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In the sixth line of the first paragraph on Page 5, the word “ideological” should precede “cousin.” Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Palmer and New York Times editorial writer Graham Hovey are friends but unrelated.

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THE RIPON SOCIETY, INC. is a Republican research and policy organization whose members are young business, academic and professional men and women. It has national headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts, chapters in seven cities, National Associate members throughout the fifty states, and several affiliated groups of sub-chapter status. The Society is supported by chapter dues, individual contributions, and revenues from its publications and contract work. The Society offers the following options for annual contribution: Contributor $25 or more; Sustainer $100 or more; Founder $1000 or more. Inquiries about membership and chapter organization should be addressed to the National Executive Director.

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Nixon at the Crossroads: Presidential Action for Human Rights

This position paper was prepared by the New York Chapter of the Ripon Society and written by Michael Macdonald, J. Eugene Marans and Lewis B. Stone.

President Nixon stands at a crossroads in development of a human rights policy for America. No President in this country has been elected with so little support from black voters as Richard Nixon. Ninety-five percent of the black voters opposed him. No President in this country has succeeded to a racial dilemma as serious as that inherited by Mr. Nixon. The new President faces an immediate credibility gap among minorities and other concerned Americans.

To gain the confidence of these minorities, President Nixon must move with dispatch to demonstrate his concern for the problem of racial division in America. To fail to act swiftly and commit his Administration to reversing the drift toward racial separatism, could engender a period of social disruption unparalleled in recent history.

The President must recognize that minority communities are not alone in their concern about the racial division that pervades American life. Concerned Americans are depending upon him to bring an end to the time of racial trouble in this country. The constituencies of youth and intellectual and of enlightened business and labor are looking to the new President to lead the nation out of its racial dilemma.

The Ripon Society implores President Nixon to move promptly toward closing his administration's credibility gap on the problems of human rights. At the outset President Nixon and his Administration must make clear their commitment to vigorous enforcement of the voting and public accommodations laws, and to prompt fulfillment of the objectives of the employment, education and housing provisions of the civil rights acts of the last five years. The strong moral leadership of the President will be critical to the country's success in reducing racial discord and division in the days ahead.

AGENCY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

There is no agency—public or private—charged with the development of a human rights policy. Some agency, preferably at the Federal level, must consider the nation's jobs, education, and housing programs together in fulfilling national human rights objectives. Creation of a new Department of Human Rights could be of great significance in assuring Americans that human rights is a concern of highest priority to the new Administration.

Federal human rights policy and enforcement functions are spread among ten executive departments and 21 additional agencies. The importance of human rights is often submerged by competition among departments and agencies. Both within them and within Congress human rights enforcement has no constant champion. The few attempts to coordinate policy at the cabinet level by informal committees have been halting and ineffective.

Second, the level of expenditures and personnel for human rights planning and enforcement is pitifully low. The budget of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department is scarcely adequate to maintain minimum enforcement of the voting and education laws now on the books. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare's budget for enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for desegregation of schools comes nowhere close to meeting the need. The Title VI enforcement capacities of the other Departments are buttressed by juggling budget figures and personnel to cloak enforcement activities as general administrative expenses.

Please turn to page 21
NEW YORK: If at First...

National Review publisher Bill Rusher, longtime Lindsay-phobe and frustrated nemesis, has revealed that the New York Conservative Party will run a candidate for New York City mayor in the Republican primary this year. And then, per usual, they’ll take another crack at Lindsay in the finals, running on their own ticket. Asked recently why he makes Lindsay a target now, when the New Yorker no longer has immediate Presidential prospects, Rusher replied, “It’s my hobby.”

MASSACHUSETTS: Clinging to Power

With the Republican leadership in the Massachusetts House whittled down to a pitiful 68 out of 240 after the November elections, many thought the winds of change were in the air. But whatever gusts appeared were not enough to topple Sheffield Representative Sidney Q. Curtiss from his Minority Leader perch.

The challenge — mounted by Representatives Frank Hatch of Beverly and Mary Newman of Cambridge — rested on Curtiss’ lack of leadership: non-existent relations with press, proclivity for excluding many House Republicans from the legislative process, and partial responsibility for the dwindling number of Republicans in the House. Curtiss cashed in political IOU’s and painted the Hatch group as a liberal effort to oust the conservatives from power.

The split was along other lines, however; new versus old. Of the 15 Republicans 35 or younger, only five voted for Curtiss. Of 36 members elected in 1966 or later, 24 voted against him. As it was, Curtiss garnered 36 votes, one more than needed for election as opposed to 26 for Hatch and six for Mrs. Newman.

At this date, the immediate future not only for the insurgents, but for the entire Massachusetts Republican legislative delegation looks grim. Three months ago the Republicans held the offices of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General and Sheriff of Suffolk County and sixty-nine House seats and fourteen — or just enough to sustain a Governor’s veto — Senate seats. Now they have just the Governor, sixty-eight House seats and thirteen Senate seats. The Party’s most attractive, articulate and ethnically-balancing men were not long ago all in elective office and all in Massachusetts. Now they are all out of town (Edward Brooke), out of elected office (John Sears), or both (John Volpe and Elliot Richardson). In December, even moderate Party Chairman Si Spaulding had to muster all his resources to beat down a conservative-based challenge to his position.

One optimistic note: the current reshuffling will open opportunities for some of the Party’s younger legislative lights to seek higher office.

VIRGINIA: Second Shot

Linwood Holton, 45, the progressive Roanoke attorney who in 1965 came within a few percentage points of becoming the first Republican governor of the century in Virginia, is the frontrunner for the gubernatorial nomination when the GOP convenes March 1. Holton, who served as one of the regional managers for the successful Nixon effort, has gained much useful experience since his last race and does not expect to fall short this time.

Biggest problem then was money, and though the coffers are not exactly overflowing now, Holton hopes his bright prospects will help him attract what he needs after the nomination.

The past two Congressional elections in Virginia have proven that Republican candidates can win if the Democrats spend themselves squabbling during the primaries. The GOP’s share of the ten Commonwealth Congressional seats has risen from two to five since Holton ran in 1965, including a strong win by Dr. G. William Whitehurst in the Norfolk-Portsmouth area.

The Democrats will miss the leadership of Senator Harry F. Byrd, Sr., the Louis XIV of Virginia politics, who died after the 1965 General Election. This is the first occasion since 1925 when he has not been around to preside over the Democratic gubernatorial nomination. As a result, what was an unopposed primary in 1965 has become a three-way race this year as Holton ran in 1965, including a strong win by Dr. G. William Whitehurst in the Norfolk-Portsmouth area.

The Democrats thus face the prospects of an increasingly bitter primary July-15 possibly followed by a runoff August 19 if no one gets a majority. Each of the three candidates meanwhile is busily trying to enlist any one of the others to join against the third to avoid the runoff. At last report, each was also opining with equal and commendable sincerity that if the Democrats do not unite behind him, the Republicans will win in November.

WASHINGTON: Close Winner

Not reported in the unofficial returns of the election was the victory of Republican Slade Gorton as Attorney General of Washington State. Gorton pulled ahead of his Democratic opponent only in the last quarter of the absentee count and won with less than 5,000 votes. An irrefragible progressive Republican, Gorton is a Dartmouth College and Columbia Law graduate, and at 40 is considered a likely successor to Governor Dan Evans if the latter chooses not to seek a third term in 1972.
Anatomy of a Bloody Mess

Biafra and the Bureaucrats

I. The Sad Diplomatic History

Last September, hard-nosed American policymakers had plausible political reasons for not rushing food to the starving population of Biafra. The men who counted in the American foreign policy establishment—from the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs to his cousin who writes the editorials on Africa for The New York Times—believed that mass starvation, however tragic for those 6,000 souls affected daily, ought at least to hasten the collapse of Ojukwu’s secessionist government. Since a “quick kill” of Biafra would allow the victorious Nigerian armies to bring relief into the liberated areas, the “most humane solution” was to let the Biafrans starve until they abandoned their intransigent claims to self-determination and military security.

While awaiting Ojukwu’s capitulation, the State Department gave wide publicity to the fact that it was supplying two-thirds of the food stockpiled by the Federal Military Government (FMG) of Nigeria. It did not mention that its contribution of aid to Biafran-held areas, where the starvation problem was most acute, was negligible. Such small countries as Norway, Sweden, Holland and Ireland bore the brunt of the relief burden in the places where the need was greatest.

But all that was last year. During the campaign, Mr. Nixon made a strong statement in favor of sending massive relief into Biafra, and in the weeks following his election the State Department has made gestures in the direction of a more effective and even-handed relief policy. It approved the release of a few cargo planes for use by voluntary agencies airlifting food into Biafra. It supplied 2,000 tons of surplus U.S. food—a 30-hour supply—to a mercy ship for use in Biafra. It has also at least stopped its talk about Biafran intransigence, and it has drafted plans for stockpiling in Nigeria and off-shore islands the 45,000 tons of food needed monthly to meet the carbohydrate shortage that may cost the lives of from 20,000 to 100,000 Biafrans a day beginning in March.

defunct theory There have also been some changes of perception of the political situation. As the new administration enters office, there are no state department briefing officers to give voice to the now discredited theory of the quick kill. On the contrary, those who have supported the old Nigeria policy are now willing to admit that even with monumental daily starvation rates Biafran resistance to Nigerian forces will continue, by guerilla warfare if necessary. They are willing to concede that Yakubu Gowon, the Nigerian head of state, has very little control over his hawkish military commanders, who recruit their own soldiers, often deal directly with foreign armament suppliers, and determine their own maneuvers; thus, even if the war did end, Gowon’s pledges of fair treatment for Biafrans are in doubt.

Indeed, most State Department officials now see Gowon’s personal leadership as much nearer to collapse than Ojukwu’s. Ojukwu’s people are loyal, though starving, while many of Gowon’s well fed citizens have begun to riot against the war and revive old tribal antagonisms against each other.

One-sided neutrality The perception of these facts has been made easier because the British, our mentors in Nigeria, have also begun to perceive them. Instability in Nigeria has given the Soviets a chance to make rapid gains at the expense of the British among Nigerian military and political leaders.

A Soviet air base in Northern Nigeria to supplement facilities in Southern Algeria and the use of the Lagos port would give them considerable leverage over all of West Africa. Any major Soviet influence over the disposition of Nigerian oil, indispensable source of supply for Britain, would fit nicely with Soviet activity in Arab countries that control Western Europe’s oil supply and further dispose Western European countries to treat Russia with respect.

The British, having competed for a year and a half to give the Federal Government more devastating offensive weapons than the Soviets can offer, are now beginning to perceive the fruitlessness of this course. Britain now wants peace. This means that the U.S. Ambassador in Lagos, whose views have coincided with those of his British counterpart, is now sending more realistic and disturbing reports to Washington.

Back to the 1870’s All of these facts would seem to argue at the very least for a more vigorous American humanitarian role and perhaps for a political role as well. They spell, after all, the utter collapse of American policy on three fronts. In general African policy, the American goal of keep-
ing black Africa free from great power rivalry is being destroyed as the Russians and British compete to arm the Federal Government, while the French give small arms to the Biafrans and the Communist Chinese and South Africans stand by waiting to help. The throwback to 19th Century imperialism that was avoided in the Congo is fast becoming a reality in Nigeria.

Second, in relief policy the pious American hope that food will flow into Biafra on the heels of a Federal victory has been disappointed by a stalemated war in which Biafra has been landlocked and put under a state of siege. Only a Biafran corridor to the sea, a cease-fire, or a massive airlift will avert mass starvation.

Third, the American hope for a stable unified Nigeria as an example of thriving regional development and as a guard against the balkanization of Africa now seems a very distant dream. The United States made the early mistake of confusing “balkanization” with readjustment of boundaries and jurisdictions that will be necessary if black Africa is to move peacefully from colonial borders to those based on the reality of African power. It made the error of assuming that vigorous regional economic development was impossible without strong central government. In Nigeria this is not the case—a regional development board can distribute the gains of Nigeria’s oil, while a dispersal of power away from Lagos is essential to the political stability which will permit economic progress.

Yet at important junctures in recent Nigerian history the United States exerted the decisive influence for over-centralization.

**NEW POLICY:** The collapse of past policies has not, however, resulted in the definition of a new approach. Though the United States was in the forefront of nations when it came to taking credit for the success of the Nigerian “showcase” it has seized on the present turmoil as an occasion to withdraw to a pious wringing of the hands. The new American posture was struck in an eloquent address by Under Secretary of State Katzenbach in December 1968. Katzenbach enumerated the reasons for America’s helplessness in remedying the situation: its wisdom in not supplying arms to either side; its determination to pursue a humanitarian course; its firm belief that it could not be the policeman of the world; its reluctance to intervene in a situation that was essentially African. All of these self-imposed restraints made the United States powerless to act, though it would continue to provide relief, monies and to use routine diplomatic channels to hasten a settlement.

To give Katzenbach his due, the speech did mark an important reversal of American dedication to the quick-kill theory, but the sense of agonized helplessness which it conveyed was due as much to bureaucratic inertia and end-of-administration lassitude as to inherent difficulties in the Nigerian war. State Department officials had, with all good intentions, been pursuing inflexibly a Nigeria policy based on misinformation and miscalculation, and one does not turn weary and defensive civil servants overnight into advocates of imaginative new proposals.

Moreover, the Nigerian situation seemed superficially to resemble the early stages of Vietnam. Its resolution might require a more forceful American role, and this could be interpreted as “intervention,” the first step on the road to a new quagmire. The lesson of Vietnam was to let the Biafrans starve. The U. S. was willing to deal with the situation through intermediaries but not to take a visible role on its own.

Unfortunately, the available intermediaries are simply not equipped to exert any decisive pressure to stop the starvation. The favored intermediaries of Mr. Katzenbach were the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for political aspects of negotiation and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for relief efforts. Both of these agencies have had severe difficulties in meeting the urgent demands of the situation.

**UNSTEMMED ARMS FLOW** Katzenbach liked the OAU, as represented by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, because he believed the Nigerian problem to be an essentially African one that could be settled only by African means. But this is palpably not the case. The Nigerian war has become a Great Power question, thanks to the efforts of Russian, British and French armaments suppliers and military personnel. African nations, most of which are dependent in some major way on at least one of these great powers, are incapable without active U. S. support of acting in concert to pressure all of them to clamp down the war by an arms embargo. And so long as arms continue to flow in, the doves in Biafra and Nigeria will find it difficult to resist the pressures of hawkish military commanders to continue and to escalate the war.

Of course, even if for a fleeting moment both sides were ripe for an agreement, there would be no representative from the OAU to hear about it. In all of its suggestions to Haile Selassie the United States had never recommended that he travel back and forth between the two sides, or that he designate representatives from other African countries as go-betweens. Without such face-to-face diplomacy, it is hard to see how both sides can agree to end the war. State Department officials have been diverting themselves with the appearance of diplomatic activity, such as the U. S.-approved cease-fire proposal which emanated from the Emperor last Christmas, when the elementary diplomatic machinery to make such activity meaningful has been lacking from the start.

The ICRC, for its part, has sent Dr. August Lindt,
a Swiss diplomat, as a go-between to negotiate for increased relief. But since any given relief proposal has military implications that seem to favor one side or the other, Lindt’s experience has not been happy. Lacking the power base that would enable him to threaten or cajole the two sides to accept his proposals, his diplomatic credit has become quickly exhausted in the recriminations on relief that are part of the propaganda war between Nigeria and Biafra.

As of this writing, the Biafrans are unwilling to trust the Red Cross, while the Nigerians have pressured the Government of Equatorial Guinea to close down the Fernando Po airstrip from which Red Cross planes fly into Biafra.

**PALMERIZED**

The Red Cross effort in Biafra has, in any case, been severely limited by the small capacity of the Fernando Po airfield, which can take only six to ten flights a night. The Class A airfield of the Cameroons, the country neighboring Biafran-held territory, would be the logical place from which to launch relief flights; but this airfield has, as some relief agency people put it, been “Palmerized.” That is to say, U. S. Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Palmer, while he was still in his “quick kill” phase, visited the Cameroons to urge that it not permit the use of its territory for any activities connected with the war. Though the State Department has since gone through routine channels to de-Palmerize the country, it has not taken the obvious and most convincing step: it has not sent Palmer himself back to tell the Cameroonian that the United States would favor their hospitality to relief as strongly as it opposed this involvement eight months ago.

II. Towards a New Policy

Perhaps it is too much to ask officials who have invested all their emotional energy in slogans like “One Nigeria” and the “quick kill” and who have devised a way to pass the buck to impotent intermediaries to become suddenly realistic and effective. But it is not unfair to demand a sharp reappraisal of policy from the new Republican administration. Mr. Nixon himself pledged such a change in a campaign statement on September 10. “The time has long passed for the wringing of hands about what is going on. While America is not the world’s policeman, let us at least act as the world’s conscience in this matter of life and death for millions.”

Though the first focus of policy-makers must be on the urgent need to provide food, they cannot ignore the political dimensions of the relief issue. For the starvation in Biafra is not like some earthquake that provides an unambiguous cause for humanitarian action. Starvation is being used as a weapon of war; any attempt to alleviate it will open the United States to charges of political favoritism. On the Nigerian side, the military policy of the division-commanders is one of siege. Allowing food into the beleaguered Biafran enclave while the war continues is bound to be interpreted by the Nigerians as a strengthening of the secessionists. For the Biafrans, the starvation issue has been an important diplomatic lever. Were it not for the drama of starvation, the American public would almost certainly allow the Nigerians with their superior armaments to decimate the population of Biafra over a prolonged period, much as it has stayed quiet while the Muslims of the northern Sudan carry out a similar program against the Christian and animist population of the south. It should not, then, be assumed that the Biafran leaders want to see the starvation problem solved if the price is likely to be the acceptance of Nigerian sovereignty and consequent occupation by Nigerian forces over whom there is no effective civilian control. Nor should it be assumed that either the Nigerians or the Biafrans can agree to stop the war without Great Power pressure on them to do so. On both sides the support of powerful domestic factions for the head of state depends on a continuation of the fighting. Were either Ojukwu or Gowon to agree to a truce that lacked the stamp of Great Power connivance their leadership and their lives might very well be in danger.

**COMPLEXITIES OF RELIEF**

If Mr. Nixon wants to get massive relief into Biafra he must recognize that this means anticipating political trouble with the Nigerians, possible objections from the Biafrans, and complications for Great Power diplomacy. It is the stubbornness of these political forces that makes the present policy of dealing through conventional channels and intermediary agencies ineffective. A coherent new policy must be predicated on the new political perceptions that have thus far only immobilized State Department planners. It must be recognized that: a) the Nigerian war has become a Great Power and not solely an African question; b) that the United States is the only Great Power that has preserved any flexibility in this matter; and c) the longer the United States delays in using its leverage the greater will be the cost in innocent lives and the greater the likelihood that the post-colonial age in Africa will not be one of orderly nation-building but of Cold War adventurism, economic stagnation and bloody civil war.

Three general lines of attack are open to the new administration, and as they are mutually reinforcing they should all be pursued concurrently.

1. **Support for intermediate agencies**—the present American policy of acting through the OAU, the ICRC and other groups already dealing with concilia-
tion and relief should certainly not be abandoned. Though not sufficient in itself, it does serve to increase the flow of food supplies, to improve the climate for negotiation, and to guard against excessive U. S. involvement. But support for these groups must be given a far broader interpretation than hitherto.

a) To make the OAU's role effective, the United States will have to do something bolder than the drafting of ceasefire proposals for Haile Selassie's signature. Such proxy diplomacy may meet the formal criteria of "non-intervention," but it brings the United States all the blame for meddling without yielding any tangible benefits. The State Department should deal more straightforwardly. It should instruct American ambassadors to inform African heads of state that the United States is deeply concerned lest the Nigerian situation turn black Africa into the new frontier for Great Power rivalry. African foreign ministers can remedy this situation by setting up a committee of heads of state to engage in regular face-to-face contact with Gowon and Ojukwu, by forming a consortium of African Red Cross Societies to deliver relief on both sides of the fighting lines and by visiting Paris, London and Moscow to lobby for an arms embargo. Press reports on the attitudes of a number of African leaders indicate that there is already considerable support for a new OAU initiative.

b) To make the voluntary agencies more effective, the U.S. should act to open the Cameroons to the Red Cross for food storage and air facilities. It should make its own assessment of the needs of the Red Cross and other voluntary agencies and offer to fill these needs in personnel as well as material from its own standby resources. The voluntary agencies, though working valiantly, are simply not equipped administratively or logistically for a problem like the starvation of several million people. If the United States waits for them to draw up the plans and hire the needed personnel, it will wait for a very long time indeed.

c) The Commonwealth Secretariat and other third parties may be working on viable peace proposals. Should such efforts come close to success the United States should stand ready to take unconventional action to back them: e.g. sending its Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs to visit both Ojukwu and Gowon to encourage their agreement.

2. Ad hoc Multilateral Approaches — There is no need for the United States to take unilateral responsibility for relief. It can join countries like Sweden, Canada, West Germany, Norway, Ireland and Holland in a consortium of concerned Western nations to assure that adequate personnel, supplies and financing reach all voluntary agencies operating in Nigeria and Biafra. These same countries can, when necessary, also provide neutral forces to police land relief routes, to open sea routes and to assure that air shipments of food are free of arms for Biafra and immune from harassment by Nigeria. Public and parliamentary opinion in all the above-named countries is well prepared for such action. Our own Congress, though slower to react, has recently approved significant American involvement (in a GOP resolution first introduced by Republican Senators Edward M. Brooke and James Pearson and Massachusetts Congressman F. Bradford Morse — the initiating draft was prepared in the Ripon Society offices and circulated to members of the Ripon Campaign Research Consortium in October.)

3. Great Power Diplomacy — American diplomacy has been preoccupied with getting France to halt arms shipments to Biafra, on the theory that this would lead Ojukwu to surrender. But De Gaulle is unlikely to stop sending small arms to the Biafrans so long as Russia supplies MIGs and Britain supplies armored cars to the Nigerians. Indeed, De Gaulle's New Year's message to the French people singled out self-determination for Biafra as one of four specific goals of his foreign policy, along with self-determination for Quebec, a revision of the international monetary structure and a Mideast settlement. The chances of a three-power agreement to embargo arms to Nigeria-Biafra and withdraw certain kinds of foreign military personnel are slight without an American initiative.

With such initiative, however, the chances are surprisingly good. Nigeria does not represent a vital national interest for any of the Great Powers, though Britain's balance of payments does require that it continue to tap a major share of Nigerian oil. The ease with which the three powers have become embroiled in Nigeria can be matched by the ease of their disengagement, and the occasion of Four Power discussions on the Mideast provides the United States with a good opportunity to propose such an agreement.

Prelude to Other Deals — It may be objected that a time when the United States is engaged in delicate negotiations on Vietnam, is worried about the Middle East and must make major decisions about the possibility of an arms limitation agreement with Russia is not the moment for talking about West Africa. But the existence of weightier matters, far from arguing against an embargo on Nigerian arms shipments, argues for it. Vietnam, the Mideast and the ABM will require a long and arduous period of international negotiation, during which time the future of NATO may also be decided. A quick and relatively painless agreement on Nigeria would not exhaust the possibilities for Great Power diplomacy but enhance
them. During the period of negotiation that lies ahead, it will be useful to have had a small success in great power relations to set a climate for relaxation of tensions. An embargo on arms to Nigeria and the drafting of general guidelines for the disposition of oil rights among the four powers would provide a propitious omen for other efforts.

It would also provide an easy means of testing Soviet sincerity about reducing world tension in areas where it has only recent interests. It is argued by many that the Soviet Union would like to preserve instability in the Middle East and Vietnam, by others that such instability is worrying the Soviets at a time when they would prefer to concentrate their attention on East Europe and China. A high level approach to them about a four power arms embargo on Nigeria would be a good way to determine their real negotiating mood in the Middle East, where their interests are roughly parallel but certainly more serious.

III. Winning the Hearts and Minds of the Bureaucrats

Now it is only proper to note that the above suggestions require a number of changes in present U.S. policy mechanisms. First, the formulation and execution of any coherent policy requires an accurate and continuous flow of information from the field. The State Department does not have such information from the Biafran enclave. It has no official or unofficial representatives there; it is not in regular contact with Colonel Ojukwu; it has had only one official meeting with Ojukwu's American representatives and did not take the trouble to make such meetings regular occurrences. The spotty intelligence reports on Biafra come not from American but British sources, which cannot claim to be disinterested. In such an atmosphere of non-communication there can be no effective diplomacy, only a few notes passed over a void and misunderstood.

State Department officials have incorrectly assumed that to remedy this situation would imply recognition of Biafra. Yet it would be easy to send private American citizens to Biafra to report on the military, health and political situations. One such person might even take up residence in the Biafran capital of Umuahia to permit regular reports to State. Republican Congressman Donald E. Lukens, the first American official to visit Umuahia, reported that the U.S. Ambassador in Lagos was ignorant of the most basic facts about conditions in the secessionist enclave. The dispatch of informal observers with the blessing of the State Department would go far to-correct this situation without implying premature recognition of Biafra.

LOWER HURDLES Second, the political grid through which State Department officials screen any new initiatives will have to be changed to meet new specifications. To date, any proposal which has seemed unduly to offend the Nigerian government or to imply even obliquely that the United States had any doubts about the desirability of a total Federal victory has been discarded out of hand. Any proposal whose success depended on back-and-forth talk with Ojukwu has died at the first stages. Any proposal implying an upgrading of the international status of the Biafrans has been ruled out as moving toward "recognition", and "the use of any techniques which hint of recognition," a State Department official told this writer, "would require authorization of the President and Congress." Finally, any measure which might require a visible American presence has been scotched as "interventionist".

All these specifications make it impossible for any meaningful relief proposal to filter up, however many plans may be submitted to U. S. officials. Massive relief will of necessity offend the Nigerian government because it violates their military policy of seige; it will of necessity require many prior face-to-face dealings with the Biafrans that will be interpreted by paranoiac Nigerians as political steps toward recognition rather than humanitarian steps toward contact. A visible and vigorous American backing for relief, an arms embargo, and for multilateral initiatives is not "intervention;" it is a responsible course consistent with our past involvement in Nigerian affairs and our present desire for relaxation of world tensions.

PREVIOUS INTERVENTION The United States did intervene to persuade Major General Gowon to hold the Federation together against his own wishes at the time of his accession to power; it intervened again to assure him of unconditional support when he abrogated signed agreements with Ojukwu that granted the former Eastern Region a measure of autonomy. Subsequent U.S. pressures contributed to the dissolution of the Federation by preventing it from relaxing its over-centralized constitution. We are in large measure responsible for the current state of affairs. Past involvement does create moral responsibilities, and though the United States has no vital national interest to protect in West Africa, it does have a duty to protect against starvation millions of innocent victims of its own contributory negligence.

Thus, though it may be argued by self-justifying civil servants that "every feasible relief proposal has already been tried," it must be argued by the new administration that every proposal must be tried again under a set of political constraints that hold greater promise of success. The U. S. must enter into contact with the Ojukwu regime while making it clear to the Nigerians that such contact will not result in recogni-
tion except insofar as the Nigerian government makes such recognition a necessary diplomatic lever.

In the extreme, this would mean that if the Nigerians shoot down relief planes the U. S. and other countries supporting these planes will recognize Biafra, not as a sovereign state, but as an entity entitled for humanitarian purposes to the use of international waterways (the Niger River, internationalized in 1898, runs into the Biafran enclave) and to overflight rights with armed, multi-nation escorts. This extreme is unlikely to be reached, however, since the Nigerian government, like the Biafran one, cannot afford an open clash with uncommitted Western countries.

**NEW BLOOD BEHIND DESKS** Third, the Nixon administration must provide within the bureaucracy a protagonist for Biafran relief. For the past few months, U.S. officials have been working ceaselessly on the relief problem. They have tried their best and at every turn they have met obstacles, often obstacles of their own creation. One cannot speak to them for long without being impressed with their dedication, their competence and the enormous difficulty they now have in conceiving new policies.

A symptom of their exhaustion is an inability to weigh fresh proposals without conjuring up their logical extremes and recoiling in horror. For instance, a massive relief policy carried out over the strenuous objections of the Nigerian government is immediately supposed to threaten the safety of the 5000 Americans working in Nigeria. Now it is true that if an unpopular relief policy were handled incompetently and the United States made every effort to emphasize that it alone was responsible, there might be reprisals against American citizens that would necessitate military evacuation from some areas of Nigeria.

But American diplomacy need not be so clumsy. All of the proposals suggested in this paper involve multilateral action. Moreover, the 5000 Americans in Nigeria represent an important assurance for the Nigerians about post-war reconstruction of their country. The war has already cost them $900 million. Nigeria is counting on American aid; harassment of U. S. nationals would not be prudent.

And, suppose we did have to evacuate all the Americans in Nigeria? Would this not be better than to use their presence as an excuse for permitting the starvation of several million innocent people? Certainly, any program for massive relief should include contingency plans for the evacuation of Americans from those areas where the Nigerian government is unable to police its citizenry. But American civilians are not supposed to be sent to such areas in any case. Scratch the worries about the 5000 American civilians and you'll find a baser concern that Gulf and Mobil may lose their lucrative concessions.

**EXCULPATORY VISIONS** Another fear is that aggressive relief efforts might precipitate the downfall of the Gowon government. The hawks in Nigeria would then take over and the war would rage on. But this should not be our greatest worry. The urgent problem in Nigeria has less to do with military hawks than with starvation. If the starvation problem were met and an arms embargo on major weaponry were in effect, it would be a long time before the Nigerian and Biafran armies could inflict great suffering on each other. The personality of Gowon is not in any case a major influence on the Lagos war coalition, and American policy should not be based on the desire to preserve him if the price is the immobilization of relief efforts. It is actually a good bet that decisive American action for relief would strengthen the doves in both Lagos and Umuahia by convincing opportunist leaders that American desires for peace will have to be reckoned with.

Another vision current in the State Department sees a unanimous outcry of African states against any new "imperialist" initiative. Though this may have been the case several months ago, the London Economist reports that many black African leaders are now increasingly worried about the Great Power arms race in Nigeria and would welcome outside leadership to end the war.

The career officers who conjure up these exculpatory visions are, for their part, also in need of fresh leadership. Mr. Nixon can provide this by designating a man in his administration to act as a protagonist for Biafran relief. Mr. Katzenbach assumed this role in the waning months of the Johnson administration and his efforts brought the United States much closer to a realistic understanding of events. To achieve results, Mr. Nixon should charge one of his appointees with acting as the conscience of the new administration in Biafra. A specific charge is necessary lest other preoccupations delay action on the starvation problem, which is urgent, and on the problem of Great Power entanglement, which, unlike Vietnam and the Middle East, can be quickly resolved.

**REMOVING ROSY LENSES** The final area for change is purely intellectual, for Nigeria, like Vietnam, represents a dramatic failure for American nation-building theories. In Nigeria, as in Vietnam, American policy with its emphasis on centralized "national" government has been ill-equipped to deal with the forces of ethnic and communal nationalism. American policy makers, after all, share a statist liberal ethos that represses references to race and religion. It is not that statisters are unaware of ethnic and religious rivalries but they think it wrong to treat them as autonomous social forces. They feel most comfortable dealing with technocrats in the capital city. Such an attitude, well suited to life in American
bureaucracy, is a handicap to understanding the politics of many if not most underdeveloped countries. Certainly in Nigeria each major political organization has had a tribal base. The three largest tribes — Ibos, Yorubas and Hausa-Fulani — have thus been able to exert demands for autonomy that they can defend by force and that cannot be crushed without mass civilian dislocation.

At the moment it is the talented, entrepreneurial Ibos whose political organization must be broken in the interests of a strong central government. But the sophisticated Yorubas, who are now rioting against the war, will probably be the next to suffer. The logic of Nigerian politics is inexorable: so long as the administration of the country’s economy and armed forces is centralized in Lagos any major tribe with the cadres capable of dominating the central bureaucracy and army is a threat to the others. The Ibos and Yorubas pose such a threat and must accordingly be crushed. Already the centralists have plans to gerrymander Yorubaland into two regions once the Ibos are decimated and confined to their densely populated Biafran enclave.

Yet, though with foreign armaments, smaller warlike tribes may be able to subdue the more sophisticated Ibos and Yorubas, there is no evidence that their wartime coalition will be able to turn into a peacetime one. On the contrary, Ibos and Yorubas cannot be governed except by their own administrators, and under self-rule they will quickly be able to move back into a position of dominance, which will be felt to necessitate more military action against them.

The dilemma’s solution is simple: loosen Lagos’ control over the economy and army. Looser confederation of tribes in their home areas — a dominance they can exercise without resort to foreign arms shipments — while using various regional agreements to redistribute oil revenues, guarantee limitations on arms and provide for free trade. This is not ideal for the smaller minority tribes, which would be denied their own states, but it is ideal for the economic development and political stability of West Africa. And though the United States would be amiss to try to impose such a plan on Nigeria, any encouragement it gives to such an outcome will limit suffering instead of exacerbating it.

Thus, the ideal of One Nigeria, though it looks good on paper, in practice means continuing communal warfare, whereas an ideal of an open-ended Confederation of West Africa, bodes a lesser degree of such warfare and accordingly provides a better basis for economic development. The United States, in its early experimentation with constitutional forms, went from loose confederation to strong union; Nigeria simply will have to go the other way.

But let us not paint too rosy a picture. As black Africa moves from colonial jurisdictions to a post-colonial age, there will be ample opportunity for economic stagnation, Great Power imbroglios, and genocidal wars. But there will also be room for devising peaceful and plebiscitary means for making the transition.

The outcome in Nigeria may well set the pattern for the rest of Africa.

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**Reality Principle** — from page 24

Ly. But neither achieving a redistribution of income nor making it feasible for threatened governments to call in American soldiers like a householder turning on a tap will eliminate the conflicts about poverty or national security.

Moderate Republicans will find conflicts particularly hard to talk about persuasively. The Ripon Society’s positions seem to me to contain a substantial criticism of our priorities and values. But we do not speak from interest in the sense that poor people or black people or old people do except perhaps on the draft issue. We do not represent a materially aggrieved minority. We dissent from the country’s purpose and direction on grounds of morality or style. The policies are not offensive to our persons or bank accounts but to our spirits. Still in rhetoric at least we cling to the problem terminology. On occasion someone tries to rationalize this by arguing that the nation “can’t survive” unless it undertakes some reform or other. I am afraid that this kind of talk is only a case of reluctance to think about the unthinkable. People want to believe that the country has to do what they think is the right thing to do, but that is no argument at all.

What is behind “radicalization” and the “New Politics” is the awareness of the shift from problems to conflicts as the center of political concern. We have a lot of thinking to do about this shift and the stands we take. Is it a permanent shift or a delusion of the Vietnam War? If it is permanent, what forum and what style are appropriate to the rather ambiguous position of moderates who represent no interest but only an ideal? Can we move from our technical proposals and our corresponding dry precision of language to the eloquence necessary for persuasion? Let us at least begin by arguing out whether the country has gone wrong or not. I think it has, through raising greed and security above liberty and compassion.

—DUNCAN J. FOLEY
Lack of response was unfortunately the most salient result of Ripon's post-election poll. 117 polls were completed and sent back to the office—a 5% return. (We suspect this may be in part to the poll’s unstrategic placing in the issue: tearing it out mutilated the cumulative index. Perhaps also the distractions of the holidays deterred others from serious political soul searching.)

On the other hand, the return represents a by no means statistically insignificant sample, and can shed some light on how moderate Republicans responded to the candidates.

The very first ray indicates that the Nixon-Agnew ticket won a clear Ripon majority on election day. The post-election poll was a follow-up to the post-GOP convention poll whose results appeared in the August issue. Nixon’s post-GOP convention 39% share of the votes rose to 48.7% after Humphrey’s nomination, to 59.8% on November 5th. 57.1% of those FORUM subscribers undecided in August eventually voted Republican.

HALF THE FRONTLASH

Ralph B. Earle, Jr., in the October ’68 FORUM poll analysis called the August undecideds the GOP “frontlash” and noted: “to keep a majority of them from voting Democratic, the Nixon-Agnew ticket will have to pledge de-escalation of the war in Vietnam, increased commitment to the cities, and increased concern for minority rights and opportunities, as well as coming out from under the flag of ‘law and order’ and demagogic attacks on the Supreme Court.” It is questionable whether Mr. Nixon made such pledges. He nevertheless won half of the “frontlash” vote according to our sample.

Reasons given for favoring Nixon, however, were indicative of a lack of enthusiasm. 100% of the 39 “Party Loyalty” and 51 “Time for a Change” votes (question 3) were Nixon-Agnew voters.

The GOP Vice Presidential candidate inspired a response that was even more clearly negative. Only four of the 38 “Liked Vice President” votes were for Agnew. A mere 6% of the Nixonites wanted Agnew in August (see October results) and he had gained no further endorsement by November 5th.

The other side of this coin is the intense positive reaction to Edmund Muskie. 34 of the 41 Humphrey-Muskie voters (82.9%) liked the Democratic vice presidential candidate. (The one remaining vote must be credited to General LeMay.)

Of the pollees who defected to vote Democratic, in addition to liking Muskie, 80.5% of them checked “Disliked opposition” or “Disliked opposition’s campaign.” This half of the “frontlash” broke the ties of party loyalty, not out of fervor for the Democratic nominee, but with a dislike for the choice of Mr. Nixon, his choice of Agnew, and their respective campaigns.

Question 4 reinforces this pattern of negatives. Over half, (50.7%) of the Nixonites checked “uneasiness” or “fatalism”. Still, he fared considerably better than Humphrey on this question: three quarters of the Humphrey supporters (75.6%) applied the same adjectives to their vote. Once the hard decision was made, voters stuck to it: there were no subsequent regrets.

Regrets, if they do come, will arise from Nixon’s policy decisions. Earliest of his decisions was the choice of his Cabinet. Judgments of these men will change, too, based on their performance in office. Question 5 attempted to discover if Nixon had redeemed himself in the minds of his detractors.

MORAL MITCHELL

Humphrey-Muskie voters were more approving than “indifference” (a rating of 4) for 7 of the 13 appointments. Campaign Manager John Mitchell earned the severest opprobrium, while Daniel P. Moynihan received almost unreserved kudos. On the whole, the respondents seemed willing to reserve judgment on the men. Despite his rough sledding on Capitol Hill, Interior Secretary Hickel was not singled out by our readers for especial criticism.

Nixon-Agnew voters were generally approving. Perhaps more discriminating, they gave Hickel their only above-4 rating. (Volpe ran a close second-to-worst at 3.8). The other 12 appointees were rated better than “indifference”, and eight of these attained averages above “mild approval.” (3-rating).

Finally, Ripon members think President Nixon should bring peace to Vietnam and attack the urban crisis, the “frontlash” issues listed by Mr. Earle. Over 80% of ALL the respondents placed these issues among the top three priorities.

Answers ranged from simply writing “Vietnam” to “End the war in Vietnam (as soon as possible, by any peaceful course, through negotiations),” to thoughtful and detailed essays.

Similarly, those urging help to cities included under this rubric a whole constellation of problems: race, poverty, welfare, education, housing and transportation, as well as environmental pollution.

Undaunted by the response to this one, the FORUM pledges a “First Hundred Days” poll in the April issue.

—EVELYN F. ELLIS
POST ELECTION POLL RESULTS

1. WHOM DID YOU PREFER ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1968, AFTER THE SELECTION OF HUMPHREY AND MUSKIE BY THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Nixon-Agnew</th>
<th>Humphrey-Muskie</th>
<th>Wallace-LeMay</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nixon-Agnew</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humphrey-Muskie</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace-LeMay</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. FOR WHOM DID YOU VOTE ON NOVEMBER 5, 1968?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>October results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nixon-Agnew</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humphrey-Muskie</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace-LeMay</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstained</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; less than 1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>(35% Undecided)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. WHICH ONE OR SEVERAL OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS WERE MAJOR FACTORS IN YOUR DECISION?

- Party Loyalty
- Vietnam War
- Time for a Change
- Disliked Opposition
- Liked Humphrey Campaign
- Liked Nixon Campaign

4. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ADJECTIVES BEST DESCRIBES THE ATTITUDE WITH WHICH YOU CAST YOUR BALLOT?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adjective</th>
<th>Nixon voters</th>
<th>Humphrey voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>enthusiasm</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confidence</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fatalism</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uneasiness</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subsequent regret</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no vote</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. USING THE NUMERICAL SCALE INDICATED WOULD YOU PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR REACTIONS TO AS MANY OF THE FOLLOWING NIXON APPOINTMENTS AS HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED WHEN YOU COMPLETE THIS POLL.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appointment</th>
<th>Average rating by supporters of Nixon-Agnew</th>
<th>Average rating by supporters of Humphrey-Muskie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of State (Rogers)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of Defense (Laird)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney General (Mitchell)</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of Treasury (Kennedy)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaster General (Blount)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst. for Nat. Security Affairs (Kissinger)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of the Interior (Hickel)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of Commerce (Stans)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of Labor (Shultz)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of HEW (Finch)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of HUD (Romney)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Secretary of Transportation (Volpe)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Special Asst. for Urban Affairs (Moynihan)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Frequently mentioned in "Other" space

6. GIVEN NIXON'S STRATEGIC POSITION VIS A VIS THE SIZE OF HIS MANDATE AND HIS LEVERAGE WITH CONGRESS, DO YOU HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS ON HOW HE SHOULD ORDER, SAY HIS TOP THREE OR FOUR PRIORITIES? — (See Text for Results.)
I never tell Elliot Richardson a joke unless I am absolutely sure it's funny. But this unusual caution doesn't reveal an idiosyncratic bump in either his character or mine. Rather it is just one more reflection of President Nixon's new Undersecretary of State's seemingly inexhaustible capacity for excellence in all spheres and the awesome respect it has inspired among those who have known him best during his extraordinary tenure in public service, most recently as Massachusetts Attorney General.

It is one thing, difficult and unusual enough, to attract a top notch legal staff to a state office of relatively low prestige with promises of being where the action is going to be. It's another to compile in two years a record which even exceeds the promises. In his two years, Richardson has used the talent recruited from law school faculties, prestigious legal firms, and the President's National Crime Commission to begin a concerted attack on organized crime which has already seen dramatic results in the cities of New Bedford and Springfield and in Essex County. He has established the country's first consumer protection division, which has already returned $200,000 to Massachusetts citizens who have fallen victim to unscrupulous merchants. He filed a full legislative program which achieved a higher rate of success than either his predecessors or the governor of his state.

**CRIME-BUSTING STATUTES**

Massachusetts now has on the law books as nearly complete a set of crime-fighting tools as any state in the country. With the exception of a continuing push for a witness immunity law, Richardson has had a remarkable degree of success with the overwhelmingly Democratic Massachusetts Legislature. He has spearheaded efforts to repeal the state's broad, confusing and probably unconstitutional wiretapping statute and enact in its place a limited, carefully controlled judicially supervised law enforcement surveillance bill drawn along the guidelines established by the Supreme Court. Responding to his prodding, the Legislature passed laws to arrest bookies without a warrant, to fight loan sharks by establishing a new crime of assault and battery to collect a debt, to establish police cadet programs, and to set up a new state agency designed to assist local law enforcement.

On the libertarian side, Richardson oversaw enactment of a comprehensive unfair trade practices act, has fought to strengthen the powers of the Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination, and seen enacted his bills for bail reform and compensation for innocent victims of violent crime. As Chairman of the Committee on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice which he started, he has single-handedly welded the independent and often feuding various state, local and county law enforcement agencies into a single force fighting for better law enforcement legislation on Beacon Hill.

**MORE THAN SUPER-NESS**

But Richardson is much more than a politicised and somewhat diversified Eliot Ness. For a train of people strewn about the country who have worked with or for him in the past twenty years, he is a father confessor, Dear Abby and guidance counselor all rolled into one. For Irish Democratic politicians in Massachusetts he is an enigmatic thorn who has stolen their specialty by being the state's acknowledged expert in health and welfare matters. He attracts young moderate Republicans by the droves and has served as a sort of great-uncle to the Ripon Society since the early days.

Richardson's career seems at first glance to be part and parcel of the Boston Brahmin tradition of public service that has included the long line of Saltonstalls, Weeks, Cabots, and Lodges, but his taste for controversy, conflict and action has made it just a bit spicier on occasion.

**CARTOONS AND MEDALS**

Following the most accepted path, he was schooled at Milton Academy, Harvard College, and Harvard Law School. While at Harvard, he managed to be both undergraduate boxing champion and chief cartoonist for the Lampoon. He used the latter talent one summer to draw cartoons for a union engaged in an organizing campaign in the mill town of Fall River. He returned to law school a much decorated and twice wounded veteran of the D-Day invasion in Normandy and became president and editor-in-chief of the Harvard Law Review.

Following law school, Richardson served as law clerk to Judge Learned Hand and then to Justice Felix Frankfurter until June of 1949. A quiet period at the practice of law in one of Boston's prestigious legal establishments followed, accompanied by some dabbling in local politics until he returned to Washington in 1953 to serve on the staff of Senator Leverett Saltonstall.

It was during these two years that Richardson began to develop in Washington Republican circles
the reputation which was to bring him back for three additional tours of duty in the federal government within the next fifteen years. Perhaps his most singular accomplishment during this period was the establishment, working with Ted Sorensen from Senator John F. Kennedy's office, of the Conference of New England Senators to coordinate efforts on bills and problems of special interest to the six-state region.

BACK TO BEACON HILL Continuing his staff-level education, Richardson returned to Boston to serve as an assistant to Governor Christian A. Herter through 1956. After working in the unsuccessful campaign of Sumner Whittier for Governor, Richardson, at age 36, sought and secured appointment by President Eisenhower as Assistant Secretary for Legislation in the newly-formed United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

The Richardson star rose and shone brightly in those three years. In an administration which was not noted for breakthroughs in domestic problems, Richardson took on the entire Republican establishment including the Cabinet, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Congressional leadership to sell the notion of federal aid to education.

He managed to topple even those bastions of tradition, and the Eisenhower administration sponsored what was to become the landmark National Defense Education Act. Richardson worked closely with leaders of both parties in Congress gaining the respect of such powerful legislators as the late Congressman John Fogarty (D-R.I.) and Senator Lister Hill (D-Ala.). He was responsible for a range of legislation including bills in the fields of public welfare, social security, public health and juvenile delinquency.

NIXON'S SECRET LIFE One aspect of Richardson's experience in Washington at the time throws light on a very significant but little known facet of President Nixon's behind-the-scenes role and attitude in Washington during the Eisenhower years. During then HEW Secretary Marion Folsom's temporary illness, Eisenhower leapfrogged several ranking members of the department to appoint Richardson as acting Secretary. As a full member of the Cabinet, Richardson found the then Vice President Nixon (and Nixon's aide, Robert Finch) as the strongest and sometimes sole allies in the effort to win support for progressive social welfare legislation.

Seeing the opportunity to return to Boston and stake out his own political future in earnest, Richardson was appointed United States Attorney for Massachusetts in 1959.

The trenches of Normandy and Washington were appropriate training for the challenges Richardson decided to assume as chief Federal Prosecutor in the state. He took on Bernard Goldfine, an intimate of President Eisenhower's crony Sherman Adams of vicuna coat fame and successfully prosecuted Goldfine for tax evasion. He put together the first coordinated file on organized crime in the area and began a drive which is still bearing fruit. Most important, he exposed a widespread highway landtaking fraud which involved one of the previously most untouchable of Massachusetts's political bosses, William F. Callahan, the turnpike czar.

FIRED BY KENNEDYS The Callahan affair continued through the end of his term in 1961, reaching ever so close to a number of prominent Massachusetts political figures. As is customary, Richardson submitted his resignation to the new President and then made an appointment to see the new Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy, in the hopes of being reappointed for a short period of time to finish the investigations and prosecutions already under way. Richardson made the case in person, later describing the Attorney General as "the toughest politician I have ever met." Kennedy asked to see the files, which Richardson furnished upon his return to Boston. By return mail Richardson received a telegram relieving him of his duties as United States Attorney and generating sighs of relief from Boston and other Massachusetts political nooks and crannies.

It was from this era that the great driving record non-scandal arose. It has been an undercover story in each of his campaigns and was recently exhumed by Drew Pearson in a column. Hopefully his adventures with Harvard rum punch have been at last laid to rest by Richardson's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

It was not difficult for Richardson to decide to run for Attorney General in 1962. The Republican nomination seemed open. The incumbent, Democrat Edward McCormack, was moving up to challenge Edward Kennedy for the Senate nomination. Most important, he
very much wanted to finish the job he had begun as
U. S. Attorney.

UNEASY  POSITION  There was only one stumbling
block in the path to the nomination—Edward W. Brooke, then a rather unknown
black attorney who had been the party's unsuccessful
standard-bearer for Secretary of State against Kevin
White in 1960. Richardson, like Brooke's opponent in
the 1966 Senatorial campaign, Endicott “Chuck” Pea-
body, was a certified civil rights leader and supporter
in the uncomfortable position of trying to prevent a
Negro political “first.” His campaign support thus
embraced a curious amalgam of liberal friends and
contacts from civil rights and social welfare organiza-
tions and those in the party who preferred not to see a
Negro candidate for Attorney General as neither he
nor Brooke submitted to various party pressures to go
for another office, a spirited and sometimes bitter
pre-convention campaign was waged.

Then a drama unfolded at the convention hall in
Worcester which is still the subject of political hot
stove conversations through the state. Richardson was
one vote short of the nomination on the first ballot
and a third candidate, Mrs. Arlyne Hassett, (whom
Richardson had appointed an Assistant U. S. Attor-
ney,) had a small handful of votes.

Senator Leverett Saltonstall, Richardson's former
boss, was in the chair when some of Hassett's delegates
asked to change their vote to Richardson before the
ballot closed. Pandemonium broke out and most peo-
ples in the hall assumed Richardson had won. Salton-
stall, however, had in fact recessed the convention in
order to try to determine whether the first ballot was
actually closed before the change had been requested.
Sometime later, with many delegates on their way
home a second ballot was taken and Brooke was nomi-
nated.

UNPOPULAR  DECISION  Richardson deliberated for a
month before deciding that the peculiar circumstances of the nomination gave him
the responsibility to test the issue in the primary. A
late uncoordinated campaign against the convention
nominee in a party which does not take kindly to such
challenges really never got off the ground and Brooke
won easily. Richardson, however, had gained valu-
able campaign experience and had solidified his party
credentials by campaigning vigorously for Brooke
through November.

Richardson went back again to the practice of
law and fully expected to sit out the 1964 campaign
when he received a call from John Volpe. Volpe had
been defeated for re-election as Governor in 1962 and
was trying for a comeback. He saw in Elliot Richar-
don the quality and background which would add much
to his own candidacy and asked him to join the ticket
as his running mate, for Lieutenant Governor. Rich-
ardson accepted Volpe's offer on the condition that
he be assured of a major policy role and responsibility
for the administration's programs in the health, edu-
cation, and welfare areas. He ran a well-financed cam-
paign designed to get his face, name and credentials
out in the open and he was elected by some 27,000
votes.

VALUABLE  PARTNER  Richardson's two years as
Lieutenant-Governor were ones of outstanding accomplishment for the Volpe admin-
istration, particularly in the health, education and
welfare fields. Accepting his role as staff man, he
neither sought nor received public acclaim for the
legislation he drafted and the nine gubernatorial spe-
cial messages he authored. Richardson wrote and
fought for a major mental health department reorgan-
ization along community mental health lines. He was
responsible for the first racial imbalance law in the
nation. He was in charge of building outside under-
standing of and support for the Governor's sales tax
programs. In a state where the previous Lieutenant
Governor had successfully challenged his own Gover-
nor in a primary contest, Richardson broke all tradition
by being a working, contributing second-in-command.

His thanks for the effort, in the spring of 1966,
was a barrage of pleas from virtually every member
of the Republican hierarchy in the state that Richar-
don abandon a relatively easy low-cost campaign for
re-election and run for Attorney General. He was being
asked to step down from the heir-apparent position
primarily because no other candidate would have had
a chance to keep this sensitive office in Republican
hands from the controversial but charismatic Fran-
cis X. Bellotti.

Against the better judgment of virtually all his
own political advisors. Richardson accepted the party
responsibility and announced his intention to seek the
nomination for Attorney General, although he person-
ally had nothing to gain by doing so. As difficult as it
is for hard-nosed political cynics to accept, this decision
does exemplify a commitment to do what he believes
is right at the expense of political expediency. This
personality streak has both endeared him to his associ-
ates and enraged his political and journalistic critics.

BIPARTISAN  SUPPORT  The emotional, almost crusad-
ing nature of the decision to run for Attorney General carried over into the cam-
paign against Bellotti. Until the last ten days it was
a tough, expensive effort highlighted by Bellotti's ref-
usal to debate and Richardson's solid support from
liberal, usually Democratic sources such as the Ameri-
cans for Democratic Action (which endorsed him)
and a group of Harvard-M.I.T. ex-New Frontiersmen
headed by Professor John Kenneth Galbraith, who
held a press conference to announce the crossing of party lines for him.

Earlier, the polls had showed Richardson well behind. This view was confirmed by the press with almost no exceptions and was shared generally by all except the candidate himself. Richardson, comparing his reception and support to that in the 1964 campaign, was convinced he was going to win. On a Monday, eight days before the election, information was brought to Richardson which showed conclusively that Bellotti had accepted, while Lieutenant Governor, fees from an out-of-state insurance company for general services rendered in connection with their obtaining a license to sell in Massachusetts and in connection with their continuing relations with the Massachusetts Department of Insurance. This evidence, never disputed, constituted a breach of generally accepted proper practices if not a violation of the Massachusetts conflict of interest law.

ANOTHER Richardson had previously HARD CHOICE scheduled a press conference for that Wednesday to answer Bellotti's charges concerning Richardson's record as Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. The issue was whether to include this information in the press conference. At a strategy session, there was general agreement that such a move, coming as late as it did, would not gain votes. In spite of this, Richardson felt strongly that the issue of the campaign had been the sensitivity of the office of Attorney General and the assertion that his opponent had not demonstrated by his public conduct fitness for the office. Here was a concrete example of Bellotti's conduct which confirmed this proposition and on which the public had a right to be informed. Fully realizing it would not be popular, Richardson decided to go ahead with the issue. The Wednesday press conference touched off a furious six-day series of charges and counter-charges, which kept the issue on the front pages of the Boston papers through to election day and, as predicted, cost Richardson votes. Another prediction, however, Richardson's own, also proved to be correct and even with this liability he won by some 90,000 votes.

Richardson, of course, tackled the job of Attorney General with characteristic elan and substantial achievement. But these are not the real hallmarks of his administration. Elliot Richardson as Attorney General has been more deeply involved with the day-to-day business of the office than any who proceeded him. He was in operation as well as name the senior partner of the state's law firm. He took the legal responsibilities of his staff personally and developed a professionalization of the office which generated the tremendous respect and admiration of all who worked for him. He considers his staff as friends and associates, not as political allies, and insists they call him by his first name. For each of us these two years have been a time of challenge, action and growth because of the opportunity to work with Elliot Richardson.

UNIQUE The switch from a state attorney general to number two man in the State Department is such an unusual jump that it is difficult to speculate in traditional terms about the attributes Richardson brings to the job. He has been quoted as saying, "like everyone else, my views on Vietnam have changed a lot." Much more important, however, are the general attributes he has demonstrated over the years—his commitment to follow through on what is right, his willingness to take risks for what he believes, and his sheer overwhelming competence. Indeed, if he has an Achilles heel, it would be his susceptibility to the McNamara syndrome of excessive confidence in man's ability to structure all choices rationally, a tendency which can lead to an obsessive persistence in policies which are simply not succeeding. Where such men fail is in the world of unpredictable irrationality—and this well describes the machinations of international affairs which he is entering. Yet what McNamara lacked and Richardson possesses is three years of field training in non-rational decision-making—his three years of adventures and negotiations with me and my colleagues in the Massachusetts House of Representatives.

Those of us who have worked closely with him are confident that Elliot Richardson will bring his abilities to bear on these new problems as successfully as he has on the range of issues and areas with which he has dealt for the past 20 years.

Yet our pride is mixed with nostalgia. As one of his young assistant attorney generals remarked at the end of the last staff meeting, "our own Camelot has ended."

—MARTIN LINSKY

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EXPANSION and TRANSFORMATION

For the Ripon Society, 1968 was a year of substantial expansion and transformation. During the past twelve months we more than doubled our size and created a highly talented full-time professional staff to complement and lend continuity and coherence to our ongoing and expanding volunteer effort.

1. Publications — During 1968 the Ripon FORUM, which in 1967 was transformed from a small newsletter into a magazine, continued to improve in content. It carried articles by President Nixon, New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Former President of the British Board of Trade Mr. Douglas Jay. The network of FORUM correspondents and contributors expanded and our coverage of the Republican Party was more thorough than ever before. Total pages increased from 148 to 348. Paid circulation at year's end was approximately fifty percent greater than the figure a year earlier. In November we were fortunate to secure the services of a talented full-time FORUM editor, Douglas Matthews, trained at Time Magazine, to succeed J. Lee Auspitz who has become President of the Society.

During the six years of its existence, the Ripon Society has produced six books. Three were issued during the past year. They were the Realities of Vietnam, Ripon’s Republican Who’s Who at Convention ’68 and The Politics of Moderation — The Ripon Papers 1963–1968. Earlier titles were Election ’64, From Disaster to Distinction and Southern Republicanism and the New South. Five more Ripon books are in various stages of production.

The Society issued 11 position papers in 1968, covering a wide range of subjects. They were:
- Multilateral Foreign Aid — A Better Way to Foster Development
- The ‘SMIC’ Boondoggle — A Study of a Regional Military Industrial Complex
- The New Nationalism
- Here’s the Rest of Him — A Special Report on Ronald Reagan
- Urban Papers — Proposals to Deal with Six Urban Problems
- The Draft’s Agony of Conscience — Papers on Conscientious Objection

All received press discussion as did our continuing reports on Republican election prospects and strategies and our series of studies on Vietnam policies.

2. Contract Research — In 1968 the basis for a highly professional research effort was laid with the formation of the Ripon Intelligence Unit run by a full-time Director of Research, Dr. Robert Behn. Intelligence Unit provides Republican candidates, officeholders, and Party organizations and community leaders as well as non-partisan organizations with research service. It also performs in-house research for the Ripon Society. In 1968 nine research contracts were completed.

3. Media — The Ripon Society made considerable progress in 1968 toward establishing itself in the public consciousness as a reasoned spokesman for progressive Republicanism. We are increasingly called upon by professional journalists for comment and analysis of Republican affairs, as well as for background guidance.

4. Chapter Development — Three new chapters, in Dallas, Seattle and Chicago, were added to existing chapters in Cambridge, New York, Los Angeles and New Haven. During the year a number of inquiries were received from individuals interested in organizing new Ripon groups, and we expect to add further chapters in 1969.

5. Organization — In 1968 further progress was made toward creating a competent professional staff. In June, as previously mentioned, the services of a full-time director of research were engaged and in November a full-time National Director was added to coordinate chapter development, volunteer activities, and press functions. Our administrative staff was enlarged, so that today the Society has eight full-time and two part-time employees.

6. Finance — Despite the problems associated with fund raising in a Presidential campaign year, contributions increased in 1968 even more rapidly than hoped at the beginning of the year. The increased level of support enabled us to enlarge our efforts in an important political year as well as to accelerate plans for research and FORUM expansion. The number of Ripon contributors increased from 156 to 221 and total contributions to the Society more than doubled. Ripon’s income from other sources in 1968 was approximately double the 1967 figure.

7. Outlook — The Republican Party controls the White House and a majority of Governorships, but not the Congress. The Ripon Society is well positioned to help the party broaden its base of support in the fastest growing sectors of the electorate — among the young and the professional communities. But whether Ripon is able to make a greater contribution to the political dialogue in 1969 will depend, as in years past, on our fund-raising success or failure. With greater financial support, we can further improve the FORUM’s quality and broaden its readership, develop new chapters, and increase our output of research, position papers, and books.

—THOMAS E. PETRI
Executive Director
Dear Sir:

In your January issue you have a piece captioned: "Goldwater Becomes a Landmark and the GOP Profits" allegedly written by your special correspondent, presumably from Arizona.

I find it difficult after having read this piece to believe that this man ever has been to Arizona because first of all, no Arizonan would consistently misspell the name of the capital city of Arizona and one of the largest cities in the United States. The proper spelling is "Phoenix."

Secondly, the opening paragraph describes a billboard which did not and does not exist. The slogan was correct and we did have a Grand Canyon billboard, but the two were never mated.

Third, the suggestion that Governor Williams slashed the budget of the universities by 50% is ludicrous.

Fourth, the suggestion that Governor William's only response to Goddard's charge about tax reform was that: "Repossession takes many years" is equally ludicrous. I think any competent observer of the Arizona election would agree that Goddard's makeshift issue blew up in his face.

Fifth, if you can find me a poll that ever showed that the Goddard-Williams race was going to be close, it would come as a great surprise to me.

Sixth, the gratuitous insult that "The party presented no issues or programs for the public consideration" is just about typical of the entire tenor of this article.

I would suggest that you change your special correspondent in Arizona to one who is not only competent in spelling of the place names, but has some understanding of what actually went on in this state in November.

Sincerely,

DEAN BURCH

(Mr. Burch, a Tuscon attorney, is former Republican National Committee chairman and managed Senator Barry Goldwater's 1964 and 1968 campaigns.)

(Ed. note: The unfortunate misspelling of Phoenix was due to hasty transcription of the report by a member of our staff to make a deadline and was unnoticed on proofs. Checking back, we find our correspondent had indeed spelled it correctly. Below is his reply to Mr. Burch.)

REPLY

Dear Mr. Burch:

First, let me assure you that I do indeed exist. I am not, as the Phoenix papers have suggested, a figment of the Republican "liberal Eastern Establishment" imagination. I have the good fortune to live in Arizona. I am sure I share with you a concern for the directions of the Republican party in our state. And, in the interest of that concern, I would like to settle a few points of fact.

You insist that the billboard that I mentioned did not exist. You were Barry Goldwater's campaign manager and I accept your word as that of an expert. But such quibbling does not change the basic point that your campaign implied that Mr. Goldwater had some kind of mystical connection with the Arizona landscape. There was a full-color board showing Barry standing before an Arizona landmark. (I think on reflection that it was Monument Valley rather than the Grand Canyon) and the caption read, "Senator Barry Goldwater, Doesn't That Sound Great?" This slogan, when coupled with some others like "Barry Goldwater, November Fifth, Remember That" and "Barry Goldwater Must Be Returned to the U.S. Senate" gave your campaign the superior, demanding tone I mentioned.

You insist that the billboard that I mentioned did not exist. You were Barry Goldwater's campaign manager and I accept your word as that of an expert. But such quibbling does not change the basic point, that your campaign implied that Mr. Goldwater had some kind of mystical connection with the Arizona landscape. There was a full-color board showing Barry standing before an Arizona landmark. (I think on reflection that it was Monument Valley rather than the Grand Canyon) and the caption read, "Senator Barry Goldwater, Doesn't That Sound Great?" This slogan, when coupled with some others like "Barry Goldwater, November Fifth, Remember That," and "Barry Goldwater Must Be Returned to the U.S. Senate" gave your campaign the superior, demanding tone I mentioned.

Your recent appointment to the Arizona Board of Regents, the group with responsibility for the state's university system, implies that you have a great long standing interest in education. I am surprised that you did not notice that last year Governor Williams recommended in his budget that the university requests be cut in half or nearly in half. Fortunately, the legislature ignored the Governor.
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BOOKS

66-1 From Disaster to Distinction: The Rebirth of the Republican Party; Ripon Society paperback; 127pp. September 1966. Unit price: $1.00 (quantity discounts available for more than ten copies).


68-2 Who's Who at Convention '68 — Biographical data on delegates to the GOP Convention. $5.00.


69-1 The Republican Papers — Leading House Republicans and academic experts define the problems of the domestic crisis and offer solutions. Edited by Melvin Laird. $1.55.

PAPERS


P64-3 A Declaration of Conscience — A Call for Return to Basic Republican Principles; 4pp mimeograph. July 1964. Unit price: $0.25.

P64-4 A New Republican Mandate — Preliminary Analysis of the 1964 Elections; 9 pp mimeograph. November 1964. Unit price: $0.50.

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P67-1 The Rights of the Mentally Ill; 6pp printed. February, 1967. Unit price: $0.50. Bulk rate: $0.30 each for ten or more or $10.00 per hundred.

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HUMAN RIGHTS — from page 3

The new Department would coordinate the myriad of civil rights enforcement duties of all federal departments and agencies. It would expand the scope of administrative remedies and introduce new techniques of enforcement. The Department would serve as a clearing house for policy decisions that now are widely diffused through a number of agencies, clearly channel talent and funds available for human rights planning and enforcement. The new Department would play an important role in educating Americans to the harmful effects of racial discrimination.

Moreover, the new Department could provide technical assistance to the state human rights commissions and departments already established in the majority of states. It could provide encouragement to private citizens to become directly involved in the solution of racial problems in every state.

Above all the creation of a Department of Human Rights would demonstrate the new priority and urgency assigned by the nation to the problem of racial division in America. It would demonstrate that the people of America care about equality and are willing to undertake a new commitment to bring about a more just society.

SPECIFIC STRUCTURE Under the Ripon proposal, the new Department of Human Rights would replace the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. It would bring under one roof the other government agencies concerned chiefly with civil rights enforcement, including the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Community Relations Service, and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance.

The Department would also have principal responsibility for enforcing the federal open housing and public accommodation laws and for carrying out federal school desegregation efforts. It would coordinate the Title VI desegregation efforts of the Office of Education with the judicial enforcement program now centered in the Civil Rights Division.

The Department of Human Rights would be able to call upon the Civil Service Commission for examiners to help enforce federal voting laws. It would have responsibility, in conjunction with the Criminal Division of the Justice Department, for pursuing all criminal prosecutions under the federal civil rights laws. In addition, the Department would have the responsibility for prosecution of key civil remedies for deprivation of civil rights. In this connection, a well-publicized Office of Personal Safety would be established within the Department of Human Rights to coordinate the enforcement of the federal statutes protecting individuals in their exercise of civil rights.

The Cabinet status of the Department of Human Rights would increase the effectiveness of interdepartmental coordination on civil rights problems. This would be analogous to the power that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development now has to convene a meeting of federal agency heads to deal with civil rights problems arising under the Model Cities program.

ENFORCEMENT Of great importance, the new Department would help shift the main burden of civil rights enforcement from the courts and motley tribunals in various federal agencies to a single administrative agency designed especially for this purpose. The unevenness of administrative remedies has seriously disadvantaged the complainant seeking benefits from the civil rights laws. On the other hand, the primitive quality of existing enforcement techniques has been less than fair to those from whom compliance is sought.

Under our proposal, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the Department would be given the powers to conduct hearings and to issue appropriate orders enforceable in court. A Complaint Bureau would be set up to process complaints in the areas of housing, public accommodations and certain other areas that may be assigned to it. It would have powers of investigation and conciliation, and if conciliation were unsuccessful, it could refer a complaint to a hearing examiner for further action.

A Bureau of Hearing Examiners in the Department would be charged with hearings on complaints referred to it by the Complaint Bureau and other federal departments and agencies. It would also supply hearing examiners for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as needed.

The Department would have an independent Human Rights Review Board, appointed by the President, to consider promptly appeals from orders of the Department. Decisions of this Board and of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission would be subject to review in the U. S. Court of Appeals.

The Department of Human Rights would require a well-trained investigatory staff. We would recommend that the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which presently assists the Civil Rights Division in the preparation of its cases, be authorized to work for the Department of Human Rights. In addition, the Department would be expected to develop its own skilled investigatory personnel, particularly for work in those areas where individual risk is less likely to be a problem.

The Civil Rights Commission, established under President Eisenhower in 1957, would be in-
cluded in the Department of Human Rights and would continue to serve as the country’s most powerful and distinguished civil rights research and policy board. As in its first decade, it would continue to conduct public hearings and make recommendations to the government for broad corrective action.

**STEP TOWARDS REAL NEEDS**

Some may argue that creation of a new Department of Human Rights would make civil rights enforcement efforts more vulnerable than they are now. It is said that federal departments spend millions of dollars on civil rights enforcement as general administrative expenses that Congress would never approve expressly for this purpose. This argument has a hollow ring. The time has come to bring civil rights enforcement into the open in every agency of the federal government. The solution of the problems of human rights, as America’s number one domestic concern, must be open to the public view.

Moreover, even if millions of dollars are clandestinely spent on civil rights enforcement, it is but a pittance compared to the need. Millions of additional dollars, perhaps several billion, are needed to focus on America’s human rights problems. Establishment of a Department of Human Rights can help attract the needed funds to this effort. We believe that the majority of American people, if presented by the President with such a proposal, would give it their enthusiastic support.

The proposal for a new Department of Human Rights does not imply that every problem of minority groups should be approached solely on the basis of race. To the contrary, the success of the Department would be in helping to eliminate all racial considerations in jobs, education, housing, sanitation, and the dozens of other social services vital to a decent life in America.

The Department of Civil Rights should, to some extent, be self-liquidating. Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, in his brilliant essay in the Brookings Institution *Agenda for the Nation* prepared for the new Administration, emphasizes that “all approaches that stemmed from racial inequities have reached their limits.” We share Dr. Clark’s view that it is necessary “to redefine the problems of our cities in terms that minimize race and emphasize the economic, political, and social imperatives for change.” At some time in the future, the racial separation that has given rise to the present structure of civil rights laws may disappear, making it possible to do without a Department of Human Rights. Yet for now, the nation needs such a catalyst as the Department to develop counter-racist measures essential to the continued health of American society.

**HUGE IMPACT POTENTIAL**

The new Department of Human Rights could have immediate impact on the most important areas of racial concern:

1. **Employment**

The new Department would be able to develop a coherent jobs policy and to coordinate efforts of federal, state and regional authorities to make it work. The Ripon Society favors the “metropolitan strategy,” proposed by Eli Ginzburg and others, as an approach to America’s urban-racial crisis. Its objective is to encourage a substantial movement of minorities into the suburbs, in the belief that the basic economic, educational, and environmental disadvantages of the ghetto can be altered significantly only in the greater metropolitan area, where economic opportunity lies and where industrial job formation is taking place. The success of this strategy, however, depends upon the ability of governmental agencies to cooperate in assuring the elimination of bias in education and housing for minority citizens who move to the suburbs. The Department of Human Rights would be uniquely equipped to help assure this cooperation.

The new Department would provide an administrative remedy for complaints to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, with enforcement through “cease and desist” orders. The order of a “plan of desegregation” for unions or businesses violating the employment provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is another form of relief that offers great promise. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission could be authorized to appoint a referee or master, either apart from or in conjunction with a desegregation plan, to serve as the sole hiring agent (or admission in the case of union) for an employer or union found to be discriminatory in its hiring or admission policy. The Department of Human Rights would be in a better position to implement these remedies since it would not be beholden to particular constituencies as are the Departments of Labor and Commerce which now have anti-discrimination responsibilities in the jobs area.

2. **Education**

The new Department would be able to help assure that federal educational programs would be consistent with national human rights policies. It could guarantee the presence of a human rights input in every federal educational program.

The Ripon Society adopts the position that the time has come to provide unequal, exceptional education as a matter of deliberate public policy to every child who needs it.

The new Department, as suggested by Harvard’s Dean Theodore R. Sizer, could encourage the Office of Education to discriminate in favor of
racial and class integration with a federal building program designed to handle diverse student populations in metropolitan areas.

The Department of Human Rights could provide federal technical assistance to state and local agencies planning and executing integration plans. Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could be reoriented and expanded, under the eye of the new Department, into a major federal effort to provide comprehensive aid to support state and local desegregation projects.

3. Housing

The Department of Human Rights could make a major contribution toward fulfilling the promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The new fair housing law provides no means for administrative enforcement. Under the Ripon proposal the Department of Human Rights would be charged with the responsibility of instituting administrative proceedings against persons whom it believes to be in violation of the law. This would represent a welcome step forward from the present law which provides only that the Attorney General may institute a court action in situations of "general public importance" and then only against those who engage "in a pattern of practice of resistance" to the fair housing provisions.

More important, the Department would be able to develop broadgauge campaigns, in cooperation with state and local authorities and with private industry, to eliminate housing discrimination in metropolitan areas in conjunction with efforts to create jobs and educational opportunities for minority groups.

DRAFTING A PLAN

We recognize that a new executive department cannot be created overnight. Nonetheless, it is clear that the new Administration's performance in its first six months will be critical to gaining the confidence of the minorities that voted against Richard Nixon last November. We recommend that President Nixon request the Civil Rights Commission and a select interdepartmental committee to draft a plan for him to establish a Department of Human Rights.

Even if a Department of Human Rights is not established now, we believe that it is essential for President Nixon to make clear as soon as possible his own moral commitment to the enforcement of civil rights and the eradication of racial division in American society. Failure to make his human rights position clear in the opening months of the Administration could cost the President vital support of minorities and other concerned Americans that would be impossible to regain during the remainder of his term.

LETTERS — from page 19

I did not say that Williams made only one reply to all the charges that were leveled at his tax program. However, I attended the Tucson Press Club forum on October 25 when Goddard charged that people would be forced to give up their homes because of the new taxes. I heard Governor Williams reply that no one would have to leave this year because repossessions take many years. He then went more in detail to explain this. I can produce the statement on tape.

The poll I referred to was commissioned by the Arizona Republic and printed on their front page September 22, 1968. It showed the two candidates for governor running for governor with 44 percent each.

You refer to the tenor of my article. Since you do not clarify what you mean by 'tenor', I would like to make my intentions clear. I feel that public office holders today are called to exercise more ability and leadership than ever before. Political parties have a responsibility to seek out, nominate and support the most capable men available. Republicans in Arizona have an added responsibility since they clearly dominate the state's politics. In electing Jack Williams, the party ignored this trust. I would have been a poor commentator on the election had I not mentioned the Governor's unique style and attitude toward his office. He insists that he is not a leader; rather, he prides himself for being friendly and harmonious. But harmony alone will not solve Arizona's desperate problems of poverty and race and inadequate state institutions.

Anecdotes about Governor Williams tend to be funny, but although you evidently were not entertained, many have laughed out loud at his statements. But I find this a grim sort of humor for his hands rests much of the responsibility for the reputation and future of our state and the Republican Party there.

14a ELIOT STREET

At 14a Eliot St., as well as 1600 Pennsylvania Ave., the guard is changing, and in some cases the twain impinge. To start at the top, the Ripon Society has a new President, former FORUM editor Joseph Auspitz, who will replace Lee W. Huebner, who has accepted a position as White House Staff Assistant to President Nixon with particular responsibilities in the speechwriting area. Huebner thus winds up six years at Ripon, the last two as President.

In other key changes:

Peter J. Wallison, also a former FORUM editor, of the New York chapter and an attorney with Royall, Koegel, Rogers and Wells, will become the new chairman of the Society's National Nominating Board. He will succeed John R. Price of New York who has resigned the position to join the Nixon administration as an aide to Daniel Patrick Moynihan.

Howard Millett, Jr., of Brookline, Mass., a Ph.D. candidate in American studies at Yale University, will be Vice President of the Society. He succeeded Attorney Christopher T. Bayley of Seattle, Washington, who has been named to the newly created position of First Assistant of the Society's Executive Committee, which oversees Ripon's financial affairs.

Robert L. Beal, a graduate of the Harvard Business School and associated with the Beacon Construction Company, Boston will take on the responsibilities of the Treasurer's office from Boston attorney Wilfred E. Gardner. Beal's prowess as an election forecaster recently won him a color television set in a Boston newspaper contest. Staying on as Secretary is Frank E. Saman, Jr., associated with the Washington, D. C. firm of Ginsburg and Feldman.

Michael S. Lottman, an Ohio native and 1962 graduate of Harvard College, has been named as the first Ripon Society Research Fellow. Lottman, who served three years as a reporter for the Chicago Daily News and more recently as editor of the Southern Courier, will be updating and enlarging Ripon's 1966 book, Southern Republicanism and the New South, which deals with the future of the party there. The book will be written with a particular eye on the coming elections.
The Economic Reality Principle

When someone talks about a “problem” today he strongly implies that there is a solution to it, some policy or program which everyone will recognize as a good thing. During the Depression unemployment and low production were problems because everyone would have benefited from a return to prosperity. But there are many social ills that are conflicts, rather than problems. A conflict arises when one group has more of something and wants to hold onto it, and another group has less and wants more. The housing “problem,” for instance, is not a problem at all. There is no magical gimmick that will produce houses for low and middle income families out of thin air. On the contrary, housing is very expensive and many people don’t have the income to buy decent accommodations. If we provide them with good housing we will have to take something away from someone else.

Problems are much easier for politicians to live with than conflicts. The great difference between Roosevelt’s successful and Johnson’s failed Presidencies is that almost everyone immediately and demonstrably benefitted from ending the Depression or the War, while only minorities stand to gain as directly from eliminating poverty, rebuilding the cities, or liberating black people. The political style of liberalism emphasized the picture of the people united doing battle against an external obstacle or a failure of the system. Liberalism is unable even to speak the language of conflict.

I don’t mean to suggest that we have run out of problems. Air pollution, for example, can be attacked in ways that will make everyone better off. If we used a direct tax on pollution to finance subsidies to businesses for installing pollution control equipment and perhaps a reduction in corporate taxes, we might come close to helping everyone. The prices of some goods would rise, but consumers would have cleaner air as compensation. Congestion of transport facilities like airports and highways could be eliminated by a sensible revision of transportation pricing policy and a calculated expansion of facilities. The big obstacle in these cases is our unwillingness to pay any direct compensation to the people who lose money when we solve the problem. This is the kind of difficulty that ingenuity and technical expertise are good for.

But what can a technician say about the poverty “problem?” If poor Americans are going to achieve a more decent life, rich Americans will have to give up some affluence. The objection to having a tax system which taxes the rich man the same proportion of his income as the poor man (and studies of American Federal and State taxes taken together indicate that our system does this) is not that it is wasteful but that it is unfair. There is something ingenuous about radical propaganda showing that the poor are ill-clothed, ill-housed and ill-treated by their government. After all, that is what being poor means. There would be no point to having differences in income if it weren’t for the goods and services income can buy. The only policies which will eliminate the terrible effects of poverty also raise income in one way or another.

Some people who are very committed to liberal ways of thinking and to a “problem” approach have convinced themselves that there is a magical way to raise productivity and incomes of poor people dramatically without lowering anybody else’s standard of living. The only forces which have done this historically are capital accumulation and technical progress, and they operate at a rate of two or three per cent per year. They will also sooner or later eliminate most poverty like the sun drying a street after a rainstorm, but there may be patches which will take a long time to reach. In any case, what we must mean by the poverty “problem” is that we are not content with this speed of advance. It appears to me that faster advance for the poor means slower advance for someone else.

I could write in a similar vein about the cities’ desire for public services and the suburbs’ hatred of high taxes, or about the “problem” of the aged. The public malaise arises because some people believe that we are spending our money on the wrong people and the wrong programs, while other people are very content with our priorities and income distribution. An economist when he speaks as an economist can only help each group to achieve its particular goals. He can recommend a negative income tax as the best way to achieve redistribution for those who want redistribution, or he can help the Defense Department deploy weapons systems more efficiently, or study the structure of peasant revolution with an eye to containing it more cheaply.