for Washington when the funds came through. The same enthusiasm was markedly absent when it came to mobilizing Congressional support for such lower priority items as saving the cities, providing decent housing or medical care.

Similarly, on ABC’s Issues and Answers last fall, Governor Reagan suggested that President Johnson could take a leaf out of his book by seeking to eliminate some of the “luxuries” first and then imposing the income sur-tax only if necessary:

Apparent reacting to the governor’s use of the term luxury, the television questioner appropriately asked:

“Would you eliminate the Supersonic Transport program?”

The governor answered by shifting gears, a trick of seasoned politicians to avoid a yes or no response to a direct question.

“Actually, I am not qualified to answer,” said Reagan. Then he plunged into another subject, the antipoverty program (Office of Economic Opportunity), using it as an example for economy.

What the governor was saying, if the listener chose to interpret the interview literally, is that the poverty program is a luxury and the Supersonic Transport (SST) program is unclassified in the governor’s mind. (Richard Rodda in Sacramento Bee, Oct. 22, 1967.)

It should be noted that the California Governor sees the government budget wholly as a matter of balancing books, not as an instrument for promoting eco-
nomic growth. His fiscal policies for the national government thus reflect an unequivocal rejection of Keynesian economics of any sort. In a speech in Milwaukee on Sept. 27, 1967, the Governor specifically said: "We will oppose the use of taxation and deficit-spending as a means of control in the market place."

MENTAL HEALTH: rising odors

In the absence of more specific knowledge about causes and treatment, a practical goal for the Mental Health Program is development, maintenance and restoration of social and personal equilibrium despite emotional stress. This means that the primary emphasis will be to assist individuals who are mentally ill to achieve a reasonable operating level. For the foreseeable future, therefore, the broad aim is not general emotional well-being nor is it complete cure. It is to provide such treatment and supportive services as will keep a child at home and in school and an adult with his family and on the job with both functioning at a reasonable level. (Reagan press release, May 8, 1967, "A Definitive Statement of California’s Goals Programs for Treatment of the Mentally Ill."

The "Definitive Statement" excerpted above would appear to suggest a reasonable and practical, if limited, approach to the problem of mental health on the part of Governor Ronald Reagan. Indeed many of his public statements embrace laudable long-range goals and express appropriate concern for the mentally ill. His long-range goals for mental health follow the lines of the liberal Lanterman-Petris Mental Health Act of 1967, which promotes local mental health programs as superior to large state hospitals. He further urged expansion of the Short-Doyle program of providing local and county mental treatment centers with some state assistance saying:

"It is our belief that local mental health programs offer the most feasible and enlightened way to achieve the best results for treatment of our mentally ill. "By increasing state assistance in the development and extension of local programs, we hope that we can continue to reduce the size of our mental hospitals and eventually use them primarily as a back-up resource for local efforts." (Los Angeles Times, May 10, 1967)

Despite such apparently progressive statements, one of the greatest battles fought by Governor Ronald Reagan during his first year in office came over the issue of mental health. The reason: his heralded budget cuts, which appeared to take precedence over almost all other policy considerations. While his stated position was that improved local programs would eventually allow reductions in the state hospitals, the Governor seemed to want to accelerate the process by cutting the state hospitals immediately, even before provision could be made for alternate facilities.

It is difficult to discern whether the apparent discrepancy between the tone of the Governor’s words and actions was a product of naivete or deception, but in either case the discrepancy was there. And the cuts administered to the state mental health program, described by some as “meat-ax” cuts, produced a howl from every corner of the state.

In a June 12, 1967, press release, the Governor blamed a “high powered propaganda campaign” for the opposition he was receiving and accused the perpetrators of “blackmail.” But neither the issues nor the situation were that simple.

The most telling criticism offered against the Governor’s cuts went beyond the question of whether they were humane and suggested that they would actually prove counter-productive and uneconomical — shortsightedness that would not only reduce the services the state could provide but which would actually end up costing more.

S. G. Hanson, General Manager of the California State Employees Association (CSEA) and no friend of Governor Reagan, was reported by the Sacramento Bee (June 8, 1967) to have cited instances of how the cutbacks were disruptive of services in a way that would eventually prove wasteful and costly:

CSEA studies show administrative plans for staff cuts will force the Napa State Hospital to discontinue care of 32 acres of lawn and shrubs and other areas, Hanson said. He also charged the staff will have to discontinue preventative maintenance programs at most hospitals because of the cutback in jobs. Only emergency repairs will be made in the future when actual breakdown occurs, Hanson declared.

"It takes many years," Hanson said, "to build a complete corps of people to operate a facility as large and complex as a mental hospital. . . . Where, for instance, do you find a plumber, an electrician or an equipment operator who can work and direct the efforts of mentally ill and mentally retarded patients who are attempting to find a useful niche in society?"

Hanson said it takes two to six months to train journeyman craftsmen to work effectively with mental patients.

Governor Reagan insisted repeatedly that if the level of treatment suffered as a result of his staff cutbacks, he would restore the cutbacks. The Governor has yet to concede that the level of treatment actually did suffer, but many examples in state hospitals throughout the state seem to suggest the contrary.

The Sacramento Bee researched a series of articles on mental hospitals throughout the state. In a summation article published December 1, 1967, the following conclusions were reached:

It is difficult for the nonmedical person to determine whether the 1967 mental hospital cutbacks have affected patient care. A picture begins to emerge only after a visitor has asked employee after employee, doctor after doctor, to compare conditions this year to those a year ago.

That picture, as sketched in conversations with numerous persons in the hospitals, indicates the cuts have
Some mental institution administrators are out to get me! ... But, I’m wise to them! ... I’ll show ‘em! ..."

brought these changes to the mental hospital:

1. A drastic loss of morale by staff members which affects their performance on the job.
2. An increase in the size of many wards as administrators put patients into larger groups as a means of stretching available staff to the maximum.
3. A weakening in programs for long-term mentally-ill patients because administrators prefer to concentrate available staff on the care of newly admitted patients who have the best chance of recovery.
4. A massive reshuffling of employees throughout the various hospitals, causing staff members to be placed in new jobs and taking them from wards where they knew their patients intimately.
5. A drop in the care for bed-ridden geriatric patients as administrators shift nursing employees to duties with patients more likely to recover.

* * *

There are also little evidences of a change which a visitor can discover by continually asking questions of employees.

Among these are:

— A clear odor of urine in the geriatric wards at DeWitt or Stockton or Mendocino State Hospitals, wards where staff members say there was no odor last year.
— A locked door on a ward at DeWitt which a staff member said formerly was unlocked but had to be locked when employee reductions made it more difficult to supervise the patients.
— A nurse and a physician at Napa who said the number of older patients suffering from constipation has risen, this due solely to a lack of attention.
— A nurse at Stockton and a physician at DeWitt who admit to an increase in the number of bed-sores among their bed-ridden geriatric patients.
— A nurse at Stockton who said there is a noticeable dulling of the morale of her patients since her ward had to quit its daily music and marching activities because of a staff shortage.

Perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of the drop in the level of mental health services due to the Governor’s cuts—despite his pledge to the contrary—was Reagan’s apparent reluctance to determine for himself whether the charges being leveled at his actions had any basis in fact. Repeatedly, the Governor simply took the word of his own administration officials that conditions had not become worse.

In the fall of last year, the Governor finally decided to visit one of the state mental hospitals to see for himself what the conditions were like. But he announced in advance just what his plans were, which gave the hospital officials plenty of time to prepare for the visit and “spruce the place up.” This is precisely what they did at Camarillo State Hospital in Ventura County, according to charges made by the Independent Union of State Employees (San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 17, 1967). But the next day, Reagan denied that the state’s largest mental hospital had been “spruced up” for his visit. He further refused to make any unannounced inspections of other mental hospitals.

This reluctance to “see for himself” whether his cutbacks had brought about worsened conditions was also evident in the Governor’s response to a series of incidents surrounding Sonoma State Hospital for the Mentally Retarded. In the early summer of last year, the Governor’s cutbacks were attacked as the cause of poor conditions at Sonoma: specifically, it was alleged that retarded children were going two days without their diapers changed and five days without being bathed. But in a June 7 press release the Governor put the matter to rest by saying, “I have been advised by Health and Welfare Secretary Spencer Williams that the patients at Sonoma State Hospital are being given excellent care.” And on what did Mr. Williams base such advice? A telephone call to Dr. Joseph E. O’Neil, the superintendent of the hospital, who denied the charges, not unexpectedly.

Reagan did concede that there was “a very brief period earlier this year when patients in some wards got bathed once a week” but he attributed that to a “temporary staff problem that had nothing to do with current cutbacks.” Somehow it escaped the Governor that if merely a “temporary staff problem” could produce such poor consequences for the patients, that stiff cutbacks could produce even worse conditions.

It came as no surprise, therefore, to some observers that five months later Sonoma was back in the headlines, as typified by the following excerpt from the Capitol Report (Nov. 15, 1967):

Niels Erik Bank-Mikkelsen, Director of the Danish National Service for the Mentally Retarded, charged in a SF Chronicle interview that conditions at the (Sonoma State) hospital were sickening. His basic accusation of “neglect” at the hospital apparently was
related to staffing levels and, to a lesser extent, the physical facilities.

Governor Reagan's response to the Danish official's accusations may be instructive:

"There is such a ward in every institution of that kind," Reagan said. "This is a ward of people who are physically mature, completely grown up and who have minds that have not developed above the one-year-old stage... And it just presents a terrible problem." (Sacramento Union, Nov. 15, 1967)

"A terrible problem," the Governor acknowledges. But how terrible? Apparently not terrible enough to warrant extra staff to take care of the people in those wards. There is a ward like that "in every institution of that kind." And that just seems to settle it.

Mental Health appears to be for Governor Reagan one of those areas of social concern in which the status quo will suffice. In fact, out of 4000 state jobs lopped off by one of the Governor's early job freezes, 3700 of them came from the mental hygiene department—out of 22,078 total jobs in the system. The California Commission for Staff Standards in State Hospitals had said earlier that the mental hospital staffs were at "barely 90% of proper standards."

The Atlantic (Feb., 1968) in an article on Reagan's squeeze-cut-trim-it-us summarized the Governor's dilemma on such problems as mental health and retardation:

Reagan shares the bewilderment of the man in the street. He is a decent human being, and confronted with individual tragedy, responds with compassion. However, confronted by mass programs, he loses the sense that humanity is involved and sees only bureaucratic machinery.

POVERTY: highways si, OEO no

Among the Governor's favorite targets are the welfare system and the Office of Economic Opportunity. In the former case, Reagan rarely misses an opportunity to advance the notion, however ambiguously, that welfare is an institution populated largely by the lazy and the unscrupulous ("welfare recipients," as he often calls the poor). On July 10, 1967, for example, he ordered a statewide probe to eliminate welfare cheaters. He didn't actually allege the specific extent to which chiseling existed, but rather wanted to "clear the air," (later he backed away from the probe), but he left little doubt as to whether he felt there was in fact large-scale chiseling going on. (San Diego Union, July 11, 1967)

But the Governor leaves nothing more than an impression. He states repeatedly that no one quarrels with the humanitarian aims of welfare programs but then proceeds to ridicule each and every program, using an administrative flaw in some isolated instance to imply that the whole concept of aiding the needy is misguided. He stresses repeatedly that "capitalism and free enterprise have successfully fought poverty" for 200 years (echoing his frequent observation that the West was built without urban renewal.) He has frequently charged that the federal Government has poured $288 million in poverty funds into California since 1964, "with no material change." (Los Angeles Times, Aug. 9, 1967, Sept., 24, 1967)

One of the first official acts of the new Governor in the area of welfare and poverty, was the announcement (press release, Jan. 12, 1967) of the elimination of eight (later reduced to seven) of the 13 multi-service centers for welfare recipients which had been opened in urban centers in the aftermath of the Watts riots. The Governor explained it as a money-saving step and later defended the move by asserting that the remaining six centers were being "beefed up," while the need for the others, which had already been eliminated, was being studied. This seemed to indicate an alarming inclination to cut first, and ask questions later when it came to programs to relieve urban ills. (Los Angeles Times, Sept. 24, 1967)

Thus the stage was set for a series of vetoes of OEO grants which began to reach the headlines late last summer. At a time when the Governor was desperately trying to "trim, squeeze and cut" millions of dollars out of the state budget, his administration was geared up to turn away every penny of federal poverty assistance whose absolute need could not be proved:

"At least half of the proposed OEO programs for California either have been approved (by Reagan) with stringent conditions for redirection or have been vetoed," (William) Clark (Reagan's cabinet secretary) said.

"The Governor has announced to his staff that unless an offer of assistance fulfills a valid public need, we are to reject it." (Los Angeles Times, Aug. 3, 1967)

Clearly the burden of proving a given OEO grant was needed by California was on OEO—and this while all other major industrial states (most of which are governed by Republicans) were begging for more OEO funds.

By October, Reagan had vetoed at least seven OEO grants, although the Governor's office claimed, apparently with some pride, that the correct number approached eleven. The Sacramento Bee (October 3, 1967) listed the following:

1. Ventura County project aimed at rehabilitating hard-core unemployed: $65,270.
2. An Alameda County Legal Aid Society for "on-campus legal services": $32,314.
4. A Los Angeles program for 12 VISTAs for which no direct cost was listed.
5. An emergency loan program for Yolo County migrant farm workers: $15,000.
6. A California Center for Economic Development at Fresno to train low income workers in the field of...
community organization and development: $109,520.

When it became apparent that Governor Reagan had vetoed as many OEO programs as even Lurleen Wallace (and more than any other Governor in the country), the Democrats in California gleefully put out a statement drawing public attention to the mark their Governor had reached, and the Governor obliged, to the surprise of many, by claiming that it wasn’t true—that he had actually vetoed more OEO programs than the Wallaces. That is when the numbers game began. The disparity in the veto-count apparently came from the Reagan Administration’s inclusion of four additional semi-vetoes or attempted vetoes. They were:

1. Fresno Tenants Council, which was receiving $25,949 from OEO. Reagan asked for an immediate withdrawal of funds, but the federal government refused.
2. $242,316 grant to Pacoima Congregational Church for social action projects—suspended by OEO Washington before Reagan had a chance to veto it.
3. $13,074 for the Economic Opportunity Commission of San Diego for a proposed Asiatic-American Service Center (Reagan’s veto came three weeks late).
4. A VISTA project at Parks Job Corps Center in Alameda County; no price tag. (Sacramento Bee, Oct. 18, 1967).

TOPS IN OEO VETOES

At any rate, whatever the final count for California, it is clear that Governor Reagan is Number 1 when it comes to vetoing OEO programs, and that he likes it that way. In fact, Governors Reagan and Wallace, between them, have vetoed more OEO programs for their respective states than all other governors of the other 48 states combined.*

When Governor Reagan vetoed the first OEO program for California, the Sacramento Bee reported that it was the first time any Governor of any state in the Western region had ever vetoed an OEO grant, and that there had been only 13 in the entire nation, largely in the South.

Reagan’s OEO vetoes are particularly revealing of his approach toward the poverty program and the problems of the poor in general. One was the Ventura County project for rehabilitating the hard-core unemployed by putting them to work beautifying open areas. Governor explained it as follows:

Among those ejected, he said, was a Ventura County project aimed at rehabilitating hard-core unemployed by putting them to work beautifying open areas.

“We didn’t quarrel with the purpose, but when our research revealed there were 17 hard-core unemployed and one-half the money would be for seven administrators to take care of the beneficiaries, we vetoed the project.” (Sacramento Bee, Sept. 27, 1967)

*William F. Buckley, Jr., was apparently oblivious of this when he berated questioners for tying Reagan to Wallace on the issue of OEO vetoes: “No mention that Governor Pat Brown had also vetoed several anti-poverty projects,” Buckley fumed. No mention? Of course not, because it wasn’t true. Cf. Buckley’s N. Y. Post column, 12/26/67.

But the “research” Reagan referred to appeared to have been dangerously superficial, when Assemblyman Willie Brown (Democrat-San Francisco) rebutted the Governor a week later:

“The Governor complained that the program called for providing seven supervisors for only 17 workers. However, anti-poverty officials said the program will fund only one-half an administrator and half a secretary to assist him.

“The other five ‘supervisory personnel’ would consist of persons, such as foremen of county crews who are already on the employing agency’s payroll. They would receive no federal money.” (Sacramento Bee, Oct. 3, 1967)

Herbert J. Kramer, OEO public affairs director, then provided further details:

Kramer said federal officials approved $56,250 to provide beautification, parks and open space jobs in Ventura for 17 chronically jobless individuals for 39 weeks. Of the total federal outlay, $3,120 was earmarked for a half-time coordinator and $620 for a one-day-a-week payroll clerk. Kramer said the overhead personnel cost to the US government thus was to be $3,640—or less than 7%. (Sacramento Bee, Oct. 17, 1967)

Nevertheless, Reagan continues to cite the Ventura project in speeches to groups outside of California.

Perhaps Reagan’s least favorite of all the OEO-funded programs is the California Rural Legal Assistance program (CRLA). The Governor has observed that CRLA had a budget of $1,545,847 and a total of 130 lawyers, investigators, secretaries and clerk-typists in ten offices throughout the state.

“Now this sounds just fine. Legal help for the rural poor.” But he went on to charge that “many” of the office’s lawyers are “actively and unethically promoting litigations, often against the state, once again leaving the taxpayers both the costs of the prosecution and the defense.” (San Francisco Sunday Chronicle and Examiner, Sept. 24, 1967)

In particular, Reagan was irked that CRLA had brought suit to prevent importation of about 8100 braceros into California on an emergency basis. Remarkably, Labor Secretary Willard Wirtz had sided with him on the issue, he added, “so we have the spectacle of a federal government body (presumably CRLA) opposing the decision of an officer of the President’s cabinet.” What Reagan failed to point out was that the California Supreme Court decided in favor of CRLA, and against Messrs. Reagan and Wirtz.

Governor Reagan then gave another example of the kind of “harassment” he and his agencies were being forced to suffer at the hands of CRLA. In one case, he said, CRLA, “using taxpayers money, is harassing a county welfare office (apparently Sutter County) to the point where that county’s board of supervisors has to use taxpayers money to hire a lawyer at $35 an hour to protect its county welfare director.” The director, the Governor said, saved the unidentified county $200,000 in welfare costs last year and “in the eyes of these people saving taxpayers money is a
crime." (Los Angeles Times, Sept. 24, 1967)

The Sacramento Bee put all these charges in a little clearer perspective when it observed that CRLA has actually won 12 of its 13 cases against the state and assorted state agencies (Oct. 7, 1967). If CRLA had lost every case, then perhaps the Governor could make a good case for costly harassment, but inasmuch as virtually every decision has gone against the state, it appears that without CRLA, the state would have been permitted to carry out policies which the state courts have found to be illegal and injurious to the poor. The whole controversy cast some doubt on whether the Governor rejected the public defender system as a whole, until, in the end, he reversed his position and accepted CRLA grant money from the OEO.

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**LAW ENFORCEMENT: a militant approach**

The outbreak of violence in the nation’s urban centers has given Governor Reagan the opportunity to underline his tendency to view problems as the product of a single "evil" cause:

Gov. Reagan Tuesday blamed "mad dogs and law breakers" for the recent racial violence throughout the US and charged there is a master plan.

"It would be pretty naive to believe these riots are just spontaneous. I believe there is a plan." Asked to identify who is behind the plan, however, Reagan declined to name names.

He cited reports by law enforcement officials that some of the same persons seem to show up at every riot. (LA Times, July 26, 1967)

A constant theme in Governor Reagan’s attitude toward riots is that agitators, and not poverty or poor living conditions, are the prime causes. He likes to point out that the crime rate during the Depression was extremely low when compared to today’s crime-ridden but prosperous and affluent society. (Sacramento Bee, May 2, 1967)

As a result, Reagan apparently believes rioters must be dealt with harshly, without appeasement. Close Reagan aide Lyn Nofziger echoed this attitude in response to plans of Democratic Assembly Leader Jesse Unruh to create jobs in an effort to head off summer turmoil:

Nofziger in Los Angeles indicated the Administration was upset over Unruh’s surprise announcement of a state-financed program for make-work projects in poor sectors such as Watts, declaring, “From what we've heard, that sounds like a bribe type of thing: ‘If we give you some money, you won’t riot.’ “ — (Los Angeles Times, Aug. 2, 1967)

At one point during the summer, Governor Reagan expressed considerable irritation at the attention being given the possibility of such outbreaks in California. His rather helpless response, when asked if he thought any such disturbances were pending in California, was, "If we keep on talking about them, we'll have them." (Sacramento Bee, July 25, 1967). More than a few observers believe that the Governor also believes the converse of that statement to be true: i.e. if we don't talk about them, they'll go away.

As the summer progressed, however, Reagan began to concede that some effort to reach the root causes might be helpful:

“We are working closely with key leaders at the local level and with local officials to stimulate grassroots actions aimed at eliminating the basic and real causes of racial tensions.”

The governor plans to meet privately today “with a group of responsible leaders of the Negro community to talk about these problems and seek solutions.” Other conferences will follow, he said, adding that “the first thing I'm going to do Wednesday is listen.” (SP Chronicle, July 19, 1967)

Unfortunately, however, the “responsible members of the Negro community” were not always representative members of the Negro community. In a July 25, 1967 press conference, Negro Assemblyman Willie Brown (Democrat-San Francisco) charged that all but one of the 16 Negroes with whom the Governor met were Republicans and had worked in the Reagan campaign. Furthermore, reports of the meeting indicated that Governor Reagan devoted much of his time in exhortations to those present to go back to their localities and stimulate more local action to alleviate the problem. Not once did the Governor indicate a willingness to channel state funds into these areas, nor in fact did any of the “responsible Negro leaders” even bring the subject up.

The Sacramento Bee (July 19, 1967) filed the following report concerning the well-publicized meeting with Negro “leaders”:

James C. Dodd, Negro architect and former GOP State Senate candidate, said Reagan 'admonished' the persons at the meeting to encourage Negroes to “take more advantage of the facilities that already exist ... and to try to do away with any feeling of hopelessness.” He said it was very constructive.

He said there was no discussion or suggestion on the use of state money in financing work projects for Negro youths.

Governor Reagan apparently sees a very close connection between methods of avoiding riots and methods of handling them once they have arisen — and in both cases it is the hard line, the threat and use of force. This posture was articulated well by then-Executive Secretary to the Governor Phil Battaglia, as reported in the San Diego Union (Aug. 16, 1967):

Battaglia said the governor’s plan to avoid racial conflict and rioting in California this summer “is working well.”

He revealed for the first time that two weeks ago, several units of the National Guard had been called to duty and put on a stand-by basis in the San Francisco area because of the possibility of rioting there.
"We could have put troops on Market Street in San Francisco within twenty minutes after we received a call from local authorities," he said. The governor, he said, fully intends to live up to his promise to take swift action to put down rioting, "and this intent itself has a decided put-down effect on those who start them."

To Governor Reagan's credit, at least in regard to his sincerity and consistency if not his wisdom, this militant approach to the enforcement of "law and order" does apply across the board. The Los Angeles Times (Mar. 12, 1967) observing that the Governor has said that he would have voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, quoted him as follows:

I believe it was not as well-written as it could have been. But I've been heart and soul all my life, active in promoting goals of that act. I regret the great bitterness that exists. I have repeatedly said that where the constitutional rights of citizens are violated for any reason, it is the responsibility of government, at bayonet point if necessary, to enforce those rights.

Also to Reagan's credit, while he apparently sees no limit to the type and extent of force that may be applied by the government, he at least rules out the National Rifle Association proposal that armed vigilante groups be formed as a back-up for the National Guard: "You don't settle anything by citizens taking the law into their own hands." (Sacramento Bee, Mar. 10, 1967).

Another theme stressed continually in Governor Reagan's views on the rising crime rate and riots, has a distinctly anti-civil libertarian flavor. If the rights of the individual conflict with those of society, then Reagan often appears to believe that the individual has no rights. This would seem to be a direct contradiction on his belief in "individual freedom"—but apparently that applies less strictly to police engaged in law enforcement. A wrong-doer menaces society. Therefore, society must punish him without regard to his individual rights.

This philosophy is most clearly demonstrated in his frequent and intense criticism of recent judicial decisions designed to protect individual rights in criminal cases:

You cannot ignore the fact that crime starts its sensational rise here in California directly from some of the judicial rulings that inhibited the policeman and have prevented him from doing all that he could do. (Terminal Island Officers Club, Oct. 14, 1965)

The Governor has even been reported to have said (at the National Press Club, May 16, 1966) that he was specifically against the Supreme Court's decision barring police from quizzing a defendant before he is warned he may talk to a lawyer first.

Reagan's antipathy for court rulings goes beyond criminal decisions. When the California Supreme Court ruled that the Governor's proposed cuts in the Medi-Cal program were illegal and contrary to the legislative mandate, an angry Reagan press release (Nov. 21, 1967) declared: "Now the legislature has the chance to say to the Supreme Court: 'Get out of our store. We are running our own shop.'"

Such outbursts as these prompted one liberal Republican legislator to suggest to some of his colleagues that he is considering ordering one thousand bumper stickers bearing the slogan, "Support Your Local Judge."

Despite the Governor's hard line against criminals (and the courts), his six-point legislative program to combat crime was astonishingly modest, and to many observers ineffective. Except for the usual creation of commissions to study the problem (and an anti-pornography measure of questionable relevance), the basic thrust of the Reagan program was increased penalties for those apprehended and convicted of violent crimes.

In his own "Report to the People" on his first hundred days' accomplishments, Reagan described his crime program as follows:

Among the most important legislation we are seeking are laws to control crime. This includes bills returning to the localities the right to deal with local problems, increasing penalties in some areas, controlling the dissemination of pornographic material and other legislation aimed at protecting the innocent. (from Excerpts of Governor Reagan's Report to the People on April 16, 1967," published by the California GOP State Central Committee)

Reagan is a great believer in the deterrent effect of harsh penalties, but it is difficult to imagine how any criminal facing a possible ten-year jail sentence would be significantly deterred by a possible twenty-year sentence. And it is surprising that the Reagan program paid virtually no attention to the necessity of improving crime-prevention methods beyond this hoped-for increased deterrence. The Governor even vetoed a bill passed by the legislature (introduced by Democrat Robert Crown) which would have required cities and counties (with matching state funds) to pay the cost of equipping their policemen and sheriff's deputies. At present, many officers must pay for items such as raincoats and guns, out of their own pockets. (LA World- Examiner, May 20, 1967). The reason for the veto, apparently, was that it would have been costly.

In fairness to Governor Reagan, one of the six points of his crime program does deserve special mention. The Governor's description of it was humane and libertarian;

We recognize that from time to time persons are arrested unjustly or as victims of circumstances. Yet, despite their innocence, they must live the remainder of their lives with a public police record. We are offering a comprehensive legislative approach that will provide relief for such persons while, at the same time, preserving such records for use by law enforcement agencies and other authorized persons. (Press Release, Jan. 16, 1967).
VIETNAM: a big athletic contest

Governor Ronald Reagan regularly shuns "labels" as being divisive and imprecise. But one label he both earns and accepts, is "hawk":

"I am a hawk," he said in discussing the Vietnam war. He said he is "critical of the fact that the military is not consulted enough on targets which should be bombed in North Vietnam." He declared "it's time we end the war," and expressed belief that an earlier intensification of the bombing would have brought the Communists to the negotiating table. (San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 20, 1967.)

This statement is entirely consistent with the Reagan philosophy of government but rather surprising in view of the Reagan style, which opts whenever possible for ambiguity. Every other Presidential prospect has been careful to steer clear of any clear designation, whether as hawk or dove.

But Reagan's closest similarities to Barry Goldwater in both style and substance come in the area of foreign policy — bold, simplistic, straight-forward and expressing a dangerous faith in military solutions and in the absolute wisdom of military leadership.

The concept of a "limited war" is an anathema to Ronald Reagan. You can't negotiate with evil. You don't combat evil with half-way measures. And you certainly mustn't "appease" it. The only way to deal with such an enemy is with a massive application of power and "technology." Pacification and economic development are clearly secondary and virtually unmentioned in all of Reagan's discussions of foreign policy:

"Isn't it time that we either win this war or tell the American people why we can't? Isn't it time to recognize the great immorality of sending our neighbor's sons to die with the hope we can do so without answering the enemy too much?"

"The war in Vietnam must be fought through to victory; we have been patient too long."

"Stop the bombing and we will only encourage the enemy to do his worst." Referring to North Vietnam as "a little, 16th rate, water-buffalo kind of country," Governor Reagan called for "whatever action is necessary to end this war as quickly as possible." But he did not say what a new President might do. (New York Times, Dec. 8, 1967)

"Our great strength in the world is technology. This is our most potent weapon. We should ask our best brains how we should handle such hot spots as Vietnam instead of using the foot soldier." (San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 14, 1967)

This turn-it-over-to-somebody-else theme expressed in the last quotation is a precise restatement of the Goldwater position in 1964 ("I would turn to my Joint Chiefs of Staff and say, 'Fellows, we made the decision to win. Now it's your problem.'"). Thus, on September 30, 1967, the Sacramento Bee reported that Governor Reagan had even gone so far as to say that if the military leaders should advise the invasion of North Vietnam, "then I would be for that."

The Governor himself recommended other kinds of escalation in a November 11, 1967 Veterans Day speech:

Governor Ronald Reagan of California said last night that U.S. should consider the invasion of North Vietnam with an "Inchon-type landing." Reagan called for further escalation of the war including the possible blockade of the Port of Haiphong and opposed plans for utilizing the UN as a peace-seeking organization to end the war in Vietnam. (San Francisco Examiner, Nov. 12, 1967)

Perhaps Reagan's least plausible foreign policy theory was a curious new twist on the President's "credibility gap," which he expressed on ABC's Issues and Answers (the same forum on which Goldwater raised the hue and cry of using tactical nuclear weapons to defoliate the rain forests three years earlier). The Sacramento Bee (Oct. 23, 1967) and the Los Angeles Times (Oct. 16, 1967) reported the following:

"I have a feeling that we are doing better in the war than people have been told. The corner may have been turned. We may be winning...."

Expanding on this theme, the governor said that in "reading between the lines," and in talking with persons who have been in Vietnam, he has gotten the impression that the corner may have been turned. (Times)

* * *

"Possibly we will be told when it is politically advantageous for the administration to tell us" how well we're doing in Vietnam. (Bee)

These statements caused pundit Arthur Hoppe, of the San Francisco Chronicle, to observe that Reagan had the right idea but didn't go far enough. The war isn't going better, Hoppe suggested, it has already been won, and the modest LBJ is merely trying to figure out a way to tell the people that it's over.

The July 10, 1967 issue of Newsweek contained a cut-and-paste job of Reagan's views on Vietnam; the following excerpts summarize his views:

Evidently, we are not hurting them. I don't think anyone would cheerfully want to use atomic weapons. But the last person in the world that should know we wouldn't use them is the enemy. He should go to bed every night afraid that we might.

I haven't declared war on Vietnam here in California, although if the President asked us to, I'd be very happy to comply. I don't have a foreign policy; the State doesn't....

I think you have to call this a full-scale war. I think the way to win a war is to win it.

In his book, The Blast of War, former British
Prime Minister Harold MacMillan observed that the United States likes to win wars like an "athletic contest, without worrying about what happens afterward." For Ronald Reagan, the war in Vietnam is one athletic contest he'd like to "win" very badly — apparently, no matter what the consequences. At times, he has shown an almost puerile insistence on unambiguous victory:

And what has happened to the warrior skills that came to Americans from experience in wars — experience unwanted and unsought, but unmatched nonetheless? We Americans have had one general and continuing experience outside our waters these past 50 years. It is the experience of fighting wars, and trying to prevent wars. And yet, at this dismal juncture, somehow we are unable or at least unwilling to bring to terms, or force an armistice, a ramshackle water buffalo economy with a gross national budget (sic) hardly equal to that of Pascaguala.

What has gone wrong? What has happened to our knowledge of politics and power? (Veteran Day Speech, November 11, 1967).

It should be noted that even the Citizens Committee for Peace with Freedom in Vietnam (including former Senator Paul Douglas, former Presidents Eisenhower and Truman, and General Omar Bradley — none of them particularly noted for their "soft" lines), have called for a "mutual de-escalation of the conflict," and emphasized the "limited objectives" of the US, asserting that the American goal is "not military victory but peace with freedom for South Vietnam." After citing the above statements, Peter Lisagor (New York Post, January 16, 1968) went on to write:

In an obvious thrust at those favoring "unleashing" air power, the group said that "in this age of nuclear weapons, we need a better alternative to surrender than a full-scale war."

"Our effort is limited, and thus, our patience must be great."

As a man who apparently sees no alternative to surrender other than full-scale war, Ronald Reagan may well have isolated himself in a position on the Vietnam War supported only by the most militant of hawks. The war issue and questions of foreign policy in general are thus the areas where Reagan is weakest on a national forum. His "common sense" views are here untempered by experience. His usual skepticism for the advice of the "experts" deserts him when the experts are military men. His usual prudence in avoiding labels also evaporates. However effective he may be on a domestic platform, he probably cannot maintain credibility on questions of foreign policy.

**DISSENT: an ugly word**

Not surprisingly, in view of the Governor's approach to Vietnam, he takes a "hard line" against those who demonstrate against the war. Reagan's position on such demonstrators ranges from insult (questioning their masculinity, for example: he likes to tell of the demonstrators he saw in California carrying "make love, not war" signs, adding that from the looks of them, he didn't think they were capable of doing either — Bridgeport, Conn. Post, Dec. 8, 1967) to rather extreme policy positions, such as declaring war so that protesters could be convicted of treason. The Governor has based his opposition to the demonstrators on the theory that they are "giving aid and comfort to the enemy." The following press reports give examples:

Reagan said if the nation were formally at war, the anti-war demonstrators who defied policy orders could be punished for treason.

"There would be plenty of laws to cover them if we were technically in a state of war." He said he "certainly" would not suggest such sanctions be used against peaceful demonstrations. He said press reports of his view left him a little "impatient." (LA Times, UPI, Oct. 29, 1967)

* * *

"Of course you have to have freedom of speech but once you have committed some young men to fight and die, freedom of speech must stop short of lending aid and comfort to the enemy."

He maintained that "when demonstrations attempt to interfere with shipment of men and supplies to the war, as some of those here did last summer, then you are lending comfort to the enemy and there is an ugly word to describe it." (Los Angeles Times, March 12, 1966)

Defenders of the Governor have said that he applied his implicit charge of treason only to illegal demonstrations. Yet he has frequently failed to make a distinction between legal and illegal dissent. He even went so far as to oppose the placing of Proposition "P" on the ballot in San Francisco for the 1967 elections. (Proposition "P" called for an immediate withdrawal from Vietnam.) He didn't just urge a "no" vote, he said it shouldn't even be on the ballot. Why? Because "it might give aid and comfort to the enemy." (Sacramento Bee, Oct. 31, 1967; and San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 2, 1967)

In fairness to Governor Reagan, it must be said that he has passed up some opportunities to be absolutely anti-libertarian in this area. One example was when, typically, he came down squarely on both sides of the question of drafting the protesters:

"Emotionally, I could go along with General Hersey," he said, "and I understand how he feels. But rationally and intellectually, I can't go along with using the draft to punish people." (Hartford Times, Dec. 5, 1967)

To his credit, the Governor has also said he is opposed to the draft system in peacetime, but he has indicated that he opposes its abolition now, during a time of war, however undeclared. (New Haven Register, Dec. 4, 1967)

Finally, it should be noted that the Governor does not always issue a blanket denunciation of all dissenters. A notable instance was his humane willingness to argue with a young dissenter at the Los Angeles Airport on Thanksgiving Eve 1967. There he showed that how-
ever shrill his remarks on group dissent may be, in the last analysis, he is personally tolerant of the individual’s right to express views contrary to those of the majority.

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**ON CAMPUS: meet force with force**

Ronald Reagan’s struggle with the academic community has been carried out on two fronts: against the (disruptive) students, one of his favorite campaign targets; and against the administrators, in his battle to cut costs.

The opening volley was fired almost immediately upon Inauguration, with the dismissal of Clark Kerr. Despite widely held belief to the contrary in liberal circles, Reagan did not actually instigate the firing of Kerr, although Reagan and his two appointees to the board of regents did cast their votes for dismissal. But they did not have enough votes to effect the dismissal without support from several other regents appointed by former Governor Brown. Many observers believe the move to oust Kerr may have come as a surprise to Reagan, who would have preferred to delay such a showdown until a more fortuitous time. But the Governor cannot be absolved of all or even a large part of the responsibility, since his tireless (and effective) campaigning on the issue of campus demonstrations and allegedly weak administration from Kerr was clearly one of the most decisive elements in creating an atmosphere and setting the stage for Kerr’s dismissal.

The well-publicized demonstrations and disturbances on various state college and university campuses in the past year produced a response from Reagan virtually indistinguishable from his attitude on “crime in the streets” and racial disorders: that is, to treat the disruptive students like any other criminals or rioters, with a massive application of force.

In a December 7, 1967 press release, Governor Reagan spelled out his views in detail, with a four-point program to “preserve law and order” on the campus. The basic thrust of it was that a campus was not different from any other place, and the police should be called in at the earliest possible moment. The last paragraph of the release summed it up nicely:

> We must restore confidence in the ability of our educational institutions to maintain the same standards of conduct which apply to the rest of society and to eliminate disorderly interference with academic pursuits.

What the Governor failed to mention was that he would also have to “restore confidence” in the ability of his educational institutions to provide a good education and racial dignity for minorities — especially blacks — before he could reasonably expect the disruption to stop.

An incident at San Jose State last fall typified Governor Reagan’s attitude on this matter. In response to what black students considered to be rampant racial discrimination on campus, a group of black militants, both on campus and off, threatened violent disruption of a football game if it were played as scheduled (among their complaints was discrimination on the football team). Tension on the campus had reached monumental proportions, and there was little doubt in anyone’s minds that if the football game were played, large scale violence and probably bloodshed would most likely result. The President of the College, Robert D. Clark, and even State Commissioner of Instruction Max Rafferty conceded that there was racial discrimination on the campus.

Consequently, President Clark cancelled the game, put all the sororities and fraternities on probation, and created an ombudsman to investigate and fight on-campus discrimination. Clark stressed that the game had to be called off because of the very real threat of violence from off-campus, not from his students.

Reagan and Rafferty were fit to be tied. “If I had to ask the President to call in the whole US Marine Corps,” Rafferty proclaimed, “that game would have been played. I wouldn’t have submitted to it. This is no good. I don’t like blackmail.”

Reagan’s words were a little more modest, but his position no less extreme: “I feel it was yielding to the threat of force. It was appeasement. ... (I believe in) calling out the necessary force and law enforcement.”

In the heat of the dispute, the most moderate voice was heard from Victor Lee (a white), president of the Associated Students at San Jose State: “It seems to me that any step to avoid violence or possible arson is definitely wiser than risking it.” (San Francisco Chronicle and Los Angeles Times, Sept. 27, 1967)

Between the Governor’s attitude toward campus
dissent and demonstration and his financial policies on
education, Reagan very quickly became one of the least
popular figures on California’s college and university
campuses. His presence in the Governor’s chair is given
as the reason for the refusal of a large number of aca-
demics to take jobs in the California educational sys-
tem. The reason: Reagan stresses repression of any dis-
turbance without treating the underlying causes—and
often without even discussing the real grievances of
students, faculty and administration.

APPOMENTS AND ADVISORS:
at ease with business

Governor Ronald Reagan's appointments and staff
can be characterized neither as extremely bad nor as
extremely good. Some of them are broadly experienced,
and many (especially his personal staff) are bright,
young and aggressive. But one generalization can be
made: Governor Reagan likes to stick with his own
kind, and very rarely ventures out into a field with
which he is unfamiliar to find an appointee. Conse-
sequently, there is a heavy reliance on businessmen and
conservatives, even in areas where they are tainted by
past controversies.

It came as no surprise, then, that Governor Reagan
named Albert C. Beeson, a management leader, to head
the California Department of Industrial Relations —
a post usually reserved for labor spokesmen or at least
men who are neutral between business and labor. Mr.
Beeson was a member of the NLRB under President
Eisenhower and his pro-business posture had created
quite a storm in the US Senate before ultimate con-
firmation. (LA Times May 5, 1967)

Reagan also appointed a businessman, William C.
Hern, as Labor Commissioner. (LA Times, Feb. 19,
1967). Critics called the appointment part of a general
policy of choosing "foxes to guard the chicken coop."

Pro-business Reagan appointees on the State Divi-
sion of Industrial Accidents and Workmen’s Compen-
sation Appeals Board provoked considerable contro-
versy when they claimed last summer that the Work-
men’s Compensation policy had been "too liberal," and
cut it back sharply. Millions of dollars were thus saved
to the employers, but at precisely that cost to the em-
ployees — and perhaps ultimately to the taxpayers of
the state, should disabled workers be forced onto the wel-
fare rolls. (LA Times, July 20, 1967)

The Governor also apparently felt at ease with real
estate magnates. He named Peter R. Johnson of San
Francisco, the president of a real estate investment firm,
to head the Division of Fair Employment Practices,
which is charged with enforcing California’s open hous-
ing law. (Oakland Tribune, April 11, 1967)

He also nominated Burton E. Smith, an ardent sup-
porter of the controversial Proposition 14 and opponent
of open housing, as Real Estate Commissioner. (SF
Chronicle, March 24, 1967). Smith was only approved
after several days delay in the State Senate because of
his open housing position. (Oakland Tribune, March
28, 1967)

Governor Reagan ran into even more trouble in
the State Senate over a nominee for the State Board of
Education. William J. McCandless, an ardent follower
of arch-conservative State Superintendent of Public
Instruction Max Rafferty, had aroused heated contro-
versy in his own local school district in Orange County
by an uncompromisingly pro-school prayer posture long
after the US Supreme Court had declared prayers in
public schools unconstitutional. When the Senate balked
at his nomination to the State Board of Education, his
name was withdrawn. (Sacramento Bee, Feb. 14, 1967,
Feb. 24, 1967)

To his credit, Governor Reagan has not excluded
Negroes, or at least a Negro, from his major appointees.
He appointed James E. Johnson as the first Negro Di-
rector of Veterans Affairs. But it should be noted that
Johnson, a self-professed “conservative,” could hardly
be described as a “soul brother” to most of California’s
blacks, and is in no way an exception to Reagan’s pat-
tern of appointments. Johnson startled more than a few
observers by a tolerance of the John Birch Society
unmatched by many of Reagan’s white appointees: “I
don’t hate their philosophy. The people I met were
Christian people, and we went to church together.” (SF
Chronicle, May 9, 1967)

One of the closest Reagan advisors, on an informal
basis (he is neither an appointee nor a paid staff mem-
ber), is millionaire oilman Henry Salvatori — an early
Goldwater supporter and one of Reagan’s first and
heaviest financial contributors for the gubernatorial
campaign. A self-professed “moderate to liberal” on
domestic affairs, Salvatori’s real political philosophy
may be understood more precisely in light of the follow-
ing excerpt from an interview reported in the Sacra-
mento Bee (Mar. 5, 1967):

“I consider myself a conservative on foreign policy,”
said, explaining why he supported Dr. Fred
Schwarz and the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade
and organized the Anti-Communist Voters League.
“But on domestic affairs, I consider myself moderate
on the graduated income tax. I’ve never accused the State Department of treason. I’ve
said the State Department has unwittingly followed
the Communist line, but I’ve never accused it of treason.
Only the extremists do that.”

By his own estimation, Salvatori meets with Gov-
ernor Reagan at least weekly, phones often, is consulted
on major matters, and set up the screening committee to
select the top twenty key men in the administration.

Ronald Reagan: Here’s the Rest of Him was written and
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STATE BY STATE

PENNSYLVANIA: has constitutional reform ruined Ray Shafer?

In Ten North Frederick one of John O'Hara's characters mutters, "Any SOB who thinks he wants to be president ought to try being Governor of Pennsylvania for four years". The General Assembly of Pennsylvania either tames a Governor or tarnishes him. The only recent exception to that rule was William Scranton. Not only did he win back the Executive Mansion after eight years of Democratic rule but the proportions of his victory carried in an almost comfortable Republican margin in both houses. Scranton used the initial capital of his landslide win to extract a tax program. Then followed programs in education, health and welfare that generated enough positive comment to muzzle the grumbling about increased taxes.

Raymond Shafer, the present governor, who had to run on his predecessor's record rather than wage an offensive campaign against an incumbent administration, could not achieve any dramatic mandate at the outset. Nevertheless, Shafer determined constitutional revision as his priority objective—an objective that eluded Scranton and every other governor in the twentieth century.

The price for getting the convention referendum bill through the General Assembly was costly. Legislators first narrowed the scope of revision. Then they packed the constitutional convention and tailored the delegate-election mechanics to give maximum influence to party organizations. Thus, it was no surprise when the proposed reforms submitted by the delegates and adopted in the April primary fell short of expectations. Still, the modestness of the proposed changes (the exception being a splendid local government article) assured an easier campaign for ratification.

The measure of Ray Shafer's place in history will be the assessed worth of those constitutional reforms. By mortgaging his future on charter revision, he exhausted his legislative credit. By comparison to Scranton, his enactments in civil rights, increase in unemployment compensation and transportation are not overly impressive. In order not to jeopardize chances of convention referendum in the spring primary last year, he postponed submitting his tax request until summer. Not until December did the Assembly come up with any revenue program—a piecemeal tax that among other things raised the selective sales tax to 6%—the highest in the nation. By then, Shafer's gubernatorial prestige was badly battered and his relations with the Assembly and particularly its Republican leaders were severely strained. Denied a wide tax base, Shafer will face in the last two years of his term a rising swell of critics frustrated at the curtailment of any expansion in government services. Some 20,000 teachers wanting better salary minimums stormed him in March and soon Catholics wanting aid to parochial schools will add their angry protest.

Although the future does not look any brighter, there is no dearth of candidates waiting to succeed Shafer, who is barred from seeking another term in 1970. The two most likely GOP heirs apparent are Lieutenant Governor Raymond Broderick, the Chairman of the Constitutional Convention, and John Tabor, Scranton's Secretary of Commerce. Broderick was a virtually unknown Philadelphia lawyer in state Republican circles when he was selected by the party caucus for the second spot on the ballot in June 1966 to replace former Attorney General Walter Alessandri who was killed in a plane crash. Broderick at that time had three assets. He was a Philadelphian, a Catholic and was the personal choice of Philadelphia GOP boss Billy Meehan.

The man who most Pennsylvanians expected to be slated at that time was John Tabor, who had considerable support for the gubernatorial nomination, but had agreed in January to take the difficult task of trying to defeat popular Genevieve Blatt, three-term incumbent for Secretary of Internal Affairs. With the death of Alessandri in April, most expected that Tabor would move up to the second spot on the ballot. Instead, Billy Meehan's wishes prevailed. They may also prevail in 1970. John Tabor has the independence, intellectual orientation and uncompromising idealism that does not win county party machine enthusiasm. As the heir to the Scrantonian tradition (Yale, Harvard Law School and Cambridge), Tabor proved his vote-getting popularity with his upset over incumbent Internal Affairs Secretary Blatt in 1966 and his administrative ability in the Commerce, Internal Affairs and now Labor Departments (Tabor was recently appointed Secretary of Labor when the Internal Affairs post to which he was elected in 1966 was abolished).

Lieutenant Governor Broderick, however, with his crisp leadership and reform votes in the constitutional convention has added considerable depth to a pastimeboard "stalwart campaigner" image. But his ready availability for party functions cannot alone win the gubernatorial nomination. Broderick has been playing Shafer's standby and his chances rise or fall with the appeal of the Shafer record. If that record is negligible, as it seems to be now, gubernatorial aspirant Tabor will be ready to evoke reminders of the popular Scranton era.

James C. Humes was cited at a dinner as one of Philadelphia's outstanding citizens of 1967 for his efforts in developing and mobilizing a "Disturbance Control Program" last summer. Humes, Executive Director of the Philadelphia Bar Association, conceived the idea of having lawyers on all-night watches at all the police stations.

After getting Republican Governor Shafer's state financial backing on the plan, he recruited a team of 85 lawyers who, by immediately advising arrested citizens, helped cool down potentially volatile situations. The pressure of these mediators in the stations, helped prevent any incidents of police brutality. Secondly, these riot-central attorneys, by contacting immediately the families or friends of the accused, undercut rumors or exaggerated reports of the arrests.

This summer program, unique in the nation, defused many inflammatory incidents that trigger explosion in an environment of frustration and was considered a substantial factor in maintaining the comparative racial calm in Philadelphia last summer. Other cities might do well to consider this approach. Humes is Ripon Forum correspondent for Pennsylvania.
GEORGIA: civil rights planks

The Georgia Republican Party and the Georgia Young Republican Federation both established Committees on Human Rights and Social Concerns at their recent conventions.

In addition to setting up these permanent standing committees, the Georgia GOP pledged itself in its platform to help alleviate the conditions of poverty and racial strife within the state and to enlist people of all races, creeds, and colors to join the GOP.

The State Party Committee is to study pressing social problems and to offer workable solutions to the communities and their elected officials.

The Young Republican Federation also repudiated all politicians who panders to racist sentiment in order to gain votes. This section was included as a part of the resolution establishing the YRF Committee.

Both Conventions passed these measures by voice vote with surprisingly little opposition. The Young Republican civil rights resolution, upon which the later Senior Party platform plank was based, was written by Ripton members Sand E. Brim and Cullen Hammond.

A strong pro-Nixon delegation was elected by Georgia Republicans at their state and congressional district conventions recently. 23 of the 30 delegates chosen would probably vote for Nixon if the National Convention were held today. Reagan and Rockefeller would probably split the other votes on a 4 and 3 basis. Reagan would, by all estimations, be the second choice of most of the current Nixon-leaning delegates.

Georgia is definitely not Rockefeller country now, but most of the delegation is made up of professionals who might be convinced to back Nelson Rockefeller should he develop a clear edge over Nixon in national preference polls by August.

CONNECTICUT: odd bed-fellows

for Nixon

Certain Connecticut Republican leaders who had been left out of the organization's central councils for the past several fortnights quieted their loud complaints in May and began whispering fetchingly to the oddest of potential political bedfellows.

Former Congressman Abner Sibal, who let it be known to moderates not long ago that he favored Rockefeller as the GOP presidential nominee, suddenly appeared as a leader in a pro-Nixon push aimed to increase Nixon support in the 16-man national convention delegation to at least six votes from the three apparent in mid-May.

Nixon forces—based in Fairfield county and eastern Connecticut—began a campaign to unseat State Chairman Howard E. Hausman of New Britain and National Committeewoman Tina Harrower of Hamden were also targets of the unseating plan.

Nixon forces hoped to replace these four at-large delegates with their own people. The state's six congressional districts were each to choose two delegates.

Further momentum was given the pro-Nixon campaign in Connecticut by the announcement that Sen. Howard Baker, Jr., of Tennessee, to be keynote speaker at the state convention, had left his favorite son stance to back Nixon publicly.

Meanwhile, in a bid to stay alive politically after two consecutive election losses to Democratic U.S. Rep. Donald Irwin, Sibal announced his candidacy for the Senate seat now held by Democrat Abraham Ribicoff.

He thus disrupted a state-wide compromise in favor of Edwinn H. May, whose candidacy was the result of an accommodation reached by the more conservative May-Hausman people with the more moderate Alsop faction. (See April FORUM).

Sibal, who could get the 20% state convention vote necessary to challenge May to a costly statewide primary, declined to say whether he would actually force such a primary if he got the 20% margin. Thus he left the door open to a possible agreement at the state convention by which he could decide not to contest the primary, if Nixon would get more Connecticut votes in Miami.

None of the principal beneficiaries of the Hausman-May-Alsp accommodation were from Fairfield County or eastern Connecticut unfortunately, and Republican leaders there were not pleased. Also uniting some Republicans in these areas was their support of Nixon. The state organization leaned toward Rockefeller because of his greater drawing power in the state as shown in the polls. Windham County GOP leader William Jordan and probable GOP congressional nominee Peter Mariani of Groton, though not overly enthusiastic about each other's company in the past, both favored Nixon, and the Fairfield County hierarchy was heavily pro-Nixon.

Pulling Hausman, Alsop, Mrs. Switaski and Mrs. Harrower out of the national delegation, however, would be only the beginning of the orgy. The frail May-Hausman-Alsp detente would be over. Hausman's state chairmanship would be up for grabs to a host of candidates, including Sibal, Bridgeport Republican leader Edward Sandula or even Mariant, who has strong support in many parts of the state.

Hausman, who had hoped he could hold the Connecticut GOP together by an accommodation with the Alsop group and by enforcing a moratorium on public support for GOP presidential contenders, may well see his compromise thrown out by those left out of it; the insurgent forces may now bid strongly to force their way back into the center of GOP councils under the wraps of their pro-Nixon operation.

As usual, the combatants here seem to enjoy the struggle well enough. The only problem for Connecticut Republicans is that they have often been too tired afterward to get themselves elected to anything.
MASSACHUSETTS: platform hearings starring NAR

The day Nelson Rockefeller announced his active candidacy for the Presidency, he was asked if he would accompany the other Northeastern Republican governors to hear suggestions for the national platform in Boston, New York, and other cities. He said no. Several hours later, when it was clear that he had won the first-ballot votes of the 34 Massachusetts delegates in the primary, the journey to Boston suddenly had a new allure. After all, the delegates would be free after the first ballot. Yes, he would go to Boston.

He used his time well. On the Sunday night before the platform meetings he met privately with the Massachusetts delegation to the 1968 Republican National Convention and impressed the delegates and their wives with his appetite for solving problems (pronounced “practicals” in Rockefellerese), with his reiteration of the words “integrity” and “imagination,” and with his simple explanation of why he didn’t call out the National Guard to collect New York City’s garbage. (Even if they had escaped injury from lifting the cans, the National Guardsmen could only have collected 4000 tons a day, and there were 10,000 tons that needed collection). Then it was on to a banquet for the delegates and selected financial and political personalities, where Rockefeller did much to soften the blow to Governor Volpe for having beaten him in his own primary: the reason John Volpe lost, Rocky explained, is that he was in Japan representing the Governors’ Association, as part of a wise program to build the governors into a unified and important national voice.

The platform hearings the next morning were stale and predictable, but Rockefeller was clearly using them to good advantage. As colleagues Volpe, Shafer, and Chafee took their seats under the spotlights in the Sheraton Plaza Hotel, the New York Governor was “on the phone,” which left his seat dramatically vacant and enabled him to make a solitary, if belated, entrance.

On came the witnesses, a fair cross-section of the Massachusetts establishment — a bank president, an AFL-CIO leader, a hospital administrator, the president of MIT, three major state officials, and even Leverett Saltonstall. With each witness, Rockefeller did three things in the question period — rattled off a barrage of statistics (the Man of Experience), asked what must be done next in the witness’ field (the Man of Action), and pondered aloud the need for a balanced budget (the Republican Mainstreamer). The delegates in the audience were watching a virtuoso in action.

The last witness was Terry Barnett, representing Ripon and slated to speak on matters affecting youth. When he brought up Ripon’s proposal to end the draft and establish a volunteer army, the reporters waited eagerly for some fireworks, but after a bout of whispering among the governors, no questions were asked on this subject. What interested Rockefeller, however, was Barnett’s attack on the House of Representatives’ recent vote to deny Federal loans to students caught violating campus rules; a similar measure is pending in the legislature in Albany. After indicating some reservations about the wisdom of such legislation vis-a-vis civil rights protests, Rockefeller nevertheless insisted that “a line should be drawn.” Hence, the liberal with a conservative streak.

The Governor’s performance almost saved the affair — almost, but not quite. There is nothing drearier than the same old witnesses viewing with the same old alarm and pointing with the same old pride. One heard much talk about the ghetto, and looked for a ghetto dweller in the room; one impassioned black speaking before the governors might have added insight and flair to the proceedings, as Fannie Lou Hamer did at the Democratic Convention 1964. There is something poignant about a gathering which discusses the alienation of the underprivileged without asking any of them to present their views.

ARIZONA: building a record to run on

Republican Party leaders in Arizona have made large and concerted efforts at producing the cohesive party organization and successful legislative record necessary for a party victory in November. At stake are the governorship of Republican incumbent Jack Williams, three Congressional seats (now with two Republicans and one Democrat), a majority in both houses of the legislature, and Barry Goldwater’s bid for re-election to the United States Senate. Arizona leaders are leaving little or nothing to chance.

The leadership achieved a major organizational victory in late January when it recaptured the chairmanship of the Maricopa County (Phoenix) party for one of its own, Arizona House majority whip Delos Ellsworth. The Ellsworth election was the result of several months of work and unbroken unity on the part of Goldwater, Congressman John Rhodes, Governor Williams, and the legislative leadership, House Speaker Stanley Turley and Senate President Marshall Humphrey. State Chairman Harry Rosenzweig apparently played the catalytic role in engineering the victory.

Early in 1965 the ultra-right wing of the Arizona party helped elect Charles O. Miller to the Maricopa chairmanship. Miller was supposed to represent an ideological compromise and to bring party unity, but it soon developed that the ultra-right was in firm control of Miller and his committee. As a result, party moderates lost faith in Miller and stopped contributing. He resigned last year when the deficit reached $17,000.

The ultra-right candidate to succeed Miller was newspaper publisher Keith Jensen, one of the organizers of United Republicans of Arizona, a group whose purpose was the financing of “conservative” Republicans in the GOP primaries. Jensen had been accused of conflict of interest in founding UROA and continuing to sit on the executive committee of the Maricopa organization.

Ellsworth was apparently encouraged to run by party leaders, for his name was not immediately mentioned in speculation after Miller’s resignation, and he was jointly endorsed by Williams, Fannin, Rhodes, and Goldwater the day after announcing his candidacy. In
the same statement these leaders blasted the UROA as divisive. Ellsworth won decisively in January and immediately purged the holdover legal counsel and finance chairman.

Party leaders have also fought hard to develop a legislative record on which they can re-elect the first Republican majority in Arizona's history. A box score for the legislature indicated passage of a comprehensive tax reform, a $10.2 million appropriation for the State Universities building funds, an increase in unemployment compensation, and some major structural reforms of the State Government, mostly involving centralizing the appointive powers in the governor.

The passage of the Governor's program has not been accomplished without anguish, however. The majority leaders had very small margins which they sometimes had to bludgeon into submission by long caucus sessions. The legislative session itself was kept for eleven days beyond its pay period. Veteran legislators, accustomed to being able to follow their whims, did not take the yoke of majority responsibility very well. One Phoenix Senator walked out during the vote on four-year terms for state officers, forcing the leadership to wheedle a Democratic vote. Another characterized the State Universities, for which capital financing was sought, as full of "substandard students, husband-hunting coeds, people trying to avoid the draft, a lot of GI's riding the gravy train, and boneheaded courses."

Weariness from fighting such obstructionism has taken its toll of the leadership, and Williams and company are hard at work trying to convince legislative leaders to stand for re-election. At least the struggle was not in vain, and the Party will face the Arizona electorate with an impressive list of new legislation.

ARIZONA: slow road to a two-party system

Emboldened by the election of the first Republican governor in a century, the Arizona GOP is looking to 1968 as a year to consolidate that victory with the election of other state officials and legislators. Republicans have few illusions about Rockefeller's win in 1966 bringing the two-party system to Arizona. Although carrying political newcomer Maurice "Footsie" Britt into the lieutenant governorship, Rockefeller's coattails were only broad enough to elect three Republicans to the state's general assembly.

The reason that Republicans are confident that this will be a GOP year is the total disarray of the state's Democratic Party. Two years ago, under Governor Orval Faubus, Arkansas was able to boast the most monolithic Democratic machine in the country. Today, with Faubus in the Ozarks writing his phantom memoirs, the state's Democrats have not even been able to agree on a party loyalty pledge.

The confusion reached a peak at the filing deadline when last minute entries saw six Democrats vying for the gubernatorial nomination. The candidates covered the full spectrum from Ted Boswell, a leader of the reform wing of the party, to Mrs. Virginia Johnson, wife of "Justice Jim" Johnson, the leader of the Wallace movement in the state. On the Republican side, token opposition emerged in the person of Little Rock salesman Sidney Roberts, who was summarily dismissed from his job upon announcement of his candidacy.

Although the large candidate turnout promises a vigorous discussion of the issues, it is clearly not heartening to the Democrats' less policy-minded pros. The party is based on unity by the American Independents of George Wallace and Jim Johnson, and on the left by the Democrats for Rockefeller, which has remained active since 1966. In the center is a leaderless party faithful which is unsure where the Democratic Party stands.

Democrats are privately agreed that to win in 1968 they must depend on Rockefeller to stumble. Some are convinced he already has. As governor of the second poorest state in the country, Rockefeller is campaigning for re-election on the promise of new taxes. In addition, Rockefeller has reaffirmed his strong support for civil rights by a call for more jobs for Negroes and by a surprise appearance at a memorial service honoring the late Dr. Martin Luther King. Although Arkansas has been relatively free of racial unrest in recent years, many observers believe that the outbreak of summer violence could leave Rockefeller the first victim of the crossfire.

POLITICAL CALENDAR FOR JULY
(compiled from materials supplied by the Republican National Committee and residential material in bold face).

1 MARYLAND: Congressional candidates filing deadline for September 10 primary.
2 MISSISSIPPI: Voter registration deadline for general election.
3 NEW MEXICO: Filing deadline for state and local candidates for August 27 primary.
4 ARIZONA: Voter registration deadline for September 10 primary.
5 MICHIGAN: Voter registration deadline for August 6 primary.
6 ARKANSAS: Voter registration deadline for July 30 primary.
7 VIRGINIA: Primary election.
8 WISCONSIN: Deadline for candidates filing for September 10 primary.
9 OKLAHOMA: Deadline for candidates filing for August 27 primary.
10 ARIZONA: Deadline for state and local candidates filing for September 10 primary.
11 WYOMING: Deadline for state and local candidates filing for August 20 primary.
12 RHOE: ISLAND: Deadline for voter registration for the September 10 primary.
14 KANSAS: Voter registration deadline for August 6 primary.
15 MINNESOTA: Deadline for candidates filing for September 10 primary.
16 LOUISIANA: Voter registration deadline for August 17 primary.
17 NEVADA: Deadline for state and local candidates filing for September 3 primary.
18 VIRGINIA: Deadline for candidates filing for the general election.
19 NEVADA: Deadline for voter registration for September 3 primary.
20 NEW HAMPSHIRE: Deadline for state and local candidates filing for the September 10 primary.
21 NORTH DAKOTA: Deadline for state and local candidates filing for the September 3 primary.
22 COLORADO: Deadline for state and local candidates filing for September 10 primary.
23 ARKANSAS: Primary election.
14a ELIOT STREET
RIPON INTELLIGENCE UNIT

On June 1 the Ripon Society formed a new division, the Ripon Intelligence Unit, to perform contract research for Republican office holders and candidates, party units, corporations and the Society itself. The Intelligence Unit represents a major expansion of Ripon's capabilities in the research area. It will operate under the directorship of Robert D. Behn. Dr. Behn is a graduate of the Worcester Polytechnic Institute who has served as a consultant to the Lincoln Laboratory of MIT and the RAND Corporation. A former teaching fellow and research assistant at Harvard University, Behn completed work this spring on his Doctorate in Engineering at Harvard. He was on the Steering Committee of the Massachusetts Republican State Issues Convention and has served as Research Director for Ripon on national issues during 1967. He thus will combine experience in state and national problems with knowledge of computer technology and experience in the use of mathematical models.

At its annual meeting April 27-29, the Society's National Governing Board approved the formation of new Ripon Society chapters in Dallas, Texas and Seattle, Washington, and elected officers for the coming year. Lee W. Huebner of Sheboygan, Wisconsin was reelected President. Vice President is Christopher W. Bayley, a Seattle, Washington, attorney; Treasurer is Frank E. Samuel, a Washington, D.C. attorney; and John R. Price, Jr., of New York was elected to the newly created post of Chairman of the Board. The Society also gave recognition to subchapter groups in Chicago and Boston and to an advisory group in Washington, D.C.

The pre-paid letters enclosed in the last FORUM are beginning to pay off in renewals, resubscriptions and closer contact with our readership. One correspondent used his envelope to suggest a topic for a guest editorial by eminent Republican Shirley Temple Black: "Poverty Can Be Fun, or Let Them Eat Lollipops."

The proposal for a Ripon tie was discussed and ridiculed at the last National Governing Board meeting, but plans for it go ahead. A British firm is preparing the design using the crest of Ripon, England, a lovely cathedral town from which Ripon, Wisconsin, the birthplace of the Republican Party, took its name. It is our small way of propping up the pound, the first line of defense for the dollar.

The absence of a correspondent from Rhode Island on our masthead was noticed by two Republican leaders of the Town of Hempstead. They have offered to keep us abreast of affairs in Providence, and both active in the state GOP. They have offered to keep us abreast of affairs in the mini-state. There are several other unfilled vacancies on the masthead. Any volunteers?

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This month's book club selection is The New Politics by James M. Perry, the best book to date on modern campaigning techniques. It was reviewed in last month's FORUM.

Solveig Bjerke and staff are collecting who's who information from the delegates to the 1968 nominating convention. The biographical data will be published prior to convention time to serve as a guide to the players. It should also be of interest to future historians and researchers.

LETTERS

NON-PROLIFERATION

Dear Sirs:

It was with genuine interest that I read the profound and precise study which the Ripon FORUM devoted to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in its April issue. May I, as an European, congratulate you on your objective view of this important question. I especially wish to commend the way in which you treat a problem which has been all too often considered from a purely emotional point of view. You are rendering here a great service. Your article will be especially useful in showing Europeans that thoughtful Americans agree with them on an issue which may have far-reaching implications in the future.

Yours truly,

ED NOTE: The FORUM's correspondent in Nassau County informs us that he has no uncertainty about any of the statements in his article, though he would like to add a new detail: Governor Rockefeller, in exasperation with Nassau County GOP leaders and their deals with the Conservative Party has threatened to campaign against them this fall. Beyond that, he says that his article did not endorse the rumors; it merely reported their existence.

RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Dear Sirs:

In its analysis of the Riot Commission report, the April issue of the Ripon FORUM makes reference in the section "What Republicans Should Do" to several Republican legislative proposals which dovetail with the recommendations of the Commission.

I wanted to specifically call to the attention of FORUM readers the Riot Commission's recommendation that tax incentives should be offered to encourage industrialization in rural areas as a way of stemming the rural to urban migration. Senator James B. Pearson of Kansas is the author of the Rural Job Development Act, S. 2134, which would provide tax credits to encourage the development of new business in rural areas.

This proposal has received a great deal of favorable attention, and it is co-sponsored by a bipartisan group of some 30 Senators.

JERRY B. WATERS
Washington, D.C.

ED NOTE: The Rural Job Development Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to approve new job-producing investment in counties in which there is no city of more than 50,000 population and in which there is evidence of poverty or declining employment. The following Republican Senators are co-sponsors of the Pearson bill: Allen, (Vt.); Bennett, (Utah); Cotton, (N.H.); Hansen, (Wyo.); Hatfield, (Ore.); Javits, (N.Y.); Jordan, (Idaho); Miller, (Iowa); Mundt, (S.D.); Percy, (Ill.); Prouty, (Vt.); Scott, (Pa.); and Young, (N.D.).

Dr. Waters is Administrative Assistant to Senator Pearson.
POET'S CORNER

PRE-CONVENTION MOTHER GOOSE

by W. K. Woods

STAR BRIGHT
Star bright, far right
First star I see tonight,
I wish you'd stay in cowboy dress
Instead of wowing Meet The Press.

HUMPTY DUMPTY
Humpty Dumpty praised the king's war,
Humpty Dumpty was a great bore.
All the king's forces,
And all labor's men,
Couldn't make Humpty a liberal again.

LITTLE DICK MUFFET
Little Dick Muffet
Sat on a tuffet,
Thinking himself all alone;
Along rolled a Rock
Who gave him a knock,
And the tuffet looked less like a throne.

MISTRESS BLISSY
Mistress Blissy,
Never prissy,
How does your
Garden grow?
With delegate fights,
And campaign rites,
And non-candidates all in a row.

LITTLE BOY BOB
Little Boy Bob, come blow your horn,
Gene's won New Hampshire, the king's robes
are torn
But where was the little boy yearning for power?
He got himself a haircut that very same hour.

HUSH - A - BYE ROCKY
Hush-a-bye Rocky
In your State House,
When a draft grows
You'll withdraw like a mouse,
When the draft cools
Your coyness will pall,
And down will come Rocky
Campaign and all.

LITTLE LYN JOHNSON
Little Lyn Johnson
Pre-pollred Wisconsin
The results only made him cry
Onto TV he flew
And promptly withdrew
Saying, "Oh what a statesman am I."

HEY DIDdle DIDDLE
Hey diddle diddle
Dean Rusk's on the griddle
The Urban crisis is hot
Republicans laugh to see such sport
While the cities continue to rot.