

RIPON
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**SAFEGUARD
SUPPLEMENT
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ONE DOLLAR

William D. Phelan, Jr.

The Non-Galbraithian State

Michael S. Lottman

**GOP Second Thoughts
in Tennessee**

Richard A. Berliner

The Vietnamese Moderates

The Ripon Society

Beyond the First 100 Days

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QUOTE OF THE MONTH

"I believe a basic mission of the Party is to be open to free expression of individual points of view. As of today, whether we like it or not, both major parties are forums for converging and diverging philosophies. No Republican should be discouraged from thought, from opinion of conviction. It is from this interaction of ideas that comes forth the energy of the Party and its will to do."

—ROGERS MORTON

Chairman of the Republican National Committee

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Ike

Many young people, almost accustomed now to the shock of political assassination, responded to the quiet passing of Dwight D. Eisenhower with more reflective curiosity than concern. He was the grandfatherly figure of our childhood, the object of ribbing by the chic and sophisticated in the Kennedy years. Liberal Democrat intellectuals, writing their contemporary pop histories for the *New York Times Magazine*, assured us that Eisenhower would never rank with the significant presidents; he was a Grant with better luck.

But Eisenhower also had better "luck" than Kennedy or Johnson. Eisenhower — among the things he "didn't do" — didn't get us into war.

Eisenhower was a great man. We who are young can only stand in awe of the hero of North Africa and Normandy, the man whom even the *New Republic* recently compared to Lee, Napoleon and Marlborough. Our generation's mural of modern diplomacy puts Ike in the beginning panel.

He is the beginning of our modern political story too. Not only did he keep us out of war, he got us out of war, and he helped soothe the domestic strains which then, as now, so painfully afflicted the nation. The high example of personal probity, President Eisenhower pledged to bring integrity back to gov-

ernment and he did it. We are grateful to Kennedy for making politics exciting. We must be at least as grateful to Eisenhower for making politics respectable.

We in Ripon also choose to remember that he was the first progressive Republican of our experience. He said he was a liberal when it came to people's needs and a conservative when it came to their money. We'll still go along with that. His middle path seemed obscure sometimes and his sense of duty to party was the kind that made him equivocate on the Right's takeover in 1964, but the hallmarks of legislation are there: the consistently munificent foreign aid programs that have not been matched since; Atoms for Peace; the St. Lawrence Seaway, the admission of Alaska and Hawaii to statehood; the creation of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare; the curbing of inflation; the intervention in Little Rock; the civil rights bills that nearly completed that phase of the black advance seeking legal equality. He warned against the military-industrial complex as he left office and later against unchecked population growth.

For these things, and because he was humble before God, generous with his fellow man and an encouraging friend of youth, we will always like Ike and treasure his memory.

Beyond the First 100 Days

Over the past six years, Ripon's main concern has been to introduce a number of progressive programs into the mainstream of Republican thought. The most intense efforts at intellectual injection have been in those areas in which we feel American society has gone out of kilter under two Democratic administrations. So, in reading the tea leaves on Mr. Nixon's first hundred days, it is in these areas we have taken special note.

First, there is military and war spending, which has gone without critical scrutiny since President Eisenhower warned of the dangers of the military-industrial complex. The pruning of the defense budget and the reallocation of priorities to domestic programs is a fundamental issue for American Politics, and it is now symbolized in two ways, the

war in Vietnam and the debate over an anti-ballistic missile system.

In both these areas, the President has made significant technical departures from the confused programs of the Johnson Administration. On Vietnam he has moved to two-track negotiations, a decided improvement. On the ABM he has revised his predecessor's misconceived program. But we cannot yet be optimistic about the general tone of the Administration in the defense area. When all is said and done, Mr. Nixon has not made a case to justify a multi-billion dollar expenditure on the Safeguard system. And in Vietnam we see no signs to justify optimism about the chances of a negotiated settlement, even though we do see signs indicating de-escalation of the American presence.

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Further, we feel the Administration must take care not to fall into the trap which caught President Johnson, who was deluded by the statistical gimmickry of his own bureaucracy into giving a false impression of progress in the war. We hope that the new Administration will not engage in similar wishful thinking about the progress of the peace.

In the broader sphere of foreign policy, the restraint and caution of Mr. Nixon's government have come as welcome relief. We would cite the quiet diplomacy of the European trip. Mr. Nixon's handling of the recent Korean provocation departed not only from the truculent tone of some of his campaign statements but also from the panicky and futile actions of Mr. Johnson after the Pueblo incident, notably the call-up of the Reserves.

### **DOMESTIC POLICY**

In domestic policy, despite limited financial room for maneuver, the President has pledged new programs and new priorities. Most important, he has determined to overhaul the welfare system, something Ripon has long recommended and which was never undertaken by the previous Administration; and, secondly, to institute a program of revenue sharing with the states and cities.

At the very least, we expect a federalization of welfare standards and tax exemption for the poor, including the working poor, with a resulting improvement of poverty conditions and social cohesiveness. Welfare reform also will reduce the incentives for migration to the cities and urban states.

If followed through, these Nixon initiations will far surpass in their impact the contributions of the War on Poverty, with its grandiose claims and meager achievements.

As consequential as welfare reform to the cities is Nixon's commitment to a program of revenue sharing with state and local governments. Largely because of Southern Democratic domination of Congressional Committees, the Northern cities and states have been vastly shortchanged in the distribution of federal revenue. New York, for example, gets as little as one twentieth as much federal aid per dollar of federal taxes contributed as Mississippi. A substantial program of revenue sharing based on a modified per capita formula will make a major contribution toward relieving the fiscal crisis of the cities, without penalizing the poorer southern states.

Also on the urban front, the Republican Administration has committed itself to rebuild the riot-torn areas of those cities whose names have become a legion of social strife in the 1960s—Watts, Harlem, Newark, Detroit, and Washington.

Advocacy of Home Rule for the nation's capital, an invigorated fight against organized crime, whose basic feeding grounds are in the nation's urban cores, are other hopeful initiatives.

## GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION

One of the least dramatic but most important areas of Presidential action is the structure of the administrative process. The Johnson administration—with its preoccupation for legislative first steps—did a relatively poor job of executive follow-through. But President Nixon's determination that "administrative performance should match legislative promise" represents a worthy correction to that failing.

This determination has been reflected in several specific ways. The revival of the National Security Council, the establishment of the Urban Affairs Council, and the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy are important developments within the White House itself. The new program for Minority Business Enterprise in the Commerce Department and the major overhaul of the Labor Department's Manpower Administration could provide improved mechanisms for dealing with the urban crisis. The Department of Health, Education & Welfare has been restructured, too, and its new office of Child Development, with its focus on the first five years of life, could be a particularly creative source of social initiatives.

Two reforms deserve special mention: 1) The decision to select postmasters through less political processes (and to reform the postal service in other ways), and 2) the establishment of common regional boundaries and headquarters for the field operations of five federal agencies (many urban experts believe this could make a great difference in the quality of federal social services to the cities). Both improvements have been urged for many years and both were long delayed for solely political reasons. Both have now been quickly implemented despite strong political counter-pressures.

## ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION

Also largely unnoticed, except by the business community, have been the initiatives taken by this Administration to halt the present trend toward economic concentration. In the series of articles in the FORUM entitled "The Complex Society," the Ripon Society has expressed concern with the trend toward "conglomeratization" and with the business-government partnership that flourished under the prior two administrations. The Johnson administration justified inaction in this area by claiming that additional legislation was needed. Under the Nixon Administration, the Justice Department has

—Please turn to page 21

# Political Notes

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## MASSACHUSETTS: Sarge takes on the Lobbyists

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Governor Francis Sargent of Massachusetts, recent inheritor of the last two years of Governor John A. Volpe's term, has bucked the powerful and seedy billboard lobby, something the Democratic-controlled legislature has been too pusillanimous to do for years.

Sargent recently "requested" (and backed up the euphemistically clothed proposal with notice that he was prepared to take more forceful measures) that the Outdoor Advertising Board relinquish to the 351 towns and cities of Massachusetts veto power over billboard erection.

This decentralization follows a separate attack on a lobby whose reputation for power is exceeded only by rumors of its unsavoriness, the liquor lobby. The new governor's announcement that he would press for a repeal of the minimum liquor price laws has already dried up contributions from the package store boys. Sargent's latest decision will undoubtedly cost the Sargent war chest thousands more — besides denying him a few choice billboard sites. As one aid summed up this problem: "If the billboard industry thinks you are a nice fellow, choice billboard locations for your election campaign are usually made available. If it doesn't, you could get a billboard in Sterling or on the side of a barn in Seekonk."

On the other hand, Sargent has made points with the increasingly influential conservationists in the state and the increasingly informed citizenry. And they will know who to thank if liquor prices go down — and who to blame if they do not.

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## RHODE ISLAND: look roostward chickens

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Last November, Democratic Gov. Frank Licht edged popular incumbent Republican John Chafee (now Secretary of the Navy) on a single narrow issue: Mr. Chafee said Rhode Island had to have an income tax — Mr. Licht said "no." Chafee was dead right — and Licht's patchwork program of new taxes (including an investment tax which is really a non-graduated, narrow-based income tax) has raised a hue and cry from the voters. Regardless of the necessity for the taxes, they feel hoodwinked and are beginning to focus their pique on the Democrats.

And thus, despite his recent defeat, John Chafee today, is the most popular politician in the state —

over

although his new job as Secretary of the Navy appears likely to keep him off the Rhode Island ballot in 1970.

Mounting Democratic difficulties, however, presage an abundance of GOP challengers for the governor's chair. Youthful and dynamic, Attorney General Herbert DeSimone appears to have the inside track for the 1970 gubernatorial nomination — but he faces strong intra-party rivals in Senate Minority Leader James L. Taft, Jr., of Cranston and former Lt. Governor Joseph O'Donnell of North Smithfield.

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## CONNECTICUT: where there's squabbles there's life

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"The party's in sad shape here in Connecticut," murmured one knowledgeable GOP observer in January. Last August at the Miami convention, Connecticut delegates had voted 12 to 4 for Rockefeller but Greenwich-Fairfield County, which had supplied President Nixon with a national finance chairman, J. William Mittendorf, and elected former Greenwich First Selectman Lowell Weicker as the only new Republican Congressman from Connecticut, was in no mood after the November election to sympathize with hand-wringing in Hartford. The struggle between the two groups for patronage still continues with the result that not until February was Republican State headquarters able to appoint a Finance Chairman, Malcolm Baldrige, Jr., an able business industrialist in his mid-40s who heads Scoville Brass in Waterbury and has friends in both Hartford and Fairfield camps.

Nor had the Senatorial race helped to establish a unified party position. Unlike Vice-President Agnew, Abe Ribicoff had made his name a household word on TV at the Chicago convention and Ed May's attempt to include a large segment of Wallace-oriented factory workers under the GOP banner backfired as union ranks rallied behind Humphrey and frontlash voters, disturbed by May's simplistic appeals, turned in desperation to Ribicoff. The local irony of the Democratic sweep at all levels in November was that the Republican state platform, chaired by former House Minority leader, Hartford attorney Nicholas Lenge, was considered by many to outdo the Democrats in constructive reform, but a blend of national issues and political personalities pushed such considerations aside and many young Republicans of potential were submerged in a tide not of their making.

Yet, in April, spring stirred again and already there are signs of renaissance. Paul Capra, a 29-year-old admissions officer at Yale and backed by a local Ripon Chapter there, is now a GOP candidate in the New Haven mayoralty race.

At the State Capitol in Hartford, Wallace Barnes, Senate Minority leader, and Stewart McKinney, House

Minority leader, are young (Barnes in mid-40s, McKinney in mid-30's) able, telegenic Republicans. Last month, McKinney, in a state almost 60% Catholic, had the courage to question the constitutionality of the numerous proposals for state aid to parochial schools.

In the continuing state-wide furor over a grab-bag tax rise to pay for Governor Dempsey's proposed \$2.5 billion dollar budget, the GOP minority in the legislature has called for efficiency, demanded an end to fiscal secrecy until budget-time, put the lid on their own platform proposals and let the Democrats bear the brunt of the taxpayer's wrath. If Dempsey and Democrat State Chairman, John Bailey, won't propose the income tax Connecticut voters are supposed to dread, why should the burden be placed on the shoulders of the badly out-numbered Republicans at the State Capitol?

The problem implicit in this question is that the innovative answers are left to those Democrats, including an active splinter Caucus group, who, angered by their own Governor's lack of fiscal foresight and Bailey's legendary manipulation of party machinery, have started some very public tax thinking on their own. Whether by their cautious response, Barnes and McKinney, who are both on the list of a baker's dozen of GOP gubernatorial candidates in 1970, are attracting Nixon's "silent" middle is also an unanswered question.

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## CALIFORNIA: GOP gains controls of assembly again

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Republican Clare L. Berryhill, rural grape grower, eked out a 38-vote margin in the May 20 run-off for 30th District Assembly seat (Stanislaus County, in the San Joaquin Valley) formerly held by now HEW Undersecretary John G. Veneman. Undoubtedly a recount will be demanded but the slim victory, if confirmed, will leave the GOP with a one-vote margin in the Assembly.

Berryhill, a conservative, had upset two favored Republicans (including Ray Simon, Veneman's former Administrative Assistant) in the primary. There was no hesitation by the Finch/Nixon Administration as they immediately endorsed Berryhill after the primary, as did Governor Reagan.

### CORRECTION

In the March issue of the FORUM, there was a political note reporting that California Superintendent of Schools Max Rafferty had written an article for Gerald L. K. Smith's ultra right-wing publication, "The Cross and the Flag." It turns out upon closer examination that what Smith was passing off as an article by Rafferty was in fact an old campaign speech. Dr. Rafferty has assured the FORUM that he has never met Smith, never talked or corresponded with him; and never gave him permission to appropriate his speeches.

# Second Thoughts in the Volunteer State

After the 1968 presidential election, Republicans predicted a rosy future for themselves in the South, and nowhere did the roses smell sweeter than in Tennessee. The Volunteer State went for a Republican presidential candidate in 1968, for the fourth time in the last five elections; the GOP had one U. S. Senator in attractive, articulate Howard Baker, and four of the state's nine Congressmen, including two with "star" quality, William E. Brock of Chattanooga and Dan Kuykendall of Memphis; and, wonder of wonders, Republicans actually controlled the state House and were a strong minority in the state Senate. The GOP looked forward with confidence to 1970, when Albert Gore's U. S. Senate seat would be ripe for the taking and when Tennessee might just find itself electing its first Republican governor in modern memory.

But when Democratic U. S. Rep. Robert A. "Fats" Everett died in January, 1969, Republicans sensed a chance to flex their new-found muscle more than a year ahead of schedule. Though Everett's district, the Eighth, traditionally sent Democrats to the House, the state and national GOP jumped with both feet into the special election to choose Everett's successor. After a two-month campaign that drew national attention but stirred little interest in the district, "Fats" Everett's bereaved constituents gave the Republican Party something to think about in the months leading up to the 1970 and 1972 elections. They elected a Democrat, Ed Jones of Yorkville, by more than a 2-to-1 margin over Republican Leonard Dunavant, a state representative from Millington. In fact, Dunavant was denied even the consolation of second place; he trailed some 700 votes behind William J. Davis of Covington, the first American Independent Party candidate (other than George C. Wallace) that George C. Wallace ever campaigned for. Unofficial results gave Jones 32,821 votes, to 16,409 for Davis, and 15,754 for Dunavant. Seven independent candidates brought up the rear. Given the district's Democratic history, perhaps Dunavant never had a chance; but the magnitude of his defeat, and the way it occurred, carried a somber warning for Republicans not only in Tennessee, but everywhere in the Old Confederacy.

### **POLITICAL LABORATORY**

The Eighth District may not have been a microcosm of the South, but it had characteristics that made it a good laboratory for testing Republican appeal. Like much of the South that the GOP

#### **THE AUTHOR**

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was claiming as its own, the Eighth had long belonged to the Democrats; Everett had served nearly 11 years in Congress, his predecessor had served 24, and his predecessor's predecessor, also 24. But the district was also solidly conservative, and therefore presumably not immune to Republican advances. Some 30% of the Eighth's 180,000 voters resided in suburban Shelby County, outside of Memphis; the rest of the district was made up of 13 small rural counties, running northward from Memphis along the state's western border. Since rural conservatism dominated the Eighth District's politics, it was easy to forget that more than 20% of the registered voters were Negroes.

The Democratic hold on the district has been broken in the 1968 presidential race, when Wallace carried every county, including the portion of Shelby. The former Alabama governor nearly outpolled the two major candidates combined, with 59,363 to 35,652 for Hubert H. Humphrey and 28,616 for Richard M. Nixon. Some Republicans were confidently predicting that these and other Wallace voters, once weaned from the Democrats, would soon become members of a Republican majority; but, as the Eighth District race was to indicate, the process was far from automatic.

In early February, the Democrats and Republicans held nominating conventions in the district, the Democrats' typically stormy and the Republicans' typically decorous. As a Memphis commentator noted, "Once again, the Democrats were nature's untamed children while the GOP delegates, functioning in their usual well-behaved manner, applauded everybody in sight including the Young Republicans who had collected the folding chairs on which they sat." But if the GOP convention was typical, its choice was not; Dunavant, from suburban Shelby, would be a stranger to much of the district. All through the campaign Dunavant tried to overcome this by emphasizing his rural roots — his birth in Ripley, Tenn., and his matriculation at Union University in Jackson, Tenn. The GOP nominee was not without qualifications — 12 years as alderman in Millington, five years on the city's planning board, and two terms in the state legislature. Dunavant was (and still is) chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, and he had also served on the Agriculture and Fiscal Review committees.

### **POLITICAL B-52'S**

While Jones — a former state commissioner of agriculture once mentioned as a gubernatorial candidate — criss-crossed the district pressing the flesh, Dunavant frantically shuttled between the district and Nashville, where the legislature was in session. Finally, with a week to go in the campaign,

the big guns were called in. First Davis, the American Independent Party nominee, pulled a considerable coup by getting Wallace to make an appearance in his behalf. Deep thinkers in the Republican camp figured Wallace would stay away, for at least two reasons: if Davis lost, which was likely, it would be a further blow to Wallace's already bruised presidential hopes; and if Davis won, he would outrank Wallace as their party's highest (and only) elected official. But for whatever reason, Wallace came, and addressed a whooping crowd variously estimated at 850 to 1,700 in rural Obion County. Though the ex-governor's remarks were strangely muted, no one doubted that his endorsement was a big boost for Davis.

On the last weekend before the March 25 election, the Republicans countered with an invasion by a veritable cavalcade of stars — Senator Baker, Congressmen Brock and Kuykendall, House Minority Leader Gerald Ford, Republican National Chairman Rogers Morton, and even cowboy-singer Tex Ritter. Democrat Jones, for his part, refused to call for help, and raised the issue — a staple in Southern politics — of "outside interference." Baker, on the stump, bristled that "this is my district, too. I represent all the districts of Tennessee." And in fact, in his Senate races in 1964 and 1966, Baker carried the counties that now make up the Eighth District. In 1969, however, Dunavant carried just two counties, while Jones swept the other 12.

What happened? There seemed to be a tendency to explain Dunavant's disaster as a reaction by people in the West Tennessee district to the Nixon Administration's continued enforcement of civil rights laws. School systems in the Eighth District had not been bothered during the campaign, but the government had been pushing for desegregation in nearby Chester County. "(White) people expected more to be done by Nixon — they want him to stop everything," said one veteran of Eighth District politics. "He's not as popular today as he was previous to being elected." But this hardly explained the scope of the GOP defeat. The only candidate who made an issue out of schools, predictably, was Davis, who criticized the appointment of black militant James Farmer to a post in HEW, and flailed the hated guidelines. On television, Davis promised to "stand with the school officials in our district" when the bureaucrats come down from Washington, "and with our children who dare to pray in school despite the orders of the Supreme Court." But it could hardly be argued that Davis drew all his support from would-be Republicans; and anyway, Davis and Dunavant together didn't get enough votes to defeat Ed Jones.

### STRATEGY NOT ISSUES

A more substantial problem was the GOP's choice of a candidate; it was not the first time a poor selection plagued the party in Tennessee. Mayor Ernest Griggs of Humboldt, a showcase Republican from the heart of the district, was mentioned as a possible GOP candidate; but he evidently decided or was persuaded that he didn't want the nomination. Dunavant had other drawbacks besides his suburban image; when he spoke to an audience or on television, his eyes seemed to focus on a point beyond his listeners

and his voice lapsed into a monotone. Moreover, he seemed constitutionally unable to say anything that might be construed as a statement on a public issue. The candidate and many of his closest advisers were unfortunately distracted in the closing days of the campaign, when friends of theirs were among 16 Memphis area sportsmen killed in a plane crash in New Orleans.

The GOP campaign also left something to be desired. Dunavant's campaign literature, posters, and radio and TV spots tended to be unimaginative and irrelevant; one of his bumper stickers carried only an American flag and the legend "AMERICA — Love It or Leave It!" and a leaflet managed to reassure voters twice in 17 paragraphs that the candidate was "a non-smoker and a non-drinker." To top it off, there was a colossal waste of time and talent when the GOP wheeled in its big guns the weekend before the election. On Friday night (March 21), Baker, Kuykendall, Brock, Ford, and Tex Ritter addressed about 850 people — at least a third of them under voting age — at a shopping center just outside Memphis, where Dunavant presumably needed no help. Early the next morning, the GOP luminaries set out in two buses for meandering trips around the rural counties. One bus, featuring Dunavant and Senator Baker in the morning and Congressman Kuykendall in the afternoon, made nine stops during the day; at most of them, Baker, Dunavant, or Kuykendall just shook hands for 15 minutes while campaign workers passed out leaflets. At several stops, local Republican workers seemed unaware of the caravan's schedule, or even its existence, and had made no particular preparations for its arrival. It seemed unlikely that Baker and Kuykendall made contact with more than 500 voters during the entire day.

There was something lacking, too, in the attitude of Dunavant's workers and in that of the Nashville Young Republicans who came to help out. Intellectually, they realized the need to contact Negroes and rural whites; but emotionally, they had no taste for it, and it showed. It showed in the remarks they made — "Did you see those three over there?" or "One of them told me, 'I'm gonna vote for the best man — loan me 50¢'" — and with some, it even showed in the clothes they wore. Shades and miniskirts are not likely to induce a feeling of oneness in the hearts of the residents of rural West Tennessee.

### THE INVISIBLE VOTERS

As far as the Dunavant campaign was concerned, the 40,000 Negro voters in the Eighth District didn't exist. Or rather, they existed as a dark, remote, threatening force that would ruin the GOP candidate if he approached them in any way. This bizarre attitude still exists among many Republicans, although private polls have shown that 70 to 80% of Southern white voters have no objection to a candidate's seeking Negro votes. Dunavant and his strategists resisted advice to appear at Negro churches, saying the candidate would be "crucified" by person or persons unknown; but Ed Jones addressed Negro groups, blithely telling them one thing and whites another, to the apparent satisfaction of all concerned. Dunavant's

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# **Techno-Capitalist Collectivism**

## **The Non-Galbraithian New Industrial State**

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In the past four months, FORUM contributor William D. Phelan has outlined how "the conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large weapons industry" is changing the structure of our society. Last month, the discussion was broadened to include the crucial role the conglomerate neo-trusts are playing in changing the nature of American business and finance.

This month, the FORUM concludes its discussion of conglomerates with an examination of how these dynamic corporations conflict with John Kenneth Galbraith's "new industrial state," and Mr. Phelan singles out one of these giants, ITT, and demonstrates how it operates in the stratospheric reaches of the new, politicized economy which might best be termed techno-capitalist collectivism.

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### **I. ITT: Star-Studded Conglom**

Implicit in John Kenneth Galbraith's analysis of the American economy in *The New Industrial State* is the assumption that the very largest corporations — like General Motors — are both the most typical and socially the most important firms in the country. Galbraith beguiles his readers by acting as though the only alternative to his own excessively bureaucratic model of the slow-growing giant companies is the shoe shine parlor or the Chinese laundry. Not only is his vision of General Motors a trifle surrealistic, however, but also one can cite other companies that deviate much further from his model yet clearly play a key role in this country and in the world.

Conglomeratization poses a considerable problem for Galbraith's model because mergers in the 1960's have so often been principally executed for financial reasons. That is, economies of scale owing to technological innovation have typically exerted far less influence than earnings or stock market expectations in generating the impetus for corporate acquisitions.

It is still possible, of course, to claim that the conglomerate is a marginal form in a society dominated economically and politically by Galbraith's version of the General Motors type of company. To put this to a test one might appropriately select a major conglomerate corporation for scrutiny. The International Telephone and Telegraph Company is an excellent candidate for several reasons: (1) It is the largest conglomerate (in terms of 1968 sales) and therefore can be regarded as a type toward which smaller conglomerates may be evolving. (2) It flourished

for decades before beginning its period of rapid growth in 1959, so it also serves as a model for the transformation of established companies into conglomerates. (3) It does less than 10% of its business with the Defense Department; consequently, the unusual contracting conditions prevailing during the Johnson Administration have been relatively unimportant in its expansion and no abrupt changes in its prospects need be anticipated. (4) ITT has very extensive interests in foreign countries; it was one of the first of the increasing numbers of American companies that have developed a global business outlook.

#### **DEFINITELY NON-GALBRAITHIAN**

Before examining ITT in detail it would be well to review the fundamental respects in which the typical conglomerate differs from Galbraith's model. First, despite Galbraith's minimization of them, earnings and stock market price are of tremendous importance. Frequent alterations in the structure of the corporation are undertaken in pursuit of optimal financial performance. Second, a small number of top executives make the principal decisions; technical specialists may be vital in various aspects of the business, but policy-making is the province of the financially-oriented leadership. Developments in computer technology, moreover, are enabling top management to increase steadily its control over decisions formerly delegated to lower levels. Third, rapid expansion of the enterprise often occurs after the assumption of power by one, or, at most, a few dynamic entrepreneurial businessmen. These men typically have the

# I. ITT's DIRECTORS

## (and a partial list of their other activities)

Harold S. Geneen, Pres. and Chmn. of the Board  
 Ted B. Westfall, Exec. V.P.  
 F. J. Dunleavy, Exec. V.P. (Finance)  
 Raymond L. Brittenham, Sr. V.P. (Law) and Counsel  
 C. T. Ireland, Jr., V.P.

### OUTSIDE DIRECTORS (Non-Management)

Eugene R. Black  
 George Rufus Brown  
 Arthur M. Hill  
 Charles D. Hilles, Jr.  
 Hugh Knowlton  
 J. Patrick Lannan  
 John A. McCone  
 Richard Sturgis Perkins  
 Warren L. Pierson  
 Felix G. Rohatyn

### GOVERNMENT (Administration)

Director of CIA — McCone  
 President of the World Bank — Black  
 National Security Council — Hill  
 President and general counsel, Export Import Bank — Pierson  
 US Bureau of the Budget — Perry  
 Director of audits, US General Accounting Office — Westfall  
 Chairman, US Atomic Energy Commission — McCone  
 Chairman, National Security Resources Board — Hill  
 War Production Board — Lannan  
 Deputy Managing Director, Development Loan Fund — Perry  
 US delegate to Tripartite Commission on German War debts (Ambassador) — Pierson  
 Undersecretary of the Air Force — McCone  
 Special Ass't. to the Secretary of the Navy — Hill  
 Special Ass't. to sub-committee of Committee on Education and Labor of the US Congress — Lannan

### GOVERNMENT (Advisory)

Special adviser to the President on S.E. Asian Econ. and Social Devel. — Black  
 Defense Industrial Advisory Council — Brown  
 Financial Advisor to the Sheik of Kuwait — Black  
 President's Air Policy Commission — McCone  
 Permanent advisory committee to evaluate US foreign aid programs — Black  
 US delegation, Bretton Woods monetary conference — Pierson  
 Special financial consultant to the Secretary General of the UN — Black  
 National Committee on International Devel. — Black

### BANKING AND FINANCE

Director, consultant and former V.P., Chase Manhattan Bank — Black  
 Advisory Committee, Chase Manhattan Bank — Geneen  
 Chairman of the Exec. Committee, First National City  
 Dir., United California Bank — McCone  
 Dir., First City Nat'l. Bank of Houston — Brown  
 Adv. Dir., Riggs Nat'l. Bank (Wash., D.C.) — Hill  
 Trustee, Bowery Savings Bank — Black  
 Dir., Bank of Monrovia — Perkins  
 Dir., Nat'l. Shawmut Bank — Geneen  
 Dir., Trust Co. of Georgia — Black  
 Dir., Western Bancorporation — McCone  
 Advisory Committee, Bankers Trust Co. — Geneen  
 Partner, Lazard Freres — Rohatyn  
 Ltd. partner, Kuhn, Loeb — Knowlton (son is Pres. of Smith, Barney)  
 Dir., International Banking Corp. — Perkins  
 Dir., Electric Bond & Share — Black  
 Dir., Great Western Financial Corp. — Pierson  
 Pres., Dir., Alleghany Corp. — Ireland  
 Dir., Investors Diversified Services — Ireland, Pierson  
 Dir., American Express — Black

Dir., Lazard Fund — Black (son is partner of Lazard Freres)  
 Bank of N.Y. — Perkins

### INSURANCE

Investment Committee, Royal Liverpool Insurance Group — Perkins  
 Dir., Equitable Life Assurance Society — Black  
 Dir., American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co. — Hilles  
 Dir., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. — Perkins  
 Dir., Zurich Life Ins. Co. — Hilles  
 Investment Committee, Royal-Globe Ins. Co — Perkins  
 Dir., Pacific Mutual Ins. Co. — McCone

### COMMUNICATIONS, PUBLISHING & UTILITIES

Dir., Communications Satellite Corp.—Westfall, Black  
 Chmn. Bd., All American Cables & Radio — Pierson  
 Dir., New York Times Co. — Black  
 Dir., member of the Exec. Com., Crowell, Collier & MacMillan — Lannan  
 Dir., Commercial Cable Co. — Pierson  
 Trustee, Consol. Edison of N.Y. — Perkins  
 Chmn. Bd., Texas Eastern Transmission — Brown  
 Dir., Center for Information on America — Hilles

### TRANSPORTATION

Former Chairman, member exec. com. dir., Greyhound Corp. — Hill  
 Dir., Penn Central — Ireland  
 Dir., TWA — Brown, Pierson  
 Pres., Chmn., Charleston Transit Co. — Hill  
 Dir., Chmn. Exec. Com., Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. — Lannan  
 Former Exec. V.P., Grace Line — Westfall  
 Dir., Southern Pacific R.R. — Perkins

### OTHER MAJOR COMPANIES

Dir., F.W. Woolworth — Black  
 Dir., Std. Oil of Calif. — McCone  
 Dir., Arco Steel — Brown  
 Dir., Allied Chemical — Perkins  
 Dir., Cummins Engine — Black  
 Dir., Halliburton (Chmn. Bd., Brown & Root [a subsidiary] — Brown  
 Dir., Chmn. Bd., S.W. Shattuck Chemical Co.—Lannan  
 Dir., Royal Dutch Petroleum — Black  
 Dir., Chmn. Bd., Joshua Hedy Corp. — McCone  
 Dir., Southland Paper Mills — Brown  
 Dir., Garfinkel Howmet Corp. — McCone  
 Dir., U.S. Industries — Pierson  
 Dir., Molybdenum Corp. of America — Pierson  
 Dir., Wah Chang Corp. — Pierson  
 Dir., Verientes-Camaguey Sugar Co. of Cuba—Pierson  
 Dir., Western Industries — Lannan  
 Dir., Utah Corp. — Lannan  
 Dir., Louisiana Land and Expln. Co. — Brown  
 Dir., Chmn. Exec. Com., Advance Ross Corp. — Lannan  
 Dir., International Executive Service Corps.—Perkins  
 Dir., Ionico — Pierson

### UNIVERSITIES, SCHOOLS, INSTITUTES, COUNCILS

Trustee, Chmn. Bd., Johns Hopkins Univ. — Black  
 Trustee, Chmn. Bd., Rice Univ. — Brown  
 Bd. of Overseers, Bowdoin College — Ireland  
 Bd. of Overseers' Visiting Committee, Harvard Univ.  
 Center for International Affairs — Black  
 Chmn. Bd. of Trustees Mag. Poetry, Univ. of Chicago — Lannan  
 Trustee, Chmn. Bd., Brookings Institute — Black  
 Trustee, Carnegie Institution of Wash. — Perkins  
 Dir., Atlantic Council — Black  
 Council on Foreign Relations — Perry  
 Trustee, Population Council — Black

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bulk of their estates — extending into the tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars — invested in their own corporations.

In the terms of Galbraith's book, conglomerates are not directed by a "technostructure" embracing all those with special knowledge, talent, or experience in any phase of company operations. Conglomerates are not bureaucracies whose principal goal is the maintenance of organizational stability. Finally, conglomerates are far from a graveyard for the entrepreneur; if anything, they provide a highly-leveraged basis for entrepreneurial enterprise. For these reasons conglomerates differ markedly from the Galbraithian model of the "mature" modern corporation.

Yet it is also true that conglomerate companies like ITT play a major role in America and can be expected to extend it. In the past twenty years ITT's sales have expanded nearly twenty-fold while GM's have tripled. Assets, earnings, and stock market price have increased much more rapidly for ITT. With \$4 billion in sales during 1968, ITT joined the list of the dozen largest industrial corporations — and achieved a percentage sales increase greater than that of any of the others on the list.

A corporation need not necessarily be a conglomerate to conform to the "post Galbraithian counter-model." To use Galbraith's weasel word, however, "mature" dynamic conglomerates should be expected to possess the fundamental characteristics of the counter-model. These characteristics are (1) entrepreneurial drive at the top, (2) great financial skill (and organizational flexibility, imagination, and sophistication at public relations in the service of traditional profit-oriented objectives), and (3) political connections (mostly through the board of directors and high-level administrators in foreign subsidiaries).

## MEN OVER BUREAUCRACY

The counter-model emphasizes, instead of denigrating, the importance of the men at the top. Galbraith's corporation is a large bureaucratic organization operated by a faceless mass of technical specialists who "identify" almost wholly with the corporation, are ignorant of broad social trends, are more or less isolated from politics outside the company, and are principally dedicated to maintaining the institutional *status quo*. In Galbraith's analysis, the key terms are bureaucracy, technical specialization, collective decision-making, and stability.

In the counter-model the key terms are finance, entrepreneurial drive, and politicization. This point deserves belaboring because the difference between the model and the counter-model is critical to a subsequent discussion of the American industrial system as a whole.

Galbraith writes (*The New Industrial State*, p. 81) that "The nominal head of a corporation, though with slight power and, perhaps, in the first stages of

retirement, is visible, tangible, and comprehensible. It is tempting and perhaps valuable for the corporate personality to attribute to him power of decision that, in fact, belongs to a dull and not easily comprehended collectivity."

In the history of conglomerates like ITT one finds again and again that drastic organizational change and rapid growth is attributed by the financial press to one man — or at most a small team — at the top. Bluhdorn of Gulf & Western, Ling of LTV, Thornton and Ash at Litton, Riklis of Rapid-American are accorded more attention than the chief executive officers of companies like General Motors or U. S. Steel. Harold S. Geneen of ITT is no exception. During the past 20 months he has been the subject of long cover stories in both *Forbes* and *Time* magazines. A particularly thorough article in *Fortune* (Stanley H. Brown, "How One Man Can Move a Corporate Mountain," July 1, 1966, pp. 82, 164, 166) offers a characteristic sketch of his public personality:

When Harold Geneen was summoned from his job as executive vice president of Raytheon by a committee of ITT directors, he confronted the strange, tremulous, but nevertheless substantial structure that had been created out of foreign telephone, telegraph, and telecommunication manufacturing companies . . . Few organizations have gone through as thorough a shake-up as the one Geneen instituted almost the day he arrived. Not without disruption, bruised egos, and recriminations, but with undeniable results, he changed the style of management and the whole shape of the baroque institution in his care. Geneen eliminated much of the autonomy of ITT's operating managers and replaced it with a control system tautly run from New York headquarters . . . Critics have often questioned Geneen about his acquisition program, their nervousness about it stemming from the degree to which he has taken ITT afield from its traditional activities . . . Unlike men who have come up through manufacturing [Geneen began his career as an accountant], he sees no special merit in 'making things.' His interest is simply in making money . . . If the figures look right, he is quite willing to buy what happens to be available — and he is just as willing to admit it. . . .

As Geneen goes about his business of buying into all kinds of companies, shaking and rattling his corporate apparatus . . ., the flurry of activity may be masking a fundamental . . . question . . .: what's the hurry? . . . When Geneen got the job, he received no timetable from the board. Neither his stockholders nor his creditors have any cause to be on his back . . . When he talks of motivation, he uses the traditional banalities: 'the bottom line,' personal financial gain, and the contribution to the economy, and society at large made by his com-



pany and its growth. He says nothing about the joys of the game, the sheer pleasure of wielding vast and growing power in an arena filled with objective measures of success. But all that shows in his almost relentless commitment to his job.

It is all very well for Galbraith to declare that the importance of the corporate chief executive is a clever public relations myth. But he has never worked for Ling, Bluhdorn, or Geneen.

One striking passage from the *Fortune* excerpt refers to the radical structural transformation that Geneen has allegedly effected at ITT. Such a change would obviously contravene the interests of Galbraith's stability-oriented technostucture. How could a newcomer to the company get away with causing such turmoil?

**NONVESTIGIAL  
NON ADORNMENTS** Well, who brought him to ITT in the first place? The answer, of course, is the directors. Without presenting any persuasive evidence, Galbraith bluntly asserts that directors are scarcely more than vestigial adornments of the modern corporation. Many companies carry a few directors for primarily ornamental — or sentimental — reasons. In some corporations the "inside" directors (top management) do, of course, conduct their business with little or no reliance on the outside members of the board.

Yet by swiftly dismissing the outside directors, Galbraith misses an important device for obtaining capital and marshalling political influence. Some directors acquire their position because they have large stock holdings or represent a large stockholder. Often, however, if this is not the reason, outside directors are selected on account of their strategic financial or political value to the company.

From this perspective the composition of boards of directors serves as a useful source of information. In Chart I the directors of ITT are listed and a partial catalogue of their other activities is provided. The political and financial power represented by this small group of men is almost incredible.

If one restricts one's attention simply to finance, the special knowledge and access to funds that men like Perkins, Knowlton, and Rohatyn offer is impressive. Nearly every outside director either is himself a major figure in the economic life of the nation or represents major economic interests. Ireland, for example, is a leading operative for the massive Kirby empire (F. W. Woolworth heirs, Allegheny Corp., etc.). Lannan has long been an important member of the Chicago financial community. Good Washington connections, both economic and political, are furnished by Hill and Pierson.

What sets ITT off, however, is the stunning combination of Eugene Black, George Brown, and John McCone. Black, a primary figure in New York and international finance, has long been associated with

the Rockefeller-Chase Manhattan economic bloc, has served as president of the World Bank, and is a major advisor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the government of oil-rich Kuwait, and — at least until recently — the President of the United States (on Southeast Asian affairs). John McCone, one of the most powerful men in California since the Second World War, has held such key government positions as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Director of the C.I.A.

No man has been more important in the career of Lyndon Johnson than George Rufus Brown. One of the titans of the Texas political-economy, a member of the Defense Industrial Advisory Council, and perhaps the prime post-1937 beneficiary of a series of enormous U. S. government construction contracts all over the globe, Brown provided the economic underpinnings for LBJ. It is difficult to cite a more mutually profitable arrangement in the history of American politics.

Brown, McCone, and Black (with emphasis on the "busy" in Black's case) are exceedingly rich, exceedingly busy, and exceedingly hard-nosed. They did not join the board of ITT for sentimental reasons, nor do they serve merely as adornments for its corporate operations. Senator James Eastland recently told businessman acquaintance of mine how much Brown has done for him — and how much he has done for the companies of which Brown is a director.

**INFLUENCE  
CRITICAL** It is hardly through happenstance that ITT has been blessed with such politically super-potent men. The scope of its international operations makes the wielding of influence over American foreign policy a critical element in protecting its investments and increasing its profits. For detailed information of the most privileged sort about foreign countries and governments who is a better source than a recent head of the CIA? For the strongest leverage with poor nations who is a better contact than a recent president of the World Bank? For special knowledge and personal connections at the Pentagon could there be anyone superior to a member of the Defense Industrial Advisory Council (with construction projects throughout much of the world) who is widely recognized as the most intimate financial backer of the (then) President of the United States?

The pattern of politicization is also evident in ITT's foreign subsidiaries. Their officers and directors include a former premier of Belgium (Paul-Henri Spaak), at least two members of the British House of Lords and one of the French National Assembly, several ministers of other foreign governments, and various officials of government operated corporations. Political "pull" in the case of ITT, unlike at some other conglomerates, does not serve as a device for rescuing an incompetent executive team. ITT has unusually capable management. Its global political network en-

ables it to forge ahead faster and further — and provides aid and protection in times of crisis.

However much ITT may deviate from Galbraith's model of the "mature" modern corporation, it is not possible to dismiss the company as a peripheral factor in the "new industrial state." A far better — though probably inconclusive — case could be made that ITT is politically the most significant industrial corporation in the world. Through examining its structure, its political, financial, and social connections, and the sources of its dynamism, one can learn much about the likely direction in which the American social system is going.

For reasons mentioned previously, ITT is probably the best available example of the type of corporation that will increasingly dominate the American — indeed, Western — economy of the next fifteen years. In any society the most powerful institutions tend to draw other elements of the social structure into an accommodating relationship. This, certainly, is one of the kernels of truth in Galbraith's book.

## II. Bureaucratic Technicism, No, Techno-Capitalist Collectivism, Si

Galbraith develops his ideas about the emerging political-industrial order principally by extrapolating from his corporate model. Since he assumes that "his" corporations are the hegemonic social institution, he quite legitimately uses them as the basis for his explanation of how the American system works.

What Galbraith has created is a very interesting and plausible social scheme. Perhaps the best term for it is "bureaucratic technicism." The dynamism and organizational requisites of technology are asserted to determine the structure of the major economic institutions. The needs of these bureaucracies — and the faceless mass of technicians that runs them — tend, in the aggregate, to shape national policy at home and abroad.

No one can deny that technology and at least quasi-bureaucratic organizations play an extremely important role in advanced industrial societies. It is merely the paramountcy of technological and bureaucratic factors that is in question. Galbraith has written that "size is the general servant of technology, not the special servant of profits." Without trifling to look for empirical support, he declares that the extensive research and development laboratories of the nation's biggest companies are vital to technological innovation. "A benign providence who, so far, has loved us for our worries, has made the modern industry of a few large firms an almost perfect instrument for inducing technical change. It is admirably equipped for financing technical development. Its organization provides strong incentives for undertaking development and for putting it into use."

## TINKERING LIVES

According to David Horowitz, however, a study of 61 "major contemporary inventions" disclosed that only twelve emerged from large corporate research laboratories. The men who developed the first models of the jet engine — one in Great Britain, the other independently in Germany — failed to interest aircraft producers in it (and the Englishman even let his patent lapse). The Kodachrome process is the result of experiments by two musicians "sometimes working in their kitchen sinks in between concerts."

Other inventions produced by individual workers include the first computer, air conditioning, the modern self-winding watch (initially rejected by the Swiss watch companies), stereophonic sound reproduction, neomycin, FM (opposed by RCA), the synchromesh transmission, and xerography. Individuals without organizational support have played a critical role in the development of the gyrocompass, the helicopter, the atomic submarine, and the Sidewinder missile.

Arthur K. Watson of IBM stated at an International Congress of Accountants in 1962 that "The disc memory unit, the heart of today's random access computer, is not the logical outcome of a decision made by IBM management. It was developed in one of our laboratories as a bootleg project — over the stern warning from management that the project had to be dropped because of budget difficulties. A handful of men ignored the warning. They broke the rules. They risked their jobs to work on a project they believed in."

In the judgment of two highly regarded government economists, economies of plant scale do not play a major part in determining organizational size. Dr. John M. Blair, chief economist for the Senate anti-trust subcommittee, notes that various huge, established corporations have been "making a veritable religion of decentralization." Moreover, Willard E. Mueller, director of the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission, has referred to a corpus of empirical studies that "clearly does not support Galbraith's generalization that very high market concentration and enormous firms are essential for production efficiency, invention, and innovation."

It is possible to develop an alternative outline of the "new industrial state" from the counter-model already proposed for the emerging modern corporations. Instead of some variant or bureaucratic technicism, the system can perhaps be most aptly described as "techno-capitalist collectivism."

The initial prefix preserves the Galbraithian concern with technology but consigns it to a clearly secondary structural position. "Collectivism" addresses itself to the observed erosion of "free enterprise." It emphasizes a quite different phenomenon from that which is the focus of bureaucracy enthusiasts, however.

As has been shown from several different perspectives in the previous articles in this series, traditional capitalist values and objectives retain a significant, compelling position in the American economic-political system. Techno-capitalist collectivism differs most sharply from Galbraith's explanatory scheme on this point. Because entrepreneurial incentives and identification with entrepreneurs remain powerful features of the world of business, it is difficult for traditional "private enterprise" — oriented businessmen to recognize how drastically the American system is changing.

Among these businessmen, for example, the Job Corps has received a generally very hostile reception. The high per pupil cost of maintaining the Job Corps Centers is frequently cited as yet another illustration of the incompetence and extravagance of government. Rarely do citizens indicate an awareness that many of the centers are operated by large defense contractors and conglomerates.

John H. Rubel, vice president of the Economic Development Division of Litton Industries and assistant Secretary of Defense under MacNamara, apparently deserves the credit for inducing the OEO to turn to defense contractors. Subsequently a General Accounting Office investigation of procedures employed at Litton's Parks Job Corps Center disclosed — according to an account in the San Francisco *Chronicle* — "a devastating picture of high costs, waste, and disciplinary problems . . . After two years of operation the estimated cost of the Center had jumped from \$12.8 million to \$25.5 million, the drop-out rate was 55% and only 8% of the enrollees were placed in jobs related to their training."

### **MULTIPLE PROFITS**

From the evidence, two purposes appear to have had a paramount role in Litton's Job Corps policy. First, its Parks Center has been used to absorb poorly-selling materials from other Litton divisions. Since the original contract was cost-plus, Litton was able to take a double profit on unnecessary equipment it sold to the Parks Center. A story in the *Wall Street Journal* reported that over \$300,000 of totally inappropriate textbooks from Litton's American Book Publishing subsidiary were bought and then stored in closets at the Center. Textbooks on the stock market and the theory of relativity were among the books purchased, purportedly to educate Job Corpsmen with woefully deficient reading skills.

A second reason for the interest of Litton and other conglomerates in the program appears to be its value as a prototype. According to Professor William Austin, former president of the Parks Federation of Teachers and Counselors, "Job Corps facilities have been a popular form of educational experimentation for these companies, allowing them to train their staffs and develop materials on taxpayers' dollars."

David Horowitz adds that "The real profits will come, it is hoped, from supplying the physical plant, audio-visual equipment, curriculum materials, and 'experts' to educational programs in large cities. Companies like Litton are planning to subcontract a city's *complete* school system, claiming to be able to meet whatever contractual standards are set more 'efficiently' than the local school boards could."

Writing of the experiences of the "human input" at the Parks Center, Horowitz states, "The pre-test, which determines the student's reading level before he takes the course, and the post-test, which determines his level upon completion of the course, are identical. In addition, the actual teaching materials used during the course and those used to measure any improvement contain the same text and exercises as do the pre-test and post-test. Of course, this setup merely passes off the repeatedly coached memorization of a particular passage as the ability to read. But schemes like this enable Litton to present impressive statistical evidence 'documenting' their expertise in educating underprivileged youth — a cruel but profitable joke . . ." Litton's Job Corps Center . . . is surrounded by a barbed wire fence with checkpoints manned by Litton-employed guards. The 2000 corpsmen sleep in open bay Army barracks, wear green uniforms, march to their meals at the mess hall, and are hauled off to the brig when they misbehave. The young men arriving at Parks are not exactly prepared for such an environment. Most of them have been signed up by the Litton recruiters who are stationed throughout the poverty areas of the nation advertising the wealth of opportunity in California . . . There is also exotic talk of pools and girls, private rooms with TV's — even draft deferments!

"If getting them there is half the battle for Litton, keeping them there is the other half. When a new enrollee decides that life was better back home . . . he is told that he cannot leave for at least 90 days for any reason other than a death in the immediate family . . . Those who protest this policy too loudly are 'quieted' by muscular counselors or hauled off to the brig. Some become desperate. A psychiatric social worker at Parks reported that he had been assigned to work with a young boy from Dallas, Texas, who had sliced his arm open in an attempt to get out."

Professor Austin sums up his impressions by saying, "The corpsmen didn't mean a damn thing [to Litton] . . . Public relations officers kept putting out fake figures . . . One would hear about this number of corpsmen being placed in job positions and this number of corpsmen demonstrating academic success by various grade levels . . . All of it was nonsense. There was so much pressure on supervisors to produce figures that in general people just faked them."

No one can accuse Litton of losing its "profit

## II. TECHNO-CAPITALIST COLLECTIVISM IN ACTION

### (The ITT-ABC Case: An FCC Commissioner's Reaction)

ITT's continuing concern with political and economic developments in foreign countries as a result of its far-flung economic interests was fully documented in the hearing by the Federal Communications Commission concerning ITT's proposed acquisition of ABC. It showed, as one might expect, ITT's recurrent concern with internal affairs in most major countries of the world, including rate problems, tax problems, and problems with nationalization and reimbursement, to say nothing of ordinary commercial dealing. Its involvement with the United States government, in addition to defense contracts, included the Agency for International Development's insurance of 5.8% of all ITT assets.

Testimony was offered on the fascinating story of intrigue surrounding "Operation Deep Freeze" (an underwater cable). It turned out that ITT officials, using high-level government contracts in England and Canada, had brought off a bit of profitable international diplomacy unknown to the United States State Department or the FCC, possibly in violation of law.

As it seemed to Commissioners Bartley and Cox and to me when we dissented from the Commission's approval of the merger in June, 1967, a company whose daily activities require it to manipulate governments at the highest levels would face unending temptation to manipulate ABC news.

ABC newsmen could not help knowing that ITT had sensitive business relations in various foreign countries and at the highest levels of our government, and that reporting on any number of industries and economic developments would touch the interests of ITT.

They would advance within the news organization, or be fired, or become officers of ABC — perhaps even of ITT — or not, and no newsmen would be able to erase from his mind the idea that his chances of doing so might be affected by his treatment of issues on which ITT is sensitive.

During the April, 1967, hearings, the *Wall Street Journal* broke the story that ITT was going to extraordinary lengths to obtain favorable press coverage of this hearing. Eventually three reporters were summoned before the examiner to relate for the official record the incidents that were described in the *Journal's* expose.

An AP and a UPI reporter testified to several phone calls to their homes by ITT public relations men, variously asking them to change their stories and make inquiries for ITT with regard to stories by other reporters, and to use their influence as members of the press to obtain for ITT confidential information from the Department of Justice regarding its intentions. Even more serious were several en-

counters between ITT officials and a New York *Times* reporter.

On one of these occasions ITT's senior vice president in charge of public relations went to the reporter's office. After criticizing her dispatches to the *Times* about the case in a tone which she described as "accusatory and certainly nasty," he asked whether she had been following the price of ABC and ITT stock. When she indicated that she had not, he asked if she didn't feel she had a "responsibility to the shareholders who might lose money as a result of what" she wrote. She replied, "My responsibility is to find out the truth and print it."

He then asked if she was aware that I (as an FCC Commissioner) was working with a prominent senator on legislation that would forbid any newspaper from owning any broadcast property. (The New York *Times* owns station WQXR in New York.) In point of fact, the senator and I had never met, let alone collaborated, as was subsequently made clear in public statements. But the ITT senior vice president, according to the *Times* reporter, felt that this false information was something she "ought to pass on to [her] . . . publisher before [she wrote] . . . anything further" about the case. The obvious implication of this remark, she felt, was that since the *Times* owns a radio station, it would want to consider its economic interests in deciding what to publish about broadcasting in its newspaper.

To me, this conduct, in which at least three ITT officials, including a senior vice president, were involved, was a deeply unsettling experience. It demonstrated an abrasive self-righteousness in dealing with the press, insensitivity to its independence and integrity, a willingness to spread false stories in furtherance of self-interest, contempt for government officials as well as the press, and an assumption that even as prestigious a news medium as the New York *Times* would, as a matter of course, want to present the news so as to serve best its own economic interests (as well as the economic interests of other large business corporations).

Eventually the merger was aborted by ITT on New Year's Day of (1968), while the Justice Department's appeal of the Commission's action was pending before the U. S. Court of Appeals. However, I ponder what the consequences might have been if ITT's apparent cynicism toward journalistic integrity had actually been able to harness the enormous social and propaganda power of a national television network to the service of a politically sensitive corporate conglomerate. More important, I have become concerned about the extent to which such forces *already* play upon important media of mass communication. (Nicholas Johnson, "The Media Barons and the Public Interest," *Atlantic*, June 1968, pp. 45-46.)

motive" and turning into a timid bureaucracy. It is ebulliently capitalist. For this reason many adherents of the ideology of "private enterprise" understandably tend to miss the collectivist aspects of the new economy. "Collectivism" is a dirty word for American businessmen, a word that has largely been reserved for descriptions of Soviet and Red Chinese societies. Nevertheless, a profit-based economy does not necessarily exclude the emergence of a collectivistic system.

Two features of the emerging system are central: (1) radical profit-oriented quantification, (i.e., treating people as inputs) and (2) manifold politicization. The first phenomenon is nicely illustrated by Litton's Job Corps policy. Conservative businessmen never would have become involved in such a project. On the other hand, narrowly exploitative "robber barons" would simply have charged as much as possible and scrimped on providing the facilities.

### PROFIT BLUEPRINT

Litton's strategy as described by Austin and Horowitz was much more sophisticated: (A) The company decided that it would be lucrative to move into the area of "educational systems." (B) It used its credit as a major contributor to the Democratic Party and took advantage of Rubel's Pentagon background in convincing the OEO to award Job Corps contracts to "private" enterprise. (C) It then could employ taxpayers' dollars to outfit and develop its Educational Systems Division. (D) It used government property as the site for the Center. (E) It used the Center as a mechanism for making a double profit through dumping slowly moving inventory manufactured by other divisions of the company. (F) It equipped the Center with flashy technological gadgets, many presumably produced by its other divisions. These were highly visible and gave an impression of technical expertise and innovative skill. According to Professor Austin, however, "There was a lot of very expensive equipment around which nobody had any idea how to use." (G) In areas where it could not make a double profit — such as the maintenance of decent living conditions — it ruthlessly economized. (H) It devoted virtually its entire training program to public relations objectives. In "cramming" for just one test, the Corpsmen were being employed to provide the highest statistically measurable "improvement" per unit cost. To maximize the number of "successes," Professor Austin notes that "if a corpsman quit after having completed just one module out of 15 in the total training, he would be considered a 'graduate.'" The Chairman of Litton and a black corpsman from his Center were saluted by President Johnson at a special testimonial to a national "success story." A variety of techniques are used to direct "graduates" into military service. (Litton arranges for the majority of corpsmen to secure a high school equivalency diploma, which makes those who had been deferred owing to low Army

test scores eligible for retesting.) The armed forces "employ" approximately 40% of the Parks Center graduates, and thus account for a sizeable proportion of those accounted as "successful" job applicants by Litton. (I) Litton is using its facilities, developed at public expense, and its reputation — acquired through a very skillful public relations campaign — to prepare for a move into the local school system business. School boards are beset by scores of problems and rarely feel competent or confident enough to deal with their mounting difficulties. It is thus a superb time for a company with Litton's "credentials" to make its services available.

### GOTTA HAND IT TO 'EM

This operation represents little less than sheer financial genius. It starts with an idea for turning a profit in the long run. At almost every stage along the way, however, public funds are used to elicit a handsome short-term profit, contribute to the development of the new division, and create a reputation for expertise in the chosen field.

The basis for this sort of undertaking can be termed radical profit-oriented quantification because all "system-inputs and outputs" — people included — have been defined as variables in a profit-generating mechanism. Of course, this does not imply that the employees or executives of companies like Litton are devoid of humane feeling or a moral sense. (It is often difficult for people to distinguish the analysis of the way in which a system operates from personal criticism of people with key roles in the system.)

All that is claimed here, however, is that the organization of the most dynamic large corporations in America leads them to a totalistic manipulation of their social environments in the interest of maximizing earnings. The projected time span for maximization obviously affects policy, and enough organizational looseness exists so that the basic systemic pressures for earnings can at times be thwarted. Also, a slackening of dynamism and gradual decline toward the Galbraithian model is always possible, but then such torpid companies would become relatively less important in the society than the new emerging dynamic corporations.

As one reviews the organizational "processing" of Litton's Job Corpsmen, part of the justification for the use of the term "collectivism" should be evident. They are treated wholly as means for realizing both short-range or long-range organizational ends. This subordination of all human values to the advancement of the corporation is antithetical to the ideal of free enterprise in a free society. It is antithetical to liberal democracy economically, socially, and morally.

Profit-oriented quantification also reveals its radically collectivistic nature in the institutional and geographical scope of its application. Several conglomerates already operate colleges. Others run nursing and con-

valescent homes. The Gulf Oil Company has taken over the experimental community of Reston, Virginia. At least one conglomerate maintains a chain of "mortality parks." Some have gotten into the business of providing a wide range of security services, population control chemicals and equipment, and private police corps. And, as has been noted previously, the conglomerates are beginning to move into "free public education" through the equipping and administration of local school districts.

Citizens who have not the slightest concern for how Job Corpsmen are processed may feel less comfortable when they or their relatives become the direct subjects of radical quantification. As conglomeratization spreads through the schools, colleges, community development projects, nursing homes, and cemeteries of America, it will be progressively more difficult for even the privileged to escape the consequences of the system. If education and cemeteries can be conglomeratized, then it would seem plausible that almost all human activity is susceptible to profit.

A good illustration of the international dimensions of the phenomenon is Greece. After the coup d'etat of April 1967 the new regime was quickly branded "fascist" because of the character of its leaders and its treatment of political prisoners. Almost immediately Norway and Denmark sought to have Greece expelled from NATO. The United States held back support.

"Then," according to David Horowitz, "three weeks after the overthrow, when the new regime was still unstable and the adverse worldwide reaction held out the possibility that the junta might disintegrate and fall, a gesture of support was made by one of the largest U.S. corporations, one with a reputation for having powerful connections in the White House and the Pentagon. That corporation was Litton Industries."

### **NO RISK 11 PER CENT**

Litton and the junta agreed on a cost plus 11% development program for Greece, with Litton undertaking to obtain \$840 million in capital over a 12-year period. As Horowitz notes, "Litton itself risks nothing. Every month Litton files invoices for its costs, and in 15 days it gets back everything it has paid out plus a profit of 11%." The head of Litton's program in Greece, Robert M. Allan, Jr., elaborates: "The return on investment here, of course, is very large because we don't have any basic investment. Our real investment is our good name which of course is the most valuable thing we own."

Perhaps Horowitz has exaggerated the crucial nature of the role of Litton in preserving the Greek junta. What is clear, however, is that the company chose an excellent time to drive a hard bargain. After agreement was reached, Horowitz adds, "Litton's promotional expertise . . . was promptly directed to the

vital task of convincing Americans — particularly very important Americans — of the virtues of iron rule in Athens.

Reporting on a conversation with the head of the Greek program, Horowitz claims that the Litton-Greece contract (The Greek junta is beginning to express displeasure with Litton's performance, though.) has been used as a prototype for comparable projects in Portugal and Turkey. Beyond them, the Litton planner indicated an interest in such countries as Nicaragua, Indonesia, and Taiwan.

Horowitz reports that "the key figure in Litton's PR work for the Junta is Barney Oldfield, Litton International's chief public information officer, who according to a spokesman for the Greek resistance runs the pro-Junta propaganda campaign in both Athens and in the United States."

Oldfield is a former Air Force Colonel who got his PR training as chief public information officer for NATO in Europe and has excellent Pentagon and political connections. The significance of choosing someone like Oldfield is that it expresses a new kind of monopolistic practice arising out of the manifold politicization at the top levels of the emerging American political economy.

### **NEW KIND OF MONOPOLY**

Tendencies toward monopoly are ordinarily subjected to critical scrutiny only when they have direct and rather obvious economic effects. Monopolistic conditions can also exist, however, in the area of vital political contacts, access to specialized knowledge or privileged information, availability of capital, and possession of resources for influencing public opinion. With regard to competition in particular industries, conglomerate-like corporations often increase the economic challenges to established enterprises. Much of the pious shrieking about the dangers of the merger phenomenon has been stimulated by sluggish — or even senile — companies who fear that efficient, imaginative newcomers will shatter the structure of the comfy oligopolies in which they have long conducted their business.

In Litton's Greek negotiations, of course, the use of the term "monopolistic practice" does not imply censure of Oldfield for entering business after retirement from military service. What it points to, rather, is the significance of a company's employing a man with well-nigh unique *contacts* for influencing American and NATO forces policy on a specific issue. Neither the interests of the American people nor those of the Greek people are of any moment in this application of influence.

To demonstrate a related form of monopolistic practice, Senator William Proxmire has prepared a report indicating that over 2000 high-ranking military officers are now employed by the major defense con-

tractors. The table of ITT directors and their activities shows the extent to which financial and political power can be deployed on behalf of corporations. As much as profit-oriented quantification, a very high degree of politicization is a fundamental characteristic of the major dynamic companies.

"All the world's a stage for profits to be made; nursing, housing, learning — each a source of programmed earning." This slogan succinctly — if painfully — captures the radical character of profit-oriented quantification. There appear to be no clear limits on the extent to which traditionally non-corporate human activities, individual persons, and whole peoples will be subordinated to the dictates of financial systems analysts.

Galbraith in *The New Industrial State* recognizes the profound importance of the large corporations. He errs, however, in discounting the continued corporate emphasis on profit, in ignoring the key political and financial role of directors in dynamic companies, and in exaggerating the policy making functions of the men below the top. The entrepreneurial drive has not vanished from America. But the means of expressing it are increasingly being monopolized by a privileged few at the command posts of the politicized economy.

## SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS

In the short run the new corporate structures are compatible with the old social forms. As has been pointed out earlier, though, techno-capitalist collectivism seriously conflicts with traditional American values. The emerging system is antipathetic both to "free enterprise" and to democracy. Inevitably, its reliance upon manipulation and special influence leads toward authoritarianism and oligarchy. Under the new order, if it becomes fully established, the "purpose" of America — and Americans — will be little more than the maintenance of a suitable environment for the realization of specifically corporate objectives.

Others talk revolution; the dynamic collectivists have been creating it. However much press coverage they get, neither the students nor the blacks nor the poor are generating the most fundamental transformations in American society. It is more nearly accurate to assert that these groups are reacting to the growth of techno-capitalist collectivism.

— WILLIAM D. PHELAN, JR.

(In Part V of "The Complex Society," which will appear several issues hence, Mr. Phelan will discuss some of the sources of instability in the emerging American system.)

## Political Mother Goose

### AN URBANIZED MOON

*More dollars, more dollars,  
Say all urban scholars;  
What makes them sing that tune?  
Why bother with old cities,  
When we're almost on the moon?*

### SUBURBAN WALLS

*Build a Wall, Zone a Wall,  
Suburban Man;  
Retreat from Town,  
As fast as you can;  
Mix your martinis,  
And make very certain,  
That no one crashes  
Your crabgrass curtain.*

### PEASE POLLUTION DEADLY

*Pease Pollution black,  
Pease Pollution deadly,  
Pease Pollution from the stacks  
Pours forth steady.  
Some hate the grime,  
Some hate the smell,  
After a bit of time,  
Some won't feel well.*

### BAH, BAH, BLACK MAN

*Bah, Bah, Black Man,  
Why do you Grieve?  
Whitey, Whitey,  
Don't be naive,  
Live in my Housing,  
Try my Occupation,  
Fall four years Behind  
With a ghetto Education.*

### THE MAYOR OF HEARTS

*The Mayor of Hearts  
Knows trouble starts,  
All on a summer's day;  
The Tycoon of Hearts  
For Maine departs,  
To rest and swim and play.  
The Poor, However,  
Endure hot weather,  
And there may be a riot;  
Vigilante groups,  
And calls for troops  
Are quite a price for quiet.*

## Volunteer State *—From page 8*

emphasis on "law and order," with its anti-Negro implications, was probably unavoidable; but he might have tempered his opposition to gun-control laws ("Guns don't kill. People kill.") in a district just outside the city where the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. was shot down less than a year earlier. Dunavant was reluctant to have his picture taken with Negro voters or to emphasize his progressive voting record in the state legislature; his workers even eliminated Negroes from their mailing lists.

But the best example of a reasonable approach to Negro voters that was rejected out of this nameless fear was a letter put out by the Haywood County Lincoln Club, an active group whose vice-chairman was one of the first Negroes in the county to send his children to a white school. Negroes gave Hubert Humphrey 1,500 of the 1,700 votes he received in Haywood County, the letter said, but when delegates were chosen for the convention that nominated Ed Jones, only four of Haywood's 17 representatives were Negroes. Jones assured white people that he would follow in "Fats" Everett's footsteps, the letter went on, but when "Jones spoke at our Baptist Church, no one heard him say he would follow 'Fats'." The letter noted that Jones, "at the pleasure of the Democratic Party," had been head of the Tennessee state ASCS (Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service) committee for eight years. (State and local ASCS committees have labored mightily in the past to deny Southern Negro farmers equal participation in federal farm programs.) "If he (Jones) could not get just one Negro man a job in Haywood, Tipton, Lauderdale or Crockett County measuring crops in 1968," said the Lincoln Club, "we should not trust him as our Congressman, he might be as helpless when it comes to helping the Negro as our Congressman Everett was."

The letter, in short, was a masterful appeal to Negro voters on a meaningful, but not inflammatory, issue. It concluded:

What about Dunavant? He agrees to represent the Negro honestly, which is more than we can expect from Davis or Jones if he follows the ex-Congressman's footsteps as promised. . . .

We, the Lincoln Club, recommend Dunavant with some reservations. He has no record to back him up. We realize only Jones or Dunavant can get results in Washington. We believe a heavy Negro vote in the District for a Republican where the Negro population has never had a voice in Congress will have effect in all future elections . . . The Negro will command more dignity and respect when not taken for granted by one party.

Since the letter made no extravagant claims for Dunavant, no fulsome promises, it was likely to have some credence in the Negro community; by the same token, it would not provide much ammunition if it fell into the wrong hands. But the Dunavant command refused to let the Lincoln Club send the letter to all the Negro voters in the district. Instead, it was sent only to the

registered Negroes in Haywood County; there was no backlash there, and Dunavant improved upon Nixon's 1968 performances by as much as a third in some Negro precincts, even though fewer people voted. But for his fear of retribution, he might have done the same all across the district. "Dunavant asked to represent the district," commented D. W. "Dick" Ross of Brownsville, a GOP veteran, after the election. "More than 20% of the district is black, but he didn't ask black people for their vote. We've got to wake up to the fact that a Congressman represents all of the people."

## ACCENT THE NEGATIVE

But Negroes were not the only interest group the Republican campaign ignored. To the extent that he raised any issues in his campaign, Dunavant generally relied on three major concerns — local control of schools ("I am strongly in favor of our school affairs being handled only at the county and state level. I am against busing of students for racial balance."); law and order and campus riots ("Federal funds given to Communist-led student groups spreading campus anarchy must be immediately stopped."); and most of all inflation and taxes. If there was one catchline that voters could associate with Leonard Dunavant, it was "Cut federal spending." "We cannot afford to endanger the future of our families, our businesses, our very way of life," the candidate said in a flyer that also did yeoman service as virtually the only Dunavant newspaper ad, "by sending to Congress a man who is committed to this Democrat program of tax and spend."

It was, in sum, a totally negative platform, appealing only to Dunavant's suburban neighbors — if, in fact, it appealed to anyone at all. "Cut federal spending," "return to a sound, conservative, business-like government," "fiscal responsibility," and "a balanced budget" did not have quite the same ring in the ghettos and on the small farms as it had in the middle-income suburbs. To a farmer who depends on government subsidies and price supports, or to a poor white or black who relies on federal food, welfare, or anti-poverty programs, a cut in federal spending may or may not be a good thing; but it certainly is not a clarion call.

Jones, the Democrat, seemed to realize that a major party in a district-wide race had to appeal to more than one class of voters; his advertisements contained all the standard conservative pledges, but he also advocated such measures as doubling the \$600 income tax exemption, rescinding a cut in the support price for soybeans (you can imagine what they thought of that in Millington and Nashville), building more community colleges, vocational schools, low-cost housing, and highways, and providing more and better jobs for the youth of the district. Pie in the sky? Something for everyone? Perhaps. But Jones at least appeared to recognize the human needs of the district, and he gave the voters something to be *for*, rather than against. As the Nashville *Tennessean* editorialized, "Tennessee Republicans are mistaken if they think they can ride into state or local office on Mr. Nixon's coattails without developing progressive programs of their own."

*—Please turn to page 21 bottom*

## The First 100 Days - From page 5

used existing anti-trust laws to commence litigation on conglomerate mergers which restrict free competition. In addition the Administration has recognized the unhealthy effects of concentration in the banking industry and has proposed legislation to close the one-bank holding company loophole and remove the danger that institutions of finance will use their lending power to restrain competition. Successful conglomerate litigation with the precedents established by new regulation of the banking industry, will have a healthy impact on the structure and nature of our economy and our society.

### YOUNG AMERICANS

Finally, there is the problem of youth, symbolized by the turmoil on a number of American campuses in the President's first 100 days. Outside factors, such as the war and the draft, have exacerbated university tensions. But even without these factors students would not return to the apolitical attitudes of the 1950s. For the new generation of young people have been reared to demand meaning, responsibility and independence at an early age. Yet society is not prepared to provide roles in which they can express these values in the years before they reach adult status and financial independence. A dispersal of power, a sharing of authority with the young will be necessary if hierarchical institutions are to tap the best energies of this new generation. But this message—their message—is not get-

ting through. Communication between the generations is breaking down, in part because debate on campus is monopolized by the loudest voices rather than by the most reasonable ones, in part because of a resort to violence that shatters the sense of community on which fruitful discourse in American institutions depends.

But in part communication is failing because of the rigidity of the generation in power, which is content to intone the principles on which its authority is based without bothering to justify them or adapt them to the needs of the younger generation. There are many older Americans who are willing to condemn the young from afar, few who are willing to reason with them face to face.

Federal legislation cannot heal the breach between the generations, but the President has the capacity to provide a mediating influence. He has already taken one step by appointing a commission to phase out the draft and replace it with an all-volunteer military—a position which Ripon has argued since 1966. But Mr. Nixon must have in addition a comprehensive program on all the various concerns of youth. Indeed, Ripon is preparing a major report to the President to provide just that.

As for non-governmental action, there is vacuum on campuses that requires the mobilization of those students who will be able to understand the wrongs of society but who will use libertarian means for righting these wrongs. On this subject, too, we expect to have more to say.

## Volunteer State - From preceding page

### RIGHT FACE

There is ample reason to conclude that Dunavant was really trying to run a respectable

version of what he or his advisors conceived of as a Wallace campaign. The American-flag bumper sticker, the singing of "Dixie" at rallies, the shunning of Negroes, the contribution card with the pledge "Dear Leonard: I agree with you that a lot has to be done in our country to clear up the mess the liberal politicians and Washington bureaucrats have got America in," all indicate a conscious determination to appeal to the extreme right, rather than the American mainstream — despite the presence of a Wallace-backed candidate in the race. But Dunavant — like other Tennessee and Southern Republicans — badly misread Wallace's appeal, in thinking Wallaceites could be reached by repeating the same conservative cliches the former governor used for code words. Such an interpretation ignored the populism, the racism, the "soul," and even the humor that go into the Alabamian's unique brand of politics. The number of Wallace votes that can be won by any Republican candidate is small; when there is also a Wallace candidate in the race (and there frequently will be in the next few years), the number, as Leonard Dunavant so conclusively demonstrated, is just about zero.

—MICHAEL S. LOTTMAN

## Directors - From page 10

Former Chmn., U.S. Council — Pierson  
Trustee, Chapin School — Perkins  
Trustee, Miss Porter's School — Perkins  
Dir., Dutchess School — Hilles

### LIBRARIES, MUSEUMS, FOUNDATIONS

Trustee, Chmn. Bd., John F. Kennedy Library—Black  
Trustee, Chmn. Bd., Pierpont Morgan Library—Black  
Trustee, Metropolitan Museum of Mod. Art — Perkins  
Trustee, Rip Van Winkle Foundation — Hilles  
Trustee, Chmn. of finance Committee, Ford Foundation — Black

Trustee, Cancer Research Foundation — Lannan

Dag Hammarskjold Foundation — Black

Trustee, Conservation Foundation — Black

### SOCIETIES AND ASSOCIATIONS

Vice Chmn., Planned Parenthood-World Population — Black

Dir., Center for Information on Aemrlica — Hilles

Former Pres., Internat. Air Transport Assn. — Pierson

Trustee, Boys' Clubs of America — Perkins

Trustee, Pres., American Shakespeare Festival—Black

Chmn. men's advisory committee to the Girls' Clubs of America — Black

Dir., Music Theatre of Lincoln Center — Hilles

Trustee, Seeing Eye — Perkins

Trustee, Pan American Society — Pierson

Dir., Project Hope — Black

Former Pres., Internat. Chamber of Commerce — Pierson

Texas Society of Certified Public Accountants — Westfall

Republican National Finance Committee — Hill

## Vietnam Middleground *-From back cover*

and labor union organizers line the jails. The Thieu regime is very egalitarian in its attempt to silence the dissident forces.

The existence of a middle ground is not very significant unless this force is able to exercise influence over the polar contestants. President Thieu has chosen to use repressive means to silence the "middle ground". The arrest of Thich Thien Minh and Father Lan and the ban of anti-war folk singer, Trinh Cong Son, indicates that he feels threatened by Buddhists, Catholics and youth they represent. At the same time by eliminating any possibility of support from these groups, he is placing his survival in the hands of military might. This for the most part still rests with the United States.

### HETEROGENEOUS BUT URBAN

Just as the GVN and the NLF can claim representation from Buddhists, Catholics and the less prominent Hoa Hao and Cao Dai sects, the "middle ground" has all of these - perhaps a majority of the devout Buddhists (which is basically a pacifistic religion) and a surprising number of Catholics. As a group it is more urban than rural based, and less likely to occupy high positions in the military or work directly with or for Americans.

It would be wrong to describe it as a "third force," however. Although Buddhists played a prominent role in overthrowing President Diem in 1963, hopes for a "third force," as an independent movement died for many in the Spring of 1966, when Premier Ky decided to take care of the Buddhist "problem" with tanks and rifles in Hue and Danang. Led at the time by Thich Quang (labeled a militant Buddhist, despite adherence to essentially non-violent tactics), the Buddhists remained dormant for over a year - until the eve of the 1967 presidential elections.

While students protested against the unethical tactics employed during the presidential election, Tri Quang and adherents of the An Quang Pagoda staged a sit-in in front of Thieu's Independence Palace protesting the revocation of the Buddhist charter. The question has never been settled.

The 1968 Tet offensive further confused and scattered the Buddhists and proponents of a "third force," while bringing several of its leaders together under imprisonment "for their own protection" according to Thieu. Tri Quang, Au Truong Thanh (former Minister of Economics under Ky) and Truong Dinh Dzu (runner-up in the 1967 presidential elections) were cloistered together with several others of similar status. Each one, although non-communist, was considered a threat by the government.

A few petitions were presented, the wives of the imprisoned staged a one-day demonstration and other similar weak responses were made to protest the im-

prisonment. Their release came eventually, in April, 1968. Today Dzu is back in jail, apparently for the duration of the regime. Au Trung Thanh is in self-exile in Paris. And Thich Tri Quang remains more or less under house arrest.

More recently, however, there has been a new round of activism by "middle ground" elements. A ten-mile procession, advocating "peace" occurred in late December led by monks of the An Quang Pagoda. It was capped with the releasing of about 20 white doves from the Pagoda roof, as well as clusters of balloons carrying paper doves. The gathering at the end of the peaceful procession was disrupted by Saigon combat police when youths began agitating for expanding the demonstration.

### CENSURE 'EM ARREST 'EM

The censure of Thich Thien Minh, one of the most prominent of the "middle ground" monks, through a warning not to advocate "peace" in his sermons, was Thieu's response to this activity.

Thien Minh has since been arrested along with approximately fifty of his followers in the wake of the most recent Communist attacks at the end of February. He was arrested under the pretext of having NLF propaganda as well as correspondence with Ho Chi Minh in his quarters at a Buddhist dormitory as well as for harboring draft dodgers.

Although it is difficult to know if this indictment is in fact true, its public pronouncement by Thieu can only further complicate his problems. If true, it means one important element of the "middle ground" has shifted much closer to the NLF than ever before. If false, it will further alienate many Vietnamese for attempting to discredit a popular figure.

Thirty-four of the students have been released, but Thien Minh was sentenced by a military court to ten years hard labor. The An Quang Pagoda issued a statement calling the sentencing, "brutal to a degree of nonsense," and "a serious provocation against the church." Dzu, the last prominent leader to be brought before a military court, was sentenced to five years hard labor as Con Son Island after testimony and deliberation of less than two hours.

Recently, the Thieu — Ky government announced the formation of a moderate party to attract the middle ground elements, but they have done little to implement their words or lay the groundwork for any genuine political movement.

### CONCILIATORY NLF STRATEGY

The National Liberation Front, on the other hand, seems to have placed more importance on the role of the "middle ground" in a peace settlement. Nor does it feel essentially threatened by it. The best example of this was the surfacing of the Alliance for National Democratic and Peace Forces, officially announced over the National Lib-

eration Front radio late in April 1968.

Although the communique said the Alliance was consummated during a two-day meeting April 21 and 22, 1968, near Saigon, it is believed that its origins go back much further. Earlier a regional committee was set up in Hue during the 1968 Tet offensive, with the venerable Thich Don Hau named as vice-president. Don Hau was also named vice-president of the national body composed of ten leaders. All are well known in Saigon as lawyers, doctors, and professors. Only one, a woman doctor, Duong Quynh Hoa, has been suspected of having previous Communist connections.

A May 9, 1969 New York *Times* report cites a captured prisoner as dating the formation of the plan to set up an alliance as far back as mid-1967. The article also cites a United States Mission Study that dates the concept for an alliance back to 1966 (that "would broaden the appeal of the NLF among various classes in Saigon who found it difficult to cooperate clandestinely with the Viet Cong.")

Whether the alliance has been successful or not, it is difficult to discern at this point. What is important is that the NLF is making an effort to attract the middle ground and therefore recognized its political potential. The Saigon government, by repressing the middle ground is furthering alienating itself from the population and making its own survival almost a matter of conjecture.

—RICHARD A. BERLINER

## LETTERS

Dear Sirs:

At the National Governing Board meeting in Easton, Maryland, the Committee on Long Range Policy, at the insistence of some of us still in the academic community, recognized that the Society may be becoming irrelevant to the group that had been its initial core—graduate students. A look at the Harvard Law School representation in the Cambridge chapter should give some cause for thought. There are ten members from the class of 1969 but only six from the class of 1970 and three from the class of 1971. Part of the problem has been that the local chapter has been so overburdened this year in carrying out the work of the National Office, especially *Lessons of Victory*, that there has been little time for active programming or recruitment. However, in a real sense our constituency has moved while the Society has stood still.

Graduate and professional schools are attracting people as concerned with social action as with creating research and political capital for themselves. The Society has been too concerned with the latter and, as a result, we have not been active at the local and campus level with regard to important local issues, such as rent control and the general housing problems here in Cambridge.

It is important that the Society attempt to increase its influence by hiring more permanent staff and creating new chapters, but this influence cannot be won at the expense of cutting ourselves off from the group that has provided the brains and, especially the energy, in the past. We can continue to be successful only if we create

hardworking volunteer organizations at the chapter level not paper organizations with part-time members.

At the moment the full impact of this trend is several years away. It would indeed be ironic, however, if history showed that the energy of the Society was coopted for a few government jobs and some influence at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. That would be a mighty small pot of porridge!

SAMUEL A. SHERER

Mr. Sherer is vice-president of the Cambridge chapter.

## 14a ELIOT STREET

● The offices of the Mayor of Easton, Maryland were the scene for the Ripon Society's National Governing Board meeting, April 26th and 27th. Two new chapters were recognized at this meeting—Hartford on a provisional status, and Washington, D.C. on a full basis. Members were divided into committees to discuss programs dealing with the cities, the administration, the party, and youth, and many new ideas and opinions were aired. Special thanks for the enjoyable stay go to the Washington chapter, and in particular to *Steve Herbits*.

● Research Director Bob Behn's editorial efforts have provided the big news of the month. The *Lessons of Victory*, Ripon's analysis of the 1968 election, was published on April 29. Already it has received much favorable comment—Thomas Lask in *The New York Times* called it "... an interest laden document ... the kind of book he (the voter) wishes he had read before going to the booth last November ... a penetrating study." The New York chapter sponsored a victory party for the book on April 29, and over 50 local chapter members and city political literati figures attended.

● Just released by the Chicago chapter is a position paper on Education in Chicago's Inner-City, complete with illustrations and a smashing red cover.

● The New Haven chapter announces its new officers: Chairman, *William E. Craig*; Vice-Chairman, *William H. Jeffress, Jr.*; Local Political Chairman, *Paul O. Capra*; State Political Chairman, *Lawrence DeNardis*; Research Director, *John Melninger*; Publicity Director, *James Carter*; Program Director, *Hayward Draper*. The new Hartford chapter also announces its new officers to be: President, *Nicholas Norton*; Vice-President, *Robert Smith*; Treasurer, *Mrs. S. Michael Schatz*; Secretary, *Mrs. Robert Mooney*; Director of Research, *William S. Glazier, II*; and Directors at Large, *Paul Aziz*, *Edward Cohen*, *Alvin Dozeman*, and *Isaac Russell*. The New York chapter sponsored a luncheon with *James Reston* on May 14; several local chapter members and men from the national office attended. The new D.C. group is planning a conference, along the lines of the Packwood sponsored Dorchester Conference in Oregon. The purpose of the conference is to excite people, and to get them involved in the issues and the party. *Dan Hirshfield* will be leaving the Cambridge chapter and his position as assistant professor of history at Boston College to work for HEW in its Policy Planning Committee. The Boston chapter is starting to organize a research project on local taxation and revenue.

● In Philadelphia a group of Ripon members is meeting to discuss *Dick Beeman's* proposed housing project for the group.

### THE CRY HALT AWARD

To Lodge 23 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (Wright Patterson AFB, Dayton, Ohio), who refuse to continue the practice of literally rolling out the red carpet for visiting poohbahs, noting that their members "have a right not to be required to bow and scrape for rank, ceremony, privilege, and power."

# The Vietnamese "Middle Ground"

One of the most important and little realized facts about the internal politics of South Vietnam is that despite the years of physical and political struggle the country has seen, there exists a sizeable "middle ground" whose "heart" has been won by neither side. This swing segment remains as disaffected and unmoved as ever by the rhetoric of the Saigon regime and the National Liberation Front.

Because the military stalemate has led to increasing emphasis on the need for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, the "middle ground" has become progressively more important. In fact, it seems clear that any settlement which pretends to be permanent will have to take this element of the population into account.

The political difficulties this imposes are immense because of the make-up of the "middle ground" itself. Fragmented among religious, political and class groupings, the one cohesive force that binds this element is a desire for PEACE, *i.e.* an end to the massive destruction with anticipation of continued "in-fighting" among the Vietnamese forces.

An important element within the "middle ground" are the youth, students in the high schools and universities as well as non-students under thirty. If there is one failure that can be attributed to the Ky and then Thieu regimes, it has been their inability to attract the support of Vietnam's young people. Thieu has not mistakenly tried to organize his own youth movement like Ky's Anti-Fraud League (which had to be disbanded because of corruption over use of government money and the purchasing of draft deferments), but neither has he gotten any of the youth organizations (and there are a considerable number) to give him more than token support.

Instead he has enlarged the disaffection felt by the youth by cracking down swiftly and subtly - not with riot troops as Ky was forced to use in 1966, but with the secret police, the jails and military courts.

A Christmas concert of anti-war songs was broken up with over eighty arrested. Youth idol, Trinh Cong Son's music was banned for its advocacy of peace and

### THE AUTHOR

*Richard A. Berliner served six months in Vietnam with the Committee of Responsibility from March, 1968. Prior to this position, he served from September, 1966 with the International Voluntary Service, working with youth and student groups in development problems and refugee assistance near Saigon. He is currently a student of Southeast Asian Affairs at American University.*

a united Vietnam. New petitions for peace have been presented to the government, and new groupings have occurred to push the peace issue. Probably the most prominent of these is the "Genuine Nationalists," reportedly formed around General Duong van (Big) Minh - a popular figure who returned from exile in Thailand last fall.

Less overt in their disagreement with the Thieu regime are a growing number of Catholics (Thieu is a Catholic), both Northern and Southern. Essentially made up of intellectuals, professionals, and priests, this group has a strong conviction for the need for peace and a realization that Thieu is not focusing on this question. A feeling is developing that it may be easier to work with the National Liberation Front and in fact necessary if peace is going to happen. This is a strong voice in face of the common belief that the 'communists' would disallow the freedom to practice religion, especially for Catholics. Priests in the South know, however, that this has not been the case in the North, through communication with relatives via Paris.

One of the bright young voices among the Catholic dissidents, Father Nguyen Ngoc Lan, has been imprisoned since December.

### EMINENT 'HO U. ALUMNI'

What Thieu has perhaps failed to understand is the politicalization that takes place in Vietnamese jails. Writes Saigon free-lance correspondent, Don Luce (whose nine years in Vietnam give him a unique perspective). "For decades political prisoners have been sent to Con Son (a prison island). In the time of the French it became known as the University of Ho Chi Minh because so many of its 'graduates' joined the Viet Minh after imprisonment there. Today, some of Vietnam's most respected leaders including Phan Khac Suu, the Cao Dai political leader, and Dr. Phan Quang Dan, Suu's running mate in the third-place ticket in the September 1967 presidential elections, proudly list their stays at Con Son among their political assets. Conspicuously missing from this list, however, is the present Saigon government leadership."

Just how many more than official American estimates of 20,000 political prisoners sit in Vietnam's jails is difficult to say. Some estimates run into the hundreds of thousands. Very few have the luxury of being brought to trial. If more were, it could be seen clearly that not only disaffected students but also prominent religious leaders, reserve military officers

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
# RIPON FORUM

May, 1969

SPECIAL  
SAFEGUARD  
SUPPLEMENT

**A  
B  
M**

## Debate: Prelude to a Broader Questioning



The arguments advanced by the Administration in favor of deploying the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile at this time have not competed very successfully in the marketplace of ideas. The most significant manifestation of this failure is the large number of Senators, among whom are many Republicans more than predisposed to support a new GOP administration's high priority proposals, who simply are not buying Safeguard.

This development represents an extraordinary turnaround in the climate of opinion, one which neither occurred overnight nor will vanish very soon. The roots of the current confrontation obviously transcend the merits or drawbacks of the ABM proposal per se. Indeed, Safeguard is by all accounts a substantial improvement over its ill-conceived predecessor, the Johnson Sentinel. But it is Safeguard's fate, like Sentinel's before it, to run up against two related and long-delayed reactions in Congress, one of dissolving confidence and one of crumbling assumptions.

*(Continued on Supplement Back Cover)*

# Contents

## I. The Meaning of the Debate

The ABM debate, of which the Safeguard controversy is merely the latest round, has been termed symbolic, but prophetic is probably a better word. The long-delayed scrutiny of the bloated U.S. weapons budget which is now beginning certainly will not end with the Safeguard vote, and the editors attempt to analyze a few of the forces at work and why they argue for genuine compromise by the young Administration.

— COVER

*This special supplement has been compiled by the Ripon Society in an attempt to clarify the confused and complicated Safeguard debate by presenting the issues as completely and honestly as possible. Copies are available at 50 cents apiece individually or at bulk rates. For information, write or call the Ripon Society, 14a Eliot Street, Cambridge, Mass. 02140 (617-491-4180).*

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## II. The Historic Armed Services Hearings

One of the most significant developments of the ABM debate was the appearance of a large crack in the Armed Services Committee Pentagon identity (at least in the Senate) which has so long endured. For the first time in many a year, both sides were heard at the April hearings, and Alton Frye explains how the specific areas of disagreement were focused while the issues themselves broadened.

— S 3

*Mr. Frye, a political scientist specializing in arms control, has taught at UCLA and Harvard and been a consultant to the RAND Corporation and to various members of the House, Senate, and executive branch.*

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## III. ABM: The Issues Raised and the Questions Unanswered

In a broad and piercing analysis of the appallingly complex debate, Jeremy J. Stone draws upon his extensive familiarity with the testimony of this Spring's hearings, the history of the ABM concept and the facts of the argument to dissect the issues which underlie the Safeguard debate and the inconsistencies which have marked the arguments of the ABM proponents.

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*Dr. Jeremy J. Stone is a member of the Council of the Federation of American Scientists and a member of the Institute for Strategic Studies. Currently working under a grant from the Social Science Research Council of New York City, he will be an International Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1969-1970. Dr. Stone has written widely on problems of national security and arms control and is the author of *Containing the Arms Race: Some Specific Proposals* (MIT Press, 1966) and *Strategic Persuasion: Arms Limitation Through Dialogue* (Columbia University Press, 1967). From 1964-1966 he was at the Harvard Center for International Affairs.*

# 'Inner Debate' Narrows While Issues Begin to Broaden

The policy issues raised by President Nixon's recommended ABM deployment are inherently complicated, and they have not always been simplified or clarified by the kind of political contest which has developed around this decision. There is a clear and present danger that proponents and opponents will be drawn into a process of escalating arguments, invoking irrelevancies, scoring points against each other but obscuring the real problems at the heart of the issue.

The momentum in this direction was already well-established by the earlier disputation over the so-called Sentinel deployment proposed by President Johnson. The manner in which that earlier debate merged into the current one accounts in large part for what Meg Greenfield of *The Washington Post* has called the "ragged non-debate on ABM." Many people, public and private figures alike, had staked out positions which seem to have made them less open to a fresh consideration of the distinctive issues posed by the Safeguard proposal, and more prone to let their predispositions govern. If one doubts this, it would be interesting to ask how many of those who expressed their views for or against Sentinel have voiced a different opinion regarding Safeguard.

The automatic quality of the response to President Nixon's decision is well illustrated by the facts that, within an hour after his first briefing on the Safeguard plan, Senator Edward Kennedy was seeking to organize a national movement against the deployment and within a scarcely larger period of time Senator Henry Jackson and other advocates of the very different Sentinel deployment were warmly endorsing the revised ABM system. In neither case did the parties allow themselves time for a thorough and deliberate study of the new proposal.

But this visible feature of the larger public debate, this tendency toward polarization and rigidity in the competition for popular support, does not adequately reflect the trends in what might be termed the inner debate, the discussion and analysis taking place among the most informed critics and supporters of the Safeguard scheme.

### NEW FOCUS TO ISSUES

This inner debate reached a notable milestone in the historic hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 22 and 23. With eight prominent

witnesses, equally divided between opponents and proponents of Safeguard, the Committee heard testimony widely described as the most balanced and constructive yet taken on the question. The result was to narrow the range of disagreement and to focus the issues more sharply.

Dr. Hans Bethe, though not a witness, had anticipated the drift of the inner debate some weeks before in a typically thoughtful letter to Senator John Sherman Cooper. Declaring himself still opposed to deployment as "premature," Dr. Bethe praised the President's proposal as "considerably improved" and as a "constructive move" away from a thick system of city defense against the Soviet Union.

"I consider the ABM defense of Minuteman sites technically feasible and in principle sensible," wrote Dr. Bethe. "It is a reasonable safeguard against the development of MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles)." However, he urged delay in deployment to allow time both for arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union and for further work on an improved radar design for hard-point defense.

The subsequent testimony before the Armed Services Committee revolved around precisely such issues. How vulnerable is the Minuteman force likely to be in the mid-seventies? Is Safeguard likely to be an effective means of protecting the Minuteman? Is there time and is it feasible to develop better radars and other components optimized for the hard-point defense mission? Is it necessary to deploy the initial Safeguard facilities to test out concepts and technologies that will be prerequisite to any more advanced system? Will the projected arms control negotiations be helped or hindered by a present decision to proceed with deployment? These and similar issues, technical, political and strategic, were addressed in a calm and reasoned manner rarely seen in the commentary on this volatile subject.

### MINUTEMAN VULNERABILITY

Concern over the potential vulnerability of Minuteman was generally acknowledged by the witnesses. Under the assumptions that the Soviet Union (1) could continue to deploy large SS-9 missiles at the recent rate, (2) could develop MIRV, and (3) could achieve by 1975 accuracies already demonstrated by the United

States in 1969, Albert Wohlstetter of the University of Chicago presented calculations showing that only 5% of the Minuteman force would survive a first strike. He challenged numbers presented by MIT's George Rathjens, who had concluded that 25% of the force would survive. Dr. Rathjens did not rebut the observation that he had used an incorrect factor which overstated the hardness of a Minuteman silo. He and most witnesses agreed that the Minuteman system could become increasingly vulnerable during the next decade.

With common agreement that the possible vulnerability of the land-based missiles to a MIRV attack could become serious in a few years, the critical questions shifted to the nature and timing of U.S. action to cope with the problem. In earlier hearings some Senators had cavalierly suggested the United States should adopt a launch-on-warning strategy, that is, determine to fire the Minuteman force on the basis of radar indications that an attack against the United States was being launched. This hasty and ill-considered notion, which disregarded the compelling arguments against a posture which would likely paralyze an American President by demanding that he launch a strike against Soviet cities merely on the basis of "blips" on a radar screen, received virtually no support.

Other familiar options to ABM were also assessed by various witnesses in various ways. Hard-rock silos to improve Minuteman survivability were discussed as a more reliable technology, or dismissed as completely at the mercy of improvements in accuracy and largely dependent on a number of uncertain physical properties of rock. It was also evident that construction of such facilities might appear to the Soviet as a massive and provocative increase in U.S. offensive missiles, since additional silos would have to be prepared before existing silos were phased out.

No one pressed for super-hardening of this type nor was there support for a present increase in the total number of offensive weapons in the U.S. inventory, though George Rathjens and Herbert York argued that this option would probably be preferable to ABM if an actual threat to Minuteman later materialized.

In brief and with some exceptions the debate before the Committee tended to concentrate on whether to proceed with Safeguard now or to postpone deployment pending strategic arms negotiations with Moscow and further development of an improved ABM system, including particularly its radars. Thus, though judgments varied sharply on these matters, the range of disagreement was substantially reduced, in both the technical and political realms.

### **SAFEGUARD VULNERABILITY**

Perhaps the most striking thesis of the two days was offered by Dr. Rathjens in his analysis of the alleged ease with which the Soviets could overwhelm

the presently scheduled Safeguard system. According to his figures, if the assumed production rate of SS-9 actually continued into the mid-seventies, together with MIRV and improved accuracies, the proposed defense of Minuteman could be swamped by three or four months' additional production of the large Soviet missile. If this calculation can be sustained in the classified submission which Dr. Rathjens promised the Committee, it would appear to be conclusive.

However, the calculation seems to have been based on highly static assumptions regarding defense tactics. For example, it may not take account of the reportedly favorable marginal costs of adding redundant radars and multiplying ABM missiles to improve the system's effectiveness and survivability. Among other things, a limited increase in radar capability permits the defense to adopt a so-called "preferential mode" of operation, allocating most of its missiles to protecting only certain radars while the offense must spread its attack across all the radars, if it chooses to concentrate on them as the weak link in the system. The theoretical results of such preferential operations are dramatic, and favor the ABM.

On this question the claims of Dr. John Foster, director of Defense Research and Engineering, are far-reaching indeed. Though acknowledging the relative softness of the radars compared to Minuteman silos, he asserts that the system is designed to present to an attacker a roughly equal trade-off between striking at the radars, in order to disable the ABM, and striking at the Minuteman targets directly. This contention is disputed by Professor Wolfgang Panofsky, though no detailed analyses have been released to sustain either view.

Setting aside the more intricate technological assessments, there emerged a fair degree of consensus that a potential attacker would have to assume that the ABM system works, and would have to plan any attack accordingly. But opinions vary greatly as to whether this necessary assumption is a helpful contribution to stable deterrence or a dangerous stimulus to an increase in Soviet offensive forces.

Nor is there agreement on the proposition that since the Safeguard system is oriented to a defense of the deterrent and not of cities, the Soviets need not increase their offensive if their goal is to maintain a capacity to retaliate against the U.S. population centers, and hence to deter an American first strike. Critics remain skeptical of this reasoning, fearing that the Soviets may feel obliged to expand their offensive forces in anticipation of a possible extension of Safeguard to a thicker city defense. The opponents discount President Nixon's explicit rejection of such a prospect and his attempt to define a deployment that minimizes the possibility of such expansion.

*—Please turn to page S 15*

# ABM: The Issues Raised and The Questions Unanswered

## I. The Argument in Capsule

The procurement of an anti-missile missile, Nike-Zeus was first considered by the Department of Defense ten years ago. By fiscal 1964, five years later, the Department of Defense viewed missile defense as the "most urgent problem" for the U. S. defensive forces but had concluded that Nike-Zeus, then being tested, "would not be effective against a sophisticated threat in the late 1960's and early 1970's."<sup>1</sup> Indeed, testimony in 1963 revealed that Nike-Zeus could have been built by 1963-1964 but would have been obsolete by the time it was operational.<sup>2</sup> There was, at this time, no consideration given to such later rationales as light Soviet attacks, accidental launches, Soviet submarine-launched missiles, or protection of command and control. Neither was there any public consideration of a possible Chinese threat.

The next system, Nike-X, was to have three major improvements over Nike-Zeus. It was to have a very high-acceleration interceptor (SPRINT) to permit delay in firing until the last possible second, when the atmosphere would have permitted discrimination of decoys. It was to have a multifunction array radar (MAR) which would permit many objects to be tracked simultaneously. Finally, its components were supposed to lend themselves to a greater degree of "hardening," that is, various steps taken to decrease a missile site's vulnerability to near hits. Nevertheless, testimony revealed the fact that it would have been obsolete relative to projected Soviet improvements two years before its construction could have been completed in 1968.<sup>3</sup>

In 1965, Nike-X was further deferred because of "technical problems" and "even greater uncertainties concerning the preferred concept of deployment, the relationship of the Nike-X system to other elements of a balanced damage-limiting effort, the timing of the attainment of an effective nationwide fallout shelter system and the nature and effect of an opponent's possible reaction to our Nike-X deployment."<sup>4</sup>

In 1966, in discussing possible Soviet reactions to deployment of Nike-X, Secretary McNamara's pos-

ture statement included among likely responses "a large number of big, land-based missiles"; evidently he referred to the SS-9 or missiles like them. (Many are now arguing that these are being stepped up in response to the signals of our intention to deploy ABM that have been emitted over the last two years. Large missiles lend themselves to multiple warheads, which are useful for exhausting the supply of interceptors of a missile defense. This is the reason the United States is increasing the capacity of its missiles on land, and those based at sea, and is soon to emplace multiple warheads upon them.) Because of this kind of Soviet response, among other reasons, and because such a response would eventually undermine, in turn, U. S. offensive weapons, Secretary McNamara further deferred Nike-X.

## ENTER THE CHINESE THREAT

In 1966, for the first time, the Department of Defense broached the possibility of a defense against Chinese missiles. It argued that a small Chinese force could possibly be deployed by the "mid-to-latter part of the 1970's." But three years later, in March, 1969, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard testified that the Chinese were "not much further along" in building ICBMs than they had been three years before, i.e., in 1966. Hence there has been little or no Chinese progress since the notion of a Chinese threat was raised. And the small Chinese force in question would presumably now emerge only in the late 1970's or early 1980's if, indeed, the Cultural Revolution has not set back the Chinese nuclear and missile program decisively. Secretary Laird did testify before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States Senate (the Gore Subcommittee) on March 21, 1969 that, on the best intelligence evidence available to him, the Chinese "will" fire a test ICBM in the next 18 months. But considering the length of time, and the Chinese failure to make significant ICBM progress for three years, 18 months seems to be the standard estimate of capabilities rather than a precise prediction. (For newspaper reports that ideological

conflicts have "slowed the development and production of Chinese nuclear armaments," see the New York *Times* of October 28, "Nuclear Program Slowed in China." China has only a small pool of western and Soviet-trained nuclear scientists, highly suspect in China, whose efficiency might easily be undermined by the requirements of self-criticism.)

The 1966 posture statement also referred vaguely to an Nth country threat but, except for China, the source of the danger is most unclear. It is symptomatic that France has been mentioned in this connection, because there seems no more likely threat in the same time horizon. The Nth Country threat really seems to mean China. Since the 1966 posture statement deferred an anti-Chinese thin defense decision on the grounds that "no deployment decision need be made now" and since the Chinese threat is no further along, it seems in 1969 that the Chinese threat would not require a decision now, either.

Yet in September 1967, Secretary McNamara did announce the decision to deploy a thin defense against the Chinese, using exoatmospheric interceptors (SPARTANS) and covering the entire country with approximately 15 sites. He called the decision "marginal" and warned in extravagant terms against letting the system grow into a thick system.

How can one explain the timing of the Sentinel decision — only nine months after Mr. McNamara had testified that no decision need be made — in light of recent testimony that the Chinese Communists are "not much further along" even two years later? Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Paul C. Warnke, argues that "we had to make the decision to deploy if we were to have a system in the field by the time the Chinese *could begin to deploy ICBMs.*" (Italics added.)<sup>5</sup> Earlier, when Mr. McNamara had argued for deferral, he had spoken repeatedly of the mid-seventies when a "small force" of Chinese ICBMs would have been in place.

It seems evident that the five-year lead time required to build the missile defense exceeded the lead time required by the Chinese to "begin to deploy ICBM's. Hence, accepting the rule that the missile defense had to be installed against China by the time the first ICBM appeared, the U. S. would have to act in anticipation of a Chinese ICBM that might never appear.

### POLITICAL REASONS?

In view of the weak rationale advanced, many political commentators suggested that the decision had been made for political reasons. These arose from: (1) the Soviet deployment of a Moscow missile defense, but one similar in important respects to an obsolete system, Nike-Zeus; (2) fears — now known to be unfounded — that the Tallinn bomber defense had signi-

ficant missile defense capabilities; (3) the then approaching Presidential election of 1968; and (4) the unwillingness of the Soviet Union for 18 months to set a date to begin the talks already agreed upon in principle.

With rare unanimity, Chinese experts saw no reason why the Chinese would be "irrational" or undeterrable. In the background, however, there were reasons for a Chinese defense that were normally discussed less openly. In answer to a question put by *Life Magazine*, Secretary McNamara suggested that the Chinese would not have an ability to retaliate significantly against a nuclear attack (i.e. a second-strike capability sufficient to cause "unacceptable" damage) for fifteen or twenty years.<sup>6</sup> Thus an anti-Chinese missile defense would increase, at least on paper, the U. S. capability to threaten China with strategic attack, with a high assurance of avoiding retaliation. In the September 1967 speech by Secretary McNamara, this advantage was sketched as an "additional indication to Asians that we intend to deter China from nuclear blackmail." Sometimes it was given as a way of preventing China from deterring us "from taking actions that might risk a Chinese attack."<sup>7</sup> Others saw it as a system that might free the United States to attack the Chinese nuclear capability. Or, more generally, as one defense analyst put it: "American leaders probably would develop different attitudes towards the Chinese accordingly as the United States did or did not have BMD," i.e., ballistic missile defense.

Paradoxically, when Secretary McNamara was asked why the Chinese could not be deterred from firing missiles at us, his only explanation was that they might fear a U. S. nuclear attack and pre-emptively fire their missiles out of fear "because otherwise they would not be able to launch at all" their "small and highly vulnerable" force.<sup>8</sup> It seems that the United States was increasing, with its missile defense, the credibility of a U. S. attack on China. But simultaneously it was giving this U. S. threat of attack as the only explanation for the Chinese launching missiles against us!

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul C. Warnke repeated Mr. McNamara's rationale; fear of Chinese pre-emption in anticipation of U. S. attack. Without explanation, he argued that the U. S. missile defense would "deter the Chinese from pre-empting." But if the Chinese feared that most of their missiles would be lost in an initial U. S. attack, the chance that others might be shot down in the air would hardly be an additional deterrent to firing them. And since Mr. Warnke emphasized the reduction in U. S. risks that such a missile defense might provide, the missile defense obviously would increase Chinese fears that the United States might just take a chance on disarming China. In short, the missile defense would seem to raise significantly the

very fears it was supposed to answer. This argument of Chinese pre-emption played an important part in the Defense Department rationale because Mr. Warnke argued that we do not consider the Chinese as "basically irrational."<sup>9</sup>

## LONG SHOT INSURANCE

In the speech announcing Sentinel, Mr. McNamara also raised the argument that Sentinel would protect "against the improbable accidental launch of an intercontinental missile by any one of the nuclear powers." More recently, testimony has suggested that the missile defense would not be primed to respond on very short warning, hence it might only be importantly useful to the extent that it could successfully intercept accidental firings that occurred in crises and were aimed at cities (many missiles are, of course, not so aimed). Considerable controversy exists over whether an accidental firing is really possible — none has occurred in the last decade on either side. Such accidents seem rather more an abstract fear than a concrete possibility whose probability can be assessed in any specific way.

The third reason given in the original announcement for Sentinel was that a "Chinese-oriented ABM deployment would enable us to add — as a concurrent benefit — a further defense of our Minuteman sites against Soviet attack, which means that at modest cost we would in fact be adding even greater effectiveness to our offensive missile force and avoiding a much more costly expansion of that force."

However, testimony given concerning more recent estimates of the cost of defending both the radars and the Minuteman missile has suggested that it might cost \$25 to \$100 million to save each \$4 million Minuteman.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, somewhere between \$700 million and \$1 billion would be involved in the Phase I effort to interdict an enemy attack with approximately 75 interceptors. For these sums, 175 to 250 additional Minutemen could be purchased; thus even if every interceptor worked perfectly and every enemy missile were perfectly accurate, two or three times as many U. S. missiles could be built as would be saved.

Two years later, under the Nixon Administration Safeguard program, the defense of Minutemen had become not an option but the central rationalization of the system. Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard argued that Soviet SS-9 large missiles, if purchased at existing rates for the next five years, if made accurate, and if fitted with multiple independently guided warheads, would threaten to destroy many Minuteman missiles.

Secretary Laird noted on several occasions that this projection of possible Soviet missile production was based on "new evidence" which his Administration had received and which had not been available to

the previous Administration. There was speculation that this new information was simply the discovery, through aerial reconnaissance, of some more SS-9's in December of last year. Was the evidence from one month's reports sufficient to permit an extrapolation, for five years, of 50 SS-9's a year? Could not intelligence that changed in a month change again?

The Defense Department spokesman emphasized the urgency of getting started on the protection of Minuteman with a missile defense. Asked about this urgency, Secretary Packard told the Gore Subcommittee that building an entire prototype test-site before beginning to protect Minuteman would mean a "four-or five-year delay." But many argued that the relevant question was the cost of putting off deployment for a year only. One need not commit himself to a four- or five-year delay, and research and development could continue.

## RADAR VULNERABILITY

Indeed, if there were urgency, would the Hardpoint program protect enough Minutemen? If indeed, there would be only several tens of SPRINT interceptors, each with only limited range (ten miles or so), not very many Minutemen could get close-in protection.<sup>11</sup> And even fewer would be protected if many SPRINT's had to be assigned to protect the vulnerable radars. One witness noted that the radars could be attacked with SS-11's, which were too inaccurate to attack the missiles. Hence perhaps no SS-9's at all would have to be diverted from attacking Minutemen by the Hardpoint Defense. The SS-9's need only wait until the radars had been destroyed and the Hardpoint Defense blinded.

Testimony has shown great concern over the effectiveness of the radar, as well as its vulnerability. Pentagon Fact Sheet 189-69 notes that nuclear warheads can be "deliberately detonated" outside the atmosphere to create large regions of ionized gas which is opaque to the long-range PAR radar "for many tens of seconds".<sup>12</sup> As far back as 1964, U. S. planners were openly discussing using a "precursor warhead" for part of the payload capacity of a multiple warheaded missile. This precursor would be "detonated above the enemy target complex blacking out, or at least degrading, enemy missile defense radars".<sup>13</sup> Why couldn't the Soviet planners do the same thing to the Safeguard radars, both MSR and PAR?

Along this line, many political observers wondered if it made political sense to protect one's deterrent with a weapons system in which there was little public or scientific confidence. Wouldn't there be defense scares and alarms as vulnerabilities in the radars (or arrangements of the interceptors) were perceived by defense specialists over the years? A deterrent has

to do more than deter, it has to have the confidence of those at home and abroad who need reassurance about the state of our defenses. Indeed, such a complicated system might not allay the anxieties for many months of even those defense experts who were pressing for it. — Would they return and ask for something new shortly after construction began? Of the bomber defense system, one expert had written, years ago, that it had so many vulnerabilities that a defense analyst could not even make his reputation by pointing out more.

## THE MULTIPLE WARHEAD QUESTION

Returning to the question of the extrapolated threat, some wondered not only about the assumption that SS-9's would be built at current rates for five years, but also about the way in which multiple warheads might be emplaced upon them. Thus far, Defense Department fact sheets has only argued that the Russians were testing MRV (multiple re-entry vehicles) and not MIRV (multiple independently guided re-entry vehicles). Without extensive and accurate guidance, multiple warheads do not present an added threat to enemy missiles because they cannot destroy more than one target. MRV warheads, which the Russians are testing, have long ago been installed in most of the U.S. missile force — e.g., in the Polaris A-3 missile which has three clustered warheads. There is no evidence yet that the Soviet Union will seek high accuracy and independent guidance both — each of which is necessary to attack Minuteman. It is significant that perhaps 800 of the approximately 1,000 Soviet land-based missiles are SS-11's, which have little accuracy and present no threat to our Minuteman.

The Russian lack of interest in high accuracy — accuracy useful for attacking missiles but not necessary for attacking cities — is one reason why Dr. Alain Enthoven, former Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis, had testified in April 1968 that: "For the most part, however, the Soviets appear to be developing a second-strike capability that is largely designed for assured destruction. . . ." <sup>14</sup> Could observations like these, based on two decades of arms race with the Russians, be shifted by a month's new intelligence? What could Secretary Laird have learned to cause such a flip-flop in Defense Department interpretation? He said: ". . . they are going for a first-strike capability. There is no question about that." <sup>15</sup> Some speculated that Secretary Laird had not been advised of the possible Soviet-felt need to use SS-9's to multiply their warheads against a possible U.S. missile defense. Conceivably, those most interested in having the U.S. begin a missile defense would find it an undesirable point to emphasize to him.

Secretary Packard, arguing for the Hardpoint program, asserted that "This country must assure itself

and any potential enemy that at least several hundred Minuteman missiles out of the 1000 deployed will survive and strike back against enemy cities. Even a few hundred surviving Minuteman could kill tens of millions of the enemy and thus deter him from attacking." He referred to the need to "guarantee the survival of the minimum essential number of Minutemen." <sup>16</sup>

## POLARIS DISCOUNTED

This raised the question of why, if a few hundred surviving Minutemen could deter the enemy, several hundred Polaris missiles could not. Was there really a "minimum essential number" of Minutemen? To this, Secretary Packard testified that we did not want to "put all of our eggs in one basket," namely the 41 Polaris submarines.

Secretary Laird also argued repeatedly that he did not believe that "Polaris would be sufficient, in that time period after 1972, to be relied upon as the deterrent force of the United States". <sup>17</sup> However Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, testified in April 1968 before the Armed Services Committee that at least he had "very high confidence" that Polaris' invulnerability would be maintained. Among other things he noted that a very-long-range missile ULMS could be installed on the submarines that would keep them in range of targets "while in port," that is, an underwater-launched ICBM. Admiral Moorer expressed confidence that Poseidon missiles mounted *even on surface ships* would be sufficiently invulnerable through mobility to serve adequately as a deterrent. <sup>18</sup>

In all the apprehension over continued Polaris reliability, no specific argument has been made to show how Polaris might become vulnerable. Secretary Packard noted only that "the limitation of Polaris' concealment lies in the degree of effort an enemy is willing to make to find and destroy the submarines". <sup>19</sup> Secretary Laird told *U.S. News and World Report* that after what he had seen, he could not say that Polaris would be invulnerable "forever." Did such observations justify calling the Nation's most prized deterrent into question? Observers in Geneva had noted, according to newspaper reports, that the Soviet treaty on the seabed was far more comprehensive than the U.S. proposal and therefore they had concluded that the United States was far ahead in anti-submarine warfare capabilities. This conclusion is consistent with much other information, and with geography that makes the Atlantic virtually a Western sea.

## MISSILE MULTIPLICATION

Observers also noted that if the MIRV program of emplacing multiple independently-guided re-entry

vehicles was completed, each Minuteman missile would have three separately targetable warheads. Hence 350 of the 1000 Minutemen could do the job of the 1000 previously. Meanwhile, the Polaris submarines would have, or eventually gain the capacity to carry, ten or even more warheads on each missile. Hence *four to six thousand separately* targetable warheads would be emplaced on 41 submarines beneath the oceans. These increases seemed far in excess of any diminutions in U.S. striking power that large Soviet missiles might achieve. (These new MIRVed missiles are scheduled to be installed beginning in 1969 and 1970.) No indication exists whether the Defense Department's concern is pre- or post-MIRV, i.e., whether it is worried about a "minimum essential number" of Minutemen with one targetable warhead or three, backed up by 656 Polaris missiles (pre-MIRV) or four to six thousand (post-MIRV). Indeed, although U.S. MIRVed warheads may begin to be deployed in a matter of months, Defense Department charts used by Secretary Packard to illustrate the extent to which the Russians might catch up in the next five years fail to show this imminent and dramatic increase in U.S. targetable warheads from about 2400 to eight or ten thousand!

Secretaries Packard and Laird testified that they had considered, as an alternative to Hardpoint Missile Defense, increases in U.S. offensive weapons but had considered them "provocative." Indeed Secretary Packard argued:

"We have some 1,500 missiles and bombers today which we believe are indeed sufficient to guarantee deterrence of the Soviet Union.

*"A further increase in the numbers of these weapons could be self-defeating however.* The Soviets do react to our weapon deployments as we react to theirs. If we were to continue to insure our deterrent by adding to these numbers, we would be inviting the Soviets to expand their own forces beyond current plans in order to keep up with us. This is the kind of arms race which we are seeking to avoid".<sup>20</sup>

It was unclear how this judgment related to the on-going enormous increases in U.S. targetable weapons — otherwise more or less stable for some years. Were we not already engaged in buying very large numbers of offensive weapons? These MIRV missiles had been ordered as an answer to a possible Soviet missile defense. Some were surprised therefore that Secretary Packard testified that the Russians have made no commitment to a missile defense of any strategic significance. The MIRV program had not been halted in response to this judgment and seemed more than adequate to redress a projected threat to Minuteman; indeed it seemed likely to have the arms-race-stimulating effect Packard had warned against. Was he arguing against the MIRV program?

## "SUPERHARDENING"

Another alternative to Hardpoint Defense was superhardening with additional concrete, which the Defense Department said it was "preserving the option" to do.<sup>21</sup> It argued that eventually super-accuracy might make even superhardening insufficient. But this kind of accuracy seemed many years off for the Russians. Many thought additional concrete a more reliable defense than complicated radars and computers, at least until one could predict with confidence the direction of Soviet offensive emphasis. According to *Aviation Week*, Air Force officials envisioned superhardening Minuteman III silos to more than 2,500 pounds per square inch, or ten times the current rating. (By comparison, even if radars were made as hard as concrete office buildings, they would be only somewhere between five and ten pounds per square inch hard.) Superhardening would require the Russians to have up to four times the megatonnage and near perfect accuracy, compared to destroying present silos.<sup>22</sup> For these reasons, some questioned whether the Air Force really approved of an Army defense of Minuteman missiles with missile defense. Significantly the Administration proposed a "combination" of hardening and Hardpoint Missile Defense.

## SS-9: PAPER DETERRENT?

Other outside studies, such as one done by Dr. Ralph Lapp, showed that the Defense Department might be even too conservative in arguing that the Russians could — even by 1976 — destroy most Minutemen. By building 50 SS-9's a year with the three warheads claimed, Dr. Lapp suggested, no Soviet planner could expect to destroy more than a fraction of the Minutemen.

Perhaps most devastating to the argument that the U. S. deterrent was being undermined by Soviet SS-9's was the observation that Minuteman was not now really part of our deterrent. Long ago, the basic targeting doctrine had, quite naturally, used submarine-launched missiles for targeting against cities. The more vulnerable Minutemen, which might be expected to be destroyed in part if war occurred, would, quite naturally again, be targeted largely against military targets so that they might be used promptly and effectively before they could be destroyed, and so that they would not initiate reciprocal attacks on cities. Thus the SS-9 would not, in any case, significantly undermine our deterrent since it would only threaten a part of our force largely assigned for attack rather than deterrence. Indeed, it would not even undermine our ability to strike Soviet missiles first since, if we struck them first, they would not have destroyed any Minutemen. The SS-9 even at worst might do no more than remove Minuteman missiles whose targets had been military ones; indeed some of whose targets would

already have been fired against them. In any case, they would have had little decisive connection with our deterrent.

## NEW ANTI-SOVIET FEATURE

Besides noting that Sentinel had been changed to include Hardpoint Defense, Secretary Packard noted that the Safeguard program now had an anti-Soviet component that was absent from the Johnson Administration proposal. This was the "added look-around capability at all of the missile-site radars" which would make it possible for the full Safeguard program to try to shoot down Soviet submarine-launched missiles.

This addition, it was explained, was necessary to provide "early warning and area defense of our bomber bases and command and control systems."<sup>23</sup> Indeed, Secretary Packard's Option 2B suggested that the growth of the Soviet sub-launched missile threat to the Strategic Air Command Bomber Force would justify building the complete system (as would the growth of the Chinese ICBM threat (option 2C)).

The purpose of the defense of bomber bases was to give the bombers extra minutes of warning time to get off the ground. The Department of Defense argued that "we must be able to intercept at least the first salvo of SLBM's,"<sup>24</sup> and this the proposed new system is designed to do." There have been a number of criticisms of this argument. First of all, keeping bombers in the air in crises is cheaper and more reliable than trying to intercept sub-launched missiles or other enemy weapons fired at them. This airborne alert in crises — indeed in peacetime — has been a long-used and still feasible solution to bomber vulnerability. Warning time can also be increased by bomber dispersal — permitting more time to get off the ground. And since Polaris-type submarines can fire missiles very rapidly — one a minute — intercepting the first salvo of sub-launched missiles could protect only such additional bombers as could take off in one minute — no more than one bomber per field. Furthermore, testimony by Professor Wolfgang Panofsky before the Gore Subcommittee has revealed the fact that a surprise attack by submarine-launched missiles would tend to defeat its purpose by giving additional warning of ICBM attack. On the other hand, an initial onslaught of ICBMs would give the bombers the warning they have in past anticipated. In short, the newest justification for the thin defense — the need to protect bombers — and the methods proposed are most controversial.

## EMPTY CAPITOL DEFENSE?

The new Safeguard program also includes terminal defense of Washington, D. C., referred to as the "National Command Authorities", against such things as an accidental launch or for other reasons.

Opinions differ on whether the SPRINT interceptors themselves provide a risk of accidental detonation to the Capital or its surroundings. These risks have been compared alternatively to the Mississippi flowing backward (which it did briefly a century ago in at least one spot) or to the Northeast power failure which did, in fact, occur. Probably the risk of accidental launch and the risk of accidental detonation of defensive weapons are of the same order of magnitude and small in both cases.

In any case, as noted before, the missile defense is only likely to be ready in crises. For crisis protection, few would counsel leaving the national authorities in the Capital, no matter how well protected. More reliable alternatives for spiriting away command authorities to protected and secret destinations have been arranged for years. This raises some question of the necessity and meaningfulness of missile defense protection for Washington, D. C.

There has been mention of "small attacks", for example by the Soviet Union, perhaps as shows of force. The missile defense would play the role of preventing single missiles from being certain of success, thus requiring attackers to enlarge somewhat their show of force. It has been suggested, in response, that the missile defense might induce an attacker to try to prove that the missile defense did not work. In circumstances so frightening and tense, it seems difficult to be sure whether missile defenses would encourage or discourage such bizarre tactics as were intended to make psychological points.

Finally, in testimony before the Gore Subcommittee, Secretary Laird argued that the Safeguard system would "offer the Soviet Union added incentive for productive arms control talks". There is evidence that the Safeguard program would be of serious concern to Russian strategists, but this evidence does seem to contradict the testimony of Secretary Packard that the system was "unmistakably" defensive in intent and totally non-provocative.

## II. Soviet Response Options

The Defense Department argues that the "defensive intent" of the modified ABM system is now "unmistakable".<sup>25</sup> But for the most part the full Safeguard program was similar to that of the Sentinel program, though differently rationalized and more anti-Soviet in capabilities. The original Sentinel proposal had not envisaged radars — with their protective SPRINT interceptors — near cities either, although this later became part of the plan. And, of course, the original Sentinel proposal did not threaten to neutralize Soviet sub-launched missiles. But, as for the rest, Secretary Packard was asked whether or not the scope of the system he proposed would, by 1973, look

like the Johnson plan in that year. Secretary Packard asserted that it would.<sup>26</sup>

Of the original Sentinel system, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul C. Warnke answered Senator Philip A. Hart by saying: "There is no practical way to provide the USSR with further assurances concerning the limited purposes of the Sentinel deployment, although we shall continue to make clear our rationale."<sup>27</sup>

Furthermore, the same testimony by Secretary Laird asked for money for an "important program" which "promises to improve significantly the accuracy of the Poseidon missile, thus enhancing its effectiveness against hard target" i.e., missile-sites. If the Defense Department was really planning to give several thousand MIRV warheads the accuracy necessary to attack hardened Soviet land-based missiles, would not its proposal to extend Sentinel's ability to destroy sub-launched missiles seem provocative? Both Soviet land- and sea-based missiles would then be vulnerable to attack or attrition.

While it was true that the Joint Chiefs had given up — a few weeks before the Safeguard announcement — their long-standing request for a thick defense of cities, would the Soviet Union be sure that attitudes might not change, perhaps if talks broke down? Indeed, the major reason given for not deploying a thick defense was that it was "not in our power to do so"<sup>28</sup> in light of current technology. Historically, however, the technology of missile defense has changed enormously every three years.

### THICKENABILITY OF THIN SYSTEM

Secretary Packard testified that the proposed thin system would not provide a "viable base" upon which to build a thick system. But the thin system would need only missile-site radars and interceptors around cities to be turned into a thick defense, and these could be added at any time. Certainly, many observers noted, the United States would be nearer a thick defense than the Soviet Union, and the threat of a Soviet defense had already led to the U. S. MIRV program, with its increase in targetable warheads by about a factor of four.

It seems that the Defense Department had always expected a Soviet reaction to Sentinel. In the letter quoted above from Assistant Secretary Warnke to Senator Hart, Mr. Warnke noted: "If the Soviets did not react at all, however, Sentinel would reduce, though not take away, their second-strike capability against the U.S." He noted that Moscow "may feel a need to respond."<sup>29</sup> Earlier, Mr. McNamara had noted in a radio interview that the thin defense would not be destabilizing because the Russians could easily reshift the balance; this also assumes a response.

Furthermore, Mr. McNamara had argued in response to the Moscow system that "As Secretary of De-

fense I must assume that they will deploy a system across their entire nation. . . ." <sup>30</sup> Corresponding assertions in the Soviet Defense Ministry would not seem unreasonable. For example, a recent authoritative article in *Foreign Affairs* arguing for missile defenses contended that ". . . much of the support (both inside and outside the Government) for the Sentinel decision came from those who believed that the system would eventually have significant capability against large Soviet attacks. It seems very likely . . . that whatever system finally emerges will eventually have such a capability, and therefore it seems appropriate to concentrate here on the actual policy issues this prospect presents."<sup>31</sup>

For Soviet strategists, the prospect of an expansion of U. S. missile defenses into a very thick system must now seem very real. The Navy is proposing a Seaborne Anti-Ballistic Missile Intercept System (SABMIS) which would "complement" a thick system with anti-ballistic missile ships stationed around the Soviet Union. Pictures and maps of such a deployment have appeared.<sup>32</sup> The Air Force has a proposal for an anti-ballistic missile system mounted on airplanes. Not long ago, a director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency called for a review of the cost-effectiveness of satellite ABM systems formerly considered prohibitively expensive. And strategists are lecturing on "defenses in depth", in which all these systems would be combined.

Indeed, in June 1968 after the Sentinel program was first approved, Senator Henry M. Jackson, a staunch proponent of the missile defense, chided his Senate colleagues in a speech on the Senate floor, for taking "too literally" the "public rationale" given by the Defense Department concerning the Chinese threat.<sup>33</sup> He noted that Sentinel would have "definite capabilities" for defense against the Soviet missile threat. Similar statements were made after the vote by Senator Richard Russell, then Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. It is not reasonable for the Soviet Union to expect many like-minded Senators to disown the "defend our deterrent only" rationale, much as they disowned, after the vote, the "anti-Chinese" rationale?

### SOVIET SIGNS OF ALARM

In testimony, Secretary Laird and Secretary of State William P. Rogers suggested that Soviet press comment had not considered the Safeguard program provocative. And it seems true that the Soviet leadership, which clearly wants talks to begin, has — in anticipation of talks — decided not to make an issue of it. But Soviet press comment has shown signs of alarm on several occasions. Three days after the decision, R. Mikhaylov in *Pravda* said the Nixon Administration had decided to "launch another round of preparations for a bigger war." It said "the Safeguard

system does not bank on disarmament or stronger peace through negotiations, but on a drive for arms with all the dangerous consequences that it spells. . . ." On March 15 at 11 P.M., Moscow Radio said, "The fact that the antimissile system will be built gradually stage by stage does not change anything. . . . America is starting on a new and highly expensive round of arms race. . . ."

Especially important, the well known *Izvestiya* political observer V. Matveyev, on March 13 shortly before the decision, warned that some speakers "from the highest platforms" in the U. S. were talking of "positions of strength" and "no hurry" about arms talks. He linked "speeding up the arms race" with "developing the Sentinel system" and warned against putting any state "in an unfavorable position with respect to other states."

Numerous affirmations, and reaffirmations, of the Soviet desire to "embark on a serious exchange of opinion", "as soon as the Nixon Government declares its readiness to do so", and "the sooner the better," and "without delay" appear in the Soviet press.<sup>34</sup>

It is possible that some of the Soviet urgency about talks arises from the threat of the U. S. MIRV program rather than from ABM. Recently, Former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford warned:

"Technological developments may well make any arms limitation more difficult to develop and enforce a year from now or six months from now than it is today."

The Russians may also feel this urgency.

## PREANNOUNCED INTERPRETATION

Secretary Laird noted in testimony on March 21 before the Gore Subcommittee that a "Soviet rejection of meaningful negotiations would demonstrate a Soviet determination to continue to build toward a low-risk first-strike force, as far as they were concerned." In short, a hitch in the talks would, according to the Secretary, be interpreted as aggressive Soviet intention. But as Senator John Sherman Cooper has noted: "It is known that following the election of President Nixon, the Soviet Union wished to enter into talks on offensive and defensive weapons." Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union may feel that the *United States* is "rejecting meaningful negotiations" and may reason that the *United States* is pursuing instead a "low-risk first-strike strategy."

Indeed, despite all the rationalizations listed herein for missile defense, a more obvious one remains. The Defense Department considers it useful to maintain the option of answering Soviet aggression in Europe with a nuclear strike upon the Soviet Union's forces. This traditional scenario, which has dominated defense thinking for two decades, would find useful not only MIRV warheads with high accuracy to strike

land-based Soviet missiles but also a missile defense that might shoot down both sub-launched missiles and surviving Soviet land-based missiles after launch. More generally, it would keep on top of technology and await still greater defensive efforts in the future. Despite the many reasons given for the missile defense, this approach seems more likely to be the unspoken reasoning of many in the defense community.

## IS SAFEGUARD NEGOTIABLE?

Since the Soviet Union was unlikely to cease its procurement of submarines with only a handful of Polaris-type submarines, questions were raised concerning the "negotiability" of the full thin (area defense) system with the Soviet Union. Secretary Laird had noted that the system was negotiable. Did he mean only that the Hardpoint Defense of Minuteman was negotiable if the Soviet Union ceased its build-up and modernization of SS-9's, and that the thin defense was negotiable if the Soviet Union would be content with only a handful of Polaris submarines unable to attack bomber bases?

Secretary of State Rogers had also testified that the thin system was negotiable and that, if the Russians "want to get out of the defensive missile business, we can get out of it very quickly. We are not even in it until 1973."<sup>35</sup> This seemed to suggest that our purpose had been a political one, to match the Soviet efforts with our own. Indeed, Secretary Rogers suggested that their system was much bigger than our own — but this must surely have been a slip.<sup>36</sup> The Defense Department has suggested that the Safeguard system would have "several hundred interceptors". It anticipates that the Moscow system will have only 100 eventually and has 67 now. And Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, testified that the Moscow system is "very similar" to the one we decided not to deploy in "the period of 1958 to 1961" He called it "far inferior" to the one we planned.<sup>37</sup>

In arguing that the decision to deploy Safeguard was not irrevocable, Secretary Rogers noted that we could "stop this program just like we stopped Nike-Zeus" and expressed surprise that many considered the decision final. However Nike-Zeus was always in the development stage and some wonder if a program of procurement would be so easy to halt, especially under the Chinese or sub-launched rationalizations.

Finally, if the system is in anticipation of a Chinese threat, can it be validly negotiated with the Russians? This question arose immediately after the President's announcement. President Nixon was asked whether he would consider "abandoning the ABM program altogether if the Soviets showed a similar willingness or, indeed, if they showed a readiness to place li-

mitations on offensive weapons". President Nixon replied that "as long as the Chinese threat is there, I think neither country would look upon [abandonment] with much favor."<sup>38</sup>

## FROM POSTURE TO POLICY

It is significant that the original Sentinel proposal which was, if anything, less anti-Soviet in orientation was widely supported as a means to bring "pressure" upon the Russians to begin talks. This was called "one of the compelling reasons" for approval of Sentinel.<sup>39</sup> Now this same system — expanded to threaten Soviet sub-launched missiles — seems likely to become non-negotiable at a time when the Russians are eager for talks. This raises the question of whether, during the talks, attempts might be made to support a "thick" anti-Soviet system as a form of "pressure" on the Soviet Union. Certainly, if yesterday's pressure for talks becomes today's non-negotiable commitment, progress in negotiations will be difficult.

Supporters of Safeguard have sometimes quietly argued that the Russians would like to have us build a missile defense because it would permit them to satisfy their military pressures for it. But this seems unlikely. Certainly the Soviet scientific community now seems in complete accord with that of the United States, as the well-publicized essay by Andrei D. Sakharov, famous Soviet Academician, makes clear in 500 words on this subject. It agrees openly with Richard L. Garwin and Hens A. Bethe's *Scientific American* article and calls defense against massive attack a "practical impossibility". It refers knowingly to the private literature and gives scientific explanations from the public literature for its position. It refers to a consensus of opinion, warns of an arms race, and suggests a moratorium on missile defense systems.<sup>40</sup> It is known that the Soviet scientific community has a place of honor and high influence in such matters in the Soviet decision-making process.

And these views are entirely consistent with remarks of Soviet scientists in Pugwash conferences, and with high estimates of the cost of the Moscow system, vis. \$20-25 billion.<sup>41</sup>

But even if both sides were agreeable, in principle, to negotiating about existing missile defenses, it does not seem very plausible that either would find it politically feasible to destroy what has already been built or heavily invested in. Certainly in this country, a majority of Senators would not oppose the existence of a Safeguard program that had already absorbed the funds necessary to construct it. Therefore the initial authorization of the system may tend to make it non-negotiable in political terms.

## KEY NEGOTIATING DECISION

In strategic terms, the negotiability of a missile defense depends on what line the Administration

wishes to take in the strategic talks on overall strategic posture. President Nixon has spoken of "sufficiency"; but Secretary Laird, shortly thereafter, linked the word "sufficiency" to "superiority", in a press conference. President Nixon first called the missile defense "part of our overall defense capabilities" downgrading its application to China only. Later, in speaking of negotiability as noted above, he seemed to suggest it was needed for the Chinese threat. President Nixon has spoken in terms that suggest that parity exists more or less, but Secretary Laird has argued, in discussing strategic "parity", that it would take the United States 1,200 one-megaton warheads to destroy 45% of the Soviet population while the Soviet Union could destroy 55% of our population with only 200 missiles.

These computations are most questionable. There are more Russians in the first 50 Soviet cities than there are Americans in our first 50 cities. As a result, if one seeks the destruction of 20% to 25% of the population, that level of destruction is quite as easy for us as for the Soviet Union. At these levels of immediate fatalities, neither country might recover, for many years if ever. But, in any case, the point being made here is that either through computations of what "parity" requires, or through doctrine as to what "sufficiency" requires, the Defense Department could easily insist on substantial measures of superiority. This would make a variety of otherwise negotiable points non-negotiable, including not only Safeguard but also many other weapons systems.

The fundamental objection to Safeguard, especially when linked to the existing MIRV program, is that the United States would be buying the very two weapons systems which it presumably hopes to persuade the Soviet Union not to build in the strategic talks. Can the Soviet Union be persuaded not to build an anti-ballistic missile system if the United States seemed to be embarking on such a course? Can the Soviet Union be persuaded not to buy multiple independently-guided re-entry vehicles (MIRV) if the United States were doing so? Strategically, our ABM would encourage their MIRV (needed for penetration).

Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island had elicited in testimony before the Gore Committee that testing of missile defense warheads would preclude a complete test ban at least until 1974, when Dr. Foster suggested that tests would be completed. These tests involve fairly large warheads and required the tests to be moved from Nevada to the Aleutian Islands. Newspaper reports suggest explosions considerably larger than a megaton and fears of earthquakes and resultant tidal waves in an area known for these phenomena were heightened by studies showing that Nevada had suffered earthquakes after tests.

### III. Conclusions

The author is convinced on the basis of the analysis provided that the Nixon Administration committed itself prematurely to Safeguard with a rationalization that does not support examination. The Safeguard program should not have been approved before the Administration had completed its strategic review. The present period is perhaps only the third time in the history of the cold war in which the arms race might be negotiated to a halt — 1955 and 1960 were perhaps two other opportunities. But existing programs of MIRV and ABM are likely, for political and strategic reasons, to make these negotiations very difficult, if not futile, when the talks do finally open.

In 1955 we began to pass the point of no return at which fissionable material would be available in such quantities on both sides that it could not be controlled. By 1960, the survival of both U.S. and Soviet Union was called into question by the level of arms each had obtained. The MIRV program may make control over numbers of warheads very difficult. And the ABM program may complicate and fuzz the notion of "overkill" on which arms control analysts had assumed and hoped initial restraint might be based.

It is unfortunate that the Administration was faced with these complicated questions in its first year. Secretary McNamara in his famous September 1967 San Francisco speech has already "apologized" for the overconstruction of missiles ordered in his first year, an over-purchase that, he said, had led to the comparable over-building on the Soviet side and hence to even greater threats to U.S. survival.

U.S. survival can only be ensured by cutting off

the Soviet weapons build-up. This has been true for years, indeed since the arms race began. And this cut-off can be achieved only through negotiation. Our own arms efforts only exacerbate and encourage Soviet efforts. It is far safer to negotiate this cut-off than to try to struggle against its effects with untested missile defenses in a world where it is easier to destroy than to protect.

The Defense Department's sense of urgency about weapons systems arises, in part, from the traditional assumption that the greatest threat is premeditated Soviet actions which demand World War. But in a world with so much weaponry, calculated deliberate attack is not our major danger, because the Russians are not crazy. Wars arising through escalation — wars nobody wants — do threaten very directly and seriously the very survival of our nation. There is no protection against this threat except negotiations with those who aim their missiles at us — whoever they may be. We can be, and are today by *all* accounts, safe from surprise attack. It remains to mitigate the grim prospects of a not-altogether-stable balance of terror. For this the talks should be opened.

At this writing, it appears that an emotional and devisive Senate confrontation on the Safeguard proposal is shaping up. The certain closeness of the eventual vote may have serious effects on the ability of the new Administration to negotiate around the world. For this and all the other reasons to question a new arms program at this time, it seems that the Administration would do well to open the talks, defer procurement of MIRV and ABM, and give the talks a chance.

— JEREMY J. STONE

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### FOOTNOTES

- <sup>1</sup>(Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on Fiscal Years 1964-68 Defense Program and 1964 Defense Budget.)
- <sup>2</sup>(U. S. Congress, House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, Part I, pp. 434-435.)
- <sup>3</sup>(U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Military Procurement Authorization Fiscal Year 1964 (88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963.)
- <sup>4</sup>(The 1966 Defense Budget and Defense Program for Fiscal Years 1966-70, A Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.)
- <sup>5</sup>(October 6, 1967. Remarks Before the Advocates Club, Detroit, Michigan.)
- <sup>6</sup>(*Life Magazine*, September 20, 1967.)
- <sup>7</sup>(*Life Magazine op. cit.*)
- <sup>8</sup>(*Life Magazine op. cit.*)
- <sup>9</sup>(Warnke speech, *op. cit.*)
- <sup>10</sup>(Testimony of Dr. George W. Rathjens, Jr. before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States Senate on March 28, 1969.)
- <sup>11</sup>(The October 17, 1960 issue of *Missiles and Rockets* showed a map of the 150 Minuteman launcher sites around Malmstrom Air Force Base. They are scattered around the base as much as 115 miles away. A ten mile radius circle is enough to cover only one "flight" of ten missiles.)
- <sup>12</sup>(This fact sheet is dated March 14, 1969.)
- <sup>13</sup>(DOD Has New Warhead Plan, *Missiles and Rockets*, April 27, 1964, Pg. 15.)
- <sup>14</sup>(Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Part I, Pg. 119, April, 1968.)
- <sup>15</sup>(Testimony by the Honorable Melvin R. Laird, The Secretary of Defense before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States Senate, March 21, 1969.)
- <sup>16</sup>(Statement by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, First Session, 91st Congress, March 20, 1969 on the Modified Ballistic Missile Defense System.)
- <sup>17</sup>(Testimony by the Honorable Melvin R. Laird, The Secretary of Defense, before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States Senate, March 21, 1969.)
- <sup>18</sup>(Status of Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Part II, Pg. 313-314.)
- <sup>19</sup>(Testimony by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States Senate, March 26, 1969.)
- <sup>20</sup>(Testimony by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States Senate, March 26, 1969.)
- <sup>21</sup>(Statement by the Honorable Melvin R. Laird, The Secretary of

Defense, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 19, 1969, Pg. 24.)

<sup>22</sup>(*Aviation Week and Space Technology*, May 13, 1968, Pg. 32.)

<sup>23</sup>(Statement by the Honorable Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 19, 1969.)

<sup>24</sup>(Submarine-launched ballistic missiles.)

<sup>25</sup>(Laird, *op. cit.* Pg. 21.)

<sup>26</sup>(March 14, Press Conference at Pentagon on Modified Sentinel Proposal.)

<sup>27</sup>(Letter of June 11, 1968, in *Congressional-Record—Senate* S7463, June 19, 1968.)

<sup>28</sup>(Laird, Pg. 22, *op. cit.*)

<sup>29</sup>(Letter, *op. cit.*)

<sup>30</sup>(*Life Magazine*, September 27, 1967.)

<sup>31</sup>(Dr. Donald G. Brennan, *The Case for Missile Defenses*, Foreign Affairs, April, 1969.)

<sup>32</sup>(*Aviation Week*, July 17, 1967, Pg. 43.)

<sup>33</sup>(Speech on the Senate floor, released by Senator Jackson's office on June 19, 1968.)

<sup>34</sup>(See January 20, 1969 Tass report of Soviet Foreign Ministry press conference, January 30, 1969 Moscow Radio Broadcast to Eastern North America, and January 22, 1969 article, "USSR Desire for Nuclear Disarmament Viewed", in *Pravda*.)

<sup>35</sup>(Testimony by the Honorable William P. Rogers, the Secretary of State, before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States Senate, March 27, 1969.)

<sup>36</sup>(March 27, 1969, Gore Committee, *op. cit.*)

<sup>37</sup>(Status of U. S. Strategic Power Hearings, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 90th Congress, Second Session, April, 1968. Pg. 113.)

<sup>38</sup>(*New York Times*, Saturday, March 15, 1969, Pg. 16.)

<sup>39</sup>(See, for example, Comment by Senator Henry M. Jackson released on Thursday, June 27, 1968.)

<sup>40</sup>(See *New York Times*, July 22, 1968, Pg. 14.)

<sup>41</sup>(See, for example, "Soviet Scientists Hint at Shift Away From Reliance on ABM," *New York Times*, September 19, 1968. See *Aviation Week and Space Digest*, October 23, 1967)

## Inner Debate - From page S4

In an impressive presentation to the Committee, Professor Panofsky contended that the United States could afford the risk of delaying an ABM decision. Panofsky stressed the improbability of a successful strike against the diverse elements of the American deterrent forces in the mid-seventies.

Panofsky added the significant thesis that, if the proposed negotiations did not succeed in forestalling a possible Soviet movement toward a first-strike capability, and if there was too little time for U.S. deployment of ABM, there should still be time to protect the country's retaliatory capacity by increasing its offensive forces. At that time and under those circumstances, he concluded, the possible provocativeness of additions to the U.S. offensive would hardly be a decisive factor.

To this counsel of delay were juxtaposed the judgments of Paul Nitze and Albert Wolstetter that an early start on deployment would improve the chances for successful arms limitations. Their theory stemmed not only from an appraisal of the specific negotiating attitudes of the Soviet Union, but from a conclusion that, given the uncertainties of any likely freeze on strategic offensive weapons, not to mention the prospective Chinese nuclear force, both Moscow and Washington might be more prepared to accept the risk of arms control arrangements if they had at least the limited margin of safety afforded by an agreed level ABM defense.

As these observations make clear, the most serious controversies relate less to technical than strategic and political matters. And on these kinds of complex, non-scientific questions, exclusive expertise is singularly lacking in any quarter. In Lee DuBridge's classic phrase, "when it comes to politics, scientists are just as dumb as the rest of us."

The epigram is no chastisement to the scientists for voicing views on all aspects of the ABM problem. Rather it is a caution to the citizenry at large to be wary in evaluating testimony which blends technical

estimates with political judgments and preferences. The worst folly in deciding the ABM issue would be to mistake it for an exclusively or even predominantly "technical" problem.

Far from it. What is at stake in these deliberations is really the question of which risks the American people choose to bear in their quest for a secure peace. While it is terribly important that those risks be appraised as soberly and systematically as possible, it is equally important that the choice be seen for what it is: a political decision, not in a partisan or negative sense, but in the tradition of self-government through which this nation charts its course.

Implicit in the discussion of the ABM is a perception that the gravest hazards facing the United States and the Soviet Union are the dangerous and destabilizing trends in offensive weaponry, particularly the imminent deployment of MIRV systems. If this deployment proceeds, and it will be exceedingly difficult to stop if testing continues unabated, the prospects for meaningful strategic arms control will diminish markedly. With such weapons in the forces of either or both sides, a relatively smaller number of delivery vehicles will confront a relatively larger number of independently targetable warheads. Given these conditions, the possibility of a pre-emptive first strike in moments of extreme stress may indeed rise.

It is this technology which is now fueling the arms race. Were it not on the horizon, the Safeguard ABM system need not have been proposed. Conversely, if MIRV is not controlled, the pressure for ABM deployment can only continue to mount.

Whatever the outcome of the current ABM debate, the urgent, priority task is to initiate negotiations aimed at limiting unsafe and unnecessary innovations in offensive weapons.

Otherwise, the fragile opportunity to curb the arms race will be lost, and the balance of terror will enter a new and even less predictable phase.

—ALTON FRYE

## A Broader Questioning - From cover

Safeguard first of all must bear the burden of following a number of other expensive and dubious programs the Pentagon has pushed for in recent years—the TFX, the F-111, the AMSA, the SST, and the Sheridan tank to name a few. In addition, this gadgetry boondoggle has recently been enveloped by the indelicate aroma of the C-5 manipulations, an intriguing case just opening up and which promise to cast certain aspects of the Pentagon's *modus operandi* in an unsavory light.

But overshadowing these considerations, as it has all aspects of American life for the past four long years, is the Vietnam war. America's Asian debacle, with its incalculable cost in men, treasure, and national spirit, has rightfully provoked a genuine "agonizing reappraisal" of the basic and often unstated assumptions that have determined America's world posture for the past decade and longer. Perhaps the greatest of these to have been proved a myth is the notion of the infallibility of American military might — and as a corollary, its efficacy in achieving political ends in foreign lands. The Vietnam post mortem does not stop there, however. Inexorably, it leads to a scrutiny of the other enterprises we find ourselves engaged in under the mantle of "national security."

So it is that responsible individuals in and out of government have begun to ask questions about our entire military posture. One of these questions is whether further billions invested in chancy military hardware will enhance true national security in a nuclear age or serve only to destabilize an already precarious balance of terror. While our cities rot, our poor starve, our educational system at all levels disintegrates, major segments of the population feel the need to arm themselves, the young revolt, and our own garbage threatens to poison the planet, reasonable men question the assumption that Soviet or putative Chinese missiles are the greatest threat to our survival as a free country. Can one listen to former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara admit that "clearly the Soviet build-up (during the early 60's) is in part a reaction to our own build-up since the beginning of this decade" without wondering whether countering hypothetical threats does not become a process of self-fulfilling prophecy?

As these questions are asked and the record of the 60's examined, others must follow and other assumptions must crumble. No longer can it be gospel that only a few individuals privy to "classified information" are capable of making decisions affecting the so-called national security. It is simply not unpatriotic anymore to question items on the military shopping list.

In short, there is a movement in the nation and in Congress to restore defense to its proper role in American society, a movement which seeks not "unilateral disarmament" but what President Eisenhower termed "security with solvency"—not to mention proper cost accounting procedures, firm control by the White House and Congress, and as much diligence in grasping present opportunities to promote peace as in anticipating future wars.

It is in this incipient effort to regain a balanced society that the Safeguard proposal has become enmeshed. Transformed into a "symbolic issue," the latest ABM proposal has become a lightning rod, an immediate and specific focus for a broad-based and determined reform movement.

Thus, there is a "clear and present danger," as Alton Frye points out elsewhere in this supplement, that the ABM debate will become more cathartic than constructive and redraw the domestic battle lines of the Johnson years. Nothing could be more disastrous to the Nixon presidency or to the fate of the nation than such a regression. And nothing could do more faster to galvanize this re-polarization than for the President to pull out all the stops in a Pyrrhic attempt to ram Safeguard through the Senate.

If the Administration wins such a battle, it will have won round one over the Safeguard opposition — over the younger members of its own party and a significant segment of its own staff, over a majority of the scientific community, over the regiment of citizens' groups the issue has assembled, over the governor of one of the states slated for the munificent missile construction fall-out, and over the tide of informed opinion. But many of the wellsprings which feed this movement are the same ones the President counts on to fill the pools of voluntarism which are such a vital segment of his vision for America. Such a bitter victory can poison them, but it cannot dam them. The President, if he persists in a hard line this year, must be prepared to wage the same murderous, time-consuming, and costly fight next year, the year after, and during the 1972 election year. No good can come of it.

It need not happen. The forces at work for reform are rational and constructive. There is no thirst in their ranks for "confrontation" on the Senate floor or anywhere else. They do not impugn the sincerity or integrity of the new President, nor do they deny the difficulty of the decision he was forced to make during his first 100 days. But neither do they feel they can abrogate their own responsibility — a patriotic responsibility if you will — to stand up and be counted in the attempt to alter the disturbing path America finds herself on.

If ever a political situation called for statesmanship from the White House, it is the ABM controversy. The country is about to enter a critical re-valuation of what national security means in the last third of the 20th century. The question is whether it will be a rationale dialogue or a shouting match, and the resolution of the Safeguard debate will do much to set the tone for what is to follow.

There is still time and latitude for an ABM compromise consistent with national security. Real compromise, acceptable to a majority of those who cannot now accept Safeguard, would go a long way to bring about the "lowering of voices" that the President so genuinely desires and the country so urgently needs for the task or reconstructing itself. As matters stands, the President is the only one who can make the first move towards the genuine compromise that can "bring us together." The whole world is watching and hoping.