Electability is the new Republican issue. It is the pitch being used by both Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan. Both men must recognize that they are now the underdog against Jimmy Carter in November. An early, placid Democratic convention and a late, acrid Republican one poison Republican chances from the outset.

For the sake of winning the Presidency and for the sake of preserving the party at its lower levels, Gerald Ford is the clear winner on "electability." The most recent Gallup Poll showed Carter leading Ford, 53-39 percent, while Reagan trailed 58-35 percent.

Among Republicans, Ford has consistently led Reagan this spring. A May survey by Louis Harris showed that Ford had a 60-30 percent advantage over Reagan, even leading him 48-40 percent in the South. Only through the disproportionate allocation of GOP convention delegates, the winner-take-all California primary (which an overwhelming majority of that state's GOP voters oppose according to a recent Field Poll), and the packing of GOP caucuses has Ronald Reagan made the Republican race into a close contest.

Reagan partisans, like columnist Patrick Buchanan, argue that Reagan has a chance to pull off a West-South strategy. Ford, Buchanan argues, would be wiped out in the South and West. "For Reagan, however, or for a Reagan-John Connally ticket, there is a plausible scenario for Republicans to recapture the White House. They would be better than even money across the South with its 130 electoral votes. Add to that California with its 55 electoral votes; Indiana and the upper New England states of Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont for 24 more; and you are within a single major state (Ohio or Illinois or New Jersey) of victory in the Electoral College." Even Buchanan admitted in a subsequent column that Reagan would still be an "underdog" against Carter.

The Reagan Sunbelt strategy is based on wishful thinking and outdated political behavior. Republican success in the South in the last six Republican presidential elections has been due at least as much to Democratic forfeit as Republican fortune. The GOP will have no such luck this year; indeed, its record of success has been declining rather than rising as it did in the 1960's. The number of Republican legislators is stagnant or falling in most southern states. There are fewer bright new political stars to run for governor or Congress. The defeat of an exceptionally able Republican candidate for governor in Mississippi in 1975 provided a salient political point: the GOP cannot win without attracting a sizable portion of the black vote in the South. The GOP has neglected the black vote in the South at its own peril.

Somehow, Reagan's supporters believe that they can build on 1964. Goldwater captured Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina in 1964. But even George Wallace and Strom Thurmond have courted the black vote in recent statewide elections. And even Georgia State Sen. Julian Bond(D) will find Carter preferable to Ronald Reagan. The breaches and divisions in southern Democratic parties which have allowed GOP victories in the past will undoubtedly be closed by Carter. Even the loyalist and regular factions of the Mississippi Democratic Party have merged. The term "Solid South" will have new meaning for the first time in nearly three decades.

The weakness of a Sunbelt strategy for Reagan was recently outlined by no less an authority on previous southern strategies than Kevin P. Phillips, who recently wrote in his newspaper column: "Today, however, with Ronald Reagan at the reins, the new southern strategy is being handled with less effectiveness and..."
wrote: "From where I sit, Reagan boys may be blowing it."

Citing Reagan's gaffes on Social Security and the Tennessee Valley Authority, Phillips wrote: "From where I sit, far from being a plus factor in Reagan's blueprint, Carter ought to be considered a major minus factor. After all, the Georgian has won every southern Democratic presidential primary save Alabama's, and his popular vote totals across Dixie dwarf those of the former governor of California. Moreover, Jimmy Carter, Baptist peanut farmer and 1970 gubernatorial race cheerleader for George Wallace, undercuts potential Republican appeal to farmers, Wallacites and evangelical Protestant voters, all of whom were critical participants in Nixon-Era Southern strategies."

It didn't take many Wallacite voters to cross party lines and swell Reagan's victory margin in southern primaries this year. The effect of the Wallace crossover vote in a GOP primary is quite different, however, from the impact needed to win a general election. Many Wallace voters stayed home or voted for Carter this spring; however, enough crossed over to make Reagan seem to be their new hero. Take the Arkansas primary where the top ranks of the party backed Ford but Reagan easily won the GOP primary with 63 percent of the vote. One might think that Wallace-leaning voters swarmed to the polls but Reagan received only 20,209 votes. Carter, whose only real opponent was Morris Udall, garnered 315,543 votes. Arkansas hardly would seem fertile ground on which to plant a Reagan Sunbelt strategy. In another state where the crossover impact was expected, Georgia, Reagan got 68 percent of the vote with 127,629 votes. Carter, whose only real opponent was Morris Udall, garnered 315,543 votes. Arkansas hardly would seem fertile ground on which to plant a Reagan Sunbelt strategy. In another state where the crossover impact was expected, Georgia, Reagan got 68 percent of the vote with 127,629 votes. Carter, whose only real opponent was Morris Udall, garnered 315,543 votes. Arkansas hardly would seem fertile ground on which to plant a Reagan Sunbelt strategy.

It could be argued that voter turnout in most of this spring's primaries was relatively light and that Reagan's vote totals will swell in the fall. That is fantasy, as the Atlanta Journal's David Nordan pointed out in May: "The pitifully low numbers of citizens voting Republican in southern primaries could be easily explained by a boring, one-sided GOP race or strict party registration laws, if either existed in any of the four above-mentioned Dixie states (Georgia, North Carolina, Florida, and Texas)—which they don't. All four presented heated, exciting, head-to-head contests between Reagan and Ford, all were vital to the candidacies of both Republicans, and not a one of them could be safely called on the GOP side before the election. If ever there was a time for a Southerner inclined to vote Republican to follow his convictions, this spring was it. On the Democratic side, after Florida there was very little suspense and excitement to draw voters to the polls."

It is generally acknowledged that Ronald Reagan's supporters—like George Wallace's before him—are more fervent in their beliefs and therefore more likely to show up at the polls than are the supporters of more moderate alternatives. Reagan clearly did not turn out these fervent supporters in large numbers, nor did he attract a truly significant protest vote in terms of numbers that would sway the November election. Reagan's advisers better quickly get used to the fact that he will lose the South. Says Nordan: "With Jimmy Carter on the ballot, the southern states—with 25 percent of the total Electoral College vote—will fall into the Democratic goody basket one by one like a mess of ripe plums, with the exception maybe of Mississippi."

Writing on the history of past southern strategies, columnist Garry Wills made an apt analogy: "In 1972, Wallace split the Democrats while Nixon provided the Republicans with a man who was acceptable to the South, yet did not lose the mass of his party elsewhere. In 1976, Reagan is dividing Republicans while Carter gives the Democrats a man acceptable to the South without alienating the mass of his party...Some candidates have taken to quoting the Bible in this campaign. Republicans who profited from the Wallace vote in the past, who constructed a southern strategy now have a chance to exemplify another bit of scripture: He who lives by the sword, shall perish by it."

Even the addition of a southerner to the GOP ticket—such as Tennessee Senators Howard Baker, Jr., or Bill Brock—would fail to effectively counter Carter's broad appeal to regional pride. Nor would Reagan's anti-Washington rhetoric be an effective ploy against a Georgia farmer whose non-Washington credentials are perhaps better than Reagan's. Reagan, after all, can't attack Carter on welfare-cheating. He can't blame Henry Kissinger on Carter. He can't promise to send Carter to Rhodesia. And he can't blame the regulations of the Occupational, Health, and Safety Administration on Carter. Without welfare, Kissinger, and government regulation to talk about, Reagan doesn't have much to say. And as the resignation of speechwriter Robert Shrum revealed, Carter is probably no "softer" on defense spending than Reagan is.

To win the South, Reagan must combine the traditional Republican vote with the Wallace vote. And he must do this against a Democrat—
ic nominee who is not only going to make inroads into those constituencies but make an effective and energetic appeal to traditional Democrats, blacks, and southern chauvinists. Any comparison, for example with Goldwater's sweep of five southern states in 1964 must take into account the increase in black voter registration which Reagan would have to counter. At the same time, the decline of the virulence of the race issue in the South makes it more difficult to attract the Wallace constituency.

Although voters across the nation have become more accomplished ticket splitters since 1964, they have also become more skeptical about voting for Republicans than they were before Richard Nixon provided a new connotation for "Republican." There is now a higher threshold of skepticism for Republican politicians to surmount on the road to public office. Non-incumbents this year may find it even harder to ride the Democratic wave if Ronald Reagan is the GOP nominee for President for they will carry a double cross: Nixon and Reagan.

By comparison, in 1964, only two non-incumbent Republicans were elected to the Senate: Paul Fannin in Arizona and George Murphy in California. That bit of history is undoubtedly disconcerting to this year's crop of promising non-incumbent Senate aspirants: U.S. Rep. Alan Steelman in Texas; U.S. Rep. Marvin Elch in Michigan; Attorney General John Danforth in Missouri; U.S. Rep. H. John Heinz III in Pennsylvania; former Indianapolis Mayor Richard Lugar in Indiana; former Gov. William Quinn in Hawaii, and former Navy Secretary John Chafee in Rhode Island. These are all able, moderate-conservative to progressive Republicans who would serve ably in the Senate; every single one of them could conceivably be wiped out in a Reagan undertow. Four Republican incumbents could also be threatened if the 1974 results are a guide: Sen. Bill Brock (R-Tenn.), Sen. William Roth (R-Del.), Sen. Robert Stafford (R-Vt.) and Sen. Robert Taft, Jr. (R-Ohio). In Maryland, Sen. Glenn Beall is already an underdog. Like Taft, whose razor-thin defeat in the 1964 senatorial race in Ohio can be attributed to Goldwater's impact, Beall has reason to remember 1964. Beall's father was crushed in an effort to seek reelection to the Senate that year, receiving only 37 percent of the vote.

Three admittedly uphill races for able moderates with political futures could easily be turned into routes by a Reagan nomination: David Norcross, former director of the New Jersey Law Enforcement Commission, against Sen. Harrison Williams (D-N.J.); Robert A.G. Monks, former Maine energy commissioner, against Sen. Edmund Muskie (D-Me.); and Stanley York, former Wisconsin state chairman and state energy administrator, against Sen. William Proxmire. A similar fate could await Washington Attorney General Slade Gorton if he decides to challenge Sen. Henry Jackson (D).

Lastly, Sen. James Buckley (C-N.Y.) should be praying these days that Gerald Ford is nominated instead of Ronald Reagan. New York voters had to split their tickets to elect Buckley in the first place, but they didn't have to identify Buckley with Reagan in that 1970 race. If Reagan and Buckley are both nominated, the Democrats are sure to hang Reagan around Buckley's neck. The Democrats could always commit hari kari in New York's primary and nominate Bella Abzug or Ramsey Clark. But Buckley will otherwise have visions of the late Sen. Kenneth Keating's defeat at the hands of Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. in 1964. (Note: Senate contests in the Rocky Mountain and Prairie states—New Mexico, Utah, Montana, North Dakota, Nevada, Wyoming, and Nebraska—are likely to be decided for reasons divorced from the presidential race.)

A survey of Republican gubernatorial chances in the June 15 FORUM showed that favorable Republican outcomes would be jeopardized in Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Predictions on House races are harder to make because the GOP lost 45 seats in 1974, thus making fewer targets for a Democratic landslide. The probable outcome is that the 30 seats the GOP hoped to regain will stay lost.

It is argued that coattails no longer exist so predictions of Reagan-led disaster in November are erroneous. It is true that positive Republican coattails are in short supply, as Richard Nixon demonstrated in 1972. But negative GOP coattails are not—as Charles Sandman demonstrated in New Jersey in his 1973 gubernatorial race. Voters need little incentive to vote "against" Republicans; they need considerable incentive, as the 1974 results demonstrated, to vote "for" Republicans. Ronald Reagan at the head of the GOP ticket could well be all the incentive most voters need to reject all Republicans.

Adding Ronald Reagan to the GOP ticket as Ford's running mate, as suggested by New York Times columnist James Reston, would add nothing to the GOP ticket where it will need it most—the northern tier from Maine to Washington State. Reagan's addition might swing California into the GOP column and perhaps even Nevada, but it would add precious little else. What Ford needs to add to the ticket is an articulate spokesman for the things in which
he believes: detente, tree trade, less government regulation, a fair tax system, expanded federalism. The GOP ticket will not be strengthened by Reagan's explanations of his non-payment of California taxes in 1970, his position on Social Security, his musings on the Tennessee Valley Authority, and his sabre-rattling on Panama and Rhodesia. Those who stand to be converted by Ronald Reagan's "speech" undoubtedly have already heard it and been enthralled. Many of the rest of us are presumably immune to his charms. A Ford-Reagan ticket would compound the conservative weaknesses of the two men, not their strengths, thus making the ticket vulnerable in both the North and the South.

A sensible Ford strategy would be to pick a running mate who appeals to the northern industrial-agricultural tier where he must find his Electoral College strength: Sen. Charles McC. Mathias (R-Md.), UN Ambassador William Scranton, U.S. Rep. John Anderson (R-Ill.), retiring Gov. Dan Evans (R-Wash.), Sen. Richard Schweiker (R-Pa.), Transportation Secretary William Coleman, Commerce Secretary Elliot Richardson, Gov. Robert Ray (R-Iowa), or Republican National Chairman Mary Louise Smith (Iowa). In truth, Ford has a wealth of talent from which to choose---many of whom have more than one speech.

If Ford chooses Ronald Reagan as his running mate in order to avoid the Reagan wing's defection, he will be acting out a political fairy tale. The Reagan wing of the party is not reconcilable; Ford should remember how quickly former admirers of Barry Goldwater turned on him this year and how single-mindedly Reagan backers excluded fellow conservatives like Texas Sen. John Tower and Oklahoma State Chairman Paula Unruh from national delegate positions. Many Reagan backers will not shed crocodile tears if the GOP is wiped out in the 1976 elections; they are bent on taking over or destroying the Republican Party. The GOP is already a minority of the electorate hovering around 20 percent; Reagan's supporters constitute about 30-40 percent of that minority. Like McGovern's supporters in 1972, many Reaganites are more interested in ideological purity than pragmatic impact. To appease them---as Ford has done throughout the last nine months without any measurable impact---is electoral foolishness. Gerald Ford selected Nelson Rockefeller as his Vice President once; choosing Ronald Reagan can never atone for that sin in Reaganite eyes.

MEMORIES: 1964

The memories of 1974 are too fresh for many Republicans to blot out. The memories of 1964 seem much more distant---perhaps closer to twenty rather than twelve years past in many Republican minds. Ronald Reagan's visions of disaster in Panama and Rhodesia are not the only ones that Republicans should contemplate. As an aid in contemplation, the Ripon FORUM herewith provides a handy summary of 1964 disasters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goldwater Percentage</th>
<th>State: Description of 1964 Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>ALABAMA: The GOP picked up five of the state's eight congressional seats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>ALASKA: GOP lost two seats in State Senate and 10 seats in lower house.</td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>ARIZONA: Richard Kleindeinst was defeated for governor and Paul Fannin was barely elected to Senate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>ARKANSAS: Winthrop Rockefeller lost first gubernatorial race to Orval Faubus (D).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>CALIFORNIA: George Murphy beat Pierre Salinger (D) for Senate with less than 52 percent of the vote. GOP picked up two House seats, three seats in California Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>COLORADO: GOP lost two House seats as well as 18 seats and control of lower house of state legislature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>CONNECTICUT: Straight ticket state. John Lodge got only 35% in Senate race against Tom Dodd (D). GOP shut out of all six congressional districts and lost a whopping 123 seats in lower house.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>DELAWARE: GOP narrowly lost governorship and John Williams almost lost Senate seat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>FLORIDA: Claude Kirk lost Senate race (36%) and Charles Holley lost governorship (41%). GOP gainly slightly in legislature.</td>
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</tbody>
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Goldwater Percentage

State: Description of 1964 Impact

GEORGIA: GOP picked up one congressional seat, gained in legislature.

HAWAII: Ticket-splitting allowed Hiram Fong to win reelection to Senate with 53%.

IDAHO: GOP gained in legislature.

ILLINOIS: Charles Percy got 48% against incumbent Gov. Otto Kerner(D). GOP suffered disaster in lower house; lost 31 seats.

INDIANA: GOP lost both Senate and governorship races, two seats in House, 11 seats in State Senate, 34 seats in lower house. A disaster.

IOWA: GOP lost governorship to Harold Hughes(D) as well as five House seats, 13 seats in State Senate, 56 in lower house.

KANSAS: GOP narrowly hung onto governorship, lost several seats in both houses but kept party control.

KENTUCKY: GOP lost four House seats.

LOUISIANA: Little GOP to help or hurt.

MAINE: GOP disaster cost one House seat, 24 seats in State Senate and 40 in lower house.

MARYLAND: J. Glenn Beall(father of current incumbent) lost Senate seat.

MASSACHUSETTS: Republican candidate against Edward M. Kennedy for Senate got 25%, but John Volpe took advantage of Democratic differences to win governorship with 50%. GOP lost 20 seats in lower house.

MICHIGAN: Elly Peterson got only 35% against Sen. Philip Hart; GOP lost four House seats, eight State Senate seats, 20 seats in lower house.

MINNESOTA: GOP candidate got only 39 percent against Sen. Eugene McCarthy(D).

MISSISSIPPI: GOP, as usual, did not contest John Stennis(D) for Senate, but one Republican was elected to House.

MISSOURI: GOP candidate for governor got only 37 percent; GOP lost 23 seats in lower house.

MONTANA: Sen. Mike Mansfield(D) won in landslide but Tim Babcock won 51% victory in gubernatorial race. GOP lost 19 seats in lower house.

NEBRASKA: GOP won Senate race but lost governorship.

NEVADA: Goldwater's impact might have been enough to cost Paul Laxalt the 49 votes he needed to win Senate election.

NEW HAMPSHIRE: GOP candidate for governor got only 33%; one House seat lost and 31 seats in legislature's lower house.

NEW JERSEY: Bernard Shanley got only 37% against Sen. Harrison Williams. GOP lost four House seats.

NEW MEXICO: GOP lost Senate race to Joseph Montoya(D) with 45% of vote and gubernatorial race to Jack Campbell(D) with 40%, but picked up seven seats in lower house.

NEW YORK: Sen. Kenneth Keating received 43% in losing race to Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. GOP lost seven House seats and control of lower house though it was strengthened in State Senate.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Description of 1964 Impact</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NORTH CAROLINA</td>
<td>Not much impact but lost seven seats in lower house.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORTH DAKOTA</td>
<td>Thomas Kleppe, now secretary of interior, got 42% of Senate race vote. GOP lost governorship, one House seat, nine seats in State Senate, 26 in other house.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHIO</td>
<td>Robert Taft, Jr. received 49.8% against Sen. Stephen Young(D). GOP lost four House seats, control of State Senate, 13 seats in State House.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OKLAHOMA</td>
<td>Bud Wilkinson got 49% in Senate race against Fred Harris.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OREGON</td>
<td>GOP gained slightly in legislature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PENNSYLVANIA</td>
<td>Hugh Scott almost lost Senate seat. GOP did lose two House seats, 16 seats in lower house.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RHODE ISLAND</td>
<td>Although GOP Senate candidate got only 17%, John Chafee won second gubernatorial term with 61%.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOUTH CAROLINA</td>
<td>GOP elected one man to House but failed to elect a single legislator.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOUTH DAKOTA</td>
<td>Nils Boe got 52% in gubernatorial race and GOP kept both House seats but lost eight seats in State Senate and 13 in lower house.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TENNESSEE</td>
<td>Howard Baker, Jr. received 47% in losing Senate race. GOP made small gains in legislature.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEXAS</td>
<td>George Bush lost Senate bid(43%) while GOP candidate against Gov. John Connally (D) won only 26%. GOP lost two House seats and loss of six seats in lower house left only one Republican legislator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTAH</td>
<td>Republicans lost Senate and gubernatorial races with Ernest Wilkinson and Mitchell Melich, respectively, both with 43 percent of vote. GOP lost one House seat and narrow control of both houses of state legislature.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VERMONT</td>
<td>Winston Prouty got 54% in the Senate race, but Gov. Philip Hoff(D) was reelected with almost two-thirds of the vote.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIRGINIA</td>
<td>Not much impact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASHINGTON</td>
<td>Voter split tickets to elect Gov. Dan Evans with 56% while lost four seats in House, nine in lower house of legislature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST VIRGINIA</td>
<td>Cecil Underwood received 45% in gubernatorial bid; GOP lost 15 seats in lower house.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WISCONSIN</td>
<td>Sen. William Proxmire(D) won easily but Gov. Warren Knowles(R) won narrowly (51%). GOP lost one House seat, control of lower House.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WYOMING</td>
<td>GOP lost Senate and House seats that might have been won as well as 10 seats and control of lower house.</td>
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Attempts to change the Republican national convention delegate apportionment formula are nothing new. In 1908 Teddy Roosevelt led a floor fight at the Chicago convention against the then-existing formula which overrepresented the Southern states. Although the floor fight was unsuccessful, the Republican National Committee was sufficiently concerned such that in 1912, acting without specific authority from the previous convention, the committee adopted a new formula for the 1916 convention. And, of course, the formula—now embodied in Rule 30 of the convention rules—was mostly recently changed at the 1972 convention, in large part as a result of litigation commenced by the Ripon Society the previous year. Ripon brought its lawsuit most reluctantly, only after its discussions with party officials proved fruitless.

Unfortunately, since the Supreme Court declined this past February to review a Court of Appeals decision that the formula was not unconstitutional, the legal issues have not been finally settled. The actions of the federal courts do not mean that the Rule 30 formula cannot be changed, nor that no other formulas are acceptable. Indeed, as a legal matter, the current Rule 30 still remains vulnerable to further legal challenge. The Supreme Court is now considering a case, Redfern v. Delaware Republican State Committee, in which the plaintiff seeks to extend the one-person-one-vote principle to state political conventions. Clearly, if that principle applies to state conventions, it also applies to national conventions. Furthermore, by upholding the constitutionality of the federal election law under which the Republican National Committee will receive federal funds, the Supreme Court has opened the Republican National Committee to constitutional accountability for its convention procedures.

In essence, the Court of Appeals in the Ripon suit said that changing delegate apportionment formula is not part of its business unless the formula results in racial or other invidious discrimination. But while it might not be the court's business to change merely unfair formulas, it is the party's business.

The problem with Rule 30 stems from the victory bonuses awarded to states that have voted Republican; the bonus allocation of delegates is not in proportion to a state's population nor to its Republican Party vote. As a result, the populous and high Republican vote states are grossly discriminated against. For example, if Wyoming were to elect a Republican to fill its one seat in the U.S. House of Representatives, it would be rewarded with one bonus delegate. But if heavily-polluted California were to elect Republicans to a majority of its 41 seats in the House of Representatives, it too would just get one bonus delegate. Whether the Rule 30 allocation is measured against population or against Republican Party vote, it is clear that many states are getting a disproportionately low share of delegates. Each delegate from California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin represents well over 20,000 (and in some cases, 28,000) Republican Presidential votes cast in their respective states in 1972. But each delegate from Wyoming represents only 6,000 comparable votes. This means that, in the case of Florida, one delegate from that state has only about one-fifth of the voting strength of the Wyoming delegate.

That's as compared to Republican popular vote. But the situation is the same with respect to population. One delegate from Alaska speaks for 17,000 citizens, but his/her counterpart from Massachusetts must represent 132,000 citizens. In other words, that Massachusetts delegate has merely one-eighth of the voting power of the Alaska delegate with respect to the state's population. In fact, if California were to be treated the same way Alaska is—that is, if California were to get one delegate for every 18,000 citizens—California would have 1,018 rather than 167 delegates to send to Kansas City.

Those figures show the statistical side of the delegate discrimination, but beyond this, there are several important reasons the current formula should be changed. The first and most important reason is that Rule 30 is unfair. Out of concern for its own public image, the Republican Party should not tolerate an internal apportionment that is so obviously unfair. If we are the party of Abraham Lincoln and the party of concern for individual liberties and freedom, it is inconsistent with this heritage—to say the least—to retain such an unfair formula.

On a practical political level, Rule 30 will help the Republican Party lose presidential elections. If the GOP National Convention is to be truly national, all states must be represented in a fair manner. The convention delegates as a whole must accurately reflect the Republican Party across the nation. Under Rule 30, they do not now do so. Conventions structured according to Rule 30 are less likely to produce a Republican nominee popular in those key states whose Electoral College votes are essential for victory in November. Since
Rule 30 produces unrepresentative conventions which have a propensity for selecting a nominee who will not reflect the wishes of a majority of Republicans across the nation, the rule has an adverse long-term impact on party members in all states. Needless to say, the continual loss of elections leads to further declines in party enrollment and activity, and an ever-worsening downward spiral for the Republican Party’s fortunes.

A third reason the current formula should be changed is that it permits wide fluctuations in the size of each state’s delegation from convention to convention. This is because a very substantial amount of the delegate apportionment is based upon the victory bonuses. If the Republican presidential nominee does not carry their states this year, those states will suffer a 25-50 percent drop in the size of their delegations. According to the current rule, for example, Nevada would drop from 18 to 11 delegates. So would North Dakota and Vermont. Proportionally, the small states would be hit the worst, but the large states would suffer wide swings in delegation size as well.

Given these three reasons for changing Rule 30, the Ripon Society has recommended to the convention rules committee a formula which would meet these objections. Our formula would keep the present delegation base of three times a state’s Electoral College vote, but it would replace the current victory bonuses with an additional allocation of delegates roughly proportional to a state’s population and party vote.

Specifically, to produce a convention of about the same size as the Kansas City one of 2,168 votes, each state would receive three delegates for every one of its Electoral College members (a total of 1,614) with the territories keeping their 16 votes. In addition, the remaining 538 delegates would apportioned among the states in accordance with their proportional share of the Republican Presidential popular vote in their states, as adjusted by the disproportionality in the Electoral College itself. Each state’s share of votes in the Electoral College is not perfectly proportionate to its population because some states have four times the relative voting weight of more populous states. Since our formula is based on the Electoral College and since Ripon’s formula weights party vote according to the Electoral College factor, our recommended formula gives the smaller states a larger share of delegates than they would otherwise receive were the apportionment to be done on a strictly proportional or party-vote basis. In short, the small states will still have an extra "say" at the convention.

Such a formula would be fair, with minimum deviations of delegation size relative to population and party vote. It would keep the overall convention size about the same. It would not permit wild variations in a state’s delegation size every four years. And most importantly, it would produce a national representative convention. It is precisely in this situation that we should want proportional representation for it is the convention’s chief job to select a nominee who reflects the wishes of a majority of Republicans in the nation, who has wide popular appeal, and who can win.

The issue here is simply one of fairness. If the convention is structured in an equitable manner, it will also be politically advantageous to all Republicans because a more truly representative nominee is likely to be selected. This is not a liberal-conservative fight. This is not an East-West or North-South fight. States such as California, Florida and Texas (all located in the South and West and all fairly conservative ideologically) are now severely discriminated against by Rule 30; they would stand to gain substantially under Ripon’s proposed formula. Nor is this a big state-small state fight for the small states are hurt most by the wide fluctuations in delegation size from convention to convention.

Ripon is not seeking to effect any change in the makeup of the 1976 convention. It seeks only a rules change for future conventions. We are aware that special circumstances will be present at the GOP’s Kansas City convention because of the close presidential nomination contest. We hope that the delegate apportionment issue will not be a divisive one and will not become an ideological football—one which would completely distort the issue. Unless a change in Rule 30 is made before the 1980 convention, the malapportionment present at that convention will be significantly worse than that at the Kansas City one—assuming that the 1976 nominee does not carry 49 of the 50 states as the 1972 nominee did.

The stated purpose of the party’s own rules is "...to encourage the broadest possible participation of all voters in party activities at all levels; to assure that the Republican Party is open and accessible to all, answerable ultimately to the people in the true American tradition." If we Republicans really mean that, it’s time our party had a fair apportionment formula.

Contributor Note: Glenn S. Gerstell is president of the Ripon Society.