

The Political and Economic
Costs of Defense

National Security in the
Reagan Era

Republicans and the
Nuclear Arms Freeze

19 New Jersey Avenue:
A Special Report

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RIPON FORUM

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
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Dear Readers:

On May 9, 1982 President Reagan proposed significant reductions in the number of nuclear warheads and weapons. On May 31, 1982 he indicated that the United States would "refrain from actions which undercut" the SALT II Treaty.

These long-awaited steps deserve applause. However, troubling questions remain. The price tag of the defense budget and the definition of national security are two uppermost in the minds of many.

The June FORUM presents a variety of writers who confront these anxieties. John Tower tells why the defense buildup is necessary, while a Ripon analysis explores something many Republicans have just begun to think about: the political and economic costs of defense spending. Alton Frye calls for restoring diplomacy, plus examines a new source of income for the defense budget. The meaning of security is addressed in Les Janka's article on the Middle East. Combined with contrasting opinions on the nuclear freeze, a clear question mark emerges: what price are we willing to pay for a debatable definition of security?

—Bill McKenzie

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A Ripon Analysis: The Political and Economic Costs of Defense

Defense spending, it appears, is quickly becoming the Reagan administration's Achilles heel. Although great victories were scored during last year's tax and budget battles, the White House has now found a thorny test: the five-year, trillion dollar defense buildup. Despite Congress having authorized the Pentagon 177 billion dollars for procurement in fiscal year 1983, the defense debate is anything but over.

Some observers question the strategic wisdom of the president's plan. Certainly Mr. Reagan's laudable moves to reduce the number of existing nuclear warheads and weapons have allayed some fears. However, many remain skeptical about the logic of arming to disarm. The president's wish list — MX missiles, B1 and Stealth bombers, B-52s with air-launched cruise missiles, two nuclear aircraft carriers, two anti-tank programs, and most threatening, chemical weapons — has left many wondering if this is real security.

This position has been voiced best by columnist James J. Kilpatrick, a surprising source.

"What earthly difference does it make," Kilpatrick recently wrote, "if the Soviet Union has 7,868 megatons of destructive capacity and we have only 3,505 megatons? Is it really material that we have 9,480 warheads, and the Soviets have but 8,040? Does any

person seriously suppose that if we were to double our nuclear arsenal, while the Soviets obligingly stood still, such 'parity' would have meaning?"

But some have more than strategic doubts. Their problems with the president's plan are economic: should we be spending such an exorbitant amount for national defense? Concerns have already been expressed from different corners.

According to a recent study by the Joint Economic Committee, the 30-percent increase in defense spending will worsen industrial bottlenecks and create cost-overruns in defense procurement. Indications show that bottlenecks now exist at the lower tiers of the defense industry. Smaller prime contractors, sub-contractors, and part suppliers are experiencing lengthy delivery delays for major weapons because of the lack of supplier capacity and because of shortages in production equipment, materials, and skilled labor.

If this continues, the Joint Economic Committee concludes, cost overruns will increase to meet existing needs. This would raise defense expenditures, thus leading to what some fear would be a new bout of inflation as more resources will be transferred from civilian to defense industries.

Another sticky economic problem the Reagan administration faces is the regional imbalance in the defense budget. The Sunbelt,

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with California and Texas leading the way, is the principal recipient of defense dollars. In those states reside most of the nation's defense contractors and high technology firms.

According to one recent study, California will receive over \$29 billion in fiscal 1982 defense expenditures. Seven of its congressional districts, in fact, will receive over one billion dollars. But every other major industrial state will suffer a net loss in its balance of payment with the Pentagon (more tax dollars paid than Pentagon dollars received). Of the 100 congressional districts in the Midwest, 94 are net losers. In the Northeast, 78 of 104 suffer likewise.

Insult may be added to injury as those industries and regions currently experiencing high unemployment do not benefit directly from military spending. This, of course, exacerbates the president's political problems about the equity of his budget.

Politics, perhaps, is best left out of any debate over national defense. However, many Republicans may think otherwise after November. If the public continues to question the soundness of defense strategy, such as the nuclear freeze movement is doing, and if inflation is aroused by defense dollars, then some GOP office-

“Politics, perhaps, is best left out of any debate over national security. However, if the public continues to question the soundness of defense strategy and if inflation is aroused by defense dollars, then some GOP office holders may be sent packing.”

holders may be sent packing.

A clear example is brought out in the debate over the Navy budget. Already the third leg of the defense pyramid has made clear its intentions to modernize. According to Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, the U.S. should attain “clear maritime superiority” and be “visibly offensive.” Regarding calls for defense cuts, such as those voiced by veteran Rep. John Rhodes, R-Ariz., and former President Gerald Ford, as “trendy,” Lehman plans to develop a Navy with large, fast and well-armored ships.

But the plan has drawn fire from experienced observers. John Roberts, dean of Wayne State University Law School and former general counsel of the Senate Armed Services Committee, is one of several who have questioned the utility of more large nuclear-powered submarines. In a recent editorial, Roberts wrote: “The Navy should be strengthened, but what it needs most is more ships and more flexible striking power, not more expensive large carriers and submarines. In a time of shrinking resources available to the national government, we must think about what sort of defense budget we really need.”

Congressional leaders are aware of this concern. As one congressional aide said during an interview for this article, a growing constituency now exists for cutting defense. Congressional mail, he said, is “voicing the desire many have to streamline military spending.”

Rep. Pete McCloskey, R-Calif., sees the same thing occurring. During a recent interview, McCloskey said he had been told by a clear majority that defense must be cut. Although most recommend reasonable cuts, one oil company executive even told McCloskey, a House veteran, that \$40 billion of defense reductions should be made. And after a town meeting in Sunnyvale, California, home of Lockheed and other defense-related firms, McCloskey claimed that

three out of four participants wanted cuts of \$14 billion or more. In comparison, he said, only a handful of California voters have not expressed concern about the size of the budget deficit and its inflationary potential.

Recognizing these signals, McCloskey and leading moderate Republican Senate hopeful, Rep. Millicent Fenwick, R-N.J., have called for cuts in the defense budget. McCloskey has outlined \$14 billion of reductions by limiting defense spending to a three percent real increase. Fenwick has called for cuts in several major weapons systems, hoping to avoid what one aide called the “crushing dilemma” Republicans face.

Likewise, doubts about the nuclear arsenal have been felt on Capitol Hill. (See **Forum** articles on nuclear freeze.) During a recent Senate colloquy on this issue, several Republican leaders spoke out.

Senator Charles Mathias, R-Md., told the gathering that “the American people are out in front of their leaders. Today, after 3½ decades of attention to other matters, American public attention is focused on this central issue of our time — how to reduce the risk that nuclear war will ever occur.”

Senator Slade Gorton, R-Wash., expressed the same sentiment. After a recent trip home, Gorton said there was a central theme to nearly every question and comment: how to have a safer, saner world. In Gorton's words, “that world will only come about when the ever increasing stockpiles of nuclear arms are controlled, restricted, reduced, and if at all possible, eliminated.”

The impact is also being felt in Illinois. Senator Charles Percy, R-Ill., said a “clear and consistent” signal came through during a recent, overflowing town meeting in Winnetka, Illinois. “Americans are anxious and indeed frightened,” Percy said, “by the prospect of nuclear war in their lifetime.” And most of all, he told the gathering, “there is anxiety over the delay in opening negotiations with the Soviets on strategic arms reductions.”

The most realistic approach to controlling defense spending and its costly effects may come through arms control. As John Chafee, Republican senator from Rhode Island and host of the Senate conference, said, “If we know what we will be allowed to have through arms control agreements, if we know the limitations, then we know how much can be spent and how much cannot be spent.”

Whether these same considerations will be taken to heart in the Pentagon and the White House remains unclear. Although the president's call for long-term reductions in nuclear arsenals is commendable, the attitude remains that a defense buildup is necessary, if not critical. As one Defense Department official said, no one who has seen the Soviet threat could think otherwise.

If it comes to a choice between smaller deficits or a smaller defense, indications from the Pentagon are that larger deficits are the lesser of two evils. They are aware what this will do to members on Capitol Hill facing tough reelection prospects. But they maintain that sacrifices must be made. The question Americans need to ask themselves, says General Mike Cousland, deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, is “what price are they willing to pay for security?”

If recent trends are to be believed, the American people are asking themselves this question. Their answer is not yet complete, but preliminary deductions can be made: reason must reign. The defense increase must not wreak havoc on the economy and realism must guide deterrence strategy. If not, voters will react in November, leaving Republicans the clear losers. What the Reagan administration must ask itself then, is what price is it willing to pay for a defense plan many have begun to question? ■

U.S. National Defense in Perspective

by U.S. Senator John Tower

The striking aspect of this year's defense budget debate is that it has not centered on our national defense needs. For the most part, outside of the Department of Defense and congressional Armed Services Committees, the discussion has been couched in terms of overall budget considerations.

This approach has dangerous implications. National defense is, in fact, the primary responsibility of national government. It also is exclusively a federal function. No state or local government, no private enterprise, can take up the slack left by federal neglect.

Our national defense spending must be driven by the nature of the threat to our national interests in the world. This threat, from the Soviet Union and its surrogates, is growing.

My long experience as a member of the Armed Services Committee has led me to the conclusion that it would be a grave error to make significant reductions in the administration's defense budget.

Global Perspectives

There can be no question that the first point of departure should be an explanation of U.S. foreign policy objectives and our role in today's troubled world.

We have become, in a sense, an island nation heavily dependent on external sources for energy, vital metals and minerals, and on the international marketplace. Open sea lanes are essential to our economic health.

"There must be no illusion that a significant overall reduction in defense will not be noticed by our allies and adversaries. It will also be reflected in a reduction of our capability to wage and sustain combat."

The magnitude of U.S. interests in Europe, Asia, and the Western Hemisphere is represented by our participation in eight formal treaties involving national security commitments to forty-two countries.

The need to fulfill these commitments is driven by a clear perception of national interest. Our military presence overseas is a result of the prudent military axiom which tells us to defend our interests as close to the source of danger, and as far from our borders as possible. The basic objective of our overseas presence is the defense of North America.

Thus, through geographic circumstance and historical and evolutionary processes, our national interests have been determined, and our foreign policy commitments developed to support them.

John Tower is a Republican senator from Texas and the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

These commitments, when combined with an analysis of potential threats, dictate our military requirements.

In recent years, the threats to our interests have increased, demanding the attention of the United States and its traditional allies to repairing unfavorable shifts in the military balance in Europe and in Asia. However, additional threats have arisen in areas not covered by the system of Western alliances, and in Latin America, where our strategic vulnerability must not be underestimated.

Against these military requirements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have long recommended an "acceptable risk" force structure which would support our national security commitments. We are currently well below that recommendation. That is the basis for the judgment of our military leadership that U.S. forces are stretched too thin and that, in the event of serious crisis or conflict, the risks of an unfavorable outcome are too high.

There must be no illusion that a significant overall reduction in defense will not be noticed by our allies and adversaries, and will not be reflected in a reduction of our capability to wage and sustain combat. Such reductions *will* be noticed and will once again cast meaningful force improvements into the uncertain future with a concomitant increase in strategic risk. Members of Congress cannot separate themselves from the foreign policy consequences of defense budget reductions.

The Defense Budget in Perspective

In addition to reviewing the manner in which defense spending supports foreign policy commitments, we should also take a cold, hard look at the annual investment in defense as an element of our total economic effort.

This administration was elected on a policy platform which fully articulated its intent to moderate growth in spending for social programs and increase spending for defense. Though painful to some, this proposed change in priorities is being implemented in a manner much less dramatic than popularly believed.

According to the Congressional Budget Office, administration data indicate that the national defense function would increase from 6.1 percent of gross national product (GNP) in 1982 to 7.3 percent in 1986 and 1987. Over the 1983-1987 period, the administration's proposed outlays would average 6.9 percent of GNP. CBO notes that this is higher than the average for the preceding five years (1978-1982) during which the average defense share of GNP was 5.4 percent. It is lower, however, than the 10 percent average for several years following the Korean War.

CBO goes on to note:

"Relative to total federal unified budget outlays national defense outlays from 1978 to 1982 were about 25 percent — the lowest share since World War II. The administration's 1983 budget indicates that this share would increase to about 37 percent by 1987 — a level last reached in 1971. In the post-World War II period, national defense as a percent of unified budget outlays exceeded 37 percent each peacetime year from 1954 to 1970."

In my view, some reductions in entitlements may be necessary. However, my principal concern is some prominent coalition might

agree to cut defense, with some hoping to reduce the deficit but others actually intending to add money to domestic programs, in which case the defense program would go down and the deficit would remain high — two unacceptable outcomes.

For these reasons, I believe we can safely set aside the argument that the federal budget is abnormally skewed in favor of defense. In historical context, President Reagan's budget still falls short of previous levels of defense spending. Given our greatly weakened defense posture, one might ask whether, in fact, the president is doing enough.

Maintaining the Defense Program

Another important measurement is the level of effort required to maintain the total defense program from year to year. Secretary Weinberger has stated, and CBO has confirmed, that 93 percent of annual defense outlays are already committed when the fiscal year begins. These outlays are composed of military and civilian payrolls, a minimum level of operations and training, and commitments from prior year programs. Thus, even by eliminating all new investment initiatives, the minimum operating cost of defense would be \$200.8 billion in FY 1983.

"It is sheer hyperbole to couch the defense debate in terms of guns and butter. We have an economy which can produce both."

Budget Options

There are numerous ways to address our options in assessing the allocation of defense dollars. Let me assess the realistic options for major defense cuts in terms of the program objectives and priorities which serve as the main pillars of defense spending: readiness, modernization and force structure.

Readiness

Readiness refers to the near-term ability of units to fulfill their assigned missions. It is based on the number and mix of personnel, and on the availability and condition of equipment. So called "readiness accounts" do not exist. Only balanced improvements contribute to solid readiness.

For example, some budget proposals will reduce or freeze military pay. Yet one of our most recent readiness problems has been related to personnel retention. I can guarantee that any backing off from our commitment to improve military compensation will have a negative effect on retention and personnel readiness.

Another area of concern is widespread equipment shortages in ground forces. A basic lack of equipment continues to be the Army's most fundamental readiness problem.

The message is simply this: don't expect to sustain, let alone improve the current readiness of our forces if you intend to generate "savings" in personnel compensation or procurement. Maintaining readiness is a multi-faceted problem, and higher operational and training tempos, which many equate with improved readiness, will actually degrade the readiness of our forces if those forces are undermanned and underequipped.

Modernization

The second option is to reduce modernization or investment.

Since the early 1970s, the Services have strived to implement a modernization program that would be responsive to the changing threat. By all accounts, these modernization plans were under-financed; and we have paid dearly in terms of money lost to inflation and inefficient rates of production, overlapping resource requirements, and reduced capabilities. Major modernization programs are now under way for strategic and ground forces; significant investment requirements for tactical aircraft remain; and an expanded shipbuilding program is planned.

This effort must be balanced. We should not make the mistake of trading systems and capabilities like baseball cards. An appropriate balance among strategic, land, sea, and air forces — and the infrastructure required to support them — is essential to maintain the flexibility required by our political leadership. Moreover, a balanced and sustained modernization effort translates into a warm industrial base which will provide a hedge against mobilization and force expansion scenarios.

Force Structure

In the face of significant budget reductions, the third option is to reduce force structure.

Because our force structure is not now large enough to support effectively our foreign policy commitments, my initial impulse is to reject such reductions. However, in committing ourselves to near-term readiness and to redressing inefficiencies in defense production and quantitative and qualitative deficiencies against the threat, there may be little alternative to reducing the overall size of our forces, should significant defense cuts occur.

Rather than make general reductions in personnel and O&M which are unrelated, the better management method is simply to reduce force structure. By taking force structure, we will ensure a balanced reduction in operations, training, logistical support, and civilian and military personnel.

I should emphasize that I do not favor these force structure reductions but will pursue them if budget pressures become too severe.

While some might charge that this is pure hyperbole, I would suggest they review the budget amendment of last October and the priorities set by Secretary Weinberger in March of 1981. The record will show that defense priorities consist of strategic force modernization, readiness, modernization, and force structure. Force structure growth is the last priority in the current five-year defense plan, and remains the last priority should significant reductions be imposed. When the Services made budget reductions last fall, all three took force structure. The Chiefs of Staff are united in their view that they would rather have a slightly smaller, fully manned and well-armed force structure than one which is, in effect, hollow.

Summary

So given the proposed balance between spending for defense and domestic programs, it is sheer hyperbole to couch the defense budget debate in terms of guns and butter. We have an economy which can produce both. Only a balanced, well-equipped, and ready national defense capability can provide the deterrent to aggression and the global stability upon which our security and our prosperity depend. We must not sacrifice, therefore, this essential capability for some momentary budgetary comfort. ■

National Security in the Reagan Era

by Alton Frye

Raja Rao, the philosopher, once defined the role of scholars in public affairs as a moral imperative: speak truth to power. That is a worthy standard, but the world of public policy is filled with many contending values of which truth is not always the first. Indeed, it is not cynicism to say that wisdom in public policy must range beyond the truth — in the sense of facts thoroughly marshalled and accurately assessed — to issues of interest and objectives outside the reach of mere analysis. Political wisdom is more than evidence; it is judgment in the Solomonic sense of the term. In a democratic community, wise policy must be grounded in evidence but it must be constructed with keen appreciation of the preferences and concerns of those it seeks to serve.

There are few realms of public policy in which it is so difficult to balance these intellectual and political elements as in the field of national security and foreign policy. The arcane nature of defense policy with its megatons and megabucks, its constraints of jargon and classification, often breeds excessive deference to the experts who are presumed to possess the truth about such matters. At the same time, national security issues are prey to the blinding power of emotional rhetoric, playing upon the real and potent fears of an increasingly dangerous world. Both of these polar perils — hyper-intellectualism and hyper-emotionalism — have affected American security policy, sometimes simultaneously. If we are to govern these tendencies, we must bring to discussions of national security issues an alert and wary eye both for the substance of policy and for the political context in which that policy is embedded.

Defense and the Budget

As an example, rising controversy over the fiscal 1983 defense budget and the five-year defense program makes clear that we face excruciating decisions regarding both general budget levels and specific programs. Many legislators are caught in severe cross-pressures between their commitment to a stronger defense and their repugnance for the intolerable deficits contemplated in the president's budget projections — deficits ranging from one to two hundred billion dollars a year in the next several years. Others also wish to strengthen our defenses but will resist mounting expenditures if they involve further curtailment of domestic social spending. There is now little prospect that the president's defense proposals will survive intact. The question is how and in which directions they will be adjusted. My purpose here is not to offer a full blown set of

prescriptions to deal with this many-faceted problem. Rather it is to offer a few ideas which could help delineate a growth path for defense programs capable of marshalling sustained bipartisan support for the coming decade.

Proposals already abound to cut back on the surge of defense spending. Cuts of major magnitude will be difficult to achieve and must be extracted bit by bit from a variety of programs. Different people will have different priorities as to which programs should be cut but prime candidates now include the MX missile program, which offers no solution to the assumed vulnerability problem already plaguing the land-based missile force; the two nuclear carriers, whose enormous capital costs invite either cutback to a single carrier, elimination of both or a shift to conventional power for the ships; and the Navy's F18 aircraft, whose enormous cost growth now makes it scarcely less expensive than the more capable F14. There is some sentiment in senior circles of the Senate Armed Services Committee to avoid major procurement reductions by taking major cuts in existing force structure, perhaps reducing the number of active duty units while improving readiness in the remaining forces.

No less difficult than the job of trimming current defense outlays will be the task of moderating the surge in multi-year obligational authority for defense purposes. Experienced defense professionals from Hyman Rickover to Melvin Laird are exceedingly doubtful that the defense establishment can absorb such extraordinary growth without congestion in the budgetary pipeline and acute inflationary pressures over the next several years. While defense programs require substantial balances for efficient management from year to year, backlogs in obligational authority of the magnitude now likely are bound to create serious inflationary competition for scarce resources and manufacturing facilities at a time when the private economy is struggling to recover. In short, the Congress and the president will have to revise the defense program with an eye to the grave strains under which the American economy is now laboring.

Increasing Revenues

In addition to the stretchout in defense spending which Congress will surely impose, there is a vital need to increase revenues to support the force modernization which will continue. The president has resisted calls from Republicans and Democrats alike to defer portions of the substantial income tax cuts enacted last year. As the search for additional revenues continues, however, one candidate for funding national security programs warrants a fresh look. Despite the widespread aversion to tax increases, one wonders if it might be possible to harness the broad public support for stronger defenses to a defense program modernization tax on gasoline. The timing could hardly be better, since gasoline prices have fallen substantially from their peak in early 1981. Indeed, a tax which

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merely recouped the drop in the average price per gallon, rounded off to an even ten cents per gallon, would produce over \$11 billion in revenues to underwrite new defense initiatives. Such a tax would make good sense in national security terms by further discouraging consumption of the imported oil which has complicated our vulnerability in recent years. Coming at a time when the international oil market is flat, timely imposition of such a tax would also decrease the future leverage of OPEC and would serve a worthy conservation purpose as well. Furthermore, such a tax could cover the bulk of the projected costs for the Rapid Deployment Force now being developed largely to protect Western interests in the Persian Gulf region.

Thus, powerful logic could support such a levy and skillful political leadership could rally a broad coalition to support such a defense program tax. Indeed, the proposal by the AFL/CIO to increase taxes for defense purposes, although different in form, suggests the possibility of diverse support for a special defense levy, partly in order to ward off additional pressure on domestic social programs which have already been sharply pruned.

Whether this idea or some other plan to raise the needed funds ultimately proves wisest, we shall have to muster all our insight and imagination to refine the administration's defense proposals and to fund them satisfactorily.

The Need for Diplomacy

But we should also look at the diplomatic side of the nation's security dilemma. The focus on the alleged window of vulnerability has diverted attention from the window of opportunity which may be open, at least temporarily, for nuclear arms limitations. The pattern here is a familiar one, for the history of arms negotiations is largely a history of lost opportunities. The understandable preoccupation

"The focus on the alleged window of vulnerability has diverted attention from the window of opportunity which may be open, at least temporarily, for nuclear arms limitations."

with the dangers of Soviet deception, bad faith or technological surprise has obscured the great opportunity costs incurred at key junctures over the last decade and a half. Repeatedly, the sluggish, super-cautious pace of negotiations has allowed technological change and steady deployment to multiply the conundrums facing diplomacy. This becomes evident when one poses a series of relevant questions:

- Would American security and international stability be greater in 1982 if the United States and the Soviet Union had entered mutual limits on the deployment of multiple warhead missiles in 1970, as many senators proposed?
- Would they be greater if the Vladivostok Agreement between Presidents Ford and Brezhnev in 1974 had been promptly implemented as the basis for subsequent reductions?
- Would they be greater if the United States and the Soviet Union had promptly completed the SALT II Agreement in early 1977, instead of entering a period of great friction in the aftermath of the Carter administration's March 1977 proposals for a more far-reaching agreement?

- Would the prospect for regulating superpower behavior have improved or declined if the past decade had seen a series of successful nuclear negotiations instead of the abortive and halting measures which have spawned political commotions and arguably higher tensions between Moscow and Washington?

The answers to these questions are not self-evident, but my own conviction is that both powers would be far safer today if their diplomatic efforts had been as vigorous as their military development activities.

The Reagan administration has left no doubt of its skeptical approach to such negotiations. It has refused to ratify the SALT II Treaty and has moved with painstaking slowness to rectify its alleged faults. To his credit, albeit under unrelenting pressure from our European allies, Mr. Reagan has launched intermediate nuclear force negotiations with his November 1981 proposals for the so-called zero option. And he has conveyed a hint of greater flexibility in his far-reaching proposals for strategic arms reduction talks. Beyond their political value as a reassurance to our European associates, these proposals could represent a viable basis for genuine negotiations to take place. Some suspect, however, that the president sees this as an all-or-nothing, take-it-or-leave-it proposition. If so, the outlook for the INF talks is bleak.

Integrated Approaches

Apart from the administration's pronounced skepticism about negotiating arms restraints with those the president once called "monsters," there is not yet apparent a coherent scheme to relate the theater nuclear negotiations to the broader question of strategic force levels. Bluntly stated, the intermediate nuclear force talks cannot succeed without the establishment of a durable strategic arms limitation framework, a fact underscored by the repeated NATO communiqués linking the theater force decisions to the SALT context. One reason for this prognosis is the simple fact that, from the Soviet standpoint, European-based nuclear forces capable of striking the Soviet homeland are, by definition, strategic. Compartmentalized diplomacy has little chance of success in this instance.

Can one define a more integrated approach which relates theater force decisions to the central strategic balance? One promising approach to a comprehensive design for limiting both theater and strategic forces might begin with the differing, though not necessarily contradictory, political requirements laid down by President Reagan and President Brezhnev. Mr. Reagan insists that any future agreement must involve real arms control, by which he means significant reductions in nuclear forces. Mr. Brezhnev, for his part, insists that any future negotiations build upon the positive features of past understandings, including the un-ratified SALT II Treaty.

This suggests an interesting possibility. Might it be feasible to extend the overall ceiling on strategic delivery vehicles specified in SALT II to cover both strategic and long-range theater nuclear forces? Such a device would meet the Brezhnev demand to build upon prior agreements and would serve the Reagan objective of imposing substantial force reductions. Indeed, one notes that such a ceiling might have many of the effects sought in the March 1977 proposal in that it might oblige each side to reduce central strategic systems to approximately 1,700 if it chose to retain 500 or so designated systems for theater purposes, a number quite close to the planned deployment of U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles. From the standpoint of negotiability, such a concept has the attractive features of meeting the Soviet demand to treat long-range theater nuclear forces as strategic and of meeting

the American concern to cover such systems as the Backfire bomber which created so much controversy in discussions of SALT II. One must also note that both Moscow and Washington are already pledged to seek substantial reductions in their joint declaration of principles for the proposed SALT III negotiations and one hears from the diplomatic grapevine that some Soviet leaders now regret having rejected out of hand reductions of this magnitude in the March 1977 proposals by President Carter.

Two special problems would require attention. Something would have to be done regarding the large number of dual-capable aircraft now based on Warsaw Pact and NATO territory. In terms of strengthening conventional deterrence, these aircraft would be far more valuable if they were de-nuclearized and available for immediate use on the authority of local commanders in the event of armored invasions. Without elaborating the argument in detail, one may note here that it should be possible to deal with this issue by eliminating the nuclear storage and handling facilities in the proximity of tactical air bases. This would be a reasonably verifiable provision and, while such aircraft might be reconverted to nuclear missions within a few hours of the onset of war, their initial non-nuclear status should diminish pressures for preemptive strikes against them and for premature escalation by them. It is also the view of some authorities that the nuclear capability of these aircraft is now thoroughly redundant, since potential targets can be covered by other systems available to both the Soviets and the Western allies. The de-nuclearization of tactical aircraft is probably a prerequisite to any significant limitation on long-range theater nuclear forces.

A second problem is even more convoluted and delicate. How should a Soviet-American ceiling deal with the existence of the French, British and Chinese nuclear forces? Without presuming to limit those forces, no ceiling is possible without taking account of their existence. In my view, the United States should seek a flexible arrangement with the Soviets which would permit us to work out with our allies how to allocate that fraction of the nuclear force quota to be deployed in or around Europe. Should future growth in French or British nuclear forces move beyond the overall ceiling, we would retain the right either to adjust U.S. deployments or to concede the right of the Soviet Union to some compensatory deployments. An agreement of this kind would have the useful property both of retaining a measure of collective decision-making among Western allies and of creating pressures for restraint on future European nuclear deployments, since our European partners might not welcome either a likely reduction in U.S. nuclear forces in Europe or an increase in Soviet forces legitimized by prior Western actions.

Pragmatism, Not Dogmatism

This outline, of course, does not pretend to exhaust the complexities which such an agreement must resolve. But the critical need now is a vision, a concept, a sense of direction to restore momentum to the faltering process of nuclear diplomacy. Without fresh initiatives of this nature, American and allied strength will be sapped by corrosive disagreements. In the absence of negotiated restraints, a re-invigorated American defense posture will purchase less security than it otherwise could.

If the president is to salvage the precious consensus on national security, he must demonstrate that he is more pragmatist than dogmatist by propounding a program of both defense and diplomacy. To do so, he must move now to forge a coalition of the constructives embracing both liberal and conservative members of the House and Senate. For he can only succeed if he recognizes that many of those who did not work for his election are prepared to work for his success as president of all the people. ■

From Rhetoric to Reality: A New U.S. Approach to Gulf Security

by Les Janka

Other writers in this issue have emphasized the importance of building up U.S. conventional forces. A major component of this buildup is a "Rapid Deployment Force" designed for military contingencies in Southwest Asia. Recent and current defense budgets have included several billion dollars to enhance U.S. capability to deter or contain a Soviet military thrust into that region. Nearly a billion dollars is currently programmed to improve various facilities in the region as operating footholds for the Rapid Deployment Force. However, the realities and complexities of the Gulf region demand that more attention be paid to the political environment affecting U.S. interests there than to the more familiar and manageable issues of geography and hardware. Accordingly, this article analyzes the political context within which U.S. defense resources must be applied to effectively protect and advance U.S. interests in this critical area.

American attention has shifted from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Gulf region because it is in the Gulf that we must act to protect the petroleum resources vital to the economies of the West and critical to the Western defense posture. Concern about Soviet influence in a fractured Iran and strengthened U.S. relations with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, both potential regional powers, will assume higher priority than the stalemated Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where Israeli military dominance and relative security will increase as Lebanon and Syria continue to crumble religiously and politically. After the turbulent and tragic events in the Middle East during 1981, the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai provides the United States a fresh opportunity to reassess its national interests in the region and to recast its foreign and defense policies into closer alignment with those interests and regional political realities. Such new policies will effectively advance American defense objectives only if the Reagan administration is responsive to the legitimate security and development concerns of the Arab Gulf states.

American Interests in the Region

Short of preventing nuclear war, there is no higher priority for U.S. policy makers than ensuring peace and stability in the Middle East and the Gulf. The Western stake in the region is so vital that failure in this pursuit could jeopardize the economic health of the West and Japan, the prestige and credibility of the United States as a world leader, the cohesion of the Western alliance and ultimately the global balance of power.

America's national interests within the region fall into four fundamental categories: maintaining freedom of access to oil, preventing the expansion of Soviet power and influence in the area, developing our economic and political cooperation with the Arab world, and honoring our national commitment to the independence and security of Israel. The challenge lies not in identifying these

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interests, but in pursuing simultaneously such diverse and sometimes competing objectives. The first step is to assess priorities among these interests and within our broader global interests.

In the Middle East the top American priority is, and must be, assured access to the region's oil supplies. Although we may wish it were otherwise, the United States will remain dependent on Middle Eastern oil to meet significant domestic energy needs. So is the economic survival of Western Europe and Japan, whose collapse would radically alter our own political and economic future as well as the global strategic environment. Even though massive efforts to conserve and to develop alternate sources have greatly lessened imports, there is simply no prospect that the West and Japan can free themselves from their dependency on Gulf oil in the near term.

The realities of our global competition with the Soviet Union, combined with our need for Middle Eastern oil, require an equally high priority on limiting Soviet influence in the area. The threat is not that Moscow would directly cut off Western oil supplies. The greater danger is that, in acquiring a dominant influence in the oil-producing countries, the Soviet Union would gain unparalleled economic and political leverage, forcing the West Europeans and Japanese to accommodate themselves to Soviet power and shifting the global balance virtually overnight.

Close behind these two priorities is a major interest in maintaining our commitment to the security and independence of Israel. This is essential to our own ideals and to American international credibility; it is crucial to insuring domestic support to our foreign policy; and it is vital to preventing a new outbreak of war in the Middle East. Finally, the United States has broad and increasingly important interests in continuing and expanding its cooperation with the Arab world. This is key to maintaining the stability of the international financial system, managing the flow of energy supplies, building markets for our goods, and maintaining military and commercial communication through the region.

In a broader context, the restoration of American military credibility abroad and the recovery of our economy at home are the priority objectives of a Republican administration anxious to restore the U.S.-Soviet balance. Continued access to Middle East oil is necessary to make these possible. Fitting this objective into the larger framework of U.S. ends and means drives the priorities and tradeoffs that must be made in the Middle Eastern theater. In such a global perspective, the traditional U.S. support for Israel cannot be separate from our requirements for secure energy supplies. As contrary to established Washington rhetoric as this might be, only such an unfettered perspective on U.S. interests will produce a set of Middle East policies capable of ensuring security for Israel and stability for the entire region.

Obstacles to Effective Policy Making

Within the Middle East the next few years will see (1) a continuation of the destabilizing effects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, (2) new challenges to the internal stability of Arab states resulting from rapid economic and social transformation, and (3) divisions and rivalry within the Arab world, with the potential for additional conflict among Arab states or between Arabs and Iran. Making these trends more dangerous is renewed energy and capability in the historic Soviet drive for influence in the region. If the United States is to have a rational approach that meets the challenges of the 1980s and secures American interests in this complex environment, we must take a fresh, hard-headed look at recent U.S.-Middle East policies and at some of the basic assumptions that lie behind them.

Before we can discuss what must be done to build stability in the Gulf, we must first critically examine generally held assumptions that American interests in the Middle East coincide precisely with

those of Israel. Largely due to domestic political considerations, particularly in the Congress, American leaders have consistently failed to distinguish between the American commitment to the security of Israel and Washington's acceptance of and support of the particular views and policies of a given Israeli government. Our support for Israel need not be uncritical or unlimited; too often it has led us to surrender our own independence of perception and policy in the Middle East. Our relations with the Arab world are badly served by the impression we have given that the Israeli government has a veto over American policies.

Both Israel and the United States have vital interests in a stable Middle East free of Soviet influence. Given Israel's critical, almost total, dependence on U.S. support, Americans can reasonably expect a greater degree of Israeli sensitivity to U.S. interests than the attacks on Baghdad and Beirut in July, 1981 demonstrated. A profound friendship of genuine admiration has been dangerously abused. A more objective relationship, based on a sounder foundation of mutual respect for each other's vital interests, will better serve both nations through the challenges ahead.

"Short of preventing nuclear war, there is no higher priority for U.S. policymakers than ensuring peace and stability in the Middle East and the Gulf region."

Such objectivity will also require a skeptical view of the Begin government's assertion that Israel is a significant strategic asset to the United States. Contrary to current mythology, the basis for the U.S. commitment to Israel is not fundamentally strategic. We must distinguish Israel's need to be important to the U.S. from our real strategic imperatives. Israel has not had a major function in the traditional East-West military calculus, and Pentagon contingency planning does not rely on more than a tertiary Israeli contribution to the West's strategic position. Indeed, Israel more frequently enters contingency planning out of concern that a new war between Israel and its Arab neighbors might provoke a broader war between the superpowers.

Israel's respected military capability and superb facilities are indeed valuable potential assets to the United States, but their actual utility is highly dependent upon the nature of the crisis in which we might need them. As we think about security in the region, we must recognize that as long as Israel holds onto the occupied territories, the Arabs will find military cooperation that also involves Israel unacceptable and destabilizing. The prolongation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and our close support for, and consequent identification with, Israel will continue to severely limit our own ability to forge closer security links with the Arab Gulf states aimed at restricting Soviet influence. The Reagan administration's efforts in September of last year to flesh out such a strategic relationship appeared to ignore these limitations.

We must also challenge generally held assumptions regarding the Soviet threat and the U.S. military presence required to protect American interests in the Gulf region. Closely linked with arguments in favor of Israel's strategic value to the United States, these assumptions hold that the Soviets have overwhelming military capabilities close to the region, that Soviet encroachment, rather than local instability, is the primary threat, and that the U.S. position will be enhanced by permanent military bases with full-time U.S. ground forces in the area.

We must be cautious not to accept at face value assumptions that the Soviets stand ten feet tall on the borders of the region and claims that only a substantial U.S. military presence will suffice to protect our interests. What is needed is careful analysis, not overreaction.

Despite considerable publicity given to a perceived Soviet superiority provided by 10, 20 or 30 Soviet divisions on its southern borders, a detailed study of the USSR's ability to project that force 1,000 miles toward the Gulf leads to a somewhat less hysterical view. The Soviet threat is real, but in terms of an ability either to push heavy armor divisions through the Caucasus and Zagros Mountains or to airlift a significant military force to the Gulf and support it with a well-defended logistics tail, the Soviet capability is more limited. In short, their "Rapid Deployment Force" may not be any better than our "Rapid Deployment Force."

While it is true that the revolution in Iran seriously weakened America's strategic position in the region, the trend of events following Iraq's invasion of Iran reveals a situation less tragic than pundits proclaimed. Two years ago, who would have predicted the frequent if not constant presence of a two-carrier U.S. task force in the Arabian Sea with 1,800 marines aboard, or a U.S. guided missile cruiser (coordinated by Saudi based AWACS patrols) providing a significant air defense barrier at the head of the Gulf?

We must also recognize that the major threats to U.S. security interests in the Gulf are more political and regional in nature rather than military aggression or direct Soviet intervention. A U.S. overreaction to such Soviet threats, and a concerted effort to force our friends in the Gulf to accept that perception, could in fact exacerbate local tensions that more directly threaten our interests. Moreover, American attempts to create a strategic military partnership with Israel have only created further obstacles to Arab acceptance of our good faith and intentions in shaping the American response to Gulf security concerns.

While U.S. military capabilities are essential to protect the Middle East and Gulf from extra-regional or proxy-forces, no U.S. military power can provide internal stability. Our objective should be portrayed and explained to our Arab friends as a partnership in which we provide deterrence and defense against mutual external threats, while encouraging our friends to defend themselves against dangers internal to the region. One mutually urgent requirement, for example, would be strengthening vulnerable oil facilities against sabotage.

In the Gulf region, too visible an American military presence could contribute to precisely the regional instability we are seeking to avoid. In particular, we should not try to force the acceptance of permanent military bases with full-time U.S. ground forces in the region. We cannot afford to ignore historic Arab sensitivities to centuries of Western encroachment and the sincere warnings from Arab governments with close ties to the West that they cannot accept permanent military bases on their soil. Too many articles have appeared recently that ignore these sensitivities and take for granted Arab ability to receive a Western presence — or worse, imply that such forces are aimed at unstable or unfriendly local regimes, rather than at mutual threats.

It is difficult to think of a more counterproductive move on the part of the United States than trying to pressure governments like those of Egypt or Saudi Arabia into providing bases which they are convinced will destabilize their own countries. Instead, what is needed is an effective American rapid response capability based on an over-the-horizon presence that includes a permanent naval force in the Indian Ocean, access to facilities in times of crisis, improvement of intelligence and warning capabilities, and pre-positioning of supplies. This must be done in the context of a global restoration of U.S. military capabilities, which will be the real strength underlying any American deterrent to Soviet adventures in the Gulf.

At the same time we can support indigenous efforts at regional security cooperation and enhance the ability of our friends to defend themselves against local and internal threats that will exist independently of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This can be accomplished

in part through limited arms sales and military training along with steps to help regional states improve their own internal security systems against terrorism and local insurgencies. Because stable moderate Arab states are the best barrier to Soviet expansion in the Middle East, the United States should do all it can to build up the sinews of modern nationhood and self-sufficiency in the region.

A New Strategy for Gulf Security

In light of the realities suggested above, the following measures might be considered in laying a foundation for new American Middle East policies based on the protection of American interests against Soviet encroachments in the region.

First, our political leaders must find the courage to acknowledge that American and Israeli objectives in the Middle East are not totally congruent and, in some respects, often contradictory. To the degree that American global responsibilities clash with Israel's shorter vision of Middle East realities, we must be prepared to treat Israel as any ally whose interests we respect but do not allow to override our own.

"Within the Middle East the next few years will see: 1) a continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 2) new challenges to the internal stability of Arab states and 3) division and rivalry within the Arab world."

Second, the United States should place its continued efforts to achieve a peace settlement in the context of its broader objectives in the region. To the degree that continued American pressure on the Arabs for compromise and accommodation is not matched by Israeli readiness to restrain expansionist impulses and to take the additional risks required for an evolution to peaceful relations with its neighbors, the United States should not pursue a hopeless or counterproductive course. The search for a just and lasting peace will remain fundamental to the long term security of both Israel and the Arab states as well as to their view of the United States as a reliable and essential friend. However, pending that distant success, we might be better served by a more aloof stance that avoids creating undue expectations and relies on other available means to foster a positive stability in the region. With such a new perception, the United States could establish healthier bilateral relations with most states in the region and take steps to protect its near-term regional objectives free of the constant constraints of a mediator's role.

Third, we must reject both the approach that holds that solving the Palestinian problem is a substitute for taking concrete steps to improve our own and our friends' military capability in the Gulf, and the approach that offers a purely military response in the belief that stability can be assured without a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the resurgence of Islam have rendered the peoples of the Arab world even more uncomfortable with communism and the Soviet Union. Coupled with the stalemate of the Camp David process and a recognition by the "rejectionist" states that their opposition has only brought a deterioration in their international position, these events provide us a new opportunity to recast our relations with the region on the basis of genuine mutual interests rather than reacting to the outdated rhetoric of the Arab-Israeli conflict. To the degree that the United States demonstrates that it is ready to act in accordance with its own national interests in the Gulf and respond even-handedly to the legitimate security and national development needs of the regional states, a Middle East more compatible with U.S. interests may emerge. ■

Republicans and the Nuclear Arms Freeze

by Mark Harroff and Joe McMahon

On three of the most significant issues of the past two decades, the Republican Party failed to project to the American people an image of either moral or substantive leadership. Ironically, the party of Lincoln failed to associate itself with the cause of equal opportunity and justice for black Americans; the party of Eisenhower failed to be the driving force behind a Vietnam policy that worked; and the party of Teddy Roosevelt did more to inhibit, rather than enhance, the popular movement to protect and preserve America's natural resources.

On these issues, Republicans, at best, are perceived to have been like the politician in the fable who said, "there go my people; I must catch up so I can lead them." At worst, we are considered to have been obstructionists.

The national movement for a bilateral nuclear arms freeze is not unlike the civil rights, environmental and Vietnam movements. With widespread popular interest and heavy moral overtones, the issue is one to which the Republican Party must respond. How we do that will — substantively and symbolically — influence voter responsiveness to Republicans for many years to come.

The current move in favor of a bilateral nuclear weapons freeze between the United States and the Soviet Union has captured public attention and support like no other movement in recent memory.

The reasons for this public response are varied and complex. But almost without exception, the rationale behind the freeze movement is understandable. It's the rationale for the precise approach to weapons control espoused by the freeze movement that is flawed.

Much of the literature and rhetoric of the freeze movement detail the likely results of nuclear war. Indeed, few would quarrel with predictions of the catastrophic destruction that would result from an all-out exchange of U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons. We can all be assured that millions would die and the very fabric of our society would be crippled or destroyed.

Fears also exist about the possibility of a nuclear weapons exchange that could be triggered by an equipment malfunction or a strategic or political miscalculation.

Polls show that these fears are held by overwhelming numbers of Americans. Their concerns are, to various degrees, valid. Republicans and the administration must recognize them as such from the outset. Symbolically, our party has everything to lose and little to gain by being cast as the side of the freeze debate that is not equally as fearful of — and committed to preventing — a nuclear nightmare.

What is more difficult to resolve is the task of determining the wisest U.S. defense and foreign policy in the face of this nuclear threat. However, if Americans perceive Republicans to be as concerned about the threat itself, then we will have a chance for our substantive approach to the problem to be rationally considered and supported.

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Retaining Flexibility

The most serious concern about the freeze movement among many policymakers is the very simplicity of its premise. Clearly stated, it calls for a U.S.-Soviet agreement to halt the testing, production and further development of all nuclear weapons, missiles and delivery systems in a manner that can be verified by both sides.

This premise leads to one overriding question that receives little or no substantive response from freeze advocates. How, we must ask, does such a freeze position lead to U.S.-Soviet negotiations that can result in the actual *reduction* of nuclear weapons and delivery systems? The answer, unfortunately, is that it doesn't.

Preparedness is the key to our overall strategy of deterrence, a strategy that has served us well for a generation by assuring that the Soviet Union would suffer unacceptable retaliation if it launched a nuclear attack on the United States or its allies. For years following the dawn of the nuclear age this theory proved sufficient to guarantee U.S. security, especially during the period when the U.S. had unquestioned nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.

During the last decade, however, the Soviet buildup of nuclear weapons, primarily a rapid increase in the number, size, and accuracy of land-based missiles, has raised questions about the strength and durability of our deterrence. At the same time, the U.S. deployed no new land-based missiles, strategic bombers or submarine-launched missiles.

It is futile to argue whether the U.S. is inferior or equal to Soviet nuclear forces. In some instances, such as number of missiles, the Soviets outnumber the U.S. However, the U.S. outnumbers the Soviets in numbers of nuclear warheads. We do know, obviously, that the U.S. is no longer in a position of unquestioned nuclear superiority. Our goal, therefore, should be negotiations that lead to actual arms reductions.

Incentives to Negotiate

Arms negotiations require incentives, which points up the primary flaw in the freeze movement. Given the recent Soviet buildup in nuclear weapons capability and the failure of the U.S. to modernize its strategic nuclear forces, we face a basic dilemma in motivating the Soviet Union to engage in meaningful arms reduction negotiations.

The source of such motivation rests with U.S. willingness to modernize its strategic nuclear forces. Freeze proponents often ridicule this approach, branding it as a "build now to reduce later" strategy that defies logic. But they miss the point. The key is U.S. willingness to modernize forces, expressed through a strong administration and congressional commitment to fund such modernization in a timely manner with economic prudence.

Experience indicates that the Soviet Union responds to firm commitments to modernize forces. Negotiations that led to the ABM treaty got underway in earnest only after Congress indicated a willingness to build an ABM system. Similarly, the Soviets showed no interest in entering serious talks aimed at limiting or reducing nuclear weapons in Europe until NATO made a commitment to deploy Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles.

A commitment to modernize our land, air, and sea-based strategic

nuclear forces will send a clear message to the Soviets. It will show U.S. willingness to maintain our deterrence and be the primary incentive to U.S.-Soviet arms reduction talks.

A freeze in the absence of an expression of such willingness is likely to lead to a protracted period of stalemate over arms reduction talks. This kind of stalemate would provide the ultimate irony of the freeze movement by actually freezing the nuclear threat we all fear without encouraging the arms reductions we all seek.

Major uncertainties, obviously, plague the effort to begin meaningful arms reduction talks. A real concern is the stability of the Soviet leadership and the likely line of succession. Another is the lack of agreement over the location and date for such talks. Nevertheless, every effort must be made to act soon so that talks can begin after full preparation to provide the best possible chances for success.

The maintenance of peace is the goal of our defense and foreign policy. To reduce the risk of war, we must achieve the lowest possible level of U.S.-Soviet military balance. This can best be done by showing our willingness to maintain those forces that provide a credible deterrence and provide the incentive for arms reductions negotiations.

Republicans are presented with an enormous opportunity by the grass-roots interest in the nuclear threat and arms issue. By projecting an image that we are second to none in our commitment to lessening that threat, while aggressively pursuing an alternative approach to the freeze that will, in fact, work, we can earn the support of the millions for whom this will be the moral issue of the decade. ■



The Chairman's Corner: Salt II and the Nuclear Freeze

by Jim Leach

Someone once observed that war is too important a business to be conducted exclusively by generals. By their support of the nuclear freeze movement, the American people are proclaiming that arms control — that is, survival — is too vital a concern to be left exclusively to politicians.

Perhaps the most mischievous notion in modern politics is that the United States may be in a position of nuclear inferiority with the Soviet Union and that American security is somehow jeopardized by a "window of vulnerability."

As Dickens might have said: "this is humbug." When American armed forces have the capacity to destroy the Soviet Union many times over, there is no such conceptualization as inferiority. Death is death. A human being cannot die twice.

The problem with the anti-freeze partisans is that their position hinges on two assumptions: 1) that the Soviets will stand still as we develop more weapons. This is nonsense. History shows that the Soviet Union will commit at least as much as we do to further weapons development. 2) anti-freeze partisans assume that more nuclear weapons really matter. This, too, is nonsense. In a world of nuclear overkill and redundancy, the U.S. and the Soviet Union are like two rivals locked in a small room in a duel to the death where one has 1,400 pistols and the other 1,200. The one with 1,400 has no advantage. One of the parties is likely to be killed or maimed with the first pistol used, and the survivor is likely to be wounded with ricochet slugs.

The terror implied in the arms control stalemate makes it anything but a fad. A fad in American politics might be defined as an idea without a constituency. The monumental difference between the arms control movement today compared to a year ago or twenty-six years ago is that it has become quintessentially middle-class. It is not a liberal movement, nor a youth movement, nor a partisan undertaking.

For the first time in American politics arms control initiatives are grassroots; they are pushing energetically from the bottom up, from the hamlets and cities of America to our government.

In no uncertain terms the American people are saying that issues of survival cannot be allowed to stultify in the demagoguery of

presidential campaign rhetoric. Expressions of concern have become institutionalized in churches, synagogues, business, unions, professional associations of doctors, lawyers, scientists, and teachers. Middle-class America is taking a stand.

The surprise isn't how rapidly the arms control issue has materialized as a popular national movement, but how late it has been in blooming.

The president's May 9 speech at his alma mater, Eureka College, therefore represents a timely recognition of the vital importance of entering into strategic arms control negotiations aimed at significant reductions in nuclear weaponry.

It must be recognized, however, that the negotiation of a strategic arms accord based on these principles will be an exceedingly difficult and time-consuming endeavor. If nothing is done to put a cap on the strategic arms race in the interim, the further development of destabilizing weapons on both sides may increase the danger of nuclear war and complicate prospects for eventually reaching agreement on substantial reductions of the kind proposed by the president. The very far-reaching nature of the president's START proposal has thus made it more, rather than less, important that existing restraints on the arms race be maintained and formalized.

There is simply no plausible reason for opposing ratification of SALT II, which in fact puts a cap on deployment of the most destabilizing strategic weapons. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recently observed: "I have great difficulty understanding why it is safe to adhere to a non-ratified agreement while it's unsafe formally to ratify what one is already observing."

It is therefore time to shelve the destabilizing rhetoric of the last presidential campaign and get down to the serious business of serious arms control. And it is also time to recognize that unwarranted delay can be a profoundly destabilizing factor in arms control.

The slow pace of U.S. decisionmaking coupled with the rigidity of administration rhetoric also runs the risk of precipitating a Soviet decision to wait out the next two and a half years in the hope of dealing with future American leadership that might be perceived as less antagonistic.

Time is therefore of the essence if the START initiatives of this administration are to be taken seriously by the Kremlin. It is patently clear that the best means of building the mutual confidence that must underlie strategic arms reductions is to ratify an existing agreement, the fruit of years of negotiations, that so serves our mutual interest that it has thus far been informally observed by both sides even in the absence of formal ratification. START negotiations have to start somewhere, and there could be no more forceful a signal of American resolve than ratification of SALT II. ■

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A Special Report: The Ripon-Bow Conference

The First Transatlantic Conference sponsored by the British Conservative Party's Bow Group and the Ripon Society was held in Washington, D.C. from April 21-24. Participating in the conference were members of Parliament, Congress, and the Thatcher and Reagan governments. Other noted panelists joined this prestigious group in discussing issues of British-American concern.

The gathering had particular significance as the Falkland Islands crisis gained international attention. Panels, in fact, were held on: "The Future of NATO" and "The Objectives and Coordination of Foreign and Defense Policy."

Addressing the NATO discussion were U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, British Minister of State for Defense Peter Blaker, and U.S. Senate Armed Services Chairman John Tower. Blaker, in his remarks which were covered by a number of news services and the American television networks, said that the issue at stake in the South Atlantic was not simply the future of 1800 people, nor of the Falkland territory, but "of the principle by which we all wish the world to be governed. The rule of law or the rule of force."

Blaker added: "We shall of course see if there are any lessons to be learned from the Falklands crisis when the dust has settled. But the central thrust of Britain's defense policy remains an essentially NATO oriented policy . . ." The top ranking civilian in Britain's Ministry of Defense also pointed out that his nation is the second largest contributor to NATO, giving nearly 5 percent of its annual gross national product to NATO operations.

Weinberger and Tower joined Blaker in confirming strong support for NATO, saying that the U.S. could not survive without a secure Western Europe. Although he said that President Reagan wants an immediate reduction in medium range arms, Weinberger reiterated the Reagan pledge to rebuild national defense. "History," the defense secretary said, "is against those who oppose rearmament."

The two American leaders also claimed that the Soviet menace must not be overlooked as the "military threat is greater today than ever before." According to Weinberger, the USSR has doubled its real defense spending since the 1960s, increased its forces by 30 percent, and expanded without limit for the past two decades. Tower also added that the U.S. can have a strong defense and a strong economy.

Former U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James Elliot Richardson emceed the second foreign policy panel. Joining him were Cyril Townsend, member of Parliament and chairman of the Bow Group Foreign Affairs Committee, Keith Best, also a member of Parliament, and U.S. Senator Mark Andrews. In trying to eliminate the threat of nuclear war, Richardson said, the goal of American foreign policy should be "to lock a stalemate into place." By this, the noted Republican leader surmised, both sides should get into a strategic position where nuclear war is not possible.

Most panelists agreed that credibility and coordination were crucial to the functioning of a smooth foreign policy. A strong domestic policy, some said, is quite important for international harmony and the role of foreign aid must not be overlooked.

Credibility, according to the panel, involves usable military units, strategic deployment forces, and shared defense arrangements.

Ripon Chairman Jim Leach led a panel during the second day of the conference on "The Battle for the Third World." Participating were U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Elliot Abrams, British M.P. Sir Peter Emery, U.S. International Communication Agency Director Charles Wick, and Bow Group Chairman Niranjan DeVa Aditya.

In opening remarks before reporters and network cameras, Congressman Leach claimed that the West can win the battle for the Third World if it understands the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Union. According to Leach, the Soviet capacity to produce weapons is insufficient as "their ideology is bankrupt" and will only lead to a "strategy of destabilization."

Aditya, a native of Sri Lanka, said that Third World nations are developing a "spontaneous taste for free enterprise." Despite an early dose of socialism, he pointed out that many underdeveloped countries are rekindling their beliefs in market economics and democracy, which he indicated is a prerequisite for free enterprise.

Economics was also the focus of two other panels. A comparison of Reaganomics and Thatcherism kicked off the three day gathering and drew a spirited debate from panelists Jack Kemp, Richard Rahn, Paul Craig Roberts, Mark Carlisle, and Mr. Emery. The first three are noted "supply-siders," while Carlisle is a former member of the Thatcher cabinet.

Rep. Claudine Schneider, R-R.I., Robert Woodson, chairman of the National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise, and Rep. Tim Petri, R-Wis., joined author George Gilder and John Lee, a member of Parliament, in discussing internal economic issues. This included an analysis of the British welfare state, American productivity, and shared concerns about labor relations.

Other panels were held on realignment in British and American politics, reindustrialization, and the role government plays in a free economy. These drew a wide range of experts, including columnist David Broder, former Senator Hugh Scott, R-Pa., and Clifford Brown, author of the Ripon book, *Jaws of Victory*.

But perhaps the highlight of the conference came during its close when a joint Ripon-Bow press conference was held. With reporters from the BBC, cable networks, and Washington stations in attendance, Congressman Leach and Mark Carlisle, senior British representative on the trip, spoke on behalf of their respective delegations in condemning "the naked aggression of the government of Argentina."

In a joint communique issued at the press conference by the Ripon Society and the Bow Group, the organizations' officers called upon the United States (days before the government actually did so) to "cut off all Argentine exports to the United States until the crisis is resolved." The communique went on to cite the "special relationship" had by Britain and the United States and concluded with a reaffirmation of "our common heritage" and a commitment "to deal together with our common problems."

The Bow Group is a Conservative Party research organization

with 110 members in Parliament, 26 members in the European Parliament, eight members in the Thatcher cabinet, and nearly 400 members at-large. Their goal is to provide intellectual guidance for the party through political analyses. Formed in 1951, the Bow Group has also been credited with providing the inspiration for the Ripon Society when it first began in 1962.

Judging from the number of attendees, the attention of the international press and, most importantly, the quality of ideas discussed, the conference was quite a success. But, as with all such events, this would not have been possible without the efforts of many "loyal foot soldiers." In particular, conference co-chairmen Frederic Kellogg, Niranjana DeVa Aditya, and Steven Livengood deserve special thanks. They not only provided the original idea for the event but also coordinated its implementation. Many thanks go to all, and we look forward to the next gathering.

Fred Kellogg was also the author of a recent Ripon study which has received widespread acclaim. The paper, entitled "A Plan for Reform of the Criminal Justice System," called for abolishing insanity defenses, establishing commissions to replace judges and juries in determining sentences, and making criminals compensate their victims. These proposals as reported in a recent broadcast of "The CBS Evening News" and in a number of daily papers, are designed to reduce the level and cost of crime as well as to relieve the plight of innocent victims. One of the most interesting replies came, however, from a former convict. Citing the need to "take the profit out of crime," the ex-auto theft ringleader said that the psychology of the criminal must be understood in order to develop a workable crime solution. This, he said, begins with making sure crime does not pay. For a copy of the Ripon analysis, please send \$1.50 to: The Ripon Society, 419 New Jersey Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003.

Interest in Ripon chapters continues to grow. During the April annual meeting, chapters at Harvard and in Boston were granted provisional status. Since both have been active in hosting candidate forums and providing research work, it will most likely be a matter of time before they meet all by-law regulations.

In fact, Boston Ripon has made plans to host another gubernatorial debate. The first debate was held in March and both events show a spirited desire to encourage the discussion of ideas during a political campaign.

Ripon activity is also occurring in Memphis where Linda Miller, Bill Gibbons, and Aaron Tatum hosted a recent luncheon for "Memphis Moderates." It was a purposefully unstructured meeting, leaving room for "interesting philosophical discussions and good company." Gibbons, a former special assistant to Tennessee Governor Lamar Alexander, has also been named chairman of the Memphis Jobs Conference, an organization formed by Alexander



Joint participants in the Ripon Bow Conference, l to r, British M.P. Mark Carlisle, U.S. Rep. Jim Leach, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.



British Minister of State for Defense Peter Blaker speaks on the future of NATO, while Sir Peter Emery listens.

to develop proposals for job training, youth unemployment, and urban revitalization.

In Iowa, Ripon member John Merriman organized a May meeting in Des Moines to hear Ripon Chairman Jim Leach speak. Over 60 people showed up for the chapter kick-off, and plans are underway for a state wide meeting.

Hawaii is the site of another possible Ripon chapter. State Rep. Michael Liu has been actively recruiting members and already has held two meetings. Anyone interested in joining this group should contact: State Rep. Michael M. Liu, House of Representatives, Honolulu, Hawaii 96813.

The New York Ripon Society remains as busy as ever, too. On June 3, the chapter held a panel discussion on: "The Nuclear Freeze: How Can Nuclear Arms be Controlled?" Participating in the meeting were Keith Best, a member of Parliament and the Bow Group; John Topping, **Ripon Forum** editorial chairman; and Dr. Jonathan Lorch, a representative of the Physicians for Social Responsibility.

In addition, interest has been shown in Houston and Seattle to form Ripon chapters. Anyone wishing to find out more about these groups, or about starting a chapter, please contact: Greg Knopp, The Ripon Society, 419 New Jersey Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003.

The **Ripon Forum** is particularly sad to announce that Richard Kessler, Ripon executive director, and David Vandermeulen, Ripon assistant research director, will be leaving the staff this summer. Kessler will join the Washington lobbying firm of Jack McDonald and Associates, while Vandermeulen will begin law school this fall. It was Kessler who provided the energy and vision needed for last year's renovation efforts, and will leave the organization on a substantially improved basis. Vandermeulen made his mark in authoring papers on alternatives for funding state and local governments and reforming health care financing. Both will be sorely missed, but the **Forum** extends best wishes for their future endeavors. ■



Rep. Leach, Secretary Weinberger, and Minister Blaker listen to conference remarks by U.S. Senator John Tower.

Political Notes and Quotes



Congressional members attending the Ripon 20th anniversary celebration, back row, l to r, Reps. Jim Leach, Larry DeNardis, Stewart McKinney, Barber Conable, Tim Petri, and Bill Green. Front row, l to r, Reps. Marge Roukema, Margaret Heckler, and Silvio Conte.



Rep. Silvio Conte addresses the 20th anniversary dinner.



Senator Mark Andrews accepts his award as an "Outstanding Freshman of the 97th Congress."

The Ripon Society celebrated its 20th anniversary May 27 at a dinner in **Washington, D.C.** The featured speaker was Rep. Silvio O. Conte, R-Ma. and ranking Republican on the House Appropriations Committee. Conte, in his remarks before noted officials and longtime Ripon activists, recounted the early days of the Ripon Society and made note of its contribution to the Republican Party. Through the past 20 years, he noted, "The Ripon Society and its publications have been a sanctuary for those who hold dear the founding principles of our Republic and a haven for those unafraid of being ahead of their time."

The twelve term congressman, who was honored by the Ripon Society as its "Republican of the Year," also spoke on the future of moderates within the GOP. "The time progressive Republicans have been needed the most," Conte said, "has been when our party has had more power in the legislative and executive-branches. Those have been the times to maintain our strength, encourage new ideas, and keep our people and principles united and directed."

The **Forum** would like to congratulate the Ripon Congressional Advisory Board for its part in making the celebration a real success. Currently, plans are being made for similar dinners in New York and Boston, where the Society was formed in 1962...

Special congratulations are in order for Ripon Congressional Advisory Board Member Millicent Fenwick. Rep. Fenwick received the New Jersey GOP senatorial nod in early June. She defeated conservative Jeff Bell (See March **Forum**) and will now face Democrat Frank Lautenberg in November...

Conscious of its image among blacks, the White House has appointed two high ranking black officials to the presidential staff. Melvin L. Bradley, the president's top black aide, was selected along with former Pepsi assistant treasurer Wendell Wilkie Gunn to work on U.S. trade policy. The move was seen as part of a wider effort to improve White House relations with black Americans...

In other moves to close the gap between the president and what one pollster said is "the majority of voters," the RNC has appointed

a labor liaison to its staff. Pat Cleary, the new appointee, formerly was a staff attorney for the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission and is a member of the American Federation of Government Employees (AFL-CIO). He will work to establish what Richard Richards calls "a constructive dialogue with labor." In addition, the RNC head has formed a labor advisory committee and will place a labor rep on the RNC executive committee...

Looking at races around the country, **Connecticut's** Senate contest remains close. As of early June, Democrat Toby Moffett was still the front runner, but Republicans Lowell Weicker and Prescott Bush are chasing hard. Weicker, the incumbent Republican senator who may run as an independent if denied the party nomination, trails Bush by 25 percent in the GOP race. However, in a two-way heat with Moffett, he trails by only three points. (Bush trails Moffett by nine points.) In a three-way contest, Moffett receives 31 percent, Weicker 29, and Bush 25...

In the GOP race for Moffett's congressional seat, State Senator Nancy Johnson, a moderate Republican, is pitted against the 1980 GOP nominee, Nick Schaus. **Forum** correspondent Mike Lewyn reports that Johnson has most of the party pros' support and that her moderate views suit the district. If she gets the nod, Lewyn predicts she will face State Rep. Bill Curry, a liberal Democrat...

Joining the Senate race in **Maryland** is Republican Dallas Merrell. Merrell, a management consultant, filed for candidacy on April 27th, hoping to defeat Larry Hogan for the GOP slot. The former Ford campaign worker also worked on the 1980 Reagan-Bush transition team. He has received campaign assistance from the president's pollster, Richard Wirthlin, and Charles Bailey, former deputy chairman of the RNC...

In **Minnesota**, Ripon National Governing Board member Craig Shaver has announced his candidacy for that state's House of Representatives. He has already received the party endorsement in District 45A, defeating two right wing candidates. Shaver hopes to concentrate on the high costs of workmen's and unemployment comp in Minnesota...

Midwestern Republicans will also lose the service of three very experienced leaders. Rep. Tom Railsback, R-Ill., was defeated in a March primary as was Rep. Edward Derwinski, R-Ill. Railsback, a Ripon Congressional Advisory Board stalwart, was defeated by a New Right candidate, state Senator Kenneth McMillan, while Derwinski, ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was thrown into a race against his congressional pal George O'Brien, the eventual victor. And **Wisconsin** Governor Lee Dreyfus has announced that he will not seek reelection this year. In a surprise move, Dreyfus indicated that he will either return to the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point, where he had been chancellor, or become a television commentator...

And in **Texas**, former Dallas City Councilwoman Lucy Patterson has announced her candidacy for Democrat Martin Frost's congressional seat. Patterson hopes to become the first black woman Republican elected to Congress. She has already blasted the Democrats, claiming they support the Voting Rights Act in Washington but have undermined it in redistricting plans back home. Texas correspondent Paul Cozby also reports that Republicans will be involved in a tough fight for a new seat in Arlington, Texas. Republican Jim Bradshaw, who ran against House Majority Leader Jim Wright in 1980, will challenge former Arlington Mayor Tom Vandergriff, a Democrat, for the state's 26th congressional district post. ■