

November
1979

RIPON FORUM

Volume XV, Number 8
Price \$1.50

On the Cover—
John Connally
Goes for
Stroke on the
Middle East

Commentary

The Iranian Crisis

The Myth of Soviet
Superiority

Facing the
Palestinian
Question

The U.S. Stake
in a Solution

A View from
Amman


Book Review:

Is There a Link Between
Oil and Peace?

Political Potpourri

Boinovich Win One of Few
Bright Signs for GOP

Cush Scores Impressively
in Straw Polls



RIPON FORUM

COMMENTARY	
The Iranian Crisis	2
Piercing the Myth of Soviet Superiority	4
Theodore Jacqueney	5
PRESIDENTIAL SPOTLIGHT	
John Connally's Big Political Gamble: A New U.S. Policy for the Middle East	6
EDITORS NOTE	
The Palestinian Question and American Interests in the Middle East	7
A View From Amman	8
BOOK REVIEW	
Cheap Oil: How To Break OPEC	11
POLITICAL POTPOURRI	
BUREAUCRACY MARCHES ON	12
	13
	16

RIPON FORUM

Editor: Arthur M. Hill II

Executive Editor: Steven D. Livengood

Art Director: Elizabeth Lee (The Graphic Tuna)

THE RIPON FORUM (ISSN 0035-5526) is published monthly (except for the March/April and July/August combined issues) by the Ripon Society, Inc.

In the publication, the Society hopes to provide a forum for fresh ideas, well researched proposals, and a spirit of creative criticism and innovation in the Republican Party. Manuscripts and photographs are solicited, but do not represent the views of the Society unless so stated.

Contents are copyrighted © 1979 by the Ripon Society, Inc., 800 18th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

Second class postage and fees paid at Washington, D.C. and additional mailing offices.

Subscription rates: \$15 per year, \$7.50 for students, servicemen, Peace Corps, Vista and other volunteers. Overseas, add \$6. Please allow five weeks for address changes.

The Ripon Society, Inc., John C. Topping, Jr., President, is a Republican research and policy organization whose members are business, academic, and professional men and women. It is headquartered in Washington, D.C., with fifteen chapters, several affiliated subchapters, and National Associate members throughout the United States. The Society is supported by chapter dues, individual contributions, and revenues from its publications and contract work.

COMMENTARY

The Iranian Crisis

Few international events in the last three decades have seared the American psyche like the mass kidnapping of the American embassy staff by theocratic led mobs in Tehran. As we go to publication, this crisis remains at a fever pitch with the ultimate fate of the hostages still quite uncertain.

Yet not since the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor has there been such a virtual unanimity of American resolve to stand up to an adversary. Public reticence for direct U.S. intervention seems linked almost exclusively to concern for the safe return of the hostages. Should any harm befall the hostages, the dovish position in American politics might be to seize Ayatollah Khomeini and his Revolutionary Council for U.S. convened international war crimes tribunals pursuant to the Nuremberg and Eichmann precedents. More interventionist alternatives might range from U.S. seizure of Iranian oil fields as reparations to the permanent desolation of all oil producing facilities in Iran. Only the voluntary release of the hostages can avert such a tragic denouncement.

Even if the Iranian crisis is happily resolved with a minimum of bloodshed, its political aftermath will almost certainly include a welter of recriminations, half truths and facile formulations. The Carter Administration will perhaps deservedly bear the brunt of much of the criticism. It can be faulted for failing to beef up the security of the U.S. embassy. This same administration which at times has seemed to view the United States as a "nonaligned nation" has by its general stance of vacillation hardly given pause to the delusions of such fanatics as Khomeini.

Dismal and craven as Carter's foreign policy leadership has been, the posturing of many of his political adversaries is hardly more attractive. Ted Kennedy offers the hint of lead-

ership while advocating demagogic energy policies that would make us even more pushovers for the OPEC cartel. Aside from a slightly greater leaning toward decontrol, the various Republican frontrunners offer little different from Carter. Of all the Presidential candidates in either party only one, Representative John B. Anderson of Illinois, has had the guts to face up to the OPEC challenge. Anderson has advocated a fifty cent per gallon gasoline tax to cut U.S. energy consumption and susceptibility to international energy blackmail. He has coupled this with a credible proposal to create a consumer cartel. For his efforts Anderson has been readily dismissed by the pundits for not being a serious candidate. The test of a candidate's seriousness is apparently his willingness to offer only least common denominator solutions and to sandwich them between tons of rhetoric about Presidential leadership.

In the unfolding national debate over how we came to this pass in Iran some fairly simplistic formulations can be expected, particularly from Presidential contenders. It will be argued that Iran has fallen into the hands of this mad monk Khomeini precisely because the United States didn't embrace the Shah long enough. In this view "the fall of Iran" can be attributed to Carter's human rights policies igniting latent anti-Shah feeling among the Iranian masses. The absurdity of this view can be seen by watching the angry faces of the demonstrators in Tehran on the nightly newscasts. The depth of the Shah's unpopularity among his own people is staggering. It is fantasy to presume that the Shah could have clung to power long once the anti-Shah movement had become so broad based.

class to assume an active political role.

The merchants, professionals and managers were the Iranians who, aside from the Pahlavi family, reaped most of the economic benefits of Iran's headlong march toward modernization. They could have assumed power in the evolution of the Shah's rule toward a constitutional monarchy but the repression by the Shah threw these modernist Western oriented Iranians into a political alliance with an anti-Western religious fanatic. We now see the whirlwind that we reaped as Iran totters between its present rigidly right wing U.S. hating religious leadership and a well organized rigidly left wing U.S. hating opposition. The pro-Western middle class is disorganized and politically impotent as it sees its country subject to the rule of the mobs and mullahs.

The third principal failing of U.S. foreign policy toward Iran far transcends the strategic importance of Iran. Five and a half years ago when our good friend the Shah decided to press for an overnight tripling of OPEC oil prices the Saudis were aghast and prepared to exert their economic muscle to collapse this move which they viewed as disastrous to the world economy. Yet the U.S. grand design called for a Shah led Iran armed to the teeth as the counterweight to Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. The Shah could play this role only through a hefty increase in OPEC price levels. The Watergate enfeebled Administration failed to pick up on the Saudi lead and acquiesced in the OPEC price hikes. Once OPEC found out how easy it was to bluff the oil ravenous industrial nations of the West, spiraling real energy prices became a fact of life.

**"We now see the whirlwind that we reaped as Iran totters between its present
rigidly right wing U.S. hating religious leadership and
a well organized rigidly left wing U.S. hating opposition.
The pro-Western middle class is disorganized and politically impotent as it sees its
country subject to the rule of the mobs and mullahs."**

There are, however, at least three very specific failings of a U.S. foreign policy that has been pursued with bipartisan support toward Iran. The first was the willingness to subordinate our intelligence gathering about the Iranian domestic situation to our unfolding regional alliance with the Shah. Our intelligence services and military became so closely identified with the interests of the Shah that they lost the detachment necessary to perceive that his castle was built on sand. American intelligence was convinced that the Shah was still an impregnable anchor of our foreign policy long after independent Farsi-speaking foreign observers had concluded that the Shah's days in power were numbered.

The second failure in an alliance as close as that that once existed between the U.S. and Iran was our unwillingness to press the Shah to permit the rapidly growing Iranian middle

Ironically, the Shah's success in breathing life into a once flaccid OPEC cartel was a major reason for his downfall. The huge increase in oil revenues to Iran ensuing from the OPEC price hikes financed the Shah's construction of a vast war machine. The same windfall revenues encouraged the Shah to embark on massive development projects. These lavish expenditures triggered a corrosive inflation, inevitably involved rampant corruption, and fanned the resentment of the poor who were bystanders to this economic boom. The rapid pace of modernization proved jarring to traditional values, but the clergy led opposition to the Shah drew mass support as the urban poor became convinced that they had no role in the Shah's vision of a new Iranian Empire.

It is doubtful that much can be salvaged from the travesty in Iran other than perhaps the lives of the hostages and other Americans together with a modicum of national dignity.

If there is a lesson to be learned from the tragedy it is that we can not build our foreign policies exclusively around the personalities and eccentricities of "great leaders". As the fall of both the Shah and Nicaragua's General Anastasio Somoza has shown, even such seemingly unassailable rulers may be swept away by domestic unrest. The development of democratic institutions is in the long run far more likely to ensure a pro-Western orientation of particular developing countries than is a close identification with authoritarian anti-communist regimes. Our ultimate ideological strength in this ongoing struggle for the hearts and minds of men and women of this world is our commitment to free institutions. In Iran we have reaped the bitter fruits of failing to adhere to the values of our Founding Fathers.

Piercing the Myth of Soviet Superiority

The debate on such critical public issues as the SALT II treaty and the drive to reinstitute the draft is shaped less by the merits of the issues themselves than by a growing public perception that the Soviet Union is about to push the United States around at will. This notion of emerging Soviet superiority is fed by hyperbolic and sometimes demagogic pronouncements by Senator Henry Jackson, Paul Nitze, and some of the more strident Republican Presidential contenders. The conception of increasing Soviet power and concomitant American weakness is not woven from whole cloth; it is based on some undeniable realities including:

- A massive buildup in the past decade of Soviet strategic nuclear forces to a position of essential parity with the United States;
- A massive advantage by the Warsaw Pact nations over NATO forces in Europe in force levels and in numbers of tanks;
- The traumatic American defeat in Indochina and advent to power of pro-Soviet governments in such disparate nations as Angola, Mozambique, South Yemen and Afghanistan.
- The Soviet contempt for U.S. national will that must have led to the decision to sneak several thousand combat troops into Cuba.

- The inexplicable ineptness of Carter Administration foreign policy formulation and execution with respect to such countries as Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Somalia, Mexico and Iran;
- The United States' glaring vulnerability to extortionate price hikes and foreign policy blackmail threats by OPEC members;
- A corrosive and demoralizing domestic inflation which pinches most American families, inflames social tensions and distorts individual values.

Yet despite these very real problems, the United States in is a far better overall position than that it enjoyed a decade ago. Little more than ten years ago, wracked by urban riots, our nation was, many serious observers suggested, on the verge of a racial civil war. Many serious social problems remain, particularly the distressingly high rate of minority youth unemployment, but such apocalyptic rhetoric no longer seems plausible. A decade ago we were engaged in a morally dubious and economically ravaging foreign war that polarized our social fabric on generational and cultural lines. This summer's gas lines certainly frayed the nerves, but there is a shared aspect to this "misery," itself hardly comparable to the life and death issues of the Vietnam debate. Even in the face of its enervating and seemingly intractable domestic inflation, America has forged a remarkable degree of cultural unity amidst diversity. The American public has become increasingly more tolerant of unorthodox life styles and other racial groups. Despite the often self-serving dissonant rhetoric of some liberal hemophiliacs, the United States is on the verge of becoming the world's first successful multicultural, multi-racial, largely middle class democracy.

The Soviet outlook is hardly so promising. The social strains in Soviet society are severe and growing. The Soviet leadership is among the most hidebound and unimaginative of any major industrialized nation. In view of Brezhnev's advancing age and declining health, the USSR may soon be facing another leadership succession crisis. Yet the crisis in the Soviet system is grounded in far more than its seemingly inherent leadership deficiencies. The Soviet Union faces serious external obstacles to the implementation of its worldwide ambitions and a series of wrenching social crises in Soviet society. The Soviet woes include:

- **The increasing unreliability of the Warsaw Pact forces in the event of a European theater war.** Despite the considerable advantage the Warsaw Pact forces enjoy on paper over the NATO allies, the USSR can hardly be confident which side the Eastern Europeans would fight on in the crunch. The visit of Pope John Paul II underscored the weak hold the Soviets and their local Communist allies have on the affections of the Polish people. This disaffection extends to other Eastern Europeans, particularly the Czechs and the Hungarians. Significant portions of the standing armies of the Eastern European Communist states might turn on the Soviets in a war time situation. Furthermore, in view of the huge anti-Soviet Fifth Column among the civilian population of the Eastern European countries, numerous Soviet and pro-Communist Eastern European divisions would be tied

down suppressing local insurrections.

• **The development of the People's Republic of China as the world's most virulently anti-Soviet major power.** The Soviets have perhaps passed the point where a pre-emptive strike on Chinese nuclear facilities is a realistic option. The coming to power of a more pragmatic leadership in China and the PRC's emerging technology transfer agreements with the U.S. make the Chinese a far more credible adversary. Soviet ambitions in Asia are likely to be stalemated by an emerging de facto superpower coalition of the U.S., China and Japan. A common interest in economic development, trade and the containment of Soviet expansion seem likely to hold together this informal Triple Alliance.

• **The transitory nature of recent Soviet foreign policy gains.** The collapse of the pro-Soviet government of Afghanistan seems imminent with staunchly anti-Communist Islamic guerrillas in control of most of the rural areas. The collapse of the pro-Soviet government in Angola would be almost immediate if the Cuban troops were withdrawn. The guerrilla chieftain, pro-Western Jonas Savimbi, has parlayed his strong tribal base in Southern Angola with resentment of the Cuban intervention to build a growing resistance movement. It seems only a matter of time before Angola will be Cuba's Vietnam with perhaps a similar fate for its local allies.

• **The growth of a revival of religious fervor among the predominantly Islamic countries bordering the Soviet Union.** The new burst of Islamic revivalism, felt in greater or lesser degree in Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan is troubling in several ways to the Soviets. First, it should hinder seriously Soviet efforts to develop influence within or hegemony over those bordering countries. Second, this ferment could conceivably jump across the Soviet border to Soviet South Central Asia most of whose population is Islamic. Almost a fourth of the Soviet population is Moslem by practice or cultural tradition. Moreover, this population is increasing at a far more rapid rate than the Great Russians who now dominate most of the USSR.

• **The dramatic decline in the Soviet birth rate, particularly among the Great Russian population.** A variety of factors including greater access to contraception, a critical housing shortage in most Soviet cities, and a general societal demoralization seem to have combined to push the Great Russian birth rate well below a zero population growth level. Although this is such a highly sensitive subject in the Soviet Union that data is not readily available, most projections indicate that Great Russians are already outnumbered by Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Georgians, and other non-Russian peoples in the USSR and that this gap is rapidly widening. This trend may portend severe problems for the dominant Great Russian political elite which has shown remarkable clumsiness in dealing with problems of nationality and race. The precipitous decline in the overall Soviet birth rate, furthermore, should eventually produce serious labor shortages and perhaps scuttle some ambitious plans to settle natural resource rich Siberia.

• **Structural weaknesses in the Soviet economy that inhibit exploitation of the USSR's huge base in natural and human resources.** The Soviet Union has one of the world's most rigidly conservative bureaucracies. The centralized nature of economic decision making, the spotty quality of low-

er level managers and the relative absence of market disciplines result in considerable waste and economic inertia. Distribution techniques remain particularly archaic. Perhaps the most vivid testament to deficiencies of the Soviet economic structure is the pitiful state of Soviet agriculture. Despite a farm work force many times that of the U.S., the Soviets are often a significant grain importer while America is clearly "the breadbasket of the world."

The problems the Soviet Union confronts are profound and seem likely to endure for several decades. While the Soviet Union is hardly likely to come apart at the seams, Brezhnev's successors may have to devote more of their attention to domestic concerns. The Russian Bear will be no pushover even for a determined America, but the situation is far more promising than the flood of defeatist rhetoric would suggest. America need not respond to the Soviet challenge by electing a macho politician as President. We would be far better off choosing someone with a realistic knowledge of America's enormous strengths and an ability to communicate its vision of human freedom to the people of the world. Despite the Keystone Kops nature of much of the Carter Administration's foreign and domestic policy, our country is still far stronger than the Soviet Union. We can hope that the hyperbole in which Presidential candidates tend to indulge will not stoke the fires of pessimism that already plague this country. The future is ours if we have the courage to seize it.

Theodore Jacqueney

The recent tragic death of Ripon National Governing Board member Ted Jacqueney came just as his efforts to advance political freedom around the world were beginning to bear fruit. A moving force behind Democracy International, Ted Jacqueney fought against political repression whether it came from regimes of the left or the right.

This past year has witnessed the downfall of some incredibly inhumane regimes in Africa—the Ugandan bestiary of Idi Amin, the Equatorial Guinean government of President Macias and Emperor Bokassa's Central African Empire—as well as the tumultuous development of Zimbabwe Rhodesia into a multiracial democracy.

Elsewhere the movement toward free institutions has been less clear cut. The genocidal regime of Pol Pot has lost its grip over most of Cambodia but the Khmer Rouge and their Vietnamese backed adversaries seem intent on fighting until the last Cambodian. The Shah of Iran has fallen, but the horrors of the SAVAK have given way to the vengeful justice of mullah run kangaroo courts. The savage rule of Nicaragua's General Somoza has ended, but the commitment of his Sandinista successors to political pluralism still remains a

question mark.

As Ted Jacqueney recognized, an effective human rights policy must not only highlight the plight of political prisoners or dissidents, it must also encourage the development of a free and fair electoral process. The true test of a democracy is the willingness of those in power to relinquish it when the voters so decree. Ted will be missed; in his 36 years he worked tirelessly to advance that most radical of ideas—the notion that government of the people, by the people, and for the people shall flourish on the earth. ■

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION: 1. Title of Publication: Ripon Forum. 2. Date of Filing: October 1, 1978. 3. Frequency of issue: Monthly. A. No. of issues published annually: 12. B. Annual Subscription Price: \$15.00. 4. Location of Known Office of Publication: 800 18th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. 5. Location of the Headquarters or General Business Offices of the Publishers: 800 18th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. 6. Name and Address of Publisher: The Ripon Society Incorporated, 800 18th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Name and Address of Editor: Arthur M. Hill II, 800 18th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. 7. Owner: The Ripon Society, Inc., 800 18th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. 8. Known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding one percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages or other securities: none.

10. Extent and Nature of Circulation	Average No. of Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months	Actual No. of Copies of Single Issue Published Nearest Filing
A. Total No. of Copies Printed	4375	3500
B. Paid Circulation		
1. Sales Through Dealers and Carriers, Street Vendors, and Counter Sales	5	5
2. Mail Subscriptions	1657	1609
C. Total Paid Circulation	1661	1614
D. Free Distribution by Mail, Carrier or Other Means: Samples, Complimentary, and Other Free Copies	1639	1836
E. Total Distribution	3300	3450
F. Copies Not Distributed		
1. Office Use, Left Over, Unaccounted, Spoiled After Printing.	200	50
2. Returns From News Agents	0	0
G. Total	3500	3500

11. I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete. Steven D. Livengood

PRESIDENTIAL SPOTLIGHT

John Connally's Big Political Gamble: A New U.S. Policy for the Middle East

by John C. Topping, Jr.

It has become an axiom of Presidential politics never to propose sweeping initiatives on controversial subjects lest you give your opponents man-sized targets to pound. McGovern's thousand dollar per person demogrant proposal of 1972 and Reagan's ninety billion dollar Federal spending cut initiative of 1976 are cited as proof of this axiom. John Connally, however, is hardly one to be cowed by such political taboos. His whole life has been one of exerting his own forceful personality to reshape the world around him more to his liking.

Thus it should have been no surprise when John Connally violated two of the cardinal taboos of American Presidential politics—don't propose sweeping initiatives and don't attack the Israeli government, at least until you are in the White House. In his October 11 speech to the National Press Club Connally was outspokenly critical of the Begin government's settlement policy. His statements favoring a return of the Occupied Territories were no departure from established policies of the last four administrations, but the novelty of Connally's position was the ardor with which he as a challenger attacked the Israeli position. Generally challengers have taken campaign positions more sympathetic to the Israeli government than that of incumbent Presidents. This pro-Israeli tilt does not always survive when a candidate becomes President as many pro-Israeli 1976 Carter voters discovered.

By explicitly linking U.S. Middle East policy to the assurance of a stable supply of Arab oil Connally undoubtedly heightened concerns of many Jewish and other pro-Israeli voters that Israel's interests might be bartered off for Arab concessions to the U.S. on oil pricing and supply. Moreover, Connally's championship of Palestinian rights was hardly unique but its timing shortly after the black-Jewish rift resulting from Andrew Young's resignation stirred further concern among many Jewish voters. Connally's close ties to multinational oil companies and his friendliness with some Saudi investors had already made him suspect to many Jewish voters.

The immediate political fallout from Connally's statement is mixed at best. Strongly pro-Israeli columnists such as George Will have seized on Connally's statement as proof of his unfitness to be President. Some cartoonists had a field day por-

traying Connally as a "shoot-em-up" Texan intruding on the Middle East peace process. Two leading Jewish supporters of Connally, New York lawyer Rita Hauser and Washington attorney Arthur Mason, resigned from the Connally Presidential committee to protest this new Middle East position.

Connally, however, seems prepared to risk such fallout from his stance. Far and away the most successful fundraiser of all the Presidential candidates with a heavily Protestant corporate financial base, Connally is effectively immune from damage from the loss of Jewish contributors. Furthermore, in few of the early primary states do Jewish voters form more than a small percentage of the Republican electorate. Connally already views Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy as the likely Democratic nominee. Against Kennedy, Connally, irrespective of his position on the Middle East, could expect to be a distinct underdog to carry New York and California, the two states where Connally's Middle East position could prove most costly.

In addition to advancing views in which he undoubtedly believes, Connally may be gambling on two additional factors, first that voters will admire his boldness in spelling out a detailed Middle East position and second that many voters resent what they perceive as a pro-Israeli tilt of most candidates for the Presidency.

Infuriated at what he perceived as an Israeli government attempt to orchestrate criticism of his statement, Connally has, according to columnists Evans and Novak, passed the message to the Israeli government to back off lest Connally take to the stump on behalf of a new U.S. policy in the Middle East. Connally has already benefited from the disarray in Israel resulting from Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan's recent resignation in protest of the Begin Administration's hard-line policy on the West Bank. In view of obvious Israeli dissent over the settlements and Palestinian autonomy issue Connally appears now more a critic of Menachem Begin than of Israel.

Perhaps the portion of Connally's speech that received the least play in the press reports and the resulting public furor

was the most significant—his proposal for a new treaty alliance to embrace Israel, the moderate Arab states, NATO and Japan. Coupled with this is a proposal for an explicit U.S. military presence in the Middle East. Connally would create a Fifth Fleet to be stationed in the Indian Ocean. His most controversial proposal, reminiscent of one advanced in the July-August 1978 *Ripon Forum* by Dr. Seymour C. Yuter, is the recommendation to station U.S. Air Force units in the Middle East perhaps by leasing from Egypt the former Israeli airfields in the Sinai.

Connally's proposal which would attempt to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute, assure stable oil supplies, and counter Soviet influence in the Middle East is Olympian in scope. Perhaps its greatest weakness from a substantive viewpoint is its great specificity. Admirable as such specificity may seem in a campaign already awash in vacuous rhetoric about decisiveness and leadership in foreign policy, it may to some degree hamstring Connally if he is elected President.

Foreign policy negotiations, particularly those in the Middle East, involve considerable give and take among states in the region as well as maneuvering among the superpowers. If the United States is to function effectively as a catalyst toward a comprehensive peace settlement it may be ill advised to place all of its cards on the table. International diplomacy is to a degree a game of mirrors and face saving. Setting policy preferences in concrete may inhibit the ability of a President to facilitate negotiations between parties in the region.

In the next few months perhaps the most significant aspect of Connally's Middle East position will not be what is now perceived to be a pro-Arab tilt but rather its strongly interventionist orientation. Connally is betting that the American electorate is sick of being pushed around by mini-powers and seeing its government at times function as if the United States were a nonaligned nation. To some degree the pendulum has swung back from the quasi-isolationism of the immediate post-Viet Nam era. The outrages in Iran have undoubtedly reinforced the shift. Only time will tell whether public opinion has swung far enough to propel John Connally into the White House. ■

EDITORS NOTE:

For the past two years the Ripon Forum and the Ripon Society have sought to explore a number of routes toward Middle East peace. A Ripon policy paper written by Mark Frazier and published in the January 1978 Forum advanced the concept of a Free Trade Zone for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Society followed this up with a panel discussion at its May 20, 1978 National Issues Conference involving representatives of the Israeli and Egyptian Governments, former Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott, Senator James Abourezk, Mr. Frazier and Peter Wallison, formerly Counsel to Vice President Rockefeller.

The July/August 1978 Forum presented two policy proposals by international lawyer Dr. Seymour C. Yuter — a very

detailed Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) proposal and a proposal for a Middle East Oil Defense Treaty Organization (MEODTO). Republican Presidential aspirant John Connally has recently advanced a Middle East peace proposal embodying major elements of Dr. Yuter's MEODTO proposal.

The current Forum includes an article by New York attorney Spencer C. Warren arguing that U.S. national interests necessitate a peace settlement that will accommodate Palestinian aspirations for some degree of self determination. Samuel Sherer who co-chairs Ripon's Research Committee also writes a View From Amman based on his recent three month stay in the Jordanian capital. The next issue of the Forum will feature an article by Wolf Blitzer, Washington Correspondent for the Jerusalem Post on the settlements and Palestinian issues as they are viewed from various Israeli perspectives.

The Palestinian Question and American Interests in the Middle East

by Spencer C. Warren*

Political realities in the Middle East demand U.S. support of some form of meaningful self-determination for the Palestinian people. Israel's interest, despite her recognition of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" in the Camp David accords, is to minimize in every way any expression of Palestinian nationalism, whether it be an independent state or a self-governing homeland under Jordanian sovereignty. Finding a meeting ground between Israel's security needs and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians—an abyss as forbidding as any on earth—is the challenge to American diplomacy. At present, notwithstanding faint hints to the contrary, the PLO is pledged to the elimination of Israel by armed force and Israel scarcely recognizes the Palestinians as an aggrieved people. But in mediating between these two extremes, the U.S. will have to assure at a minimum the realization of a Palestinian homeland independent of Israel. Unlike oil and water, oil and the Palestinians do mix, and vital U.S. economic and political interests are intertwined with the Palestinian question. Not only is it the key to the outcome of the peace talks, but it lies at the center of the web of oil, regional stability and competing U.S. and Russian influence in the Middle East.

Now that a settlement of the issues unique to Israel and Egypt has been achieved (or, given their history, perhaps one should say appears to have been achieved), Middle East negotiations are focused on the Palestinian question. Unfortunately, the Camp David provisions contain only the most modest Israeli concessions with respect to the Palestinians and ignore East Jerusalem entirely. As a result, most Arab moderates, led by Saudi Arabia, have condemned them and the Jordanians and moderate Palestinians have refused to join the current talks on the autonomous five year transitional regime for the West Bank and Gaza, as provided by the accords. Israel's position in these talks, the outcome of which will be the guide for the "final status" of these territories to be negotiated subsequently, can only continue to alienate the Arabs, as Mr. Dayan recognizes. Despite surface

geniality between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, there has been little or no progress thus far. Israel has been most unconstructive, defining the "full autonomy" stipulated in the accords in the narrowest terms, allowing only token administrative powers to the planned self-governing authority and treating the inhabitants almost as subjects of a colonial power.

Israel's continuing claim to sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza, symbolized by her settlements policy and her termination in September of the prohibition against purchase by private Israelis of land on the West Bank and in Gaza, can only serve to confirm the Arabs' belief that she will not countenance any real expression of the Palestinians' legitimate rights. It further strengthens their suspicions that she intends to keep effective control of these territories, butressing her military defenses with a matrix of paramilitary settlements and secure in her powerful strategic position, one greatly enhanced by Egypt's separate peace.

In this connection, Israel's insistence that her annexation of East Jerusalem shortly after the Six-Day War is non-negotiable also threatens to torpedo the peace process. While there is no question the Jordanians denied Israeli access to the Wailing Wall when they were in control from 1948 to 1967, the Arabs nonetheless can never be expected to acquiesce in the present situation, since East Jerusalem is an Arab city housing two of Islam's holiest shrines. The fever of religious passion, which also surely underlies Israel's position, makes such acquiescence inconceivable.

Without the participation of moderate Palestinians and Jordan and the support of Saudi Arabia, the negotiations will run aground and the elections for the interim regime will be an utter failure. At Camp David Egypt gave up most of her cards, but Israel, staying put in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, retained most of her own. She will have to demonstrate a readiness to yield some to get the remaining

**Spencer C. Warren is a lawyer in New York City
and a long time Ripon Society member.*

principals to the table. This requires indications that she is prepared to compromise on the sovereignty and settlements issues and on East Jerusalem. Full autonomy will have to be broadly defined, even at the risk of it leading to an independent state, and East Jerusalem eventually returned to Arab sovereignty though there is wide room for administrative arrangements to support Israeli interests, such as President

implicitly recognizing the right of the Palestinians to meaningful self-determination, which along with Israel's security is the essential component of a general peace agreement. And by doing so in the negotiations with Egypt, with her back still turned to the PLO, Israel could set off a chain of events that could overcome the momentous hurdle now facing peace, the PLO's refusal to recognize Israel.

“Without minimizing the danger, a Palestinian homeland, even an independent state, would not inevitably become a terrorist hotbed or a Russian puppet. Here the interests of Israel and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and possibly even Syria (the latter two have warred with the PLO in the past) are parallel. The first four, to be sure, would have a common desire in ensuing regional stability against a radical troublemaker.”

Sadat's proposal for a joint Arab-Israeli municipal council for the whole city and ironclad guarantees of free access to all Holy Places.

Without minimizing the danger, a Palestinian homeland, even an independent state, would not inevitably become a terrorist hotbed or a Russian puppet. Here the interests of Israel and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and possibly even Syria (the latter two have warred with the PLO in the past) are parallel. The first four, to be sure, would have a common desire in ensuring regional stability against a radical troublemaker.

The PLO's diplomatic success in recent months in Europe and with American black leaders in the wake of the Young affair have made increasingly clear that there can be no Palestinian settlement without a strong role for it. Were Israel to show the flexibility suggested above, it would put pressure on the PLO and tend to exacerbate its chronic factionalism. The moderates wishing to abandon the PLO Covenant's vow to eradicate Israel would be strengthened, as would moderates in the occupied territories, who have been thrown into the PLO's arms by Israeli intransigence. As one West Bank Palestinian told *The New York Times*, "As long as the Israelis offer us nothing, why should anyone consider the split with the PLO?" (*New York Times Magazine*, 9 September 1979, p. 38.) The moderates inside and outside the PLO are in an especially difficult position when Mr. Begin will not even countenance a Palestinian entity federated with Jordan. (*New York Times*, 27 September 1979, p. A9.) Israeli flexibility would also make it less difficult for Jordan and Saudi Arabia to encourage the PLO to recognize Israel (with Israeli reciprocity) and to join the negotiations, accompanied by King Hussein. Alternatively, the PLO might decide to acquiesce in such participation by representatives from the occupied territories, following the precedent of its toleration of the inhabitants' participation in the West Bank mayoral elections in 1976. But whichever way it occurs, the talks must be widened.

By demonstrating the necessary flexibility, Israel would be

Unless there is progress on the Palestinian question, the whole foundation of U.S. interests in the region will be undermined. President Sadat certainly needs such progress. As the years pass, where would the hopes for peace lie if, unable to make headway and achieve even the form of Palestinian self-determination, with living conditions in Egypt not evincing the expected bonanzas of peace and isolated in the Arab world, Sadat is condemned for selling out to Israel and overthrown by a new Nasser or a Moslem fanatic?

U.S. relations with the other Arab states hinge significantly on progress on the Palestinian issue as well. One need only cite the 1973-74 oil embargo, the drastic OPEC price increases of 1973-74 and 1978-79 and, more beneficently, the Saudi increase in production earlier this year at the time of the Iranian shortfall and the promise early in July to raise output by 1 million barrels per day for three to six months, extended to the full six months late in September. (Would the Saudis have been so accommodating if the airplane sale had been rejected by Congress last year?) While the Saudis have many links to the West, the extent to which they have and will continue to try to deflect the fierce blows OPEC inflicts is tied in some measure to our role in the Palestinian conundrum. Arab oil prices and production levels will undoubtedly be greatly affected by the course of the negotiations. As Sheikh Yamani, the Saudi oil minister, warned during the summer, increased production requires "a comprehensive, over-all solution for the Middle East crisis, which must—repeat must—first and foremost, mean a solution for the increasingly desperate Palestinian people." (*Newsweek*, 9 July 1979, p. 21.)

Without movement towards such a solution, we could see a return of the chilled U.S.-Saudi relations of last winter, after Camp David and the perceived American failure to "save" the Shah, when the Saudis cancelled Crown Prince Fahd's visit to the U.S. and endorsed the Egyptian boycott approved by the Arab League at Baghdad. U.S. policy must assure the continuation of the pro-American position of the leadership, which, at times, has been known to consider a more independent course in the direction of stricter oil con-

servation and closer ties with Arab radicals.

Besides giving due regard to their standing in the Arab world, the Saudis and the other rulers on the Gulf shore must be mindful of the presence in their domains of large numbers of foreign workers, many of them Palestinians open to Marxist notions, Moslem fundamentalism and Palestinian nationalism. Of Saudi Arabia's population of about 8 million, 1 to 1½ million are immigrants, and of these about 110,000 are Palestinians. Most of the Palestinians are skilled workers, making up 60-65 percent of the employees of Aramco, with their hands near the jugular of Saudi Arabia and the West. Awareness of their potential for the most alarming mischief was shown even before this year when Aramco shifted them away from sensitive installations. There are an estimated 200,000 Palestinians in Kuwait, comprising 20 percent of the population; there are 40,000 or 30 percent of the total population in the United Arab Emirates; and the total population of 45,000 Palestinians in Qatar outnumbers the indigenous population. The same fuel that ignited the Iranian upheaval can be found in varying measure in each of these states. With the fate of the Shah etched in their memories, the potential for radicalization of the Palestinians and other discontented aliens—most of whom do not share in the oil riches—as well as sabotage of oil facilities undoubtedly weighs in the minds of the rulers on the Gulf shore. And the Kremlin too is surely aware of these factors.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf potentates also worry over the stealthy encroachment of Soviet power in the region—the Horn of Africa, South Yemen, where the Russians are entrenched in what has become under their own, as well as Cuban and East German tutelage, the Arab world's first totalitarian state and, to the northeast, Afghanistan, where they are reported to be establishing two military bases. The Russians have already directed their South Yemen vessels on a foray into North Yemen, which prompted stern U.S. and Saudi countermeasures; and by their proximity they can stir up the sporadic Dhofar rebellion in adjacent Oman. In fact, the new treaty between the Russians and South Yemen goes further than any previous pact with an Arab state in that it specifies military cooperation and speaks of an "Asian defense organization". The Saudis do not sleep well with this turbulence at the foot of the Arabian peninsula.

Russian weapons, technical aid and expertise have long been welcome in Iraq and Syria, the heads of the rejectionist front against the Camp David accords. But Russian influence there has fed on Arab hostility to American Middle East policies. The leaders of these states prefer to be less reliant on the Russians, and without the wall of our conflicting positions they would have more room in which to maneuver in remaining free of the Polar Bear's clutches.

Under her new President, Saddam Hussein, Iraq earlier this year concluded billion dollar-plus arms deals with France, who has long been more cognizant of the Palestinian problem than the U.S., and was promised in return a 25 percent increase in oil deliveries, and, reportedly, with Spain. Important visits have been paid by French Premier Barre and West German Foreign Minister Genscher. Iraq has opposed Russian policies in South Yemen and Afghanistan, wiped out her communist party and improved relations with Saudi Arabia as a result of tensions with the Ayatollah Khomeini and with

Syria (whose ruling Alawite sect is related to the Ayatollah's Shiite branch of Islam).

Nor need Syria continue to be as adamant as she has been. Early in 1977, President Assad joined President Carter in trying to persuade the PLO to attend the planned Geneva talks and accept U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which would have amounted to its recognition of Israel. And with the loss of Egypt, Syria has no realistic chance of reconquering the Golan Heights.

These factors present the U.S. with an important opportunity. Unlike the rejectionists of the PLO, Iraq and Syria's vital interests do not require the destruction of Israel. Israel's commanding military position, with the loss of Egypt to the Arabs, can encourage some steps toward peace, as only Arab concessions and U.S. influence can bring about any Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories (though it will never be total) and the realization of a Palestinian homeland based on self-determination. Just as President Sadat perceived he was more likely to regain the Sinai through Washington than Moscow, an American policy creating more Israeli flexibility can set into play the same dynamic with Iraq and Syria. The entry of Palestinians and Jordan into the talks with Saudi support could also pressure one or both of them in this direction. If they have grounds to believe that by firmly recognizing Israel's right to exist behind secure frontiers they can gain at the peace table what they cannot reasonably hope to win on the battlefield, with a bonus, perhaps, of American economic aid tossed in, the forces of moderation, including those working on the PLO, will be strengthened, and Russian influence will correspondingly suffer.

American policies to counteract Soviet influence in the Middle East are particularly important now that the Bear's attentions to the Gulf are no longer motivated merely by the age-old thirst for a warm water port, but also by a more pressing thirst for oil. For the Russians and their eastern bloc are facing their own energy crisis in the 1980's. Russia, the world's number one oil producer, expects a major slowdown in her rate of oil production. Already, Kosygin has warned the satellites that "strict measures" are necessary to economize on energy use, as Russia's supply of 90 percent of their oil needs will have to be cut to 60-70 percent. These developments mean economic stagnation and potential unrest in what are now unsteady economies in the satellites, and perhaps even in Russia herself. And the communists are short of the hard currency and products needed to buy oil from OPEC. The currency is now needed to buy Western wheat and technology. Thus, the Persian Gulf is no longer an allure-ment; it is becoming a desperate necessity, and the incentive to grab by subversion or more direct means what she cannot afford to purchase grows accordingly. As economic crisis creates the danger of nuclear crisis, maximizing American influence and assuring regional stability are crucial to protect oil supplies and prevent Russian hegemony.

Accordingly, the question of Palestine is closely tied not only to peace in the Middle East and the provision of future energy needs for the U.S. but to our increasingly perilous contest with the Soviet Union. It is more critical than ever that the United States find a way of brokering the legitimate interests of Israel and the Palestinians to achieve a Palestinian homeland legitimate in the eyes of its people. ■

A VIEW FROM AMMAN

by Samuel A. Sherer

About twelve miles outside of the municipality of Amman is the third largest human settlement in the Kingdom of Jordan, although its population of 60,000 persons is not recognized as a permanent settlement by the government. Baqa Camp is the largest and most visible of the official camps run by the U.N. Relief and Works Administration (UNRWA) for Palestinian refugees from the 1948 War. Its crowded conditions and lack of basic municipal services attest to the view of its residents that some day they may return to their former homes in what is now Israel. After 30 years it is a curious combination of permanence and transience. Its narrow streets do not indicate planning and many of its dwellings are little more than huts. However, along the main road one sees a number of permanent commercial establishments and the ubiquitous Mercedes and the branch of the Jordan-Kuwait Bank which indicates wealth from remittances sent back by relatives working in the Gulf. Similar conditions can be seen in the large Al Hussein camp in the northern part of Amman and in a similar camp in Irbid, the largest urban center in the north. The events of 1948 continue to play an important role in present-day Jordan.

In addition to these official camps are the crowded squatter conditions of the unofficial camps for former residents of the West Bank who fled after the 1967 War. Approximately 60,000-70,000 households in Amman Municipality are crowded into such camps which have population densities of up to 1,500 persons per hectare. Most of these households live without an adequate water supply, depending on expensive water delivered from trucks, and also without sewerage, drainage or open space.

The people in the official and unofficial camps make up a large proportion of the 60 percent of the population of the East Bank of Jordan which is of Palestinian origin. Most of the commerce and banking leaders in the country, as well as most of the professionals, are of Palestinian origin. The Bedouins are predominant in the government and in the military, the bulwarks of the Hashemite Dynasty. However, the Palestinians are necessary for the successful operation of the economy and for the future prosperity of the nation.

Beyond the importance of the Palestinians for the economy of Jordan is the influence that the Palestinian question has upon the financing of future economic development. Since the 1974 Rabat Conference, Jordan has been receiving large amounts of assistance from the other Arab countries. In 1978 grants from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates totalled approximately \$250 million and dwarfed the U.S. grant contribution of \$50 million. This large influx of new monies over the last five years has been used for a large increase in ordinary expenditures, only part of which

has been used for defense purposes. In addition, the Kuwait Development Fund and the Abu Dhabi Development Fund are financing large development projects. Thus the future development of the country is now linked to the Arab World in a way that was not so evident when the major foreign development capital came from USAID.

A further sign of the growth of Pan-Arabism is the development of the Arab Common Market. For Jordan this has meant increasing trade linkages with Syria, especially for its agricultural produce. In addition, there have been serious talks between Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia regarding the rehabilitation of the legendary Hejaz Railway built by the Ottoman Empire to link Damascus with Medina. The completion of that rehabilitation would facilitate the flow of goods from Istanbul to Saudi Arabia and establish the central position of Jordan in Arab and Middle Eastern trade.

These general facts have a lot to do with the present position of Jordan with regard to the Middle East peace talks. The past several years has seen a marked increase in solidarity of the Arab countries and is a primary reason for the united stand against Egypt and the vehemence of the reaction to the efforts of President Sadat. Jordan and Egypt have maintained close relations and Egyptian workers perform menial duties as hotel workers and maids. Thus there is a close personal tie. However, at the same time President Sadat is viewed as having forsaken the cause of Arab unity and a Palestinian homeland for his own gain. He is further viewed as a dupe for providing oil and trade to the Israelis without having won any significant concessions on the Palestinian issue. "If Sadat can get back the West Bank and return Jerusalem to its pre-1967 status then we will listen to him again" is the most moderate response one encounters.

At the same time Jordan has been discouraging President Quadaffi of Libya and others who would like to assassinate President Sadat. The Government feels uncomfortable about Arab rejectionist plans to arm the Palestinian refugees. The King remembers the Black September of 1970 when PLO stalwarts were in de facto control of Amman until decisively defeated by the Jordanian Army, mostly made up of Bedouins. The situation is very different now as Jordan is very peaceful and the Palestinian community does not appear to desire such arms which would add another explosive ingredient into an already difficult situation. The Jordanian government's concern over such arming has been reinforced by the recent events in Iran and the assassinations in Syria.

The key to the solution of the Middle East situation as viewed from here is self-determination for the Palestinians. Most Palestinians in Jordan have relatives in the West Bank and have been personally affected by the efforts of Israel to restrict and harass travel between Jordan and the West Bank as well as to establish settlements in existing urban areas. In addition, East Jerusalem is still viewed as moderate with re-


Mr. Sherer was recently in Amman for three months.

gard to these issues. This position has been reinforced by its increasingly economic dependence upon its Arab neighbors. Not only are major development projects being increasingly funded from such sources, but more of the new upper class homes in Amman are being purchased for second homes by Saudis and Kuwaitis or by refugees from Beirut or by Palestinians with monies earned in the Gulf. Without those oil monies the economy of Jordan would not be in good shape given the lack of viable industries, except for phosphate and tourism.

The sense of Pan-Arabism cannot be overstated, despite the differences between Bedouins and Palestinians. The keenest observer of Arab behavior and mores in the Twentieth Century, T. E. Lawrence, wrote that Arabs are basically individualistic and only act in concert for a short period of time.

They believe in persons, not in institutions, and will follow such persons absolutely. In the 7th century the immediate successors of Mohammed were able to destroy two empires within a period of ten years. Under King Abdullah, present King Hussien's grandfather, the United Arab Force conquered Jordan and Damascus at the end of World War I. Since the death of Nasser there has been no Arab leader capable of inspiring devotion. The unknown ingredient with regard to the Middle East is the rise of such a leader. If he should arise in the present situation of instability the future of Israel would indeed be in doubt. None of the present Arab leaders are strong enough to resist such a person. Given the shortness of distance in this area actions could be taken quickly. This possibility in itself should be enough to cause all parties to seek a permanent homeland for the Palestinians. ■

BOOK REVIEW



Cheap Oil: How To Break OPEC, Dr. Seymour C. Yuter
(Expedited Publishing Co., 254 pages, \$14.95)

by John Q. Publius

Cheap Oil suffers from a number of flaws. The book is to some extent a splicing together of the author's 1974 Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) proposal and his 1978 Middle East Oil Defense Treaty Organization (MEODTO) proposal together with a dubious promise of cheap oil if only the Saudis can be whipped into line by a forceful U.S. President. While some of Dr. Yuter's prescriptions are hard to swallow in a single sitting and his prose bears traces of the scintillating writing style of international lawyers, the book is chock full of imaginative scenarios and some possible future policy directions for a post-Carter Presidency.

Yuter's proposals are far more detailed, although quite similar to some advanced by John Connally in his controversial National Press Club speech. On one sensitive issue, that of Palestinian self determination, Yuter is far more explicit than Connally. He proposes bypassing the PLO with a moderate Palestinian government in exile led by a well groomed Yasir Arafat to negotiate a nonmilitarized Palestinian Republic for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Yuter argues:

No one can reasonably expect Palestinian moderates to give up dreams of a secular state throughout all of Palestine, which means the end of the Jewish state. But dreams are one thing and reality another. A fail-safe Palestinian state treaty committed to suppress terrorism and not to militarize would present no significant military threat to Israel. The proposed Republic of Palestinian States (REPALS) is such a state.

And no one can reasonably expect Yasir Arafat to confront the radical Palestinian groups at a future meeting

of the Palestine National Council to seek a mandate for such a Palestine government in exile—*unless* Israel was first persuaded by the United States to seriously consider such a Palestinian state. Then the PLO would be bypassed and Mr. Begin could negotiate with a new, well groomed, Arafat, a man of peace, rather than with an unkempt Arafat projecting an offensive terrorist image in the eyes of Israelis.

While one may reasonably quibble with Yuter's classification of Arafat as a moderate rightist in the Palestinian political context, Yuter is hardly a carping critic of Israel. He enjoys close ties with many Israeli political leaders, particularly those in the Opposition to the Begin Government. Moreover, Yuter was an active campaigner in the Jewish community for Richard Nixon in 1972.

Yuter directs his strategy at the Saudis who he feels alone have the power to break OPEC. Saudi sovereignty over the Islamic shrines of Jerusalem, and the creation of a non-militarized Palestinian state would be the carrots to induce the Saudis to "free market" oil. Absent such a Saudi turn-about, Yuter argues the U.S. can threaten a cutoff of military and development aid.

He argues that there is a conjunction of vital political interests between Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United States. Israel can not afford a war of financial attrition in which OPEC derived Arab petrodollar surpluses finance the construction of a superior war machine that ultimately will overwhelm the outmanned Israelis. The Saudi royal family, Yuter suggests, fears external aggression from its leftist-neighbors as well as the possibility of an army or air force coup such as those that toppled King Farouk of Egypt or King Idris of Libya. The House of Saud would, Yuter suggests, trade a free marketing of oil for explicit U.S. security guarantees against domestic as well as external subversion.

This premise of Yuter, incorporated to some degree in John Connally's Middle East proposals, may be invalid. As much as the Saudi ruling family may fear an anti-royalist coup it is doubtful that they would rely upon U.S. military forces to protect themselves against such a threat. First, it is doubtful the U.S. public would sanction such a use of our troops in the case of a purely domestic insurrection. Second, the very fact of such a U.S. commitment and the associated link with Israel would make the Saudi leadership the immediate target of a virulent campaign by rejectionist Arabs. The benefits to the Saudis seem conjectural at best while the liabilities are all too obvious and immediate.

As much as the Saudis have been almost reluctant participants in the dramatic rises of OPEC price levels, it is hard to imagine they can be induced to "free market" their oil. The best the U.S. can realistically anticipate is stability in real dollar terms of OPEC prices as a result of relatively high Saudi production. The Saudis recognize that even their immense oil reserves are nonrenewable and hence they are hardly likely to pump it out at a rate which would collapse international price levels while hastening the depletion of their

reserves.

There is a note of hype in the title "*Cheap Oil*". U.S. energy policy makers can seek price stability through political accommodation with the Saudis. In the face of still ravenous energy consumption by the industrialized countries and a burgeoning demand from the developing countries, the days of cheap oil are likely never to be seen again. Cheap energy, if it is ever to be achieved, will come not from political artistry but from some fundamental scientific breakthroughs in such an area as advanced fuel fusion or photovoltaic solar.

Peace in the Middle East, if it is to be achieved, will, moreover, probably be the result of a series of partial steps rather than the imposition of some grand design. While Yuter's book suffers from an excessive zeal to achieve Middle East peace by linking several complex, seemingly insoluble problems together, this work nevertheless may be worthwhile reading to students of Middle East politics. An impressive compendium of facts and documents, *Cheap Oil* is much more provocative than the bloodless tomes too often encountered on the Middle East. ■



Voinovich Victory in Cleveland One of Few Bright Signs for GOP

The colorful and controversial mayoral tenure of Cleveland's Dennis J. Kucinich came to an abrupt end in the November 6 runoff when Kucinich was buried by an eclectic city wide coalition assembled by Republican Lieutenant Governor George V. Voinovich. The vote of 94,407 (56.2%) to 73,505 (43.8%), a 20,902 margin, was the largest win in a contested mayor election since 1962, (Ralph Perk won by 45,000 votes against token, last minute opposition when the Democratic nominee withdrew less than three weeks before the general election in 1973) and in its wake the mayor's brother, Gary, lost his councilmanic seat and the former Finance Director turned executive secretary, Joseph Teagreen, finished a distant third in his bid for clerk of Municipal Court, the post used as a stepping-stone by Kucinich on his way to City Hall.

The Voinovich sweep was massive, carrying all but eight of 33 wards. Only those near the mayor's home (he failed to carry his own ward), several served extensively by Municipal Light championed by Kucinich, and three black wards were won by the incumbent.

Voinovich carried black areas by approximately 55.2%, in part because of the tacit support given by President of the City Council George Forbes, who did not campaign. In addition, the Republican was endorsed by Arnold R. Pinkney, former President of the Board of Education and a former Democratic mayoral nominee, by the Black Elected Democratic Officials of Cuyahoga County, by Virgil E. Brown, a black Republican County Commissioner, and by several prominent local ministers. The margin in black areas would have been much greater had not Kucinich after the

October primary named James Barrett, the Safety Director and a black, as his campaign manager, and then received the endorsement of Louis Stokes' Congressional District Caucus and Larry Holmes, the heavyweight boxing champion, and for the final five days of the campaign brought in former mayor and now New York anchorman on WNBC, Carl Stokes. In 1971, while heading Democrats for Perk, Kucinich had said, "Stokes' influence in the mayor's office must be ended." As Marjorie Schuster, columnist for the *Cleveland Press* pointed out, "The last-hour tactic of bringing in the former mayor, Carl Stokes, hardly helped bridge Kucinich's widening credibility with the voters. Here, incongruously, was the present mayor, accepting support from CORK, a coalition of West Side whites opposed to school busing, as well as the efforts of his former enemy, Stokes, to enlist the black vote on the East Side." Nonetheless, the appearance of Stokes is credited with keeping Voinovich's margin in black areas below 65%.

The campaign had a tragic interlude and fortnight hiatus during the second and third weeks of October due to the death of Voinovich's youngest child, Molly, who was struck and killed by a van while returning from school. Up to that point, Kucinich's strategy had been replete with his usual abrasive and abusive style, attacking his Republican opponent as a "tool of the fat cats"—particularly the banks, utilities, newspapers (all main papers—two dailies, one black and three nationality papers endorsed Voinovich) and special interest groups. In addition, he accused Voinovich of engaging in "McCarthy-like tactics", an especially ingenious charge emanating from the rapier-tongued leader of "The Kiddie Korps" whose whole administration has featured one scurrilous and demagogic statement after another.

The last two weeks of the campaign saw fewer ad hominem attacks and more stress on the issues—a critical analysis by both sides of the accomplishments and areas of concern of the Kucinich administration. To many political observers, it was this more introspective, reasoned, and issue oriented style that made the election as close as it was. Early polls,

and even some late polls, put Kucinich 20% or more behind and a light turnout most likely reflects the feeling among many potential Voinovich supporters that "the election was in the bag." Clearly, Clevelanders had tired of the vindictive, arrogant and contemptuous diatribes and behavior of the incumbent, who would attack constantly, but achieve little, always blaming adversaries almost paranoically for personal failures.



By contrast, Voinovich's theme was "Together we can do it," an open appeal to all segments of a most fractured city. In campaigning city-wide, rather than making sectarian appeals to one ethnic or racial group, Voinovich pointed to his successful county auditor administration, in which efficiency and service were the main features, replacing political personality.

The Voinovich mayoralty promises to be a team effort of professionals intent on ridding the city of debt, antagonism and acrimony. A top finance director to assume responsibility for default resolution, a new police chief from within the department after so many outside appointees, and work within the various neighborhoods and "with but not for business" will all be key themes of Voinovich in his officially nonpartisan post. Harmony with the City Council is envisioned as well as consultation with area congressmen and with Ohio's Senators to undo the legacy of a record number of vetoes and unprecedented number of federal programs unfunded because final plans were never submitted by the city.

As Voinovich states, "I'm the first mayor who's going to enter this job since 1965 who doesn't have to respond or speak to racism." November 6, 1979 may well be remembered as the start of this major industrial city's long climb back, and the vehicle will be Republican George V. Voinovich.

Slim Pickings for the GOP in Southern and Other Big City Races; Gains in New Jersey

In the face of a Democratic administration and Congress groping unsuccessfully with rampant inflation, a worsening energy situation and a battering of U.S. prestige in the world, one might have expected perceptible Republican gains in the 1979 off year elections. Yet these elections seem more than anything to underscore the fundamentally weak position that the Republican Party enjoys in both the big cities and the South.

The Voinovich victory in a nonpartisan race was essentially a rejection of Dennis Kucinich, a nominal Democrat but a

bitter pill for even the most partisan Democrats to swallow. Republicans did, however, score two other impressive mayoralty victories in Ohio in Columbus and Akron. In Columbus, a city with a fairly strong Republican tradition, incumbent mayor Tom Moody won reelection to a third term by 30,000 votes over former judge William Boyland. Moody's impressive victory has already thrust his name into speculation as a possible Republican gubernatorial candidate in 1982. In somewhat more of a surprise, Republicans also retained the mayoralty of Akron where popular incumbent John Ballard was retiring after a 14 year tenure. Democratic City Council President Ray Kapper, Ballard's 1977 opponent, was expected to breeze into office this year. Instead Republican Roy L. Ray, for ten years city finance director, swept to victory with 49 percent of the vote in a five man race.

In other Northern big city elections in such places as Boston, Philadelphia, San Francisco, New Haven and Hartford, Republicans either did not figure in the running or were well out of the money. Aside from the Voinovich triumph in Cleveland, one of the few resounding GOP big city victories was registered by Indianapolis Mayor William Hudnut.

In New Jersey, Republicans made significant gains in the off year state legislative elections. By picking up ten seats in the Assembly the GOP moved to a 44-36 deficit. Four of the ten seats were gained in the pivotal suburban county of Bergen which was long the cornerstone for Republican victories in the state. After the election the GOP once again holds a majority (six) of the ten Assembly seats from the County. Unfortunately, New Leadership Fund supported candidate Dick Zimmer was not among the New Jersey winners.

Meanwhile in New Hampshire Susan McLane, who chairs the Republican Women's Task Force and also enjoyed Fund support, won a special election to give the GOP control of the State Senate by a 13-11 margin. Another Ripon stalwart, Minnesota Chapter Chairman John (Jay) Finnegan, won a City Council seat in West Saint Paul.

The Republican showing was especially disheartening in the governors' races in Kentucky and Mississippi. Former Kentucky Governor Louie Nunn lost by a 3-2 margin to Democratic fried chicken magnate John Y. Brown, while Mississippi Republican Gil Carmichael lost by a similar margin to Democrat William Winter. Both elections seemed to underscore the minority party status of the GOP in both Kentucky and Mississippi.

Kentucky voters faced a fairly unappetizing choice between Brown, a jet set Democrat who had parlayed lavish spending, a glamorous bride, Phyllis George, and an issueless campaign to win the Democratic nomination, and Nunn, a Republican veteran known for his streetfighter image. Nunn's slashing campaign attacks continually misfired thus creating sympathy for Brown, a candidate otherwise hardly meriting such voter solicitude.

In Mississippi, voters faced somewhat more attractive alternatives as both Republican Gil Carmichael and Democrat William Winter had reputations as able, racially moderate Mississippians committed to innovative programs of economic development. Carmichael was hobbled by the resentment of the party's ultramontanist wing for his 1976 role in

supporting Gerald Ford. In addition, the state's large black electorate broke heavily for Winter, largely on the grounds of his Democratic affiliation. Republicans efforts were also hampered by the GOP failure yet to develop strong organizations in many of the state's rural counties. The sad truth of the Mississippi results may be to emphasize the likelihood that in a Deep South election for a non-Federal statewide office between an attractive Democrat and an attractive Republican, the Democrat can normally still be expected to prevail.

Bush First, Reagan Fourth in Straw Polls of Iowa, Maine GOP Activists

George Bush continues to show remarkable headway among Republican activists in Iowa, the first precinct caucus state. He was the runaway winner of a Presidential straw poll conducted by the Iowa Press Association at a mid-October \$50 a head party fundraiser in Ames attended by 3,500 Republicans. Bush received the support of 35.74 percent of the 1454 Republicans casting straw votes. John Connally received 15.35 percent, Bob Dole 14.79 percent, Ronald Reagan 11.28 percent, and Howard Baker 8.20 percent.

This Bush support among the party's medium sized contributors seems to mirror the strong organizational edge the Bush forces have gotten in Iowa. A large number of Republican legislators and many of those in Governor Bob Ray's organization have signed on with the Bush campaign.

Although Reagan's poor showing in the straw poll could be attributed partly to the fact that the former California Governor was the only major GOP Presidential contender to pass up the Ames fundraiser, the results still seem to show remarkable slippage since 1976. That year Reagan battled Gerald Ford to a near draw in the Iowa district caucuses and state convention.

Despite Reagan's relatively high standing in national polls among the GOP rank and file, his Achilles Heel may be his waning position among party activists outside the Northeast. In 1976 Reagan's strength among the most avid partisans thrust him to victory in many caucus states and closely contested primaries while Gerald Ford enjoyed nearly a two to one lead over Reagan in national polls of GOP voters. Today many of the most fervent 1976 Reaganites seem to have shifted to other candidates or to have cooled their ardor for Reagan.

This same trend showed up in a straw poll at a Maine Republican Presidential Forum attended by the most GOP White House aspirants in Portland on Saturday November 3. Howard Baker, backed by the state's popular U.S. Senator Bill Cohen and much of the GOP party leadership, was widely expected to come in first. Expecting a comfortable victory the Baker campaign sought to fan press interest in the event. When the votes were counted, however, George Bush emerged narrowly on top with 35 percent to Baker's 33 percent. Running third was John Connally with 15 percent followed by Ronald Reagan, a poor fourth at 7 percent.

Baker's second place finish was hardly a sign of fundamental weakness but rather an indication that his fledgling organiza-

tion still needs some tightening. By focusing on this event immediately after Baker's announcement the Minority Leader's strategists set their man up for a pratfall. Seeing a chance to embarrass Baker, undoubtedly some supporters of candidates other than George Bush cast votes for the former UN Ambassador who appeared to be running a close second to Baker going into the Portland meeting.

The principal significance of the Maine results is to underscore the early organizational lead enjoyed by Bush in many caucus states and to point out the slippage of Reagan among party activists. Even allowing for the possibility that some Reagan straws were cast for Bush, the Californian's seven percent showing was a paltry performance for a state in which he enjoyed the support of a sizable minority of party activists in 1976.

South Carolina GOP Sets March 8 Presidential Primary

South Carolina is likely to be the site of the first 1980 Republican Presidential primary in a Southern state. Stealing a march on Georgia, Florida and Alabama, all of whom will hold their Presidential primaries on Tuesday March 11, the Palmetto State GOP has just set its primary for two days earlier on Saturday, March 8.

At this point the South Carolina primary shapes up as the first Southern confrontation between Ronald Reagan and John Connally. Connally already seems somewhat stronger than Gerald Ford was four years ago in this 1976 Reagan stronghold. The three delegates in each of the state's six Congressional districts will be bound to the candidate receiving the most votes in the Congressional district while the seven at large delegates will be bound to the candidate obtaining a statewide plurality.

The early Southern primaries seem to be shaping up primarily as Connally-Reagan confrontations but more moderate Republican contenders such as George Bush and Howard Baker may stand their best chance of gleaning delegates in the Alabama primary. There, over the vigorous opposition of Reagan forces, the state GOP recently voted to split its delegates on a proportional basis.

Chappaquiddick Film in the Works

The imminent Presidential candidacy of Ted Kennedy has already attracted commercial interest. Fledgling film producer Glenn Stensel, boasting an \$800,000 budget, has begun shooting for a film depicting the 1969 incident on Chappaquiddick Island. Due to the lack of cooperation of local authorities footage on location has had to be filmed clandestinely. Maintaining the same sensibilities toward Senator Kennedy's feelings that they displayed ten years ago, local officials denied the film maker permission to recreate the accident of the actual scene by citing potential pollution from the car's motor oil. As a result the accident scene and most of the picture will be filmed in California. There Stensel can expect far greater cooperation from the local hierarchy. Both Governor Jerry Brown and his immediate predecessor are strong believers in *cinema verite*, particularly in matters of such public interest. ■

BUREAUCRACY



Marches On!

Joe Califano may be gone but his spirit lives on in the Carter Administration. A recent job announcement at the Interior Department made it clear that a GS-16 senior executive position was open to all qualified applicants regardless of race, religion, nationality, sex, physical or mental handicap. The last characteristic seems to be a virtual prerequisite for undertaking service in the embattled Carter Administration.

The actions of Interior Secretary Cecil Andrus a few weeks ago certainly seemed to confirm this notion. A young herpetologist at Interior had the effrontery to write a letter on government stationery to Dominique D'Emo, proprietor of a posh French restaurant a couple of blocks from Jimmy Carter's Populist Palace. The young snake scientist informed Dominique that the Pennsylvania rattlesnake he was serving in wine sauce was a possible endangered species. Dominique's obliged and switched to Texas rattlesnake. Far less obliging was one of Carter's Populist Poobah's, Cecil Andrus, a habitue of Dominique's. Andrus personally delivered a letter of apology to Dominique and in another first for the Carter Administration fired his snake loving civil servant. Andrus' courageous initiative succeeded in getting both Hamilton Jordan and Ted Kennedy off the front pages. Dominique's basked in the publicity while rival restaurants debated how to match Monsieur D'Emo—perhaps by adding roast Georgia swamp rabbit to their fare. The only loser in this affair aside from the Texas rattlesnakes, was Secretary Andrus who after eating crow rehired his herpetologist. Fortunately we must report the Carter Administration made more progress on another front in its War on Wildlife.

Unable to deal with the problems of energy and inflation, President Jimmy's "Life is unfair" Carter nevertheless scored a spectacular success on another front, virtually exterminating that killer fish, the snail darter. The few hundred remaining snail darters had threatened Tennessee's Tellico Dam and hundreds of millions of dollars in construction contracts. By signing the public works bill with its virtual death warrant for the snail darter, Carter wheedled a few extra Congressional votes for his own imperiled Department of Education legislation.

Then by a hairline margin Congress gave Carter a well bought victory, another DOE. The new department will, many expect, do for education what Carter's other DOE has done for energy. Shortly before getting his new department Carter received more cheery news on the education front—SAT verbal and math scores were continuing their precipitous decline. Strongly backing the new Department of Education was the National Education Association, expected to dominate the policy in that agency so long as Carter remains President. Among the NEA's policies to stem the breakdown of our public school system is a ban on competency testing for

teachers. Recognizing that Carter had done his political homework, the NEA conferred its presidential endorsement on Carter shortly after the passage of the DOE bill.

Although the President has put such trivial educational concerns as rampant illiteracy and a breakdown of discipline on the political back burner, his Administration is courageously waging a battle against a far greater educational concern—tooth decay. Assistant Agriculture Secretary Carol Foreman is flexing her department's financial muscle to force local schools to ban the sale of soft drinks and candy during school hours. Perhaps the Carter Administration's legacy will be a generation of educationally malnourished school children gleefully shouting, "Mom, I ain't got no cavities."

Bureaucratic outrages are rendered not only to Carter but also to God. At a recent hotly contested National Convention of the Southern Baptists, the nation's largest Protestant group, an ultraconservative Fundamentalist faction narrowly won control. The triumphant Fundamentalists made much of their commitment to Biblical liberalism. Apparently some of them were a little tepid in their support of the Eighth Commandment as a three month inquiry by the registration secretary of the Southern Baptists concluded that 284 votes have been cast for the organization's new President, a Memphis pastor.

Ballot stuffing may not be taken too seriously in some parts of the South, but crime certainly is. The Texas Supreme Court recently upheld a mandatory life sentence imposed under the Lone Star State's habitual offender law for William J. Rummell who had committed the requisite three crimes over a nine year period. This hapless Texan had been convicted of the following crimes—trying to defraud with a credit card, passing a bad check and fraudulently promising to fix an appliance. These offenses could have netted no more than \$229.11. Heaven knows what might have been the punishment if this list had also included such serious offenses as jaywalking and double parking.

Meanwhile things are not too bright on the judicial front in sunny California. That state's once august Supreme Court, torn the past year by well publicized bickering over an alleged effort of some justices to delay a release of a controversial decision until after the last election, has been hit where it counts—in the pocketbook. A cheeky lower court judge has ruled that the state's highest court is subject to a state law barring judges from collecting their paychecks if their case backlog is more than three months. The average high court backlog is about three times the legal limit. Perhaps the California court will respond with characteristic ingenuity by requesting technical assistance from the world's prime model of speedy justice—the Islamic Republic of Iran. ■