PAKISTAN: Background to a Crisis

&

BIAFRA: A Post Mortem

and

A Proposal for a Disaster Relief Unit

ALSO:
The Ripon Prize;
D.C., Chicago,
Philly elections;
NGB report;
Sen. Miller
and the war
WASHINGTON VIEWPOINT

What President Nixon could learn from Ted Williams, or, how to manage the Senators. Mr. Nixon has refused to go with anything new on Vietnam this year. Howard Gillette, Jr. notes a proposal by a most loyal team player, Senator Jack Miller of Iowa, which unfortunately the President will sit on the bench all season. Also, why Republicans should rise above partisanship and support a Vietnam elections commission. —8

PAKISTAN: BACKGROUND TO A CRISIS

East versus West Pakistan: rather than a civil war, the action was more of an invasion of one state by the military of another. Why did the war break out? What were the demands of the East? And, finally, what has been policy and why should this country have cut off military and economic aid to West Pakistan and supported an independent Bangla Desh? —10

A POST MORTEM ON BIAFRA

Ripon reviews and confirms its charges against the U.S. State Department and calls for an American disaster relief unit. W. G. Rogers finds that the State Department ignored political realities, that it was unprepared of responding effectively to the Biafran crisis despite strong leadership from the White House. A disaster relief capability, as he sees it, could assess quickly and accurately the seriousness of a disaster anywhere in the world and provide adequate relief immediately. A fascinating detailed wrap-up on the Nigeria-Biafra civil war. —18

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Includes reports on the NGB meeting, Ripon’s man of the year award and the Boston-Cambridge chapter Goodell dinner. —23

LETTERS

THE RIPON PRIZE

RECOMMEND US

Know anyone who might be interested in Ripon? Pass this magazine (plus the enclosed envelope) on — we’re always looking for converts.
Political Notes

WASHINGTON D. C.: the lessons of defeat

Though John A. Nevius lost D.C.’s first Congressional election to Reverend Walter Fauntroy, the Nevius candidacy demonstrated that a progressive Republican (he jokingly calls himself “Ripon’s oldest living member”) can attract a meaningful vote in a constituency which is 71 percent black and 87 percent Democratic/Independent.

Nevius ran second, drawing 25 percent of the vote against Democrat Fauntroy’s 58 percent in a city where Republicans registration is 13.1 percent. He drew 30 percent of the two-party vote, compared to the GOP 14.4 percent share of the two-party registration. Outside of the white areas of Washington, the Nevius vote actually exceeded the total Republican registration in 21 precincts.

The Nevius candidacy was perhaps the first to put into practice the theory of an “open party.” Young blacks in particular were attracted to the campaign, people who do not buy the Republicanism represented by Richard Nixon and Carl Shipley, the District’s National Committeeman.

The lesson from this defeat is one that the Republican Party must study if it is to become viable in other cities. Inroads can be made into traditionally Democratic voting patterns, but only with a candidate of conscience, a campaign of substance, and a determined effort not to write-off any segments of the electorate.

ILLINOIS: more lessons

Republican candidate Richard Friedman managed to lure only 30 percent of the vote away from Mayor Daley on April 6. Though nobody expected Friedman to win, or even come close, Daley’s hefty 418,000 vote plurality disheartened many Friedman supporters.

Why only 30 percent? The Chicago Ripon chapter catalogued the difficulties faced by Friedman: “Daley outspent Friedman ten to one, Daley’s patronage army gave him five times as many full-time, experienced precinct workers, Daley was endorsed by all four major newspapers and was again able to siphon most big business support from the Republican candidate.”

In addition, only 63 percent of the electorate voted; voter apathy strongly favors the better-organized candidate. Friedman garnered only approximately one half of the liberal-independent vote and the same percent-
age of the Jewish vote. And what he gained in black middle-class neighborhoods (he won well over 30 percent in prosperous black wards), he lost among registered Republicans (probably 40 percent of registered Republicans voted for Daley). Finally, Friedman’s press image as a Northside swinger, a Trudeau sportsman didn’t win any votes.

The lessons from this defeat are that Daley is a unique opponent, but that the GOP can attract black voters (especially those who have broken out of the slums). Friedman got 30 percent where Nixon got only 5-6 percent. One might conclude (along with Charles Nicodemus of the Chicago Daily News) that: “all forms of legislation that will help deter racial discrimination, help blacks improve their economic status . . . ought to receive serious GOP consideration. What should be equally obvious is that Republican lawmakers need not expect or receive electoral majorities in the black community in order to make such a legislative ‘investment’ worthwhile. Various Republican contenders . . . would have been tickled to have had an extra 10 percent ‘bonus’ from the entire black community, similar to the one Friedman got Tuesday from the middle-class black wards.”

CONNECTICUT: mayor Uccello bows out

Republican Mayor Ann Uccello of Hartford, who lost her bid for U.S. Representatives last fall, has taken a federal civil service post in Washington. Transportation Secretary John Volpe has appointed her the director of the Office of Passenger and Consumer Affairs (at $32,000 a year).

Miss Uccello lost the congressional race in Connecticut’s first district to Democrat William R. Cotter by a margin of only 785 votes. Her defeat was due largely to her surprisingly poor showing in the city of Hartford itself. She carried most of the outlying towns only to lose by more than 13,000 votes on her own turf.

The 1970 defeat made her chances for reelection as mayor this fall look pretty slim, especially as Hartford Democrats now outnumber Republicans by almost 4 to 1. The federal post will keep her name in the political limelight; next year she may run again for the first district seat. She is also being considered by some state-level Republicans as a potential candidate for the U.S. Senate nomination against incumbent Democrat Abraham Ribicoff in 1974.

ACU: a misquotation

The Vice President’s office has informed us that Battle Line, the monthly publication of the American Conservative Union, misquoted the Vice President as saying “the only good Republican is a conservative Republican.” The quote, which appeared in the October 1970 issue of Battle Line, was reproduced in the March
issue of the Ripon FORUM. "The Vice President did not make the statement," Victor Gold, the Vice President’s Press Secretary, wrote to Ripon recently.

PHILADELPHIA: Rizzo is not Daley

Philadelphia’s Democratic voters have a choice of four candidates in the May 18 mayorality primary. Three are "liberals." But the race is attracting national attention because of the fourth, Police Commissioner Frank L. Rizzo. Rizzo, who has been endorsed by the Democratic City Committee, is undoubtedly an efficient commissioner. Philadelphia has a low crime rate, a large percentage of minority officers, and a special­ly trained Civil Disobedience Squad. He is one of the best-known public figures in the city, and has the highly emotional loyalty of large segments of the white population, particularly among ethnic groups.

On the other hand, he leaves much to be desired as a potential mayor. His infrequent statements on matters outside his area of expertise have been simplistic and emotional, and he has had no substantial experience outside of police work. His approach to issues is to avoid them — instead appealing to emotions, using "code words," and playing on his "tough cop" image.

His principal supporter is the incumbent mayor, James H.J. Tate, who has managed to alienate many of the Democratic leaders of the city and most of the citizenry as well. Tate has exercised so little leadership as mayor that Rizzo has had pretty much of a free hand in police operations. Tate nevertheless retains control over the party machinery, a major factor in any primary. And with the advent of a Democratic governor, additional patronage jobs are now under Tate's control.

Rizzo is also widely unpopular among the vocal segments of the black community, as well as white civil libertarians. Blacks comprise approximately 25 percent of the electorate.

The other Democratic aspirants are:

1) Congressman William S. Green, who resigned as party chairman in 1969 after a split with Tate, is attractive, intelligent, liberal, young (32) and heir to a family tradition of playing a major role in the Philadelphia Democratic machine. However, in three and a half terms in Congress, he hasn’t cultivated much local exposure and his status as leader of the "young turks" among the City’s Democrats means that he will have most of the machine working against him. He appears, however, to be emerging as the leading opponent to Rizzo.

2) David Cohen, City Councilman, is a maverick Democrat who is hard to characterize, other than that he marches to his own tune. He is running hard and has found some financing. He is regarded as the only Democratic Councilman who thinks for himself, and this alone should give him some backing from those frustrated in fighting city hall. Not a strong contender, however.

3) Hardy Williams is an attractive young black leader who has risen rapidly in his community and was recently elected to the State Assembly. It is clear that all the Democrats except Rizzo are left-of-center. The Democrats are due for another liberal dance-of-death with Rizzo profiling on primary day.

After primary day, Democratic City Council President Paul D’Ortona will decide whether to run in November as an Independent. He plans to run only if Rizzo wins the nomination. This would split the Democratic vote, and improve the Republican’s chances substantially.

The Republican is Thacher Longstreth, City Councilman and Executive Vice President of the Chamber of Commerce. Longstreth is an articulate and intelligent moderate Republican leader. He ran for mayor once before in 1955 and lost by what was then considered the tremendous margin of 160,000 votes. However, in 1959 Stassen lost the mayorality election by 210,000 votes; in 1960 Nixon lost the city by 330,000; and Goldwater’s losing margin in 1964 was 430,000. Consequently, as Longstreth puts it, “Republican leaders started looking around for that young man who did so well back in 1955.”

Longstreth, despite a 2-to-1 Democratic registration edge, has a real chance to win if Rizzo is the nominee. Rizzo would turn off blacks and liberal Democrats. Green would obviously be tougher to beat.

This race is most significant to progressive Republicans because 1) Longstreth has a real chance (vs. the recent Chicago election) of winning; 2) because Rizzo is essentially a one-issue, “law and order” candidate; and 3) because this is a real test of how the GOP can appeal to independent voters, to youth and to blacks.

TENNESSEE: budgets and busing equal unpopularity

In an unprecedented two-week recess from regular legislative session, the Tennessee General Assembly conducted intensive hearings on the validity of Governor Winfield Dunn’s budget request for the next fiscal year. The Republican governor had approached the legislature, which numbers the Democrats in the majority, for $95 million in increased taxes. For the Democratic legislators the high point of the hearings was the appearance of former GENESCO head, Maxey Jarman. Almost the first act of Governor Dunn on taking office was the appointment of the apricot-haired Jarman as chairman of “The Governor’s Study on Cost Control.”

Buoyed by flattering and flowery speeches by the Democratic members of the legislature, Jarman was goaded into saying that $50 million in savings originally projected by the Dunn administration was too conservative a figure. “We could conceivably save as much as $100 million or even $150 million,” prattled Jarman. One legislator summed up the feelings of most of the body when he said: “If Maxey says a jackrabbit can plow, let’s hitch him up.”

Before the hearings even got under way it became apparent that somebody miscalculated in writing the governor’s Budget. The more than $3 million cost of collecting the increased taxes, for instance, was nowhere provided. Then not many friends were made by singing
cut and naming certain kinds of businesses and slapping a tax on them. One kind was barbershops. The president of the barbers union said bitterly, "We were hurting enough anyway with all this long hair around."

Originally a large revenue was expected from a new tax to be imposed on commercial leases. The powerful Tennessee Manufacturers Association lobby group was incensed by this proposal. Shortly after it was announced, the governor rescinded this proposed tax.

Senator Howard Baker is the next Tennessee Republican up for reelection — in 1972. The Republican tax program has alienated many Tennesseans, the majority of whom are Democrats anyway. If a conservative-leaning Democrat should run against him, Baker would certainly have a fight on his hands.

Baker's popularity is precarious just now in Tennessee for another reason. In Nashville a group of black parents have obtained a hearing in the U.S. District Court concerning the desegregation of the Nashville Metro School System. They feel the order by the court was announced, the governor rescinded this proposed tax.

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The judge hearing the case was recommended for appointment by Senator Howard Baker.

When it appeared from news reports that the judge, Clare Morton, might decide in favor of the black parents who brought the suit, a group of white parents calling themselves "Concerned Parents" disrupted the court to such an extent the judge had to adjourn the court. Their major complaint was that a decision in favor of the plaintiffs would mean a pupil locator map giving the location of every school child in Nashville was required before the present school year is over. (It would be more reasonable to start busing, if that is what is necessary to insure a unitary school system, in the fall; in the past, however, delaying tactics have often covered up unalterable opposition to integration.) Later the Concerned Parents called a mass meeting which attracted approximately 7000 persons. The signs some of them carried and the speeches made from the platform indicated that they blamed Senator Howard Baker for Judge Clare Morton.

Baker was in Nashville at the time all this was going on and his office received literally hundreds of phone calls on the subject. Baker, however, made no public comment on the case.

When court reconvened Judge Morton decided that a pupil locator map giving the color and location of every school child in Nashville was required before the case could continue. Overruling the objection of Attorney Williams that the locator map was necessary only in implementing the decision, not in making it, Judge Morton adjourned court indefinitely. The delay caused by getting the map and studying it is expected to last long enough to allow school to let out for this year.

Morton is known as a tough judge and is expected to make a decision on the legal merits of the case. But another U.S. official seems to have fewer scruples about politicizing a non-political position. U.S. Attorney Charles Anderson, who was in no way involved in the case, commented only a day after Morton's delay was announced, that the 1964 Civil Rights Act makes busing illegal and that the law requiring an end to segregation does not require integration. The latter was struck down in 1968; "freedom of choice" is not enough; positive action must be taken to end de jure segregation. Not only is Anderson mistaken on points of law, but his comments, front page news, were intemperate, untimely and inappropriate.

IOWA: factional pressures

The stresses between the moderate and conservative wings of the Iowa Republican party seem to be intensifying as the factions begin to maneuver for the 1972 elections.

The conservatives won the first battle in March on congressional redistricting (according to the 1970 census Iowa loses one seat). The incumbent placed in the worst position is John Kyl, himself a conservative but a good friend of Governor Robert Ray, a moderate. Kyl was thrown into a new Fourth District with Democrat Neal Smith, and his chances of survival are slim. Also, the most liberal Iowa Republican in Congress, Fred Schengel, won a narrow victory last fall and could have used some help. He got none, and will have substantially the same district as before. The three hardcore Republican conservatives, H.R. Gross, Wiley Mayne and Bill Scherle again received rock-ribbed districts. The redistricting was done by the conservative Republicans in the state legislature under the leadership of Lieutenant Governor Roger Jepsen, who will probably run for Governor in 1972. There were rumors that the conservatives offered Scherle a safe district if he would stay out of the governor's race in 1972. Kyl threatened to run for the governorship too, and split the conservative vote, if "others (read Jepsen) get into a primary race against my good friend Bob Ray." This might have been just a play in the redistricting struggle, but it could also mean a wide-open Republican primary.

The next factional battle is shaping up over taxes. Governor Ray favors progressive taxation, and he, the Democrats and a few Republicans support a raise in the income tax. The conservatives prefer increasing the sales tax. The most probable outcome is a compromise, where both will be increased, but there are no signs yet that a compromise is emerging. Jepsen apparently wants to go slow, let a deficit build up which will embarrass Ray, and then come riding in to save the state with his own solution. Ray and he are no longer on speaking terms, and the Democrats are beginning to make political capital of the split, with speeches in the legislature and such.

The only thing Iowa politicians agree on is the SST. All nine Iowa members of Congress voted against, an unheard-of unanimity which left the state stunned, but happy.

In a recent Iowa Poll taken by the Des Moines Register, Muskie led Nixon 39 percent to 37 percent with 7 percent for Wallace and 17 percent undecided. Let's face it, if a Republican is behind in Iowa, he's behind everywhere.
THE NATION: republicans and amnesty

One of the guests attending the annual dinner of the Cambridge and Boston chapters of Ripon asked the main speaker, former New York Senator Charles E. Goodell whether Lincoln's Reconstruction program offered a solid Republican precedent for a general amnesty for those Americans who chose to go to jail, leave the country, or seek asylum from duty in the armed forces in other countries, rather than fight in Vietnam. The question was:

In December of 1863, before his "with malice toward none, with charity toward all" Second Inaugural President Lincoln, the first, and perhaps the greatest Republican President, announced his plans for Reconstruction. Part of his program called for readmission to the Union of all Confederate states once 10 percent of their voting populations agreed to swear future loyalty to the United States. (Once again, the bringing together of the Union was foremost in Lincoln's mind.) General amnesty was granted to all taking the oath. Only high civil and military leaders of the Confederacy were excluded from taking the oath and participating in the formation of new state governments. But Lincoln meant this exclusion to be of short duration.

Excluded confederate leaders were traitors to the Union in the most classical sense of that term — they had conceived and implemented plans to destroy the Union, waged war upon her and her citizenry; they had led an armed rebellion which caused the death of many citizens of the Union and the destruction of much property. Yet Lincoln intended that these men would be restored to full citizenship in the Union.

Civil wars are the most brutal of all wars; there was much clamor for revenge and retribution by leading spokesmen for the North, but Lincoln chose mercy and compassion, knowing full well that the Union could never be reunited in fact and in spirit without the leadership of these men and without a demonstration of brotherhood and charity on the part of the victors.

The Vietnam war has been a Civil War of the spirit, of the individual conscience, for most Americans. Never since the Civil War has this nation been so divided on an issue of war. Now that this war seems finally and hopefully to be coming to an end, is it not time for all Republicans to consider Lincoln's acts and to be guided by his wisdom in granting amnesty to all those who chose jail, self-exile, or going AWOL and seeking amnesty in another country, rather than violate their consciences and fight in a war and kill Asians whom had not threatened her existence as a nation?

Senator Goodell's answer was that he and others would do more than consider such a precedent; he felt that Lincoln's example should be followed and amnesty granted.

Another instructive Republican precedent is President Harding's matter-of-fact pardon of Eugene Debs for his pacifism and resistance to America's involvement in the Great War of 1914-1918. That messianic Democratic moralist Woodrow Wilson refused to pardon Debs. Very soon after assuming office, Harding granted a pardon to Debs without any fanfare. President Nixon has an opportunity to show his Republican stripes and seize upon the precedents offered by Lincoln and Harding.

OHIO: the lull is over

In the wake of last November's elections, Ohio politicians played a waiting game. All the major party figures and factions chose "to row toward their objectives with muffled oars." After losing the State House while picking up a second Senate seat, the GOP took time to heal its wounds.

The quiet will now end. Governor John J. Gilligan recently presented his two year budget based upon a sweeping tax reform that includes a state corporate and personal income tax. Republicans immediately attacked Gilligan's program and tax reforms as unbearable financial burdens for Ohio citizens. Certain GOP legislators plan to offer a sales tax alternative to the governor's plan.

Although he set about appointing competent men to state offices, Governor Gilligan moved cautiously concerning tax reform. He knew that he confronted hostile majorities in both houses of the legislature, and that tax programs in other states have sentenced governors to single terms. Gilligan first created a task force chaired by a prominent Republican businessman to make recommendations about Ohio's tax structure.

Since the task force recommended both a personal and corporate income tax, the governor can call his proposals non-partisan priorities for the state.

Former Governor James Rhodes waits in exile in Columbus. He hopes that reformer Gilligan will be anathema to Ohio voters by 1974. He also hopes that they will call for "folksy Jim" to return the state to normalcy.

Meanwhile, Donald "Buz" Lukens arranged for his appointment to an unexpired seat in the Ohio Senate. From there, he can keep in the news as a self-appointed watch-dog over the Gilligan administration. Lukens knows that many members of the GOP hierarchy don't care for William B. Saxbe's independent stance in the Senate. With the help of wealthy conservatives, in and out of the state, Lukens might attempt to knock off Saxbe in the 1974 primary.

Senator Saxbe periodically leaks stories that he doesn't care for the Senate. He talks about the powerlessness of this body to function effectively, and he hints that he may retire after one term. Pressure from unhappy Ohio party leaders may also be a reason for Saxbe's discomfort.

In the Republican oriented newspapers of the State, Robert Taft, Jr. now wins all the headlines. Urban businessmen feel comfortable with Taft, because he acts as a spokesman for the Administration. While Saxbe continues to sit with the Senate's dove coalition, Taft backs the President's every step in Laos, Cambodia and
MASSACHUSETTS: hardly foundering

Here's what National Review prints about Massachusetts politics (From April 6 issue):

A reporter wanted to know why Massachusetts conservative Republicans felt it was necessary to organize their own Conservative Party. It's because, said one of the organizers, trying to work through the Riponesque GOP in Massachusetts is like "renting a deck chair on the Titanic."

Ripon's analysis is even briefer: Funny thing, Brooke and Sargent seem to win elections.

UTAH: outside mismanagers, or 1970 revisited

One more example of how Republicans managed to turn the possibility of victory into the certainty of defeat last fall.

Washington sources recently revealed the contents of a letter being circulated between Republican campaign organizations by Utah GOP officials, bitterly attacking the running of former Congressman Laurence Burton's bid for the Senate seat held by Democrat Frank E. Moss last fall.

The letter, signed by State Party Chairman Fred T. Wright, State Vice Chairman Eleanor Olsen and National Committee members Kendall Garff and Madge H. Fairbanks, attacked the handling of the campaign by Civic Services, Inc. of St. Louis. Blaming the loss on the managers "not knowing the territory," the letter leveled several specific charges at the firm. The campaign managers, Roy Pfautch, Ed Grefe and Brad Hays, "alienated large cross sections of volunteers" through abrasive handling and an almost total exclusion of Utahns from any position of leadership. The letter contended, "Civic Services, Inc. did set up a kitchen cabinet of Utahns to assist in planning campaign strategy; however it soon became apparent that the kitchen cabinet was not allowed to have any influence on the direction of the campaign."

A complaint of financial mismanagement was also filed against the firm. Not only was Burton left with a $40,000 campaign debt, but monies raised were deposited in out-of-state banks.

But the most serious claim was that the Civic Services-devised media campaign destroyed Burton's chances in the last weeks to upset two-term veteran Moss. The letter assailed the projection of Burton, uncomfortable, dressed as a cowboy and seated astride a horse, in television spots. And, the letter went on, the coupling of the media creation of "a man to match our mountain," with hard-line attempts to "picture his opponent...as a man who favored crime, war and violence," resulted in the landslide Burton loss.

It is difficult to say if a well-run effort, attuned to Utah's particular political background, would have resulted in a recapturing of the Senate seat, but disgruntled state Republican leaders contend that Burton's old 1st congressional district seat would not have been lost by Richard Richards to Democrat Gunn McKay. Even the 2nd district's highly popular Republican Congressman Sherman P. Lloyd blames his 5000-vote victory margin on the detrimental effects of the Burton effort.

The letter also announced the initiation of "procedures to prevent a repetition of (last) year's campaign" — a statement that many view as an embargo on out-of-state management of Utah campaigns in the near future.

THE PENTAGON: graphic clarity department

He had bought a large map representing the sea, Without the least vestige of land: And the crew were much pleased when they found it to be A map they could all understand.

Lewis Carroll
"The Hunting of the Snark"

THE NATION: Miller's hot potato plan

U.S. Senator Jack Miller (Republican of Iowa) has introduced a joint congressional resolution pledging total withdrawal of all U.S. military personnel from South Vietnam within 12 months of the exchange of all prisoners of war. And, reportedly, Miller would be willing to accept "an agreement to exchange all prisoners" instead of "the full exchange of all prisoners" as the operative triggering phrase from which time the period until withdrawal would be measured.

Under this resolution, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong votes of the House and Senate Democratic caucuses, has introduced a joint resolution, which would have full responsibility and capacity to end the war, for they would have the power to determine unilaterally the final and specific date of total U.S. withdrawal.

This Republican initiative offers far more hope for ending the war soon than the politically-calculating votes of the House and Senate Democratic caucuses, which resolved to work for ending the war by December of 1972. These votes, while looking good in the press, actually put no additional pressure on the President in terms of the 1972 elections beyond what he already sees in the polls.

Senator Miller, formerly a troubled but staunch Midwestern supporter of the President's war policies, has now broken with the President. A recent Gallup poll clearly showed that the Midwest gives the President the lowest regional vote of confidence on his handling of the war. Miller must also face the voters in 1972, and peace forces in Iowa are well organized. Miller's probable opponent is Democratic Congressman (and "dove") John Culver.

THE NATION: look at both sides of C C

Common Cause chairman John W. Gardner has replied to an accusation in Monday, the weekly publication of the Republican National Committee, that Common Cause is not in fact non-partisan, but "liberal Democratic." The April 5 issue of Monday devoted over two and a half pages to examining "Just How Non-partisan is the 'Nonpartisan' Common Cause." Monday concluded that CC's nonpartisanship was only a pretense.

In reply, Gardner has said that Monday was "shamelessly selective" in its presentation of evidence. It singled out Democratic members of the staff or board and ignored Republican ones. Unmentioned was the fact that CC's two top officers (Gardner and Lowell Beck) are both Republicans. (A more valid complaint involved Common Cause's trading mailing lists with the Democratic National Committee; but Gardner had already expressed regret over the incident.)

Monday criticized Gardner for criticizing President Nixon, but failed to mention Gardner's support of the Family Assistance Plan, the "Philadelphia Plan," and Nixon's reorganization programs. "If occasional vigor-
The Washington (baseball) Senators opened a new season without the benefit of the President, the Vice President, or even the President’s son-in-law this year. In a move to dramatize the plight of American POW’s held in North Vietnam, the Administration called on Army M Sgt. Daniel Pitzer to throw out the first ball. A captive of the Vietcong for four years before his release in 1967, Pitzer threw two perfect strikes to start the hapless Senators on their way to their first opening-day victory in eight years. The President, who not only follows the baseball Senators, but loves to interpret the world through sports analogy might well have drawn a lesson from opening day.

The President has had several bad seasons of his own with the Senators on Capitol Hill. The once highly disciplined team which carried out executive orders at will has, in the last few years, practically ignored the wishes of their own manager, particularly on the strategy for Vietnam. So far they have done everything possible to make life difficult for their leader except refuse to play. Shortly before making his troop withdrawal announcement April 7, the President was given what should have been a welcome hint from one of his most loyal team players over the years, Republican Jack Miller of Iowa.

Senator Miller suggested that the United States agree to the complete withdrawal of all American military from Vietnam within twelve months following completion of the exchange of prisoners of war and accounting of men missing in action. The proposal differed only slightly with the President’s position by announcing in advance a commitment to total withdrawal within a fixed time. Previously the President had suggested a willingness to negotiate a fixed date only after the release of American prisoners.

Miller’s proposal might well have been seized upon to satisfy critics on the President’s first team, including the veteran Aiken and rookies like Lowell Weicker that the Administration go with something new for the new season. If accepted by the President it would surely have dampened the “final deadline faction” within Senate ranks. It would have given new impetus to the Paris talks, testing in particular Vance Hartke’s claim that the opposition could accept exchange of prisoners when tied to “an acceptable deadline.”

But the President insisted on sticking to his own game plan, leaving himself open to the inevitable criticism of a team whose record fails to meet public expectation. Most important, by failing to take any new initiative on POW’s through the Paris talks, he leaves them only the symbolic value they had on opening day.

* * *

One problem Republicans now have in the Senate debate on war policy is rising above partisanship when it appears increasing opposition to Administration policy among Democrats may serve partisan purposes as well. Thus when Senator Adlai Stevenson proposed to establish an elections commission designed to insure free elections this fall in South Vietnam, Republican leader Hugh Scott, having just led a counterattack on Democratic critics of the Administration, felt compelled to reply in partisan terms. Such a commission, he said, would provide unwarranted interference in the South Vietnamese electoral process. Unfortunately the point of the Stevenson proposal, as it came from four young former State Department employees in South Vietnam, was precisely that the U.S. is already interfering unfairly on the side of the incumbent government in violation of the principle of free elections.

According to members of the Vietnam Elections Project some monitoring agent is necessary to prevent total American identification with the incumbent regime in face of U.S. toleration of the harassment of political candidates and restriction of free press by that regime. In 1967 President Johnson appointed a commission to oversee the elections, primarily to protect himself from critics of the electoral process. Unlike that commission — described since as too little, too late — Stevenson’s plan would send staff to Vietnam well in advance of the elections, including Vietnamese-speaking representatives who could establish a presence independent of any particular political faction in the country.

Far from being a partisan matter, the Stevenson proposal should attract support from both parties, but particularly from Republicans who should have an interest in refuting charges that this Administration is tied to President Thieu more than to the general principle of self-determination.

HOWARD GILLETTE, JR.
Pakistan: Background to a Crisis

1. History of economic and political domination of East Pakistan

In many ways East and West Pakistan have never been one country. Even at its strongest, the bond between East and West Pakistan was somewhat tenuous. They are physically more than 1,000 miles apart, the people speak different languages, have different cultures and different economies. They have in common religion, a short history, and the same central government.

Since the formation of the state of Pakistan 24 years back, the East Bengalis have derived little benefit from the association other than a limited sense of security that the Hindu landlords would not be able to return and repossess the land.

It has become increasingly apparent that the economic and political interests of the East Pakistanis have been systematically subordinated to those of West Pakistan. Even the Central Government's highest planning authority was forced to take official notice of the widening economic disparities between the two regions. A recent report by a panel of experts to the Planning Commission of the Government of Pakistan showed that, while average (per capita) income in the West was 32 percent higher than in the East in 1959-60, the disparity had almost doubled to 61 percent ten years later in 1969-70.

A CAPTIVE MARKET

The Central Government's instruments of tariffs, import controls, industrial licensing, foreign aid budgeting, and investment allocation have been used to direct investment and imports to develop high-cost industries in West Pakistan whose profitability is guaranteed by an East Pakistan market held captive behind tariff walls and import quotas. Though 55 percent of all Pakistanis live in the East, its share of total development expenditures has been as low as 20 percent during 1950/51-1954/55, and reached only 36 percent in the period 1965/66-1969-70. East Pakistan's share of private investment has been around 25 percent. Historically, 50 percent to 70 percent of Pakistan's export earnings have been earned by East Pakistan's products, mainly jute, hides and skin. Yet its share of foreign imports (which are financed by export earnings and foreign aid) has remained between 25 percent and 35 percent. Basically, the East's balance of payments surplus has been used to help finance the West's deficit on foreign account leading to a net transfer of resources, estimated by an official report to be approximately $2.6 billion over the period 1948/49 to 1968/69.

The subordination of the East's economic interests has been accomplished by the overwhelming concentration of governmental authority in the hands of West Pakistanis.

FORGOTTEN EAST

After the military regime of Ayub Khan took power in 1958, the East has had little political representation in the Centre. Only cooperative Bengalis were appointed to political office, and in the powerful Civil Service, Bengalis held only a small fraction of the positions. Under-representation of Bengalis in the army was even more severe, believed to be 10 percent or less. Ayub Khan, against whom the Bengalis had voted heavily in 1965, was forced to resign because of widespread unrest in both East and West, culminating in demonstrations and strikes in 1969. Since taking power in the Spring of 1969, Yahya Khan's martial law regime has always spoken of itself as an interim government to be replaced after popular elections. In the economic and social spheres,
the army made no innovations. However, the military did take one positive step: they held free and fair elections in December of 1970, both for a Constituent Assembly and for Provincial Assemblies.

These elections were based on "one man, vote vote," this meant that in the Constituent Assembly the East was allotted roughly 55 percent of the seats. Two parties dominated the elections. In the East, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's party, the Awami League, won 167 out of 169 seats for the Constituent Assembly; in the West, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's party won approximately 80 out of 140 seats. The Awami League actually had sufficient seats to be a majority in the Constituent Assembly.

The Awami League ran on a single issue, autonomy for East Pakistan. Until the shooting began on March 25, they did not seek independence but a loose union with the West. While on paper they had the votes to dominate a strong central government they presumably felt they could not, in fact, dominate, given that the military, the civil service, and the large businesses were all in the hands of West Pakistanis. Therefore, they opted for a form of government which would give them control over what they considered their essential interests. The established interest groups in the West, particularly the military whose budget was threatened and large businesses who stood both to lose markets and the foreign exchange earnings of the East, opposed autonomy for the East.

OPEN FIRE!

When it was clear that the East would not compromise on its demand for autonomy, President Yahya Khan postponed the Constituent Assembly scheduled for March 3, resulting in demonstrations in which hundreds of people died in army firing on March 1. Despite this provocation, Sheikh Mujib kept the door for negotiations open. General Yahya Khan appeared to respond by holding talks for two weeks with the Awami League leadership. In retrospect, this appears to have been a ploy to buy time for reinforcing the West Pakistani armed forces in the East. On March 25, the military authority outlawed the Awami League, arrested its leaders, and opened fire with tanks, artillery, and automatic weapons (much of it supplied by the U.S.) on the defenseless and unarmed civilians.

The military's approach appears to be to intimidate the urban population through a reign of terror. Killing and destruction apparently have been indiscriminate. Reports on the number killed in the first three days ranged from 15,000 up.

In the short run the army can intimidate the people of the major cities. But it cannot even now control any substantial part of the countryside. In the long run the military position is untenable. In a hostile environment and given the logistical problems, maintaining even the 60,000 West Pakistani troops now in the East will be difficult. Moreover, the military cannot possibly guard the borders or prevent the Bengalis from acquiring arms with which to resist.

The Bengalis have now declared themselves independent and have the will to fight. In the end, they will win; the only question is, how many deaths, and how much destruction must take place before they achieve their independence.

The recent elections provided East Pakistan with a political party capable of governing. Rather than a civil war, the present action is more of an invasion of one state by the military of another, with the aim of overthrowing a duly elected government and subjugating the people.

II. An independent East Pakistan in the international community

Bangla Desh, the name chosen by East Pakistanis for their desired nation, is bound to establish good relations with India. Apart from the cultural bonds of a common language — Bengali — between East Pakistan and the state of West Bengal in India, interest in strong economic ties coincides. The industrialization of East Pakistan would be greatly facilitated by the nearby supply of coal and iron ore in West Bengal. Even for agricultural growth, much of the investment to improve water control would have to be undertaken in India, presumably as cooperative ventures, likely with World Bank support. India would benefit not only from water control but also from direct access to the East Pakistan market, and incidentally by the improvement of access to Assam. Historically, in spite of evident mutual interest in regularizing cultural and trade relationships between India and East Pakistan, such a development was consistently discouraged and resisted by the West Pakistani-dominated government. Specifically, the West Pakistanis believed that, short of war and victory, they have no other lever to force a settlement of the Kashmir claim but the economic interest of India in resuming trade in the East.

BANGLA DESH AND MAO

An independent Bangla Desh may set up minor economic ties with China, but these are likely to be much less than the current scale of trade and aid between China and Pakistan. The chance of international links between China and Bangla Desh are likely to increase the longer the independence struggle takes to achieve its goal, since its control may, over time, slip from moderate Awami League leadership to more militant and leftist elements such as the National Awami Party (which did not contest the December elections).

In recent years U.S.S.R. has competed with China for influence over the West Pakistani-dominated Central Government, using the levers of economic and military aid. In its newly established relationship the
Soviet Union's contacts have been confined to the military regime in West Pakistan. Though it is hard to predict the Soviet attitude towards an independent Bangla Desh, ties with the Soviet Union are unlikely to be any stronger than with China.

III. United States policy: past and future

The likely pattern of United States relations with Bangla Desh depends crucially on U.S. policy in the current crisis — particularly with regard to the decisions on economic and arms aid to the Central Government in West Pakistan. To appreciate possibilities for U.S. policy, a little history is helpful.

Since the early 1950's when Pakistan joined mutual security pacts of SEATO and CENTO, she has received massive economic and military aid from the United States. By 1969 economic aid amounted to about $3 billion and military aid, a classified figure, has been estimated to have been between $1.5 and $2 billion. This assistance has included F-104 Starfighters, F-48 Sabre jets, C-130 transports, Patton tanks, armoured personnel carriers, heavy artillery, and automatic weapons. This arsenal of sophisticated equipment was explicitly intended for defense, and in terms of the context in which they were provided, the Communist Bloc was seen as the potential aggressor. After the 1965 Indo-Pakistan border war, when the U.S. imposed an arms embargo on both countries, the Pakistan government turned for support to another adversary of India, i.e., the People's Republic of China.

ARMS FROM EVERYBODY

The Pakistani initiative was sympathetically received by China, presumably not so much because of the Sino-Indian conflict but because it represented a breach in SEATO and CENTO. The growth of Chinese military and economic aid spurred similar offers from the Soviet Union, anxious to get into the act of weaning Pakistan away from its military alliances with the Western powers. Perhaps because the United States still believed it could compete for influence with Pakistan through arms sales, or perhaps due to the sheer momentum of long and close ties between the Pentagon and the military superstructure in Pakistan, attempts to circumvent the arms embargo gathered strength in 1967. Attempts were made to persuade "third countries" — West Germany and Turkey — to sell arms previously provided by the U.S. to Pakistan for nominal prices, with the assurance that the U.S. would replace these weapons with newer equipment. Though this particular move of the Johnson Administration was frustrated by the unwillingness of any suitably equipped third country to go along with the arrangements, in October 1970 the Nixon administration offered to sell Pakistan certain items including a squadron of F-104 Starfighters, a squadron of B-57 bombers, and about 300 armored personnel carriers.

Viewed from the United States, the emergence of an independent Bangla Desh friendly to India is likely to aid the long-term U.S. foreign policy goal of reducing conflict and tension on the Indian subcontinent. The issue of Kashmir, a matter on which East Pakistan has never been aroused, will continue to divide India and West Pakistan. But as a separate entity, West Pakistan is unlikely to have the capacity to continue the long and costly confrontation with India, which has sapped the scarce resources of both these poor countries.

An independent East Pakistan will probably follow a moderately pro-Western policy, which may be consolidated with the provision of aid by U.S. and multilateral agencies. But if the struggle for independence is prolonged by the continuation of U.S. aid to the Pakistan government, the damage to the United States' image and the rise to power of leftist elements in the independence movement will both frustrate the development of friendly relations with the U.S. Eyewitness reports in the Washington Post and New York Times confirm that American arms are now being used, along with Russian and Chinese, to establish a reign of terror in East Pakistan. The American Government must not be party to the killing of defenseless civilians or the forcible repression of the struggle by East Pakistanis for control over their own lives. Since the agreements under which the arms were given limit their use for defensive purposes, the U.S. certainly has a basis to protest their use for massacring unarmed civilians.

Continuing military and economic aid is not neutrality in this matter. In the current situation, all aid is bound to flow to the government in West Pakistan. At the very least, the United States should prevent deliveries under the October 1970 arms offer, avoid all further arms deals, and cut off economic aid to Pakistan. Such action, together with moral and diplomatic pressure, could bring an end to hostilities and lead to early institution of democratic government.

FOOTNOTES

6. Planning Commission, op. cit., Appendix III.
7. The Six-Point autonomy program of the Awami League is (1) Establishment of a federation "on the basis of the Lahore Resolution and the Parliamentary framework of government with supremacy of legislature directly elected on the basis of adult franchise.
2. Federal government shall deal with only two subjects: that in defense and foreign affairs and all other residuary subjects shall rest in the federating states.
3. There should be either two separate but freely convertible currencies for the two wings or one currency for the whole country, provided that effective constitutional provisions were made to stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. There should be separate banking reserves and a separate fiscal and monetary policy for East Pakistan.
4. It denies the centre the right of taxation and vests it in the hands of the federating states with the centre receiving a

— Please turn to page 8
NEEDED: A Disaster Relief Unit

A Post Mortem on Biafra

INTRODUCTION
In March 1970 the Ripon Society charged the State Department with an inadequate and lethargic response to famine conditions in the area of Nigeria formerly known as Biafra. The charges were especially serious in view of President Nixon's expressed desire to expedite relief to the former Biafran enclave. The following article reviews the charges of a year ago in the light of additional information on U.S. relief assistance to Nigeria/Biafra, particularly a report by the General Accounting Office. In addition, the article contains an up-date on conditions in former Biafra itself. Though it is not the purpose of the article to assess personal blame, we believe our charges of a year ago have been proved correct. And we believe that it is important to understand the mistakes of the Biafra case so that they may be avoided in the future.

In order to better handle future disasters Ripon proposes that the U.S. establish a stand-by disaster relief capability, able to quickly and accurately assess the seriousness of a disaster anywhere in the world and to provide adequate relief immediately, and for as long as necessary. This capability need not conflict with existing relief organizations or similar efforts of other nations. Indeed, the United Nations' plans for an international disaster relief capability provide a framework within which the U.S. can operate.

The important lessons of the Biafra experience are: (1) A large portion of more than $120 million in U.S.-supported relief did not reach the Biafrans or fed those who subsequently died of renewed starvation. (2) The inadequacy of the relief effort was, in part, a result of American fears of offending the Nigerian government; the Biafran case illustrates the principle that if politics is given priority over relief, then people aren't going to get fed. (3) The State Department was incapable of responding effectively to a crisis despite strong leadership from the White House; the defective bureaucratic machinery could affect our response to future crises where U.S. interests are more directly involved. (4) Finally, even if politics and inadequate crisis-response had not diluted the U.S. relief effort, that effort would still have been insufficient; the Biafran crisis underlines the fact that there is no machinery in the U.S. government (or any other government for that matter) for handling large-scale and long-term disaster relief.

The Biafra story is in large part a chronicle of missed opportunities. Nevertheless, there remain important steps which can and should be taken now to improve conditions in Nigeria and to discipline American administration responses: (1) The White House and the State Department should make available to Congress documentation withheld from the General Accounting Office, as well as additional information to enable the GAO to bring its study up-to-date. Furthermore, the interim GAO report and subsequent additions should be completely de-classified. (2) The Executive Branch itself should undertake an audit of how U.S. relief funds were spent. (3) The U.S. should continue and increase its support of groups operating in Nigeria. In particular, support for UNICEF's school and hospital re-roofing and re-equipping scheme should be continued and expanded. (4) To provide better communication be-

THE AUTHOR
William G. Rogers, 28, until recently Research Director for Ripon, was a Peace Corps volunteer in Eastern Nigeria (Biafra) from September 1964 to December 1966. Since his return to the U.S., Mr. Rogers has remained an active student of events in Nigeria; he has edited a newsletter and written articles on the Nigerian civil war.
tween Washington and the former Biafrans, the American Consulate in Enugu should be re-opened. A willingness to do this would be the most convincing test of the Nigerian government's expressed intention to restore normal conditions in the former Eastern Region.

RIPON'S CHARGES

In the March 1970 issue of the Ripon FORUM, Christopher W. Beal's article "How the State Department Watched Biafra Starve" charged the State Department with allowing perhaps ½ million people to starve in the period immediately following the collapse of Biafra. In the article and accompanying editorial "Biafra: The Cost of Bureaucracy" Ripon focused on the State Department's handling of a report by Dr. Karl Western on the condition of the Biafran population. Ripon's charges were unique and important. They drew an evasive rejoinder from then three months later when Elizabeth Drew, writing in Atlantic Watched Biafra. In the article and accompanying editorial "Biafra: The Cost of Bureaucracy" Ripon focused on the State Department's handling of a report by Dr. Karl Western on the condition of the Biafran population. Ripon's charges were unique and important. They drew an evasive rejoinder from then three months later when Elizabeth Drew, writing in Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson. It was the Atlantic that came to somewhat similar conclusions. 1

To review briefly what Ripon wrote a year ago: Though the relief organizations operating in Biafra had officials with first-hand knowledge of the condition of the population, their assessments were not based on scientific surveys of large numbers of people and were thus open to charges of exaggeration. Many felt that relief officials might tend to inflate starvation statistics in order to solicit more relief contributions. Indeed, in the absence of hard data, there must have been an understandable tendency to over-estimate the need to be on the safe side. Finally, the Nigerian government accused the relief organizations, together with the Biafran government, of exaggerating the relief problem in order to elicit sympathy for Biafra's political cause.

Against this background of uncertainty and politicization of the problem, Dr. Western's visit to Biafra in October-November 1969 was extremely important. Dr. Western was employed at the Communicable Disease Center in Atlanta, part of the U.S. Public Health Service, and his findings were endorsed by a colleague who frequently consulted with the Nigerian Health Ministry and by his superior, the Director of the Communicable Disease Center. Dr. Western examined almost three thousand Biafrans in thirty-six separate villages and refugee camps. He found that almost one third (31.4%) of the population had edema — the last stage of starvation in which the body starts to swell up with excess water and begins to consume its own cells. The edema rate in Biafra was found to be three times higher than in the worst sieges of World War II, those of Leningrad and of the Western Netherlands. Western's survey represented an un-biased, scientific assessment of the nutritional situation in Biafra. His study revealed the highest starvation rate in recorded history. His report was completed on November 26, 1969, and handed to Prof. C. Clyde Ferguson, President Nixon's special coordinator for Nigeria/Biafra relief. That report was not properly disseminated, Ripon charged, until much much later. And the delay must have cost thousands of lives.

SANITIZED VERSION

On October 19, 1970, Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees, released what was described as a "very sanitized" version of a classified interim report by the General Accounting Office on U.S. relief assistance to Nigeria. In particular, the report contains an independent account of the lethargic dissemination of Western's data of which Ripon wrote a year ago. However, substantial portions of the GAO report remain classified more than a year after the surrender of the Republic of Biafra on January 15, 1970. 3

The GAO report suffers from what it describes as "two significant limitations": the Nigerian government refused to grant entry visas to GAO staff; and long delays were experienced by the GAO in receiving documentation from the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Lagos. According to the GAO, some documents were received so late that there was not sufficient time to review them for inclusion in its report. The GAO adds: "Documentation on the White House National Security Council's policy guidelines, and contingency planning have not yet been made available for our review."

The GAO report states that of the total of $167.3 million spent on relief during the war, $73.3 million (58.3 million in public funds) came from the U.S. In the post-war period to June 30, of the $93.3 million in relief provided, $48.3 million — more than half — came from the U.S. government. Thus, a year after the end of the war, the American public still has no adequate accounting of how its relief money was used.

STATE DEPT. OBSTRUCTION

One can only speculate on the reasons for the State Department's obstruction of the GAO's efforts. Perhaps the State Department continues to fear offending the Nigerian government by showing how bad things were (and are?) and how relatively little was done about them. An increasingly cogent reason at this late date is that State Department bureaucrats are still trying to cover up their mistakes. In any case, the bureaucratic ineptitude the report does reveal suggests that it is only the tip of an iceberg, the major portion of which remains submerged in Foggy Bottom.

Ripon vs. GAO

On January 11, 1970, when it became apparent
that Biafra would soon collapse, the President offered tens of additional food to the Nigerian government, 8 C-130 cargo planes to carry the food, and $10 million to pay for a massive relief operation into conquered Biafra. At the same time, the President ordered the State Department to transmit to the Nigerian government all information the U.S. had on nutritional conditions. Due to bureaucratic incompetence, Ripon charged, the Western Report was not conveyed to high levels of the American government (let alone the Nigerian government) with any sense of urgency until January 19 when Dr. Western briefed Ferguson, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs David Newsom, and Director of the Nigeria Desk William Brubek. This belated briefing is confirmed by the GAO report.

Still, Ripon wrote, the Western Report was not forcefully conveyed to the Nigerian government— even though the State Department now had, in addition, a one-page January 14 memo by Dr. Western on food tonnage requirements for the Biafran population. Ripon had written: "On January 25, Dr. William Foege, one of Dr. Western's colleagues at the State Department briefings of the previous week... convinced Ambassador Truehart that more should be done to communicate the problem to the Nigerians. So on the 26th, ... the U.S. Embassy presented the Western Report and a high estimate of postwar food needs to a Nigerian cabinet minister." The GAO account: On January 24, the GAO report states, the Department of State, "disturbed by the possible underestimates of the relief situation, directed that a U.S. Public Health Service doctor conduct briefings on the Western Report and tonnage estimates for the Ambassador and his staff and discuss the problem with the Nigerian Ministry of Health." Interestingly, what happened after January 24 was deleted from the published GAO report.

RESULTS OF INSUBORDINATION

The relief airlift into Biafra had stopped the night of January 10-11. Thus, it was not until two weeks after relief stopped coming in that the U.S. bothered to convey the Western Report to the Nigerian government. By that time, as Ripon pointed out in the March, 1970, article, the Nigerian government was publicly proclaiming that there was no serious mass starvation, that allegations to the contrary came from rebel sympathizers and foreign detractors or yellow journalists — such as the reporters who had been finally allowed into the area on January 20, and had written lurid (albeit accurate) stories of starvation, chaos, rape, and looting. Thus, it appeared to the Nigerian government that the U.S. was simply echoing the news-hungry journalists, without there being a scientific basis for concern. It should be emphasized that the Nigerian government had been very interested — and the U.S. knew it was interested — in getting accurate information. As Assistant Secretary Newsom stated after his January 13 visit with Nigerian Head of State Gowon: "[General Gowon] stressed that he wished to be certain that requests for relief which Nigeria made were based on genuine need..." 4 It must have been incomprehensible to Gowon, then, that if the Western Report did represent genuine need, the U.S. had taken so long to bring it to his attention.

RIPON VS. DREW

A year ago Ripon charged that the bureaucracy had sabotaged Presidential policy. On this point Elizabeth Drew differed with us. Referring to Ripon's earlier article, Miss Drew wrote: "The article even spurred an abortive inquiry into the affair by Clark Mollenhoff, President Nixon's special White House investigator. But Mollenhoff's investigation was apparently begun on his own initiative and was turned off by the White House. The Ripon article overrepresented the extent to which the President had a policy, and to which the State Department did, or is capable of doing, anything so deliberate as to subvert one."

Elliot Richardson's comment on Biafra in the February 1, 1971, issue of Newsweek helps clarify the issue of Presidential policy: "We were discussing what to do about starvation in Biafra. There was a definite danger in straining our relations with Nigeria, then in the final stages of its civil war. The President weighed the problem of Nigerian displeasure against the need of the hungry Ibos; the deciding factor was the humanitarian feelings of the American people. The President owed it to his fellow citizens to make the kind of response that was rooted in the American character: the President's reaction could not be the 'correct' diplomatic reaction, it had to be the gut American reaction."

Richardson's remarks indicate that the President did indeed have a policy at the end of the war, and that policy was to get relief to the Biafrans. However, we must also conclude that the President was not interested enough in the Biafra case to take action to find out what went wrong in implementing his policy, to determine who was responsible, and to insure that the defective bureaucratic machinery was repaired.

EFFECT ON THE RELIEF PROGRAM

The delay in presenting nutritional information to the Nigerian government had its effect on the Biafran people. Dr. Western found almost a third of the 3.2 million Biafrans with edema when he made his survey. At that time the relief airlift was flying in 250 tons daily (1750 tons weekly) of food. After
the end of the airlift on January 10-11, only 175 tons was delivered to the former Biafran enclave in the first twelve days. In contrast, Dr. Western's January 14 memorandum stated regarding a rock-bottom tonnage figure: "If food is desperately short, and the first week of an emergency you are feeding only those with edema, you could get by with 3,500 tons per week (1 million people)." Furthermore, these figures did not include relief for those who had been on the Nigerian side of the lines before the collapse.

Western's minimum estimate for the longer run: "... if full rations are given only to those people who have edema — 1 million or 30% of Biafrans — and the remaining population a 600-calorie per day ration, the need would be 6,000 tons per week." Again, the figure does not include those formerly on the Nigerian side of the lines. The Nigerian Red Cross estimate, as contained in a statement of February 1970, called for about 4,200 tons a week for 3.1 million people. However, the GAO reports that each of the eleven weeks for which data was available in the 12-week period from January 25 through April 18, was on the average 40% below the Nigerian Red Cross goal — which was, in turn, only about 70% of Western's figure. Reporter Michael Wolfers cites a week in early March "when it was reckoned that more than three million had been given food in one week, 26,000 in-patients were being treated, and more than 3,000 new cases of malnutrition were diagnosed in the week." In part because of U.S. mishandling of the Western report, postwar relief never reached the level of need. 

What Happened over the Past Year

The starvation during the war was primarily a result of the Nigerian Military Government's blockade of Biafra. The blockade put an end to the import of dried fish ("stockfish") from Iceland and the Scandinavian countries, and cattle from northern Nigeria — two sources from which the Biafrans derived a large portion of their protein. Protein deficiency more than lack of food generally was responsible for millions of deaths. The supply of staple carbohydrates — yams and cassava — was also restricted by the war; these became scarce as people abandoned overrun farms and moved to land already occupied by others.

LITTLE IMPROVEMENT

The end of the war brought no immediate increase in locally-grown food. Biafran currency was not accepted as legal tender by the Nigerian government, and millions were thus rendered penniless and unable to buy local or imported food. Furthermore, January-March is the traditional planting season in Biafra, with yams and cassava harvested in the fall. Therefore, even assuming that all farmers had the opportunity to return to their homes, had the strength to plant, and had obtained the seedlings to plant, the soonest that indigenous traditional food supplies would become plentiful would be in late fall of 1970. Indeed, Elizabeth Drew wrote in the June 1970 Atlantic that "as late as March and early April, American doctors returning from advisory work for the Nigerian Red Cross reported that there had been little overall improvement in the nutritional condition of the population." James Doyle wrote in the April 7, 1970, Washington, D.C., Evening Star that "the rate of starvation has not diminished since the Nigerian civil war ended, according to an unpublished report by U.S. government doctors." According to the Star article, more than a million were still suffering from edema. The Star article was disputed by George I. Lythcott, M.D., one of the doctors referred to. However, Ripon has determined independently that (1) there were statistical inaccuracies in the article sufficient to justify Dr. Lythcott's criticism of it; and (2) the overall picture the article paints is accurate.

PREMATURE PHASE OUT

During May and June the Nigerian Red Cross relief operation was phased out and transferred to state rehabilitation commissions. (Biafra, the former Eastern Region of Nigeria, had been divided into three states — the land-locked East Central state inhabited by the Ibo, the Rivers state in which the Ijaw predominate, and the South Eastern state of the Efiks.) Accompanying the phase-out was a reduction in food tonnage delivered. Dr. Roger Hickman, a relief worker in Nigeria with the British Save the Children Fund, wrote in the September 28 London Financial Times (the English equivalent of the Wall Street Journal): "[The Nigerian Red Cross] drew up a 'phase out' plan for May and June. This included a drastic reduction in the total tonnage of food from 3000 tons to below 1000 tons a week. It was widely considered that this was premature and that it was based on an overoptimistic assessment of the situation." Compounding the problem were Nigerian intra-governmental transfer problems, so that, in fact, the average tonnage entering the East Central state (which approximates Biafra at the time of the collapse) averaged about 800 tons a week during May and June.

Nigerian writer Tai Solarin wrote in the May 4, 1970, Nigerian Tribune after one of his visits to the East Central state in conjunction with his own relief efforts: "In feeding Owerri [the last capital of Biafra], nutritional experts worked out a figure of 1600 tons of food per week. For shortage of food, however, it was reduced to 820 tons. Today, it is only 400 tons of food a week to feed 1.2 million people...."
Though measures of the effect of the cutback are few, the still-starving population must have been hard-hit. Out-patients at Owerri hospital rose from 12,000 the week ending June 12 to 41,000 the following week. 13 Jim Hoagland wrote in the *Washington Post* 14 that the week of June 6, food distributed had dropped to 439 tons, with 3,049 new cases of starvation — as compared to 3,179 new cases in a week in early March. At least 214 people died of starvation that week in June.

The relief effort remained at low levels throughout July and the first half of August. 15 Michael Wolters 8 states that new cases of malnutrition in July were being recorded at a rate of just over 1,600 a week. There were 180 deaths a week recorded among in-patients in the East Central state feeding program.

TRANSPORT PROBLEMS

According to Sam G. Ikoku, East Central state Rehabilitation Commissioner, "[the fall in relief was] a result of arguments between the Federal Ministry of Economic Development and the National Red Cross." 10 The "arguments" acted to slow transportation: "From the moment the Nigerian Red Cross pulled out of the relief effort at the end of June until the middle of August not a drop of petrol came from any Nigerian source to keep the food trucks running" 10 —it being the responsibility of Lagos to authorize bulk petrol buying. 16 The August 22 *Economist* 17 wrote: "Although the British government alone gave more than 100 trucks for relief work, the commission has only 12 with which to collect food from Port Harcourt and distribute it throughout the East Central State — an area of 8,750 square miles. Otherwise, it must rely on hired transport." R. Lindley, in the news broadcast cited above, 19 pointed to another aspect of the transportation problem: "As we bounced and lurched down almost impassable tracks in the middle of Nigeria's rainy season it was easy to see why transport is a continual worry to the relief teams, why so many vehicles end up cannibalized wrecks in graveyards like this (FILM SHOT OF LORRIES WITH THE RED CROSS MARK ON THEM THAT HAD BEEN JUNKED) for want of spare parts. The Nigerians insist that all relief supplies go through Lagos. $147,000 worth of urgently needed spares are now somewhere in the pipeline. Although transport is too precious just to carry messages the Federal Government still hasn't allowed the relief teams to use the radios they all possess."

In August, the unexpected arrival of thousands of tons of food proved a mixed blessing. The vast quantities of food over-burdened Port Harcourt's storage facilities and much food either rotted or was pilfered, according to Jim Hoagland writing in the December 10, 1970, *Washington Post*. 18 "Then,"

Hoagland writes, "because of bureaucratic ineptness, [the food was] rushed out to the field warehouses, which were even more inadequate." Still, there was food again. Bridget Bloom 15 wrote (September 2) that "it is only the last couple of weeks, partly through the hiring of transport, partly through a sustained effort to clear food unloaded at Port Harcourt (4,000 tons last week) that food has been reaching the areas needing it most." According to the Christian Council of Nigeria, 10 1429 tons of food were delivered to the East Central state the week ending August 1, 2351 tons the week ending August 8, 2419 tons the week ending August 15, and 3640 tons the two weeks ending August 27. In addition, a July maize (corn) harvest was good, providing the first locally-grown food since the end of the war. 20 31

The relief effort hit another snag in mid-September — reportedly involving inefficient scheduling of relief ships by foreign relief agencies and Nigerian in-fighting — which resulted in a fall from 900 tons a week to nearly zero in many areas. 18 A good harvest of yams in late fall marked another improvement — although some relief teams had no food to distribute throughout November. In mid-January, the relief program was still feeding 100,000. 28 The World Food Program of the U.N. was scheduled to distribute about 30,000 tons of food over the next four or five months. 14 30

CURRENT CONDITIONS

What is the situation now? It is impossible to answer with precision there having been no recent equivalent to Dr. Western's 1969 study. The testimony of visitors coming out of Nigeria is based on random impressions which can be no substitute for a scientific survey, especially since no observers are now in a mood to offend Nigeria. However, one can conclude that starvation has been drastically reduced from what it was a year ago. Jim Hoagland reported in the November 22 *Washington Post* that "malnutrition cases in many areas drop to 10 or 20 percent of wartime levels." Other observers are, by degrees, more optimistic, with a few going as far as to say that starvation as such is no longer a problem — though many people are still very, very hungry. Still, there has been substantial improvement in the past year.

This improvement may be attributed to the following causes: (1) In the first few weeks after the collapse of Biafra and in subsequent drastic slow-downs in relief, thousands of the weakest must have died. The number of people to be fed was reduced. (2) Local harvests have been successful. (3) The relief program itself was a factor, though much of the wartime food went to people who subsequently died and many supplies never reached their intended destina-
The weakened population is very susceptible to disease. Like the nutritional situation, the extent of the problem is difficult to assess. Although the health care system stands in disarray, making over-all figures very tentative, Jim Hoagland wrote that there were 1,000 deaths a week in early October and 2,000 deaths a week in November from hepatitis. 14 Doctors interviewed by William Borders in mid-January report that hepatitis is now "under control." 22 Tuberculosis and malaria have also been problems.

There is a shortage of drugs and medical equipment. Emekuku hospital near Owerri had more drugs during the war, when the whole enclave was supplied by air, than in the year since the war's end. 22 Hospitals and schools were systematically looted during and following the war. Thousands of schools and clinics (and indeed almost all concrete buildings) remain without roofing sheets. 23 The University of Nigeria in Enugu (East Central state) was officially reopened in October, but it too was extensively looted; there are practically no books, furniture, or equipment. The situation is even worse in secondary and primary schools. In high schools, students prepared for standardized exams in chemistry, physics, and biology without lab equipment. 24 Anthony Asika, head of the textile mill in Enugu is operating at only one-fifth capacity and the coal mines are producing a mere 50 tons a day compared with a pre-war daily output of 2,300 tons daily. 20 24 28 29 Un-restored services — a shortage of electricity is responsible for the low operating level of the Enugu textile mill — and lack of capital to restore war-damaged industries are important factors hindering industrial recovery.

Outside the East Central state, the Ibos are not being readily welcomed back to their former jobs. This problem is especially acute in the Rivers state, whose capital, Port Harcourt, is the second most important port in the country and was developed principally by the Ibos. Lack of skilled labor there — which the Ibos formerly provided — has prevented many industries from re-opening. 20 Ironically, some commentators estimate that 10 percent of the Ibos living in northern Nigeria before the war have returned; 20 it was in the north that the series of massacres of Ibos and other Eastern Nigerians occurred which were a principal cause of Biafra's secession.

Federal troops are garrisoned throughout the East Central state often in school buildings and hospitals. As much money is being spent on permanent barracks for troops as is being spent on education in the East Central state. 30 At least one third of the Federal government's budget goes to the military — which remains at full strength a year after the end of the war. 27 Both within and outside the East Central state de facto discrimination against former Biafrans threatens to be the most serious obstacle standing in the way of real re-integration.

In January, it was announced that bank accounts operated during the secession had finally been unfrozen, thus releasing an estimated $56,000,000. 27 This action promises to be of great significance. Until recently, the former Biafra was operating almost entirely on a barter economy.

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

(1) A large portion of U.S.-supported relief either did not reach the Biafrans or fed those who subsequently died of renewed starvation. To focus on the June 1969 cutback is instructive. From June 1968 to June 1969, the U.S. government had expended about $50 million in relief funds. After the ICRC stopped its half of the airlift and ceased operations on the Nigerian side of the lines, the U.S. spent only about $9 million in the last six months of the war — a yearly rate of less than half of the expenditure of the previous twelve months. 28 Thus, in terms of relief expenditures alone, it is clear that the U.S. allowed those it had earlier helped save to go without food. The conditions of Biafra's collapse suggest that starvation was a major cause — even the army got so little food it had no strength to fight. Full-scale relief did not begin until almost two weeks after the collapse and even then never reached wartime levels of 5000 tons a week going into the former Eastern Region. (Nigeria had claimed 3000 tons were going into federally-held areas, while an average of 2000 tons reached Biafra in the first six months of 1969.) An accurate census will never be held to determine the full extent of deaths from starvation. But from the Western reports, the pattern of U.S. aid, and the sad facts of corruption and waste in Nigeria,
it is fair to deduce that much of the $120 million spent by the U.S. on relief did not succeed in saving lives.

(2) If politics is given priority over relief, people aren't going to get fed. Political considerations ("we mustn't offend the Nigerians") played a part in the delayed dissemination of the Western report; ironically, the delay resulted in offending the Nigerians more than if the report had been presented immediately. Here is another case-in-point: During the first 5 months of 1969 the relief airlift was at its peak. The two principal groups running the airlift were Joint Church Aid (JCA) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). On June 5th, the Nigerian Air Force shot down an ICRC relief plane. Subsequently, although the pilots were willing to fly, the ICRC stopped its half of the airlift and tried to get an agreement between the blockader and blockadee on relief flights; negotiations continued until the end of the war with stockpiled food rotting in warehouses. Meanwhile, JCA continued flying illegally and continued to feed people. Both groups were, incidentally, barred from Nigeria at the end of the war. The U.S. plays the major role in determining what the ICRC does. After supporting the contributions of concerned Americans in bringing the Biafrans out of starvation in the first half of 1969, the U.S. used politics as an excuse to let them starve again, in disregard of the wishes of the President.

NEXT TIME?

(3) In its handling of the Western Report, the State Department has shown itself incapable of responding effectively to a crisis. Major U.S. interests were not directly involved in the Biafra case; but "next time" the creaky State Department machinery could produce consequences as serious for the U.S. as they were last time for the people of Biafra.

(4) Finally, even if politics and inadequate crisis-response had not diluted the U.S. relief effort, that effort would still have been insufficient; the Biafran experience underlines the fact that there is no machinery in the U.S. government (or any other government for that matter) for handling large-scale and long-term disaster relief. From its late beginning in May 1968, the U.S. relief operation was reorganized at least seven times. The GAO itself wrote that "there appeared to be ad hoc changes which were responsive to the increased demands of the Nigerian relief program, suggesting that the [State] Department's established organization might be inadequate to handle the management and operation of a long-term relief operation." This lack of a relief capability had its consequences, of course. First, though the planning figure of 9,000 tons of food per one million persons per month was used throughout the war, the relief delivered at the peak of the effort — January through July 1969 — was only about one-half the planned rate; the amount of food distributed was never limited by food stocks available. Second, there was no contingency planning for post-war relief needs until December 1969, beyond estimating requirements for and providing stockpiles of supplies. Poor planning was also responsible for a glut of relief supplies in August — food which over-burdened storage facilities and much of which rotted. Third, it was not until March 25, two months after the beginning of the post-war relief program, that the American Embassy in Lagos reported that accountability procedures had been established. And it is highly unlikely that the procedures are, even now, satisfactory. Jim Hoagland reports in the December 10, 1970, Washington Post that "well-placed sources indicate that a 20 per cent loss [through corruption] is either a 'minimum figure' in the words of one source, or 'a very conservative estimate' according to another." Hoagland reports that drivers carrying relief loads often don't go to their scheduled stops, choosing to sell their cargoes rather than pick up wages. Trucks and $1,000 American donated microscopes are missing. At least one-third of a $250,000 donation of drugs from West Germany has disappeared. Clothing donated for war victims is being sold in Calabar, South Eastern state; U.S. donated relief food is on sale in Umuahia in the East Central state. The Nigerians recently began their own investigation of corruption; the East Central state branches of both the Nigerian Red Cross and Rehabilitation Commission have been investigated. Foreigners, however, especially the Americans, don't seem to like finding out the truth about themselves. Representatives of U.N. agencies through which U.S. contributions are channelled refused to talk to Hoagland about their role in distribution. Sam G. Ikoku, East Central Rehabilitation Commissioner, claimed that "documentation and control is deliberately insufficient." By whom? In the absence of an executive audit by the U.S. government, there is certainly no reason to assume that corruption has been limited to Nigerian citizens.

WHAT CAN BE DONE TO BETTER HANDLE FUTURE DISASTERS REQUIRING LARGE-SCALE RELIEF?

The U.S. should develop a standing disaster relief unit responsible directly to the President.

In December 1968 the General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution preparing the way for an international disaster relief capability to supplement and cooperate with existing relief groups. The resolution calls upon countries to develop their own relief units, which could be placed at the disposal
of the Secretary General. The United States should follow the guidelines given in the U.N. resolution in establishing its own relief capability.

Specifically, the resolution

(1) "Invites Governments which have not already done so to make national preparations to meet natural disasters, including administrative arrangements and such measures as training of relief personnel, stockpiling of supplies needed for disaster relief, earmarking of means of transportation and the development of warning systems and of means of speedy communication." The U.S. capability should be headed by medical personnel and others with proven competence in disaster relief planning. A body of relief workers who could be called upon in time of crisis should be identified. They might be drawn from the Armed Forces, the National Guard, the U.S. Public Health Service, or from the ranks of conscientious objectors to military service — or from a combination of these. The use of Public Health Service personnel and CO's would be particularly appropriate in situations where the presence of foreign military personnel would be viewed with distrust.

(2) "Invites Governments and organizations of the United Nations system, as well as other organizations concerned, to give full recognition to the need to promote scientific research regarding the causes and early manifestations of impending disasters, to ascertain and assess areas and places of high vulnerability, and to encourage preventive and protective measures, such as the construction of disaster-resistant housing." In implementing this part of the resolution, the U.S. should develop contingency plans for both "man-made" and natural disasters. In addition, it is important that a team of medical and other personnel with experience in estimating the need for assistance be on call to go to a putative disaster area on 12 hours notice.

(3) "Urges the Secretary-General in co-operation with the organizations of the United Nations system as well as the League of Red Cross Societies and other organizations concerned, to consider ways of expanding assistance to Governments in the fields referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above." Though the U.S. will be called upon to offer assistance to other countries, there is no substitute for trained relief personnel indigenous to the disaster area. Through the U.N. the U.S. should encourage other nations to develop their own disaster units.

(4) (paragraph 5 of resolution) "Appeals to States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies to consider offering, through the United Nations or otherwise, emergency assistance to meet natural disasters, including stand-by disaster relief units or the earmarking of similar units for service in foreign countries, and requests the Secretary-General to consult States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies on the types of emergency assistance they would be in a position to offer." It should be noted that the U.S. does have a capability for handling disasters within the U.S. On the federal level, the Federal Disaster Act of 1950 (Public Law 81-875) gave the President broad powers and created a fund for his use at times of major disasters. The Office of Emergency Preparedness, in the Executive Office of the President, was created by the Federal Disaster Act to handle federal relief activities. 29 We need a similar body to discharge foreign relief responsibilities.

Other paragraphs of the resolution are concerned with strengthening staff arrangements within the U.N. Secretariat for dealing with natural disasters, and financial and report-making arrangements.

BEYOND THE U.N.

The U.N. effort will, it is predicted, take years to come to fruition. And it does not cover "man-made" disasters such as the Nigerian civil war. The capacity of all countries to handle any kind of disaster should be developed. The "political problems" surrounding relief in war-time should be reduced as the ability to assess and handle natural disasters is improved. The Biafra case is not unique. Some of the same problems were present in the case of East Pakistan, where the lack of standard operating procedures for distribution of U.S. relief led to much delay, waste and corruption. The U.S., then, should go beyond the U.N. resolution and act now to develop a relief organization which can respond to any disaster.

Still, the basic question is whether the U.S., and the world community in general, is willing to give
priority to people over politics — especially in internal conflicts where international law is weakest. One would hope that the nations of the world might be able to agree that the right to starve a section of a country’s population is not one of the rights of nations.

WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE IN THE NIGERIAN CASE?

The following steps should be taken immediately:

1. The State Department and the White House should make available the documentation withheld from the GAO, as well as additional information to enable the GAO to bring its study up-to-date. Furthermore, the interim GAO report and subsequent additions should be completely de-classified. It is intolerable that the details of a relief operation be kept secret; especially when the President specifically wanted diplomatic secrecy to serve the interests of relief not to override them. Classification of information has gone too far when it is used to prevent people from knowing how much of the food they paid for has actually gone into some child’s stomach. In addition, such an extension and opening up of the GAO study should provide valuable information about problems in the Biafra case which could be avoided in planning for future disasters.

NEEDED: EXECUTIVE AUDIT

2. The White House should independently undertake an executive audit of the expenditure of U.S. relief funds. Difficulties the GAO experienced in getting its own personnel into Nigeria suggest that the White House and State Department would be more effective in investigating charges of waste and corruption in the distribution of relief funds. Furthermore, an executive audit is natural from an organizational point of view: the White House gave out the money; the White House should be interested in how it was spent.

3. The U.S. should continue and increase its support of groups operating in Nigeria. In particular, support for UNICEF’s school and hospital re-roofing and re-furnishing scheme should be continued and expanded. It seems clear that the food shortage is going to be met only by the Ibo man planting and harvesting his own crops. Perhaps the best thing outsiders can do now is to give the former Biafrans the tools to help themselves.

4. The American Consulate in Enugu should be reopened. One of the principal reasons for the inadequate American policy toward Nigeria from 1966 on was that news from the East, relayed through the Consulate in Enugu, got drowned out by the view of the Ambassador in Lagos. However, the situation got worse with the closing of the consulate in 1967, as Enugu was about to fall to Nigerian troops. To begin to get more accurate information about eastern Nigeria faster, the consulate should be re-opened. The consulate would be useful in other ways as well. For example, it might be able to help encourage the reopening of eastern Nigerian branches of American companies. Furthermore, the entrance of easterners into the U.S. for study, or for purchasing business equipment, for collecting books for schools, could be expedited.

WILLIAM G. ROGERS

FOOTNOTES

5. “Nixon Behind the Scenes” by Elliot Richardson, Newsweek, February 1, 1971.
22. Confidential interviews with reliable sources.

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NGB MEETING

Ripon's annual National Governing Board meeting was held the first weekend of April in Cherry Hill, New Jersey.

Representative Paul N. McCloskey spoke to the approximately 75 attendees on Friday evening: "Rip Van Winkle". The GOP candidate for mayor of Philadelphia, talked to the group at dinner Saturday; and William H. Rehnquist, Special Assistant to the President, chaired a discussion of DOD policies that afternoon.

The National Executive Committee also authorized the hiring of two new staff members. Dan Swillinger will become Ripon's full-time political director and George Gilder will become co-editor of the Ripon FORUM. The FORUM has plans to convert to a bi-weekly publication schedule by July. An eight-page newsletter, published on the 15th of each month, will supplement the regular 24-page magazine.

The NGB elected new officers for the Society. They are: Howard Gillette, Jr., President; Michael F. Brewer, Chairman of the Board; Josiah Lee Auspitz, Chairman of the Executive Committee; Howard L. Roter, Vice President; Robert L. Heal, Treasurer; and Quincey White, Secretary.

RIPON'S MAN OF THE YEAR

The Ripon Society has selected Walter J. Hickel, former Secretary of the Interior, as its Man Of The Year. Governor Hickel will be presented the Award at a dinner on Earth Day, April 21st, in Seattle, Washington.

Sponsors of the dinner include such leaders in the environmental movement as: Robert O. Anderson, Chairman of the Board Atlantic Richfield Co.; Barry Commoner, Center for the Biology of Natural Environment; Governor of Washington; Mark O. Hatfield, Senator from Oregon; Tom McColl, Governor of Oregon; Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., Congressman from California; William G. Milliken, Governor of Michigan; Bob Monagan, GOP Minority Leader of the California Assembly; Bob Packwood, Senator from Oregon; Francis W. Sargent, Governor of Massachusetts; and Ted Stevens, GOP Senator from Alaska. The topic of Mr. Hickel's speech will be "Needed: A New Breed of Leader."

In a poll of the readers of the FORUM, taken before Hickel left for the Nixon Administration, Secretary Hickel received the highest rating of any member of the Nixon Cabinet. (Others receiving high ratings were Richardson, Romney, Shultz and Blount.) It was on the basis of this poll that he was selected for the Man Of The Year Award.

"The award is in part a recognition of the Nixon Administration's achievements in the environmental field, said Ripon's President Josiah Lee Auspitz, who will present the award to Hickel. "In part it is also a tribute to Secretary Hickel's dedication to national reconciliation at a time when polarization was the prevailing wind."

GOODELL DINNER

Former Senator Charles E. Goodell was the main speaker at the Fifth Annual Dinner of the Boston and Cambridge chapters on March 31. Almost 200 guests gathered at the Parker House roof to hear Goodell talk about the future of the GOP and his Mobilization of Moderates, a soon-to-be-held conference that will discuss how to turn the President around on the war and perhaps participate in a Republican insurgency. Dinner sponsors Joseph Spaulding and Francis Hatch, Mary B. Newman, William L. Saltenstall, Martin A. Linsky, Mr. and Mrs. Franklin A. Lindsay, and Dwight Alford, President, the Greenwich and Litchfield, and Governor Donald Dwight dropped in for the pre-dinner cocktail party.

The Cambridge chapter elected new officers after the dinner. They are: Joel P. Greene, President; Willard Moffat, Vice President; Bob Stuart, Treasurer; Craig Stewart, Secretary and Evelyn Ellis, Susan Tharand, Doris White and Gus Southworth, members of Executive Board.

• The new President, Howard Gillette, Jr., will deliver the keynote address at the Arkansas YR state convention on May 8. Details on the keynote address, other convention activities will include the adoption of a platform, a "Miss YR Luncheon" with State Senator Jim Coldwell, and a "Footsie Britt Appreciation Dinner" to honor former Lt. Governor Maurice "Footsie" Britt.

• Several Philadelphia Ripon chapter members are heavily involved in "Rip Van Winkle". The Year Day is in charge of campaign headquarters and of the volunteer effort, including Citizens for Longstreth; the campaign policy chairman is Richard Klein; chapter president Robert Moss and Vito Canuso are serving as high-level troubleshooters; and Steve Hamelin will do speechwriting and research.

• Attorney Stewart H. McConaughy of West Hartford, has been elected President of the Ripon Society of Greater Hartford. Other officers for the coming year are Henry Kinne of Glastonbury, Vice President, Robert S. Smith of West Hartford, Treasurer, and Miss Phoebe McConaughy of Hartford, Secretary.

• Former Senator Charles E. Goodell was named a contributing editor of The North American Review, and also had an article entitled "The Day-Dreaming Professor Coach" in the January issue of World Tennis.

LETTERS

LITERARY LAPSE

Dear Madam:

Robb L. Louis Stevenson must be turning over in his grave in the South Seas. The March 1971 Summary of Contents of the FORUM says, "Agnew recently has been playing a meek Mr. Hyde, but who's to say when the Dr. Jekyll image lurking in the closet may be donned again?" I cannot recall Mr. Hyde ever being the meeker of the two personalities. Either I have confused the two roles, which I doubt, or you have.

Yours truly,
ROBERT McCLENNON
Hamden, Conn.

Edit. Note: My high school education seems all forgotten. Sorry.

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THE RIPON SOCIETY
PUBLIC POLICY PRIZE

"....an idea whose time is yet to come"

First Prize ...... $1000.00    Second Prize ...... $500.00

The Ripon Society, a Republican research and policy organization, has prepared over the last several years a series of proposals on public policy for the Republican Party. The ideas set forth in political research papers by Ripon include:

- The Negative Income Tax
- Revenue Sharing
- A Volunteer Military
- Multilateral Foreign Aid
- A Deescalating Strategy in Vietnam
- Contact and Containment with China
- Reduction of Farm Subsidies

The Ripon Society Prize is now seeking progressive public policy proposals that represent "an idea whose time is yet to come." Such ideas may have been frequently discussed in the academic community but need to be developed for use by political leaders. They should further the Ripon Society's objective of bridging the gap between the world of ideas and the world of government. Grants totaling $2000 will be awarded to the authors of the best, high quality papers that propose new directions for public policy.

All papers will be judged on the basis of the originality of the proposal, its practicality and its relevance to the problems facing the United States in the 1970's. The papers may be addressed to any area of public policy, foreign or domestic. The winning entries will be chosen by the panel of judges:

Kenneth E. Boulding
Director, Institute of Behavioral Sciences,
University of Colorado at Boulder

Malcolm C. Moos
President, University of Minnesota

John Sherman Cooper
Republican Senator from Kentucky

Aaron Wildavsky
Dean of the Graduate School of Public Affairs,
University of California at Berkeley

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Prizes

An award of $1000 will be made for the best paper submitted; a second award of $500 will be made for the second best paper. All entries will be considered for these awards. In addition, the best paper authored by an undergraduate will be considered separately for an award of $500. No entry will be eligible for more than one award. The best overall paper, receiving the $1000 award, will be published in the November 1971 issue of the Ripon FORUM, the Society's monthly magazine.

Eligibility

The competition is open to all candidates for academic degrees who are studying for, or will receive, their degree during the academic year 1970-1971. Members of the National Governing Board of the Ripon Society are excluded. Previously published papers are also excluded from the competition.

Format

Papers should not exceed 5000 words in length. They must be typewritten and doublespaced, and submitted in two copies. They should focus on a specific practical proposal (i.e., they should not merely analyze the problem) and should be well documented with sources included for facts and figures which are not well known. The author must be fully identified, with academic status indicated, and home and school addresses given (if appropriate). Entries must be postmarked no later than June 30, 1971. Award winners will be notified September 30, 1971, and a full list will appear in the November issue of the Ripon FORUM. All entries become the property of The Ripon Society Prize, Inc.

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Entries and/or questions should be addressed to:

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