President Ford may not have all the right answers to the nation's economic problems, but he has the right general approach. It is easy to find defects in the Ford proposals, but his general program is strong because it is an economic, not a political, solution to the current crisis. The President has outlined a program which would cut taxes to stimulate consumer and business spending; raise fuel import duties to cut oil consumption as well as the deficit in the balance of trade; and halt the burgeoning growth of government by blocking new spending programs. These objectives are difficult to criticize. Some of the President's proposals, however, need to be modified to meet his proposed objectives.

The proposed $16 billion income tax rebate is critical. The bulk of its impact should be directed toward middle-income taxpayers who pay the bulk of the federal tax receipts and who are responsible for the bulk of the purchases in the "high ticket" areas of the economy. It is these markets areas which have been most depressed by the recent recession, whereas "basic" industries such as food and clothing which consume a large portion of low-income budgets have emerged relatively unscathed by the economic downturn. The goal of an income tax cut is stimulation of the economy, not redistribution of wealth. Tax reform is a legitimate but a different issue. The President and Congress would be well-advised to concentrate the rebate program in the low- and upper-middle income brackets where the rebates will have the greatest impact in consumer purchasing.

The proposed $16 billion income tax rebate is critical. The bulk of its impact should be directed toward middle-income taxpayers who pay the bulk of the federal tax receipts and who are responsible for the bulk of the purchases in the "high ticket" areas of the economy. It is these markets areas which have been most depressed by the recent recession, whereas "basic" industries such as food and clothing which consume a large portion of low-income budgets have emerged relatively unscathed by the economic downturn. The goal of an income tax cut is stimulation of the economy, not redistribution of wealth. Tax reform is a legitimate but a different issue. The President and Congress would be well-advised to concentrate the rebate program in the low- and upper-middle income brackets where the rebates will have the greatest impact in consumer purchasing.

The Ripon Society has consistently advocated the use of free-market strategies to promote energy conservation. For more than a year, it has advocated drastic increases in the federal gasoline excise tax, coupled with a simultaneous decrease in either income or social security taxes. The goal is to cut oil consumption without crippling living standards. The President's proposed increase on imported oil duties would be both a counterproductive and inequitable solution to the nation's energy problems. The duty will hit hardest at the basic heating needs of the nation. If the high cost of oil has not been sufficient cause to turn down thermostats and caulk windows, this additional blow will have no greater impact than on the number of unheated New England homes and apartments and unpaid fuel bills. Some analysts have suggested that the import duty will encourage oil companies to concentrate price increases in the most price-inelastic segments of their markets (home heating oil), while they minimize price increases in the most price-elastic segments (car gasoline sales). If so, such a development would destroy the potential benefits of the President's proposals. A gasoline tax would have a more direct effect on the intended fuel target without introducing the inefficiency and distortions of a rationing program.

Ripon agrees with much of the rest of the President's energy program—deregulation of natural gas, enactment of a natural gas excise tax, elimination of price controls on domestic crude oil, encouragement of new oil exploration on the outer continental bank, enactment of a windfall energy profits tax, efficiency labels for appliances and automobiles, etc.—but it is concerned with proposals to suspend environmental advances and postpone a drastic shift to smaller cars. Instead of deferring pollution emission standards for automobiles, Ripon would advocate auto excise taxes which would be steeply proportional to either 1) car weight and engine size, or 2) gas mileage as measured by the Environmental Protection Agency. Such taxes would provide additional stimuli to both American consumers and Detroit auto-makers to clean up the air and reduce fuel consumption.

Finally, the President has indicated he will insist on a firm line on new spending programs and inflationary government salary and payment increases. The call for self-restraint and austerity is an important one that should not be limited solely to the government. Indeed, the President's own economic messages in mid-January have been noteworthy for the self-restraint and auster-
ility of their language. Inconvenience and hardship can be accepted by the nation only if Congress is willing to accept a leadership role in endorsing the virtues of such imperatives. The nation must search for solutions to its problems, not loopholes by which individual citizens can escape from the burdens of the current economic dislocations.

It may be too much to expect that Congress will exert such a role. Congressional Democrats have been notable for their failure to develop a rational and coherent economic program in the past. Their solutions have too often favored the political polemics of bigger tax cuts or the bureaucratic morass of gasoline rationing. Democrats have too often clung to discredited solutions like wage and price controls long after the most liberal economists have admitted the failure of such solutions. The Democrats have been big on panaceas, short on legislation. The only solution to the energy crisis may be to harness congressional windpower (which is inexhaustible), but that may require a technological breakthrough not yet imaginable on Capitol Hill.

**COMMENTARY: SALT**

The Case for the SALT II Agreement

by Stan Sienkiewicz

Most of the misperception and misunderstanding which characterize the debates over the SALT agreements arise from the frequently unrealistic expectations held out for the arms limitations negotiations. Such expectations create an inappropriate yardstick by which to assess the recent SALT II agreement in Vladivostok.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to restrain themselves to forces no larger, approximately, than the U.S. had been planning for new major components of its nuclear capability: 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 1,320 MIRVed missiles. This is a significant achievement since intelligence projections have indicated that the absence of mutually-agreed limits might lead to significantly larger Soviet forces. Such an outcome would have led to probable recommendations from the Defense Department for comparable increases in U.S. forces.

It is possible to devise more comprehensive agreements or to devise agreements which might generate greater savings in the strategic budget. But before criticism of the SALT II agreement can be accepted on these grounds, it must be demonstrated that such alternative agreements were in the realm of negotiating possibility.

It could also be asserted that this agreement somehow does not protect particular U.S. national security objectives or that on balance, its omissions are of sufficient weight to raise questions about its "net" desirability. Nevertheless, there are substantial grounds to argue that the SALT II agreement is a significant breakthrough in several dimensions. Such assertions may not be politically prudent, however; a more modest elaboration of SALT II's merits be a more effective way to gain public and congressional approval. In any case, the SALT II agreement does not merit rejection by Congress---as an analysis of the following factors should indicate.

U.S. strategic forces are based largely upon intelligence projections of Soviet strategic forces five or more years in the future. Such projections typically show an increasing wedge of uncertainty about the growth of Soviet forces that far in the future. Prudent necessity requires U.S. forces to be hedged on the high side of that wedge. If Soviet forces evolve at lower levels, the U.S. has built its forces unnecessarily. If, however, the Soviets also hedge in a roughly similar fashion, it may become impossible to know whether both sides might have settled for lower levels had they seen the opportunity. The agreement to place ceilings upon two major dimensions of strategic weapons should alter this calculus substantially. A great deal of strategic uncertainty is removed, and U.S. forces can be designed to meet fixed, constant levels of Soviet armament.

Prudent planning requires that the Defense Department focus upon somewhat different questions: What are the prospects for Soviet cheating? Are possible levels of cheating sufficient to merit U.S. concern? Can the letter and spirit of the limits be circumvented by weapons systems and activities unconstrained by the agreement? What strategic factors should concern the U.S. in the next decade if follow-on agreements are not easily forthcoming?

Removing uncertainty as well as the Soviet right to increase forces beyond some given level can preclude substantial additional expenditures on strategic forces. It is argued that the eventual vulnerability of fixed ICBM forces not precluded by the agreement will require large expenditures upon mobile nuclear systems. This is by no means clear; furthermore, this problem was moved beyond the resolution capacities of SALT once the U.S. chose to deploy significant levels of MIRVed missiles.
There is another potential expenditure saving as a result of this agreement. Without the SALT II agreement, the U.S. would have to contemplate increases in its own strategic forces to offset expected increases in Soviet forces. U.S. modernization and replacement programs would assume additional importance. The Trident submarine and B-1 bomber programs have been played for SALT leverage because in the absence of SALT agreement, they are a particularly expensive way to match a Soviet buildup, particularly if the Soviets chose to build up their ICBM arsenal. With such a buildup largely precluded by the SALT II agreement, the U.S. has a real opportunity to relax and reevaluate the costs, rates, and extent to which we want to modernize our strategic bomber and submarine forces. Given the right to deploy and maintain equal force levels, there is no need to spend excessively to maintain the exact numbers permitted. We do not need, for example, to operate old, marginal systems if their operation is uneconomical. We do not need to keep the last 50 or 100 systems operating if their marginal cost is high and their marginal increment to capabilities is low. Nor do we need to rush the new systems into deployment if the budget crunch suggests a more leisurely schedule of development.

Systems like the B-1 and Trident have mistakenly been viewed as "goodies" that the U.S. does not need. If, however, the U.S. wishes to maintain strategic bomber or submarine forces, new systems must be developed and deployed to replace today's systems as they literally wear out. At some point in time, the U.S. will deploy all Trident-like submarines, not merely the 10 Tridents scheduled to replace our 10 Polaris boats. The U.S. will then be able to develop and deploy a far smaller strategic submarine force. What the SALT II agreement should permit is the healthy (though unfortunately rather technical) debate about the desired capabilities, technical characteristics, replacement rates, and overall force mix for U.S. strategic forces. In this respect, any agreement setting reasonably low, and relatively equal ceilings on offensive forces can be viewed as a substantial breakthrough.

SALT II is a breakthrough in another important regard. The survivability of fixed, land-based ICBMs has been of significant concern. Increasing missile accuracies, yields, and to some extent, MIRVing, mean development of the eventual capability to destroy very large proportions of either side's fixed ICBMs if they are not launched on warning of attack.

This problem has generated continuing interest in SALT Limits which ban or restrict Soviet MIRVs to low numbers, particularly on their larger missiles. Such limits, probably viewed as unequal from the Soviet perspective, were therefore never possible at costs the U.S. was willing to pay. Such U.S. government concerns tended to put the U.S. in the position of supplicant before the Soviet Union, seeking to solve a potential U.S. strategic problem by persuading the Soviets to make "concessions." This is not a particularly strong negotiating posture for dealing with the Soviet Union. The breakthrough in this area is the explicit acknowledgment in SALT II that both sides will simply live with the prospect of increasing ICBM vulnerability and/or fix it unilaterally in permitted ways, such as shifting strategic resources to less-vulnerable delivery modes (e.g., submarines.)

The vulnerability issue is at the heart of the concerns raised about actual missile throw-weight disparity resulting from the substantially greater size of Soviet ICBMs. Questions about this inequality should not be phrased in terms of the throw-weight differential between U.S. ICBMs and substantially larger Soviet counterparts. The problem is the potential this throw-weight asymmetry creates for an eventual Soviet advantage in total MIRV warheads and/or hard-target counterforce capability. (Hard-target counterforce capability is the potential to destroy targets hardened to withstand substantial effects of nuclear detonations, e.g., ICBM silos. It is a function of warhead yield and accuracy; a warhead of a particular yield and accuracy has a certain probability of destroying a target hardened to a particular level. Further hardening a target will make it more survivable against any particular yield and accuracy combination. Conversely, increasing yield, accuracy, or both increases the probability of destroying targets of a particular hardness. Accuracy is the dominant variable. For high accuracies, however, numerous technical uncertainties become more important and can create a lack of confidence in the hard target capability of the missile. For example, missiles are tested by both sides on east-west trajectories, but their operational trajectories are north-south. This difference creates navigational uncertainties due to variables such as variations in the earth's shape. Missiles of lower accuracy are less sensitive to such uncertainties. Consequently, the higher-yield, lower-accuracy combination can be said to have "higher confidence" capability against hard targets than an equally lethal combination with lower yield and higher accuracy. Terminal guidance technology, which would permit trajectory correction or "homing" in the terminal phase of the trajectory would remove many of these uncertainties in accuracy.)

Since most Soviet ICBMs are considerably larger than U.S. ICBMs and therefore have a substantially larger throw-weight, they can potentially deploy either greater numbers of MIRV warheads...
or larger MIRV warheads on each ICBM. The latter could provide the Soviets with a higher-confidence, hard-target counterforce capability. In short, there is a greater destructive potential associated with substantial Soviet advantage in missile throw-weight.

This advantage should be viewed in its proper perspective. First, the hard-target counterforce capability in question is the capability to destroy fixed, land-based, hard targets. Given the current U.S. lead in missile accuracy and guidance technology, there is nothing to preclude U.S. maintenance of comparable hard-target counterforce capabilities against Soviet ICBMs. Second, if the provisions of the SALT II agreement are written so as not to preclude modernization of the ICBM force with missiles of larger dimensions, the U.S. would retain the right to significantly decrease any ICBM throw-weight disparity vis-a-vis the Soviets. Such a choice, however, would amount to spending large sums of money on potentially vulnerable systems, and preferable alternatives are available. Third, even conceding a Soviet advantage in hard-target counterforce capability, what use is such an advantage. It does not constitute a first-strike disarming capability against the United States since several thousand warheads on patrolling missile submarines and alert Strategic Air Command bombers will survive (not to mention the so-called FBS or non central systems excluded from the agreement).

To an aggressive Soviet Union, willing to run the risk of nuclear suicide, a high-confidence hard-target counterforce capability would provide the potential to destroy some or all U.S. ICBMs with "limited" U.S. fatalities (perhaps millions rather than tens of millions). The U.S.S.R. would then be able to threaten the U.S. with an attack upon her cities should she retaliate with an attack against Soviet cities with America's surviving submarine and bomber forces. The practical concern is probably not with this more extreme case, but rather with the political risks attendant to a substantial, perceived U.S. disadvantaged or with possible Soviet incentives to use nuclear weapons in a crisis.

Lastly, no attacker could guarantee that the ICBMs of the victim, given the available warning time of about 30 minutes, would be left in their silos to ride out the attack. They could be easily launched against an extensive target system (including the attacker's silos in order to prevent reloading) before they were destroyed. Such a launch-on-warning policy is widely viewed as an undesirable policy for the United States because it risks nuclear war by technical error. Nevertheless, it is perhaps the most fundamental and unresolvable uncertainty for any potential attacker.

Meanwhile, the great disparity between U.S. and Soviet ICBM size may be viewed as a misguided strategic choice for the Soviet Union since it means that a much larger proportion of Soviet strategic throw-weight is deployed in this highly-vulnerable force component than is the case for the U.S. Still, the concern about missile throw-weight disparity is a legitimate concern of the Defense Department. It is charged with worrying about worst cases and marginal differences. In the larger perspective, however, the missile throw-weight disparity is relatively less important, and should not become an obstacle to the negotiation and ratification of the agreement reached by President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev in Vladivostok. The SALT II agreement is perfect from neither the American nor the Soviet perspective. It is, though, a step in the ongoing process of strategic arms limitation and the commitment of both countries to further negotiations.

CONTRIBUTOR NOTE: Stan Sienkiewicz is an analyst for the Defense Department, but his views do not necessarily represent the position of the U.S. government.

**POLITICS: STATES**

New jobs: Seattle City Councilman Bruce Chapman has been appointed secretary of state by Washington Gov. Dan Evans (R). Chapman, a former national political director for the Ripon Society, succeeds A. Ludlow Kramer (R), who resigned to form his own consulting business. Kramer, who was defeated in a congressional bid last fall, said he could no longer afford the post's $15,000 salary, which is about $6,700 less than the salary of the secretary of state's top assistant. Like former California Gov. Ronald Reagan (R), Kramer also hopes to do a radio commentary show. In nearby Oregon, former Gov. Tom McCall (R) is preparing a newspaper column with hopes of national circulation. Former Ohio Gov. John J. Gilligan (D) is preparing to replace new Ambassador Elliot Richardson (R) as a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., but Gilligan has also made moves to reenter the insurance business.

The suggestion from a Kentucky state senator that the GOP skip this year's gubernatorial race created a storm of controversy in the Kentucky Republican Party. The elevation of Julian Carroll from lieutenant governor to governor means the GOP will face an incumbent governor this fall. Given the party's disastrous track record in the past
They later announced they would interview prospective candidates for the gubernatorial race.

LOUISIANA

Last year, Gov. Edwin Edwards(D) did not expect any serious opposition for reelection this year. Edwards said as much and most observers conceded as much. The situation has changed drastically, however. Reports in November about Edwards' extensive Las Vegas gambling (and losses) were followed by an accusation by a former aide that Edwards had sold a position on the state Superport Commission in return for a $20,000 campaign gift. Responding to a grand jury investigation of the supposed incident, Edwards said: "I became embroiled in this controversy the same way that Jesus got involved with Judas. A friend turned on me. The real story behind all this is that the governor refused to cave in to the wishes of a friend to the disadvantage of the state." Edwards' other problems include legal ones involving his income taxes as well as additional scandals in his administration. As a result, other Democratic politicians are assessing the odds on a gubernatorial challenge to Edwards. Among the possible aspirants are State Sen. Robert Jones, son of former Gov. Sam Jones; Lt. Gov. James Fitzmorris; Atty. Gen. William Guste; Public Service Commissioner Ed Kennon, the nephew of a former governor; and former Gov. John J. McKeithen, who had some scandals of his own when he was governor. Edwards is no longer unbeatable.

MAINE

Maine Republicans have elected moderate Auburn Mayor Jack Linnell(R) as the new chairman of the state Republican Party. Linnell succeeds Harold Jones, whom he defeated for reelection to the post in a four-ballot contest. His election ends recent conservative domination of the top GOP leadership. Conservatives, including former state executive director Alex Raloff, had charged that Linnell's election would mean a takeover of the state party organization by U.S. Rep. Bill Cohen(R). Said Linnell: "I'm a friend of Bill's, and we share a lot of the same philosophy, but that's all." Linnell's election came after State Sen. Waking Tanous(R) dropped out of the race. Tanous had entered the chairmanship contest because conservatives were threatening to quit the party if Linnell was elected. "If [Linnell] makes it, there'll be a split right down the middle," predicted Tanous. The new state chairman has promised to concentrate on local rebuilding efforts and a state GOP convention to be held in Augusta, May 9.

MISSISSIPPI

Mississippi Republicans are looking for a couple of candidates for governor this year. They already have one, defeated 1972 Senate candidate Gil Carmichael, but they are looking for some additional ones on the grounds that a Republican primary would be good for the party. Carmichael reportedly agreed though he is acknowledged to be the strongest candidate available to the GOP after his 1972 race against Sen. James Eastland(D). Carmichael received 40% of the vote in that contest. However, as Wayne Weide of the Clarkedale Press-Register points out, "Carmichael has never been one whom State Republican Chairman Clarke Reed or executive directors Bill Wilkins and Haley Barbour could easily program. With his usual candor Carmichael started saying some things that did not sit right with some of the party archconservatives and fat cats." The would-be governor is a moderate-conservative by Mississippi standards. On the Democratic side of the race, the frontrunning position is currently occupied by Lt. Gov. William Winter(D). However, a large number of Democratic politicians have indicated an interest in reliving events of 1967, when Winter was defeated in the Democratic gubernatorial primary.

TENNESSEE

Dortch Oldham, who was an unsuccessful candidate in the 1974 Tennessee gubernatorial primary, has been named state GOP chairman, succeeding S.L. Kopald, Jr., who resigned after last year's elections. Oldham in turn has named David Jones, a former aide to Sen. James Buckley(Cons.-N.Y.), as the party's executive director. Jones had helped direct the primary campaign of another unsuccessful gubernatorial aspirant, Dr. Nat Winston, and then worked on the Public Service Commission campaign of Jane Hardaway, who has been vice chairman of the state GOP.

UTAH

A post-election poll by the Deseret News indicated that former U.S. Rep. Wayne Owens(D) lost the 1974 Senate race to Salt Lake City Mayor Jake Garn because he emphasized a negative media attack on Garn more than his own congressional record. A particular source of voter discontent was an Owens brochure attacking Garn. According to one seasoned and respected Republican observer in Utah, the poll offers "additional evidence that negative campaigns are not in vogue in Utah." The backlash to Owens' media campaign—which was imported from an eastern agency—was similar to reactions encountered by Republican Lawrence Burton in 1970 when he brought in eastern public relations help for his campaign against Sen. Ted Moss(D). "Based upon the [Deseret News] poll and the '70 experience, it is difficult not to conclude that a Utah candidate should: (1) argue the merits of his views; and (2) go lightly indeed upon the demerits of those of his opponent," argued this Utah Republican.
DULEY NOTED: REPUBLICANS

"New, Sad Omens For Republicans," by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak. Boston Globe, January 1, 1975. Texas business conservatives do not need the Republican Party; they have Robert Strauss as chairman of the Democratic National Committee, argue Evans and Novak. Commenting on a recent meeting with Strauss, they write:"These fellow Texans were lavishly praising Strauss for what they view as preventing at least temporarily radical control of the Democratic Party. Whether Strauss really has accomplished that is less important than the belief here that he has. In a city that was once the mecca of muscular conservative Republicanism in the New South, it is now marginally more respectable to be a Democrat than a Republican." The growth and momentum of Texas Republicans during the late 1960's has been dramatically halted, and the party lacks a leader capable of rekindling the party's energies.

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"Can GOP Broaden Its Base?" by Lou Cannon. Washington Post, January 2, 1974. The job and proposals of the Republican National Committee's Rule 29 Committee may be hopelessly tardy, argues Cannon. "Republicans have been talking for a long time about broadening the base of their party. However, their effort to translate this talk into action comes at a time when the party's vital life signs are so weak that the GOP may be incapable of resuscitation." The party is worse off in 1975 than it was after its defeat in 1964... Cannon points out that "the 43 [House] losses this year came out of the bone and muscle, not the fat, of the party." Citing statistics about Republican voter identification among women, blacks, and youths, Cannon writes: "With statistics such as these, it is no wonder that Republicans are eager to attract the support of groups once conceded to the Democrats. But the party is caught in a dilemma of decline. People usually join political parties in the hope of accomplishing something, but the Republican Party is in such a state of decay that it is unlikely to attract groups or individuals that want to get their hands on the levers of power. There are so few Republicans left in the country that it remains to be seen whether anyone will walk in through the party's more widely-opened doors."

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"The Republican Party: An Endangered Species," by Dana Prom Smith. Los Angeles Times, December 12, 1974. Writing on the current state of the GOP, this long-time Republican minister, "Republicans have intramarried for long in quest of political purity that the breed has been reduced both in numbers and vigor... In spite of what the columnists say about Watergate, the malaise of the Republicans has less to do with the foul deeds of the White House than this bent for purity... The only way out, as I see it, is to corrupt the Old Party with a little, old-fashioned diversity. We need to get in touch with our environment—the people and ideas around us. Enough of purity. It's too much like sterility."

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"A Congressman-elect On GOP Party Reform," by Larry Pressler. Washington Post, December 17, 1974. Writing a letter to the editor, South Dakota's new Republican congressman takes issue with the party's proposed public relations program. "From what I have heard of the RNC plan, I fear it will hurt rather than improve the party's image for these reasons: 1. It is a slick, advertising-agency approach which the American voter will see through. 2. The RNC plan is not an issues-orientated approach. Why can't we use this $2 million to have a National GOP Issues Conference, similar to the Democrats' mini-convention? The Democrats are getting millions of dollars worth of free coverage, while we are standing idly by. 3. Finally, the RNC plan does not emphasize assisting GOP candidates... If this $2 million were made available to winners of GOP primaries, Republican candidates at local, state, and congressional levels could communicate on the issues much more effectively. Better people would run for GOP nominations if they were automatically assured of at least some financial help from their party."

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"Restoring the Health of the Republican Party," by Elliot Richardson. Speech before the Washington Press Club in December, 1974. "The single most important variable affecting the health of the Republican Party in 1976—the most important by far—is not likely to be talk of 'left' or 'right' or 'middle' or even 'old this' or 'new that.' The most important variable affecting the health of the Republican Party is, to put the matter directly, the performance of the incumbent Republican President." The former attorney general identifies five key problem faced by President Ford: an interdependent world economy, rapidly changing foreign policy determinants, equality of world resources, continuity of humanistic traditions, and growing complexity of world problems. Richardson concludes that "the problem of confidence in the capacity of government remains to be addressed. People will respond favorably if complex realities are met with clear, conscious, coherent, and comprehensive strategies. But if not, the people will surely send another message [as they did in 1974]. For Republicans, the message of the moment is simply this: If the health of the party is to be restored, the health of the nation must be restored."
Speaking at the Washington Journalism Center, Republican National Chairman Mary Louise Smith said recently: "Back in the late 1960's and the early 1970's when the women's movement came to its zenith, it was seen as being, perceived to be, a somewhat liberal movement—radical to a certain extent. And I think Republican women pulled off from it. I think they were not comfortable with the women and the ideas that were being espoused—that were in the forefront of the women's movement. Now, I think we've never caught up."

"Tinkering With Party Machinery," by Ed Salzman. California Journal, January, 1975. "Party officials are relatively unimportant in California, which has a tradition of weak political parties, and the state central committees have virtually no effect on the daily lives of Californians. Elected public officials pay little attention to the party structure—except when they are seeking money from the party coffers or when they are seeking leadership posts themselves. The party chairman is a spokesman without power. Party conventions and party platforms are exercises in rhetoric." Salzman cites the feud between Lt.Gov.Mervyn Dymally(D) and the congressional Burton brothers(U.S.Reps. John and Phil Burton) as an example of the way personal political ambitions have been allowed to interfere with the operation of state party committees. He also cites the contest that almost developed in January between former Lt. Gov. John Harmer(R) and new State Bruce Nestande(R) for the post of state vice chairman. Harmer withdrew from the race but Salzman questions how a legislator can devote sufficient time to the party vice chairmanship, which traditionally in California is a prelude to the party chairmanship. Says Salzman: "Over the years, the worst chairman of both parties have been those who have held simultaneous public office or who were allied with only one element of the party or were seeking political gain for themselves...If the political party structure in California is worth building (and it may not be), this can be done only over a period of years by chairmen who see themselves more as behind-the-scenes organizers and peace-makers than out-front self-promoters and speech-makers."

"GOP Purge In Move To The Right," by Cliff Jackson. Arkansas Advocate, January, 1975. "Similar to the national party, the Arkansas GOP excels in perfecting the art of losing—and barges blindly forward in pursuit of its death wish. In the process, party ideologues and zealots, diseased with tunnel-vision, have gutted the carefully constructed Rockefeller Republican coalition, the only hope for the creation of an effective opposition party in Arkansas." Jackson, former counsel and research director for the State GOP as well as chairman of the party platform committee in 1974, is scathing in his denunciation of the trend taken by new State GOP Chairman Lynn Lowe. "In short," writes Jackson,"the Arkansas GOP has decided to ditch the Rockefeller Republican coalition and withdraw to their ivory, ideological towers where, like white knights of old, they can sally forth against the forces of evil both within and with the party ranks." Jackson charges that the GOP is deliberately turning its back on the areas of past Republican strength:(1) the Republican counties of Northwest Arkansas; (2) the urban centers such as Little Rock, Fort Smith, and Pine Bluff; (3) the black community; and (4) by inference, the young people." He cites, for example, the reduced representation of Pulaski County(Little Rock) on the state GOP executive and central committees as well as the dismissal of the executive committee's only black, the Rev. M.L.Hendricks, as assistant party secretary. "Regarding the ideological purity of the party, Jackson quotes Lowe as suggesting "we can't just let anybody walk in off the street and call himself a Republican."

Republican State Central Committee to succeed GOP National Committeeman L. Keith Bulen, who announced his resignation during last fall’s Senate campaign, in which he had been serving as campaign manager for Indianapolis Mayor Richard G. Lugar(R). Hart, a builder and developer, was recommended for the post by Gov. Otis R. Bowen(R). Hart indicated the Republican National Committee could use some "good old Hoosier philosophy" and he would try to supply it. His appointment was made, Hart suggested, because "I don't have a favorite candidate for any public office."

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"Patronage Reviving Politics in Clubhouse," by Martin Tolchin. New York Times, January 19, 1975. "Bulldozer operators for the Sanitation Department, who earn $20,300 a year, are hired out of political clubhouses. All appointees to non-Civil Service jobs—-even those at the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation Services—must be cleared through City Hall. Communities that had voted against [Mayor Abraham Beame] in the primary election have lost schools, housing services, and other projects planned in the budget. In such ways Mayor Beame has made tough-minded use of his patronage powers to strengthen Democratic clubhouses throughout the city and to weaken his political adversaries," writes Tolchin. Beame has used his patronage powers to punish former Queens County Democratic Chairman Matthew J. Troy, Liberal Party leader Alex Rose, and U.S.Rep. Herman Badillo(D). According to Bronx Congressman Badillo, the Beame Administration "is the most unabashedly political organization that I've seen in my political career."

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"An Eye On '78; Huddleston Stresses 'Keeping in Touch,'" by Ed Ryan. Louisville Courier-Journal, January 17, 1975. Sen. Wendell Ford(D-Ky.) has barely replaced Marlowe Cook. Gov. Julian Carroll (D-Ky.) has barely replaced Ford. Huddleston is already anticipating a 1978 primary challenge from his fellow Democrat. Huddleston takes comfort, however, from the lack of recent historical precedent for Kentucky Democrats rejecting an incumbent senator. He also notes that Carroll, if reelected, would presumably be busy in 1978 with an active legislature and thus too preoccupied to fight an additional political battle.

DULY NOTED: NATION

"Media Ignore Potential Conservative Presidential Prospects," by Howard Phillips. Human Events, December 21, 1974. According to former OEO Director Phillips, the conservative wing of the GOP is overflowing with possible presidential talent: James Buckley, Jesse Helms, Barry Goldwater, Bill Brock, James McClure, Philip Crane, Phyllis Schlafly, John Ashbrook, Robert Bauman, David Treen, Trent Lott, George Roche, William Rusher, and "a man I esteem highly, as both a friend and a public servant...Meldrim Thomson." Phillips decries the failure of the media to highlight such presidential prospects. Regarding New Hampshire Gov. Thomson, Phillips suggests: "He has certainly proven himself to be an outstanding conservative governor—the only East Coast Republican to win a governorship north of the Mason-Dixon line in 1974. Shouldn't the press give him at least as much presidential attention as they accord a Tom McCall or a Terry Sanford?...If Mel Thomson were to come out of the New Hampshire primary with a large chunk of the vote against Jerry Ford or Nelson Rockefeller as Gene McCarthy won against LBJ, would the media at last pay heed?"

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