THE NIXON OPPORTUNITY

This time – Nixon, said the posters and this time they were right. The long and often lonely odyssey has ended in triumph. Richard Nixon has fashioned the most remarkable political comeback in our nation’s history and achieved the highest honor his countrymen can bestow.

In his acceptance speech at Miami Beach, Mr. Nixon recalled to his audience the declaration of Winston Churchill: “‘We have not journeled all this way, . . . across the oceans, across the mountains, across the prairies, because we are made of sugar candy.’ He used the comment to describe the proven strength of the American people. But the words also speak an important truth about Richard Nixon and his journey to the White House.

Now the loneliness of the long distance runner gives way to the different loneliness of high office. Mr. Nixon must now face the great question which he also put to the American people that night last August: For what purpose have we traveled all this way? As he wrestles with that awesome concern, the new President will require and deserve all the support and assistance our people can provide. The Ripon Society, for its part, recognizes this high obligation.

Over the years, Ripon has tried in two ways to play a constructive political role. First, we have worked to develop progressive policy recommendations based on identifiably Republican themes. Values such as decentralization, voluntarism and self-help have been important elements in Ripon’s approach. A number of the proposals which the Society has endorsed have also received Mr. Nixon’s support. Such research and policy development efforts are now more important than ever, we believe. For our party must avoid both inaction and redundancy in the next four years and raise

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THE RIPON SOCIETY, INC. is a Republican research and policy organization whose members are young business, academic and professional men and women. It has national headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts, chapters in seven cities, National Associate members throughout the fifty states, and several affiliated groups of sub-chapter status. The Society is supported by chapter dues, individual contributions, and revenues from its publications and contract work. The Society offers the following options for annual contribution: Contributor $25 or more; Sustainer $100 or more; Founder $500 or more. Inquiries about membership and chapter organization should be addressed to the National Executive Director.

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EDITORIAL

In view of Richard Nixon's almost legendary 15-year devotion to the cause of fostering a strong Republican Party, it is particularly ironic that his candidacy did so little to help it in last month's election. As the nation's anticipation of the reign washes away memories of the campaign, it remains important to take a last look at the past to determine how it will impinge on the future.

To begin with, let us recall what the script originally called for in 1968. Ever since the remarkable Republican successes in 1966 and last year, political experts in both parties had predicted that 1968 would climax the comeback story. The unpopularity of the President, his counterproductive and agonizing war and the spiraling domestic disorder and discontent seemed to assure their prophecies. To top everything off, the ugly spectacle of Chicago highlighted the contrast between the United Republicans and the atomized Democrats and drove disgusted liberals away from Humphrey.

Even the cautious London bookmakers rated Nixon's chances at ten to one, and the only real debate became whether the Nixon landslide would sweep Republicans into control of the House or leave them a hair short of it. In any event, the New Deal coalition was at last going to shatter in this watershed election, and for the first time since the 1920s, the GOP was to become the majority Party. This prognosis held up until the end of September. But a scant month later, it was the once discredited Democrats who were on the offensive. Given a bit more cooperation from Richard Daley in August, Lyndon Johnson in September, Eugene McCarthy in early October, or even a slightly later election date in November, Hubert Humphrey, Edmund Muskie, Larry O'Brien, George Meany and Joe Napoliant might well have won the contests. (George Gallup for one believes that a few more days would have made the difference.) As it was, the Republicans won the election but they lost the campaign.

We do not believe that the American electorate lost its appetite for change between August and November of 1968. But they did, in large measure, lose their confidence that a Republican President would produce the kind of change they desired. Mr. Nixon has frequently said that he pursued the Republican nomination in a way that would allow him to win the election and that he pursued electoral victory in a way that would allow him to govern effectively. Unfortunately, his 43% share of the popular vote indicates he was not as successful in the latter task as he was in the former.

The trouble lay in the dichotomy between the springtime pronouncements of Mr. Nixon and his performance in the fall, as this month's cover attempts to dramatize, which eroded his appeal to the swing voters. The Richard Nixon of the spring was the new, mellowed, responsible centrist Nixon stressing his acceptibility to primary voters and liberal convention delegates. The candidate of the fall was at first conciliatory Mr. Nixon trying to hold onto everyone by offending no one and remaining an acceptable alternative. The apotheosis of this strategy was the selection of Spiro Agnew as running mate, a man who apparently fit all the politically mechanical externals of the campaign. Although Mr. Agnew turned out to be less than the ideal campaigner, his lack of finesse could not be predicted, and the policy of caution was a plausible one for the front runner Nixon. Thus, he promised to end the war in Vietnam, but took care not to repudiate the Cold War assumptions that trapped the United States there in the first place. (He troubled to make the curious point that his administration would see a new Attorney General but made no mention of a Secretary of State.) His substitution of tax incentives to private enterprise to solve the problems of the city had appeal and covered over his lack of willingness to commit the government to actions which lower-income whites might find threatening.

But there comes a point when one can appease one group only by offending another. When Mr. Nixon decided that "justice" was too controversial a word to be included in his discussions of "law and order," he could hardly expect its omission to escape notice. Lukewarm support of racial integration subtly implied that his obeisances to it were merely tactical, an impression reinforced by his general avoidance and even cancellation of ghetto appearances.

To transform honorable differences with the philosophy of the Warren Court into a Wallacite theory of crime causation displayed at best flagrant opportunism and at worst a frightening lack of social insight. Seizing upon the Czechoslovakian invasion as an opportunity to denounce backhandedly the treaty that may go down in history as the one positive achievement of the Johnson administration in foreign affairs was not only bad diplomacy; it proved to be poor politics as well.

In the end, Richard Nixon's strategy played right into Hubert Humphrey's hands. The Humphrey campaign was calculated to conjure up an image of Nixon as the embodiment of anti-union, anti-social,
legislation, pro-military-industrial-complex demon of Republican mythology. Humphrey ran his campaign against the old Nixon, and Richard Nixon obliged by playing the role. The most perfect illustration of this sad fact was his response to the issues raised by Humphrey's Vietnam speech, probably the most effective moment of the Humphrey campaign. Nixon rummaged in the cellar of the 1950's and came up with his atavistic "security gap" statement. This irresponsible fantasy probably did more than any other move in the campaign to persuade liberals that Humphrey was indeed the less backward-looking, less uninspiring and less disquieting choice.

So, trying to ride the backlash tide, Mr. Nixon almost floundered in the powerful "frontlash" undertow. As it was, the anticipated gains in the House of Representatives all but vanished. Although all but two of the Republican class of 1966 survived, only five of the 34 marginal Democratic seats changed Party. The role of the frontlash in this election was crucial, spelling the difference between the anticipated victory and the actual stalemated near defeat. "Frontlash" is a shorthand for the emergent highly independent, well informed, largely suburban group which ordinarily leans Republican but supported Johnson in 1964 and preferred McCarthy or Rockefeller this spring. This group comprises about 17% of the electorate outside the South and favored Nixon two-to-one in September. Because of the three-way race, their support became very strategic since a switch from Nixon to Humphrey simultaneously impoverished the former and enriched the latter. While it hurt Nixon, however, a vote switch from him to Wallace did not help Humphrey directly. Ripon predicted in September that if Nixon aimed his campaign at Wallace voters, he would dissipate his margin in the North and win only a "narrow victory," and we must conclude that this analysis was essentially accurate.

Although Nixon finally won enough votes from Wallace in the peripheral South to defer the dreams of the Alabama spoiler, in the process he reversed the two-to-one frontlash edge of September to a two-to-one deficit by November. It appears that about one-third of the Republican voters who crossed over to vote for LB J in 1964 crossed over to the Democratic candidate again in 1968, despite their early inclination not to do so. On the whole Nixon ran about 10% behind his suburban pace of eight years ago, with only a fifth of that falloff going to Wallace. In the northeast, Nixon's performance was even further off the GOP norm, and it

### Cabbages and Kings

**On Creeping Disarmament**
George Hanson, Republican senate candidate in Idaho: "How long will our hunters have their guns in Idaho if the soldiers and sailors who are defending their country have theirs taken away?"

**Truer Words Never Spoken**
Carl Albert as he took the gavel as permanent chairman of the Democratic national Convention: "We will be judged on our decorum."

**Better LeMayism than Gayism**
Nixon aide in response to suggestions that a State Department Purge which brought in new hard-liners would increase the risk of war: "Better thermonuclear war than letting the fairies take over."

**Reassurances We'd As Soon Not Get**
From Richard M. Nixon: "Some people say California is different from the rest of the country, but they are wrong. I say what is happening in Orange County tonight is happening all over America."

**Telling It Like It Is**
Massachusetts Senator Edward Brooke introducing Richard M. Nixon — after attacking Hubert Humphrey and George Wallace: "And so Dick, I guess that leaves only you."

**Button Up Your Overcoat Dept.**
*Dagens Nyheter*, Stockholm's daily newspaper: "We must express our hope that no harm comes to Mr. Nixon because it would pave the way for Spiro Agnew whose qualifications — to use a neutral term — are world famous."

**The More You Stir It Dept.**
Governor John Volpe defends Spiro Agnew's use of the term "fat jap" on the grounds that it is merely an abbreviation for Japanese and "was used in all the newspapers during World War II."

**Summing Up**
Glenn E. Goresica, Iowa farmer on the campaign: "I think that if you stuck them both in a barrel and shook them up, neither one of them would come to the top."
stands out in particularly bold relief when compared to Republican candidates who made strong frontlash appeals, notably Charles McC. Mathias of Maryland, Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania, and Jacob Javits of New York. In the case of a few liberal GOP Congressmen living in frontlash districts, the contrast is even stronger. Paul McClockey of suburban San Francisco won by 80% of the vote in a district that was carried by both Humphrey and Democratic Senate candidate Alan Cranston. Charles Whalen carried Dayton, Ohio and its environs by 78.1% of the vote, again while the Democratic presidential and senatorial ticket was carrying his area. If Nixon had been able to keep pace with Mathias and Gilbert Gude in the Maryland suburbs of Washington, D. C., the Nixon-Agnew ticket would have carried that state.

This is not to say that Nixon lost all of his liberal and moderate Republican support, nor that Independents and Democrats did not vote for him. It appears that about one-fourth of his vote came from 1964 Johnson voters. He was supported by at least seven percent of the Cranston voters in California, mostly Kuchel Republicans who opposed Rafferty. He shared large numbers of voters with Democratic Wayne Morse in Oregon, Harold Hughes in Iowa, and Gaylord Nelson in Wisconsin — mostly in swing areas in these states.

The Republicans cannot take for granted in 1972 the frontlash votes that it received this year, but given a reasonable performance in the meantime it can expect to woo many of them back to the party. Far less optimistic are the prospects of increasing Nixon’s dismal performance among other crucial segments of the population.

For example, at a time when the polls showed 50% of college students identifying with neither major party and with so many young people repulsed by tales of Chicago, the Republicans lost an important opportunity to gain new adherants. Most of the undecided young went for Humphrey, and the penumbra of alienation from the GOP was spread not only to those who were not attracted this year, but to those who will be voting for the first time in 1970 and 1972.

And precisely when urbanization has become the definitive theme of our culture, the Nixon-Agnew ticket, running consistently behind even the mediocre 1960 pace, carried almost no large cities, (Nixon enemy Murray Kempton made this point a little too strongly when he claimed no GOP victories in any city “large enough to have a bookstore.”)

But perhaps the most foreboding omen of all was Nixon’s performance with blacks, a crucial segment of the population just beginning to organize as a politically effective bloc. The Nixon-Agnew ticket’s percentage support from blacks didn’t even hit double figures in most areas and fell to less than five percent in urban centers like Chicago, Brooklyn, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Gary.

In short, the Nixon candidacy with its stubborn and almost fatal adherence to the “border strategy”, far from marking the end of the New Deal coalition, strengthened it outside the South and polarized voting patterns against the Republicans. All this occurred at a time when the GOP was marked by unprecedented unity matched only by the opposition’s disarray. As Hubert Humphrey began to gain on him, Richard Nixon acted like a confused young maid whose virtue was assailed, frantically defending the secondary almost at the expense of the primary.

The voters who abandoned Nixon, the young, the black, the urbanized, and the frontlash, comprise the fastest growing groups in the electorate. Adding to them the farmers, who seem of late to swing strongly against the “in” Party, and even further defections from urban Catholics if the next Democratic candidate is of their faith, highlights more clearly than ever the highly perishable nature of the slim Nixon plurality.

All in all, despite Nixon’s ultimate victory and despite the gains in the Senate and to a lesser extent on the State level, the Republican story of 1968 must be written as one of forfeited opportunity. The possibility for building a healthy and progressive Republican majority has not been foreclosed, however. As the Republican experience in the last decade demonstrates, in American politics opportunity knocks again and again.

Right now, the door on which the opportunity for rebuilding the Party knocks most loudly is that of the White House, newly occupied by a professional Republican politician for the first time in 40 years. The strategy by which power was pursued need not be the strategy by which it is wielded. Indeed, one of the more dubious but enduring traditions of American politics is that the promises — stated or implied — of the candidate are only of minimal help in predicting the performance of the officeholder. In many areas we fervently hope this will be the case with Richard Nixon as he assumes Presidential power.

We firmly believe that Mr. Nixon has both the capacity and the desire to be an effective President. Clearly, he wants very much to respond to the signboard plea of the little girl in Dechsler, Ohio to “bring us together,” a point he made convincingly in his post-election appearance. In two radio addresses during his Spring campaign, he expressed the same philosophy and with the greatest sophistication. In “Toward an Expanded Democracy” he
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ELECTION '68:

What Did and Didn't Happen

The election is over, but the analysts have just begun to fight, as each interpreter strives to extract lessons from the 1968 results to vindicate ideological preconceptions or fill columns and airwaves.

Actually, the real hard analysis must await the appearance of more detailed returns and their interpretation by the computers, but already a number of campaign myths are hardening in "facts" and "lessons" completely belied by the even fragmentary evidence now available. Perhaps it is too early to discern what really happened, but it may be even too late to set the public mind straight on what didn't. Nevertheless, herewith a modest attempt:

Myth No. 1: Nixon was winning by a landslide in September but he peaked too soon and almost lost. Richard Nixon indeed almost lost, but both Gallup and Harris agree that he reached his peak just before the Democratic Convention. They also concur that for the next three months he leveled off, Gallup placing him at 43-44% and Harris four points lower at 39-40%. In November, on the weekend before the election, the pollsters temporarily converged, giving him 42%, a drop according to Gallup and a gain according to Harris; within hours, however, Harris put him back down to 40%.

The public was unusually close-mouthed this year, with as many as one-third of prospective respondents refusing to have anything to do with the pollster. Even worse, almost half of the rest expressed serious dissatisfaction with both candidates. Given this hostility, a single national poll might have been off by the usual 4% error, but there is no reason to doubt the consistent picture presented by two sets of repeated polls.

NARY A VOTE SINCE JULY

Nixon did not pick up significant support when either of his rivals fell — Humphrey after the Chicago convention and Wallace just before election day. Even though he gained part of the Wallace vote, the authoritarian tone of his campaign pronouncement cost him dearly in "Frontlash" votes.

In short, Nixon did not follow his often described strategy of "peaking," gaining the last minute support of volatile voters with a bandwagon psychology and a last minute clinching maneuver. Despite enormous publicity about his substantial lead over Humphrey, which Gallup twice reported as over 10% and Harris once conceded was almost that much, Nixon made no net gains in popular support. His last minute maneuver, the nostalgic "security gap" charge, was a tactical blunder which reinforced Humphrey's very effective prior depiction of Nixon as a mindless militant who favored the spread of nuclear weapons. In addition, Nixon was unable to counter Johnson's last-ditch tactics on the bombing halt since he had refused to take any position at all on the war, even to repeat the balanced phrases of the Republican platform.

The results of the election and the barometer of the polls even allows us to dispel yet another myth, that the Democratic Convention did Humphrey in. Perhaps it anchored those who were already in the Nixon camp more firmly, but all the ones it chased away from Humphrey eventually came back to him.

Myth No. 2. No one went fishing on election day as was feared, perhaps because of Wallace's third party and McCarthy's eventual endorsement of Humphrey. This year only 69% of the eligible age group voted, the smallest percentage since 1948. Voting has increased dramatically in the South since 1964 but few northern states had normal turnouts for a presidential year. Only nine northern states, of which Illinois was the only large one, had turnout percentages as large as those of 1960 and 1964. In most northern states, Nixon had fewer votes this year than in 1960.

The low 71 million turnout this year has not been publicized, though it confounded all predictions. Gallup's last report to the public emphasized that his workers asked six questions to determine whether a person would vote, and he confidently predicted that 76 million Americans would do so. The Census bureau predicted the same, and a book co-authored by a former director of the census, Richard Scammon (Where the Voters Are) projected a 77-million vote.

This is not the first year a low turnout has been ignored. In 1948, the turnout percentage fell, and Dewey got fewer votes against Truman than he had received in wartime against Roosevelt. As in 1948, the proportion of the vote among one of the three candidates may have been determined by the relative turnouts of the different ethnic groups.

Myth No. 3. The 1968 election, like those of 1948 and 1960, was a cliffhanger in which the outcome in the electoral college could have been reversed by a small number of extra votes in a few states. Despite the remarks of the TV commentators recalling the pic-
turesque frauds of 1960 in Chicago and Texas, Nixon’s victory in the electoral college is not as narrowly based as Kennedy’s was. In 1960, there were 16 states in which the winning margin was less than two votes out of every hundred cast. Kennedy won 12 of them, two of them by fraud. This year, there were only six such close states. Nixon won only three of them (Ohio, New Jersey and Alaska), and they had fewer electoral votes than the ones Humphrey squeaked through in (Texas, Pennsylvania and Maryland).

Myth No. 4: Wallace the spoiler significantly disrupted the normal pattern of state-by-state party voting hurting either Nixon or Humphrey decisively in some states. This assumption is used by both parties to lay claim to the Wallace vote. The whole future of the Republican Party may turn on the ultimately dominant interpretation of which party Wallace’s votes came from.

The conservative Republican myth is that Wallace’s supporters are really members of a “conservative opposition” to liberal Democrats. To add Wallace’s 13% of the national vote to Nixon’s 43% and project a new winning Republican coalition assumes that Wallace’s supporters are rational, issue-oriented souls who would vote for Republicans if their party moved to the right. Goldwater’s “Southern strategy” simply assumed that Wallace’s white Protestant supporters in the South would respond more quickly to conservative Republicans than would his partly Catholic supporters in the North.

TWO-EDGED ASSUMPTION

Liberal Democrats use the “spoiler” assumption to buttress their counter myth — that Wallace supporters are so hostile to Republicans that they can never be won over by a Republican candidate whatever his ideology. In short, they maintain, the “hate vote” has been conditioned for generations to hate Republicans and will continue to do so and be safely absorbed by the Democratic party without unduly influencing its policies. The geographical position of the liberal Democratic stronghold in the North may cause each myth to feed on the other; Republicans are tempted to write off the North and the Democrats are tempted to take the South for granted. The Republican Party is consequently both pulled and pushed southward and to the right.

Neither conclusion is borne out by the basic data available right after the election. The state-by-state alignment remains basically the same as that of 1960. The only major difference is that five of the six Deep South states which Johnson’s courthouse visits won for Kennedy in 1960 went for Wallace and the other was delivered to Nixon via the good offices of Strom Thurmond rather than because of any Wallace influence.

In only one other state did the Wallace crusade have any clear influence: New Jersey, one of the only states where the rest of the ticket in two party races did not far exceed Nixon’s total in the three-way race. The congressional candidates only got 47% of the statewide vote, three points below the thin majorities registered in 1966 and in 1960, when Nixon narrowly lost the state in a two-party race. Despite this drop in the Republican vote, Nixon managed to edge out Hubert Humphrey 46% to 44%. The only possible conclusion is that Wallace seduced eight times as many Democrats as Republicans into giving him his 9% showing.

In California, where the TV networks claimed that Wallace was helping Nixon, Republicans in general did very well. Republican congressional candidates won 52½% of the statewide vote this year (54½% if congressional blanks are excluded), about as good as the 53% statewide vote associated with Reagan’s 58½% gubernatorial victory in 1966. Nixon could win California for the presidency while Democrat Alan Cranston was winning for the Senate because frontlashed Republicans crossed party lines and voted for them both, then switched back to Republicans at the congressional level. Despite Wallace, it was a Republican year in California and therefore a Nixon year.

The 7% Wallace showing came mostly from conservative Republicans who also deserted Nixon in 1962 after he defeated conservative Republican Shell Cranston in the primary. If Nixon were to plan future California victories on wooing the bulk of the conservatives over to his side, he would lose the gains in frontlash at the other end of the spectrum.

ALBATROSS MINIBLOC

The pursuit of the Wallace mini-bloc in the big industrial states would also be a counter-productive maneuver. In Michigan and Pennsylvania, Nixon’s defeats this year were associated with low Republican votes, the lower houses of both legislatures falling to the Democrats. Even though arithmetically Wallace “held the balance” in Michigan, the real problem was that Nixon fulfilled the fears of party leaders and was a drag on the whole GOP ticket. In New York and Connecticut, Humphrey got 50% of the vote, rendering Wallace irrelevent, while local Republicans made important gains, winning the lower house and two Congressional seats in New York, and one in Connecticut. The two seats the GOP lost in New York City did not reflect party strengths, for they had belonged to Mayor Lindsay and Judge Fino, whose personal appeals to Democrats and Independents could not immediately be equaled.

MISSING FINGERPRINT

Wallace’s fingerprints fail to show up elsewhere. Washington State in 1960 experienced an anti-Catholic surge against Kennedy, but this year succumbed to a great union effort for Humphrey. (Washington is the most unionized state in the country). Maine voted for Nixon in 1960, but switched to Muskie this year. Delaware and North Carolina were
narrow Nixon losses in 1960 and narrow Nixon wins this year. Nixon got more votes in Illinois than the Democrats this year, as he did in 1960 when Richard Daley’s unique vote accounting methods put the state in the Kennedy column. Nixon lost honestly in Texas this time, but very closely. One cannot, incidently, use the large 49% vote for GOP gubernatorial candidate Paul Eggers as an indication that the Wallace vote hurt Nixon more than Humphrey because their total includes the Texas liberals who supported Humphrey but to whom Eggers’ opponent Preston Smith was anathema.

CONTINUITY OF TREND

Another indication of the stability of party voting patterns despite the Wallace presence is that this year’s presidential election also followed the congressional results of 1966, when Republicans recovered most of the seats lost in the Goldwater disaster. In 1966, Republicans won statewide majorities of the congressional vote in 26 states, and all of them except Michigan and Pennsylvania voted for Nixon. There were nine more states in which the congressional vote went at least 46% Republican in 1966, and six of these went for Nixon this year. (Washington, New York and West Virginia were the laggards.) Nixon won only two other states: Nevada and South Carolina (already accounted for). In none of the rest was he even close except for Texas, where Republicans do not contest many congressional seats, and Maryland, his running mate’s home state.

In short, Nixon won in states where Republicans do well as a party and lost in states where Republicans do badly. Wallace won five states on his own in the South, but elsewhere drew evenly from the two major parties.

Myth No. 5: Nixon’s victory after a bland, non-committal campaign, vindicates his policy of avoiding controversy as a strategy to unify the nation.

The sad reality principle of American politics is that it is dominated by racial, ethnic, religious and regional antagonisms.

CHARISMA CONQUERS

As of 1960, Eisenhower, building on the urban-oriented campaigns of Dewey and Wilkie, had softened both class and emotional antagonisms in American politics. The elections of 1960 and 1964, however, have polarized American politics, just as the elections of 1928 and 1936 did.

The first step in 1960 came along religious lines. By 1956, Eisenhower had pushed up his percentage of Catholic voters to 49%, enough to increase his percentage of the total vote in the face of farm defections. Kennedy got almost 30% of the country’s Catholics to switch, putting his share at 78% of the Catholics, who gave him the margin of victory in five close, big states. (New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, New Jersey and Connecticut.) Class lines were relatively unimpor-

tant in that year. Union members voted almost 60% for Nixon if they were Protestant but barely over 20% if they were Catholic.

The Catholics have remained with the Democrats for the last two elections. In 1964, Goldwater only pulled 24%, and Nixon this year was able to grab only 28%, only 6% better than 1960 even though his opponent was not Catholic this time.

THE BARRY BOGEYMAN

The Goldwater candidacy fueled the second phase of polarization in 1964. Eisenhower had pushed his share of Negroes almost to 40% in 1956, and Nixon managed to hold on to 32% in 1960, carrying many Negro precincts despite Kennedy’s famous phone call to the jailed Martin Luther King. The Goldwater bogeyman effect managed to scare away four-fifths of that bloc and pull the percentage down to an almost negatively unanimous 6%. Goldwater ironically managed to polarize Jews against the Republican Party in 1964, although no Gallup estimate is available.

At the same time, Goldwater loosened the Republican Party’s hold on well-educated (white) Protestants, the “frontlash,” particularly in the Northeast. The defection was largely attributable to the peace issue, and LBJ’s post-election Vietnam doublecross combined with their customary Republicanism allowed Nixon to recoup some of these losses. Nevertheless, Nixon failed to woo back many of the defectors, particularly in the North. U. S. News and World Report compared upper and middle income precincts in New York City and San Francisco and discovered that in both cities Nixon’s support had fallen to 50% from the 60% he got in 1960. In the Yankee towns of Massachusetts, Nixon lost one fourth of the towns he won against Kennedy including such Republican bastions as Lexington and Concord. He might have lost much less had not his troglodyte “security gap” posture been highlighted by the McCarthy campaign, last minute Humphrey push and the desperately contrived but politically effective bombing halt.

CLEAR-CUT INFLUENCE

Only national polls and precinct-by-precinct analyses can estimate the extent of this developing polarization, but its importance is clear from readily accessible data. Twenty-five states have fewer than 10% Negroes and Jews, the most anti-Republican groups, and more than 60% white Protestants, the only pro-Republican group. The largest of these states is Indiana (13 electoral votes). Nixon won all but four of these ethnically favorable states (84%) and the four others were either favorite-son states (Minnesota and Maine) or highly union-influenced ones (Washington and Virginia).

Of the remaining 26 states (including D.C.) Nixon won only ten, and eight of those ten had at least —Please turn to page 12
spoke eloquently and compassionately of the alienated citizen" both black and white, who sensed that "society in the mass is losing touch with the individual in the flesh." And in "A New Alignment for American Unity," he perceptively identified the common strands which could bring together a new political coalition for the last third of the 20th century, a grouping which would include old Republicans, new liberals, the new South, the black militants, and the silent center.

But, as we have seen, the themes and implications of these two speeches were muted this fall. In his new role as healing statesman, Mr. Nixon's first task will be to persuade the groups his campaign alienated that he is "on their side." An important step in the substitution of the politics of hope for the politics of fear will be, for example, to enlarge his interpretation of America's crime problem to include the vicious cycle of poverty and racism. It would also be helpful if he would take pains to correct the impression that he prefers to err on the plus side in military spending and on the minus side in social investment. If Mr. Agnew is to play a prominent role in the problems of the cities and states, a prompt exposition of an enlightened urban philosophy would do much to allay lingering apprehensions stirred up by some of his campaign pronouncements.

The President-elect is obviously groping in the direction of reconciliation. His announcement that he would include Democrats in his administration is probably a necessary step, considering his tenuous mandate, but his emphasis in naming them first indicates that there are to be more than token appointments. "Youth" qua youth is a neutral quality, but the claim that the Nixon appointees will be the most youthful ever must be taken as good news. Political appointments have an unSpotlighted but tremendous impact on the effectiveness of government as ghetto leaders trying to deal with federal agencies can testify. If Mr. Nixon has more in mind for these youth than prominent display, energetic young Republican activists can have a huge effect on galvanizing the often unresponsive bureaucracies to action.

Above all, it is essential that a significant number of appointments at the Cabinet, sub-Cabinet, Agency and Commission level provide sources of encouragement to those who did not support Mr. Nixon and the more liberal of those who did. To attempt to fill the administration with inoffensive appointments, bland choices which neither please nor offend any important group would reinforce many unfortunate and prevalent impressions about the President-elect. Far better that the new administration represent a wide political spectrum but be limited to individuals who are strong and effective figures in their own right. Nixon's men will presage Nixon's policies. Not only will these appointments determine the success of the new government in the long run, but they will also be seized upon by eager and nervous publics as occasions for immediate despair or uplift.

Ultimately, of course, the success or failure of the Nixon administration will depend on the decisions that the President alone can make. As he takes office, the legacy of his predecessor's decisions weighs heavily on the nation. The war in Vietnam is far from ended. And the slow motion economic crisis which it has engendered is reaching a stage that calls for agonizing decisions. In the absence of any change in our policy of backing the dollar with gold, Nixon will have to walk the tightrope between unemployment and recession on one side, and inflation and balance of payments problems on the other. How soon the Vietnam drain will be slowed, how persuadable Wilbur Mills is on the tax incentive scheme, and whether he can establish a working coalition with Democrats in Congress complicate the economic equation tremendously.

But the most important trade-offs Nixon will be making are the ones between missiles and housing, the cities and the Pentagon. Having won the battle for the "thin" missile system, the military and defense contract lobbyists are now eyeing a "thick" system, tentatively budgeted at $4 billion. (Preliminary estimates on large-scale government sponsored technical projects have unfallingly run from 50% to 100% low.) As scientists of the stature and integrity of Nobel laureate and weapons expert Hans Bethe have pointed out, the offense can always easily outrun the defense in the missile game. There simply is no real defense against a multiple warhead blanket missile attack in the nuclear age, and already the development of a new type of plasma film memory cell casts serious doubt about the obsolescence of the thick system before it is even off the drawing boards!

Whether President Nixon will be unduly impressed by such gadgetry remains to be seen. But in view of the magnitude of the long-neglected domestic crisis and the rising expectations of slum dwellers, Mr. Nixon and his advisors had better think long and hard before reinvesting the dividends of peace in the enterprise of war. Indeed, in view of the terrible toll our record of questionable foreign involvement has taken in the past four years, it is not just shaking the stick of history to point out that the economic consequences of military spending have vitiated other nations as comparatively great and rich as ours.

Those who would counsel Mr. Nixon to follow a different strategy hold out the unattained Wallace vote of 1968 as the prize in 1972 for a conserva-
EDITORIAL — From Page 10

tive orientation before then. They also argue that legislative success requires important, dramatic, concessions to the conservative Southern Democrats who control some Congressional Committees.

Ripon's recommendations rest primarily on considerations of good policy rather than good politics. But we also believe that an effective reconciliation strategy will prove to be the only viable political strategy in 1970 and 1972. He who works the Wallace political vein mines fool's gold.

In the first place, marginal districts in the House and Senate in 1970 will continue to be located primarily in more liberal areas of the country. House seats in the Northeast in 1970 as in 1968 will present the ripest field for Republican reaping, a fact which Congressional leaders like Congrressmen Ford and Laird have repeatedly stressed this year and which led them to favor a progressive vice-presidential candidate in August.

In the Senate, the potential for Republican gains — and even control — in 1970 is also considerable. Only eight Republican Senators are up for reelection, while 25 of the Democrats must run again. This disproportion results from the twin GOP disasters of 1964 and 1958. But it is also true that the third of the Senate seats which are contested in 1970 is a set with which Republicans have often done very well. In fact, the only two times the GOP has controlled the Senate since the 1920's were just after the elections of 1946 and 1952. One reason for this record is the fact that only five of the Senators who grouped with this one-third are from the South.

The Republican cause in the 1970 Senate cannot be aided significantly by a Southern strategy, especially since the most vulnerable Democratic seats are in Ohio, Michigan, Indiana and Connecticut in the East, and in Wyoming, Utah and Nevada in the West. Meanwhile the most vulnerable Republican seats are in California, New York, Delaware and Pennsylvania.

The political case against a pre-empt Wallace strategy is equally compelling in view of the 1972 election. The only new electoral votes that President Nixon could hope to add to his 1968 total would be those of the five Wallace states, plus Texas and possibly Maryland, a potential total of 80 at the outside. Even this gain would require such a conservative stance by Nixon that Wallace — or a more appealing surrogate — would decline to run against him. But it is unlikely that Mr. Nixon, operating now in the bright spotlight which focuses on the President, could successfully keep right and successfully hold on to swing voters who helped him carry states like Ohio, Illinois, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Oregon and California (representing at least 127 electoral votes). Nor is it likely that northern backlash voters would join the Nixon cause, particularly since their frustration tends to focus on the "ins" and most particularly if the Democratic candidate is Edward M. Kennedy. A great many Wallace supporters in the North this year were originally supporters of Robert Kennedy, it should be remembered.

It would appear advisable, therefore, for President-elect Nixon to listen to the advice of California Lt. Governor Robert Finch, who, according to newspaper reports, maintains that the election of 1968 is the last that will be decided by the un-young, the unpoor and the un-black. The new President should also recognize that, recalcitrant committee chairmen notwithstanding, he can expect strong support in both Houses of the Congress for progressive initiatives. He himself can deliver a bloc of Republican votes unavailable to President Johnson simply because he puts a Republican stamp on progressive programs. And Democratic liberals are likely to support such programs whatever their source in preference to complete inaction. Early surveys show that when all personnel changes are taken into account the 91st Congress is perhaps a shade more liberal than the 90th. We believe that a bold and enterprising Nixon leadership could produce a legislative record which would match or surpass that of any of his predecessors.

To be overconcerned about Southern Committee chairmen is to seek maneuvering room on the right which Nixon as President already has. It can be a valuable asset, but if he is to maximize his own freedom and power, he must attend to other constituencies.

Just as Mr. Nixon has a great opportunity for creating an impressive domestic record, so does his credibility with conservatives give him far more freedom of maneuver in foreign policy, and particularly in Vietnam, than Mr. Humphrey would have possessed. The Republican ticket received no mandate from the voters on November 5th, but an early and honorable settlement of the Vietnam war will produce a wave of public enthusiasm which will give Mr. Nixon his mandate.

Successful performance, in short, both at home and abroad, is the best way for Mr. Nixon to achieve the party growth he talks about and to aid his own chances for reelection, and a progressive orientation is the path to that achievement. Armed at last with Presidential power, the Republican leader is now free to create new political realities rather than passively adapt to old ones. His narrow margin of victory need not prevent him from being a good and even great President. That is why members of the Ripon Society, while we may look back with regret to what might have been, also look forward with hope to what can still develop.

—The Editors
60% white Protestants. Humphrey, a white Protestant, won higher percentages than Kennedy did in the country's most Catholic States—Rhode Island and Massachusetts! Of the ten states Humphrey won by more than 2%, he won nine by at least 60% in a three-party contest, eight of them by higher percentages than Kennedy had. Yet another indication of the polarization is the decrease since 1960 in the number of closely fought states from 16 to 8 despite the similarly close national popular vote.

Republicans could write off 1964 as an aberration, particularly after the revival in 1966. The 1968 returns are harder to dismiss. Despite election day fears, the party has avoided a stalemate in the Electoral College. However, a portentous omen for the future is the failure of the Presidential ticket to pick up strength beyond the states dominated by white Protestants. Even worse, Republicans failed to make significant gains in the US House, (ten seats won, six lost) or in state legislatures (seven houses won, three lost). In-deed, while the minorities are polarizing against the GOP, the Republicans hold on well-educated, upper-income whites has weakened in the North. Even Eisenhower lost strength among some groups, particularly the farmers, but he was able to gain much more strength elsewhere, among Catholics. For Nixon it will be much harder to gain compensating increases among rednecks, Catholics, Negroes, or Jews because of his admitted shortage of charisma.

THE BOTTOM OF THE TICKET:

The Auguries are Propitious

Although Richard Nixon failed to carry the House of Representatives, the GOP showed encouraging “bottom-of-the-ticket” strength and is in the strongest state-level position since the early Eisenhower years. The Republican Party now controls 19 state legislatures (in both houses). Adding in California, where a Republican Lieutenant Governor gives the GOP de facto control of the split (20-20) State Senate and brings the total to 20 including the two most populous states in the union.

The balance of power shifted in nine upper and lower chambers of which the Republicans gained control of five (the lower chambers of California, Nevada, and New York and the upper chambers of Indiana and Iowa); tied one, (the Tennessee House, at 49-49 with a Republican-leaning Independent); and lost three (the lower chambers of Alaska, Michigan and Pennsylvania.)

The net change of only 36 actual seats seems to belie all of these turnarounds, especially in comparison with the 1966 gain of 503 and the 1967 gain of 102. However, as the research division of the Republican National Committee has pointed out, the 36 net change is technically larger when one considers that reapportionment in many legislatures has created smaller-sized chambers. Thus the Republicans have gained a total of 641 seats since 1964, but the Democrats have lost a total of 1301 in that period, whittling down their overall lead from over 2500 to about 1000.

In the state executive branches, the Republicans gained seven new seats and lost two incumbent ones for a net gain of five. The briar patch of sales taxes seems to have been decisive in the two lost seats of Montana's Tim Babcock and Rhode Island's John Chafee. The Republican-Democratic line-up has now switched from 26-24 to 31-19 (although an almost sure Democratic selection to succeed Vice-President elect Agnew will equilibrate the levels at 30-20). The GOP also added two new lieutenant governors, six attorneys general, a secretary of state, three treasurers, and two auditor/controllers. The following table briefly sums up state government alignment by party:

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*N: non-partisan

The new Republican strength comes at a crucial time for the economically pressed states, and they will surely be looking to Washington for help. At the same time, a governor is part of the White House team for the first time since the Roosevelt administration. All in all, the basic elements are propitious for the new era in federal-state relations that President-elect Nixon is anxious to inaugurate.
ALABAMA: despite Wallace sweep, encouraged GOP eyes his rednecks

Despite a Wallace sweep under the traditional Democratic Rooster in Alabama, the three Republican incumbents for Congress held their seats. And party leaders in the state consider it an indication that Alabama will vote Republican for solid, conservative men who wage strong, well-financed campaigns.

The Republican victors were first district Congressman Jack Edwards of Mobile, second district Congressman Bill Dickinson of Montgomery and sixth district Congressman John Buchanan of Birmingham. Notable among the scarce Republican victories in local campaigns was Bill Joseph's re-election to the Montgomery County Board of Revenue (county commission). Joseph ran a personal, well-financed campaign, bucked the Wallace tide while three other GOP incumbents for the same five-man board fell.

In other House races, Democrats ran unopposed by a Republican for two of the five other seats. Former Lt. Governor Jim Allen, a Democrat, rode the Wallace tide to the Senate over Montgomery County Probate Judge Perry Hooper.

Republicans held their Congressional territory independent of the Nixon campaign. Nixon, who attracted only bedrock Republicans, finished an embarrassing third behind Humphrey who received almost all of the state's black vote. Republicans conscientiously kept the Nixon campaign token and separate to avoid endangering local and congressional candidates on the GOP ticket, as it was certain most of the state would resent opposition to the Wallace presidential campaign.

Despite the separate Nixon campaign and the low Nixon vote, party leaders feel the Nixon administration will provide an atmosphere in which the Alabama GOP can begin to grow as the Wallace fury is expended.

As state GOP chairman Alfred Goldthwaite sees it: "this is the first time in years you've had a President on friendly terms with the people of Alabama." Goldthwaite feels that if Nixon will send his representatives into the state — for example, particularly the Secretary of Agriculture — he can begin to give the Republican party concrete meaning for Alabamians.

At the moment, however, Republicans are struggling to give the party some real meaning for themselves. Though they hold their congressional ground, their other holdings are scant — zero in the state legislature. The five congressional seats won during the 1964 Goldwater sweep were whittled down to the GOP's urban stronghold as hopes for GOP increases in 1966 were blasted when Lurleen Wallace beat Republican Jim Martin 2 to 1 in the governor's race. In the face of the Wallace presidential bid this year, no actual GOP gains were possible.

What's more, the party has no strong, unifying leader. At the state convention in Mobile in June, former Party Chairman John Grenier and former gubernatorial candidate Jim Martin clashed head-on in a bid for the National Committeeman seat. Martin won, but pro-Martin men lost in a bid to enlarge the state committee. If Martin remains the more powerful (and the more conservative), Republicans still don't agree on who will be unifying and leading the party by 1970.

Also dividing the party is the issue of whether to hold a primary, which many feel the Republicans must do if they are seriously to challenge the Democrats, whose May primary, in which anyone can vote, has become the general election in Alabama. The primary is opposed mostly by the small and rural counties.

While Republicans are fighting intra-party personal battles and trying to put their machinery in order, the Democrats have been cultivating new ground. The Republicans have declined to seek Negro participation at the county level, but the Democrats, albeit quietly, have sought to establish vote-getting connections with the Alabama Democratic Conference, a coalition of Negro groups. A special slate of Humphrey electors pledged to oppose the Nixon electors and the Wallace roster was established by the liberal wing of the Democratic party. The Republicans seem to notice only the Democratic division, but the special Democratic group attracted strong black support in the presidential vote.

Republicans base their future hopes on the fact, as outlined by one former GOP congressman, that the "people who voted for Wallace this year were voting Republican four years ago." The fact is true, but whether these voters can be brought back to the Republican party remains to be seen.

The voters who voted for Goldwater in 1964 and Wallace this year, also voted for Democratic Governor Albert Brewer as a Wallace Elector and Jim Allen for Senate. Brewer is expected to seek re-election in 1970. Allen will have six years to establish himself. Wallace would be eyeing John Sparkman's Senate seat, which comes up for re-election in 1972.

Still the Republicans are encouraged by the presidential outcome. A Republican victorious on the southern strategy is good news. The state GOP emerged from the 1966 elections with a $54,000 debt, which has since been cut to $20,000. With the new auspicious atmosphere for state Republicans, they hope to knock that off within six months and get down to serious business. A committee will be appointed to study the state primary laws to see whether the state executive committee should cause a primary to be held, as recommended by the state convention.

If the primary is held, more voters will become involved in Republican politics. And as Party Chairman Alfred Goldthwaite sees it, the Republicans could begin copping some carefully selected state legislative seats.
by 1970. On other races, Republicans are not sure what will happen at this date. But, says an optimistic former congressman: "Now there's a whole coterie of people who are ready to take the conservative cause and go with it."

**RHODE ISLAND: from distinction to disaster**

Whether the Rhode Island GOP has gone from distinction to disaster is a question uppermost in the minds of many political observers in Rhode Island. On the surface, the answer to the question would seem to be yes. The Party, which two years ago elected three general officers for the first time in 28 years lost two of the three on election day. John Chafee, the most popular governor in Rhode Island's history — in 1966 — suffered a loss of 100,000 out of 400,000 votes cast in two years. The result was a narrow defeat by Superior Court Justice Frank Licht. Lieutenant Governor Joseph O'Donnell was also defeated by a small margin. The lone survivor was Republican Attorney General Herbert DeSimone.

The reasons for this turnabout seem to be two: The first is a five letter word: Nixon. Richard Nixon lost the state to Hubert Humphrey by 125,000 votes. For the third time in a row Rhode Island gave the Democrats their biggest victory in the nation. The Nixon dead weight effect was obvious, especially in the loss of the two congressional races by large margins.

The second reason was taxes. Governor Chafee, in a display of great political courage, had proposed a personal income tax early in this election year. He had first won the governor's chair by opposing such a levy. He argued that in the six year interval, the needs of the state had grown, and the tax had become necessary. The Democrats countered with a limited income tax which would affect only income from bank accounts, investments in intangible property and capital gains. He insisted that it was not an income tax. The voters went on an anti-spending spree, defeated the governor, and rejected most of the statewide bond issue proposals.

Republican overconfidence should not be overlooked as a cause either. Some GOP leaders, recognizing the Party was in organizationally poor shape, suggested things would be much better in 1970 when Lieutenant Governor O'Donnell would win the governorship. On January 1, O'Donnell will be out of office.

On the brighter side, the 1968 election stands in contrast to the 1960 disaster. In that year, all Republicans were defeated. The closest anyone came to winning was the 50,000 vote defeat of incumbent Republican governor Christopher DelSesto. This year, Attorney General DeSimone, by compiling a good crime fighting record, by attempting to push through a recalcitrant Democratic legislature crime reform legislation similar to the Brooke-Richardson program in Massachusetts, and by campaigning hard, eked out a narrow victory. The party also did much better in the state legislature than it did eight years ago.

During his time in office, John Chafee attracted to the Republican Party many young, articulate people, as well as persons who found the Democratic Party too full of tired old men who blocked the progress of the younger and more ambitious. These persons remain in control of the party which in turn is in a strong position for a comeback with Chafee, DeSimone or some other person heading the ticket in 1970.

**OHIO: the machine did its job**

Organization, unity, full campaign coffers and a potpourri of aggressive candidates gave Ohio's GOP a crushing state-wide victory this November 5th. Huntley-Brinkley aficionados may challenge this conclusion, because of their knowledge of Richard M. Nixon's and William B. Saxbe's slim margins over Hubert H. Humphrey and John J. Gilligan. Saxbe's close election to a senate seat and Nixon's narrow victory that gave him Ohio's twenty-six electoral votes fail to indicate how effectively Ohio's Republican machine rolled out votes for its local, state and national candidates.

Although a Deshler, Ohio teenager provided Nixon with a slogan for his first days in office ("bring us together"), this state's voters denied him a mandate to lead. Unlike Barry Goldwater's disastrous impact on local Republican candidates in 1964, Nixon's candidacy created no backlash for this state's GOP office seekers. It appears, however, that no Ohio Republican rode into office on Mr. Nixon's coattails. On the contrary, a case can be made that Nixon owes his shaky 91,229 vote margin to the effectiveness of GOP organizations throughout Ohio.

If an analyst can make one safe conclusion about Ohio's recent campaign it is this: Success comes to parties that utilize superior political techniques and maintain efficient organizations. Citizen concern over law and order, inaction and high taxes helped many Republicans, but these issues can't explain impressive victories by moderate to liberal GOP Congressmen like Robert Taft, Jr., William M. McCulloch, Charles W. Whalen, Jr., and Charles Mosher. Conservative Congressmen like Donald E. Lukens, Donald Clancy, John Ashbrook, and William Harsha also scored lopsided triumphs in their districts. While Whalen received 78% of the votes in his district, Lukens tallied a 71% margin in his bailiwick. Taft garnered 62% of the votes cast in his contest, and Clancy gathered in 62% of the ballots in his race. Statistics record a Republican sweep rather than a victory for liberalism or conservatism. Age more than issues probably accounts for Frances P. Bolton's defeat after twenty-eight years as a Congresswoman from her twenty-second district. This
loss of one member still leaves Ohio's GOP with an 18-6 edge in seats in the House of Representatives.

If Saxbe wishes to be known as a Republican progressive, he must win this reputation as a working senator. With regard to issues in this campaign, Gilligan clearly spelled out his opinions, while clever slogans and vague rhetoric made it difficult for voters to fathom Saxbe's positions. Although Saxbe's constructive criticism of the Vietnam war should have gained him some support from Republican and Independent doves, Gilligan's national publicity at Chicago and his image as a "new politics" man allowed Gilligan to inherit most of Kennedy's, McCarthy's and Rockefeller's workers. Saxbe, like Nixon, could certainly afford to make some overtures to students, blacks and academicians.

One Ohio congressional race in particular should cheer up progressive Republicans. While Hubert Humphrey and John Gilligan carried his district, Charles W. Whalen, Jr., walloped his young Democratic opponent by a vote of 113,386 to 31,702. In Ohio's third district, an urban-industrial area with a Democratic tradition, Whalen scored an upset victory in 1966. His smashing re-election shows that city voters will support a man regardless of his party if he squarely confronts today's urban crisis. Whalen ran a campaign that stressed ending the war so that urban problems could receive top national priority. After his impressive win, Whalen's aides talk about their man seeking the governor's mansion in 1970.

MISSOURI: Danforth's star shines

Richard Nixon's narrow electoral victory failed to provide coattails for Missouri Republicans as popular Governor Warren Hearnes rolled up a big margin over Republican candidate Lawrence K. Roos, and the young liberal dove Thomas Eagleton defeated former Congressman Thomas B. Curtis for the United States Senate. The outstanding exception to the Democratic ticket victory was Ripon-endorsed John C. Danforth, who was elected Attorney-General by a 50,000 vote margin over the Democratic incumbent. The leading Republican vote-getter, Danforth became the first Republican to win statewide office since 1946. The victory established the 32-year-old lawyer and Episcopal minister as the man to watch, an almost certain candidate for higher office. Danforth's campaign stressed fair administration of the laws as a requisite for law and order, and was aided by campaign appearances of Mssrs. Lindsay, Rockefeller, Hatfield, Percy and Romney.

Republican representation in Missouri's congressional delegation dropped from two to one, as former Congressman Curtis' seat was lost to James Symington, son of US Senator Stuart Symington. But look for Curtis to get the kind of important presidential appointment that his role as a hard-working and innovative Congressman has merited.

Post-Election Mother Goose

THERE WAS AN OLD NIXON
There was an old Nixon who said he was through,
He hired so many ad men that now he's called New.
So cool and unruffled was his fall campaign,
That a surge by the Hump almost cost him his reign.

HUBY
Huey, Huey, round as pie,
Gushes words and loves to cry;
From behind he had to run,
But couldn't pull a Truman.

THE BONE WAS A BOMB
Old Lyndon Johnson
Reached in his stetson
To find his poor veep a bone;
He pulled out a bomb,
And promised world calm,
But the poor little veep had none.

ROLL ON, GEORGE
George, George, the South's true son,
He loves to rail against the young,
He'd steam-roll pickets as they lay,
And work for peace with Curt LeMay.

DAVE AND CHET
Dave and Chet
Had hoped to get
An early calculation;
A scrappy veep
Kept us from sleep,
But can you imagine Nixon?

POLL RIDING
Ride a cock horse to Banbury Cross,
To see the polls of each ward
For candidates can't be sure
What's up,
Until they take a daily Gallup.

HEY, DIDDLE, DIDDLE
Hey diddle, diddle,
The Vast Silent Middle
Sitting in front of the tube.
If you're thirty or older;
Candidates hold ya
By shouting law n' order.
S. DAKOTA: GOP steamrolls but Gubbrud flattened

National attention was focused on Democratic Senator George McGovern's bid for re-election to his second term in the United States Senate, and now there is considerable discussion in Republican circles seeking reasons why George McGovern received 57% of the total vote, despite overwhelming majorities piled up by most Republican candidates in that state. Progressive young Republican Attorney General Frank Farrar was elected Governor with 58% of the vote. All the other state constitutional officers elected were Republican, averaging better than 55%. The newly elected legislature will be more than two-thirds Republican, and both incumbent Republican Congressmen were elected with large majorities.

While the majority view holds that McGovern was elected because of a well financed, extremely skillful campaign, there are many who find other explanations for former governor Archie Gubbrud's defeat. Though they admit that Gubbrud's campaign was top-heavy with central staff and poorly coordinated with county central committees, was under-financed, and used ill-advised "personal attack" type advertising, they feel that other troubles are indicated by contrasting the 1962 general election. In that election, Archie Gubbrud was elected to a second term as governor with 56% of the total vote while George McGovern won his senate seat with only 50.2%. It is obvious that South Dakota voters have now become extremely selective, and are not hesitant to cross over for a candidate who appeals to their imagination. Perhaps winds of change have reached South Dakota to the extent that the Republican party can only win with progressive younger candidates who offer change from the traditional conservative party line. Certainly, South Dakota voters can no more be taken for granted as knee-jerk conservatives.

Within the Republican party, the struggle for more progressive leadership will be intensified by this election. Those who seized control of the national committee posts at the last state convention and who were then intimately involved in the progress of the Gubbrud campaign will undoubtedly blame their opponents within the party for the loss. Progressives will argue that the success of other Republican candidates proves the need for the party to be more progressive and responsive lest other Democrats of Senator McGovern's persuasion be elected. They feel that Democrats can still be stopped in South Dakota; that McGovern's success is an individual one; that many Democratic party officials are disenchanted because McGovern at no time has sought to strengthen the state party organization, but rather has always emphasized his personal appeal. If not, and more Democrats are elected, an increasingly organized Democrat party might doom Republican supremacy in South Dakota.

Richard Nixon carried South Dakota with 51% of the vote. This is contrasted to 58% in his previous campaign in 1960. Though George Wallace drew some 5%, probably one-fifth of this was urban Democratic "backlash" type. Some of the drop in Nixon's percentage can be attributed to those who supported other candidates for the Republican nomination and who were rudely pushed aside in the spring. The general consensus is that Richard Nixon can and will increase his popularity in South Dakota. Congressman Ben Reifeil, who was overwhelmingly re-elected, and who has a real feeling for the thinking of South Dakotans, stated:

"Though we have a Republican President, the closeness of the election shows a divided American community. I feel that the new Republican Administration is called upon to provide progressive programs to fill the needs of disadvantaged Americans, regardless of race, and also to fill the needs of the meaningfully oriented young people to feel a part of the system. In South Dakota, the maturity and sincere involvement of teen-age Republicans proves that young people can be meaningfully involved. I sincerely feel that Richard Nixon can provide this kind of leadership. The absence of the ethnic coalition and organized labor support that the Democratic party has held together since Roosevelt's first election could spell defeat and frustration for the Nixon administration unless he can convince the American people, as he has convinced me, of his sincere concern with the needs of the people. Without this understanding of his sincere concern our social fabric will continue to be divisive and the '72 campaign could be disastrously splintered."

NEW YORK: critical era ahead

When Spiro Agnew blurted out that "when you've seen one slum you've seen them all," everybody stopped looking for spectacular Nixon gains in New York City. When the arithmetic is performed, it appears that about a million voters took pains to split the ticket to vote against Nixon and for other Republicans, notably Javits. In the process, the GOP dropped two seats in New York City, though it recouped them upstate.

Not everything was Agnew's fault, however. The school strike hurt Republicans downstate, and Nixon forces upstate did not get the backing from national headquarters needed to turn out the vote.

For the future, the Republican Party in New York can be gratified by its state-wide achievements, having won total control of the State Assembly, but it can ill afford complacency. In 1969, the election for Mayor of New York City comes up. At the moment, John Lindsay is in deep trouble; and though he has shown resilience previously, some observers think that he cannot survive the current labor difficulties plaguing the city. In 1970 both the office of governor and junior senator are up, Charles Goodell, the up-state Republican appointed by Governor Rockefeller recently to fill Robert Kennedy's seat, will face a difficult task holding
his seat if the Democrats come up with a superior candidate. Although he is already making a rapid move to the left, he may find campaigning in Harlem a bit more difficult than that in Jamestown, from which he comes. The Democratic Party in New York has a ten year history of nominating mediocre men for statewide office. Only Robert Kennedy, a force unto himself, was an exception to this rule. But now the McCarthy and Kennedy wings of the Party are actively struggling for new influence. They are looking to men like Steve M. Smith, Arthur Goldberg and Theodore Sorenson. The day may be fast approaching when Republicans will no longer be winners because of the blunders of Democratic Party professionals.

But Republicans have no reason to be discouraged, either. The new Assembly Speaker, with its powerful patronage, will be Perry Duryea, who is a bright, attractive, and aggressive Assemblyman from Nassau County. Some say he has his eyes set on the Governor's office. Malcolm Wilson, present Lieutenant Governor, has been beneath Rockefeller for ten years, and has the potential to blossom into a state-wide force. He, too, is making few bones about his interest in becoming governor. Ogden Reid, Congressman from the 26th District of New York (Westchester County), once again was re-elected by an overwhelming mandate, and continues to be an attractive candidate for statewide office.

All of these men are progressive Republicans who are actively concerned with urban problems, race relations, and the future. Maybe, when all is considered, Nixon's defeat might mean simply that New Yorkers are not confident that he shared these qualities.

**FLORIDA: Kirk vs Murfin**

Florida's conservatives have come home to roost and in the process have built a strong two-party system. The voters, who only two years ago voted overwhelmingly for Governor Claude Kirk, turned the George Wallace movement into a third-rate attempt by voting for Nixon. No stranger to voting Republican in Presidential campaigns (52, '56, '60), most voters thought it impossible to register Republican until several years ago.

Kirk, the political neophyte, who hurled his "sometimes Party loyalty asks too much" against the "ultra-liberal forces who threaten to take over the state of Florida" was the first Republican to be elected Governor in almost one hundred years.

Now the voters have proven their staying power by electing a Republican senator as well. Republicans held on to two congressional slots and made gains in the State House of Representatives (though there was a slight loss in the State Senate.)

These gains were the result of a Party unification drive after Kirk alienated himself from the Murfin (Party Chairman) forces in his attempt to take over the state organization and to get on the ticket as V.P.

This unity may prove to be short-lived as the forces are already polarizing. Only three days after the election, James Wilson (R), acting director of the Florida Development Commission, submitted his resignation because of interference from "Kirk's Turks." There are rumors of other resignations.

Uncertainty in the Republican Party is matched by confusion in the Democrat Party. Maurice Ferre, state coordinator for Humphrey, said, in a three and one-half page statement, that the "real losers in this election are the state-wide office holders who sometimes, when the sun is shining, parade under the Democratic banner." There is talk of extralegal organizations setting up outside the Democrat Party to promote candidates — even talk of a new party.

This leaves Governor Kirk, already running for re-election, and Chairman Murfin with the responsibility of holding the party together rather than clashing their personalities. If they can accomplish this there will be no stopping the dynamic Florida Republican Party.

**MAINE: senescent GOP losing touch**

Maine gave its favorite son ticket a wide 10% margin over the Nixon-Agnew ticket and returned its two Democratic Congressmen to their seats for good measure. The Muskie coattails were long enough to allow the Democrats to pick up strength in the Legislature as well.

In the First Congressional District, Republican challenger Horace A. Hildreth, Jr., ran much worse against incumbent Peter Kyros than many Republicans had been hoping for at the beginning of the campaign. Hildreth had racked up a progressive record as a State Senator in the last session of the Legislature, bore the name of his father, a Maine Governor in the forties, and initially seemed an attractive candidate. In addition, his campaign was well financed and produced the most professional advertising that ever hit the state.

Unfortunately, Hildreth didn't live up to it. In public he appeared nervous and unsure of himself and consistently lost in a series of debates with Kyros. To some extent, also, his advertising backfired. Its slickness reinforced feeling that he was a rich man's candidate, and the slogan, "Hildreth Is The Better Man — Far Better," was a bit too much. Kyros was a hard man to beat, anyway. He has a good feel for the press and recently got considerable mileage in the state by attacking the award of a gun contract to a midwestern firm despite a lower bid from a plant in his district. On balance, the voters undoubtedly felt that he was better than Hildreth, even if not "far better."

In the Second District, one-term Republican State Legislator Eldon H. Shute, Jr., conducted a vigorous campaign against Congressman William D. Hathaway. His hardline conservative approach to the issues didn't wash with the increasingly liberal electorate of Maine, however, and they returned the lackluster but more liberal Hathaway to Washington.
The Republicans lost four seats in the State Senate and ten in the House to whittle their respective margin to 18-14 and 84-67. The losses were actually fewer than many in both parties had feared.

The outlook for the Republican Party in Maine in the near future is frankly grim. Basic Republican strength, both in the way of superior candidates and in voter allegiance, is shown by its continued dominance on the lower portions of the ticket. However, the 1968 election, notwithstanding Muskie’s appearance on the top of the ticket, is an indication of a continuing deterioration of Republican strength. While many sections of the State remain solidly Republican, the Republicans are consistently slipping in the cities and larger towns, and other areas of economic and population growth.

In this small State, with a relatively short ballot, there are few offices open to aspiring politicians. The Democrats now hold the two Congressional seats, one of the Senate seats and the Governorship. The aging Margaret Chase Smith is the occupant of the other Senate seat for life, and she has little interest in building up the Republican Party. She has always been outside the regular Republican organization. Consequently, it is difficult for ambitious Republicans to build a power base and difficult for the Party as a whole to make a comeback.

On the liberal side of the party, there are several promising but as yet untested Republican politicians in the State Legislature, where Republican-sponsored legislation has often been more imaginative and liberal than that of its Democratic counterparts.

Not to be forgotten is former Congressman Stanley R. Tupper, who survived the Goldwater landslide in 1964 only to take a Johnson appointment to be Ambassador to Expo ’67 in Montreal. He is now employed by a Rockefeller financed urban affairs organization in New York, but is obviously still interested in public office. If he could survive the Republican primary, he would still be a formidable candidate.

The Republican Party in Maine still carries an image of negative conservatism with the younger voters of the State and this must be overcome.

In a State where doctrinal considerations have not been improved in recent years, the Republican image can only be improved upon by the appearance of more imaginative, attractive and youthful candidates and office holders. Without a change in the Republican image, its fortunes at the polls will continue to decline. The outlook for such a development is not good, and it is not helped by the prospect of Edmund S. Muskie heading the ticket in 1970 again and possibly in 1972 as well.

GOP LIPPMAN’S

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formance in each state. The list goes on and the permutations multiply.

So do the pitfalls. Any enthusiasm for direct popular vote, for example, should be tempered by the fact that it would take weeks to settle who the winner was in any close election; also, since every vote counted, so would every fraudulent ballot and the incentive for broad-based vote tampering would be tremendous. Splinter parties would be encouraged also; former director of the census and voting expert Richard Scammon believes that if the direct vote for President had been in effect this year, there would have been strong independent campaigns for Rockefeller, McCarthy and a black power candidate. To deal with the risk of eroding the President's mandate might necessitate unwieldy runoff elections or limiting access to the ballot, a dangerous and undemocratic precedent. At the minimum, direct vote would certainly devalue the party nomination and weaken the party system as we know it.

The attractiveness of more direct choice of the electorate via increasing the importance of primaries should also be viewed in the light of the fact that it would make money and media manipulation an even more decisive factor in the Presidential race.

In short, electoral reform is not merely an innocuous bit of constitutional tidying up with unambiguous and automatically sanguine results; yet the present set-up of the college is unsatisfactory enough to mandate some changes. There is plenty of ground for any commission that might be appointed to cover, although such excellent studies as Congressional Quarterly's Neal Peirce's The People's President will make the spade work much easier.

A Commission is not designed to prevent adequate public debate, but rather to insure that the debate is productive; indeed, the existence of a Commission will foster continued public interest. Otherwise there is no real indication that the political motivation is sufficient to produce reform by 1972. The prestige of a politically diverse and intelligently led Presidential Commission provides the best opportunity for action.

George Wallace has promised to run again in 1972 and there is no reason to doubt his intent or ability. The process of Constitutional revision is a long one and it is only prudent that action be taken now — early in Mr. Nixon's term. If the hard maneuvering of 1972 Presidential politics begins before reform is implemented, the opportunity to prevent Constitutional confusion may have passed.

—ROBERT D. BEHN

The Nixon Opportunity — from page 1

instead a banner which is both new and distinctively Republican.

Ripon has also commented from time to time on party strategies, both with praise and with criticism. We have consistently called for a revitalized Republican Party which would have greater appeal to young people, poor people, city dwellers, blacks and also to the independent suburbanite, the so-called "frontlash" voter. The failure of our party to achieve this goal in the 1968 election is discussed in an editorial which appears on page 3 of this issue, written by our FORUM editor and routinely released to the press on December 1.

News media coverage of the editorial quoted phrases which a number of our officers and board members would not have used in describing the campaign. But the editorial also makes important, constructive points which we would not like to see obscured. For all of us share Mr. Nixon's earnest hope that he can "bring us together again." And we are concerned, therefore, that those groups which gave him the least support in the election are the same groups in our society which have long felt the most apart.

That Mr. Nixon and his advisors appreciate the thrust of these observations is already clear from his early appointments. By and large they have been impressive and encouraging, building confidence among those who did not support Mr. Nixon and reinforcing it among those who did. There is every reason to hope, moreover, that a promising set of appointees will be matched by equally promising legislative proposals and administrative performance. If that is the case, then the public response to effective government could provide the new President with the mandate which the election failed to give.

Mr. Nixon is the first professional Republican politician to occupy the White House in 40 years. His strong, personal interest in the structure and image of the GOP could do much to encourage a vibrant two-party system in places where it does not now exist, in both the Democratic South, for example, and in the Democratic cities. An important resource in this effort will be the sense of new unity among Republicans, a quality which Mr. Nixon remarked on again and again this fall.

Still, it must also be remembered, as Ripon has often said, that a unified minority is still minority. We firmly believe that the GOP will not become an effective majority party until it can make significant inroads with groups which have long been absent from its ranks. Nor can the new President be an effective healer without broadening his appeal. This he is now in an ideal position to do. For the Presidency mixes with its heavy burdens some splendid opportunities. May President Nixon make the most of them.

—Lee W. Huebner

Mr. Huebner is President of the Ripon Society.
It was not until nearly noon Wednesday that the nation was able to relax—not because Mr. Nixon had been elected President, but because a President had been elected. During the previous evening, the contrast between a communications technology, which displayed almost instantaneously the election returns, and an archaic Constitution, which presented the specter of all those votes being indecisive was particularly vivid. After a political year when many segments of the electorate doubted if the political process was at all responsive, an electoral deadlock could have been the final blow to public faith in the Constitutional system.

Now, because the crisis has been avoided, any public pressure to improve the election system has been dissipated. It has yet to be a prominent issue, with specific proposals and counter proposals, debated publicly and in depth. Direct election of the President has been proposed but not examined in sufficient detail to produce a political alliance of those groups who would be hurt and consequently opposed.

This is a crucial point in any realistic discussion of electoral reform, because to change the method of selecting the President is automatically to tinker with the political balance of the country; and on this account political parties have always been suspicious of past proposals to change the system. In 1956 John Kennedy argued against change because he thought the bias toward large states was needed to provide an urban balance wheel to rural bias in elections to Congress and State Legislatures. Now, after redistricting, it is the Conservatives who fear they will suffer from direct election of the President.

When Congress convenes in January, both Senator Birch Bayh and Representative Emanuel Celler have promised to hold hearings on electoral reform. However, the consequence of a slow public airing on this touchy subject will be the almost immediate drawing of political battle lines along partisan or ideological grounds.

Precisely because positions have not solidified, however, election reform is susceptible to intelligent political leadership. The opportunity for Mr. Nixon to move confidently and decisively is available in the form of a Presidential Commission. The recent rationale for such bodies has been to relieve political pressure on the President; here the purpose would be to provide a vehicle that can eliminate the potential log jam of the normal legislative process. Functioning as a mini-constitutional convention, the Commission's deliberations could hopefully produce a compromise proposal devoid of significant political opposition.

The principal concern of the commission would be to develop an election process that conclusively and equitably selects a President, but the mandate should be broad enough to encompass additional needed reforms. The adoption of a universal 24-hour polling time might be considered. Along with this idea, the need to prevent early results from prejudicing later votes might call for specific statutes prohibiting the publication of any vote totals or "projections" before all the polls have closed. The nomination process cannot be philosophically separated from the aim of ensuring representative and responsive government, and should also be subject to investigation.

A fairly extensive preliminary agenda can already be outlined from ideas that have begun to circulate in the pre-election discussion of possible reforms.

On nomination reform, certainly, direct national primary should be debated and considered, as well as the alternatives of "regional primaries" with a number of simultaneous primaries in adjacent states. As a preliminary step in primary reform, the Commission should urge the states to adopt more open and responsive primaries.

As for the election process per se, perhaps the concept of electors might be kept but chosen on a congressional district rather than a statewide basis, thereby structuring an electoral college of 435 discrete bits. Or the present statewide electoral system might be kept but automated to assure that each state's electoral vote goes to the winner of each state. Or direct national vote could be approached by eliminating the winner-take-all feature of the system and apportioning state electoral votes according to per-