MARK HATFIELD:

Facing the Vietnam Issue

"It is entirely proper for candidates to weigh carefully their comments on Vietnam because of possible international repercussions and effects on the Paris negotiations. But caution growing out of a sense of responsibility should not be confused with caution growing out of political calculation. The Paris peace talks should not become the skirts for timid men to hide behind.

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The Draft's Agony of Conscience

Vietnam Memos for the Next President  Don Luce, David Marr Tran Van Dinh

What Moderates Think of Nixon

A Ripon Position Paper

A Ripon Society Poll
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WINNING AN INFORMED CONSTITUENCY

If Spiro T. Agnew has been effectively muzzled, the worst of the campaign may be over. The Nixon-Agnew ticket, we may hope, will cease to embarrass and antagonize its progressive Republican supporters. In the interests of unifying the country, Mr. Nixon should balance the largely negative appeal of his early campaign by returning more frequently to the progressive vision of his pre-convention speech on Expanding Democracy — a vision of a government that can call forth participation, creativity and volunteer effort at all levels of society.

His September 19 radio address on the Presidency is a welcome step in this direction. Further statements on domestic programs — for transportation, the cities, youth, education, the aged and, yes, civil rights — will follow if Mr. Nixon wants to demonstrate his intention to govern fairly and responsibly.

But for the first part of the next administration, the most important tasks will not be domestic. Serious choices will first have to be made abroad: the Vietnam war must be settled, an impending crisis in international finance must be averted, and a thoroughgoing reassessment must be made of US relations with NATO, the Soviet Union, China and Japan. The way in which the next president copes with these external problems will have important consequences for the domestic economy as well as for the subsequent conduct of US foreign policy.

Both candidates owe it to the electorate to present coherent thoughts on America’s role overseas. In a guest editorial in this issue, Mark Hatfield makes a strong case for requiring office seekers to tell what they mean to do about Vietnam. The same case can be made for the general direction of policy in other critical areas. For if the American people are to be required to adjust their personal lives to the demands of their nation’s role abroad, they ought to be given a clue of what this role is likely to be.

The last man who tried to play a con game with them on foreign policy found that though he could muster the voters for an easy electoral victory, he could not hold a consensus of informed opinion afterwards. An electoral majority, he found, will install an administration, but only an informed constituency can provide the sustained support on which the success of any policy depends. Once such a constituency is lost in a given area of policy it cannot be regained by off-year Gallup polls proving that an electoral majority potentially exists in support of the administration.

In domestic affairs a new informed constituency is emerging, and Mr. Nixon has been quick to adopt its emphasis on private sector involvement, self-help, decentralization and protection of the individual against bureaucratic excess. In foreign affairs, however, he and other Republican leaders have been wedded to older ideas at a time when the Vietnam experience has prompted a far-reaching reevaluation of America’s role abroad. To say that there has developed an informed constituency with a global grasp of American foreign policy would be premature, but on the question of Vietnam, at least, informed people do hold a well-defined view of the war.

Does Mr. Nixon share this view? At the Republican National Convention his staff prepared and John Tower delivered a memo to the platform committee that suggested he might. Vietnam, the memo said, is “not primarily a military struggle . . . . It is primarily a political struggle with the enemy conducting military operations to achieve political and psychological objectives. It is a war for people not for territory . . . . Rather than further escalation on the military front, what is needed now is a dramatic escalation of our efforts on the economic, political, diplomatic and psychological fronts.”

The memo urged negotiations but warned that “the conference table must be wide enough and the issues placed upon it broad enough to accommodate as many as possible of the powers and interests involved.” To many, this sounded like a “new” Nixon on Vietnam.

But since the convention Mr. Nixon himself has not uttered the words of his platform memo in public. Instead, he has emphasized military aspects of the war in such a manner as to give rise to speculation that he has backed away from his earlier position and from portions of the Republican Platform on Vietnam that once had the support of his pre-convention backers. The fact that one of the principal drafters of the platform memorandum has since left his staff has bolstered the suspicion that Mr. Nixon’s written statement to the platform committee was only a tactical move to head off a threatened floor fight by George Romney and other critics of the war.

Does Mr. Nixon really subscribe to the view of the war embodied in the Republican platform? If so, he can commit himself to it by repeating it in a public statement. But if he remains silent on the most critical issues of foreign policy, he will have lost a chance to rally to his cause a constituency essential to effective government.
Negotiators have been meeting for nearly four months in Paris and while they have been holding their cordial, weekly meetings and coffee breaks, 5000 Americans have died and another 34,000 young men have been wounded. No one knows how many thousands of South Vietnamese have been made homeless or how many have been killed and maimed. Yet, despite the growing casualty figures and the lack of progress in Paris, the American public is mesmerized and mute: political candidates at all levels and of both national parties have declined to speak out on the relevant issues of Vietnam.

It may be that I — and other critics of our Vietnam policies — are to a degree responsible for the hypnotized state of American public opinion which allows political candidates to successfully avoid confronting the issue. For many months we repeatedly emphasized the need to establish negotiations. And perhaps in stressing the necessity for peace talks, we did not state clearly enough that negotiations were not an end in themselves. Now many people feel obligated to remain silent, and allow office-seekers the luxury of silence; because the President has given us peace talks, he has ostensibly met our demands. The point is, however, that negotiations themselves are not the objective: peace is the objective. The establishment of discussions in Paris represents no more than a first step in moving from a military to a political resolution of the war.

It is past time for the American people to begin demanding that the political parties and candidates who seek to govern face up to the issue of peace and display the political courage to match their political ambition.

In 1964 the American people — trusting the campaign promises of the Democratic presidential candidate — thought they were voting for peace, only to have their trust betrayed. Candidates at all levels are again expecting voters to accept their post-election intentions on faith and they deal with Vietnam in terms of assurances not to “sell out” our men in Vietnam and vague promises for “an honorable peace.” This is not enough. In the democratic process voters should not be forced to go to the polls with their fingers crossed: they should not be forced to rely on blind faith that the man they vote for will share their views on the most important issue of the election.

I am not suggesting that political candidates are obligated to present blueprints for our extrication from Vietnam; but I am suggesting that those people who want to be a part of the political leadership of this country during the coming years have an obligation to American voters to address themselves to the relevant issues of Vietnam.

It is entirely proper for candidates to weigh carefully their comments on Vietnam because of possible international repercussions and effects on the Paris negotiations. But caution growing out of a sense of responsibility should not be confused with caution growing out of political calculation. The Paris peace talks should not become the skirts for timid men to hide behind.

LEGITIMATE QUESTIONS

There are many legitimate questions concerning Vietnam that can be put to candidates. What is their position on the bombing of North Vietnam? How would they define the goals of the negotiations in Paris? Do they favor continued search-and-destroy operations in the South? Would they consider a unilateral cease-fire? Should the Vietcong be represented at the conference table when substantive peace talks start? What would they do to help the South Vietnamese government win the allegiance of its people? How would they involve the United Nations in the settlement of the war? Would they accept Vietcong participation in a representative South Vietnamese government? What vital interests does the United States have at stake in Vietnam and are these worth the price demanded of us and of the Vietnamese? What should be US policy — both economically and militarily — toward Southeast Asia after the Vietnam conflict is settled? What should be the US role in the reconstruction of this country?

Many candidates talk in terms of the substitution of South Vietnamese troops for American forces. Others insist that the South Vietnamese government put a halt to corruption and make the long needed economic, political and social reforms. No one would quarrel with these goals and while they make fine campaign slogans, they miss the point. The question to put before candidates is: "how are you going to accomplish these goals?" What possible ways do you see to force the South Vietnamese to assume responsibility for the war and to make the reforms that should have been made 15 years ago? And what alternatives would you consider if the
South Vietnamese government refuses or is incapable of taking over the war or restructuring its social, political and economic institutions?

BUILDING THE GOP

Although Vietnam is an issue transcending party lines, let me be partisan for just a moment. A year ago, in the fall of 1967, I began speaking to Republican groups and detailing for them my conviction that the GOP must disassociate itself from the Vietnam policies of the present Administration. I remain convinced that this is not only the wisest course in terms of political advantages in November but it is the necessary course in terms of building a strong Republican Party.

I don’t believe we should underestimate the agility of Democratic candidates. There is no question but that many Democratic office-seekers will disassociate themselves from President Johnson’s Vietnam policies and leave Republicans standing in the public spotlight as “supporters” of the Administration. This could be disastrous. The primaries and polls have demonstrated that millions of Americans disagree with the Johnson Administration’s policies, but Republicans have not yet convincingly demonstrated that they offer any alternative. If Democratic candidates were to pre-empt this role they very probably would win support from the anti-war Republicans and the millions of McCarthy, Kennedy and McGovern backers.

A Republican victory in November based on the protest vote, the stay-at-home vote and other dissident votes will not build a strong Republican Party for future campaigns and elections. If we want to enlarge our political base and reverse our stagnant position as the perennial minority party, we will have to demonstrate to the American people that we stand for something, that we are not merely political opportunists riding to power on a wave of disenchantment and malaise. Republicans may very well win political offices by carefully refraining from taking stands on controversial issues so as to offend no one, but we will not have won any type of permanent political allegiance that will serve as a foundation for future victories. —MARK O. HATFIELD

VIETNAM II

A Middleground Solution

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Tran Van Dinh, 45, was born in the Imperial City of Hue and educated at Quoc Hoc College and Hanoi University. He was active in the anti-Japanese underground movement and fought against the French in the Vietnamese Independence War. He joined the South Vietnam Foreign Service in 1954, and has served in Asia, Latin America, and at the United Nations. Mr. Dinh’s last post was Acting Ambassador of South Vietnam to the United States. He resigned in 1964 to become a journalist and writer.

It is a truism to say that the war started in South Vietnam and therefore it should end there. Yet there are those in Washington and Saigon who think that the war can be brought to a conclusion mainly by clever maneuvers in Moscow or Paris, or even worse by an invasion of North Vietnam.

The conflict in South Vietnam has been generally described as a “fight between two political ideologies: communism and democracy.” In reality these two ideologies, in the Vietnamese context, are in essence utopian ideas proposed by revolutionaries and politicians with little support and understanding from the masses. Political parties, left or right, can attract followers only if they succeed in finding a set of basic and historically true concepts and goals which the majority of the population finds relevant to their hopes and close to their interests. There are three goals which all Vietnamese, in the cities as well as in the countryside (more so in the countryside as anyone who has lived in Vietnam for some time can testify) pursue and agree upon: Doc Lap (Independence, meaning absence of foreign troops), Thong Nhat (Unity, meaning territorial unity of Vietnam) and Cong Binh Xa Hoi (Social Justice meaning broadly land distribution and austere and dedicated leadership at all levels).

In the early years of President Ngo Dinh Diem’s regime, the first goal, Doc Lap (Independence) was attained. He asked the French troops to leave in 1955. No one accused him of being a puppet of a foreign country. President Ho Chi Minh once admitted that “in his own way, Mr. Diem was a patriot.”

In 1956 when the problem of reunification of the country (as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements) demanded a solution, President Diem did not offer any concrete, positive proposal, only a negative and vaguely explained one. The issue of Thong Nhat (Unity) was ignored. From 1956 until his assassination in November 1963, largely because of the influences of his brother and his sister in law, Mr. and Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu, President Diem became gradually prisoner of a policy marked by arrogance, oppression and a disregard for the people’s wishes. He remained a lonely figure of austerity and honesty among a corrupted entourage.

His repressions of Buddhism, the majority religion of Vietnam (President Diem was a Catholic), in May 1963 prepared the collapse of his nine-year-old administration. Even before that, two events of importance signaled the imminent crisis: the rebellion of Colonel

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Nguyen Chanh Thi (commander of paratroops and President Diem's most trusted officer, now a general in exile in Washington, D. C.) in November 1960; and the formation of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFSVN, usually called Viet Cong) in December of the same year. With the passing of President Diem, the whole political and administrative structure of South Vietnam disintegrated. The generals who replaced him did not wear the mantle of Doc Lap (Independence), having fought with the French, did not talk about Thong Nhat (Unity) and did not care about Cong Binh Xa Hoi (Social Justice). Normally the conflict should have ended then with the formation of a coalition government of NLFS-Vietnamese, and the exodus of rich generals to Paris or Miami.

But it was not so. The US had presented to the American public the problem of South Vietnam not as a revolutionary war with all its complexities, all its political, social, economic, psychological and cultural aspects, but as a clear-cut case of "Communist aggression", of a black and white duel between the evils of Communism and the angels of democracy. It could not afford to lose the game, not necessarily for the sake of the Vietnamese but for reasons of domestic politics.

The Americanization of the Vietnamese war began. With repeated military escalation, Washington escalated its explanations of the Vietnam commitment with unproved theories about dominoes, the containment of China and the inevitability of wars of liberation in underdeveloped countries. Caught in its own rhetoric, the US was left with no other choice but to attempt to solve a political-social problem with a massive influx of military power.

Reliance on conventional military power leaves little room for political, social and psychological considerations. In February 1965, US planes bombed North Vietnam. The bombing of North Vietnam was not only a military failure but also a political and psychological disaster. It consolidated the regime in Hanoi which the US wanted to destroy. It created a furor in the world. It confronted the non-communist Vietnamese in the South with a painful situation: no Vietnamese in his own right mind could applaud at the sight of a foreign air force pouring bombs in the half territory of his own country no matter how much he disagrees with the political system in that part of his fatherland.

Most Vietnamese began to realize that the war was totally irrelevant to Vietnamese interests, a point confirmed by Washington's statement that "the US is in Vietnam for American interests and security". This verified and confirmed the continuous Viet Cong theme that the US "is in Vietnam to replace the French". The moral and political grounds of the non-Viet Cong side were lost.

**MOUNTING VOICES**

The alienation of the non-NLF Vietnamese set in. Those who were not directly and intimately involved with the Saigon military junta and with the US Embassy became intellectually disengaged from the war and searched for a new way to get out of the tragic situation. To suppress these disengaged elements, which kept growing, the Saigon military junta labeled them communists or neutralists. The Buddhist Church and the liberal Catholics were listening to the mounting voices of their faithful and proposed a third force, beginning with free and fair elections. The elections which took place in September 1967 which General Nguyen Cao Ky himself admitted were a "waste of time and money, a mockery" deepened the distrust of the people towards the Saigon regime. Had they been free and fair, the third force would be in power.

In the summer of 1966, the Buddhist non-violent resistance was ruthlessly suppressed by US planes and tanks and Saigon marines and paratroopers. The break between the Buddhists and the military junta headed by a Catholic general, Nguyen Van Thieu, was irreparable. Some young Buddhists left their Church to join the Viet Cong just to reappear in Hue and other cities during the Tet offensive at the beginning of February 1968. The Tet offensive, a Viet Cong masterpiece of military planning and political coordination, was a shock to the city dwellers who had closed their eyes to the war raging in the villages a few miles from their air-conditioned rooms. Now the brutalities of the war were brought into their homes and their offices. The indiscriminate use of artillery and air power, the destruction of the cities "in order to save them" by the South Vietnamese and US forces demonstrated to the urban population that they were not safe and protected even with friends. After the initial shock, the Vietnamese were more than ever convinced of the futility of the war which they wish to end. War weariness became generalized.

**THIRD FORCE**

In the tumult of the Tet offensive, a new political organization appeared: the Alliance of National Forces for Peace and Democracy. The chairman of the Alliance is Mr. Trinh Dinh Thao a wealthy and respected lawyer. The Vice Chairman are: Thich Don Hau, a popular Buddhist monk from Hue and Mr. Lam Van Tet, a Saigon millionaire. The members of the Central Committee reads like a Who's Who of South Vietnam intellectuals. Washington and Saigon were quick to point out that the Alliance was just a product of Hanoi and the Viet Cong. Suppose it were, the question remains: "Why had Hanoi and the Viet Cong created it?" Politically speaking, the support of the Alliance was a tacit recognition by Hanoi and the Viet Cong that a third force does exist in Vietnamese politics, thus confirming the Buddhist point of view.

In the meantime, several Saigon intellectuals and politicians drew up plans to end the war, all recognizing the Viet Cong as a "reality".

Against this background, the bitter internal struggle between General Thieu and General Ky came to a climax with the elimination of Ky (the most hawkish of all Vietnamese) and his Northern supporters from political and military power. Prime Minister Nguyen Van Loc, a Ky associate, was replaced by Tran Van Huong, a respected and honest Southerner. The presence in his Cabinet of Liberal elements such as Dr. Ton That Thien (former Editor of the Vietnam Guardian closed by Ky's police in October 1966) and Au Ngoc Ho (an associate of Au TruongThanh), the peace candidate who was not
allowed to run in the 1967 elections) raised hope for a climate for accommodation. Hanoi and the Viet Cong decided that time was appropriate for negotiations and North Viet Nam answered President Johnson's message of March 31st, 1968. On May 13, 1968, the delegates of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) met with the delegates of the United States in Paris.

Then came the unnecessary and uncalled for Honolulu meeting between President Johnson and General Thieu. President Johnson's affirmation of the US military commitment to Vietnam was made in strong terms. Thieu took it as a sign that the US was still interested in a military victory. On his return, Thieu started a campaign of repressions of all peace oriented, liberal elements. Truong Dinh Dzu, the runner-up of the 1967 elections was sentenced to five years at hard labor by a military court. The leaders of the Alliance of National Forces for Peace and Democracy were condemned to death in absentia. Student leaders were arrested and sentenced to prison. These unwarranted acts which embarrassed even the US Embassy in Saigon brought back the blind rigidity characteristic of the Saigon politics of the last several years.

However, I do not think that the process of accommodation although temporarily mutilated is dead. If and when the bombing of North Vietnam is stopped—and stop it should—then Hanoi will "discuss other relevant matters". At that time the problem of the political structure in South Vietnam will become the main topic of the agenda. The third force of middle ground elements, a combination of the Alliance and the other anti-war groups will engage in negotiations with the Viet Cong for a ceasefire and the formation of a coalition government based on absolute neutrality in foreign affairs. Theoretically, the military war in South Vietnam would be over and South Vietnam would return to the situation of July 1954, after the Geneva Agreements. This to me is the best way to solve the Vietnamese problem with no clear cut victory for either side. But Vietnam, first in the South and later as a whole, after supervised elections for reunification take place, will continue its revolution geared to the three main national goals of independence, unity and social justice. The political organization which can lead the people to attain these three objectives in the climate of neutralization and with minimum of violence will come out the winner. The role of the Buddhist and the liberal Catholics will certainly be important and decisive in this long political competition.

—TRAN VAN DINH

VIETNAM III

The Intelligence Gap

THE AUTHOR — David Marr, a Lecturer in Southeast Asian History at the University of Southern California at Berkeley, served in the Marine Corps from 1959-64. From 1962-64 he served in Vietnam as a language and intelligence specialist. He resigned his commission as captain to pursue graduate studies in East and Southeast Asian studies. In 1967 he held a Fulbright-Hayes Fellowship for research in Vietnam.

Regardless of political affiliation, every American must hope that we will learn something from our Vietnam experience. If, shall we say, the United States were to be granted one single oracle on this subject, no more, it might go about as follows:

A nation may be the most powerful on earth, but it cannot possibly know what is happening everywhere, everytime. On the other hand, it is tragic folly to commit one's blood and treasure without learning the history, politics and socio-cultural background of the area involved and, equally important, conveying this knowledge to men at all levels charged with implementing policy. In short, priorities must be established, both as to strategic interests and serious, long-term studies.

US power was applied in the politics of Indochina as early as 1944 and by 1955 we had taken on major commitments of which most Americans, including many in government, simply were not aware. By 1962, when we were being forced to back up our commitments with thousands of men and hundreds of aircraft, the man in the street was still completely unconcerned, and his government was doing little to enlighten him. Enlisted men arriving in Vietnam by air from Okinawa or Clark Field were still asking the briefing officer whether they were closer to Japan or France. Helicopter pilots, while mostly college educated and well aware of geographical locations, knew absolutely nothing about the people of Vietnam. The result: everyone grabbed for quick stereotypes—"slothead," "money-grubbers," "shifty-eyed," "dirty." The men hung on to these images and, worse yet, soberly conveyed each of them to their replacements six months or a year later.

At command and staff levels, where decisions were being made everyday, regardless, the situation was almost as grim. There were only a dozen or so Vietnamese linguists and not one American on the spot really familiar with the history and culture of the country. Whatever was provided on such subjects had been culled from a few, highly generalized French texts. Staff intelligence briefings stressed enemy numbers, weaponry, locations of main units, but had almost nothing on political motivation of the enemy, local cell structure or the relationship of the mass of the villagers to the conflict at hand.

In 1963-64, when US military and civilian echelons began to involve themselves in day-to-day attempts at
governing the country, it was still only the CIA that maintained a sizable active file on Vietnam's political personalities; and most of this was gathered from old French files or from local informants who had been playing this game, for money, well back into colonial days. Top-level generals being briefed in Hawaii hardly concealed their impatience at the mention of Vietnam's turbulent politics and insisted on calling major Vietnamese personalities by nicknames, rather than learning correct pronunciations. An enterprising Marine sergeant and intelligence specialist developing a personality file for future reference was ordered to cull out all but high-ranking officers and cabinet officials.

Back in the United States in late 1964 and 1965, where decisions were made to bomb North Vietnam and commit hundreds of thousands of American combat troops, there still was not an acceptable book in English on the history of Vietnam. Journalists and a few scholars rushed books into print to feed the demands of an increasingly concerned American public. Such efforts, while generally sincere, often served only to demonstrate how minimal was our store of hard primary data on Vietnam.

Today, in 1968, there still is not a center for Vietnamese studies at any American university. Our top echelon in Saigon, the U.S. "Mission Council," still does not include a single person who speaks fluent Vietnamese. Considerable gains have been made in the collection of intelligence, but only at the expense of a general encroachment on parallel Vietnamese organizations. We still do not know what motivates various segments of the NLF and North Vietnamese apparatus, finding it easier to simply point in horror at examples of terror and coercion, or talking ourselves in circles as regards their amazingly complex organization system.

It may well be that such questions, at least as they relate in a policy sense to Vietnam, are rapidly losing their obvious cogency. After, all, America's registered voter in the Fall of 1968 does not have to read a book, much less study Vietnamese or research the psychology of the Vietnamese peasant, to know that something is radically wrong. He doesn't necessarily have to know how we got into this mess in order to decide that we must extricate ourselves, soon.

Nevertheless, our concern here, beyond events of the moment, is that enough Americans will come to understand the sequence, the manner in which we reached today's sorry situation, in order that they will know better what to do when similar circumstances arise elsewhere. This will not bring back the tens of thousands of Americans and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese who have died. But it may save our children and grandchildren, perhaps all humanity, from a similar fate.

—DAVID MARR

VIETNAM IV

Post-war Reconstruction

THE AUTHOR — Don Luce has spent nine years in Vietnam and speaks fluent Vietnamese. Last fall, in protest against the Vietnam War, he resigned his post as director of International Voluntary Services, a private group partly financed by the US aid program. He is now a research associate at the Center for International Studies at Cornell University. The present essay will be included in a book on Vietnam that Mr. Luce is writing in collaboration with John Sommers.

South Vietnam is a rich country and its potential for development is great. Rice paddies stretch for miles in the Mekong delta; virgin forests, grazing land and some of the world's best rubber producing land is in the highlands. The narrow central coastline, although generally characterized by poor soil, has several river valleys with productive land; it offers fishing potential, particularly with a motorized fishing fleet. Despite these natural resources, the present situation does not offer optimism for the post-war development. A quarter of the population has been relocated at least once. Neglect, defoliation and indiscriminate bombing have destroyed much of the agriculture. The educational system suffers from lack of teachers, overcrowded conditions and continual political interruptions. The sudden return to civilian life of a million Vietnamese soldiers could create massive unemployment. A sudden end to American economic aid would, if not replaced by some other source, cause massive starvation.

Most Americans, regardless of their political attitudes toward the war, feel deeply the suffering of the Vietnamese people and will want to assist in the reconstruction of Vietnam after the war. The planning of this aid and the way it is offered will affect both its effectiveness and its acceptability. One real possibility is that despite Americans' desire to help, feelings of Vietnamese nationalism and even feelings of bitterness towards the US will be so great that the Vietnamese will decide they have had all the American "help" they want. A recognition of Vietnamese sensitivities and an avoidance of tying economic aid to political considerations are important first steps in making our aid more acceptable.

Preparations for post-war reconstruction should begin immediately. The study being carried on by the Lilienthal/Thuc Post War Economic Development Study Group is a good beginning on the planning side. However, there are programs that should be carried out now to prepare Vietnam for the time when peace comes.

The first priority should be on the development of Vietnam's human resources and better use of the available personnel. The importance of a well-trained indigenous population was vividly demonstrated by the
effectiveness of the Marshall Plan in rebuilding Europe after World War II. Without trained personnel at all levels, neither economic aid nor the resources of the country can be used effectively.

SHOUT AND HOLLER The first step is to de-Americanize the aid effort. Presently, the American presence goes all the way from Americans writing psychological warfare leaflets to making decisions on relocation of Vietnamese villages. The American takeover has gradually undermined the self-reliance and self-respect of the Vietnamese. Massive material aid programs have been given in such a way that, instead of benefiting the masses or providing chances for self-improvement, the benefits have accrued to a few — the corrupt and opportunistic.

Freedom must be given to the Vietnamese themselves to participate in their own development. Unfortunately, as young Vietnamese begin to become effective in their work, the Saigon government sees them as threats. Take, for instance, the concerted effort of a group of students to assist the Cam Lo refugee camp near the DMZ. Their effort was seen by both American and Vietnamese observers present as one of the few really positive efforts to help the refugees there. However, one of the Saigon political factions, seeing them as a threat, withdrew them. A few days later, another faction, wanting to gain a political advantage with the students, sent them back, confusing both the students and refugees.

One of the largest "brain drains" is the practice of self-exile by many of the most capable leaders of the country. Some of these leave for political reasons, but more leave because they cannot see a role for themselves in the present setup. One way of encouraging the return of exiled teachers, agriculturalists, physicians and economists would be to guarantee them work in their specialized field when they return. If the government feared criticism for not drafting them because they were from the middle/upper class, it could use them to upgrade the pacification program which is badly in need of capable Vietnamese personnel.

The educational system also needs to be revamped. The present system is a deteriorated, pre-World War II French system which is inadequate both in quality and quantity. Children are taught by the rote, or "shout-and-holler" method, which is completely inadequate for modern society. Teachers who can barely read and write themselves struggle with classes of 80 to 100 students, while the military service drafts qualified teachers at the rate of 3000 per year. Assignment of teachers is based on a system that sends those receiving the poorest examination grades to the most remote areas. University professors try to teach at three or four universities during a semester, forming a corps of 'flying professors' that commute between Can Tho, Saigon, Dalat and Hue. When the students protest against the system, they are put in jail as agitators.

If improvements are to come, the government must upgrade the priority of education. Draft deferments must be given teachers. Prestige and academic freedom must be accorded the university teachers so that they remain in their teaching posts. Professors' salaries should be upgraded so that they do not have to earn additional money by 'moon-lighting' at other jobs. The present inadequate physical facilities must be improved; this means more space, improved lighting, adequate laboratory equipment.

Training programs should be initiated within the Vietnamese armed forces emphasizing skills that will be needed after the war, (e.g., for army truck drivers, the most obvious place to begin would be driver education courses). A program which kept 10% of the armed forces in training would, if properly handled, result in both increased morale and efficiency. Even evening correspondence courses should be offered to include a variety of subjects from literacy to agriculture.

The fruits of American research in Vietnam should be made available to the Vietnamese. Some very valuable information is being collected in the various studies contracted by the Department of Defense. However, information such as the interviews with refugees, which would be invaluable in predicting future problems in returning the refugees to their farms, is usually classified. It is true that some of the material cannot be released because of its sensitive nature. However, much classified material is not in this category. To this we can speak from personal experience, having had a fertilizer report we once submitted classified (and then made unavailable to us, since we were not cleared!)

The foregoing suggests what can be done to prepare Vietnam for post-war development. Let us now turn to that development itself.

The problems of peacetime reconstruction will be complicated because there will be no sudden halt in the violence. There are so many bandit groups and extremists on both sides that no immediate end to violence can be expected. It will take time for a lasting accommodation to be reached on the local level.

BACK TO THE FARM As peace comes, the government must develop a new dedication among the Vietnamese people. The war-weariness of the people must be overcome and a sense of direction must be promoted in its place. The strength of Vietnam lies in its rural people and it is here that the major effort should be directed after the ceasefire. There should be an immediate "back to the farm" campaign. This should emphasize both the traditional values of returning farmers and certain economic inducements such as an opportunity to own their own land, seed and agricultural implements. Until the first major crop is harvested (at least eight months) food will have to be supplied. Farms are like furniture; when unused they deteriorate rapidly. The tiny dikes that separate the rice paddies will have to be rebuilt, the irrigation canals dredged, fruit trees replanted and the houses rebuilt.

It must be clear from the very start though that when the peacetime government is not a "hand-out" government. There should be a charge of so many days of labor on each item given the farmer. This labor would then be used to provide the services that the village needed: a road into the hamlet, an irrigation canal or a school building. These activities should be carried out
during the slack season so they will not interfere with rice planting and harvest.

A return of refugees to rural areas will both make use of the skills the people have and help to relieve urban areas of their present congestion. Perhaps even more important, a back-to-the-farm movement will emphasize the traditional values of closeness to the land and family solidarity that are essential if Vietnam’s civilian population will be needed.

If an imaginative program is not also developed for those people who do not want to leave the cities, the new government will be faced with an uncontrollable group of street wanderers, petty thieves, gamblers and dope peddlers. A combination of job training, job provision and a strong police force dedicated to helping the civilian population will be needed.

For the Montagnards in the highlands, a guarantee of a certain amount of autonomy, a bill of rights and a clear property deed to their lands are all important. Recent agreements between the Saigon government and the Montagnards point in this direction. One area where the Montagnards could contribute significantly to the national economy is through beef production. This would fit into their pattern of life and the vast quantities of grazing land available in the highlands. Assistance in establishing a cooperative market for selling the cattle and stocking such common items as salt, cloth and brass gongs would be the most valuable economic assistance the government could provide.

The schedule of release of the armed forces should be planned to prevent unemployment and the corresponding morale problems for the soldiers. The availability of training programs and high labor projects will be especially important. Two projects that merit special attention are the Mekong Project which has been under the auspices of the United Nations and the Phan Rang Irrigation Project which would make use of the water from the recently built DaNhim dam. The Mekong Project will provide cheap electricity for delta cities, including Saigon. The Phan Rang Project would provide water to the Phan Rang valley, an area of low rainfall which contains some of the best soil in Vietnam. Because of its proximity to Cam Ranh Bay, raw materials could easily be exported. The area has the potential for forming a rich agricultural-industrial complex.

It can be expected that Vietnam, because of memories of French domination of capital investment and profits and because of present feelings of nationalism, will emphasize a minimum of direct foreign investment, preferring international loans from agencies like the Asian Bank. The importation of luxury goods such as cars, refrigerators, Hondas, air-conditioners, television sets and electric fans will probably be forbidden or carefully regulated and scarce foreign money used on productive imports like machinery and fertilizer.

Solid planning and implementation of selected programs in Vietnam, rather than political rhetoric, is what is needed now. A major back-to-the-farm movement and program implementation by Vietnamese with international and private assistance will be needed when peace comes. The American government’s role at that point, especially in providing the food and capital necessary to get Vietnam back on its feet, will be crucial, but should be coordinated through international and Asian auspices.

Peace, as welcome as it will be, will bring a whole new set of problems. Jobs will have to be found for approximately a million returning soldiers and the thousands of people who presently depend, directly or indirectly, upon Americans for employment. Rehabilitation for both the physically crippled and those whose social values have been turned upside-down by the presence of hundreds of thousands of foreign soldiers will present a formidable task. But the Vietnamese are a resilient people and have a long history of rebuilding after war. It will be this strength that will rebuild their country. A young Vietnamese wrote of this determination after the destruction of the Tet offensive:

I still keep working to rebuild Vietnam in our “own” way. I am probably very idealistic but I believe that we, the Vietnamese people, can make it.

— DON LUCE

The three foregoing articles were selected for the Ripon FORUM by Stuart Marshall Bloch. Mr. Bloch, a graduate of the Harvard Law School, returned recently from South Vietnam where he worked with International Voluntary Services. He is now associated with the Vietnam Education Project in Washington, D.C.

THE REALITIES OF VIETNAM
A RIPON SOCIETY APPRAISAL

One of the best pieces of Vietnam analysis available—and also a model exercise in political responsibility. It seeks a “moderate” solution to the Vietnam war, one that would involve de-escalation rather than either an abrupt pullout by US troops or further escalation... It remains a strong and relevant book in its emphasis of the complex interrelationships of political forces in Vietnam.”

The Christian Science Monitor.

See Order form on page 28

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COLLECTOR of political campaign buttons. Contact David Gay, 201 Suffolk, College Station, Texas 77840.
SELECTIVE SERVICE: The Draft’s Agony of Conscience

The ultimate answer to the draft is to end it, or as the Wednesday Group of House Republicans has said, "to reduce the draft calls to zero" while moving to an all-volunteer system. (The Ripon Society advocated this approach in a paper published in December 1966 and the Republican Platform of August 1968 now endorses it).

But for many the political channels through which an all-volunteer system can be accomplished are too slow and too confining. The rising clamor of protest recalls the draft riots of the Civil War, and earlier, Daniel Webster's warning, which was heeded by the pioneer generation of 1814, that "If the Administration has found that it cannot form an army without conscription it will find . . . it cannot enforce conscription without an army." From the reasonable pinnacles of debate and democratic remonstrance some have gone on to civil disobedience, others to draft resistance, still others to emigration.

Many sincere and patriotic young people have chosen such extra-legal forms of protest because the Selective Service System allows them no other recourse.

The present system's kangaroo court procedures make no provision for the usual amenities of due process: there is no clear definition of the right to counsel, or of the way to appear personally before an appeals board; there is no requirement for written records of proceedings and no right to judicial review. Moreover, the present standards for conscientious objectors are narrow-minded, outdated and possibly unconstitutional.

The Ripon Society advocates the reform of high-handed administrative procedures and the revision of standards to permit selective conscientious objection. It recommends the substitution of alternate service for those who cannot conscientiously accept military service.

I. General Hershey's Kangaroo Court

What, in fact, is America's policy on conscientious objection today? How does the country officially regard the man who objects to war on grounds of conscience? One might think it is a fairly definite matter; either a man meets certain set requirements or he doesn't. Yet, unhappily, this emotion-surrounded deferment suffers mercurial fluctuations even more extreme than those for college students, people in critical occupations and those with low intelligence.

Before the Vietnam escalation, estimates Arlo Tatum, executive secretary of the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors in Philadelphia, Selective Service was approving 80% of even those controversial CO applications that got as high as national headquarters. By 1967 only 5% were being approved. The same percentages obtain for CO applications from men already in service. Were these refused applicants sincere? It would seem many were, for, besides the untold thousands in Canada, 450 individuals in 1966 and 750 in 1967 accepted prison sentences rather than enter the Army.

Partly the CO's are thought to be a threat to the draft's manpower supply, and, as with other deferments, when draft calls go up draft boards become more stringent. Further, whereas only one man in 2,000 called in World War II claimed CO status, one in 350 claims it now. But still only a few thousand men are involved. Clearly the main reason CO deferments are being overwhelmingly denied is the usual Selective Service desire to control the attitudes of men who are not drafted. General Hershey doesn't want anti-draft sentiment to gain too much respectability.

Indeed, the draft process is designed to discourage any kind of deviation from the routine norm. Men who disagree with their classification are seldom aware of their right of appeal, though General Hershey always
mentions it to public questioners, usually in reassuring, mock-legal rhetoric. And when he wishes to circumvent the regular law by punishing draft protesters, he describes their deferments as a kind of parole whose terms they have broken. Their cases are "reviewed" (he does avoid the word "tried") by the draft boards, who are "judicious," if not judicial.

But in reality the draft appeals system bears more resemblance to a kangaroo court than any one would encounter elsewhere in the United States — including the military.

The supposed existence of appeals agents, (Government-appointed volunteers charged with handling appeals) and the technical fact that draft procedures are non-judicial and non-criminal have kept the courts from requiring right of counsel for registrants. "This premise (of the courts) is unassailable on constitutional grounds," says Charles H. Wilson, Jr., in the California Law Review, "but it is not so clear that such a restriction is consistent with notions of basic fairness, . . . . The non-lawyer who tries to learn of his rights and obligations by reading the statute and regulations will probably become only more bewildered for his efforts. The statute and regulations are written in typically technical language, and the legal meaning of a particular provision can hinge on the meaning given to a particular word or phrase."1

Some of the forms a man must complete are difficult and detailed. and the draft board, in its discretion, can take away the right of appeal on a number of administrative grounds. It would seem that the procedures are purposefully obtuse in order to discourage "troublemakers."

### FIVE MINUTE HEARINGS

As for the "appeals agent," his position of representing both the registrant and the draft board contradicts the accepted fairness of our traditional adversary principle, and furthermore, as has been mentioned before and is observed by Wilson, "most registrants are generally not aware that they can make use of the services of the appeal agent."

A registrant has the right to a hearing before the local draft board, but common experience of young men who avail themselves of this right is that the "friends and neighbors" whose detailed concern General Hershey feels justifies the decentralized system, give only five minutes to a man. Moreover, they often use that time to lecture the registrant rather than to hear his case. A typical opening remark put to a boy is, "Just what makes you any better than everybody else?" Such prejudiced comments will not be recorded in board minutes, since no detailed account is required, nor need the board give any explanation for the decision it reaches.

True, a man may appeal to the state level, but he rarely appears in person before the appeals board there, and a decision is reached solely on the written record, which will be sparse unless the registrant has carried on correspondence with his local board. Perhaps the local board's true motivation in denying a CO status, for example, was that the registrant had been in anti-war demonstrations, but they need not let the appeal board know that (nor can the young man use the local board's basis of decision as grounds for taking the matter to court), and appeals boards are are understandably influenced by the fact that the local board actually interviewed the registrant and they did not. If aware of their rights, CO claimants may have a hearing before a Department of Justice representative.

Finally, the registrant, if the appeal fails, may appeal to the President. "The President," it turns out, is a Hershey-appointed panel that normally has the national Selective Service headquarters handle its cases. In short, the Selective Service System is prosecuting attorney, defense attorney, judge and jury, and is so from the lowest to the highest "court!"

Even before the Congress rewrote the draft act in 1967 it was difficult for a registrant to take his case to a real court. Only if a man had exhausted all his remedies within the Selective Service System could he petition for judicial review. Even then, his case probably wouldn't be heard. "Congress gave the courts no general authority of revision over draft board proceedings," declared the Fourth Circuit Court, "and we have authority to reverse only if there is a denial of basic procedural fairness or if the conclusion of the board is without any basis in fact."2 But, within such restrictions, and in cases where freedom of speech and other constitutional guarantees clearly were involved, the courts did wisely intervene to remedy flagrant draft abuses.

The Congress, however, under the guidance of the House Armed Services Committee, in 1967 made the citizen's plight before the law even more agonizing. Under present law no judicial review is allowed unless a man refuses induction (breaks the law) and is criminally prosecuted. This gamble — win, you get your deferment back; lose, you get up to a five year prison sentence — is more than all but a small percentage of men are daring enough to take. One must remember, moreover, that even in court handling of draft cases, the burden of proof lies on the defendant, not on the Selective Service.

One formerly had the last resort option of accepting induction and then challenging his classification with a petition of habeus corpus. This too was a gamble, and a serious conscientious objector who felt he had been wrongly denied his deferment probably would not risk it, prison being preferable to forced military service if he lost his case. But the new law, with what seems an attempted deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right, denies the registrant his right to go the habeus corpus route.

### II. Churchmen against the System

Oddly, while the draft legislation has grown more arbitrary and authoritarian, civil liberties generally have been expanding. "We have gone way hog wild on individual rights in this country," General Hershey concluded in June, 1966, as he called for tightened rules for conscientious objection. But even as he demanded

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1Charles H. Wilson, Jr., "The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle Course," California Law Review, 1966. Since this article was written the period for appeal has been raised from 10 to 30 days. This has made the obstacle course difficult instead of impossible.

2 Blalock vs. United States, 1957.
and, in 1967, got a “crack down” on CO’s and other troublemakers, the churches were beginning to speak up for looser rules.

The CO category has long offended the crypto-statist who would deny the sincerity of any conscience but his own. The President’s Commission on Selective Service (1967) found one unnamed state where 50% of the draft boards thought no one should be allowed objector status under any circumstances. Originally, the basis for acknowledging the CO, of course, was not so much liberation as practical. If the government in World War I (and again in World War II) had not granted exemptions to members of the Quakers, Brethren and other conveniently small and theologically exotic sects, the prisons of the country couldn’t have handled all the martyrs. Later, in the wake of post World War I disillusionment, pacifism became a strong minority trend in the standard brand Protestant churches and, later still, in the Roman Catholic Church. Today the CO status is available, theoretically, to any sincere, religious-trained pacifist.

In practice, “sincerity” means he has to be fairly articulate in defending his views. Further, he should have been a pacifist for some years. (For this reason it is better to make application for CO status as soon as one registers for the draft.) The Selective Service and the Conscientious Objector Section of the Non-criminal Division of the Justice Department are suspicious of what they call the “Road to Damascus” type of conversion. Also in practice, “religious” means membership and training for several years in an established denomination, and it still helps if that denomination is all-pacifist in theology and it helps further if one’s parents are members of that faith. Finally, “pacifist” usually means — though individual states and local boards differ — an opposition to the use of force in any form.

DISPUTED CRITERIA

Virtually all these criteria for CO status, both in written form and practiced form, are undergoing criticism in American churches of various denominations. Stringent “sincerity” standards do deny the possibility that a man might only discover what his conscience demands after he is confronted by the necessity of choosing. To assert, in effect, that a conscience cannot be awakened in, say, a year of reflection, denies that the courts should void the government’s intent, for in 1967 Congress pointed out that “… ‘Conscience’ is not a monopoly of Christians or of the religious traditions. Neither is there one kind of conscience that is ‘religious’ and another that is ‘non-religious’, but only the human conscience, which Christians see as God’s gift, whether or not every individual so understands it.” In short, the Church no longer will have its sanction abused by hypocritical politicians, who so often would rather exploit religious prestige than live in the spirit of their own church’s teachings.

The third CO criterion, pacifism, likewise has been a subject of dispute between the courts and the Selective Service System, and even in its written form constitutes religious discrimination against a large section of the Church. In the first case, Selective Service boards frequently inquire of the CO applicant whether he opposes use of force in any form; whether, for instance, he favors maintenance of a police force or would defend himself if personally attacked. Dr. Ralph Potter, a Presbyterian minister teaching social ethics at Harvard Divinity School, provides an explanation for this kind of interpretation of the law “(It) is administratively convenient…can be applied directly, verbally, and is simple enough to be assessed by the least sophisticated member of a local board. It also serves to keep down the number who can qualify for conscientious objector classification.” Moreover, board member’s “own inarticulated moral sensitivities…are offended by the claim that one may, in good faith, and conscience, resort to violence in some circumstances and yet oppose the command to cooperate in or to commit violence in other situations.” But the courts repeatedly reverse rejection of CO status on such grounds since the law specifies “opposition to war in any form,” not to “force in any form” or “violence in any form.”

JUST WAR DOCTRINE

Many churchmen, having rejected the current standards of sincerity, religion and pacifism are rediscovering the “just war” doctrine. Before World War I the attitude of the bulk of Christian churches was formed by the “just war” doctrine originally propounded by St. Augustine. In World War I it was evoked to justify the United States’ going to war, and in the anti-war reaction of the ’20’s and ’30’s, was supplanted by a mixture of pacifism and indifference in the churches, until World War II, when again the religious establishment joined more-or-less wholeheartedly in the fight. In short, the “just war” doctrine in this century has been used to establish an ethical basis of rejecting a particular war.

Most Christians, in fact, do have the “just war” doctrine as the basis of their own thinking, though they may not recognize the label. In brief, the conditions for a “just war” are:

“A. The war must be waged by legitimate authority.
In the case of the United States, that is the President
and Congress.

"B. The object must be to vindicate justice. A defensive war, or one to protect rights that have been infringed, is generally held to qualify.

"C. The intention must be peace with justice.

"D. The war must be waged without hatred and with love and reconciliation as the ultimate aim.

"E. The conduct of the war must be just. The enemy has human rights that must be respected. Non-combatants must be observed in the targets selected and the weapons used.

"F. The damages inflicted must not be out of proportion to the injuries suffered, or threatened, and there must be a reasonable prospect of success.

"G. The war must be a last resort only after every possibility of peaceful settlement has been exhausted."4

These standards admittedly are difficult; they require one to think, to apply moral cost-analysis to a particular war, which is a sense is more demanding than a faith that precludes participation in any conflict or objectors' doctrine — devout Methodists, Lutherans, Jews, Catholics, and, indeed, humanists and atheists. Such individuals are just as morally outraged by the war in Vietnam as a Jehovah's Witness is to all war and refusal to grant them equal status with other CO's is discrimination against them on the basis of religion and deprives them of equal treatment before the law.

The churches are now beginning to realize their own oversight and the government's bias. For example, the Rt. Reverend John Burt, Bishop Coadjutor of Ohio, explained to the Episcopal General Convention in Seattle, Washington, September 1967, "In truth, the Episcopal Church itself has unwittingly conspired against its own young people who have used church teaching in determining their objection to this particular war. After giving them the "just war" guidelines, we abandon them when they apply those guidelines and decide that they cannot morally participate in this war. Small wonder many become cynical about the relevance of the Church in regard to real personal moral problems . . . The least the Church can do," the Bishop said, "is to walk with these young churchmen whose only crime is that they have taken Christian teaching seriously."

Some contend that permitting selective conscientious objection would lead to "anarchy." Says Burt, "In fact, the contrary can be expected. Civil disobedience would decline as selective conscientious objectors found it no longer necessary as a way to protect their moral sense. [Further] the Selective Service law itself presently tests the sincerity of all applicants for CO status, and would continue to do so . . . [Finally] Great Britain offers us an excellent precedent on this matter. That nation no longer has a draft, but when it did it recognized selective conscientious objection, even in the midst of World War II. The British realized that the lot of the war objector is never an easy one, and that social pressure alone tends to discourage the insincere objector. There was no 'anarchy'.

What Episcopalians like Burt, Presbyterians like Porter and Catholics in the American Pax Association and elsewhere would like to see is institution of a very much looser CO standard, such as the one which exists today in Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland (and formerly, in Britain). All men's consciences are protected in such a system, and speaking practically, only 2% of young men there actually request the CO exemption.

III. Recommended Changes

Hundreds of thousands of American youth are in the deepest conflict over the draft, forced, often, to choose between duty to country and obedience to their deepest moral beliefs. Deprived of a vote in the making of policy, denied a voice on their draft boards (30 is the minimum age for members), bereft of even procedural consistency in their treatment by the Selective Service System, they also are deprived of a solution to their dilemma that does not compromise one crucial value or another. A society that calls itself just is diabolically hypocritical to require such decisions of its citizens.

It is sad that so many youth have adopted anti-republican methods for resisting the draft, for such are in neither their own best interests or the country's. But it is sadder still that so many unquestionably sincere youth have been driven to Canada or prison in order to save their consciences.

The draft should be ended for any conscription is antithetic to a free society, except perhaps in time of real national emergency. Practically speaking, that is the only perfect resolution of private conscience and official "duty." But in the meantime, the Ripon Society asks that conscription at least show a civilized regard for conscience. Objectors should be forced to meet no other test: not religion, not total pacifism. Selective conscientious objection on the grounds of "just war" doctrine should be permitted provided it can be defended with conviction by the objector.

The appeals structure of the Selective Service System should be reformed to require at least the right of counsel at all levels, a clear right to appear personally before all appeals boards, to require maintenance of a written record of all board meetings and to allow a pre-induction right of judicial review.

The practical loss of military manpower as a result of selective conscientious objection would be minimal, as it was in Britain. The incidence of civil disobedience most probably would decrease, and there would be neither reason nor excuse for violent draft resistance.

PROBLEM OF OPPORTUNISTS

Of course, under the loose qualifying standards for CO status advocated here some opportunists undoubtedly would use them as a matter of personal convenience rather than conscience. Moreover, during an unpopular war like that in Vietnam, less social stigma would attach itself to such a person than did, say, in

4 This interpretation from "Military Service and the Young Churchman", a pamphlet produced by the Executive Council of the Episcopal Church, New York, N. Y., 1967.
Britain’s war for survival, or than does in Scandinavia today, where one could hardly use the “just war” principles as a basis of conscientious objection since no wars are being fought. However, it is doubtful that the number of pure opportunists—who would still have to face family, friends and acquaintances—would be such as to threaten the military’s manpower supply, especially since even in the Vietnam war, only one of every two men reaching draft age will ever have to serve. As a moral question, one must ask if it is less just to allow a few opportunists to escape than, as in the present system, to violate the conscience of sincere objectors while thousands of other men are not even asked?

Some argue that the problem of the opportunist could be met by requiring all objectors to perform alternate service out of uniform. The “crack down” mentality would protest that alternate service should not be compared to military service because it is less dangerous, but that case stumbles on the fact that even in the military only one in five men will enter combat situations. A quite different and more valid objection is that alternate service is not needed (one keeps thinking of those in the 50% never called to the colors at all) and that to make the CO perform duties not connected with the absolute necessity of defense is a waste of everybody’s time and money in a free society.

But we do see that many Americans simply will not support the extension of the CO right unless it is connected with alternate service. On political grounds, if no other, the suggestion has merit. It certainly would be preferable to the present situation.

As it is, the very soul of a large part of this generation of youth is being crucified. If the older generation would send any young men to fight ostensibly for the conscience of the individual will not in fact ultimately lose it in the process.”

“All our history,” wrote Chief Justice Fiske Stone, “gives confirmation to the view that liberty of conscience has a moral and social value which makes it worthy of preservation at the hands of the state. So deep in its significance and vital, indeed, is it to the integrity of man’s moral and spiritual nature that nothing short of the self-preservation of the state should warrant its violation and it may well be questioned whether the state which preserves its life by a settled policy of violation of the conscience of the individual will not in fact ultimately lose it in the process.”

It is time for America to come home to its libertarian traditions. Republicans can lead the way by adding to their endorsement of an all-volunteer army a program to make the draft, so long as it exists, more consistent with the ideals of a free society.

This position paper was prepared by the Seattle Chapter of the Ripon Society and written by Bruce K. Chapman. It was reviewed by members of Ripon’s National Governing Board.
THE RIPON POLL

Yes, still another poll, but what makes this one of unusual value is that it reflects the reactions of a knowledgeable group of Republican activists to both the nomination of Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew and to the GOP National Convention in general. To our knowledge, it represents the only such post-convention analysis; coupled with Ripon's similar poll taken last winter, it affords a detailed view of the position of Mr. Nixon within the Party and the balance of strengths and weaknesses he brings to the fall campaign.

The 510 respondents whose polls arrived between August 15 - 30* this time represented 29% of Ripon's membership, up from last winter's 25%. Supporters (as of August 5th) of Governor Nelson Rockefeller made up 82% of the sample, an increase of 22% from the earlier poll; supporters of Mr. Nixon had increased from 7% to 12%, with backers of Mayor John Lindsay and Governor Ronald Reagan at 3% and 1%, down from 9% and 2% respectively.

The first clear inference which can be made from the poll (question 3) is that the selection of Governor Agnew lacked support across the board. Agnew was the first choice for Vice-President of not a single Rockefeller, Lindsay, Reagan or other partisan; only 6% of the Nixonites wanted Agnew. The man who had the broadest support was Senator Mark Hatfield. Among Nixonites he tied for first with Senator Charles Percy at 21%; Reagan backers chose him 17% of the time; 12% of the Rockefeller people wanted Hatfield on the ticket with Nixon; 14% of the Lindsay people made him their first choice.

As might have been expected, John Lindsay was the Ripon membership's overall choice — 44% wanted him. But Percy won a strong following as well and he was equally acceptable to the backers of Rockefeller, Nixon and Lindsay. It cannot, therefore, be argued that Governor Agnew was the least offensive candidate. Both Hatfield and Percy had stronger support; but neither of them, presumably, could be cleared with Strom.

MIAMI BEACH

The reaction to the events in Miami Beach, tabulated in question 4, are quite revealing, for they pinpoint Mr. Nixon's location within the Party as of that week in August as being not in the middle of the GOP, but on the right. The Lindsay people were the farthest left. As a group they firmly disapproved of the platform's plank on the urban crisis and mildly disapproved of the platform as a whole. Similarly, Mr. Nixon's stance on Vietnam, the cities and crime, as well as his choice of Agnew, incurred their disapproval.

All this could have been anticipated. What is important is the fact that the replies by the Rockefeller people are all significantly to the right of those by the Lindsay people in eleven cases out of the twelve. Only

in condemning the role of Strom Thurmond did they agree.

Rockefeller supporters were indifferent to the platform and not quite mildly disapproving of Mr. Nixon's acceptance speech and running-mate, but they were significantly to the left of the Nixon partisans, who undifferentiatingly "sort of" approved the platform and definitely approved Mr. Nixon's positions. (They came down between indifference and mild approval of Agnew.) But in all these cases Nixon backers were significantly to the right of the Rockefeller supporters. Were the Reaganites to their right?

No, except in three instances. The platform was not conservative enough on Vietnam or the urban crisis or as a whole for those who would really rather have had Reagan. On the other nine, including the role of Strom Thurmond, of which they approved, the Nixonites and Reaganites went hand-in-hand.

These results should temper the notion that Rockefeller and Lindsay Republicans are to be lumped together on the far left of the Republican Party (and therefore in the center of American political thought). There exists a consistent, significant difference between the liberal Republicans backing Lindsay and the moderates supporting Rockefeller, just as there exists a consistent, significant difference between the conservative backers of Nixon and the moderate supporters of Rockefeller. But 75% of the time, there is no difference in point of view between Reaganites and the Nixonites.

NOVEMBER

Of course, Mr. Nixon can justifiably claim that in order to win the nomination he had to hold hands with the conservatives. Events in Miami Beach proved him correct. Now that he is nominated, however, he has no similar excuse for remaining on the right, unless he believes that, just as the South rose to its feet for him in August, it will rise again for him in November.

And what will happen in November? Well, apparently those disloyal Rockefeller "Republicans" are at it again — only 32% indicated they will definitely support Nixon-Agnew, as contrasted with 89% of the Nixon people (which still leaves a possible defection of 10%). One out of every seven had already planned to vote for Humphrey-Muskie; the largest bloc, 40%, wants to wait to see what Nixon and Humphrey do to earn its vote. This is the GOP "frontlash" Christopher Beal wrote about in the FORUM last month and they are quite clear in their demands on Mr. Nixon. To keep a majority of them from voting Democratic, the Nixon-Agnew ticket will have to pledge de-escalation of the war in Vietnam, increased commitment to the cities, and increased concern for minority rights and opportunities, as well as coming out from under the flag of "law and order" and demagogic attacks on the Supreme Court.

The pressure on Mr. Nixon from his own pre-convention supporters who now say their vote is contingent comes from both the right and left, so Mr. Nixon has a difficult choice: whether to take votes from Wallace or

*An additional 78 polls which arrived between September 3 - 19 are not included; they do not differ from those filled out before the Democratic Convention.
from Humphrey. A majority of those Republicans who have to be convinced, not sloganed, are active Party workers. (Interestingly, only two-thirds of the Nixon backers in the sample urged the Ripon Society to support Nixon-Agnew without reservation.

NIXON'S IMAGE

Mr. Nixon's image has changed appreciably in the past eight months. The most drastic shift in opinion has been the result of his silence on the war in Vietnam. Last winter 62% of the FORUM readers thought Nixon had extensive knowledge of and a well-defined position on the war. That number has dropped to 26%. Only 64% of his own pre-convention backers now give him this trait. Similarly, his image of general expertise in foreign affairs has dropped 22 points to 65%.

While holding his own as a man to help the Negro achieve equality (21%), as one who is a competent administrator and deliberate decision-maker, the former Vice-President's coattails have shrunk. Last winter 21% thought that as the Presidential nominee he could help local Republicans win election. Now only 12% think so; only 49% of his own supporters believe this.

On the negative side, the feeling that Nixon does not have a clear-cut position on the war has risen from 14% to 45% (25% among his own supporters), and his not understanding the problems of the cities is seen by 47% now, up 11%. And so, while campaigning successfully for the nomination, Mr. Nixon has weakened his image among issue-oriented Republicans. He is now a less-defined candidate on the issues, especially the war, than he was eight months ago.

On the war, a full five out of six readers now favor de-escalation and a negotiated settlement with the Viet Cong. This is an increase of 9 percentage points since last winter and runs parallel to an increase from 45% to 66% in those who agree that United States withdrawal from Vietnam would be preferable to continuing the war for another five years.

LINDSAY

For the future, John Lindsay is the choice of moderate Republicans as their leader. On this Rockefeller and Nixon supporters are agreed, and that kind of consensus about whom to rally around (or against) is remarkable. But we should remember the hopes which centered on Governor George Romney. When he faltered, the hopes of moderate Republicanism fell too. Not even the leadership, experience and energy of Governor Rockefeller could save it. The poor showing in this poll of Ed Brooke, John Chafee, (who is after all, the chairman of the Republican Governors' Association), of Mark Hatfield, of Charles Percy and of George Romney should be a warning, therefore. At Miami Beach, Theodore H. White wondered why the young Republican moderates do not seize power in the Republican Party. We should wonder too. Or would we prefer that a '72 or '76 battle for the nomination among Lindsay, Reagan, Tower and Rafferty to one among Lindsay, Brooke, Percy and Hatfield?

— R. B. E., Jr.

POLL RESULTS

1. WHOM DID YOU PREFER ON AUGUST 5, 1968, BEFORE THE BALLOTING FOR THE GOP NATIONAL CONVENTION?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Last winter's results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JOHN LINDSAY</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RICHARD NIXON</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARLES PERCY</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RONALD REAGAN</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NELSON ROCKEFELLER</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. ONCE NIXON WAS THE NOMINEE, WHO WAS YOUR FIRST CHOICE FOR VICE-PRESIDENT?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Supporters, as of August 5, 1968, of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rockefeller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGNEW</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAKER</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROOKE</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVANS</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HATFIELD*</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINDSAY*</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCY*</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REAGAN</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROCKEFELLER</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMNEY</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOWER</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOLPE</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO RESPONSE</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

> Less than 1%.

* Includes share of the 2% who responded "Hatfield/Percy" and of the 3% who responded with combinations of Hatfield, Lindsay, and Percy.
3. **USING THE NUMERICAL SCALE INDICATED, DESCRIBE YOUR REACTION TO THE FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS AT MIAMI** (1 = vehement approval, 2 = approval, 3 = mild approval, 4 = indifference, 5 = mild disapproval, 6 = disapproval, 7 = vehement disapproval)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Rockefeller Rating</th>
<th>Nixon Rating</th>
<th>Lindsay Rating</th>
<th>Reagan Rating</th>
<th>Others Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The platform plank on Vietnam</td>
<td>3.8*</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.2*</td>
<td>3.8*</td>
<td>4.1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The platform plank on crime</td>
<td>4.3*</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.6*</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The platform plank on the urban crisis</td>
<td>4.0*</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.7*</td>
<td>3.2*</td>
<td>3.9*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The platform as a whole</td>
<td>4.0*</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.7*</td>
<td>3.2*</td>
<td>3.9*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Nixon’s acceptance speech as a whole</td>
<td>4.2*</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.7*</td>
<td>3.2*</td>
<td>3.9*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Nixon’s stance on Vietnam</td>
<td>4.0*</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.7*</td>
<td>3.2*</td>
<td>3.9*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Nixon’s stance on the urban crisis</td>
<td>4.8*</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>5.5*</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Nixon’s choice of running mate</td>
<td>6.0*</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.3*</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The decision of some moderates to contest Agnew’s nomination</td>
<td>2.5*</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.7*</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The decision of Mayor Lindsay to second Agnew’s nomination and to discourage placing his own name in nomination</td>
<td>3.5*</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.4*</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The role of Strom Thurmond at the convention</td>
<td>6.4*</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.8*</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.8*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significantly different (at the 97% level of confidence or higher) from the corresponding average rating by Nixon supporters.

4. **HOW DO YOU INTEND TO VOTE FOR PRESIDENT IN NOVEMBER?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Total (Supporters, as of August 5, 1968)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rockefeller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon-Agnew</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humphrey-Muskie</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Wallace</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A fourth party</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstain</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My vote is contingent upon the future stands of the major party candidates</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, or no response</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

> Less than 1%.

5. **IF YOUR VOTE IS CONTINGENT ON FUTURE STANDS OF THE CANDIDATES, WHAT POSITIONS WOULD THE NIXON-AGNEW TICKET HAVE TO TAKE TO MERIT YOUR SUPPORT?**

**ROCKEFELLER SUPPORTERS**

- De-escalation of the war in Vietnam 40%
- Increased commitment to alleviating the urban crisis 40%
- Increased concern for racial/minority problems, civil rights, human welfare 26%
- A commitment to justice before "law and order" 16%
- Keeping the South from exerting a disproportionate influence in the Party/Abandoning the Southern Strategy 11%
- Support for the Supreme Court and its decisions 10%

**NIXON SUPPORTERS**

Only one position was mentioned more than once — "Greater emphasis on law and order" was noted twice. Others mentioned ranged from a pledge of increased aid to Biafra, and strong U. S. aid to Israel, through the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, and a promise either to escalate or get out of Vietnam, to the retraction by Gov. Agnew of his statements regarding the treatment of rioters, and the reorganization of farm subsidies.

*In Question 5 readers were asked to write in their opinions rather than check off alternatives. The categorizations are our own summaries of the often lengthy and detailed responses.
6. IF YOU DO NOT INTEND TO VOTE FOR THE NATIONAL REPUBLICAN TICKET, STATE YOUR REASON.*

**ROCKEFELLER SUPPORTERS**
- Nixon not sufficiently qualified/Disagreement with Nixon's stands: 58%
- Agnew not sufficiently qualified/Disagreement with Agnew's stands: 30%
- Nixon-Agnew's pursuit of the Southern Strategy: 21%
- Nixon's approach to problems is anachronistic or shallow: 17%

**LINDSAY SUPPORTERS**
- Nixon not sufficiently qualified/Disagreement with Nixon's stands: 50%
- Dissatisfaction with the platform: 17%
- Nixon-Agnew's pursuit of the Southern Strategy: 8%

7. DO YOU PLAN TO BE ACTIVE IN ANY 1968 CAMPAIGNS? IF YES, AT WHAT LEVEL? IN WHAT CAPACITY? TO WHAT EXTENT?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Congressional</th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Volunteer</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Full-time</th>
<th>Part-time</th>
<th>Occasional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rockefeller</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindsay</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagan</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. AS A GROUP DEVOTED TO THE LONG-TERM REBUILDING OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, WHAT SHOULD THE RIPON SOCIETY DO IN THE MONTHS AHEAD?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support Nixon-Agnew without reservation</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Rockefeller</th>
<th>Nixon</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Reagan</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ignore the national ticket and continue to produce research papers, expand chapters and support selected state and local candidates</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make support of the national ticket contingent on its performance during the campaign</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support a fourth party</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Republicans for Humphrey-Muskie</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Nixon-Agnew with reservations</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. CHECK THE TRAITS THAT YOU BELIEVE DESCRIBE MR. NIXON. LEAVE BLANK THOSE THAT DO NOT APPLY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Rockefeller</th>
<th>Nixon</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Reagan</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>He has extensive knowledge of and a well-defined position on the war in Vietnam</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He is knowledgeable and experienced in foreign affairs generally</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In Question 6 readers were asked to write in their opinions rather than check off alternatives. The categorizations are our own summaries of the often lengthy and detailed responses.
He understands the problems of the cities and has specific proposals to alleviate them
He understands the problems of the American farmer and, if elected, could help him significantly
He understands the causes of poverty and can offer programs which will help the poor help themselves
If elected, he could substantially help the American Negro achieve social, economic and political equality
He will be a capable manager of the economy
He has sufficient administrative ability to be a competent President
He makes decisions only after careful deliberation
His presence at the head of the ticket will help elect Republicans everywhere
He is a loyal party man
He has the confidence of young people
He has the physical stamina required by the Presidency
He has the confidence of the working man
His personal life sets a good example for all citizens
He has no clear-cut position on the war in Vietnam
He is inexperienced in foreign affairs
He does not understand the problems of the cities
He does not appreciate the plight of the American farmer
He does not have any proposals to eliminate poverty
He does not understand the management of the economy
His election will further alienate the American Negro from the mainstream of American life
He does not have the confidence of youth
He does not have the confidence of the working man
His presence at the top of the ticket will be a handicap to other Republicans running for reelection
His personal life is not satisfactory

10. WHOM DO YOU REGARD AS THE LEADING MODERATE REPUBLICAN STANDARD-BEARER IN THE YEARS TO COME?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supports, as of August 5, 1968, of</th>
<th>Total Rockefeller</th>
<th>Nixon</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Reagan</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brooke*</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chafee</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatfield</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindsay*</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percy*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockefeller</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scranton</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too early to say</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

> Less than 1%
* Includes share of the 4.5% who responded “Lindsay or Percy” and of the 2.4% who responded with combinations of Brooke, Lindsay, and Percy.
11. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS MOST NEARLY EXPRESS YOUR POSITION ON THE WAR IN VIETNAM?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Supporters, as of August 5, 1968, of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The U. S. should follow its present basic course in Vietnam</td>
<td>Rockefeller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The U. S. should substantially increase its military effort to achieve victory in the Vietnam War</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The U. S. should de-escalate the military approach in Vietnam and take new political initiatives to reach a negotiated settlement with the Viet Cong and North</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Of those who chose one of the alternatives.

12. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING RESPONSES MOST NEARLY EXPRESS YOUR OPINION OF THE STATEMENT: "UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO CONTINUING THE VIETNAM WAR FOR ANOTHER FIVE YEARS"?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Supporters, as of August 5, 1968, of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Rockefeller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Of those who chose one of the alternatives.

**MAN TO WATCH**

'Peace and Quiet' Sheriff

It was the autumn of 1964, not a particularly favorable year for Republican candidates for any office, the 33 year-old candidate for the Great and General Court of Massachusetts (the state legislature) began his campaign with a foray into territory which was hostile to members of his party even in the best of political years: the heavily Italian North End of Boston. John Winthrop Sears, seven-greats grandson of the first governor of Massachusetts and a stock-broker not many years out of Harvard and Oxford, started his hand-shaking with a grizzled old gentleman sitting on a street corner. He introduced himself and received the unexpected and pointed reply, "Where do you work?" "Brown Brothers Harriman," answered the candidate swiftly, thinking too late that the blue-ribbon sound of this place probably had very little vote-getting appeal with the North Ender. He was wrong. "I bet on Mr. Harriman's horses," the old fellow said, "so I guess I'll bet on you, young man."

Thus in a year when nearly three dozen Republican legislators lost their seats, John Sears was elected to represent his North End - South End - Beacon Hill - Back Bay district, beating two incumbent Democrats in the process.

Today the towering (6'4") Sears has got a new job: High Sheriff of Suffolk County (Boston), to which he was appointed last February by Governor John Volpe. For decades the office had come to be known as a profitable enterprise in which the Sheriff and his deputies annually shared some quarter-million dollars in legally-obtained fees (gotten by serving writs on the City of Boston at $10 a writ)—all in excess of generous salaries. No law enforcement duties were connected with the post, save for the management of the Charles Street Jail, an antique structure with a record of escapes that has been a scandal for years. Republican circles were therefore stunned at Sears' ready acceptance of Volpe's offer: to them it seemed as if Sears was committing political suicide by deserting a safe seat in the House for a quixotic and tenuous position as Sheriff. But John Sears, an old hand at pulling off political surprises, conjured up a new one for his doubters.

Within hours after being sworn in by Volpe, the new Sheriff abolished the fee system and put his deputies on straight salary. Seeing that the prisoners in the Charles Street Jail, most of them young men, had no opportunity for self-advancement, the Sheriff set up an athletic program and organized a 1500-volume library under the direction of Mrs. John Saltonstall.

Extrapolating from an ancient colonial law (never repealed) that the Sheriff is to be fined if he does not appear on the scene of a disturbance, Sears drew up plans for a corps of special deputies recruited from among ghetto teenagers to report potential conflicts in time to prevent violence. And then in the wake of the murder of Robert F. Kennedy, Sears announced his deputies would not wear guns unless absolutely necessary, making him the nation's leading no-shoot sheriff. The press trumpeted all these acts with headlines and editorial accolades. Thus in a few short weeks, John Sears converted a vestigial sinecure into a superb personal forum, one far better than the Massachusetts legislature from
which to aid his political career—and in which to try to
effect at least a small share of the social reforms for
which he campaigned during his race for Mayor.

John W. Sears was born in 1930 in the Back Bay to
one of Boston's most distinguished families, and in the
fashion of his breed he went to St. Mark's School before
Harvard, forging an impressive scholastic record in both
places. He wrote his undergraduate thesis in govern-
ment under the direction of the late Professor V. O.
Key, Jr. The respected political scientist suggested to
Sears sometime in 1949 or 1950 that he choose a group
of Congressmen whose voting records he would study
in order to discover what forces motivate members of
Congress to vote as they do. To balance an Eastern lib-
eral against a Western conservative Republican, Sears
made a prophetic selection: John F. Kennedy and Rich-
ard M. Nixon. The thesis earned for him a degree
magna cum laude.

**BOSTON IN THE BLOOD**

Following his graduation in
1952, Sears served two years of
destroyer duty with the Navy. He
went back to Cambridge to enter Harvard Law School
but he stayed only briefly: having been chosen a Rhodes
Scholar, he spent two years (1955-57) at Oxford's Balliol
College, where he wrote a thesis on British disarmament
policy. Sears returned to Harvard Law School, and
upon his graduation in 1959 moved to New York City
where he worked on international banking matters with
Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. and served part-time as
an aide to then-Congressman John Lindsay. But Bos-
ton was still too much in his blood, as was a desire
to make his way in Massachusetts politics. After additional
service with the Navy during the Berlin Crisis of 1961-
62, Sears moved back to Boston and in 1964 declared his
 candidacy for the State House of Representatives.

Despite the disadvantage of a two-to-one Demo-
cratic edge in registration, he was elected. Realizing
the unnatural marriage of neighborhoods in his gerry-
mandered district as well as the necessity to win North
End votes, the new Representative began courting his
constituents, serving on civic associations and helping
North and South End residents obtain state jobs. His
efforts paid off, and he led a field of six candidates in
his campaign for a second term in 1966. During his
three-and-a-half years in the General Court, Sears com-
piled a remarkable record, filing 102 bills in the 1967
session and seeing over thirty of them signed into law.

But skilled though he was as a legislator, Sears
yearned for a different channel for his governmental
talents. "Political power comes from administrative
office rather than legislative office, and from elected ad-
ministrative office rather than appointed administrative
office," he once remarked. So being, in mid-June 1967
he threw his hat into a crowded ring: the race for Mayor
of Boston. Outnumbered both in party registration and
fellow candidates by nine-to-one, Sears was the first
Republican in over thirty years to make a serious race
for the office. The Sears mayoral campaign was a small
masterpiece of modern political campaign techniques,
from extremely effective use of the media to an opinion-
sampling vehicle called the Mayormobile. But the State
Representative also concentrated strongly on old-fash-
ioned practice of meeting the voters person-to-person.
Conducting walking tours through neighborhoods in
which Republicans were as rare as Junior League mem-
berships (probably in the same proportion), the can-
didate would point to his Navy-style footwear and state,
"I think it's about time a Republican wore out shoe lea-
ther trying to get your vote." The Sears wit was also
used widely; at one rally he confessed, "You all know I
am a Republican: that means I don't have a single rela-
tive on the payroll at City Hall."

But most effective of all was the message of the campaign: "John Sears cares" ran the slogan, and it ap-
piled to the imaginative, Lindsayesque proposals the can-
didate made to "bring government closer to the people,"
with neighborhood city halls, 24-hour telephone service
at City Hall, and a sort of permanent Mayormobile.
Sears' concern for the long-neglected human problems of
the so-called New Boston won a surprising response from
the voters, and the polls showed him making a remark-
able rise in popularity during the final days of the cam-
paign. But it was not fast enough: in the preliminary
balloting of the nonpartisan contest, Sears finished third
with 24,000 votes (a 15% share in the ten-man race),
placing behind Secretary of State Kevin White, who was
ultimately elected. The Republican's showing earned
for him an attention among the press and politicians
seldom attained by a losing candidate. The post-elec-
tion consensus was that if any politician can turn defeat
into an asset, John Sears had done so.

His acceptance of the job of Sheriff did nothing to
defeat what some observers see as Sears' goal: to win
statewide office and the governorship in particular. But
the Bay State has the enviable problem of too many out-
standing Republicans for too few political opportunities
in 1970: Lieutenant Governor Francis W. Sargent, At-
torney General Eliot Richardson, State Senators William
D. Weeks, William Saltonstall and Frank Hatch, to
name but a few. Thus, Sears' desire for the office first
held by his namesake may have to be put off until at least
the 1974 election and perhaps even 1978. In the mean-
time he must resolve a more immediate problem: reelec-
tion to his present job.

The office of Sheriff is far below the electability
line for Republican candidates, certainly in Suffolk
County which, when the cross-harbor towns of Win-
throp, Revere and Chelsea are added to Boston, offers
a ten-to-one registration disadvantage for any Repub-
lican. Moreover, Sears has found that few people con-
sider contributing to a Sheriff's campaign because of its
bodle-bestrung reputation. If he should be defeated
for office this fall, Sears might not be able to win the
same respect he obtained from political Boston after his
mayoral loss last September. But if he should be elected,
the sheer accomplishment of his victory will enhance his
standing within the Massachusetts GOP, and its six-year
term will deliver him to the threshold of 1974. This
fall, then, offers the most crucial juncture in John Sears' poli-
tical career. He faces a "law and order" opponent
with the simple countervailing theme of "peace and quiet."

—CHARLES G. UNTERMeyer
Action For Washington

In a political season notable for the failures of participation politics on a national level and the increased alienation of younger political activists, students and young adults are being given a unique opportunity in Washington to make an effective contribution to state-level "system" politics. An independent campaign organization, Action For Washington (AFW), is backing four Republican candidates for state offices: Governor Daniel Evans, Secretary of State A. Ludlow Kramer, Arthur Fletcher for Lieutenant Governor and Slade Gorton for Attorney General. Through its campaign activities, AFW is training members of the politically forgotten generation (16-35) in the arts and crafts of practical politics.

Action For Washington was begun in 1968 by Christopher Bayley, 30-year-old Seattle lawyer and Ripon National Vice President, and Sam Reed, 27 year-old Executive Director of the Governor's Urban Affairs Council, as a viable solution to the two-pronged problem of young people in politics — their alienation from the political "system" and the failure of the party to recognize the potential political strength of an organized, well-trained young citizens' organization. It was to be activity-oriented, not a loose-knit federation of discussion groups. It would appeal to people of all political affiliations who wanted constructive, progressive political action. Members of Action For Washington, it was assumed, would learn by doing and gain influence by providing the candidates with competent campaign aid and leadership.

The plan called for division of AFW by age groups — a youth or high-school division and a college division which would work on a specific campus, and an age 21-35 division which would work through county organizations. Bayley and Reed hoped to use much of the strategy that proved so effective in the organizations of, for example, the Young Tennesseans for Baker and Davidoff's Raiders in New York. AFW, however, was to be largely independent of specific campaign organizations. And that independence meant that AFW would have to raise nearly all its own funds.

AFW organization efforts were at first very successful. Initial financial backing was secured from the Dan Evans Committee following the formation of a 16-35 Steering Committee in February. And in early March Bill Hoitink, 24, a Spokane student with a prominent record as a Republican activist, was appointed executive director with the task of beginning state-wide organizations. It then seemed that the large number of tentative campus chairmen that had been previously contacted would give the director a good base to work from.

The concept, however, was not immediately realized. Although Collegians for Evans and Collegians for Kramer organizations sprang up on nearly every Washington college campus, Action for Washington remained a name that meant little to most of their members. The formation of a progressive, thriving, state-wide College Republican League (CRL) following a recent split within the state young Republicans caused many to fear AFW as a potential rival to CRL. It was difficult to dispel this fear and promote the idea that an organization designed to fill a temporary campaign service need not spook the CRL and YR's.

Also, because AFW was an entirely new concept, little was known about what it really could do. The Governor was enthusiastic, but the other candidates had yet to be convinced. And the gap between the theory and practice of amateur organization seemed to grow as time went on. It was during the summer, when AFW began to act, that it became a viable source of power and responsibility for young people in politics.

With organizations established in two counties by June, AFW began to produce — and as it produced, to grow. By the end of August activities ranging from a rally at the State Convention, to sign-painting, to canvassing and literature distribution had involved over 1000 people in the AFW campaign. To promote AFW, core groups from unorganized areas and campuses were trained in campaign schools, involved in AFW activities relying on manpower from many areas, and then aided in beginning new groups by AFW state organizers. During the summer, organizations were established in 16 of 19 target counties, on 32 college campuses, and in over 100 high schools.

The Fletcher, Gorton and Kramer chairmen, whose campaigns were not so highly financed or sophisticated as the Governor's began to increasingly rely upon AFW as a manpower resource and a project director. In particular, the campaign to insure a primary victory for Art Fletcher, a black with a brilliant record in urban development, became AFW's campaign as it began to fill Fletcher's manpower and leadership needs.

As each AFW project was completed more positions were created — enough to fill an 18-page "Opportunities Catalog."

The hundreds of precincts doorbelled and thousands of signs painted and other campaign services not withstanding, AFW has made perhaps its greatest contribution to the future health of the Republican party. It has attracted progressive Republican candidates and trained in the workings of the political system a large number of volunteers who were previously politically non-committed or moderately anti-Republican. Action For Washington activities opened campaign positions usually closed to political initiates.

AFW has demonstrated that young political amateurs not only provide additional manpower for a campaign, but also the necessary leadership and planning capabilities that the party will rely upon in the future.

— PAUL CUNNINGHAM
Illinois Republicans stand tall in this state of the Daley Democratic Machine. Sensing the coming of a sweet and sweeping victory over the now unmasked Neanderthal, the Republican Party is working with relish as well as diligence and care to win the "big ones."

The first "big one" is carrying Illinois for Richard Nixon. Under the direction of William Rentschler, the Illinois for Nixon Committee has this responsibility. Rentschler is ably assisted by Roy Papp as the Nixon Cook County Chairman and maybe not so ably assisted by Ray Page as the Nixon Downstate Chairman. (Page, the present Superintendent of Public Instruction, is being touted by some rightists as a primary challenger to incumbent Senator Charles Percy in the 1972 Republican primary in an admitted attempt to reincarnate a Kuchel-Rafferty battle.)

A second "big one" is carrying Illinois for Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, who seems in a good position to return as Minority Leader.

A third "big one" is carrying Illinois for Richard Ogilvie for Governor and the accompanying state Republican ticket. After the June primary, Ogilvie moved to remake the Republican Party for himself; he has already succeeded to a great degree. Ogilvie led the Illinois delegation at Miami to Nixon (which TV skipped in favor of a few more reports from the floor). Ogilvie has cleared away in Timothy Sheehan and Audrey Peak two party officials that persistently had opposed his take-over and replaced them with his own stalwarts: Edmund Kucharski is the new Cook County Chairman and Mrs. Brooks McCormick is the new National Committeeewoman.

Ogilvie may not have gained complete dominance of the official party structure, for the prospects are that the new chairman of the Republican County Chairmen’s Association is going to be a supporter of Ogilvie’s rival in the primary John Henry Altorfer. The non-Ogilvie chairman would be Harris Rowe, who lost to Adlai Stevenson III in 1966 in the same election that put Charles Percy in the Senate. Rowe is an articulate young Republican who should move up to public office; most importantly, he is being put up to act as a spokesman for downstate forces in the Republican Party. Recognizing the danger of opening the fissure between downstate and Cook County, Ogilvie is likely to go along with Rowe’s selection. Ogilvie can work with Rowe, and Republican unity should survive.

A fourth "big one" is carrying one or more of the Congressional seats presently held by a Democrat. The twelve incumbent Republican Congressmen are patently safe. Two Republican challengers could win. In the Third Congressional District, Robert Podesta, a moder-
and was not opposed at the primary.

There is considerable difference of opinion as to the effect of Democratic Senator George McGovern's short-lived campaign for the presidency on his re-election against former Governor Archie Gubbrud. Though experienced office holders, particularly Senator Karl Mundt and Congressman E. Y. Berry, feel that McGovern may have hurt himself, rank-and-file Republicans across the state are of the impression that he has enhanced his position with the independent voter and with some Republicans. The last South Dakota poll—a usually reliable sampling run by three South Dakota newspapers—shows McGovern with 56% of the vote and Gubbrud with 40%. The management of the Gubbrud campaign had expected to reach 40% on that poll by the forpart of October. They now feel that this unexpected growth would indicate that Governor Gubbrud may make further gains on McGovern.

NEW YORK: Nixon and the Conservatives

Richard Nixon recently found himself right in the middle of the fierce antagonisms between the Republican Party and the fledgling Conservative Party in New York State. The Conservative Party, organized in 1962 and making steady progress each election, wanted to have Nixon head its ticket this year. But because of the Electoral College system, the Party would have to run the same slate of electors as the Republicans, if the votes were to be effective. If the Conservatives ran a separate set of electors pledged to Nixon, this would split the Nixon vote and thus make a Humphrey victory in the state a certainty.

The Conservatives thus made overtures to the state GOP, but were firmly rebuffed. The GOP State Committee, after naming its electors, passed a loyalty resolution which forbade the electors from accepting Conservative Party endorsement. This left the Conservative Party with the options of running a separate slate and hurting Nixon's chance in the state irreparably or leaving the Presidential line blank, and thus harming the rest of the Conservative ticket (which includes a Senatorial aspirant and many Congressional and state legislative candidates).

In the end, the state committee of the Conservative Party voted 92-49 for a leadership proposal that would have the Presidential line left vacant. To appease his conservative supporters, however, Nixon sent a long letter to the Party—asking them not to nominate a separate set of electors, but welcoming their support as a Party. His recognition of the Conservative Party's importance in the state may upset Governor Rockefeller and Senator Javits, who have long been fighting the upset Party by treating it as an extremist outpost, but it may also mean the margin of victory for Nixon in New York. And if Humphrey loses New York, few people give him any chance at all to win the Presidency.

VIRGINIA: four target seats

Recent Republican success in Virginia has depended on presenting good candidates at a time when Democrats were bitterly divided by ideological bickering. With the Humphrey drag on the ticket, Virginia Republicans may be coming into their own as the majority party. If the Congressional races go well this year, it will be a good omen for the 1969 gubernatorial race of Linwood Hall, a moderate who has been a prime mover in Virginia's Republican resurgence. In addition to the four GOP incumbents in Congress, there are four marginal seats worth watching as an index to the Party's prospects.

In the twin port city district comprising Norfolk and Portsmouth, Professor G. William Whitehurst, 43, is a widely admired television personality. For five years prior to getting the Republican nomination for Congress, Whitehurst combined service as Dean of Students at Old Dominion College with a regular commentary program on WTAR-TV. His opponent F. T. "Bingo" Stant, 50, acquired a controversial reputation during a bruising primary contest to succeed retiring Congressman Porter Hardy.

The Third District made up of Richmond and its two suburban counties offers promise of success to chemical engineer John S. Hansen, 33, an attractive and articulate veteran of two terms in the lower house of the Virginia General Assembly. In this metropolitan area whites and blacks alike frequently complain that the status quo is failing them. As the bearer of an old political name, the somewhat lackluster and exceedingly conservative incumbent David E. Satterfield, III, 47, may find support lacking among the many new people who are registering to vote for the first time. He has already been declared unacceptable by the local Negro leaders.

The somnolent Fifth District in Southside Virginia is caught up in a campaign which presents perhaps the strongest contrast between the Old and New Politics yet seen in Virginia. Seeking to succeed former Governor William Tuck, the retiring dean of the Virginia delegation, is a 27 year-old Republican cousin Weldon Tuck, who managed the last two GOP campaigns which very nearly forced his elderly kinsman into involuntary retirement. Drawling but aggressive, the young stockbroker is blanketing the rural district with handshaking appearances and advertising appeals to put another Tuck in Congress. His opponent is Delegate W. C. "Dan" Daniel, 54, President of the Virginia Chamber of Commerce. Daniel, former state-wide campaign manager for the current Senator Byrd, Harry junior, is conducting an old-fashioned Byrd-style campaign. Weldon Tuck could be slightly ahead in this contest.

The lush Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, now sends mostly Republicans to the General Assembly, including three term Delegate A. R. "Pete" Giesen, 35, who had a large role in this success since 1961. As a graduate of Yale and the Harvard Business School, Giesen has proven that education and intelligence need be no barrier to political victory in rural precincts.
Conservative incumbent Democratic Congressman John O. Marsh, Jr. has offended his conservative supporters by voting for the motion which failed in reseating Adam Clayton Powell. He was the only Virginian to vote in favor of the well known New Yorker. Look for a strong Giesen challenge.

RHODE ISLAND: tax issues

After a dull start, the Rhode Island campaign has finally produced one hotly contested issue centering, as predicted in the August FORUM, on the newly enacted tax program and the need for a state income tax.

Republican incumbent Governor John Chafee, seeking his fourth term, has ordered department directors to cut spending. He fears that the tax program enacted by the Democratic legislature will fall short of its revenue-producing goals. Chafee has proposed an income tax to meet the state's needs. He is presently declaring that such a tax is inevitable.

His opponent, former Judge Frank Licht, promises a program, to be announced at some later date, that will produce the required income without an income tax. Chafee responds by accusing Licht of "teasing" the voters.

At this time, it is hard to predict whether the squabble will have any effect on what may be simply a personality contest, which Chafee is expected to win easily.

KANSAS: the long and the short of it

Moderate William H. Avery, former Congressman and Governor, was soundly beaten in the primary for US Senator by conservative Bob Dole, Congressman from the huge and largely rural first district. Dole lacked both a platform and a state-wide image, but Avery has not been popular since he raised taxes during his only term as Governor. Dole should win easily over his Democratic opponent William S. Robinson, who is little more than a party hack. In the Democratic primary Robinson defeated liberal James Logan, retiring Dean of the University of Kansas Law School who was making his first political race.

The most exciting race in Kansas will be the race between incumbent Democratic Governor Robert Docking and the moderate Republican challenger Richard Harmon. Harmon had no state-wide image before entering the Republican primary and yet he easily defeated the Lieutenant Governor in the race. Harmon hit hard at the Docking record throughout the primary and concentrated particularly on the size of Docking's various staffs and committees, which appeared to be doing nothing for their salaries.

As has been reported before in the FORUM, Kansas politics is almost the reverse of national politics. Here the incumbent Democratic Governor is the conservative who insists on "holding the line" on taxes while vital state services languish and falter. The Docking record stands for little more than inactivity and Harmon has much to talk about. He won the primary while insisting on the need to raise gasoline taxes (currently the lowest in the nation) and it remains to be seen if Kansas accept this challenge in November.

An interesting sidelight in this race is the relative size of the opponents, Docking is quite short while former All-American (Kansas State University) basketball player Harmon is nearly seven feet tall. The long and short of it—a close race for Governor which will be decided more by local issues and personalities than by the race on the national level.

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<td>(compiled from materials supplied by the Republican National Committee)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>October</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>4 MICHIGAN: Deadline for voter registration for Nov. 5 election.</td>
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<td>5 FLORIDA: Deadline for voter registration.</td>
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<td>5 MASSACHUSETTS: Deadline for voter registration.</td>
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<td>5 SOUTH CAROLINA: Deadline for voter registration.</td>
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<td>5 VIRGINIA: Deadline for voter registration.</td>
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<td>7 INDIANA: Deadline for voter registration.</td>
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<td>7 MARYLAND: Deadline for voter registration.</td>
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<td>7 NEW MEXICO: Deadline for voter registration.</td>
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<td>12 CONNECTICUT: Deadline for voter registration.</td>
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<td>15 ARKANSAS: Deadline for voter registration.</td>
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<td>16 COLORADO: Deadline for voter registration.</td>
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<td>21 SOUTH DAKOTA: Deadline for voter registration.</td>
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<td>23 WISCONSIN: Deadline for voter registration.</td>
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<td>25 NEBRASKA: Deadline for voter registration.</td>
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<td>26 ALABAMA: Deadline for voter registration.</td>
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<td>30 UTAH: Deadline for voter registration.</td>
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<td><strong>November</strong></td>
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<td>2 VERMONT: Deadline for voter registration.</td>
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<td>5 GENERAL ELECTION.</td>
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LETTERS

THE CASE FOR HUMPHREY

Dears Sirs:

The Ripon Society is on record with frequent, eloquent, effective protests and proposals during the past 1964 period. We, as individual members, have applauded the Society's positions on national and party policy. The credibility of the Society as a whole seems to me to be at stake in whatever we do or fail to do this year.

Did we really mean what we said or was it all sham?

The Southern strategy has prevailed again. Are we now to endorse that which we have so long and so forcefully opposed? I really believe that Nixon and Agnew must reject the narrow, sectional advice and influence of Thurmond, Callaway and Tower after this election. Can we be sure that Mr. Nixon would not appoint a person as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and the position of Attorney General? To expect Mr. Nixon to behave after his election differently than he did during the Convention is an article of faith larger than I can accept. The sellout to the South must be repudiated forcefully, effectively and without regard for party unity.

If Ripon members really are sincere about the positions presented in the Chicago Street, they must support Vice President Humphrey.

For one thing, the vice presidential campaign is the most vital campaign for the future of the Ripon Society as a political entity. The Thurmonds, Callaways, Towers, say "NO". The Nixons and Agneys equivocate—just maybe—Republican liberals and moderates can successfully apply to 1972 the lessons we learned from 1964, but failed to apply to 1968.

If we decide not to support the ticket, we could do nothing further this year. But Ripon members are activists, not prone to abdicating responsibility on matters of deep and personal concern.

Ripon members must take the only realistic, potentially effective, constructive course open to them. Join the Black American welcome to full-fledged citizenship in the United States. The Thurmonds, Callaways, Towers, say "NO". The Nixons and Agneys equivocate—just maybe—Republican liberals and moderates can successfully apply to 1972 the lessons we learned from 1964, but failed to apply to 1968.

Conducting these Ripon "leaders," I say, "Yes," the Black American is welcome to full-fledged citizenship and must be actively encouraged to act as a human being. In my view, Hubert Humphrey says, "Yes," also. Members of the Ripon Society have, to date, said, "Yes" but the time has come for each of us to reaffirm it. For others, the war in Vietnam is the prime issue, over-shadowing domestic strife. The period between the writing and publication of this piece may bring significant changes in the war. But apart from daily events and statements by both Mr. Humphrey and Mr. Nixon, I ask you to compare these men. We are faced with trying to judge how each of these two men will behave in situations likely to arise during his Presidency. The most reliable basis for your judgment are the attitudes each has developed throughout his political career. Which of them would be more likely to operate under the outdated assumption of the Cold War? Which of them is more likely to justify a drift toward a deeper conflict as a necessary protection of national interest? After dancing to the tune of segregationists, isn't Mr. Nixon likely to march to the drums of the military-industrial complex?

Mr. Humphrey, on the other hand, has made clear his commitment to peace during his long public career, especially during 18 years in the Senate. He advocates a re-ordering of national priorities away from militarism and toward programs for peaceful world development. His identification with the limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, establishment of the Special Disarmament Subcommittee in the Senate (1965), creation of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1961) and international cooperation in the exploration of outer space, the United Nations, the Peace Corps and the World Health Organization demonstrates where he stands and provides an accurate measure of the direction our foreign policy could be expected to take under his leadership.

More important to me, however, is the Vice President's record on domestic policy. Clearly he will stand with the forces of justice against the forces of repression. Can one say the same for Mr. Nixon? From Vice President Humphrey's days as mayor through his Senate emphasis on housing and his effective efforts leading to passage of the model cities and rent supplement programs, he not only demonstrates where he stands, but has successfully worked to move the country toward his views. He has proposed essential elements of the National Defense Education Act during the Eisenhower Administration and originally suggested a program of tax credits for college tuition, now a key plank in the Republican platform. He thinks well of the Ripon position on federal revenue-sharing with the states and the traditionally Republican position encouraging private investment in the inner city.

Hubert Humphrey's fight in support of human rights for all Americans has been one of action—not just words—to eliminate injustice and discrimination, whether racial, religious or ethnic.

One of his first acts as mayor of Minnesota was to establish a city Council of Human Relations and launch a strenuous campaign which resulted in passage of the first municipal Fair Employment Practices Act in the nation. He first launched a full-scale campaign against anti-Semitism, enlist the help of community leaders. In 1948, Humphrey led the successful fight for a strong civil rights plank at the Democratic Convention, with a fiery speech urging the party "to get out of the shadow of states' rights and walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human rights."

In 1949, Humphrey carried his battle for human rights to the larger arena of the U.S. Senate. He was the first member to hire a Negro professional staffer. He sponsored Fair Employment Practices bills in nearly every session of Congress, as well as anti-lynch laws, measures to outlaw poll taxes and help Negro voter registration, desegregation of public transportation and development of a Commission on Civil Rights. He was a leader in securing passage of the 1957 and 1960 civil rights bills. Humphrey's 15-year struggle for comprehensive civil rights legislation culminated in his role as floor leader for passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

If you are willing to act on your policy convictions, you have no realistic alternative to supporting Mr. Humphrey over Mr. Nixon.

JOHN B. TALMADGE
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Talmadge is an organizer of Republican Citizens for Humphrey.
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66-1 From Disaster to Distinction: The Rebirth of the Republican Party; Ripon Society paperback; 127pp. September 1966. Unit price: $1.00 (quantity discounts available for more than ten copies).


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