If conservatives wanted to take over the Republican Party, 1976 should have been their year. And if they wished to start a new political movement, 1976 should have been their year. Since conservatives of the Reaganite variety explicitly failed to make their option work, much of the conservatives' wishful thinking is open to question.

Conservatives had a lot going for them this year. To begin with, an increasing number of Americans were beginning to think of themselves as conservatives on either social or economic issues. The bloom was off the government spending rose and every politician in sight was making "fiscal integrity" noises. Watergate and Wayne had so tarnished Washington's image that any liberal or bureaucratic connection with that city was suspect. The incumbent Republican President had never been elected in his own right and had gambled his own political future with the pardon of his disgraced predecessor. Moreover, the incumbent was a poor campaigner and worse speaker who contrasted to his disadvantage with the conservatives' chosen one—an articulate, attractive campaigner whose spellbinding style of speaking was his one claim to presidential potential.

Other circumstances also aided the conservatives. The absence of a progressive Republican presidential candidate shifted the tone of the campaign and the complexion of the delegates sharply to the right. By narrowing and focusing the party's base, the conservatives were able to magnify their own influence within the party. They were aided in this endeavor by the collapse of George Wallace's presidential campaign on the Democratic side. In those key states which permitted crossover voting, the conservatives were able to attract Wallace renegades to their cause. As Michigan's Kent County GOP Chairman Paul Henry observed, "The Reagan delegates came out of the woodwork. They were yahoos who came out of nowhere."

In many states—Texas, Alabama, Arizona, and California, for example—the conservatives took control of their delegations by repudiating their state's own conservative GOP leadership. The GOP's own rules aided the conservatives in their quest. Without California's winner-take-all primary, Ronald Reagan would have been finished in June. Without the disproportionate advantage given to small, southern and mountain states by the GOP's bonus delegate provisions, Reagan would have been further handicapped.

The conservatives also benefited from the standing logistical apparatus which they have developed to spearhead their political movement. Reagan's candidacy was a virtual crusade for organizations like the Young Americans for Freedom and the American Conservative Union which were able to pump money and volunteers into Reagan's campaign. A dozen conservative columnists, moreover, could be counted on to comment favorably on the former California governor and somewhat counteract any "media bias."

In contrast, President Ford had no such movement on which to draw. It was ironic that the most favorable "op ed" commentaries were written by liberal columnists scared out of their wits by Reagan. Ford reinforced Reagan's tactical organization advantages by competing with him for the same constituency—rather than seeking to create his own constituency which would support him at the polls. Ford thereby turned off moderate voters who might otherwise have been attracted to the GOP primaries.
But the Reagan candidacy was only part of the conservative threat to the GOP. The other half was the much-discussed third party with which conservatives have been blackmailing the GOP for two years. In essence, they have said: Either you let us have your party or we'll make our own. Despite this year's opportunities, the conservatives were unable to turn their threat into reality. In the end, the Wallace descendants in the American Independent Party told the pointy-headed Eastern Establishment conservatives like William Rusher, Richard Viguerie, and Howard Phillips that they weren't needed or appreciated.

In constructing their third party threat, the conservatives benefitted from many of the same advantages they had in their internal struggle in the GOP. A potential constituency existed. In Ronald Reagan and George Wallace, they had leaders with demonstrated voter appeal. A conservative infrastructure separate from the GOP already existed---Howard Phillips' Conservative Caucus, Richard Viguerie's fundraising operation, and William Rusher's Committee for the New Majority. Rusher et al couldn't find a presidential candidate to their liking and the candidate to the AIP's liking, Lester Maddox, was not their kind of respectable conservative.

So despite all their brave talk of forming a new conservative party by merging the GOP's fiscal conservatives with blue collar conservatives from the Democratic Party, Rusher and company failed. And in failing, both Rusher and Reagan may have seriously jeopardized their own goals.

For one thing, this year's struggles have split conservatives. It has split them between supporters of Ronald Reagan and Gerald Ford. It has split them between those who want to stay in the Republican Party and those who are unwilling to abandon it. And it has split those who have abandoned it between those with pragmatic political goals and those who are content to nominate a segregationist symbol. A united conservative movement might have a future. The current divided one does not.

Rusher, Viguerie, and Phillips would not shed any tears over the death of the GOP. They'd be delighted by a landslide defeat of President Ford---if it would clear the way for a conservative party. But not all conservatives have made the emotional break with the GOP that Viguerie has: "I know marketing and I think it would be easier to market Typhoid Mary or an Edsel than the Republican Party in my lifetime." Viguerie's comments contrast with those, for example, of conservative stalwart Sen. James McClure (R-Idaho): "The potential for suicide within the Republican Party is very great, but I don't agree it's dead yet. In a great many states like mine, it's healthier than ever. Trying to launch a third party effort founders for lack of party organization at the grass roots. Nor do I see any colorful, articulate leadership around which to build a third party." McClure's points are well taken. Conservative officials---as opposed to operatives like Viguerie and Phillips---have been conspicuously unwilling to join the third party movement. The nomination of William Dyke, former GOP candidate for governor of Wisconsin, as the AIP's vice presidential nominee is the closest the conservatives have come to sparking a major defection. The list of big name Republicans unsuccessfully wooed by the Rusher group is a long one---Reagan, John Connally, New Hampshire Gov. Meldrim Thomson, North Carolina Sen. Jesse Helms, and Illinois U.S. Rep. Philip Crane.

Helms, who on occasion has been as critical of the GOP as Rusher, rejected the offer saying, "I respect what they are doing, but I just see nothing to be gained by it." Similar views were voiced by conservative columnist James J. Kilpatrick, who called the Rusher-Viguerie moves "bubbleheaded stuff" and "hogwash." "Rational conservatives---conservatives whose heads are screwed on straight---could not hope to elect a ticket more conservative than Mr. Ford and Mr. Dole. They could not sell a more conservative platform than platform adopted here last week," wrote Kilpatrick. The Republican Party has been around for 120 years. It is in trouble now; obviously, it is in trouble now. But the GOP holds a fourth of the governorships and a third of the seats in the state legislatures. It remains a workable piece of machinery in state and local elections; it offers a salable ticket for November; it provides the only comfortable political home that conservatives have. No leaderless band of rampant bull moosers is likely to pull it down."

The goals of Kilpatrick and Viguerie are obviously quite different. To Viguerie, "The bottom line this year is the defeat of Gerald Ford. The only thing shoring up the Republican Party is control of the White House. Without the White House, the (Republican) party would collapse like a house of cards." This inability to agree on tactics will continue to handicap conservatives. Because the AIP will probably fall far short of the five percent national showing needed for federal campaign financing aid, the conservative movement will still be handicapped in any non-GOP efforts in 1980.
Conservatives will also bear scars from this year's losing battle for Reagan. One significant casualty may well be outgoing Mississippi GOP Chairman Clarke Reed. For about a decade, Reed has been a spokesman, rallying point, threat-maker, and all-round guru for southern conservatives. He has been a vocal critic of any "liberal" moves by the Nixon and Ford Administrations. He has been the most visible conservative organizer at meetings of the Republican National Committee. And as spokesman for southern GOP chairman, he has loudly warned against the GOP wandering into the liberal wilderness.

The importance of the Mississippi delegation's unit rule raised Reed to new levels of importance this year. He was assiduously courted by both Reagan and Ford and pushed into the Ford camp by the selection of Sen. Richard Schweiker as Reagan's running mate. After Ford's nomination, a distraught Reed told Reagan he'd made "the worst mistake of my life." Recalling a similar move in 1968 when Reed backed Nixon over Reagan, Reagan aide suggested that Reed was consistent; he made the same mistake every eight years.

There was a time when Reed's voice carried a great deal of weight at the national level because of his solid base in Mississippi. The Ford-Reagan battle may leave deep scars in the Mississippi GOP, however. In particular, money man Billy Mounger and 1974 gubernatorial candidate Gil Carmichael have been further estranged by the nominating conflict. As one state GOP leader observed, the nomination struggle may have given the Mississippi GOP "too much" publicity for its own good.

Reed's influence at the national level may never recover. Human Events editorialized that Reagan might have won "if it hadn't been for the antics of Mississippi State Republican Chairman Clarke Reed. Reed cooked Reagan's goose from the beginning, first, by carelessly loading up the delegation---especially the alternates---with Ford people, even though Mississippi Republicans overwhelmingly favor Reagan; secondly, when he suddenly leapt to the President's side when he saw Reagan weakening. Indeed, it may not be too much to say that, following some serious strategic errors in Reagan campaign planning, Reed's betrayal of the Reagan camp and his good friend David Keene, a key Reagan operative, delivered the final blow to the Californian's chances."

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The masochistic tendencies of some conservatives were demonstrated in the past year by the wrath engendered by Sen. Barry Goldwater when he had kind words for Nelson Rockefeller and endorsed President Ford. It was also demonstrated by their exclusion of former conservative heroes like Sen. John Tower and Sen. Paul Fannin from the Texas and Arizona delegations, respectfully. Tower said at the convention that conservatives failed to be as pragmatic as GOP liberals. The Texas senator noted that while elected conservative leaders tended to back Ford, the "shibboleth shouters" at the grassroots rallied behind Reagan. Similar condescension was voiced recently by Goldwater regarding the Reaganites who have taken over his state party: "Young people run the Arizona party now, and Rosie (Harry Rosenzweig, longtime GOP chairman) and I are on the outside except when they come screaming like bulls, asking mama and poppa to get them out of trouble."

It may be difficult for the conservative movement to paper over such differences—the Alabama GOP delegation went so far as to censor their own state chairman for working for Ford—much less start a new political party or win the presidency. Of course, if the GOP were totally wiped out this November, conservatives would have enough latitude to attempt the improbable. But Ford's dramatic improvement in the most recent Gallup Poll sharply reduces the probability of a Goldwater- or McGovern-type disaster.

So, despite the conservative rhetoric and rampant Reagan demonstrations in Kansas City, the fate of conservatives may be less rosy and less certain than it appears.

First, the conservatives must find a leader. One logical choice is John Connally, but he may have hurt his stock with Reaganites by supporting Ford. His following will doubtless be strengthened by campaigning for congressional candidates this fall, but it will be damaged if he fails to pull Texas into the GOP column for Ford. In terms of name
identification and speaking ability, Connally is the only logical successor to Reagan that conservatives have. But Connally's views and constituency are not really the same.

As the National Review recently pointed out, Reagan represents "strong defense, resistance to Communism abroad, limited government at home, and rejection of moral permissiveness." Connally, however, "is a national and a social conservative, but also a progressive in the Teddy Roosevelt sense, and he tends to see the government playing an activist role in the economy and various other areas." Connally's views run afoul of conservatives who oppose Big Government and favor libertarian principles. Presidential campaigns have a way of highlighting such inconsistencies.

Other than Connally, the most prominent conservative to emerge from Kansas City was North Carolina Sen. Jesse Helms. He gained points with the true believers by taking up the platform fight for ideological purity where Reagan left off. He has the gratitude of Reaganites for his leadership in turning the North Carolina primary into a Ford defeat. He was a key mover in the Committee on Conservative Alternatives and a prime draft target of Rusher's third party movement. The Washington Star's James Dickinson quoted one Reagan aide as saying: "He intends to emerge as the leader of the right wing. He doesn't care particularly if it's in the Republican Party or out of it, but right now, he is wedded to the party for the short run." Helms' future is clouded by a potentially difficult reelection campaign in 1978. Although he may have defused the possibility of a primary challenge from Gov. James Holshouser, the fortunes of the Tarheel GOP have recently been on the decline and a vigorous Democratic effort to unseat him is likely.

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Sen. James Buckley(C-N.Y.) has similar difficulties. His short-lived campaign for the GOP presidential nomination did not improve his standing in the New York GOP. Its impact on his reelection campaign may be negligible, but his survival in a campaign against Daniel Patrick Moynihan may be imperiled. Buckley's credentials as a party regular are hardly impeccable—having twice run for the Senate as the candidate of the Conservative Party. Given brother Bill's recent endorsement of liberal Democrat Allard K. Lowenstein (of anti-Vietnam fame) in a Long Island congressional race, it would not be beyond the Buckley family to attempt the political improbable.

Other conservatives with a much harder task in achieving national recognition. New Hampshire Gov. Meldrim Thomson(R) was regarded as enough of a potential embarrassment to Reagan that a Reagan staffer, nicknamed "Muzzle," was assigned to accompany the Granite State governor. South Carolina Gov. James B. Edwards doesn't seem interested. Two congressmen might be, however. U.S. Reps. Jack Kemp(R-N.Y.) and Phil Crane(R-Ill.) are both young, articulate, and ambitious.

Conservatives will probably never have another Ronnie Reagan, however. And their strength at the 1980 convention may be significantly reduced if the Ford-Dole ticket carries the Midwest and some Eastern states while losing the South. Conservatives may live to regret the day they fought the Ripon Society suit for more equitable delegate apportionment. The loss of the bonus delegates granted each state under Nixon's 1972 landslide is going to come as a shock to the Solid South.

The nomination of Ronald Reagan was the conservative's improbable dream for 1976. Looking backward in 1980, conservatives may wonder how they came so close.
1980 will be open season for the Republican Party regardless of the outcome of this year's election. It will be particularly crucial for Republican progressives, who will have an opportunity to do what they have not done in almost 30 years—make a concerted, unified run for their party's presidential nomination.

The failure of GOP progressives to make such a presidential effort is one of the root causes of their dwindling influence within the Republican Party. Their preference for pragmatism over ideology has turned out not to be pragmatic in the long run. The progressives' problems date back to 1952 when they opted decisively for electability and backed Dwight D. Eisenhower for President. Eisenhower in turn chose Richard Nixon, who had connived to break his state's backing of progressive California Gov. Earl Warren, as his Vice President. So, by backing Ike, moderates effectively deprived potential converts of any reason to vote in GOP presidential primaries for 12 years. Still, conservative Republicans were similarly deprived, but they learned their lesson. Progressives didn't.

Progressive "pragmatism" was demonstrated by New York Gov. Nelson Rockefeller in 1960 when he bowed out of the presidential race in the "Compromise of Fifth Avenue." The long-run beneficiaries of that compromise were Richard Nixon and the conservatives—not the progressive wing of the party. Nixon got a free run at his party's presidential nomination and conservatives were sufficiently angered and energized that they mobilized early and effectively for the party's 1964 presidential nomination.

1964 might have provided the opportunity that progressives needed. Handicapped by his recent divorce, Nelson Rockefeller sought the GOP nomination. He was unsuccessful but his presence was enough to keep other progressives out of the race until after the California primary. By then, it was too late for Pennsylvania Gov. William Scranton to have an impact. It is worth remembering that Scranton nevertheless held a 55-34 percent lead over Goldwater among Republican voters.

Indecisiveness also killed the progressives in 1968. George Romney's campaign fell apart early and Nelson Rockefeller made his entry too late. As in 1964, there was no concerted, well-planned effort. And without such planning, progressives could not hope to win their nomination. The longer they postponed such an attempt, the fewer progressives remained in the party. The Nixon years turned some progressives into independents or Democrats, but more importantly, potential new voters had no reason to consider voting in the GOP presidential primaries or caucuses. There was no progressive for whom to vote.

1972 was another holding operation for the GOP as the party's two wings anticipated the 1976 nominating battles. It began to look, however, as if one progressive had learned from the past. Illinois Sen. Charles Percy hired the campaign consulting firm of Bailey, Deardourff, & Eyre to prepare a detailed game plan for the 1976 campaign. That plan was shelved, however, in the euphoria following Gerald Ford's ascension to the presidency.

In the past, conservatives—particularly Ronald Reagan—have suffered from a debilitating indecision. They have been caught in the vise between ideology and pragmatism. In 1968, the pragmatists like South Carolina Sen. Strom Thurmond convinced them that their interests lay with Richard Nixon. In 1976, there were enough conservative pragmatists to nominate Gerald Ford.

The progressives were also pragmatic in 1976 and Gerald Ford owes his nomination to them—not to the conservatives he courted so assiduously and so unsuccessfully. It was the large moderate organizations in Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York—joined by strong showings in smaller states like Delaware and Connecticut—that gave Gerald Ford the base of his support. The problem, as Washington Post columnist David Broder recently suggested, is that progressives gave away their votes and influence. Broder's logic is persuasive:

Rockefeller does symbolize one cause of the liberal Republicans' decline—senescence. Like Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, Clifford Case of New Jersey and Edward Brooke of Massachusetts, he has grown weary of the fray and just doesn't care that much what happens to his party. Other liberal Republicans, who do care very much, make themselves ineffective by doing something no serious politician should ever do—giving their help for free.

Sen. Charles McC. Mathias of Maryland is one of those conscientious progressives. He complained on television the other day that President Ford was ig-
noring the very people whose help was es-

tential in making him the nominee---the liberal Republicans.

Mathias is right, but he doesn't carry his argument far enough. Last De-

cember he was weighing the possibility of becoming the third candidate for the

Republican presidential nomination. But Mathias ruled himself out, on the grounds that his candidacy could only hurt Mr. Ford's chances of beating Ronald Reagan.

By that decision, he guaranteed that the only effective pressure on the Presi-
dent, through the moment of his nomination, would be the pressure from the right. Had Mathias run, and won a share of the dele-
gates from Massachusetts, Maryland, Minn-
esota, Oregon and other liberal states, then the progressives would have had the same kind of bargaining power at the con-
vention that Clarke Reed of Mississippi enjoyed by withholding votes from the con-
servative side.

Ford would have been blown out of the race right at the start, in New Hampshire, had not such liberal local Republicans as Walter Peterson, Robert Reno and Victoria Zachos, aided by such outside campaigners as liberal Reps. Paul McCloskey and William Cohen, belatedly mobilized the mod-
erate Republicans of that state—who had no great enthusiasm for the President--
to rescue him from defeat at Reagan's hands.

Ford would have been a sure loser again had not ex-Gov. Richard Ogilvie and Sen. Charles H. Percy organized Illinois for him. If Gov. William Milliken had not stepped in to save Michigan when the Pres-
ident was reeling from his defeats in Tex-
as and Indiana, Ford would not be planning a campaign this week.

All of these rescue missions were led by liberal Republicans. But they got nothing in return, not even a voice in the vice presidential choice, because they never asked.

If Ford is elected, they may have a chance to recoup. The President will con-
tinue to fill his cabinet with liberal Re-
publicans; they represent the real talent in his party.

But if Ford loses, the conservatives very likely have the votes to complete their takeover of the party organization and progressives would face real exclusion — and a tough choice whether it makes more sense to remain in the GOP or take the independent route that (Connecticut Sen. Lowell) Weicker and Mathias have come close to choosing.

As I was about to say before Broder said it better, Gerald Ford owes a lot to

progressive Republicans—a lot more than he has thus far acknowledged. The ability of progressive Republicans to convince Ford that he must adjust his campaign to win pre-
cisely those states where he won his nomination will tell a lot about the future of progressives and the Republican Party. Ac-
cording to Maryland's Mathias, if Ford cam-
paigns "in the great progressive, humanitar-
ian traditions of the Republican Party, he

may still overcome the burden of Watergate and all the rest. But if he fails to do this, there may be very few pieces of the party to pick up."

The role of campaign consultants John Deardourff and Doug Bailey and pollster Robert Teeter in the Ford campaign should encourage Ford to move in this direction and encourage progressives to see that their own self interest lies down the same path. Their influence within the party will be commensur-
ate with the votes from progressives that they can swing behind the President in the northern tier this fall.

Richard Nixon's southern strategy is dead. It is no wonder that strategy author Kevin Phillips thinks that the GOP now has a limited future. The 1960's strategy of ap-
pealing to disgruntled southern conservative Democrats and deliberately alienating south-
ern blacks has reaped a disastrous harvest for southern Republicans in 1976. Conser-
ervative Republicans helped destroy the basis for their own potential effectiveness in the South by appealing to segregationist instincts. As the St. Petersburg Times' Eugene Patterson recently observed, Richard Nixon misinter-
preted Barry Goldwater's 1964 successes in the South as the basis for long-term political growth in that region. "Nixon's short-sight-
edness can be seen and is being paid for by his party in 1976. Overlooked in his politi-
cal engineering was the people's need for change and the inevitability of it in the South. Democratic leaders like Georgia's Carter and Florida's Rubin Askew, South Carolina's John West and Arkansas' Dale Bumpers, spoke to the need and gradually took power from the southern primitives Nixon had favored, like old Strom Thurmond. The southern people were changing under such modern Democratic leadership, and under pressure from a Democratic President, Lyndon Johnson. The completeness of the South's move into modern times was proclaimed by Carter's nomination, with black and white support, in the South and in the North."

Concluded Patterson: "Even through the Eisenhower years the blacks of Atlanta were still voting for Republicans for President out of faith in the party of Abraham Lincoln. Something happened to destroy that faith, and the convention here, preoccupied with the purity of a narrow conservative ideology, never got around to addressing what it was. The progressive wing of the party that once urged attention to such things was silenced in Kansas City."

Progressives still have a function; but for three decades they have waited for others to perceive the validity of that function. They have never organized effectively to press their case within or outside the party. Democratic strategist Alan Baron, writing on the GOP convention in The Nation, observed: "However, if the party's liberals and moderates are going to remain even a minority force within the party, there will need to be a great deal more such communication (across state lines). As long as the Percys and Hatfields see themselves as individuals—with little role to play in the party—they will grow even less relevant. In 1974, when moderate Houston Flournoy ran for governor of California, his fellow moderates never mobilized to help. Flournoy received nearly 49 percent of the vote; had he won, he would have been a major force for moderation in the party. Former Alaska Gov. Walter Hickel says that moderates have got to 'get together and learn to fight.' If they don't, they might as well leave the party. And if they do that, just how conservative an alternative government will there be when the Democrats decide to lose? And that, of course, is bound to happen again one of these days."

One hopeful sign is that progressive leadership may have finally and belatedly passed to a new generation with the retirement of Nelson Rockefeller. Writing in the Wall Street Journal, James Gannon noted: "It's only an impression, but a look at the faces of the GOP in this city prompts the thought that the party has a generation gap showing up. The liberal-moderate leaders seem old and worn-out. In his speech to the convention, Vice President Rockefeller joked about trying for 16 years to get the GOP presidential nomination, but it wasn't funny. A whole generation of Republican liberals waited in line behind Mr. Rockefeller, but he never got out of their way. Now the Scrantons and Percys and Hatfields are the what-might-have-been-gang."

The situation is not quite as bleak as Gannon paints it, but if progressives do not act quickly, it will be. New York Sen. Jacob Javits noted at the convention that the situation is especially acute in his own state: "Rockefeller, myself, (Attorney General Louis) Lefkowitz, (former Gov.) Malcolm Wilson—-we're all getting on. Following the election, it'll be necessary for us to get together. I think a change is coming."

Still, moderates do seem to have a relative overabundance of talent. The question is whether they can bestir themselves, get organized and channel their collective egos behind one candidate in 1980. It is in the interest of their own self-preservation and not incidentally in the interests of the American political system for them to do so. The possible GOP candidates continue to make a long list: Dan Evans, John Anderson, Elliot Richardson, Charles Percy, Mark Hatfield, Ed Brooke, Kit Bond, Bill Milliken, and Charles McC. Mathias, to name the most prominent. The lack of an obvious titular of the progressive wing has itself been a problem. It is doubtful that any other political group in either political party can boast so many attractive presidential possibilities. And undoubtedly, no other group has done so little to take advantage of those possibilities.

Progressives may well heed the advice of the Queen in Through the Looking Glass, when she observed that it is "a slow sort of country. Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that."
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...ago-after-the-opponent campaign instead of sitting back and cruising along on the strength of his incumbency. Hayakawa, the challenger coming from the minority party, is playing a much more cautious role. Part of it appears to spring from pollster suggestions that the challenger is starting out ahead of the incumbent." Hayakawa has accepted one and only one invitation to debate although speaking one of his strengths. The GOP candidate is handicapped by his age and the shallowness of his public support. According to the California Journal's Ed Salzman:"The big problem for Tunney is winning most of the 1.2 million Democratic votes cast for Tom Hayden in the primary. Are the Hayden supporters irate enough at Tunney to support the man who more than any other is the symbol of student repression in the '60's? Tunney has a weak constituency in California, partly because he has offended liberals by turning his back on national health insurance and by advocating deregulation of natural gas prices. Hayakawa obviously has a broad constituency but based almost exclusively on the one event that made him a folk hero—his jump onto a sound truck during a San Francisco State student demonstration and unplugging the wires." Hayakawa recently told a California Republican Platform convention that the GOP needed to broaden its base. So will Hayakawa to win in November.

NEW JERSEY

Poor Gov. Brendan Byrne. He can't seem to do anything right. A recent poll by Joseph Napolitan Associates that 42 percent of those surveyed would vote for any Republican candidate over Byrne in 1977 and only 14 percent were committed to vote for the Democratic incumbent. By comparison, the same survey showed Jimmy Carter with a 46-22 percent lead over President Ford. Byrne, who has been hurt by his inept leadership style and an unpopular income tax fight, seems prepared to seek another term. Fellow Democrats are lining up to challenge him already. One, Assemblyman Charles Yates, can't find much substantively wrong with Byrne's administration but will challenge him anyway. Businessman Yates says "all (the policy changes made by the Byrne Administration will) go down the drain in the election if we try to sell the same administration to the public." Among the other Democrats who may take a gubernatorial interest are Jersey City Mayor Paul Jordan; Joseph Hoffman, Byrne's own commissioner of labor and industry; State Sen. Frank Dodd, and U.S. Rep. Robert Roe. Byrne's political fortunes are not aided by the enmity of Democratic State Chairman James Dugan, who seems to delight in embarrassing the governor. Dugan succeeded in replacing three Byrne allies on the Democratic National Committee in June and the feuding has blocked Byrne—an early Carter backer—from taking a significant state role in the presidential campaign.

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