THE LINDSAY SWITCH

Hell No, We Won't Go

ALSO THIS MONTH:

- A Preview of the 1972 Senate Races
- A Guide to the Democrats — Part II
  Clifford Brown
- The GOP McGovern Commission
- The Learned Man's Rafferty
  John McLaughry
THE LINDSAY SWITCH

A reprint of the Ripon Society's statement at a news conference the day following John Lindsay's registration as a Democrat. As we've said before, Ripon would rather fight than switch. — 8

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The Republican Delegates and Organizations Committee has made public a report urging needed and admirable reform of the party's delegate selection process. Yet the report seems destined to remain a "paper elephant." The Committee failed to demand procedural or other guidelines to guarantee implementation by the state parties. It would be ironic if the party and the RNC, who authorized the delegate selection study, proceeded to ignore its recommendations. — 7

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Editors: Evelyn F. Ellis, Ernest G. Gilder.
Technical Editors: John Woodman.
Contributors: Christopher W. Beal, Duncan E. Faley, Douglas Matthews, William D. Phelan, David Oliver White.

Circulation Dept.: Judith H. Bohn.

Correspondents

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The Lindsay Switch

Hell No, We Won’t Go

The Ripon Society regrets that John Lindsay has left the Republican Party to become a Democrat. We wish him well, but we intend to fight rather than switch. We urge all progressive Republicans to do likewise.

We have in the past looked to Mayor Lindsay as one of our leaders, but his defection by no means debilitates our wing of the GOP. Other progressive Republicans are unlikely to follow his lead. They retain a significant power base among our Governors and Senators, in cities like New Haven, Bridgeport and Philadelphia where progressive Republicans are waging powerful mayoral campaigns, in certain parts of the national Executive, and most importantly, among a large portion of the electorate. We intend to preserve and extend this base in coming electoral battles and we expect to continue the expansion of the Ripon Society into all areas of the country.

We have long sympathized with Lindsay’s ideas and commitments, but we disagree with his present political analysis. His opportunities for advancement within the GOP were limited not chiefly by his ideological stance, as he maintains, but by his own special circumstances: by the constraints of fusion, by his narrow primary defeat, by a feud with the Republican governor, and finally by his endorsement of the Democratic gubernatorial candidate.

We respect the personal choices dictated by these circumstances. But we do not accept his attempt to parlay his own predicament into a national realignment.

We shall carry on the fight within the Republican Party because we believe it has acted in many localities and can act nationally as a crucial force for constructive change. We are further encouraged by the Administration’s adoption of our essential positions in areas such as welfare reform, revenue sharing and China policy, and by some signs in recent months of a move away from the politics of polarization.

Still, we are by no means entirely satisfied with the Nixon Administration and we agree with many of Mayor Lindsay’s criticisms, particularly on national priorities, civil rights, civil liberties and urban problems. Such criticisms, of course, are still being trenchantly made within the GOP by Congressman McCloskey among others. To the extent that the President relinquishes moral leadership on these issues as he suggested he is willing to do in recent hard-line statements against busing, he risks the loss of enough swing Republicans to lose the 1972 election to a candidate like Mr. Lindsay.

The 1970 election results indicate the existence of a large group of “front lash” voters who recoil at virulent right wing campaigns but who will vote for moderate Republicans. In four of the nation’s largest states, for example, the national Republican organization attempted a polarizing strategy against Democratic candidates whom they accused of being soft on crime, drug abuse and student unrest. All four candidates won: Tunney in California, Gilligan in Ohio, Shapp in Pennsylvania and Hart in Michigan. In four other states where Mr. Nixon won in 1968 (Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey and Utah) similar hard-line campaigns failed to elect Republican candidates to the Senate. But in the first four states moderate statewide Republicans won, indicating a large shift by voters available to moderate candidates away from the strident proponents of the “social issue.”

A look at the figures, moreover, shows that in each of those states enough voters split their ballot between Democrats attacked for permissiveness and moderate Republicans to swing their states’ Presidential electors:

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Mr. Lindsay and other potential liberal Democratic candidates for national office will watch closely Mr. Nixon’s ability to retain his hold over progressive Republicans. In the meantime, Republicans around the country will continue to advocate the kinds of progressive policies that win elections. For some, disillusioned with the President’s policies, the McCloskey campaign will beckon irresistibly.

So despite the urgings of reactionary Republicans and liberal Democrats, we are not about to leave the GOP. We believe it would be tragically irresponsible to abandon a great national party to the forces of reaction. And we say to Lindsay, “Good luck, but, Hell, no, we won’t go.”

EDITORIAL POINTS

CONSERVATIVE REVOLT

Richard Nixon is learning the high price expected of him for the backing of his friends on the ideological right. The recent "suspension of support" declared by 12 conservative spokesmen* implicitly demands abandonment of his China trip — and thus loss of his most important foreign policy initiative, his claim for a place in world diplomatic history, and his best hope for re-election as a protagonist of peace. As an alternative, they urge a seige of defense spending that would prohibit achievement of his major domestic programs, further distort the economy, and end one of his other chief hopes for a politically convertible symbol of peace: an arms control treaty. Then they attack him for deficit spending and inflation.

The "suspension" callously refuses to make allowances for the impossible economic predicament Nixon inherited from the Johnson Administration. Perhaps the 12 conservatives think they know how Nixon could have maintained war and other defense spending at the levels they urge, while at the same time curbing deficits, inflation and unemployment and simultaneously gaining the acquiescence of a Democratic Congress. But until they tell the rest of us, their reiteration of Democratic economic charges is no less impertinent than Hubert Humphrey's or Edmund Muskie's. The drastic quality of the President's recent measures indicate that he, at least, did not suppose the problem could be solved by incantations.

But the conservatives' chief concern, which they emphasize "above all" is defense and foreign affairs. In this realm they display an obtuse misconception of the President's military and China policies and an insulting lack of faith in his sense of responsibility in carrying them forth. They depict a deterioration in our defenses which "in the absence of immediate and heroic countermeasures, can lead to the loss of our deterrent capability ... and all that this implies." The President is represented as some kind of infatuated Chamberlain, prattling Peace in Our Time and about to return from disarmament talks with a folded nuclear umbrella. Such a ludicrous caricature of Richard Nixon could hardly be contrived, in a demented moment, by Herbert Block.

But this spirit of doomsday adventism has long pervaded the pages of National Review, Human Events, Battle Line and the other publications represented in the "suspension" of support. Their alarms cannot be understood outside of the context of previous articles and statements. A good summary of conservative thinking about our "deteriorating defenses" and Soviet gains can be found in a speech by James Buckley delivered to the National Press Club on July 14, cited extensively in Battle Line, and reprinted on the front page of the July 24 issue of Human Events. In Buckley's view our position at the SALT talks epitomizes the Administration's failure to take seriously the growing Soviet threat.

His key point is that the United States, by agreeing to negotiate a ban or restriction on anti-ballistic missiles, while failing to insist on meaningful constraints on offensive systems, is stripping our land-based retaliatory forces of protection, while allowing the USSR to proceed with its own first strike capability against them. We are to believe, it seems, that Henry Kissinger, after all these years of lucubration over the pitfalls of disarmament diplomacy — and Richard Nixon, after all his tough-minded appeals for military preparedness — have suddenly gone soft in the head.

But a close scrutiny of the current understanding at SALT reveals, not surprisingly, that the Administration knows what it is doing and Buckley does not. A treaty effectively restricting ABMs would have a result approximately opposite to the one Buckley envisages; that is, far from giving the USSR a first strike capability, it would prohibit them from seeking such a position for the duration of the treaty — all in exchange for U.S. renunciation of a weapons system, Safeguard, of a futility exceeded only by its expense. For if the USSR cannot try to protect its population with ABMs a first strike strategy is effectively excluded.

Buckley also cites suspect Research and Development figures and compounds them with erroneous interpretation. He cites long term future Soviet capability and compares it with an underestimate of current U.S. deployments and concludes that the "11th Hour" is at hand. Furthermore his specific proposals to improve our security, i.e. "immediate heroic countermeasures" developing and procuring all the new systems the Pentagon wants, would in fact weaken our defenses. Valuable manpower and resources would be squandered on weapons like ABM and the B-1 bomber that may be technologically advanced but are conceptually and strategically retarded.

In sum the twelve have little good evidence

*Jeffrey Bell, American Conservative Union (ACU); William F. Buckley Jr., National Review (NR); James Burnham, NR; Anthony Hinkjan, Southern States Industrial Council; John L. Jones, ACU; J. Daniel Mahoney, N.Y. Conservative Party; Neil McCallum, Conservative Book Club; Frank S. Meyer, NR; William A. Rusher, NR; Allen H. Ruskind, Human Events; Ronald C. Taggart, Young Americans for Freedom; Thomas S. Winter, Human Events.
or argument for their position. And having taken an untenable stance at an extreme on the political spectrum, they have left themselves with just two options: they can drop their demands or be safely ignored. The President would do well to ignore them.

The President would do better to get on with his “peaceful American revolution” and his efforts to secure a “generation of peace.” To the extent that these goals are pursued forthrightly he will have our enthusiastic support and, we think, the support of a vast majority of the American public whose hopes lie more in progress than in ideological posturing.

**AN OPEN REPUBLICAN PARTY**

The Delegates and Organizations (DO) Committee of the Republican National Committee has made a number of important recommendations to reform the delegate selection process and to acquire a fairer role in it for young people and women (see analysis, p. 7). As of the moment, however, the Committee appears reluctant to take any specific steps to encourage states to make reforms before the 1972 National Convention.

Republicans can be proud that their party never maintained the kind of undemocratic procedures presented by the Democratic party, with its lack of written rules and its often highly centralized selection mechanisms. Still, we see no reason for the GOP to take eight years to put its own house in order.

The DO Committee has a mandate to see that state parties open the delegate process to all interested citizens before it makes its formal report to the Rules Committee in 1972. This mandate cannot be fulfilled without prescribing guidelines for the states and exerting the full moral weight of the National Committee to assure compliance prior to the Convention.

**MISSISSIPPI: wave of moderation**

The wave of moderation that swept the South in the 1970 elections appears to have reached even the hard-core voters of Mississippi. In the August 3 Democratic gubernatorial primary, two racial and political moderates led the field, cornering 68 percent of the vote between them. Lieutenant Governor Charles L. Sullivan, who polled 39 percent of the more than 650,000 voters, will face former Jackson District Attorney William Waller in the August 24 run-off. Sullivan has always been relatively subdued on the issue of race, and Waller is best known for his dedicated (if unsuccessful) prosecution of Byron de la Beckwith, accused killer of Medgar Evers.

The two outspoken segregationists in the seven-man field, Jimmy Swan of Hattiesburg and Circuit Judge Marshall Perry of Grenada, together received only 19 percent of the vote. The 16 percent showing of Swan, a widely known firebrand who was making his second try for the nomination, was perhaps the clearest indication that things are changing in Mississippi.

The outcome of the Democratic primary, furthermore, was probably not the result of massive black support for the moderate candidates. Fayette Mayor Charles Evers, a gubernatorial contender, and many other black candidates are running as Independents in November. Evers, in fact, had urged his supporters to vote for Swan if they voted at all, since Evers thought that Swan would be the easiest man to beat in the fall.

The GOP, as is customary in major races in the states that seem to be the intended beneficiaries of the Southern strategy, is not putting up a gubernatorial candidate.

**NORTH DAKOTA: cut to one**

North Dakota’s two Congressmen probably will face each other in a political shoot-out next year. One will return to the nation’s capital after the 1972 election and the other will be left for dead on the lone prairie. The showdown will take place because the state is losing one of its congressional seats.

It is expected that five-term Republican Rep. Mark Andrews will square off against freshman Democratic Rep. Arthur A. Link in the at-large contest. However, Link might switch to the gubernatorial race if Democratic Gov. William L. Guy retires. Guy isn’t interested in running against Andrews.

Despite widespread discontent with the Nixon administration’s farm program, Andrews will be heavily favored to defeat Link or any lesser Democrat. Guy could give Andrews trouble if he did run but the governor is expected to save his ammunition for the 1974 Senate election.

**WASHINGTON D.C.: women’s caucus grows**

Although the original gathering of the National Women’s Political Caucus in Washington, D.C. was marked by extensive rhetoric of the “lib” movement, a general absence of Republican representation and little practical political discussion, local caucus groups are popping up around the country. A tri-state group for New York, Connecticut and New Jersey has been formed. Similar meetings have been held in Massachusetts, Maryland, Virginia and the District. But in all but the Maryland caucus, Republicans have been conspicuous by their absence.

At the D.C. meeting the only designated Republican
spokesman was Evelyn Cunningham, Special Assistant to Governor Nelson Rockefeller, who, having identified herself as a true minority — a black woman Republican from Harlem — gave a most effective speech. A call from Cunningham for a show of hands by Republicans revealed that there were only about 15 out of an audience of 150 to 200 women.

National Caucus leaders, including Betty Friedan and Bella Abzug (D-NY), have reportedly spent more time in infighting than in efforts to make the meetings truly bipartisan. A national policy meeting is scheduled for New York City in September to discuss specific objectives — and a look then at the national board should indicate the balance of Republican and Democratic involvement.

CALIFORNIA: a special loss

In mid-July, the Republican Party lost a critical special election for a vacant State Senate seat in a Los Angeles district, as Democrat David Roberti defeated Republican John Brophy by a nearly 2-1 margin. Before that, the GOP had won seven straight special elections. The Democratic victory, maintaining the Democrats' slim majority in the California Senate in a redistricting year, dealt a heavy blow to the Republicans who invested large sums of money and flew in volunteers from as far north as San Francisco. The large Democratic majority indicated disapproval of Governor Reagan's recent policies on health and welfare and his wholesale budget cuts.

IOWA: intra-party battle

In June Governor Robert Ray responded to questions about possible opposition in the 1972 primary from his Lieutenant Governor Roger Jepsen by saying: "It would be like Spiro Agnew challenging President Nixon." A few days later Jepsen announced anyway. Although Ray has not yet publicly stated his plans, the prospect is now for a full-scale battle between conservatives and moderates in 1972. This could be an extremely divisive campaign, with the bitterness continuing on into the general election, affecting the re-election chances of his Lieutenant Governor Roger Jepsen by saying: "Iowa has scheduled for New York City in September to discuss specific objectives — and a look then at the national board should indicate the balance of Republican and Democratic involvement.

KENTUCKY: what next for Nunn?

With his term as governor ending in December, Louie Nunn's future in Kentucky politics has become an interesting topic for public discussion. The conservative Nunn is now concentrating on electing his hand-picked successor, Tom Emberton, as governor in the November state elections.

Most political observers expect Nunn to go for the Senate seat being vacated by retiring Senator John Sherman Cooper. However, Nunn caused some second thoughts recently by announcing his intention to move to Lexington when his term is up, instead of returning to his Los Angeles district, as Democrat David Roberti defeated Republican John Brophy by a nearly 2-1 margin. Before that, the GOP had won seven straight special elections. The Democratic victory, maintaining the Democrats' slim majority in the California Senate in a redistricting year, dealt a heavy blow to the Republicans who invested large sums of money and flew in volunteers from as far north as San Francisco. The large Democratic majority indicated disapproval of Governor Reagan's recent policies on health and welfare and his wholesale budget cuts.

MARYLAND: off the deep end

Maryland Congressman Lawrence J. Hogan, considered a moderate Republican, appears to have gone off the deep end over the government's efforts to desegregate the schools in his Prince George's County bailiwick. Prince George's, the tenth largest school system in the nation, has been under pressure from the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare since the April Supreme Court decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. Though the student population is 20 percent black, 133 of the county's 226 schools are at least 90 percent white or 90 percent black. Nevertheless, Hogan personally appeared at a decisive school board meeting July 29 and urged the board not to adopt even a modest staff-design plan that would have desegregated nine predominantly black schools. He accused HEW of "idiocy" in insisting on further desegregation, and blasted "the misguided zeal of social experimentors and manipulators." As of press time, no plan had been adopted.
Delegate Selection Scrutinized

DO Committee: Reform Without Teeth

The committee authorized by the 1968 GOP convention to draw up recommendations for party reform has made public a report which sounds remarkably like, but is in some ways an improvement on, its counterpart on the Democratic side. Unlike the well-publicized McGovern and O'Hara Commission, the Republican Delegates and Organizations (DO) Committee held no public hearings and invited no members from outside the Republican National Committee. Yet the DO Committee recommended comparable changes in the delegate selection process:

- selecting alternate delegates in the same manner as delegates
- forbidding proxy voting
- removing fees and assessments on delegates to the national convention
- recommending that there be no automatic delegates at any level of the delegate selection process.

To achieve balance in delegate representation, DO went beyond the McGovern Commission, to recommend that each state delegation include "equal representation of men and women" and "delegates under 25 in equity to their voting strength within the state." (The McGovern Commission recommended that young people and women be represented "in reasonable relationship to their presence in each state's population.")

OVER AND ABOVE The DO Committee made McGovern recommendations which were not only more explicit than the McGovern guidelines, but it also suggested that one man, one woman, one delegate under 25 and one member of a "minority ethnic group" be selected from each state delegation to the important Resolutions, Credentials, Rules and Order of Business and Permanent Organization Committees of the National Convention.

The most telling aspect of the report, however, lies not in what it said, but in what it did not say. The DO Committee was authorized under Rule 29, passed at the 1968 National Convention to:

(1) "review and study the Rules adopted by the 1968 National Convention and the relationship between the Republican National Committee, State Republican Committees and other Republican organizations" and

(2) to implement Rule 32 which states that "participation in a Republican primary, caucus, any meeting or convention held for the purpose of selecting delegates to a County, District, State or National Convention shall in no way be abridged for reasons of race, religion, color, or national origin."

Despite the mandate of implementing Rule 32, the DO Committee recommends no procedural or other guidelines to guarantee participation in the selection process to minority groups. While the McGovern Commission recommended that delegations include minority groups as well as young people and women in reasonable relationship to their presence in the state's population, the DO Committee said nothing.

By just looking at statistics on blacks or other minority groups the DO Committee could have found prima facie evidence of discrimination and set mandatory standards of notice and representation applicable to the state parties.

A HANDS OFF POLICY More fundamentally, in reviewing the relationship between the National Committee and the state Republican organizations, the DO Committee failed to set any procedural standards for the states. "We find that in most States the methods are fair and open," the Committee reported. "There are legitimate reasons for states to use the procedures they follow, so it is not that we praise or criticize one over the other but recognize that reasons of geography, population, economy and politics determine the methods used."

Such a hands-off policy reflects the feeling that the National Committee, as an association of the state parties which assemble in a convention, has in itself no legally binding or enforceable obligation to set or maintain standards of selection and representation among its constituent parties.

Yet the 1968 National Convention's charge to DO states emphatically that it shall implement Rule 32 which says "The Republican State Committee or governing committee of each state shall take positive action to achieve the broadest possible participation in party affairs (italics added)."

Unfortunately the DO Committee, in reviewing state procedures uncritically, failed to grapple with the myriad local party rules — to document problems of premature delegate selection, failure to give adequate notice of meetings and other impediments to the democratic process.

The DO Committee recognized the complexity of the delegate selection process. But by failing to provide guidelines for reform and in the absence of such a request from the National Committee, it has failed to come to grips with the basic problems of delegate selection. Its solution, embodied in Recommendation 10, the only recommendation accepted at the RNC meeting in July, is to publicize party procedures as they now exist, not to change them in favor of more democratic procedures.
GOP Loss Forseen

A Preview of the 1972 Senate Races

An early appraisal by Ripon correspondents of the 33 U.S. Senate races in 1972 suggests that the Republicans will lose seats. With 19 incumbent Republicans up, only 8 seats are considered "safe" to be retained by the party, compared to 9 of 14 Democrats. Only one Democratic seat, Pell's in Rhode Island, is rated "swing" (i.e. likely to fall to the challenger), while four Republican seats — Miller's in Iowa, Pearson's in Kansas, Griffin's in Michigan, and the ailing Mundt's in South Dakota — are expected at present to "swing" to the Democrats.

The Republicans also lead, 7-4, in seats classified "vulnerable" (i.e. not definitely predicted to swing but open to capture if the challenging party gets some breaks). Thus, assuming the "swing" seats go as predicted, even an optimal result, with the Republicans saving their seven "vulnerable" seats and winning all four "vulnerable" Democratic seats, would give the GOP a net gain of only one.

The most likely result on the basis of the reports is a Republican loss of four to seven seats, depending on the impact of the 18-21 year old vote and on the success of President Nixon in achieving economic recovery, agricultural prosperity, peace and a substantial margin of victory.

In any case, however, the President is likely to face a larger Democratic majority after 1972 than at present, according to the report. Hopes for party realignment or "ideological majorities," moreover, will be frustrated, as most of the conservative Democrats and progressive Republicans are safe. The Wednesday Club of progressive Republican Senators, in fact, will increase its proportionate strength in the party caucus, if the GOP loses seats as expected and John Chafee wins as predicted in Rhode Island.

In each race we have presented, where applicable, an analysis of the prospects for primary competition; a financial appraisal; a look at the respective party organizations; and some general comments. In many states, it is too early to cover all these aspects of the contest, but all the races have been rated on the best available information. Protests, corrections and amplifications are invited.

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Note: Senate seats held by a party are subjectively classified as:
1) "safe," likely to be retained by incumbent's party, barring major upset.
2) "vulnerable" to capture if the opposing party gets some breaks.
3) "swing" i.e., likely to be taken by the opposing party.

20 16 7 4
Ted Stevens has been before the voters three times since 1968. In 1970 he was the leading statewide votegetter with close to 60 percent. Stevens could be hurt only by a poor Nixon race, with the economy stagnant, the trans-Alaskan pipeline stalled, and an unsatisfactory settlement of the Native Claims issue.

Although McClellan's age is a factor, and labor, blacks and young voters probably won't support him, his seniority is the pride of Arkansas and means federal money for the state and support for the Senator. But even if one of his challengers is nominated, the Democrats should hold the seat. No obvious GOP candidates have emerged as yet.

If the GOP state legislature reapportions Congressman Frank Evans out of his seat he would represent the strongest challenge to Allott.

Although no GOP primary is expected, Wilmington Mayor Harry G. Haskell, Jr., and freshman Congressman Pierre S. du Pont IV are preparing behind the scenes in case of the possible retirement of the popular 82-year-old Senator. Haskell is currently favored by the party organization for this race if Boggs is out. Among the likely candidates in a Democratic primary are: former Governor Elbert N. Carvel, Wilmington Advertising executive Samuel Shipley, and the young anti-war leader Christopher Smith.

The GOP organization is well financed and fairly solid. The Democrats are in disarray, and cannot seem to shake their tradition of divisiveness.

Ted Boggs has considerable electoral appeal among traditionally non-Republican groups (i.e. organized labor and downstate farming areas), but younger men want in, and it will come down to Boggs' personal desires.

The Democratic primary could be a crowded affair, with the field against Gambrell possibly including: former Governor Vandiver (who is still bitter about not being appointed on Russell's death), State Commissioner of Labor Sam Caldwell (who has already announced), former Governor Carl Sanders, Congressman Bill Stuckey, and of course, the unpredictable Lester Maddox, who would be the favorite if he chooses to run. For the Republicans, Congressman Fletcher Thompson has said he will run if he is redistricted out of his seat, as is likely.

Gambrell, a close confidant of Governor Jimmy Carter, is an affable person but has much to learn about campaigning, and could be vulnerable in the Democratic primary. During the summer recess of Congress, he, Stuckey, and Thompson have taken to the roads of the state to sound out support. At present the two most likely candidates, Gambrell and Thompson, are both untested and relatively unknown quantities in a state-wide race, but Thompson, with his smooth appearance and adroit exploitation of the race issue, may have considerable appeal. A Republican victory is not out of the question, especially if the Democratic primary is a rough affair. (Bo Callaway outpolled Maddox in the 1966 governor's race, only to lose in the legislature.) A great deal depends on Maddox's decision and on finding a good Republican candidate.

**State:** ILLINOIS  
**Rating:** SAFE REPUBLICAN  
**Incumbent:** PERCY  
**Primary:** There will probably be no GOP primary. Mayor Daley will select the Democratic candidate. Among the current possibilities: Lt. Gov. Paul Simon, ex-U.S. Attorney and Chicago Seven prosecutor Tom Foran, State Auditor Mike Howlett and Congressman Dan Rostenkowski.

**Comment:** Percy is leading both Governor Ogilvie and President Nixon in the most recent polls.

**State:** IOWA  
**Rating:** SWING REPUBLICAN  
**Incumbent:** MILLER  
**Primary:** A gubernatorial primary bloodbath between GOP Governor Ray and Lt. Gov. Jepsen, which could divide the party and divert funds from Miller, is in prospect. If the young Congressman John Culver, a good vote getter, is the candidate as expected, Miller will have a tough race.

**State:** KANSAS  
**Rating:** SWING REPUBLICAN  
**Incumbent:** PEARSON  
**Comment:** In the past 6 months Pearson has been considerably strengthened by spending more time in Kansas. The strongest possible opponent would seem to be Governor Bob Docking who broke tradition to become a three term Democratic Governor and may wish to break the Kansas tradition of Republican Senators. However, recent polls indicate that Attorney General Vern Miller is now even more popular than Docking. If Docking should make the race and maintain his Democratic-conservative base, he could give Pearson a tough fight.

**State:** KENTUCKY  
**Rating:** VULNERABLE REPUBLICAN  
**Incumbent:** COOPER (retiring)  
**Primary:** With Cooper’s planned retirement, likely GOP candidates are Governor Louie B. Nunn, whose term expires this year and who cannot succeed himself, Congressman Tim Lee Carter, an ally of Senator Cook, and Congressman M. Gene Snyder, a right winger. Possible entrants in a crowded Democratic field are former Governor Edward Breathitt, Attorney General John Breckinridge, former Kentucky Fried Chicken President John Young Brown, Jr., 1968 Senate Candidate Katherine Peden, and Walter “Dee” Huddleston, campaign chairman for current Democratic Gubernatorial candidate Wendell Ford. The 1971 Governorship race is expected to virtually determine the candidates: if Republican Tom Emberton wins, he will favor Nunn; if Ford wins, he will assure the Democratic nomination for his campaign chairman Huddleston.

**Comment:** Barring a Cooper comeback — he would win handily — the GOP will be in trouble without improvement of their city organizations and a good run by Nixon. A governorship win in 1971 would help.

**State:** LOUISIANA  
**Rating:** SAFE DEMOCRAT  
**Incumbent:** ELLENDER  
**Comment:** Allen Ellender, President Pro Tempore of the United States Senate, which means he’s been there the longest and is the oldest member, may find himself in a rough primary with Governor John McKeithen, who has indicated his intention to challenge the aging incumbent. A key factor will be the outcome of the Louisiana gubernatorial race. A victory by a pro-McKeithen candidate will greatly improve his chances of defeating Ellender in the primary.

**State:** MAINE  
**Rating:** VULNERABLE REPUBLICAN  
**Incumbent:** SMITH  
**Primary:** At present the only possible opposition to Mrs. Smith is multimillionaire Robert Monks. But he would need a miracle to defeat the Senator. The Democrats will try hard to avoid a primary. Current possibilities are: second district Congressman William D. Hathaway, a strong vote getter; and State Senator Elmer Violette, who opposed Mrs. Smith in 1966.

**Financial:** Senator Smith has never needed a great deal of money to gain re-election (in 1966 she spent under $3000). Hathaway would have no trouble raising money while Violette would have to depend on the party for most of his funds.

**Organization:** Smith has her own organization which will serve her well. The Democrats, however, are strong due to Muskie’s efforts.

**Comment:** With straight ticket voting still likely to prevail in 1972, Mrs. Smith could be in trouble if Muskie is the Democratic Presidential candidate. Many Maine Republicans have criticized Senator Smith for being too independent, too inaccessible (she maintains no state office) and too old (she is in her 70’s). However, right now, the Democrats would need a few other breaks before they could capture the seat.

**State:** MASSACHUSETTS  
**Rating:** SAFE REPUBLICAN  
**Incumbent:** BROOKE  
**Comment:** The formation of a conservative party could affect the race, but not the results.

**State:** MICHIGAN  
**Rating:** SWING REPUBLICAN  
**Incumbent:** GRIFFIN  
**Primary:** Griffin, the moderate Republican whip, should face no primary challenger, although there is an outside chance that right winger Robert Huber (who threatened Lenore Romney in the 1970 primary) might enter, in which case progressive Republican Rep. Donald Riegle might make it a three way race. He would be most difficult for a Democrat to beat. Front running Democrats are Attorney General Frank Kelley, former Detroit Mayor Jerome Cavanaugh and Judge Blair Moody. The leader so far is Kelley.

**Financial:** Although the state GOP is in the red, Griffin as a member of the Senate leadership should have no trouble attracting the needed funds. Kelley recently had a successful $100 a plate dinner to boost his war chest.

**Comment:** Since Nixon has never carried Michigan and likely will lose the state in ’72, Grif-
State: **NEBRASKA**  
Rating: VULNERABLE REPUBLICAN  
Incumbent: CURTIS  

Organization: Senator Curtis will be able to unite the factions of the state party. A newly elected Democratic Governor Exon will help the party's small but strong organization.

Comment: Nixon carried the state with 59 percent in 1968 and should he again win in Nebraska Curtis will have little difficulty.

State: **NEW HAMPSHIRE**  
Rating: VULNERABLE DEMOCRAT  
Incumbent: McIntyre  

Comment: The GOP contest, which comes after the Presidential primary, could be a very rough affair, with eccentric former Governor Wesley Powell receiving strong support from the reactionary publisher of the Manchester Union-Leader, William Loeb, and with conservative Rep. Louis Wyman a very effective campaigner. Governor Walter Peterson's possible candidacy is the best moderate hope. The equivalent McIntyre could face a tough battle, but Muskie as a Presidential candidate would be big help.

State: **NEW JERSEY**  
Rating: SAFE REPUBLICAN  
Incumbent: CASE  

Primary: Prospective primary opponents to Case and in the Democratic primary might depend strongly on redistricting; in the GOP, upward-mobile victims might include Congressmen John Hunt and Charles Sandman; among the Democrats threatened are Congressmen Howard and Helstoski. Other likely Democrats are electoral unknowns.

Organization: Under Governor Cahill the GOP has been united and strong. The Democrats have been having trouble electing and controlling the state house but the old machine went into high gear to re-elect "Pete" Williams; given any momentum in the 1971 state races it could be rolling by '72.

Comment: Case should have no trouble keeping his Senate seat. Even if Nixon falls again to carry New Jersey (46 percent in '68), Case already has proven he can win anyway (in 1968 Case won while Kennedy had a plurality of 300,000).

State: **NEW MEXICO**  
Rating: VULNERABLE DEMOCRAT  
Incumbent: ANDERSON  

Primary: The GOP primary could be crowded and factious. Current possibilities are: Pete Domenici, 1970 gubernatorial candidate; Ed Foreman; ex-Governor Dave Cargo, who pulled 46 percent against Montoya in 1970; Anderson Carter; Bill Sego and Bob Davidson. The best bet to win: Domenici. Senator Anderson, whose health may be a key factor is likely to face difficult primary opposition from Tom Morris, Jack Campbell or Dave Norvell.

Organization: The Democrats are badly split, particularly over the Governor Bruce King's performance, which will hurt in '72.

Comment: If Anderson should face a difficult primary or retire because of his health the GOP would have a good shot at the Senate seat.

State: **NEW YORK**  
Rating: VULNERABLE DEMOCRAT  
Incumbent: McCARTHY  

Primary: The 1972 race will hinge on the fate of Governor Rockefeller. Rockefeller's political future is very much in doubt, following his re-election by the 

Organization: The Rockefeller campaign has been struggling; the GOP has named former Congressman Sol Schmell as its candidate.

Comment: If Rockefeller should leave office early, his successor will be a very strong asset to the Republicans. If Rockefeller stays, he will have little chance against Congressman Frank Annunziata. If Rockefeller chooses to re-run, he will have a very strong chance of winning, but perhaps at the cost of losing the Senate seat.

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Comment: In all probability, the Democratic primary victor will win the election, but the Republicans could break through with a strong candidate and Nixon performance.

State: OKLAHOMA  
Rating: SAFE DEMOCRAT  
Incumbent: HARRIS (retiring)

Primary: Most likely GOP candidates are former Governor Dewey Bartlett, astronaut Tom Stafford, Ozark Commission Director and former GOP state chairman Bud Stewart and GOP National Committeeman Bud Wilkinson.

Comment: Harris' withdrawal has given Rep. Ed Edmondson a clear shot at winning the general election without a damaging primary. Only a severe split in Democratic ranks would give the GOP any hopes of moving this seat from the "safe" column. Edmondson is a strong and well financed candidate, who will receive conservative backing.

State: OREGON  
Rating: VULNERABLE REPUBLICAN  
Incumbent: HATFIELD

Primary: Hatfield is in trouble, with recent polls showing him behind McCall 62 to 24 percent in a Republican primary. If McCall decides not to enter "the congressman" Wendell Wyatt or Al Ullman might decide to run. Wyatt, who lacks any statewide organization or familiarity is shown in polls defeating Hatfield 51 to 32 percent. Depending on the GOP situation, the most probable Democratic candidates are Congresswoman Edith Green, former Congressman Robert Duncan (who has once lost to Hatfield), State Treasurer Robert Straub (who has lost twice to McCall) and State Senator Don Willner. Wayne Morse has also indicated interest but his chances are slim. The best bet is Mrs. Green. Present polls show her defeating Hatfield 47 to 38 percent, but losing to McCall 49 to 38 percent.

Organization: The GOP party structure is fragmented ideologically, with right wingers in control in some counties. A Hatfield-McCall primary would divide the progressive wing of the party.

Comment: The most important race here may well be the primary. Should Hatfield survive a divisive primary the Democrat will have a good shot. If McCall is the nominee he has a very good chance of winning.

State: RHODE ISLAND  
Rating: SWING DEMOCRAT  
Incumbent: PELL

Comment: The GOP organization needs much improvement to cope with a Democratic organization augmented by state patronage, but if he runs, popular Navy Secretary John Chafee should beat Pell.

State: SOUTH CAROLINA  
Rating: VULNERABLE REPUBLICAN  
Incumbent: THURMONT

Primary: Possible Democratic candidates are: ex-Governor Robert McNair, Congressmen William Jennings Bryan Dorn and James Mann. The most likely winner is McNair. If he runs, Dorn and Mann may decide not to risk their congressional seats.

Organization: Thurmond runs his own show and relies little on the regular party organization. On the other hand, the Democrats have a tight organization ready for a good candidate and capable of giving Thurmond a battle.

State: SOUTH DAKOTA  
Rating: SWING REPUBLICAN  
Incumbent: MUNDT (retiring)

Primary: With Mundt too sick to run, GOP hopefuls are: Al Schock a Sioux Falls businessman; ultra-conservative former state Senator Robert Hirsch; State Rep. Jim Nelson, an attractive young progressive; and ex-Governor Frank Farrar. The leading Democratic candidate will be second district Congressman Jim Abourezk, liberal, well financed and a good campaigner. Also mentioned as possible candidates are: Lt. Gov. Bill Dougherty and former state party chairman George Blue.

Organization: The GOP defeat in 1970 put the party in a close to chaotic condition. The Democrats are unified at all levels under McGovern's leadership.

Comment: Unless the GOP can find an attractive candidate to match Abourezk, the Senate seat is likely to be lost.

State: TENNESSEE  
Rating: SAFE REPUBLICAN  
Incumbent: BAKER

Primary: Democratic primary may include: Ross Bass, seventh district Congressman Ray Blanton and Hudley Crockett.

Financial: Baker's position is sound. The Democrats treasury is weak and large campaign debts are still owed from 1970.

Organization: The GOP organization is good in East and West Tennessee but almost non-existent in middle Tennessee. The Democrats are poorly organized.

Comment: Baker had no trouble defeating Governor Frank Clement in 1966. However, he will have to lead the ticket to be sure of victory in 1972. Nixon carried Tennessee in 1968 with only 38 percent. Baker will need promised assistance of the Brock organization.

State: TEXAS  
Rating: VULNERABLE REPUBLICAN  
Incumbent: TOWER

Primary: The Democratic primary situation may remain unclear for several months. Possibilities are: former Senator Ralph Yarbrough, former Johnson appointee as U.S. Attorney, Barefoot Sanders, State Sen. Joe Christie, Land Commissioner Bob Armstrong, Austin School Board Chairman Will Davis and Ramsey Clark. Lt. Governor Ben Barnes and South Texas rancher Dolph Briscoe are clearly headed for the Governor's race, where Yarbrough is now expected to join them — barring Armstrong to the fore among the Democratic Senatorial possibilities.

Financial: The Democrats are expected to focus on the Governorship.

Comment: Tower will run a conservative campaign in what still seems on balance a conservative state and only a strong Democratic candidate and a poor showing by Nixon could threaten him.

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A Guide to the Democrats — Part II

A Dark Horse Winner?

Last month we examined the over-all balance of forces within the Democratic Party and the strategic options of the three main Presidential possibilities: Muskie, Humphrey and Kennedy. Much of the interest in this nomination contest, however, stems from the still reasonable chance of a dark horse winner.

One of the lesser candidates could reach convention victory by following a variation or combination of two principal strategies.

1) By delivering a coup de main: a string of unexpected primary victories and well-engineered upsets at local conventions and caucuses accompanied by a surprising upsurge in nationwide polls and the attendant corralling of key party figures.

2) By emerging from a "deadlocked" convention as a compromise candidate — a not-so-dark dark horse — in an age when the smoke-filled room has been partially superceded by the conference telephone and when negotiations to prevent a factious deadlock can take place weeks or months in advance.

AVOIDING PITFALLS

These strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive, although a candidate who wishes to pursue them consecutively must avoid both spectacular failures in the primaries and the antagonism of key rivals whose support he may subsequently need.

Senators Bayh, Harris and Jackson might hope to follow such a dual approach to the nomination, while Chairman Mills and Senators McGovern and Proxmire have no choice but to attempt a coup de main: it is inconceivable that any of the latter three could ever emerge as a compromise candidate in a negotiated decision, although Mills could become the vice-presidential nominee this way. Senator Stevenson, if he has presidential ambitions, is presumably following in the footsteps of his father who was nominated in 1952 after a non-campaign along the lines of the "deadlock" and compromise strategy.

First we will consider the three candidates who must succeed in a frontal attack upon the established norms of the party:

I. THREE COUPS

McGovern

Without in any way trying to question the sincerity or integrity of the Senator from South Dakota, it is still difficult to take the McGovern candidacy very seriously and the question must be asked: what is he doing? Is his candidacy a symbolic effort, a means of laying certain issues before the public? Is he in effect running as a stand-in for Ted Kennedy as he presumably did in 1968? Is he angling for a position in a new administration?

In all probability the Senator himself could not define his aims with precision, but if we could know the answer to these questions it would be a lot easier to predict the course of the McGovern candidacy: if he is running symbolically, he may well remain a candidate right down to the wire — or until another of similar persuasion steps forth; if he is running as a stand-in, his candidacy will last until Kennedy is ready to make a move; if he is running because he expects to win, then he may pull out early if it becomes clear that his chances are nil.

As things stand now, he will probably do tolerably well in New Hampshire, somewhat poorer in Florida, moderately well in Wisconsin, and not well enough in subsequent primaries to keep his candidacy alive. With faltering finances and no real momentum he will probably pull out of the race no later than April or early May if his object was victory.

There is only one way for McGovern to envision being nominated: through Kennedy's genuine all-out support. But even this would not suffice without other favorable developments.

First, McGovern would have to be the beneficiary of the 18-year-old vote in a most dramatic way in polls and primaries.

Second, McGovern would have to be lucky on the war issue — Vietnam would have to become an area of highly emotional concern.

Third, he would have to parlay these advantages into a dramatic series of primary achievements: a
win or a close loss in New Hampshire, a strong performance in Florida, a victory in Wisconsin, Oregon and California — and perhaps a number of other states.

Fourth, the McGovern organization — with Kennedy money and strong liberal support would have to elect liberal delegates in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania — in large proportions.

Fifth, Gilligan in response to Kennedy pressure and his own ideological preferences would have to deliver Ohio — after beating off all comers in a delegate primary contest.

**OUTSIDE MAXIMUM**

Having met these requirements and gained the additional delegates here and there, the McGovern total would stand around 1200. Daley could toss 150 or more votes his way, but it is unlikely that this would happen, even with Kennedy pressure, as long as any other viable candidate remained in the race. The hard-nosed delegates from Michigan, Pennsylvania, Illinois, the border states, and the South would long hesitate before going to McGovern. Even with intense pressure from Kennedy, it is doubtful that the 1,509 votes could be assembled. The approximately 1200 votes seem to be the outside maximum for McGovern.

For Kennedy it thus would be easier to be King than King-Maker. It seems that no matter what the relationship between him and McGovern, there cannot be a sufficient commitment for Kennedy to incur the risks of king-making for the sake of the Senator from South Dakota. And a coup-de-main without Kennedy’s support seems nearly impossible.

**Mills**

We need not dwell on the policy divergences between the House Ways and Means Chairman and the majority of his Democratic brethren. His right-of-center stance means he would have to assemble a coalition of delegates almost entirely (except for Texas) outside the Big Nine. Mathematically this seems impossible.

For Mills to become a formidable figure at the convention in terms of delegate strength, he would have to have near-solid support from the South and Border States (which is possible). He would then have to marshal strong congressional support — which is possible but nowhere near decisive, and he would have to win some primaries — again possible, but not decisive because he could not win as many as he needed, or by sufficiently impressive majorities.

One thing is clear, if Mills wants to get anywhere at all, he must commit himself to candidacy early. If he does not, he will find himself with much less congressional support than he expects. Congress is relatively weak in the nominating process — and although Mills might engineer some form of party revolution by revitalizing the congressional role, he would have to begin early. As Nelson Rockefeller found out in 1968 even the most friendly of congressmen will not stick their necks out for a non-candidacy amid pressures to jump elsewhere.

Even with a declared candidacy, it is difficult to turn Congressional power into delegate strength. The parallel to the 1960 candidacy of Lyndon Johnson is instructive. The most powerful majority leader in modern history and the most respected and powerful Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn, acting in concert were able to bring hardly any delegates to Johnson outside the South and Border areas. Mills, for all his power and prestige is neither more respected than was Mr. Sam nor more feared than was Senator Johnson, and the South has much less convention strength now than then.

Looking at Mills’ own situation, how many Congressmen from Illinois or Massachusetts could deliver a single convention vote (perhaps including their own) to Mills? Some New York Congressmen might want to support him, but the primary diminishes, if not eliminates, the effectiveness of their voice. Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, New Jersey — who are the Congressmen likely to give more than private encouragement to Mills? He might get some support west of the Mississippi, but that is all — and Democratic Congressmen are scarce in that region.

**A STRING OF UPSETS**

In any event, if Mills wants to parlay Congressional support into delegate strength he must start early, and if he does he will be compelled by law to enter a number of primaries: Florida, Wisconsin, Tennessee, North Carolina, Nebraska, and Oregon. Most party professionals and public relations experts will snort in contempt at the possibility of Mills winning some of these primaries, but in multi-candidate races strange things may happen. He might get sufficient strength in Florida’s conservative areas to come in first in a multi-candidate race. Mills’ conservative image and soft-spoken manner might become appealing to large numbers of Wisconsin Independents and Republicans in the open primary. He might be a refreshing change to the glamour image displayed by the others. Tennessee is not foreign soil to an Arkansas Congressman, and Oregon with a strange constellation of candidates might exercise its traditional independence.

Such a sequence of events would at least upset the calculations of others — but to no avail. Mills could never get 50 percent of the vote in any non-Southern primary and even a string of whacky primary victories would get him nowhere. For a party to nominate a candidate with no delegate strength in the very states necessary to win the general election
would be most unusual; it will not happen in 1972.

Proxmire

The difficulties of McGovern and Mills are no greater than those of William Proxmire. First, despite a fair amount of television coverage during senatorial hearings, he is largely unknown. Second, the Wisconsin Senator, while generally respected by most of his colleagues, can certainly expect no more help from Capitol Hill than Mills can — for similar reasons. Third, his sources of revenue are not vast. Fourth, his maverick role on many senatorial questions makes him suspect in party councils in many of the Big Nine. Finally, he has issues but not allies and most of his issues are already possessed by someone else: you cannot build a national campaign on the issue of cost overruns.

The starting point of a victorious Proxmire campaign would be an impressive victory in his own Wisconsin primary, but to achieve victory in Wisconsin, his campaign would have to be of credible national proportions by the time of the Wisconsin balloting. No matter how popular a man is in his own state — and the 1970 election results show that Proxmire is very popular indeed — the electorate does not usually want to throw away its chance to select the next president by voting for a favorite son. A Proxmire victory in Wisconsin must be forged outside of the state — by raising his candidacy to national stature. To achieve this he must announce soon and start national campaigning.

After Wisconsin he would have to win a series of primary victories, including California, pick up most of the pieces of the McGovern campaign, receive the tacit blessing of Kennedy, and perhaps of Muskie — whose campaign would be in a most serious state after Proxmire’s primary victories. These gains would have to be accompanied by a dramatic upsurge in the polls and the attendant defection of many big party figures.

Proxmire could only win after such a series of dramatic events, but even these would not be sufficient if, at the last moment, Kennedy pulled the rug out from under him or Humphrey decided to fight a last-ditch battle, presumably with Southern and labor support. The fate of the Senator from Wisconsin will always lie in the hands of others, and a genuine coup de main, while necessary, seems at this point beyond his grasp.

II. THREE COUPS-AND-COMPROMISES

Jackson

Three candidates can go the coup-and-compromise route: Senators Bayh, Harris, and Jackson. The strategic position of the Senator from Washington is, however, the most interesting because he begins his assault on the party from right-of-center, but must move progressively to the left as the campaign continues in order to emerge as a middle-of-the-road compromise. His requirements are numerous:

First of all, Jackson must line up very substantial support in the South and Border areas — both by winning primaries in Florida, (where former Senators Smathers and Holland are supporting him) Tennessee, and North Carolina and by convincing the overwhelming majority of delegates in the rest of the South that he is their only viable option. Here the importance of the Mills candidacy is demonstrated. If Mills runs a credible race, Jackson will be denied this support in the crucial early stages of the campaign when he has to feel sufficiently secure in his Southern support to begin his moves to the left. Mills could also give Jackson very serious trouble in the three primaries mentioned above — either by defeating him or by splitting the conservative vote so that someone else wins. The eventual defection of Mills’ supporters will be of little consolation to Jackson if by then he has been reduced to a regional favorite who has not even won the primaries of that region.

Second, Jackson must win a number of primaries outside the South, certainly Oregon and California, but one or two more as well; Nebraska, Maryland, West Virginia, even Wisconsin present him with opportunities — and risks.

Third, Jackson must make significant inroads with labor unions and the “hard hat” elements in the Northern Industrial States. His domestic record and foreign policy positions make him easily acceptable to this group, but here the competition is quite fierce: Muskie, Humphrey, Kennedy — to the extent that they are in the race — will have locked up most of this vote. Jackson’s best hope is to become the second choice of many of these delegates — and get second choice commitments — so that as one or another of
these falter the fallout will go to him and not to someone else. No matter how well he does elsewhere, no matter how many primaries he wins, he will still need about 300 votes from New England, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan — and he will never get “liberal” votes from these areas. Jackson’s task here is not impossible, but these votes will not fall his way without considerable effort and luck.

Fourth, Jackson absolutely must assuage the fears and diminish the animosities of the left wing of the party. He can never become beloved of the left, but he must become acceptable. To accomplish this he has to emphasize his domestic positions, move to the left on a number of issues, and hope that foreign policy is not the cynosure at convention time. If he has not succeeded in placating the left, the key figures such as Daley may exert tremendous pressure to block Jackson’s nomination — they do not want a repeat of 1968. Daley and others, moreover, will have much influence with those 300 “hard hat” votes that constitute Jackson’s minimum requirement in the Northeast.

REPLACING MUSKIE

Finally, if Jackson succeeds in all of the above, he will be in a position to achieve his most vital requirement — to replace Muskie as the middle-of-the-road compromise candidate. As long as the Muskie candidacy is alive and occupying to some extent the middle-of-the-road, Jackson is effectively blocked. If a liberal (Kennedy, e.g.) appears to be winning, the South will move decisively to Muskie; on the other hand, if Jackson appears to be in a strong position, the liberals will move, albeit less decisively, to Muskie. While these propensities may not be sufficient to nominate Muskie — as we saw last month — they are sufficient to destroy Jackson. Of course the best way for Jackson to get rid of Muskie is to beat him in the California primary where the liberal vote may well be split, where there are a number of conservative (Yorty) Democrats, and where the aero-space industry, for which Jackson is the champion, needs help.

Most crucial to Jackson is timing. If Mills is not removed early enough, then Jackson must delay his left-ward movement. If the spadework in the hard-hat areas is not done soon enough, then the early collapse, let us say, of the Humphrey candidacy will send his much-needed delegates scurrying elsewhere. On the other hand, if Muskie should falter too early, before Jackson has made his peace with the liberals, then some other candidate, such as Bayh, would emerge as the middle-of-the-road compromise. Furthermore, Muskie’s demise may lead swiftly to a Kennedy nomination unless Humphrey picks up a lot of the pieces. The odds, therefore, are strongly against Senator Jackson, but his nomination is nowhere near as hopeless a prospect as are the candidacies of Mills, McGovern and Proxmire.

Bayh

Henry Jackson is not the only candidate who must aspire to a well-timed take-over of Muskie’s central position. Birch Bayh must go the same route without, however, Jackson’s asset of conservative support or his attendant liabilities of liberal animosity. He becomes the logical compromise candidate should Muskie be driven from the field and should Kennedy terminally withdraw. He is close to the Kennedys and has adroitly mended his fences on the left, yet his Midwestern background and his more moderate stands on controversial issues make him much more acceptable to the center and to the right than Kennedy, McGovern or Proxmire — perhaps even than Harris. Where Bayh stands with the center and the right in relation to Humphrey is less clear.

But the first question that must be asked about the Bayh candidacy is its relationship to the putative Kennedy candidacy: is the Senator from Indiana effectively a stand-in for the Senator from Massachusetts? If he serves as a stand-in, how strong are the implicit commitments in each direction? We cannot, of course, answer these questions. But the close association between Bayh and Kennedy would make such a stand-in strategy possible and Kennedy’s obvious interest in eliminating Muskie by proxy would make it desirable. Bayh must realize that if Kennedy makes a strong bid for the nomination his own chances are very slim indeed — slimmer, let us say, than Henry Jackson’s. So it would make sense for Bayh to play the stand-in role, receive early financial and political support from the Kennedy forces and induce through his efforts on Kennedy’s behalf a commitment from
Kennedy to support him as an alternative.

Bayh, then, has two shots at the nomination: he can pull off a modified Kennedy-backed coup should Kennedy decide not to run, or he might emerge as a compromise should Kennedy run, but fail. From the standpoint of Bayh these routes to the nomination are not mutually exclusive.

Bayh’s task is clear. First he must win a series of primary victories. He would do well to stay clear of New Hampshire and make Florida his first trial of strength; he has some local support there and an outside chance of upsetting Muskie. Bayh then must survive Wisconsin with a tolerable showing, win in native Indiana by an impressive margin — hoping that someone else will enter the primary and make this possible. Then he should perhaps win one of the May primaries and take Oregon and California. The likelihood of all this happening is not great, but should it happen the Muskie and Jackson candidacies would be dead; Humphrey would be in a very weak position unless he had pulled off some delegate-selection surprises in Michigan and Pennsylvania; and, if he wanted it, Kennedy might be tempted to step in and claim the prize, especially if Bayh’s primary victories were not impressive in terms of vote percentage.

**A NARROW SQUEAK**

It is interesting to speculate whether Bayh, with the prize almost within his grasp, might then dispute the issue with his patron. It would not be the first such challenge in politics and all of his hitherto successful exertions might seem to justify it. Should he take such a course, however, he would be well advised to do his mathematics in advance and to check on the degree to which the legally bound California delegation is personally committed to his cause. He would need the support of the South (which he might get) and of virtually every other candidate in the race — including Humphrey. Even at this it would be a narrow squeak.

If Kennedy did not make a move for himself at this moment, and if he put his weight behind the Indiana Senator, then Bayh’s chances would be excellent. He could move into Muskie’s central position and, since he would be emerging at a late date, would become the front-runner in fact and name, gathering to himself all the advantages of that position with few of the liabilities.

Suppose, however, that Kennedy does contest, that Bayh after a few initial successes begins to falter and loses the California primary, although without disgrace. What are his chances of emerging as an eventual compromise? If a genuine deadlock arises, they are probably as good as those of any other candidate, and we shall turn to the dynamics of deadlock in the next issue.

**Harris**

There can be very little to say about Harris at this point, except that he must go a route similar to Jackson’s and Bayh’s, without Jackson’s support in the South and without Bayh’s possible backing from Kennedy. He must do well in the primaries, replace all of his liberal rivals (McGovern, Bayh, Lindsay), hope that Kennedy does not run, and be ready to pick up a fair number of pieces from the Muskie campaign. As Jackson had to move in behind Muskie from the right (after securing his extreme right flank), so Harris must move in behind Muskie from the left. Given his rivals for this position, the odds against him are enormous and a presidential effort on his part may well be directed to a lesser prize — the vice-presidency (for which he has been considered in the past) or a cabinet post.

**III. TWO MAVERICKS**

**Lindsay**

After a moment of initial euphoria, the Mayor’s staff will recognize the difficulties of their position. Lindsay faces two very serious obstacles: first, he and Kennedy are competing for the same constituency — the liberals, the young, the blacks, the war opponents. As long as Kennedy is in the race, Lindsay is completely out of it since Kennedy’s hold on these groups, if he wishes to exercise it, cannot be broken by Lindsay. Second, his relations with labor are not the most friendly, and labor, with its IOU’s from 1968, will probably have the power to veto any nomination.

To win, then, Lindsay will have to postulate a Kennedy non-candidacy and will have to destroy the remaining opposition in the primaries. To do so, he will have to win virtually all the primaries, but, unfortunately for him, the earlier the primary, the worse his chance of winning it. Labor will cut him to pieces in New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Rhode Island and Indiana, and the candidate/voter ratio is just too high for liberals in Florida. Lindsay might do well in Oregon and California, but he has to win some earlier primaries to reach the West Coast with a campaign-in-being.

If Kennedy is not in the race, Lindsay might make some headway with McGovern supporters and among the black delegates, but it is difficult to see him parlaying this strength into any possible winning coalition.

**McCarthy**

Eugene McCarthy will certainly deserve more than a footnote when the political history of this half-century is written, but at the moment it seems that he will be more remembered for his activities in 1968 than for any electoral successes in 1972. If it is difficult to understand the motives of a McGovern, it is impossible to fathom the calculations of the former Senator from Minnesota — in prospect or retrospect.

*Turn to page 18*
Democrats from page 17

If McCarthy views his future as within the Democratic party he has a series of almost insurmountable obstacles: the issues of war and peace which propelled his candidacy in the past have found numerous other champions; his associations with the left wing of the party are seriously compromised by the long-standing feud with the Kennedys; labor has never been excited by the man; the black community has never regarded him as a stalwart supporter; the party professionals are very suspicious of his fourth party ruminations; the conservatives remain hostile; and he has no home base of operations. Of course, such obstacles have never deterred him in the past, but then he has never come near to the nomination in the past either. His role in 1968 was catalytic, and should McCarthy enter the 1972 fray with his assets of high visibility and effective television style his role will be similarly catalytic: he may upset the primary plans of many liberals, and his threat of a fourth-party movement could well force the Democratic party to secure its base of operations. In this sense McCarthy’s effect upon the nomination process may be profound, but his eventual victory is out of the question.

CLIFFORD BROWN

Political Notes from page 6

NEW YORK: studying the city

As the acrimonious legislative session drew to a close in June, Republicans managed to push through a bill calling for the establishment of a $250,000 State Commission to Make a Study of the Governmental Operations of the City of New York. Within hours, Mayor Lindsay countered by announcing that he was setting up a commission to investigate the state. At its creation, legislative leaders might have thought of the state commission as the perfect vehicle to embarrass Lindsay — during the year he would be running for president — with disclosures of corruption and mismanagement in the city administration. However, after seeing the appointments to the state commission, that view seems no longer correct. Governor Rockefeller appointed Stuart Scott, President of the State Bar Association and extremely apolitical, as chairman of the Commission. The other appointees are: Mrs. Shirley Chisholm, the outspoken first black Congresswoman in the nation; Herman Kahn, the defense analyst and founder of the Hudson Institute; Lucius D. Clay, retired Army general and business executive; and Robert Milano, a chemical industrialist and chairman of Millmaster Onyx Corp.

... Last month this column noted that liberal Republican State Senator Roy Goodman went along with up-state conservative legislators in slashing state aid to localities by three percent. Senator Goodman asked that the FORUM note that he had a key role in the restoration of these heavily-cut revenue sharing funds and in the successful efforts to raise the commuter tax, both of which helped to alleviate the fiscal crisis confronting New York City. His consistent advocacy of enlightened pro-urban legislation has assured him of relatively easy reelection next year and of possible advancement to statewide office the following year.

Senate from page 12

State: VIRGINIA
Rating: SAFE DEMOCRAT
Incumbent: SPONG
Primary: GOP possibilities are Congressmen Bill Whitehurst and Bill Scott, with Scott regarded as most likely. Linwood Holton, who cannot succeed himself, would be a top contender if his choice. Shafran, wins the Lieutenant Governorship this fall and becomes a likely successor.
Organization: Governor Holton has helped to maintain a good party structure. Although Spong has his own well run organization, the Democrats are split between the Henry Howell and Harry Byrd factions.
Comment: Those running for Lieutenant Governor such as Shafran, George Mason Green and Warren Barry may convert current statewide exposure into momentum for the 1972 Senate race. Although Spong is rated slightly more liberal than his electorale, only with a strong challenger, like Gov. Holton, can the GOP hope to capture the Senate seat, and a Holton race is now judged “inconceivable” by his aides.

State: WEST VIRGINIA
Rating: SAFE DEMOCRAT
Incumbent: RANDOLPH
Comment: Pending an unlikely Randolph retirement there are no prominent GOP candidates, but Governor Arch Moore has placed a number of talented young Republicans in key state posts, one of whom might surface as a candidate. If Randolph should retire there could be a real scramble (especially if Jay Rockefeller runs).

State: WYOMING
Rating: SAFE REPUBLICAN
Incumbent: HANSEN
Comment: Although there is little activity as yet, all early indications are that Hansen, a popular former governor, is safe.

Letters from page 19

LIVE AND LET LIVE

Dear Sirs:
I have just completed reading your Newsletter. Philosophically, I am in complete agreement but . . .
If we Republicans are to obtain majority support, we must lessen our public attacks upon one another. Scanning your Newsletter, it seems that the great bulk of your attention is devoted to the shortcomings of the Nixon administration and its local supporters. The criticism may be valid, but we Republicans still must live with one another if we are to so identify ourselves.

May I suggest that 75% of the lineage of the Newsletter and FORUM be devoted to the flaws of the opposition party, and 25% to Republican foolishness.

CHANDLER G. KETCHUM
Pittsburgh, Pa.
LETTERS

YR's DEFENDED

Dear Sirs:

I was most distressed to read the article in the Ripon FORUM of July 15, 1971 titled "YRs Fail to Disband." As a Young Republican who feels that our party should be inclusive rather than exclusionary, your parochial opinion regarding the YRNF seems to concede the youth vote to the Democrats. It is no less than a truism that some organizational vehicle is necessary in order to recruit the youth vote for the Republican party.

That organizational vehicle is most logically the YRNF and the CRNC operating in a spirit of cooperation with the state and local College Republicans and Young Republicans. This is one of the top priorities of Don Sundquist's program. In your article, you accuse Don Sundquist as being a "right-winger" and support this contention because Senator James Buckley's Administrative Assistant, David Jones, managed Don's campaign. You say that Don Sundquist's campaign was "ostensibly non-ideological." When in truth his campaign was, in fact, non-ideological.

I first met Don Sundquist at a YR National Committee meeting in Dallas, Texas, in December, 1970. At that time, Don and I had an hour together in which to get acquainted, and during the course of our conversation, we covered a panorama of subjects, including politics. Don told me that in terms of his own ideology, he considered himself a moderate Republican, that he supported President Nixon, and that, if anything, he was a little more liberal than many Republicans in Washington and too inclined to high office. To the best of my knowledge, Don has never done or said anything to indicate to the contrary.

The South Dakota Young Republicans is an organization which attempts to attract young people of all philosophical persuasions, both those who are conservative and those who are liberal. Any investigation of the South Dakota Young Republicans would indicate that we have many members of both philosophical persuasions. The majority of our members are moderates. Our South Dakota delegation to the YR Convention in Phoenix unanimously supported Don Sundquist for YRNF chairman. Our delegation of 8 members included 3 college students, 3 high school teachers, a recent college graduate who is presently engaged in a farming operation, and the undersigned who is an attorney. We supported Don Sundquist because we felt he was the candidate who would breathe fresh air into the YRNF; that he had the intelligence, the ability, the ideas, and that he would work hard to make the National Young Republicans a strong organization, ready, willing and able to assist Republican candidates of all philosophical stripes in their efforts to gain election in 1972. Don has already out to achieve this goal.

I suggest you rethink your position on the YRNF, in general, and on Don Sundquist, in particular. Don Sundquist has accepted the challenge to recruit young people into the GOP and to work with vigor for the election of Republicans of all philosophical persuasions in 1972. I believe he deserves the support of Republicans of all philosophical persuasions. Don's responsibility is great; for if the Young Republicans cannot encourage our youth to identify with our party, who can?

JAMES S. STOCKDALE
National Committeeeman
South Dakota Young Republicans

MONDAY OBJECTS

Dear Sirs:

You rather suspected that the only way our recent analysis of "Common Cause" would find its way into the pages of the FORUM would be if someone blasted the article. Your recent piece, titled "The Nation: look at both sides of CC," (just when was our side presented?) has confirmed this suspicion.

Throughout the article, it's John Gardner said this, Gardner said, that, Gardner said... The only mention of what we wrote is when it is necessary to make Gardner's reply understandable.

Gardner says we were "shamelessly selective" in our evidence. I would prefer to let your readers decide this for themselves. And so they can do this, I have attached a copy of the article for you to reprint. If you choose not to, those interested may have a free copy by writing me at the National Committee.

It's this sort of one-sided coverage by your organization that gives credence to those who refer to your outfit as the "Rip-Off Society."

JOHN D. LOFTON, JR.
Editor, MONDAY
Republican National Committee
310 First St. SE
Washington DC 20003

(Ed. note: The Ripon Society ran John Gardner's reply at length because Monday did not. It was suggested that we do this, so that dialogue within the GOP be preserved. When Mr. Lofton reprinted Mr. Gardner's statement in full, we shall run his article.)
If anyone is raving mad about the condition of American education today, it is Dr. Max Rafferty, erstwhile California Superintendent of Public Instruction. Like his earlier book, Suffer Little Children, his new volume is a lurid expose of the disaster zone called American education, replete with tongue twisting alliterations and ludicrous similes.

The problem with Max Rafferty's writing is that the medium tends to replace the message, until the reader can remember only that he is being shouted at, not what is actually being shouted. It is worthwhile to distill the essence that inspires Dr. Rafferty's fulminations, because he has, beneath the screaming and table thumping, put his finger squarely on many of the ills of education that are worthy of serious concern.

To Rafferty it is clear and unequivocal that:

- The purpose of a school is not to make pupils popular or well-adjusted or universally approved, it is to make them learned. It is to teach them to use the tools that the race, over the centuries, has found to be indispensable to the pursuit of truth... schools exist to teach organized, systematic, disciplined subject matter to the children... the schools are the only societal agencies specifically designed to perform this function... if the schools do not so teach subject matter, the children are never going to learn it. (P. 66)

This statement may seem commonplace enough, until one examines much of what passes for schooling in the land today. The Progressive Educationists, inspired by the ghost of John Dewey, have been working for three decades, despite occasional setbacks, to destroy the idea that there are any positive standards of good or evil; to foster "life adjustment" instead of "education in depth"; to tailor the curriculum to what the child wants, not what his elders have learned through experience is important to him; to promote group acceptance and popularity at the expense of self-reliant individualism; to downgrade reading in favor of much more broadly defined "experiences"; and to extirpate from our schools anything that operates against these precepts.

Rafferty laments the decline of the learned man in favor of the rich and powerful man. He believes fervently that the schools belong to the people that pay the taxes and consign their children, and opposes attempts by educators to exclude the layman from setting policies. He believes that teaching is a noble profession to be inhabited by professionals, not by skilled laborers. He opposes things, like extravagant dress styles, which operate to distract pupils from the pursuit of learning in the classroom. And he unloads heavily on Mom and Pop who, through neglect and sloth, have allowed little Johnny to run wild at home (and away from home), bereft of moral guidance and any sense of individual integrity.

Rafferty is obviously proud of the Education in Depth philosophy adopted in California under his leadership. It includes annual statewide, reading, math and English tests for all pupils; subject matter requirements for the would-be teacher; grammar in first grade and geography in third; the interring of Dick and Jane in favor of children's classics like Ivanhoe, the Odyssey, and Jack the Giant Killer; and new courses in understanding economics.

Lest one think Rafferty is a devotee of the old-style British boys' boarding school, with its abundance of hickory sticks and Latin verbs, it is worth noting that he has a very positive and balanced view of such recent educational fashions as ungraded instruction, teaching machines, and courses in the history and culture of racial minorities. Even more surprisingly, to old Rafferty-haters, he appears to agree with the suggestion "Get the Vietnam mess over with. We Americans had rocks in our heads when we sent 600,000 of our boys 10,000 miles away to slog around in a swamp." He also comes out in favor of the 18-year-old vote, more responsibility for student government in managing student affairs, and the desperate need for school administrators to listen to what young people are saying.

Unhappily, Rafferty is unable to pitch his argument to the kind of learned men he wishes society would produce. His rhetoric seems always aimed at those who can be more easily enraged by hyperbole than persuaded by calm reason. Thus the reader is obliged to endure excoriations of "the muck merchants who prey upon puberty," the "mod ministers" who "sneeze at the Virgin Birth" and "poke fun at the divinity of Christ," those who tolerate "a four year course in sex, drugs, and treason," and - are you ready for this? - a "gruesome grownup golem who makes the late Boris Karloff look like Harold Stassen by comparison" (the militant student activist).

Then, too, though Rafferty attacks the self-righteousness of the liberals and progressive educators, one cannot help but feel that Rafferty thinks he is in sole possession of the Philosopher's Stone.

It is regrettable that a book with so many sound and timely (one would not dare say "relevant") observations must present them enwrapped in so much colorful and vapid baggage. Perhaps someone will soon perform the much needed service of preparing "The Learned Man's Rafferty," through which the good doctor's ideas can proceed on their intrinsic merit, shorn of the verbal histrionics.

THE AUTHOR

State Rep. John McClaughry is occasionally referred to as the Max Rafferty of Vermont, mainly by his detractors.

John McClaughry