

The View From Here

We shall not crow. The November elections gave the Republican Party no overwhelming national victory. The results were marked by no unmixed trends; they were an assortment of individual triumphs which leave as much room for opportunism as for statesmanship to determine the Republican future.

But tentatively, we shall begin to hope. For when all the facts are sifted, one overriding fact becomes clear: in the 1966 elections the foundations of a new Republican Party have emerged. A party of promise, of potential, a party which for the first time in generations can take political initiative in American life, has begun to grow amidst the very ruins of an antediluvian coalition calling itself by the same name.

The key to this new party is not to be found primarily in the rich array of youthful leaders whom the 1966 elections have brought to national prominence. For though it is essential to have these men, their personalities alone cannot build a great party. Individual personalities are not merely insufficient in an age of complex social organization; they are also suspect, so long as modern showmanship can lend the semblance of substance to any clean face the comes along.

Nor is the key to the new Republicanism to be found exclusively in the enlightened strategy that helped many candidates to victory this fall. For though it is instructive to have conclusive proof that Republican moderates can appeal to Negroes, union members, youth, and intellectuals, this, too, is only a symptom of rebirth.

INTELLECTUAL RESOURCES The real key, the element of the 1966 elections that gives most promise for the future, was the ability of a number of candidates to talk in concrete terms about issues, proposals, and programs. As the Ripon election analysis (see pps. 3-6 of this issue) points out, "The introduction of substance into Republican campaigning was perhaps the most heartening development of the 1966 elections. Throughout the country local candidates, often drawing on local intellectual resources, were able to find ideas within the traditional framework of the Republican Party which dealt correctly with important social problems."

The alternative to this kind of local initiative is government based on the dated fiction that the social problems of this country can be solved from Washington. Unquestionably, it is a less burdensome alternative, and one which, given the resources of America, can build a greater society than now exists elsewhere in the world. But a Greater Society of this sort will also be an emptier one. It will be rich in statistics of progress but devoid of the satisfactions of meaningful public action and automatic in the conduct of everyday affairs.

For when the political initiative of a country is concentrated in one place, so too is the need to discuss,

to compromise and to persuade. In such a country, people living side by side will abandon conversation with each other in favor of shrill, extortionist harangues directed toward the center of national power.

To have a Society that is not merely large, rich and egalitarian but also creative, self-respecting and just means the involvement of citizens in political activity on a scale never seen before. It means the infusion of social debate into the lowest levels of government, into business corporations, into school systems, mental institutions, mass media, prisons, slums, into problems of housing design, transportation, conservation, and leisure time. It means the development of new techniques for democratic participation, new safeguards for individual rights, and new processes for correcting bureaucratic abuse. It means that politics must become more than a spectator sport.

The Republican Party, with its traditional emphasis on private initiative and decentralization, has a natural advantage in effecting this transformation. The 1966 election campaigns indicate that some Republicans recognize their party's opportunity. These men have gained support not by denouncing the ideas of Franklin D. Roosevelt, but by going beyond them. They have expressed a vision of American society that many Democrats are ill-prepared to grasp.

They have offered concrete suggestions for the revitalization of state government, for the local solution of racial problems and for public discussion of foreign policy. Whether their orientation will be able to permeate the Republican Party during the next two years is open to doubt, for many who call themselves Republicans are still preoccupied with the belated battle against the New Deal.

Yet political inertia is not the only force in American life. A fresh vision can count for something, especially in a country that is growing ever more educated, ever more aware, and ever more revolted by the weary platitudes that issue forth from Washington.

—MAHOUT

Coming In The Forum

- "Politics and Conscription"
A proposal to replace the draft
- "The Rights of the Mentally III"
An angry proposal
- "Target Seats in Congress"
Ripon surveys Republican prospects for controlling the House.

The Bliss Philosophy

The Friday following the elections, Republican National Chairman Ray C. Bliss, in one of his rare appearances before a non-Republican group, spoke before a press luncheon at the Overseas Press Club in New York. The FORUM attended and presents here a report on the National Chairman's interpretation of the Republican gains.

Chairman Bliss stressed his "great interest" in the state level, especially state legislatures. "That's where the victory was," he said (see August, 1966, FORUM for a Ripon analysis of the Republican State Legislators). Bliss cited the record of his administration including 160 meetings with Republicans — many of them "firsts" — meetings of research directors, public relations directors, campaign managers, etc. He reviewed statistical gains in state legislatures, county court houses, and constitutional offices from 1962 to 1966, noting with obvious personal satisfaction, "It was done under National Committee auspices." Bliss stressed particularly the RNC-directed "secret" move to get out the Republican vote through some seventy Congressional workshops. He noted that he had made it a special point to attend all statewide workshop meetings.

'ROTTING SINCE 1952' Probing deeper into the election results, Bliss leveled strong indirect criticism at Republican national leadership during and after the Eisenhower-Nixon administration. "It doesn't mean a thing to get forty-seven new Congressmen elected. I look two or three elections ahead. I'm a long range planner — my test is 'Did we win in depth?'" He contrasted his approach with the "sky-rocketing" approach that had been used

in 1952 but hadn't worked over the long run. "We have rotted since 1952. It wasn't 1964 that caused the debacle. Don't blame it on '64. There was a steady rotting process since 1952."

Bliss accented the "unity role" he had played since taking over the national chairmanship. There had "never been a harsh word" at a session of the Republican Coordinating committees. Its role, according to Bliss, is "to build unity in the party." "The Coordinating Committee would have fallen apart if I hadn't presided and I had to keep silent on issues." He also noted that he presided at the weekly Congressional leadership conference where "people would get off on ideology" if it weren't for him. At another point in his remarks, the National Chairman stressed: "I'm just a nuts and bolts operator."

REPUBLICAN DE GAULLE

During the question and answer part, Chairman Bliss gave his audience a rare insight into the way he ideally would run the Republican party. Asked about splinter groups like the AMA political action committee, Bliss replied: "The Republican party is too hydra-headed as it is. We have too many committees trying to do things (he noted especially the Congressional and Senatorial Campaign Committees). All resources must be decided by one top man and he has to make the key decisions. I hope we can eliminate splinter groups like DeGaulle did. He got order in France."

As for the future, the Republican National Chairman stated: "We can't rest on our laurels, and we can't stop. I am now planning for '68."

POLITICAL NOTES

● *Scene:* November 11, 1966, in a red-carpeted suite on the fifth floor of the Marriott Twin Bridges Motor Hotel overlooking the Potomac to the White House from the Virginia side.

Cast: Leonard Hall of New York, Republican National Chairman under President Eisenhower; Robert Carter, Colorado executive of Continental Airlines, former aide to Mr. Hall, adroit sergeant-at-arms at the 1964 San Francisco GOP convention; Representative Joel Broyhill (R-Va.), an early supporter of Mr. Goldwater in 1964; and finally, George Romney and his entourage: motel owner J. Willard Marriott, Jack McIntosh from Michigan, William Seidman, the Governor's financial assistant, key staffer Walter DeVries, and a Michigan state trooper bodyguard.

Plot Summary (courtesy of the New York Post): Hall waxes bullish about Romney's chances of carrying the Eastern and most of the Midwestern delegates at the 1968 convention. Amidst mundungus, talk of how to win state delegations. Romney picks up some new staffers.

● Jack Mills, retiring executive director of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, will take a post with the American Medical Association.

● Barry Goldwater has repeatedly said that Governor Romney would be an unacceptable presidential nominee because he failed to support the official party candidate in 1964. Yet now William F. Buckley, in his

recent book about his candidacy for mayor of New York in 1965 on the Conservative Party ticket, states that he had a signed endorsement from Goldwater for use against the official Republican nominee, John V. Lindsay.

● The National Negro Republican Assembly presented its first annual award to Governor Nelson Rockefeller at a \$50-a-plate dinner held recently in New York. The award termed Rockefeller "the tallest man in America, whose stature has never diminished."

● In New Jersey, Senator Clifford Case, long a popular (though independent) Republican, has served notice that he intends to assert personal leadership over the state party in an attempt to revitalize the debt-ridden and divided organization.

● Senator John Tower, on television, Sunday, November 6: "Political parties are only vehicles to elect men to office. A party should never be considered an end unto itself. Party is never more important than principle."

● Republican Congressional leaders might do well to listen to Representative Thomas B. Curtis in considering changes in party organization within Congress. Recently Curtis recommended that House Republicans restructure themselves "toward adequate study and research to develop alternatives to social problems or to explain with clarity why the private sector . . . or state or local government . . . is better suited to meet the problems."

THE POTENTIAL TO GOVERN

A Ripon Election Analysis

(The following assessment of the 1966 elections and of their significance for the new Republican Party of the 1970's was released to the press on November 13, 1966.)

There were no unambiguous trends in the November elections; our country is too big and diversified for that. But on balance one thing is clear: the Republican Party, which the Goldwater strategy brought to the lowest ebb in its history, has now become, in the words of one television commentator, "the party of promise."

A presidential victory in 1968 has become a real possibility. More importantly, the GOP has emerged from the elections with a new foundation from which it can become the exciting majority party of the 1970's and 1980's and from which for the first time in fifty years, it can build the most creative political force in American life.

This new basis for a dynamic party has three components which were tested successfully in many individual races this year: responsible leadership, enlightened strategy, and well-developed ideas.

I. Leadership

For leadership, the Republican party finds itself with an embarrassment of riches. In the first place, it has two "elder statesmen" whose advice and energies will be invaluable in years to come: Nelson Rockefeller and Richard Nixon.

Governor Nelson Rockefeller upset all prognostications to become the senior governor in the United States. His victory is a tribute to courageous and intelligent leadership — in state government and in national politics. Richard Nixon, the most seasoned campaigner in the country, has labored tirelessly to maintain unity and continuity in the Republican party. Although neither Rockefeller nor Nixon can yet be dismissed as national figures, both grant that their front line positions have given way to a new generation of Republican leadership.

The new leaders of the first echelon are characterized by refreshing ideas and styles as well as tested experience in positions of executive and political responsibility. They are qualified for nationwide service, as national candidates, Cabinet members, ambassadors and policy makers.

In late October, the Ripon Society endorsed selected candidates whose qualifications as future progressive leaders were particularly distinctive. Of the seventeen Ripon-endorsed gubernatorial candidates, fourteen won. Of the eleven Ripon-endorsed Senate candidates, nine were victorious.

GOVERNORS George Romney demonstrated extraordinary drawing power, polling the largest gubernatorial plurality in forty years in a state which Johnson carried by over a million votes in 1964. Romney pulled Senator Robert Griffin to a resounding 56% victory and brought in five new GOP congressmen — the largest Congressional swing in the nation. He led the GOP to control of one chamber of the state legislature and a stand-off in the other, reversing strong Democratic margins.

Also compiling dramatic margins were John Volpe, who polled nearly two-thirds of the vote in the Kennedy's home state, and John Chafee with a similar percentage in urbanized Rhode Island.

The most significant thing about the Romney, Volpe, Chafee, and Nelson Rockefeller victories is that each man won a *third* term. They defied an axiom of modern political science that gubernatorial mortality rates are very high — that it is far easier to be elected than to be reelected.

The four third term victories thus carry particular distinction, as do the 55% victory of John Love in Colorado and the impressive 63% win of James Rhodes in Ohio — both elected to second four-year terms. Warren

Knowles in Wisconsin and Nils Boe in South Dakota were also returned to office. Moreover, the victories of progressives Tom McCall in Oregon and Raymond Shafer in Pennsylvania represent endorsements of the incumbent GOP administrations of Mark Hatfield and William Scranton.

It is obvious that even Democrats and Independents have given votes of confidence to the kind of state government Republicans have offered. These Republican governors have set a standard which their new colleagues will do well to emulate. It should take nothing away from those who now enter governorships for the first time to say that state houses are expected to change hands frequently. Republicans everywhere can take special pride in the fact that leadership which has been on the firing line for several years has been rewarded in this year's polling.

In addition to these experienced executives, many freshman governors may also win national attention if they meet the test of state leadership. These include such moderates as Winthrop Rockefeller of Arkansas, Spiro T. Agnew of Maryland, David Cargo (a Ripon Associate) of New Mexico, and Norbert Tiemann of Nebraska. Paul Laxalt of Nevada and Ronald Reagan of California, both of whom had prior conservative credentials, won by de-emphasizing right-wing views and appealing to moderates and independents. We shall have more to say about the Reagan campaign below.

SENATORS

The 1966 elections brought the brightest single infusion of Republican talent into the United States Senate in half a century. Hatfield in Oregon, Percy in Illinois, Brooke in Massachusetts ran distinguished campaigns. All three faced hard-line Johnson supporters; all three disputed the President's Vietnam policy. All three were able to discuss in specific and concrete terms new, creative approaches to domestic problems. All will now properly assume a role as national GOP spokesmen.

They are joined by Howard Baker, Jr., who campaigned in Tennessee as a moderate and won enough Negro support to achieve the first statewide GOP victory in modern times.

Returned to the Senate with unexpectedly large margins were Case of New Jersey (62%), Boggs of Delaware (60%), Allott of Colorado (59%), Smith of Maine (69%), and of course, Griffin of Michigan (56%). All have distinguished and generally progressive records.

Three major right wing efforts which had been accorded some chance of success were notable failures: New Hampshire, Montana and Alabama. Among the conservatives returned to the Senate was John Tower, the only Texas Republican to ever win an entire term. Tower, who holds Lyndon Johnson's old seat, moderated his positions and gained large numbers of Mexican and liberal votes.

THE HOUSE

In the House of Representatives the Republican gains were bigger than almost every prediction but Senator Dirksen's target of seventy-five. A number of points have been overlooked, however, in post election commentary on the Republican success:

1. GOP House pick-ups were widely distributed across the Republican spectrum. They did *not* constitute a conservative Republican counterweight to moderate Republican gains in the Senate and among the Governors. Prominent new moderate Republican winners were former Congressmen Fred Schwengel of Iowa and Robert A. Taft, Jr. of Ohio, Daniel E. Button of New York, Thomas Meskill of Connecticut, Gilbert Gude of Maryland, William Cowger of Kentucky, Jerry L. Pettis of California, John Dellenback of Oregon, and the large new Michigan delegation.

2. The new GOP House seats are largely a reflection of statewide GOP victories by gubernatorial or senatorial candidates whose coattails in numerous instances reached down to the level of state legislative districts. Of the fifty-two new seats won by Republicans, *forty-seven*

occurred in states that had statewide Republican victories. Notable examples were Michigan with Romney (five), Kentucky with Cooper (three), Ohio with Rhodes (four), New Jersey with Case (two), California with Finch-Reagan (two — both moderates) and Wisconsin with Knowles (two). In Iowa, next to Michigan the scene of the greatest GOP House gains, the Republican state organization developed a progressive Republican platform that was instrumental in giving the party a vote-getting posture. (See Ripon FORUM, October, 1966)

3. The quality of new Republican candidates, moderate and conservative, seeking to regain seats held by Freshman Democrats was a marked improvement over Republican incumbents defeated in 1964. Among young and articulate conservative winners were George Bush of Texas and William Steiger of Wisconsin.

4. Important seats in the Northeast were still not regained from the Goldwater disaster — seven in New York, two in New Jersey, one each in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Maine (which lost an additional seat). These remain important marginal seats for Republicans. Similarly four seats in Washington state, which did not have a statewide race this year, might be regained in 1968 with a moderate Republican nominee.

5. Most of the GOP gains were not in districts lost in 1964. It was older Democrats who gave way to a youthful GOP challenge. Among the Democratic losers were Judge James W. Trimble of Arkansas (72), Winfield K. Denton of Indiana (70) and House Agriculture Committee chairman, Harold D. Cooley of North Carolina (69). Cooley's opponent based his campaign on youth versus age.

6. Backlash did not necessarily show in key races where Republican pro-civil rights records were at issue. Ohio's William McCulloch withstood an attack on his civil rights leadership in the House by his Democratic opponent. In Wisconsin's sixth district, twenty-eight year old William Steiger, who helped write civil rights legislation in the state legislature, defeated Democrat John Race, the only Wisconsin Congressman to vote against the 1966 civil rights bill. William Cowger, a noted civil rights supporter, carried his Louisville district.

PAUCITY OF DEMOCRATS

When the Ripon Society book, *From Disaster to Distinction*, appeared early this fall, a common response was, "We know that disaster came in 1964 but what is the date of distinction?" We believe that the 1966 elections have begun to provide a strong answer to that question. For taken in sum, the 1966 elections provide the Republican Party with a large group of attractive and progressive leaders whose influence will be felt well into the next decade.

A strong team of Governors, an outstanding group of Senators, and on the whole, a younger, more capable array of Congressmen join such important incumbents as Mayor John Lindsay of New York, Governor Daniel Evans of Washington, and Senators Javits, Kuchel, Morton and Scott.

In sharp contrast is the paucity of new Democratic faces. The Democrat's old front line, meanwhile, has been tarnished by the elections. Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, and the brothers Kennedy were unable to bring Democratic victory — or even a modicum of Democratic unity — to their home states. Nor were their visits around the country at all effective in producing votes for local Democrats.

II. Strategy

Campaign strategies were locally developed, but their widespread success should make them attractive for national application. Many individual Republicans ran enlightened campaigns, operating largely on their own resourcefulness.

The most successful formula has clearly been the moderate one. With the exceptions of Kirk in Florida and Thurmond in South Carolina, no Republican has won major statewide office using a Goldwater-conservative strategy. Some analysts have talked about a vindication of conservative strategy in California. We deal now with this contention.

CALIFORNIA

An analysis of the California returns shows that Republican victories in this state can certainly not be attributed to Goldwater Republicanism. Ronald Reagan's speeches were non-committal and non-ideological ("I have said all along that I didn't like the use of labels," he proclaimed on election night). His campaign techniques were geared to the effective use of mass media to contrast himself with colorless Pat Brown. Several of his positions were borrowed from Republican moderates.

Reagan's managers wisely saw that as a Goldwater conservative their man could not win California. Their interpretation was borne out by the overwhelming defeat of the conservative-sponsored anti-pornography amendment (CLEAN) and the defeat of Republican Spencer Williams who campaigned for Attorney General on the CLEAN amendment. It is also most significant that neither of the new GOP Congressmen (Mathias and Pettis) campaigned as a conservative.

But the most dramatic fact about the California outcome was the overwhelming victory of Robert Finch, Reagan's moderate running mate for Lieutenant Governor and Richard Nixon's campaign director in 1960. Finch ran 100,000 votes ahead of Reagan in the final tally, piling up the largest Republican plurality since Earl Warren in 1950. National observers would do well to study the significance of Finch's ability to outdraw Reagan.

NEGRO SUPPORT

In one crucial respect, however, Reagan's formula for victory was an exception to the Republican rule for success: the California candidate won without any substantial Negro support. Almost every other Republican — Percy, Romney, Case, Rhodes, and Boggs, just to name a few — increased his Negro support over previous elections.

In Spiro Agnew's race against open-housing opponent George Mahoney in Maryland, Negro ballots provided the margin of Republican victory. The Republican Negro vote was up an astounding 54% over the last gubernatorial election, one of the largest such swings in recent history. Agnew won 94% of Negro votes.

Many Southern Republicans who tried to out-Dixiecrat the Democrats, on the other hand, found it didn't pay: Grenier and Martin in Alabama, Walker in Mississippi; and Parker (who got only 3% of the Negro vote) in South Carolina. In Georgia, even a slightly more moderate stance might well have given Calloway the important Negro and liberal votes that helped bring victory to such moderate Republicans as Winthrop Rockefeller in Arkansas and Howard Baker, Jr., in Tennessee.

UNION VOTES

The labor vote was another area where several Republicans made gains. Hatfield in Oregon, Agnew in Maryland, Case in New Jersey, Brooke in Massachusetts, Shafer in Pennsylvania, Romney and Griffin in Michigan, and particularly Rockefeller in New York were all able to smash the stagnant alliance between Democratic machines and union voters.

The Democrats contributed to the success of Republican strategy. President Johnson's inability to campaign for Democratic candidates on his return from East Asia undoubtedly cost votes. But perhaps more costly was his tactless, gratuitous attack on Richard Nixon for making justifiable criticisms of the Manila conference.

The President demonstrated what local Democratic campaign managers were proving from the O'Connor race in New York to the Brown race in California: old style partisan politicking is simply not enough to shore up the Democratic party.

III. Ideas

Democrats were also inferior to many Republicans in their ability to formulate exciting programs and to use new, thought-provoking ideas. Indeed, the introduction of substance into Republican campaigning was perhaps the most heartening development in the 1966 elections. Throughout the country local candidates, often drawing on local intellectual resources, were able to find ideas within the traditional framework of the Republican party which dealt concretely with important social problems. The Ripon Society was able to help in

this process with campaign staff and research support in many states.

At the same time, a number of traditional national sources for Democratic ideas ran dry. The Democratic Study Group in the House of Representatives failed to give its usual logistical support for candidates, and the impact of the liberal bipartisan National Committee for an Effective Congress was limited due to an internal leadership crisis.

Even campaign financing from national Democratic sources was skewed in favor of Johnson supporters from the pre-Kennedy years. These factors affected the ability of some freshmen Democrats to snap back in 1966, though it should not be forgotten that a majority of the Democratic 1964 freshmen held on to their traditionally Republican seats.

INTELLECTUAL FERMENT Another significant Republican gain came in new support from the academic and intellectual leadership communities. Hatfield, Percy and Brooke won support for the independence and originality of their views. Democratic segregationist candidates in Arkansas, Alabama, Georgia and Maryland alienated many thoughtful Democrats across the country. A Ripon Society - Republicans For Progress statement on the eve of the election underlined the Republican opportunity to assume responsible leadership in the South.

Scarcely anywhere in the Democratic Party of 1966 was there the intellectual excitement or the ferment of ideas that characterized so many Republican campaigns.

IV. The Future

The Republican victories of 1966 are a prelude to the Presidential contest of 1968. More importantly they represent a gateway to the politics of the 1970's. Republicans across the country share a new sense of excitement and optimism for the party's future. Once again it is "fun" to be a Republican.

The most dramatic advances have come in the expanded ranks of Republican Governors. These men and their state parties already represent a vital and growing base of Republican power, program and organization. Their full contribution to national Republican leadership and to the rebuilding of national party organization has yet to be realized.

Congressional Republicans, enlarged in numbers and strengthened in quality, have a heavy responsibility: to translate the positive impulse of Republican victory in 1966 into a constructive legislative record for the national Republican candidates in 1968.

We direct the attention of our party, as we did in early 1964, to fundamental choices of principle and strategy, not to the contending Republican personalities and factions. A wise selection of leaders and a genuine unity of party will follow a proper determination of strategy. With an unsound strategy, no personality, no amount of organization and finance, can deliver the Republican party from another great debacle.

1. RACIAL PROGRESS A central lesson in the Republican defeats of 1964 and the gains of 1965 and 1966 — in the urban North and the border states — is the moral and political necessity of a firm Republican commitment to civil rights. The national Republican party must be identified unequivocally with the cause of racial progress and harmony. Between the extremes of racism — black or white — Republicans can articulate a philosophy and program of moderation that will have broad appeal to the responsible majorities of both the white and Negro communities.

In 1964, the Republican party proved it could win the hard-core segregationist South, at the expense of alienating virtually our entire Negro population and losing traditional Republican support across the country. In 1966, on the other hand, Republicans proved they could defeat segregationist Democrats in Arkansas and Maryland on a platform of racial moderation.

Some would argue that 1966 demonstrated the continued potency of the white "backlash," and that Republicans can win without the Negro vote in industrialized states like California. In no other major non-

Southern state did a Republican win statewide office without sizeable Negro support. Charles Percy in Illinois cut deeply into traditional Democrat strength among Chicago's Negro wards where he campaigned jointly with a young Negro Republican candidate for Congress, David R. Reed.

It would be a fatal mistake to carry the backlash argument again into the national election of 1968. Senator Thruston Morton has stated the case persuasively: "A Republican national ticket getting less than 20% of the Negro vote is in serious trouble." Even in the South the potential for backlash gains will be short-lived in the face of rising Negro registration.

A responsible Republican strategy precludes any appeal to backlash or racial hatred. It can brook no alliance — overt or covert — with the racial demagoguery of a Dixiecrat or Wallace third party in 1968 or with segregationist Southern Democrats in the new Congress.

Already Governor Wallace's announced independent candidacy has destroyed the electoral fantasy of the Goldwater Southern strategy of 1964. Much more will be demanded — in a positive commitment to human dignity — from those who would lead a majority Republican party.

2. VIETNAM POLICY

Vietnam was the silent issue of 1966. Few candidates made it the central issue of their campaign.

Without such a direct test little that is definitive can be read into the current election returns. We can reasonably anticipate, however, that Vietnam will emerge as a major, if not the major, national issue by 1968. A foreign policy commitment of such magnitude and duration must inevitably and legitimately enter the arena of electoral politics.

Vietnam will force difficult choices of priority in domestic programs and economic policy, choices that in their very essence are political. In foreign policy, our continued preoccupation with Vietnam has already raised vital questions about our ability to meet the leadership challenges of a new Europe not to mention the enormous problems of the less developed nations.

The immediate challenge for responsible Republican foreign policy is Vietnam. During the past two years, the Republican party has avoided a rigid position on the war in Vietnam. The Republican Congressional leadership and the Republican Coordinating Committee have issued occasional statements. Individual Republicans within and without the Congress (Senators Aiken and Cooper and Senators-elect Brooke, Hatfield and Percy) have articulated a range of policy alternatives for a political settlement of the war, maintaining in the process important options for the future development of Republican policy.

The nature of the Republican response to Vietnam may well be the determining factor in the elections of 1968. It would be tragic to forfeit the new claim to leadership the party has won in 1966 through an ill-conceived policy on Vietnam — notably a policy of irrational military escalation that offers no prospects for a satisfactory termination of hostilities or for the preservation of the gains we have fought so hard to secure.

3. THE NEW FEDERALISM

A third major element of a winning Republican strategy in 1968, in our estimate, is the definition of a positive Republican alternative to the Great Society. That alternative exists in the revitalization of the American federal system, in the achievement of a new synthesis between the tensions of centralization and decentralization in our society, and in the creative initiative of our state governments.

The temptation of "negativism" will be presented to Republicans in the new Congress. The fiscal and budgetary pressures generated largely by our commitment in Vietnam will lead to a demand for "retrenchment" — an uncritical attack on the programs of the Great Society.

To interpret Republican gains in 1966 as a mandate to dismantle or obstruct at every point the programs of the Great Society would be a fundamental misinterpretation of the Presidential elections of 1964 and an invitation to further Republican setbacks in 1968. Even a strategy

of selective opposition to the Great Society is inadequate in itself.

The Republican Party must demonstrate to the American people, through its record in the Congress as it has already done through its record in the state houses, that it has the capacity, the will, and the desire to govern. Republicans must first begin to think like a majority party; the voters will then respond in kind.

ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS All of the elements for potential success are present: a coordinating mechanism in ideas and action for Republican governors (The Republican Governors' Association) and Republican state legislators (The Republican State Legislators Association), prototypes for reform and effective state government (the seventeen states with Republican administrations during the past year), proposals for a redistribution of revenues in the Federal system (such as the joint Republican Governors'

Association-Ripon Society research paper on revenue sharing, an idea receiving further development by Republicans in Congress), the articulation of a philosophy for the new federalism (ranging from The Ripon Society's new book, *From Disaster to Distinction*, to the policy papers of the Free Society Association) and, most important, a generation of successful political entrepreneurs with practical experience in building state government (men like Governors George Romney, Nelson Rockefeller, Daniel Evans, James Rhodes, and John Chafee to mention only a few).

The Republican party can find new unity and purpose from the grass roots party worker to the top councils of party leadership if it will but accept *positive* commitment in these three areas. In the process, Republicans will find as well what has eluded them as a national force since Theodore Roosevelt: both the mandate to govern and the capacity to shape the destiny of the American nation.

MASSACHUSETTS ELECTION ANALYSIS

The widely-publicized victories of Governor John A. Volpe and Senator-elect Edward W. Brooke, by respective majorities of sixty-four and sixty-one per cent, have shown that hard-working and progressive Republicans can win in even the nation's most Democratic large industrial state.

Four statistical points, not apparent in the election-night publicity, delineate the present Republican position. The first relates to the white backlash against Brooke, and the other three bear on the Republican need for effective local organization.

BACKLASH ON BROOKE White backlash appeared where it was expected, and the real surprise was its small magnitude, not its nonexistence. Brooke's statewide majority fell from sixty-seven to sixty-one percent from 1964 to 1966, while Volpe's rose from just over fifty per cent to sixty-four per cent, a contrast which shows a twenty per cent relative decline for Brooke. Allowing for the fluctuations in turnout between the two years, Brooke lost 338,000 votes from his 1964 performance, while the total vote fell only 346,000 (preliminary results).

Most of Brooke's relative decline was in Boston, where he had previously compiled increasing totals and percentages against three Irish Democrats. Former Governor Endicott Peabody, a strong supporter of civil rights, gave no comfort to the white Bostonian spirit which is losing state aid for the city's schools in defiance of a Republican-sponsored integration law. Even so, Peabody scored a fifty-six per cent majority in the city, almost as high as his sixty-one per cent of 1962.

The white backlash may have cost Brooke as much as ten to twenty per cent of his previous vote in the worst ward in Boston, but it did not reduce his total seriously elsewhere. As for his potential vote, there is no simple way to determine if his 1964 majority could have been even larger (Kennedy broke seventy per cent on his second statewide campaign) and hence no way of attributing Brooke's loss relative to Volpe's to the white backlash.

AN END TO YANKEEISM Massachusetts Politics have improved greatly since the 1950's, when the two parties insisted on nominating all-Yankee and all-Irish statewide tickets and Democratic control seemed inevitable at all levels of government after the departure of the grand old Yankees, Governor Christian A. Harter and Senator Leverett A. Saltonstall. The Republican party has finally — after four biennial statewide campaigns and three victories each for Volpe and Brooke — lost the image of unrepentant Yankeeism which aroused the automatic hostility of the state's diverse ethnic groups.

Three more statistical points show that we have reached "the end of the beginning" rather than "the beginning of the end."

NO SWEEP First, though the mass media termed Volpe's and Brooke's large majorities "a Republican sweep," there was no coattail effect for lack of attractive candidates at the local level.

Only three seats were gained in the House by Republicans, only one in the Senate, and there was no gain in the Governor's Council. Only in the Senate can Governor Volpe's veto be sustained by a Republican one-third vote — by just one vote.

As State Committee Chairman John Parker observed in his post-election statement, Governor Volpe's possession of the state's first four-year term gives him an unprecedented opportunity to clear out the party's "dead wood" free from the pressure of another statewide campaign in just another year. All Republicans should support the Governor in such an effort.

LOW TURNOUT Second, though the climate of Massachusetts politics has definitely changed, the two sixty per cent statewide majorities exaggerate the number of Democrats converted from irreconcilability. Although the population and registration in Massachusetts have increased gradually since 1960, there were fewer votes cast in 1966 than in 1962, and in 1964 than in 1960, the comparable non-Presidential and Presidential years. In 1960, Governor Volpe received more votes statewide and in the city of Boston, with respective percentages of only fifty-three and forty-one per cent, than in 1966, when he received clear majorities of sixty-four and fifty-three per cent.

Unquestionably the Governor's courage and persistence in passing the sales tax in seven major efforts converted many voters to Volpe personally, for his vote actually increased by ninety thousand while the major party gubernatorial vote declined by almost 350,000. Nevertheless, it is impossible to analyze Massachusetts elections without checking fluctuations in voter turnout, and the low turnouts since 1960 have given Republicans an ill-appreciated opportunity to gain more on the divided and apathetic Democrats through more effective local organization.

RICHARDSON Third, the first Yankee Republican to win his first statewide election since 1952, the Lieutenant Governor and Attorney General-elect Elliot L. Richardson, was not seriously hurt by the election day front-page editorial in the normally Republican *Boston Herald* comparing him unfavorably to the late Senator McCarthy. Most observers have regarded Richardson's fifty-two per cent majority, smaller than the fifty-six per cent of the new Yankee, Lieutenant Governor-elect Francis W. Sargent, as proof of the *Herald's* power.

But Sargent's larger winning percentage statewide was due largely to the greater number of blanks (120,000) cast in his race, for he ran only five thousand votes ahead of Richardson. In 1964, even though Richardson won his race and the Democratic candidate for Governor, Francis X. Belotti, then running against Volpe, lost his, Belotti still received 31,000 more votes than Richardson. In simple terms, Richardson won this year because he lost only 100,000 votes from 1964 while Belotti lost over twice as many, despite the fact that he had the advantage of two previous statewide races to Richardson's one.

—C.W.B.

Romney on Civil Rights

by Robert E. Smith

"Everyone seems agreed that he is a man of strong convictions. He takes himself very seriously and believes that he is an instrument of God's will in furthering liberal, humanitarian causes. He is devout and will show moving pictures of his trip to the Holy Land at the drop of a hat. He apparently sees himself as having been tapped to put the Sermon on the Mount into governmental practice. This is not a pose but reflects a sincere, if unusual conviction. Any approach to him which overlooks this strong religious drive — which is completely intermeshed with his personal ambition — will miss the mark."

It was said of Soapy Williams in 1960, but it could just as well be said of Michigan's latter day saint of politics, George Romney.

Just about everyone, political allies or critics, will concede that Romney has what one calls "a moral consciousness."

On things like civil rights, George Romney says — and apparently believes — the right thing. Whether he ends up doing the right thing, or does enough of the right thing, will be scrutinized as Romney becomes more prominent in national Republican politics.

Romney seems to feel the scrutiny is unfair. "You measure a man, you measure what he believes by what he does," he said in an interview with the Ripon FORUM. "My record speaks for itself. I stand on what I have done."

And what has he done?

Romney speaks first of his efforts as a businessman (American Motors executive) to give everybody a fair chance. And if just everybody, every soul in private life, would do this there would be no civil rights problem.

WRITTEN GUARANTEES

Romney as co-chairman of Michigan's Constitutional Convention in the early sixties pushed, among other things, for a constitutional clause guaranteeing civil rights and authorizing a state civil rights commission. Now he says firmly, "Michigan is the only state in the union with civil rights guarantees written into its constitution. The only one with a civil rights commission set up by its constitution."

"The commission began in 1964 with a staff of 16 and a budget of \$164,000," he told a Negro audience in Detroit in September. "The Civil Rights Commission this year is building into a powerful state agency with nearly one hundred employees and a budget of almost a million dollars. In less than three years, the commission has accepted over 1800 complaints of discrimination in all fields of civil rights including employment, housing, public accommodations, law enforcement, and education."

In other words, Romney calls the commission a success.

"It has had considerable success in a number of fields," says a Detroit civil liberties lawyer. "It has used conciliation and persuasion and publicity, rather than court action." Of the 1800 complaints Romney mentioned, only eight went into court.

The commission's latest action was to advise cities in Michigan how to avert racial strife.

The advice was needed: Summer 1966 brought to Michigan more separate incidents of rioting than prob-

ably any other state experienced. There was unrest in Lansing, the capital; in Detroit, the largest city; in Benton Harbor, a resort; and in Jackson.

Still, Romney said in an interview, "Radical Negro leaders can't get a hold here. We've had some, of course. But we haven't had many, even though we've had those charges of police brutality that have led to racial incidents elsewhere."

After the violence in Lansing, Romney said this:

"There is neither need nor justification for violence or disobedience of law in the State of Michigan in order to receive human justice or to eliminate human injustice resulting from discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed or national origin. . . . [The state Civil Rights Commission] is the sound and legitimate solution to prejudice and discrimination where it continues to exist. And wherever laws are violated by organized mobs, criminal acts occur and other citizens are threatened by such acts as have marked the Lansing experience. Such irresponsible conduct threatens the progress we have made."

NEGRO COOLNESS

What concerns Romney is the fact that Negroes haven't embraced him with open arms. He received less than six percent of their votes in his first run for elective office, in 1962. In 1964, he pointed out, "when the Republicans didn't do too well among Negro voters because of the national ticket," he received almost twenty per cent. In 1966 he got thirty-three per cent of the Negro vote. Thus, he thinks he's making progress in Michigan.

Yet he has not been popular among Negroes in national polls. Why?

Romney says, "I know why. It's because of the traditional domination of Negroes by the Democratic Party, by offering them New Deal and other type programs, and the unfortunate policies of some Republicans in the past. The Republican Party can attract more Negroes by standing for equal rights to be achieved through private initiative."

The answer isn't through more laws, he says.

A group of Negro Republicans who were upset by the ticket and platform of the national party in 1964 met in Detroit in May 1966 and gave Romney a warm reception. He called for "a crusade to persuade Negroes they should not segregate themselves politically. . . ."

"Keep the parties guessing," he advised the National Negro Republican Assembly's first convention. The two-party structure is particularly needed by Negroes to achieve their objectives."

In the corridors and hotel rooms, there was a buzzing about another reason why Romney is suspect among large blocs of Negroes. Eventually, someone talked in public about it. Jackie Robinson, the first Negro in major league baseball and an active Republican, said he would have no hesitancy about endorsing Romney for President in 1968 but that from the Negro's point of view there was one chink in Romney's armor.

MORMON ISSUE

And that is Romney's membership in the Mormon Church. The church does not allow Negroes to attain the priesthood and has in its literature references to the inferiority of black men. Among its

leaders, of whom one is Romney, are several conservative advocates.

A recent book called "The Mormon Establishment" by Wallace Turner says that Romney is secretly embarrassed by his church's position, but still powerless to affect church doctrine. "His church's policy on barring Negroes from full participation is really the only major problem the saints have given to Romney in his political career. But he would never say this, nor did he say it to me, even by indirection," said Turner in a chapter called "George Romney, Latter-Day Saint."

Romney said in an interview that he has not read the book but that Wallace Turner does not know all there is to know about the Mormon Church. He hinted that the chapter was not a reliable account of his views. He did not go into detail about the church and his relationship to it on the matter of civil rights except to say, "It's got nothing to do with the issue. That's irrelevant. The church has stated that it believes in the full rights of every man. . . . You measure a man by what he does. My record speaks for itself."

REASONABLE LEADERS Romney's one brush with controversy in civil rights in his latest campaign for re-election was a veiled criticism of the Johnson Administration.

"In the last few years, the national leadership has made commitments that exceed capacity, and it is a dangerous situation that has contributed to unrest. It has contributed to the creation of a situation where aggressive militant leadership can move in and challenge reasonable, sound leadership that is trying to bring about the elimination of social injustices in a lawful manner," he said in a press conference on October 5th.

His idea of "reasonable leaders," he said, was people like Martin Luther King, Jr., and Whitney Young, Jr. Once again, in reference to Michigan, he said, "My actions speak for themselves."

Michigan Democrats and some columnists picked him up on the statement, saying it was ill-advised to say that the federal government was wrong in committing itself to guaranteeing proper constitutional rights. He waved one of the columns in the air as he elaborated on his views before a group of Negro ministers in Detroit October 18:

"I will not change my views with the ups and downs of public opinion." But, he said, "when you focus attention purely on the passage of a national law or a national program and fail to make clear that people can't expect everything simply from the passage of a law or program . . . then you create expectations that play into the hands of the radicals who have come along since." He said the Johnson administration was too optimistic about its civil rights legislation. "If you're going to make progress in the field you have to have a total approach."

'MORE THAN A PLATFORM' And that is what he wants Republicans to do. "You need more than a platform," he said. "You have to get people in their private lives to treat others equally, to hire equally, to sell homes on an equal basis." He said at another time that he thinks the best way to assure fair housing buying and selling is through voluntary agreements or court orders that the Civil Rights Commission can get.

George Romney's creed is today, what it was in 1965 when he said, "I propose that we Republicans as in-

dividuals and as a party exercise our full powers of moral persuasion against individual prejudice."

He gave some indication of what this means in concrete terms in a post-election appearance on "Meet the Press." Asked whether he favored open-housing, Romney said that he did. He disclosed that he had wired Senator Dirksen during the debate on the civil rights bill to urge support for the open-housing provision which was in the end defeated in the Senate.

Asked whether he thought open-housing legislation should apply even to single family dwellings, Romney replied, "We have it in Michigan."

Robert E. Smith is a staff writer for the Detroit Free Press. He was formerly editor of The Southern Courier in Montgomery, Ala., and a reporter for the Trenton, N.J. Times. His article is based in part on an exclusive FORUM interview with Governor Romney.

RIPON NEWS

Members of the Ripon Society served as campaign and research aides for Republican candidates in thirteen states this fall, including Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, Iowa, Oregon, Missouri, California, and Washington. In the Massachusetts Senatorial campaign of Edward Brooke, Ripon members organized the research department and helped prepare a series of position papers which received national attention.

The Society's 1966 election endorsements (of selected Republicans whose qualifications as progressive leaders seem distinctive) were featured in the *New York Times* (together with sixty other papers) and listed state-by-state in the *Washington Post*. More than forty candidates called the office and fifty wrote after the list went out, some to request that we withhold public endorsement for tactical purposes; others to thank us; others to request staff assistance. Of the seventeen Ripon-endorsed candidates, fourteen won. Of the eleven Ripon-endorsed Senate candidates, nine were victorious. —W.S.P.

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