Can Nixon Still Lose It?

You bet he can, notwithstanding the bandwagon cries of his backers and the confident smile on his face. On one side of him, there will be a bloc for non-candidate Rockefeller; on the other, a bloc for Reagan. If these groups put the squeeze on the favorite sons in the middle, Nixon could be denied the nomination. To prevent this, he must dance awkwardly in the center, darting from left to right.

— PAGE 3

Mixed Reviews on the Riot Report

The Report of the Commission on Civil Disorders faces squarely the need for law and order as well as social and economic reform. It shows why brutal repression doesn't work, and it contains a number of proposals on which Republicans should act immediately. But its sloganeering about white racism as a cause of poverty is bad as a political tactic and sloppy as social analysis. Robert W. Gordon, J. Eugene Marans and Peter J. Wallison review the complete text.

— PAGE 7

Laird on Congress

Some think that a Republican Majority in the House of Representatives would be unprogressive and obstructionist. The Chairman of the House Republican Conference refutes this charge and outlines his agenda for a GOP House in 1969.

— PAGE 24

Non-proliferation Problems

A nuclear treaty is all very good in an election year, but so is a strong Western Alliance. Yet the manner in which the Administration has pushed the non-proliferation treaty may proliferate the strains in NATO. Indeed, if it follows the nuclear pact with a troop cutback in West Germany, the Germans may become very uncooperative next year when they reconsider NATO and hold their own national elections.

— PAGE 11
THE RIPON SOCIETY, INC. is a Republican research and publishing organization whose members are young business, academic and professional men and women. It has national headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts, chapters in Boston, Los Angeles, New Haven and New York, National Associate members throughout the fifty states, and special affiliated groups of sub-chapter status. The Society is supported by chapter dues, individual contributions, and proceeds from its publications and contract work. The Society offers the following options for annual commitments: $25 or less; $50 or more; $100 or more; Founder $1000 or more. Inquiries about membership and chapter organization should be addressed to the National Executive Director.

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14a ELLIOT ST: Ripon Book Club

Beginning this month we shall offer from time to time selected discount to readers of the Ripon FORUM. There is no contract to sign and no minimum number of books to buy. We shall try to pick books that are important and readable, books that will hold together on the bookshelves of thinking people who also happen to be Republicans.

The selection for April is The Republican Establishment by Stephen Hess and David Broder. It was reviewed on these pages last month by Ripon President L. W. Blumenthal, who "mandatorily reading for anyone who wants to understand the Republican Party today." It also happens to be very engagingly written.

The selection for May, which you may order this month, is well, is The Vanquished: The Society Appraisal. The book contains eleven fresh, hitherto unpublished essays including two analyses of how Eisenhower handled the problem of Korea in 1952-53. It will also include a fully footnoted version of Ripon's "confederal strategy" that first appeared in the September 1968 issue of the FORUM.

As a special bonus to those buying both titles (or two copies of one) we are offering a free copy of Southern Republicanism and Federalism: A 129-page analysis of the GOP in eleven Southern states.

- Massachusetts Governor John A. Volpe joined the Cambridge/Boston Chapter for dinner at the Harvard Faculty Club on March 6th. He spent some time answering questions on his work as Governor and as Chairman of the National Governors Conference. At the conclusion of an impressive performance at the podium, Governor Volpe presented outgoing chapter President Lee Huebner with a plaque entitled him to honorary membership in the Order of Paul Revere.

- While in Boston in late February Governor Tom McCale of Oregon discussed the political situation in his state with over breakfast.

- In March the Cambridge/Boston Chapter elected new officers. They are: Robert D. Crangle, President; Terry A. Barnett, Vice President; Christopher C. DeMuth, Secretary; and Samuel A. Scherer, Treasurer. The members of the Executive Board are Christopher W. Beal, Michael F. Brewer, Ralph B. Earle, Jr., Daniel Hirschfeld, Howard L. Reiver, Bink Shorts, Robert L. Beal, George D. Brown, Michael W. Christian, Wilfred E. Gardner, Jr., Robert S. Gulick and Rep. Martin A. Linsky. The last six names are on the Steering Committee for a new downtown group which is planning to split off to form a separate chapter. The split arises from the rapid growth of the Cambridge/Boston group.

- In late March Don Luce, former Vietnam director of the International Volunteer Service Corps, analyzed the situation in the war zone for the Cambridge/Boston Chapter. Also in March, Lee Auspitz, Editor of this Journal, represented the position on Vietnam before a crowd of 200 at the Metropolitan Republican Club of New York.

- Mel Bernstein of the Los Angeles Chapter appeared on KRJTV-TST Tempe III show hosted by Don McGuire to discuss Reagan Presidential strategy. Audience response was highest, however, on the Vietnam war questions. McGuire authored 1800 Fling Street, which is a spoof of the 1800s New South. Bernstein's analysis of the current race for the GOP Senate nomination in the Golden State, "Kuchel vs. Rafferty," appeared in the March 9 New Republican.

LETTERS: Flexible Exchange Rates

Dear Sirs:

The articles on international monetary policy by Professors Foley and Hart in the February FORUM did not, despite a note on the demonetization of gold, give adequate attention to a very simple alternative to complicated international monetary reserve systems: let the foreign exchange price of the dollar float. This would imply letting the foreign exchange price of the dollar vis-a-vis other currencies be determined by supply and demand. Contrary to fears of political consequences, it could be done before Presidential decree and does not require an act of Congress.

Sincerely, (turn to page 23)
Governor Rockefeller's decision not to contest the Oregon primary does not yet make Richard Nixon a sure winner. Though the Nixon camp will almost certainly attempt to generate a bandwagon psychology among delegates, Rockefeller's decision leaves things very much as they were before. On the one hand, there will be a pro-Rockefeller core, which

THE NOMINATION GAME

Can Nixon Still Lose it?

we now estimate at 263 votes (see the first ballot projection on page 4). On the other, there is a pro-Reagan core of 207 votes. And then there remains a long list of favorite son delegates, some of whom will lean to Rockefeller, some to Reagan, some to Nixon. The use of the favorite son technique is a clear sign that a number of states are waiting to strike a good bargain. If, when they show their spots on the second ballot, Nixon does not have a clear majority, the convention will be a brokered one.

To avert this possibility Nixon will continue the careful cultivation of potential delegates that his lieutenants throughout the country have carried on for months. This oldest and most basic part of his campaign bears the greatest promise of success without substantial difficulty. Because Nixon does not possess the same emotional appeal that Goldwater offered his adherents, the Nixon team will probably not seek "all-out commitments" from delegates as Goldwater did in 1964. Their delegate drive will be aimed in part at splitting up large favorite son blocs like that reportedly collecting around Senator John Tower and thus generating a first ballot victory by acclamation. To achieve this end, Nixon will dangle the possibility of a vice presidential nomination before as many favorite sons as possible.

But along with this behind-the-scenes operation, Nixon must pursue a strong public campaign designed to prove his superiority to Rockefeller in the polls. For if he is at the top of the polls at convention time, it will be very hard to convince favorite son delegations to withhold support from him. The 1968 Reagan organization, like the 1960 Goldwater organization, is not strong enough to block Nixon single-handedly. It needs the existence of a strong moderate bloc, and Nixon's one sure way of demoralizing the moderates is to outrank Rockefeller in the polls. Nixon's public strategy, therefore, is simultaneously to woo moderates in the party and to speak out on the issues enough to pique public interest in his candidacy without creating any real controversy. The Nixon courtship of Republican moderates is designed both to lay the groundwork for claiming their support in the Fall election campaign and to keep them politically quiescent and disorganized until the August convention. Issue-oriented moderates, however, may be unwilling to embrace Nixon merely because he is the frontrunner for the nomination. Governor Rockefeller is planning a series of speeches and position papers that will create additional pressure on Nixon to take more definite stands and to offer solutions for specific problems.

Richard Nixon may be understandably reluctant to forsake the technique he has used thus far—to offer the public relatively candid statements on nomination politics coupled with only the broadest generalities on the difficult issues. The decision to offer specific proposals involves substantial risks. By taking stands, Nixon risks alienating either the moderates or the conservatives within the party. He enables press criticism to focus effectively on his particular positions, and he surrenders the issue flexibility he would cherish in opposing the Democratic nominee.

Perhaps the greatest risk for Richard Nixon in speaking out is not that he will make some spectacular blunder, but that his views will be met with public apathy that betrays political impotence. The party professionals who now favor his nomination do not bear the kind of attachment to Nixon that would prevent their turning to Rockefeller or Reagan, should the polls indicate that the frontrunner had failed to gain widespread approval for his stands on the issues.

FOUR PRONGS Meanwhile, Rockefeller's supporters will rely on a four-pronged argument in selling their candidate. First, they
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NEEDED TO NOMINATE: 667
will argue that Rockefeller is in the best position to win the presidency. Rockefeller, they will say, in a race against President Johnson would be sure to attract the Kennedy-McCarthy Democrats estranged from the President—particularly the large bloc of under-30 voters who have been notoriously cool toward Nixon.

If Robert Kennedy were to become the Democratic nominee, Rockefeller would be able to win by cordoning Kennedy off on the left while occupying the center and right of the political spectrum. Nixon, on the other hand, would have a more difficult time gaining the support of independent and middle-of-the-road Democrats if pitted against the New York Senator. In either case, Rockefeller would loom as a sure winner, whereas Nixon would only be a doubtful one.

Secondly, the argument goes, Rockefeller's candidacy holds the greatest promise of a Republican takeover in the House of Representatives. Rockefeller is the strongest Republican in the Northeast, the area of least recapture in 1966 and greatest potential gain in 1968. And if Rockefeller moves as a running mate, a man with appeal in the South, a move which nomination strategy may dictate, Congressional candidates might be helped in all but the Deep South states after the manner of the Kennedy-Johnson ticket of 1960. The Northeast and South contain the greatest number of marginal House seats.

The third element of the Rockefeller argument is that he is best prepared to be President and to unite the country behind his administration. The impact of this claim on party leaders will be measured in the reaction to the public stands Rockefeller makes on the issues and to the public mood created by significant changes in the national and international scene occurring in the next few months.

Rockefeller's refusal to oppose Nixon in Oregon supplies his partisans with a fourth and final argument: that he is now a loyal party man who has humbly put his future in the hands of the professionals. Previously, Nixon could argue that he alone could preserve party unity. But thanks to Rockefeller this unity is now foreordained, and whoever comes out of Miami as the nominee will have a party undivided by bitter public displays of factionalism in the primaries.

These are potent arguments that could convince a few key governors to withhold support from Nixon if Rockefeller remains high in the polls. A number of state delegations would in any case prefer to stay uncommitted as long as possible, either to avoid internal factional disputes or to remain independent of Mr. Nixon's bad image with independents and Democrats at home.

Conservatives, for their part, are faced with a dilemma by the Nixon candidacy. Were it but a matter of simple confrontation between Nixon and Rockefeller, Nixon would be the obvious choice of the conservatives. Nixon's views are generally acceptable to conservatives, who view Rockefeller with mistrust as representing an alien force in the party.

Yet Nixon's nomination would threaten the end of the conservative insurgency in the Republican party. Richard Nixon is preeminently a party man and one who trusts his own political counsel above all others. As the nominee and, if elected, as president, Nixon could be relied upon to build his own party infra-

structure which would leave no room for direction and control by conservative ideologues. The infusion of Nixon people into state party organizations would upset the dominance the conservatives have gained in many local areas over the past eight years.

Rockefeller, however, even as President, would probably lack the party contacts necessary to upset conservative control of the party organization in most areas where the local political climate favors them. This conservative dilemma may produce a split between the "doctrinaire" conservatives who could never support Rockefeller under any circumstances and the "realists" who see Rockefeller presenting the prospect of a national party victory while offering little threat to their localized power. The outcome of the internal debate among conservative party leaders in states like Texas, Oklahoma, Florida and Illinois may significantly affect the result of the nomination contest.

A second consideration for Republican conservatives is that if events combine to deny Nixon an early ballot nomination, Governor Reagan's nomination prospects are preserved and quite substantially enhanced. Reagan himself has done nothing to foreclose his emergence as the candidate of a divided convention. His remarks to date, in fact, have coyly suggested that he almost expects the convention will turn to him when Nixon reaches a peak short of a majority. For the Reagan backers, then, support of Nixon involves the sacrifice of their first choice.

One can accordingly expect cagery Reagan partisans to prop up Rockefeller and downgrade Nixon. Their difficulty is that their own man has been declining steadily in the polls. And, though public opinion is not nearly so important to conservative morale as to the moderates, a really low showing could destroy Reagan's credibility for first place on the ballot. Still, Reagan backers have a sizeable block of votes, and they may accept a vice-presidential nomination and choose to fight for the presidency another day.

Richard Nixon may, of course, be able to win the nomination by continuing to avoid detailed discussion of Vietnam, urban problems and other issues; by gaining what mileage he can by attacking the Johnson Administration (though he is hardly alone in this field); and by relying on his behind-the-scenes delegate courtship effort. To say more than that Nixon has a big lead in the race for the nomination, however, is at this point premature. Several developments may still reverse Nixon's dominance—the character of the debate on the issues, the role Rockefeller chooses to play and its effect on Nixon and the public, the maneuvers of the Reagan supporters, and the resolution of the conservatives' dilemma over their future in a Nixon-led party organization.

Perhaps the most crucial questions are whether pro-Rockefeller support can stay together in the absence of an announced candidate and whether such support can be organized in a form that will bring Rockefeller's four-part case directly to the delegates. If the answers are yes, Nixon still can be stopped by a squeeze from both ends of the party spectrum.

If Reagan remains strong at the precinct level and Rockefeller remains up in the polls, the 1968 convention may yet become a widely fascinating political show the like of which has not occurred since the pre-television era. —P. C. J., H. A. R., J. L. A., T. E. P.
The garbage strike in New York has indirectly and ironically led Governor Rockefeller to raise an issue that should be central to national debate this year. By refusing to call out the National Guard to collect the garbage or break the strike, the Governor recognized the limited usefulness of military power in trying to influence social events. I thought this was refreshing, especially since many people who looked on the strike as an illegal resort to something close to violence instinctively wanted the State to meet “force with force.”

Military force is not a very effective way to mold people’s behavior because it generally has little or no effect on the underlying incentives, habits, and institutions that produce behavior. The use of strikes by public employees is obviously a very natural evolution of labor practice in this country. Labor unions, in a sense, exist to call strikes, and it is unlikely that we can have unions without some strikes.

We also have a habit of underpaying public employees, and of expecting the worst from them in terms of inefficiency, impoliteness and corruption. We often get just what we expect and what we pay for. These attitudes are holdovers from days of political patronage when public employment was a kind of welfare setup to take care of the wards. We have to adjust our attitudes now to the fact that government bureaucracies are among the largest and most important institutions we have. If we want them to perform well, we have to transform them into high-morale, competent and enthusiastic institutions. This obviously involves a rapid increase in pay levels which is going to produce conflict. Military intervention in a complicated social event like this is dangerous because it is completely irrelevant to these larger social forces that are producing the problem.

A satisfactory resolution of a public employee strike means, almost by definition, finding a way to get the existing union to perform its function. A solution that involves breaking the union or exterminating the sanitation men is not really a solution because it ignores or destroys the “givens” of the problem.

These observations naturally bring to mind the War in Vietnam, which is an example of the surrealistic results of insisting on military enforcement of a policy which seeks ends that military force is unable to effect. If our goal in Vietnam was to create a stable, anti-Communist government that could defend itself and govern the country as a functioning agricultural society, then we have already lost. The obstacles to the creation of such a regime were objective social, geographical and historical facts that made it inevitable that under any non-Communist government which did not have a very broad popular base, many individuals would have incentive and opportunity to carry on a revolutionary war. The history of the revolution against French colonialism, the existence of a guerilla network as a going institution, the nearness of communist North Vietnam, the roughness of the terrain, and the wide consciousness of injustice, inefficiency and corruption in traditional society provided objective preconditions for a reevaluation.

Although the visible results of this conjunction of circumstances included violent behavior by the guerillas, very few of the underlying conditions could be affected at all by organized armed forces. We have tried unsuccessfully to interdict supply routes by massive bombing, and a naval blockade. We have done nothing remotely relevant to the parts of the situation which are rooted in history, geography, or, most important, people’s attitude toward themselves and the government. But how can military force affect these factors? If there were a fixed number of guerillas and their strength depended only on survival, we could kill them all. But in a situation like this, incentives and opportunities determine the strength of the enemy much as supply and demand determine a price in economics. Killing guerillas makes no impact on the situation of the mass of people who are the fund from which the guerilla armies are replenished.

Military power of enormous cost has been driven to destroying the society as the only way to destroy the conditions of the problem. Our success, such as it was, up to the Tet offensive was attributable chiefly to the destruction of the whole life of the countryside. Military power can accomplish this by removing the villages from the land and creating for their people a new non-life in refugee camps. But this only destroys the society over which we were fighting. In this case our use of military force in a situation in which it was inappropriate and irrelevant has led us to action which in any other context we would be unanimous in condemning as criminal.

More essential even than resolving the Vietnam War to our national interest will be finding a way to manage the violence which is breaking out in our own cities. Here we need a very sober and prudent judgment as to what contribution military force can make to resolving the conflict. Our experience in the past summers has shown that many military or para-military operations in riot situations only increase the killing and property damage. The police and national guard may have the impression that they are controlling the riot, but they seem in reality only to be interacting with a social event beyond anyone’s control. Perhaps force can prevent the spread of the riot or of rioters but most of the riots seem, like forest fires, simply to burn themselves out. Military force makes no contribution to mitigating the violence or the damage.

I hope we will find — this year — men to lead our party who have imagination enough to recognize that the question of when and where force is desirable is both too pressing and too complex to be answered by platitudes or evasions.

by Duncan K. Foley

THE BALANCE SHEET
RIOT COMMISSION REPORT

I. Repression is not the Answer

Those Americans who sympathize with the poverty of urban Negroes balk at thinking about riot control; those who don't, think of nothing else. Thinking about conditions of poverty and control of riots together, as the Commission has done, is to confront the dragon. When the report was published, the mayors sidestepped the confrontation by saying that the conditions of poverty were the responsibility of the federal government; they said nothing about control. The President, after some delay, sidestepped it by saying nothing about either issue. And Mr. Nixon sidestepped it by saying that—shades of Vietnam—you have to have 'security' before you can begin to think of political and economic remedies. In one way or another, official spokesmen have made it plain that they have no plan, when the summer comes, but to sally forth for another season of repression.

By linking the problems of prevention and control, the Commission is alone in confronting the real urban crisis. For the "crisis" in American cities is not the usual collection of middle-class complaints which include as a rule everything from traffic jams to infrequent opera. Nor is it that Negroes live sordid and humiliating lives, that they suffer from the indignities of joblessness, a stingy and officious welfare system, schools that make their children listless and stupid, dangerous and dirty houses, insolent policemen and summer heat. What is critical in the crisis is that when some Negroes kick up a fuss about the way they live, and others take advantage of the fuss to go on disorderly sprees, the authorities respond with a murderous fearful violence wholly disproportionate to the offenses. The Report finds that rioters killed only two of Detroit's 43 dead. Nearly all the killing was done by Police and National Guard; nearly all the victims were Negroes.

There may be and have been other possible readings of this Report. Mine is that its driving argument is one against the violent repression of Negroes. This is a difficult and unpopular argument to make when the prevailing, not always outspoken agreement seems to be that if repression is not the right thing to do, it may be the only thing to do. In strict cost analysis terms—say in dollars per peaceful Negro—it is the cheapest. And a growing body of opinion holds that if the state is neither to "appease" rioters by legislating in their favor before this summer, nor to "reward" them after it, that oiling the machinery of repression is also of all courses the wisest. With the same logic that this country has applied overseas, the authorities and white people generally are escalating and Negroes know it.

In struggling against this mode of reasoning the Commission has had to reckon with the fact that broad political support for unrepressive measures lasted only so long as the disabilities of black citizens were legal and technical and the remedies would move them no closer to the white middle class. Now that these conditions for generous treatment have vanished, the Commission is trying to establish new ones. Chiefly, it is trying to restore guilt-feelings in Northern whites, and its tactic is to call them racists.

GUilt TACTICS

As a tactic, this has severe disadvantages. To begin with, many whites are not racists. This is not to say that they are wholly free from any tinctures of race-consciousness, but that does not make them racists in the only sensible construction of the word: an ideology of active hostility to Negroes based on a conviction of black inferiority. If they are so clogged with guilt as to believe themselves racists even if they are not, the Commission's preaching to them is preaching to the convinced.

Many of those who are racists, moreover, or at least racially prejudiced, do not know that they are; and still others who know that they are will not confess that they are. They have a trick of concealing their racism from themselves and others under a blanket of respectable phrases with wide appeal: neighborhood schools, a man's right to sell to whomever he pleases, law and order. Their thinking about Negroes is clouded by a mass of extremely common misapprehensions—so common, indeed, that a majority of Commission members probably shared them before beginning their investigation. Most people know that Negro crime and birth rates are high, but that their children's reading scores are low, that their skills are unsuited to modern technology. One does not have to be a racist to perceive these facts, talk about them, and make them a basis for action and analysis.

The Commission performs an admirable service in showing that, properly understood, these facts should lead toward compassionate analysis and generous action. All lower class crime and birth rates are high, it argues; the unwillingness of schools to believe that poor children can learn prevents them from learning; Negroes are untrained because few firms will hire unskilled people in order to train them. The Commission also argues those immigrant groups that cannot understand why Negroes, to be accepted, will not make themselves acceptable as they did. The Report points out that the European immigrants were different: they entered a more primitive economy that needed them more, they suffered no destruction of their families through slavery, they discovered methods of mobility in crime and politics not available to Negroes.

It is heartening to see a national commission spell out in this patient manner some of the basic historical and demographic facts relating to the plight of Negroes in our society, especially because even intelligent and educated Americans are not always aware of them.

Indeed, the Report would have been far stronger had it simply pleaded against error. One always has a better chance of convincing an opponent if one9

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his views result from an honest mistake. Instead, the
Commission indulges in name-calling. Being racists, it
says, whites are collectively responsible for the condi-
tion of Negroes; whites therefore owe blacks
restitution, centuries of back pay.

The trouble with this argument is that it emphasizes
the gulf between whites and blacks instead of trying to
close it. It should have emphasized the identity of In-
terest of all Americans in solving the problems of poverty
and despair. It should have insisted that repression is
wrong not because whites are racists but because re-
pression is stupidly destructive, and if continued it will
make all our lives unbearable. Towards the end the
Commission warns of the possibility of “urban apartheid
with semi-martial law in many major cities, enforced
residence of Negroes in segregated areas, and a drastic
reduction in personal freedom for all Americans, par-
ticularly Negroes.” It is this that should have been spell-
ed out in more detail. For even the most anxious, fear-
ful, insecure and angry white lower-middle class Amer-
ican who sees Negroes as destroying his precarious se-
curity is, like anybody else, a bundle of complex and
contradictory instincts. Many of them are decent, and
many can be appealed to on the level of reason and
compassion. But no more than a Negro will he stand
for being bullied by epithets of racism.

SLOPPY ANALYSIS Identifying racism as the cause
of Negro poverty and thus of
riots is not only bad tactics. It
is also bad as a method of social analysis. Even social
scientists who like the general thrust of the Report will
be a long time forgiving it the sloppiness of its pre-
sentation. Lawyers usually write reports like this one,
and they look for the place to fix fault or blame. But
that procedure does not fit a complex historical prob-
lem like that of the condition of Negro Americans.
Obviously there is a relation between white racism and
Negro poverty. But surely it is not the simple casual
one that white hatred makes Negroes poor.

It was of course a racist institution — slavery — that
inserted Negroes in the political and economic system at
such a time and in such a manner as to set going the
machinery that would condemn them to a largely self-
perpetuating cycle of poverty. And racist (or at least
prejudiced) attitudes continue to be instrumental in
slapping down at the margins of the middle class Neg-
roes who try to break out of that cycle.

But if all prejudice were extinguished tomorrow, it
would have slight impact on the condition of the really
poor people in the cities. More middle-class Negroes
could if they wished move out. Those who remained
would continue to suffer in the old ways; life would run
on in the old channel, much as it does for poor whites.
With the most articulate and energetic leadership gone,
there might not be any more riots. But the secret of
ending poverty would not have been discovered in end-
ing racism.

DYNAMICS OF RIOTS The sort of sloppiness that
leads the Commission to allow
first place to racism as a cause of
poverty also distorts its analysis of the riots themselves.
The Commission does well to refute the common no-
tion that organized conspiracies arranged them. Its
field staff ably demonstrates that most of the reported
“nests of snipers” were, as one newspaper editor put it,
“the constituted authorities shooting at each other, most
of them.”

But the Report substitutes for devil theories no ade-
quate explanations of its own. The important Chapter
2 on “patterns of disorder” describes the “typical rioter”
as an angry young man, single, a life-long resident of
his city, underemployed, informed about politics and
distrustful of the political system. Rioters were not riff-raff lumpen, but people with a cause. In short, this
is a half-hearted argument for the idea that these were
protest riots, born of frustrated hopes and broken pro-
mises, bent on wrecking “symbols of white authority”
as the Luddites wrecked machines.

On the face of it, this simply is not plausible as the
whole story. Political protest explains how police in-
cidents start trouble, but not the widespread looting or
the carefree party atmosphere of the bigger riots. After
the crowd gathers around the police car, the others who
join the riot must do so for a variety of motives, among
which, one would guess, would be simply the desire for
a new TV set and the delight that something interesting
is happening in a monotonous street on a soggy sum-
mer’s day. As an account of the dynamics of a riot —
something nobody really understands very well — the
last chapters of Ellison’s Invisible Man are a good deal
more realistic than the Report of the Riot Commission.

PLETHORA OF PROPOSALS All that said, I will be the last
to dispute the Report’s stress on
the need for a large variety of
policies to strike at all the causes of poverty, including
racism. Yet while the Report catalogues these policies,
it does not sort them out. If it seriously expected to
have some influence before the summer at a time when
neither the President nor the Congress is in a spending
mood, it should have assigned some priorities to its pro-
posals, putting at least a few of the cheapest, simplest,
and most politically acceptable first.

The Commission, unfortunately, obeys the precise pat-
tern of previous commissions by indiscriminately elabor-
ating strategies to remedy all national evils. Those who
want to make the Report a basis for social action will
have to cull the more fruitful policies from a plethora
of proposals.

COMBAT ARSENALS It is particularly saddening that
these proposals are not sorted out,
because it makes it so easy for
ill-wishers to wave away the whole bag. With it they
wave away the part of the Report that should be acted
on immediately. This is the argument against violent
repression: if immense, it is because it tells the author-
ites exactly what to do. It is specific and urgent, and
unlike the rest of the Commission’s proposals it does not
require massive federal expenditure, which ought to
come this year but won’t, or a softening of spirit among
welfare administrators, school principals, police court
judges, encyclopedia salesmen, retail TV businesses, and
Policemen’s Benevolent Association, which won’t
come this year either.

In a firm appendix, the Commission tells officials
charged with control to use harmless gases, bright lights,
and noise. It properly insists that a combat arsenal
involving machine guns, tanks, and artillery has “no con-
ceivable place” in riot control.

Yet in this vital respect, the Commission has ap-
parently already failed to influence. Cities are stock-
piling machine guns, and military units are training
with tanks. In another hideous summer, the state will
choose again the policy of violent repression, and drive
its black citizens deeper into rage and despair.

—ROBERT W. GORDON
II. What Republicans Should Do

Unfortunately, reaction to the Report of the Commission on Civil Disorders—from both Republicans and Democrats—has been primarily quantitative rather than qualitative. The knee-jerk response of critics of the report has been that its recommendations are too expensive and that the Commission gave scant thought to costing them out.

The report does, to be sure, contain recommendations for tremendous quantitative increases in jobs, education, housing and welfare. But it also contains vital qualitative recommendations for breaking down the racial attitudes that embitter community-police relations; for making our legal system work more equitably and quickly; for fostering neighborhood participation in local government; for utilizing the private sector in place of expensive federal programs; for breaking down the barriers of social and economic discrimination. These recommendations do not demand federal money; they demand leadership.

LEADERSHIP VACUUM

Such leadership has been absent from Washington. When the Report was published, the President could have invited Commission members to the White House and used the occasion to emphasize the efforts and success of the Urban Coalition and the National Alliance of Businessmen. He could have described the fundamental steps the Federal Government is taking to meet the objectives of the Report. He could have reviewed the progress made over the past nine months by state and local governments in the fight to strike at the causes of civil disorder. And, finally, he could have pledged to report to the nation in the coming months on those Commission proposals which could be implemented in 1968 and those that had to be deferred, for reasons of cost or otherwise, until 1969.

Since he did none of these things, the President has declared in effect that his Administration lacks the will to save the country from racial turmoil and that the Commission’s proposals, if they are to bear fruit at all, will have to be carried out by a new regime in Washington and by public action at the grass roots.

Thus if it fails to Republicans to fill a vacuum of leadership, they should be quick to use the Report to their advantage, for amidst a long catalogue of proposals, the Commission champions many of the GOP’s most progressive ideas. Throughout the Report appear two major Republican threads that GOP leaders should emphasize.

STINGING INDICTMENT

First, the Commission calls for intensive development of pluralistic efforts within the private sector in place of the continuing proliferation of existing government programs. The existing federal program approach, the child of thirty years of Democratic control, receives a stinging indictment by the Commission:

There is little doubt that the system through which federal programs are translated is a major problem in itself . . . . Federal programs often seem self-defeating and contradictory: field officials unable to make decisions on their own programs and unaware of related efforts; agencies unable or unwilling to work together; programs conceived and administered to achieve different and sometimes conflicting purposes.

Republicans could hardly hope for a more thorough bill of particulars in their constructive criticism of the federal approach to cities.

Second, the Commission places the primary operational responsibility for the future of the American city on state and local governments. The urban mayor has the “decisive role . . . to develop a working concept of democracy within the city,” the Commission asserts. “State government has a vital role to play,” it says, particularly in fashioning a “lasting and mutu-
ally productive relationship” between the city and the rural and suburban areas.

GOP IDEAS STRESSED

In addition, a number of important concepts endorsed by the Report are Republican in origin.

(1) The Commission recommends the creation of a Federally-chartered corporation to coordinate the creation of one million new jobs in the private sector in three years. Job development and placement in private industry is now handled separately by a variety of agencies and programs. The federal corporation would reach both individual companies and trade associations, systematically and extensively, with information about incentive programs and aids; it would have authority to negotiate contractual arrangements and channel incentive funds to private employers. The creation of a Federal corporation for purposes of this sort has been demanded by Republicans for some time, notably by Senators Jacob K. Javits and Charles H. Percy.

(2) The Commission asserts that the “single most powerful inducement for broad involvement of private enterprise in job training and job development lies in the use of the tax incentive.” The Commission found that neither a guarantee technique nor a contracting mechanism offers the same appeal to businessmen in enterprises of all sizes as does a tax incentive. Under the Commission proposal, a businessman could receive a substantial credit against his income tax for the year in which he hired a person certified as one of the hard-core unemployed by a government agency, or preferably by a Federally-chartered corporation like the one previously described. This tax credit proposal differs only in detail from the Human Investment Act that has been promoted by Senator Winston Prouty and other Republicans for several years.

(3) The Commission recommends, a parallel investment tax credit for the location and renovation of plants and other business facilities in urban and rural poverty areas. In support of its tax credit proposals, the Commission states that existing tax credits for equipment investments were taken on 1,239,000 corporate tax returns and 6,904,000 individual tax returns during the period 1962-1965, representing new investments in the total amount of approximately 92.5 billion dollars. The Commission’s plea for a tax incentive proposal should be compelling to Republicans.

It is precisely because of the need for a similarly pluralistic and large-scale answer to the problem of joblessness in the ghetto, that we have turned to the most pluralistic technique for channeling governmental assistance: the individual decisions of thousands of businesses to utilize the tax credit in making their daily employment and plant location decisions.
The establishment of neighborhood action task forces is the major element of the Commission's recommendations for the cities. Each task force would include representatives of the mayor's office, city agencies local business, labor, professional and church communities, and elected leaders including dentists could use the neighborhood task force to cut through red tape in the collection of garbage, removal of abandoned cars, installation of lights in the parks, and the establishment of playstreets. The "community cabinet" provided by the task force could make a major contribution to the prevention of civil disorders by providing an early warning system to identify potentially explosive conditions.

For half a century, Republicans have been condemning the "boss" system as failing to serve the needs of the individual city resident. The neighborhood task force is an important alternative that could easily be embraced by Republican leaders. In connection with the task force proposal, the Commission recommends establishment of neighborhood city halls and multi-service centers, the expansion of legal services to the poor, and generally more effective community participation in the affairs of the city.

LINDSAY'S RESPONSE

Some Republican leaders have expressed justifiable dismay at the President's hesitating response to the Report. Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, alluding to the "strange silence" of the White House, has declared that "a great national commitment" was needed to attack the race problem. The Governor said: "This kind of resolve, beginning at the top, is not present now."

The Republican Conference of the House of Representatives has established an Urban Affairs Task Force under Congressman William Cowger of Kentucky to appraise what federal action should be proposed in response to the Report. Senators Javis, Protry and Percy have been among those calling for implementation of the Commission's recommendations.

Rarely does a day go by that Mayor John V. Lindsay of New York does not announce the implementation of one of the Commission's recommendations, some requiring little or no additional expenditure. Immediately after the Report was released, Lindsay instructed all of his department heads to prepare memoranda on what could be done to carry out the Commission's suggestions in New York. For example, in late March he named a special committee to insure proper arrest and judicial procedures during civil disturbances, thus following one of the least expensive but most highly promising recommendations of the Commission.

NIXON'S NEGATIVE

Yet the response of some other Republicans, such as former Vice President Richard M. Nixon, has not been encouraging. In his first comment on the Report, Mr. Nixon charged that "one of the major weaknesses of the President's Commission is that it, in effect, blames everybody for the riots except the perpetrators of the riots." Mr. Nixon, who has been one of the strong supporters of tax and credit incentives to encourage the neighborhoods of private enterprise, completely ignored these specific proposals in the Report. The former Vice President chose to make a wholly negative response instead of fastening upon the Report's many constructive proposals with which he must be in substantial agreement.

PLAN FOR POLICE

Mr. Nixon seems to want to please those who criticize the Commission for failing to pay due respect to the importance of law and order in the cities. Yet the Commission cannot be faulted on these grounds. Its conclusions and recommendations on the role of the police in the community are a profoundly important part of the Report. It found that police responsibilities in the ghetto have grown as other institutions of social control—the schools, religion, family, career aspirations—have lost authority. Yet the police, generally speaking, have not had the training and organization essential to meet their new responsibilities. Warning against both blind repression and a capitulation to lawlessness, the Report brings together an extensive catalogue of devices for simple riot control including such sensible suggestions as assigning seasoned policemen to patrol ghetto areas; providing effective alternatives to the use of lethal weapons; establishing an intelligence system to help prevent the outbreak of disorders, and creating special details to collect, evaluate, and dispel rumors that might ignite civil disorder.

The Report also puts forward many suggestions to prevent the eruption of disorder by improving the relations between the police and the ghetto community. These suggestions include (a) intensifying the recruitment, assignment and promotion of Negro policemen; (b) involving the police in the performance of community services; and (c) assuring that the quality of police protection in the ghetto matches that in the rest of the community. The establishment of the neighborhood task forces would also be an important element in developing respect for law and order in the ghetto community.

The Commission has thus contributed a wealth of specific proposals on both law enforcement and economic and social development. Many of its best proposals are specifically Republican in orientation. It should be the task of the Party's leadership to point this out, not to pander to public ignorance.

—J. E. M., P. J. W.

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AUTHOR'S ASSISTANT for a book on money any politics. Good pay for a man of highest writing ability and knowledge of American politics. Send resume to Box 8.
The Administration has based its nuclear non-proliferation policy on the simple assumption that the danger of nuclear war increases with the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons. While this may be true under specific circumstances, the theory overlooks an important question: what are the political implications of a non-proliferation agreement for our allies, not to mention third-world countries? The case of West Germany is particularly crucial, for the diplomatic ramifications of the non-proliferation treaty, may well help drive the Germans out of the western camp.

West Germany, in 1949, voted against neutralism and for a pro-Western foreign policy. Western policy under the Truman and Eisenhower administrations held that steps towards East-West detente in Europe should be coupled with progress on the issue of German re-unification to which these powers had pledged themselves in 1945. This policy, already eroded by developments in the 1960's, came officially to an end with President Johnson's announcement on October 8, 1966, proclaiming American steps toward detente independent of the German problem (Erhard's government which was already in serious trouble, fell shortly afterwards).

The new policy has handed the Soviet Union important leverage on the reunification issue. So far, the Soviets have refused to discuss reunification since, it is assumed, they want to safeguard the existence of East Germany. This may not remain their policy. In fact, it is possible that they will wait for the moment when sufficient disaffection over the Western allies has built up in West Germany and then offer reunification on their own terms. Internal pressures would make it hard for West Germany to resist. Thus, the Soviet Union would gain an important aim it has not been able to gain militarily: to extend influence into Central Europe—vital for the defense and economy of Western Europe—and to end all efforts towards European unification and NATO reconstruction.

While the United States and the Soviet Union have common interests in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union should not be allowed to use the issue to drive a final wedge between West Germany and the United States: the Soviets have declared—most recently through Premier Kosygin in London last year—that they will not sign a non-proliferation treaty unless West Germany signs. Since West Germany has renounced manufacture of nuclear weapons in the Paris Treaty of 1954 and will hardly receive such weapons from outside sources for national purposes, the Germans can argue that they cannot possibly pose a nuclear threat to Russia. Successive West German governments have declared their intention not to build a national nuclear force.

Those Western European countries with fledgling nuclear industries—among them Italy and West Germany—have expressed certain misgivings about the proposed treaty. They fear

a) that industrial espionage may result from inspection by agents of the International Atomic Energy Commission,

b) that the development of their nuclear industries for peaceful purposes would be hampered, and that they would lose out in competition,

c) that Western European unity will receive a serious blow if Euratom will not be the inspecting agency,

d) that an integrated Western European nuclear force or ABM system would never come into existence, and that they would too permanently rely upon American nuclear protection in the face of already considerable disagreement with the United States on NATO defense policy,

e) that the treaty will be forced upon them by an ally, which in itself undermines mutual trust,

f) that they will be discriminated against by accepting inspection and giving up rights without getting anything in return, while the "atomic giants" continue to build up their atomic arsenals.
The new inspection clauses offer no firm guarantee for a permanent Euratom inspection and the possibility of a Western European nuclear force but rather leave these issues open to interpretation. The fact that the United States made changes in the draft treaty only after strenuous objection from several countries has in itself contributed to the impression that she is not interested primarily in her allies.

There have already been considerable strains in West German-United States relations since the early 1960's, involving such issues as troop reductions, offset payments for US troops in Germany, weapons purchases in the United States and, above all, bilateral US-USSR consultations affecting European security and atomic issues. An example is the MLF project which was dropped without consultation with the Germans after the German government went to considerable lengths to defend the idea. There has been increasing West German irritation with American policies toward the Soviet Union, NATO, and on the issue of reunification, unresolved since 1945.

German dissatisfaction with the Western allies contributed to the strengthening of the radical Right: the National Democratic Party, founded only in 1964, has polled an average of 7% of the popular vote in six states since 1966. It advocates West Germany's leaving NATO and the Common Market and striking a deal with Russia on reunification. The mainstay of the democratic parties in the Bundestag in foreign policy, however, remains United States-German and Franco-German friendship.

**NEUTRALIST REACTION**

If West Germany feels that her interests are not served by the alliance with the United States, that her security is made the toy of changing fashions in US military thinking, that she is being forced by her main ally to sign a treaty against her wishes and interests, and that the road to European unity is blocked by France, she will increasingly become despondent of western ties and become neutralist in foreign policy. Cooperation in NATO and in monetary affairs would be affected first, and US frustration would lead to a rapid deterioration in relations. Pro-Western policy would have been recognized as a failure both in terms of reunification and foreign policy in general, and the stage would be set for a Soviet-German rapprochement. (An ominous sign are recent talks between the Soviet ambassador and SPD officials regarding the status of Berlin on which the United States felt obliged to issue a warning.)

As Congressman Paul Findley of Illinois recently pointed out, the non-proliferation issue has already played into the hands of the radical Right in Germany which makes the present German government the scapegoat of "surrender" charges.

The United States does face a dilemma in regard to West Germany's signing of the non-proliferation treaty. If such a treaty is to be universal, no exceptions should be made; and it is clearly in the US interest that proliferation of national nuclear armaments be stopped. Yet the treaty puts strains on the Western Alliance without touching relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

**SHARP QUESTIONS**

The House Republican Committee on Western Alliances demanded on April 21, 1967 that open hearings on questions arising from the proposed treaty be held. The statement posed some sharp questions:

The proposed nuclear non-proliferation treaty raises serious, far-reaching and complex questions which have not been adequately explored. If they are left until the time when the treaty is presented to the Senate for ratification, open-minded discussion and evaluation will be virtually impossible.

West German public reaction to the first non-proliferation draft of last year was vociferous and, by and large, missed the mark. It has recently become a matter of sharp political debate, with Socialist leader Willy Brandt endorsing it and Christian Democrat Franz Joseph Strauss opposing. If the United States should steamroll the treaty through and then follow with a cutback of troops in Germany, there would be a strong "Gaullist" reaction in German politics.

President Johnson is eager to conclude the treaty before the elections in order to present himself as a man of peace. Republican Senators should ask themselves if they want to help him reach an "understanding" with the Soviet Union without measuring the cost to the West.

—A. V. G.

**THE CITIES**

**Lyndon B. Johnson, the Housing Thief**

Stealing other people's automobiles, filing off the serial numbers, repainting them, and offering them to the buying public is a crime in these fifty states. If the same theory applied to federal legislation, the sheriff would be beating at the White House door.

The purloined property, until recently owned by Congressional Republicans, is now distributed throughout the Administration's Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, which accompanied President Johnson's "Crisis of the Cities" message of February 22. The nature of the theft was spelled out clearly in a biting article by Monroe Karmin in the *Wall Street Journal* on March 7.

Karmin saw LBJ's pronouncement on the urban crisis as "exemplary instruction in the art of political one-upmanship." When Congress takes the initiative away from the President, said Karmin, the President (a) demolishes the Congressional initiative, (b) defends his own programs to the death, (c) quietly discards the programs thus defended, and (d) beseeches Congress to follow his lead in enacting the Congressional proposals, by now carefully disguised in Administration garb.

The principal Republican property ravaged by the Administration in its quest for public approval was the National Home Ownership Foundation Act, introduced by Senator Charles Percy of Illinois, Congressman William B. Widnall, and 146 other Republican members of Congress, including the entire Republican membership of the Senate. As introduced, the NHOF Act created a private non-profit Foundation to raise private capital and channel it into home ownership programs in
The bill provided a subsidy from the Federal government to help the low income family meet the payments on its home; if the family's income rose, the subsidy would be phased down and possibly even retired. The Federal government assisted by guaranteeing the debenture bonds of the Foundation. In addition to providing mortgage money in this way, the Foundation also provided technical assistance to non-profit housing sponsors and cooperatives to help them conduct both housing programs and essential social services for lower income families.

When originally proposed in April of 1967, the NHOF Act drew an immediate and caustic response from HUD Secretary Robert Weaver, acting on White House orders. Weaver claimed that the act would not help "really" low income families, that it ignored local government, and that it needlessly duplicated existing laws which would much better achieve the same purpose.

To top off this critique, Weaver suggested that home ownership for the poor was a dangerous idea, as it would produce riots when the poor failed to meet their mortgage payments. (When asked why HUD's existing programs would not produce the same result, since they allegedly would do everything the NHOF bill proposed to do, Weaver rather lamely answered that since the HUD programs were only experimental, the rioting would be correspondingly less.)

But the Administration bill also dwells upon the need to provide technical assistance to non-profit housing sponsors such as community corporations, a major feature of the Republican proposal. Another section recognizes the importance of permitting "sweat equity" — self-help housing construction by lower income homeowners. Another would expand the scope of Federally-assisted training programs to include non-professional neighborhood people who intend to manage housing development projects for local community organizations.

The bill also expands the definition of public housing units which can be sold to tenants or tenant cooperatives. These latter two proposals were opposed by HUD when offered by Republicans in 1965 and 1967.

The Administration does, however, neglect to steal the Republican proposal for setting up an insurance program to protect the low income home owner against losing his home in times of economic difficulty. This proposal, in fact, was the major product of a massive study of foreclosures in 1965, conducted by the Housing and Home Finance Agency chaired by Robert C. Weaver, but studiously and inexplicably ignored by him ever since. It is difficult to see how any theft of Republican proposals could be considered complete without inclusion of this potentially far-reaching item.

It is clear that the Johnson message is solidly founded on discerning larceny. For that, perhaps, the Nation should be grateful. Republicans, however, should ask themselves why the President should find it so simple to steal the ball from them. The question reveals what is perhaps one of the most fundamental weaknesses of the Republican Party today.

Republicans have never been devoid of responsible, imaginative ideas for dealing with current and developing problems, as any Congressional archivist can testify. The problem is that by and large Republicans, individually and collectively, do not seize the initiative and peddle their ideas effectively to the press and public. The availability of so many good ideas, a Congressional corps of articulate and intelligent speakers, and elaborate machinery at the Republican National Committee and the various Congressional Republican organs should give heart to any public relations specialist. But the sad fact is that, with only rare exceptions, Republicans either do not care to, or do not know how to, peddle their products. Thus, it is easy pickings for the President and his vast Administration bureaucracy to filch GOP ideas and pass them off as their own with little fear of arraignment.

The Republican Party ever expects to earn the allegiance of a majority of Americans, it must demonstrate effectively that it has the capacity to lead and govern. That demonstration cannot be made in secret. There is no lack of ideas or of resources for getting Re-
President Johnson's proposed reorganization of the Narcotics Bureau — which will go into effect on April 8 unless Congress acts — is a misguided attempt to deal with the very real and growing problem of drug abuse in this country.

Citing the inconsistency of present drug laws, the President has recommended combining two agencies that now regulate drugs: the Treasury Department's Narcotics Bureau, which has jurisdiction over opiates, cocaine and marijuana, and Health, Education, and Welfare's Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, which regulates stimulants, depressants and hallucinogens. He proposes the formation of a new Bureau of Narcotics and Drug Abuse Control in the Justice Department.

It is true that present laws are inconsistent: compare the Draconian penalties of the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 (the only Federal law with a mandatory minimum sentence for a first offense) with the present absence of punishments for possession of stronger drugs like LSD. But all indications are that the kind of consistency Johnson has in mind with his new Bureau is an extension of the harshness of the Narcotics Bureau's laws to a great many chemicals now handled more sensibly.

Under the 1914 Harrison Act, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) controls opium and its derivatives (including morphine and heroin) and cocaine. Under the Marijuana Tax Act, it also controls intoxicants derived from hemp. Both of these laws are revenue measures, and part of the confusion in existing drug regulations arises from this peculiar construction. Thus, under Federal law, one can be convicted of "failing to pay tax" on a quantity of marihuana, and in order to obtain legal marijuana for scientific research, one must go through a complicated process of applying to the Internal Revenue Service for special tax stamps.

TWO AGENCIES

One pot

Two agencies are thrown together in the Justice Department, although it is likely that each will retain its own administrative bureaucracy intact. Presumably, moving the FBN will necessitate recasting the laws covering opiates, cocaine, and marihuana, because it would be inappropriate to administer taxing legislation through the Justice Department. Such a change would be welcome. It would not only eliminate the legal complications of the present laws, it would also give legislators a chance to reconsider the wisdom of imposing severe penalties for possession of drugs.

Unfortunately, the mood of the Congress (and probably of the public) is not conducive to liberalization of drug laws. Just a few weeks ago, for example, the New York State Assembly passed a law requiring a life imprisonment sentence for any adult found guilty of selling marihuana to a minor. It is in the light of this tendency to make drug laws stiffer that the President's proposal is especially frightening.

Food and Drug Administration Commissioner Dr. James L. Goddard correctly fears that the impending reorganization will force the Drug Abuse Control Bureau to become much more like the FBN, particularly in its position on drug possession. Already Federal legislation making possession of strong hallucinogens a criminal offense is pending. One of the worst consequences of such laws is that, like the marijuana laws, they make lawbreakers of a substantial number of people (especially young people) who otherwise are not criminals. In a very logical way, these people come to see themselves on the same side of the law as real lawbreakers like thieves and big-time narcotics peddlers against the forces of order and morality in society.

The social effects of the laws then become far more disruptive than the situations they were passed to control. Commissioner Goddard, who has spoken out many times against legislation of this sort appeared to have been under considerable pressure to support the President's plan and did so with great reluctance. He now seems about to resign his post.

Under Goddard's administration the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control has been reasonably enlightened. Because it has been part of the Food and Drug Administration, its efforts have been directed against illegal manufacturing of drugs and control of traffic in dangerous stimulants, depressants, and hallucinogens. By contrast, the FBN has always stressed its police powers and has considered illegal possession of drugs to be as evil as illegal traffic.

In addition, Drug Abuse Control agents have always been willing to admit that very little is known about the commonly abused drugs, that most of the information available on them is probably wrong, that research is desperately needed to get better information, and that restrictive laws make research difficult or impossible. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics has held diametrically opposed views, even arguing that scientists have been freely able to investigate marijuana under the 1937 act. (Since that act became law, only two human experiments with marihuana have ever been done in the U.S. The last was in 1946).

Current publicity in the enormous increase in use of hallucinogens and stimulants might have given the Johnson Administration an opportunity to do something useful about drug abuse. The President might have commissioned a major study of drug-taking, including encouragement of medical research. He might have urged reorganization of the archaic tax laws under which the FBN operates. He might have pointed out to Congress the unfortunate social consequences that result from laws aimed at possession rather than traffic. Instead, in the name of "consistency" he has proposed an executive re-arrangement that will doubtless please the press, will encourage the passage of more sweeping repressive legislation, and will, almost certainly, make the whole problem of drug abuse more difficult to deal with in the future.

— ANDREW T. WEIL
California: unpledged slate hopes to challenge Reagan

Dr. Thomas A. Brown has resigned his position as President of the Ripon Society of Southern California to accept a position on an uncommitted Presidential slate for California in opposition to Governor Ronald Reagan's "favorite son" slate.

The 86-man slate, including many political unknowns as well as "citizen politicians" at the grass roots level, will be representative of moderate and liberal sentiment in contrast to the Reagan slate, which is weighted in favor of conservative interests.

The Committee, many observers calculate, would require at least 25% of the primary vote as a significant showing in California to affect Reagan's national standings as a Presidential contender. Committee members and volunteers, however, maintain that their obtaining a ballot position will embarrass the Governor and flash to Republicans across the country the submerged dissatisfaction among Republicans with the Governor's programs on education, medical aid and welfare, and his Presidential ambitions generally. One poll has indicated that while most Californians generally support Reagan's performance as Governor, only about 9% prefer him for President as compared to other leading Republicans.

The Governor has steadily maintained he is not a candidate for the nomination and is serving as favorite son in order to maintain state party unity and to insure California its proportionate share of influence at the convention. Further, many moderates and liberals fear that an anti-Reagan or free choice delegation will split the Party once again on liberal-conservative lines and jeopardize the already threatened position of Senator Thomas H. Kuchel, who faces re-nomination on the Republican ticket. Kuchel is being contested by Max Rafferty, California Superintendent of Public Instruction and an articulate, flamboyant spokesman for the conservative wing of the Party. Reagan has so far maintained a hands-off position in the senatorial primary.

The grass roots "Committee for a Choice" is young but relatively experienced, poorly financed but deeply committed. Most California political figures of the moderate stripe have taken a position of quiet opposition to the slate, fearing an ignominious defeat at the polls could strengthen Reagan's chances and damage Kuchel.

Connecticut: Nixon forces to upset the compromise?

For a year now, Republican State Chairman Howard Hausman has been fashioning a political truce among fractious factions of the Connecticut GOP. But a surface Nixon-for-President movement now threatens to shatter the newly-achieved détente scarcely after it has been consummated.

In February moderate leader John Alsop (brother of the columnist) was elected National Committeeeman in exchange for his commitment to line up his wing of the party behind the US Senatorial nomination of conservative former Congressman Edwin May, Jr. To preserve the party's precarious peace, Hausman requested an indefinite freeze on presidential politics in the state.

But even as the May-Alsop amalgamation was being formalized, rumblings began to come from the bedroom communities of Fairfield County, traditionally the state's mother-lode of Republican voters and still its major source of GOP money. Ostensibly the complaints concerned the begegnery of Hartford-area party leaders (including Hausman, May and Alsop). But ideological as well as geographical considerations soon became apparent.

Foremost in the Fairfield-based group are Nixon partisans led by ex-Governor John Lodge, who have been growing increasingly restive over reports that Hausman has committed himself to support Rockefeller at Miami. Hausman's public statements have simply noted that the polls show Rockefeller to be the strongest candidate for Connecticut, a fact even ardent Nixonians will not contest. The Chairman called the rumors of a deal "pure fabrication."

Assured of electing two Nixon delegates from Fairfield's Fourth Congressional District, as well as two from eastern Connecticut's Second District, the conservatives nevertheless jolted the party's equilibrium by nominating J. William Middendorf, the very conservative treasurer of the national GOP, to contest the state leadership for one of the four at-large positions on the Connecticut delegation.

To make room for Middendorf, the Fairfield group will try to oust either National Committeewoman Tina Harrower or State Vice-Chairman Anna-Mae Switskki from the delegation. Since the targets of the move are the only two women slated to be sent to Miami from Connecticut, the removal of either would deprive the Nutmeg State of a key convention committee seat specifically earmarked for a female.

Meanwhile, the coalition was being attacked on the other flank by Abner Sibal, the moderate ex-representative from Fairfield's Fourth District, who challenged May's candidacy over the issue of Vietnam, attacking his noncommittal call for an end to the war through "new leadership." But May's support, even among Fairfield moderates, remains secure.

Illinois: one last hurrah for Everett Dirksen

"Yes, Virginia, Everett Dirksen is Illinois Republicanism," even if he more often looks like a Johnson Democrat. It will probably be Dirksen, not Percy, who will have the major influence in Illinois' important delegation to the 1968 National Convention. For the Illinois Republican National Convention Delegation is being formed by the fiat of the very regular Republican Establishment.

Although they made noises about building a delegation of moderates "looking for a winner," the operatives of Senator Charles Percy have made no moves to get these delegates elected because of a number of inside shocks. There was first, the forced withdrawal of the delegate candidacy of Congressman Donald Rumsfeld, a personal friend and close political ally of Percy, after the regular organization threatened to oppose him in the congressional primary and to oust National Committeeman Robert Stuart, another personal friend of Percy. Then endorsements were given the candidacy of
Richard Nixon in Illinois by Superintendent of Public Instruction Ray Page, the highest elected state Republican, by William E. Rentschler, a young but perennial GOP candidate and by House Minority Whip Leslie Arends. (Arends seldom speaks on national politics without first clearing it with Senator Dirksen.) If there is hope for Rockefeller in the land of Lincoln, it lies in part in Ev's propensity to flip-flop, as our sources tell us he is now planning to do on Vietnam. Harold Rainville, Dirksen's Administrative Assistant in Illinois, will be important in deciding where the Senator puts his political weight within the state.

In the GOP gubernatorial race, there are now two mayoral candidates, plus a possible spoiler in the person of former Governor William Stratton. The real battle centers around a clash between Richard Ogilvie, President of the Cook County (Chicago) Board of Commissioners and former Sheriff, and John Henry Altrofer, 1964 candidate for Lieutenant Governor on the ticket with Charles Percy. This clash, in substance, offers no more than a personality contest, buttressed by power struggles inside various regular county committees between the traditional downstate "pork" who lined up behind Altrofer and the "Y-R syndicate" elders who are represented by Ogilvie.

In contrast, the other statewide offices are marked by harmony. The Republican nominees have familiar names: Paul Carper, the son of the late Illinois Secretary of State and party power is running for his father's old job. Scott, former state treasurer and loser to Percy in a viciously personal 1964 gubernatorial primary, is running without major opposition for Attorney General. Dwyer, a national coordinator in 1960 of Citizens for Nixon-Lodge and in 1964 of Citizens for Goldwater-Miller, is running unopposed for Lieutenant Governor with the professional campaign aid of Whittaker & Baxter. The prospects are for a strong state Republican ticket running against a Daley machine-made collection of Democratic mediocrities. The Republicans will show some visible wounds post-primary and little progressivism because—need we repeat it?—"yes, Virginia, Everett Dirksen is Illinois Republicanism."

Iowa: GOP gains likely with a strong national ticket

The outlook for moderate Republicans in Iowa this year appears very good. There is a chance of winning both a Senate seat and the Governorship, and if a moderate Presidential candidate demonstrates any likelihood of being nominated and looks like a stronger contender against LBJ than Nixon, he can expect substantial backing from the Iowa delegation.

In the Senate race, the two strongest Republican candidates opposing Democratic Governor Harold E. Hughes for the seat vacated by Bourke Hickenlooper are State Senator David Stanley, a "dovish" moderate, and former Congressman James Browmell, a "hawkish" conservative. There is a third contender for the Republican nomination, a Des Moines insurance man, William N. Plymat who has announced himself as a peace candidate and an opponent of the draft. However, he is not likely to get party support, since Stanley offers Republican moderates a better chance for victory.

Either Stanley or Browmell will have a difficult fight against Hughes. Governor Hughes' margin of victory in 1964 was over 429,000 votes, 68% of the vote. In 1966, he achieved a 100,000 vote margin, with 55% of the vote. The Iowa Poll of January 28 indicates:

- Hughes 51%
- Stanley 31%
- Browmell 27%
- undecided 18%

A poll run by the Des Moines Register of GOP county chairmen and vice chairmen, gave Stanley 28½ votes (the half vote for an undecided response), Browmell 28½, and Gross (no longer a contender) 18. The poll was conducted before Plymat's entry, but there is no indication of any substantial backing for him. Since Gross is a conservative, Browmell can be expected to get his support and therefore holds a slight edge. But he is known as a lazy campaigner. Stanley, who has been campaigning vigorously since August, has a good chance of beating him in the primary (see the article on Stanley's campaign in the January 1968 FORUM).

In the gubernatorial race, the Democratic nominee will probably be State Treasurer Paul Fraenzburg, a defender of the Hughes administration and very likely a strong contender. There is a five man contest for the Republican nomination between Robert D. Ray, Robert K. Beck, Donald E. Johnson, John Knudson, and Colonel Henry.

Ray, the former Republican State Chairman is the most important leader of the state's moderates and is given much of the credit for rebuilding the state party after 1964.

Robert Beck, the publisher of the Centerville Iowaian, has previously served a term in the State Legislature and on the State Highway Commission. He is quite conservative.

Johnson, who served as National Commander of the American Legion in 1964-65, is extremely conservative.

Both John Knudson and Colonel Henry are nuisance candidates, although Henry may prove troublesome, since he has a sizeable amount of money to spend on his campaign.

It seems likely that Bob Ray will receive the gubernatorial nomination. Beck and Johnson appeal to the same group thus dividing it, and Beck's past performance has shown him to be a poor campaigner, a fact that will probably divide his 1966 support. Also, Ray stands to gain some conservative support due to his performance as Party Chairman. His popularity with county chairmen will stand him in good stead should the nominee be chosen at a party convention. Iowa law requires that if no candidate receives 35% of the primary vote, the nominee must be chosen at a party convention.

With regard to the gubernatorial race itself, the Iowa Poll published January 28 in the Des Moines Sunday Register shows the relative strength of both Ray and Beck opposing Paul Fraenzburg:

- Ray 31%
- Beck 30%
- Fraenzburg 31%
- undecided 38%

There was no Iowa Poll indicating the strength of Johnson, Knudson, or Colonel Henry. There seems a good chance that Ray will be nominated and elected. Ray's old post of GOP State Chairman, meanwhile, is now filled by Jack Warren of Black Hawk County (Waterloo). Warren belongs to the moderate, urban-oriented element in the Iowa GOP. His emphasis is, like Ray Bliss', on careful organization, and he usually avoids divisive ideological disputes.

In the Congressional races, the seven incumbents are sure to run. The five Republican seats seem secure,
although Schwengel’s and Kyl’s might be endangered if LBJ were to carry Iowa, but this coattail assist seems unlikely.

Of the two Democratic seats, John Culver’s in the Second District might be captured, but the Fifth District with Neal Smith is fairly secure.

There are three Republican contenders for Culver’s seat: State Senator Tom Riley, one of the most liberal Republicans in the Iowa Senate, whose vote-getting ability has been demonstrated in mainly Democratic constituencies; Iowa House Speaker Maurice Baringer who, though more conservative than Riley, is still a moderate; and State Senator John Walsh who must be fairly liberal since his Dubuque constituency is normally Democratic.

Whoever is nominated — and Tom Riley would probably be the toughest opponent — will need help from the top of the ticket.

In the presidential race there is now no evidence to support the first ballot projection included in the December FORUM awarding all 24 Iowa delegates to Nixon. In 1964, 10 of the 24 — one of them the present Republican State Chairman Jack Warren — held for Scranton, and the moderates are even stronger now. Even the conservatives are favoring the strongest possible candidate, realizing the need for help at the top to achieve local victories. Pragmatism and realism are characteristic, and although personally they may prefer Nixon, half at least might support a moderate.

Results for the Des Moines Register poll of county chairmen and vice chairmen published January 28 in which there were 74 answers to 190 questionnaires representing more than half the 99 counties showed:

- Nixon 36
- Rockefeller 25
- Reagan 8½
- Percy 2½
- Romney 1

The latest Iowa Poll published February 4 in the Des Moines Sunday Register revealed that all the above candidates were leading LBJ in Iowa. Rockefeller was the strongest, leading Johnson 52% to 28%, with 20% undecided.

Iowa sends 24 delegates: 2 from each of the 7 Congressional districts and 10 at-large. The at-large delegates are likely to be more conservative than the delegation as a whole, which will be a source of potential strength for a moderate candidate. Iowa Republicans would like to see coattail victories for local candidates. The lessons of 1964 were particularly bitter, and Republican leaders have not forgotten that experience.

Ohio: Governor Rhodes hangs loose

Concern about Governor Rhodes’s presidential predilections began in mid-February. Certain Cleveland Republicans, believing that the Governor would throw Ohio’s delegation to Richard Nixon, announced their plan to run delegates in the May primary pledged to Nelson Rockefeller. Opposite motives prompted Congressman John Ashbrook to organize an independent slate of Republicans in the primary in Ohio’s Seventeenth District. Ashbrook, an arch-conservative, feared that Rhodes might deliver the Ohio delegation to the New York Governor.

TO HIS COY CANDIDATE

(with apologies to Andrew Marvell)

Had we but world enough, and time,
This coyness, Rocky, were no crime.
We would sit down and think which way
To wait and fight some other day.
Thou by the Hudson River’s side
Shouldst delegates find: I to bide
My time and complain. I would
Ask you ten years before you stood,
And you should, if you please, refuse
Till the conversion of Strom Thurmond’s views.
Your band wagon should grow
Vaster than Barry’s and more slow;
An hundred years should go to praise
Thine bills and on thy record gaze;
Two hundred to adore each term,
Won’t that make Bill Buckley squirm?
An age at least to every part,
And you will win your party’s heart.
For, Rocky, you deserve this fate
Nor would I lure at faster rate.

But at my back I always hear
Lyndon’s winged Cadillac hurrying near;
And yonder all before us lie
Years of vast uncertainty.
Thy wisdom shall not mean a thing,
Unless your hat gets in the ring.
My echoing plea will seem a joke
To the Birchers whom you provoke,
And your reluctance turn to dust
Every moderate’s hope and trust.
Albany’s a fine and dandy place,
But now you must get in this race.

Now, therefore, while there’s time,
Start the polls on an upward climb,
And while George Romney’s bid expires,
Gird thyself for campaign fires.
Now let us sport while we may,
And fight that man called L. B. J.;
That we may rob him of his power
Before his ego seeks more to devour.
Let us roll all our strength and all
Our programs up into one ball,
And drop your foes with one bowl,
As a Miami win becomes the goal;
Thus, though we cannot make Dick Nixon
Stand still, yet we will make him run.

— W. K. WOODS
The Governor launched a new journalistic guessing game when he agreed to introduce Nixon to a Republican Women's organization in Cincinnati on April 2nd. Reporters hope to gauge which way Rhodes leans by observing how he treats Nixon. A glance at a list of Ohio's at-large delegates and at the names of Republicans who will represent the first two Congressional Districts indicates that if Rockefeller or any other moderate wishes to receive Ohio's votes, his only chance will be to bargain with Rhodes. These delegates look conservative indeed, and Hamilton County Republican Chairman Gordon Scherer already broadcasts his approval of Nixon.

The Democrats, meanwhile, are having their own troubles. No one wishes to predict who will win between Gilligan and Lausche. Democrat officials and organized labor support Gilligan, but flocks of independents and Republicans may decide to select a Democratic ballot this May. To help Lausche's cause, Governor Rhodes maneuvered to place his $850 million revenue bond issue on the ballot in November instead of May. Ohio's senior Senator favors this type of revenue bond, but a similar proposal lost by a large margin last spring. By postponing a vote on the bond issue, the Rhodes Administration eliminated an issue that Gilligan might have pounced upon. The former Congressman spends his time in Ohio's large cities discussing Lausche's negative voting record on urban programs.

The Ohio Legislature just finished a busy session. Moderate Republicans in alliance with the Democratic minority scotched most of the inflammatory aspects of the House's punitive anti-riot bill. Compromises made this piece of legislation much milder than "law and order" legislators originally intended. Both bodies discussed the possibility of yearly sessions, and they approved salary increases for themselves. A move to relieve personal property tax burdens was shelved, while no significant social legislation was enacted during January and February.

South Dakota: 1968 nominations may be uncontested

Senator Karl Mundt has formed and announced a Nixon-pledged slate of delegates to the Republican National Convention. On the list of delegates are such prominent members of the Goldwater 1964 organization as Jack Gibson, Goldwater's state chairman from Sioux Falls and Kenneth Killar, who helped form a Goldwater-pledged delegation in 1964. Also appearing on the slate is former Governor Archie Gubbrud who headed an "unpledged" slate to the 1964 convention. This unpledged slate, by the way, received nearly two-thirds of the primary vote that year.

A Rockefeller organization has been forming in the state. It appears to be headed by State Senator Carl T. Burgess who was at one time majority leader in the State House of Representatives. Now that Rockefeller has withdrawn, it is unlikely that his supporters will contest the June Fourth primary.

In a private poll conducted mid-February, Nixon appeared to have a strong lead with 43.3% of the voters favoring him, against Rockefeller 14%, Ronald Reagan 8.1%, George Romney 7.1% and 21% undecided. The fact that the quite popular senior Senator will be heading the Nixon delegation and that no prominent state-wide name has so far agreed to serve on the Rockefeller slate may create additional problems.

In the gubernatorial race, incumbent Attorney General Frank L. Farrar, a young and relatively progressive candidate, seems to have a clear field. The most prominent primary opposition candidate to Mr. Farrar, Dr. G. Robert Bartron, State Senator from Watertown, withdrew from the race on February 26, and on March 4 State Senator Richard F. Kiep, probably the most threatening Democratic candidate, withdrew from the Democratic primary despite the fact that petitions had been circulating in his name. Mr. Farrar has decided to hold himself completely apart from any primary race for delegates to the National Convention.

In the Senatorial race, there is no firmly announced Republican candidate to oppose U.S. Senator George S. McGovern. It appears most likely that Governor Nils A. Boe will enter the Republican primary for this race. There is still a possibility that former governor Archie Gubbrud will oppose Boe, though reliable informants say that Gubbrud has stated that he will not seek the nomination if Boe does.

Washington: how to rig a political suicide

Former Washington Republican State Chairman Bill Walters of Tacoma wanted to attend his precinct caucus, for that is where the selection of Presidential delegates begins in Washington, as in many states. But when he telephoned his county committee, and then his precinct committeeman, he repeatedly was given the run-around. Finally, on Tuesday, March 5, the day caucuses were supposed to be held, Walters got through to his precinct committeeman to try again to find out the caucus time and place, only to learn that the meeting had been held the night before. "Where were you?" the committeeman asked slyly. "We put a notice of the meeting on a telephone poll in the alley of your own block."

The right-wingers in Washington were having a good time. They had rigged the caucuses so that no matter how many moderates came out, the rightist cause was all but assured of success. Here is how it was done.

First, the GOP Chairman of King County — Seattle and suburbs — had appointed some 700 people to vacant committee-man positions (out of 2070 total), and ran a quiet campaign to get moderate committee-men to resign. The technique in the latter instance was to telephone the committeeman with a long list of chores to be accomplished in the immediate future. When the committeeman demurred, he was told someone else in the precinct was willing to assume the job and asked whether he would like to resign.

Then the King County Republican Executive Board decided that in addition to the delegates elected at the caucus (the committeeman is an automatic delegate and one other is elected), some 475 extras would be appointed by the Chairman and his associates. Since only 1300 precincts held caucuses, 2600 committee-men and elected delegates will go to the legislative district conventions, where they will be joined by the additional appointees representing nearly 15% of the total. Almost all of the appointees will be hand-picked right-wingers.

Then the National Committeewoman, Mrs. Fran Cooper of Seattle, produced a statement that only
"known" Republicans should be admitted to the caucuses since the state has no registration by party. "Known" she defined as those having contributed money or work to the organization. Implicitly, independent dissident Democrats and even many Republicans "unknown" to the precinct committeemen were to be excluded.

Next County Chairman Rogstad refused to let the local Draft Rockefeller Committee, or the newspapers, have a list of precinct committeemen or a list of when and where the caucuses were to be held. Diving that privileged information was solely up to the committee members, who, presumably, would advise all the "known" Republicans personally. However, other interested persons were invited to go through a long process of telephoning first the County Committee, then the District Chairman, then the precinct committeeman, who might or might not be helpful. Some printed notices also were distributed in case the committeeman felt like posting them—as in Bill Walter's alley.

If all this rigging wasn't sufficient, many caucuses were held at peculiar times and, in some cases, switched from the times they were originally scheduled to earlier ones. Rockefeller backers in suburban Bellevue Precinct 16 arrived at the home of Mrs. Sally O'Neil, for example, on Tuesday night to find a sign advising that the caucus had been held the night before and that the precinct committeewoman had so informed those individuals to whom she felt "obliged."

The rigging did not end even after the caucuses. Despite the demands of Camden Hall, Co-Chairman of the Draft Rockefeller Committee, County Chairman Rogstad has repeatedly refused to release the names of those individuals elected delegates and is unlikely to do so before the legislative district caucuses in April, after which, incidentally, he can appoint still additional delegates to the state convention. He says that Nixon delegates outnumber Rockefeller delegates 2 to 1 and that Reagan has almost as many as Rockefeller. But the Rockefeller people's own study shows Nixon and Rockefeller neck and neck, with Reagan virtually out of the picture. As for the real facts of the matter, no one but Rogstad knows for sure.

The same sort of byzantine procedures no doubt are being played out in other states, and many persons are beginning to wonder if only the most overwhelmingly popular moderate can ever win in such a system. A Washington poll conducted by Opinion Research of California has shown that only Nelson Rockefeller could carry the state against President Johnson, yet many here believe that in the caucus-convention apparatus Nixon will get the first ballot votes of nearly the entire state Republican delegation to Miami next summer. There is even strong suspicion that those delegates will really be Reagan supporters in disguise, for the moderate Nixon representatives here—former Under Secretary of Commerce Walter Williams and former Seattle Mayor Gordon Clinton—have placed much of their effort into the hands of Rogstad and Co., who want the most conservative candidate possible.

Even under ideal circumstances, however, the complicated process of precinct caucuses, followed by legislative, county and state conventions, makes direct democracy in electing the President of the United States a mockery. Some several hundred King County precincts held no caucuses at all, effectively disenfranchising the residents of those precincts. There is no provision for absentee voters — shut-ins, travellers, military personnel.

Further, the size of precincts in Washington State can vary from 10 to 900 people, and well-attended caucuses get the same number of delegates as those where the committeeman and his wife are the only persons there.

This is a year of increasing frustration for champions of popular democracy in America as they behold the most important office in the land up for grabs by special, kept organizations that in many a majority of states, like Washington, have little contact with the average citizen. In Washington candidates for every political office, from Governor and U.S. Senator to county officials, are chosen in an open, blanket primary where everyone may cast his vote in secret and on neutral ground whose location is known well in advance. Yet the candidate for President is selected in a process inherently corrupt enough to make Machiavelli blush.

The answer in Washington, and perhaps nation-wide, simply is an extension of the primary system to the Presidency. A bill to that effect was passed by the Republican House in Washington last year, but failed to get out of committee in the Democratic Senate. Since local supporters of Senator Eugene McCarthy are getting too much better treatment from their party organization, a coalition to achieve voting reform for 1972 seems hopeful of success. But that is a long time to wait.

The lesson of Washington State applies in particular to progressive Republican activists, most of whom neglect the grubby business of precinct work until the election season. Once again, as in 1964, this oversight is likely to prove fatal. One may have infinite faith in the judgment of the average American voter, but unfortunately, that individual seems to count less and less in the stacked deck of "practical" politics.

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A Year of Growth

The past year has been the most successful in the Ripon Society’s history. Membership, FORUM subscribers, research contracts, studies, and contributions all reached new highs. Major progress was made toward expanding our monthly publication, the Ripon FORUM, and building a competent full-time professional staff.

FORUM
During 1967 the FORUM was transformed in stages from a small newsletter into a magazine. Twelve issues were produced, up from nine in 1966, and total pages increased to 148 from 64. Paid circulation at year's end was approximately double the figure for the year earlier. In December of 1967 the services of a full-time FORUM editor, with extensive professional experience, were engaged, putting us in an excellent position to continue the magazine's growth in the coming year.

During the year past several FORUM pieces received major press attention, particularly articles such as "The View from Colorado Springs," a report on the Republican Governors' Association, and "The Current Picture," an assessment of the Presidential Race. Four 1967 features were widely reprinted in national and college newspapers.

BOOKS
at a brisk pace in 1967, though they are not fully reflected in the financial statement as a considerable portion of the revenue produced was received as publisher's advances in prior years. The remaining stock of Election '64 was sold during the past year and a number of orders could not be filled. Sales of Southern Republicanism and the New South were below expectation despite considerable favorable publicity but sales of From Disaster to Distinction were good, in excess of 20,000, and should continue strong through the November 1968 election. Near the end of the year we entered into a contract with Public Affairs Press of Washington, D.C. to publish a Ripon book in the spring of 1968 tentatively entitled The Realities of Vietnam. Work has begun on several other Ripon books.

PAPERS
The Society issued five white papers in 1967, up from three in 1966, covering a wide range of subjects. They were:

- On the Fringe of Freedom: The Rights of the Mentally Ill
- The Negative Income Tax: A Republican Proposal to Help the Poor
- The Myth of Bipartisanship: A Call for Republican Foreign Policy Initiative
- Overkill at Omaha: Analysis of the Young Republican National Federation
- The Realities of Vietnam: A Call for New Departures in American Foreign Policy

All received press attention, though "The Negative Income Tax," "Overkill at Omaha," and "The Realities of Vietnam" were most widely covered. The Negative Income Tax was selected as the National College debate topic for the 1967-1968 season enabling us to considerably broaden the audience for our paper on that subject. The pressure generated by "Overkill at Omaha" was one of the factors which enabled Republican National Chairman Bliss to impose some long needed reforms on the party's Young Republican branch. A number of foreign embassies requested copies of our Vietnam analysis. The paper won the respect of those familiar with Southeast Asian policy, and we have received several indications that it is having an impact on our government's planning...

GOP POLITICAL CALENDAR FOR MAY
(Compiled from materials supplied by the Republican National Committee — Presidential nomination data in bold face type)

May 1 ARKANSAS: Filing deadline for gubernatorial, senatorial and congressional candidates for the July 30 primary. Voter registration deadline for July 30 primary.
2 EMMETT: Republican National Committee campaign management seminar for Eastern States; Princeton University, Princeton. Lasts through May 5.
4 NEBRASKA: Deadline for Voter registration for May 14 Presidential Primary.
5 MISSISSIPPI: Voter registration deadline for June 4 state primary.
   NORTH CAROLINA: State primary.
   TEXAS: State primary.
   VIRGIN ISLANDS: State Committee meeting.
6 RHODE ISLAND: State convention.
7 D.C.: Presidential primary (1964 results: 9 unpledged delegates elected on 1st ballot, 4 voted for Goldwater, 5 for Scranton).
   IDAHO: Candidate filing deadline for August 6 state primary.
   INDIANA: Presidential Primary (1964 results: Goldwater 67%, Stassen 26.8%).
   OHIO: Presidential Primary (1964 result: Governor James A. Rhodes ran as a "favorite son").
9 ALASKA: State convention. Lasts through May 12.
10 MAINÉ: State convention. Lasts through May 11.
   UTAH: Filing deadline for state and local candidates in September 10 state primary.
   WYOMING: State convention.
11 HAWAI: State convention.
   SOUTH CAROLINA: Voter registration deadline for June 11 state primary.
14 ILLINOIS: Voter registration deadline for June 11 primary.
   NEBRASKA: Presidential primary (1964 results: Goldwater 49.5%, Nixon write-in 31.5%, Lodge write-in 16.2%, and Rockefeller write-in 17.2%).
   WEST VIRGINIA: Presidential primary (1964 results: Rockefeller ran unopposed; 9 delegates were uncommitted; 3 favored Goldwater, 2 supported Rockefeller).
   NEW YORK: Filing deadline for state and local candidates in June 18 primary.
15 SOUTH DAKOTA: Voter registration deadline for June 4 Presidential primary.
18 VERMONT: State convention.
23 UTAH: Republican National Committee campaign management seminar for Western States; University of Utah, Salt Lake City. Lasts through May 26.
25 TENNESSEE: State convention.
28 FLORIDA: Presidential primary (1964 results: Goldwater 41%, unpledged 58.1%; 32 of 34 unpledged delegates voted for Goldwater on the 1st ballot).
   KENTUCKY: State primary.
   OREGON: Presidential primary (1964 results: Rockefeller 33%, Lodge 27.7%, Goldwater 17.6%, Nixon 16.8%, Smith 2.9%, and Scranton 2.0%).
30 Republican National Committee campaign management seminar for Central States; Indiana University, Bloomington. Lasts through June 2.
in that important area.

**CONTRACT RESEARCH** Contract research was one of the fastest growing areas of Ripon activity in 1967. This service was organized to meet the need of candidates, officeholders and Party organizations for carefully prepared analyses on which to base speeches, legislation, and decision-making. The research is undertaken on a confidential basis. During the year several contracts were completed, and others were in the process of completion at year end. The market for this service is expanding. Whether Ripon's activity in this area also expands will depend in large measure upon our ability to attract a capable staff to handle this aspect of our operations.

**MEDIA**

The Ripon Society's public visibility clearly increased in 1967. Attention given to the group by columnists, news reporters, authors, newspapers, magazines, radio and television news was greater than in any past year. Significantly, secondary references to Ripon, not prompted by any particular activity of the group, increased markedly during the course of the year. We are becoming a publicly recognized symbol and one that may do much to improve the acceptance of the Republican Party by several important groups in society.

**CHAPTERS**

No new chapters were added in 1967, but important progress toward chapter formation was made. Several new forms of organization were developed and tested. One is the Ripon Luncheon Group. The first such group was successfully organized in Boston in the fall of 1967. Another is the Ripon Study Group. The first of these was started at Williams College in the latter part of 1967. We expect these groups to serve as models for those interested in organizing Ripon groups in other communities.

Our existing chapters maintained or increased their level of activity during the year. The Los Angeles chapter actively promoted Ripon publications and laid the basis for the formation of new Ripon groups in its area. It continues to study and report on political phenomena in the State.

The New York chapter moved to new offices, engaged the services of a part-time research director and considerably expanded its membership. It completed several research projects and made material progress on others. The group markedly increased its schedule of public programs.

The New Haven chapter has completed a busy year combining research with political activism as has the Boston chapter. Both had busy schedules of symposia, panel discussions, and speakers and completed major research projects. And both had active contributors to campaigns and party conferences in their areas.

Groups in Dallas, Washington, D. C., Seattle, San Francisco, and Chicago organized to apply for chapter status, and a number of inquiries were received from individuals interested in organizing new Ripon groups.

**ORGANIZATION**

In 1967 the Ripon Society took the first steps toward creating a competent professional staff. In June, the services of a full-time executive director were secured and, as previously mentioned, in December, a full-time FORUM editor was added. Toward the end of the summer we were able to engage the services of a full-time Washington coordinator for a nine-month period. At year's end the Society moved into expanded offices in Cambridge that were three times as much floor space as the old quarters. Today the Society has four full-time and three part-time employees.

**FINANCE**

As in the past, contributions and other income increased in 1967 though not as rapidly as had been hoped at the beginning of the year. Several offers of help with fundraising did not result in contributions, and others produced considerably less than had been promised. Chapter fundraising efforts were disappointing. Despite these setbacks, we were able to markedly increase the number of Ripon contributors, from 67 to 156 and the total contribution to the Society. The increase was greatest in medium and small contributors. This represents an important stage as a broadening contributor base increases the Society's financial stability and enables us to minimize broad swings in income from this source.

In 1967, for the first time, the increase in income from sales and services exceeded the increase in income from contributions.

**OUTLOOK**

As 1967 drew to a close, moderate Republican chances of securing the 1968 presidential nomination were steadily increasing, though still slim. Moderate prospects are based on the growing realization among Republican Party professionals that a moderate Presidential nominee gives the party its best chance of recapturing the White House and making solid gains in Congressional and state elections.

For the Ripon Society, as for the Republican Party, 1968 is a crucial year. The Society is well positioned for growth. An expanded staff, magazine, and research capability give us the capacity to take advantage of the many opportunities available to the Society. But whether Ripon is able to make a significant contribution to the political dialogue will depend, in larger measure, on our fundraising success or failure. With adequate financial backing we can foster the development of new chapters, increase our research output, and materially broaden the FORUM's readership base. As things now stand, the Ripon Society expects to double the scale of its operations in 1968.

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**FINANCIAL REPORT**

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*National budget only. Does not include chapter budgets.

**Included under staff salaries, subheading "other" in these years.
The advantages of a floating rate are great. The balance of payments would be brought into automatic adjustment, through exchange rate changes. The world price of the dollar would be determined by foreign demand, and not by the political concerns of the United States. Minor, temporary fluctuations would cause only minor changes in the price of the dollar. Capital controls would be unnecessary. And the balance of payments for the United States would be little affected by minor fluctuations in the price of the dollar.

This proposal means that foreigners would have the same reasons for holding dollars as Americans have. The dollar would be an asset as a store of value, and an instrument of international trade. Instead of backing the dollar with a few billions in gold, we would back it with hundreds of billions in goods, services and securities.

The fears expressed about floating rates are often not justified. The Canadian dollar between 1949 and 1954 has been a success. The dollar is not a trade weapon. It is a floating rate with the help of smart speculators, who are keeping the rate at the level that fundamental conditions warrant and help smooth the transition from one fundamental rate to another. The development of robust forward markets ought to help reduce the risk of those engaging in trade.

As for inflation fears, fixed exchange rates do not seem to have stopped inflation in Europe. Nor did flexible rates lead to rampant inflation in Canada. Arguments here boil down to this: "we bankers know better than you politicians—if it was not for our restraint, you would always engage in inflationary orgies." Such an argument is out of place in a democratic society. Decisions to adopt a fixed rate or to inflate unemployment must be in the hands of the political leadership—our leaders—who run the banks as advisers, not as dictators. Freely floating rates will give responsible political authorities more room to maneuver. In any case, opponents could reify the costs of any "inflationary" policy in the morning's quotations on exchange markets. There would be little doubt about the costs of excess demand. Under current practice, the costs of restraints in loss of jobs, trade, or productivity and investment opportunities cannot be evaluated at all clearly.

Given the menu of choices that confronts us at present, a floating exchange rate should be the choice of the United States. The alternative troubles are innumerable, and many will be able to right itself. The other alternatives are impractical or too costly, especially for those in our society who need more growth and more employment. A floating dollar might well be the only way to keep the world monetary system from sinking.

The writers are Teaching Fellows in Economics at Harvard.

PROFESSOR HART REPLIES:

I value the opportunity to react to the interesting letter by L. J. White and M. C. Spechler, with its recommendation that international monetary problems be resolved by dropping fixed exchange rates and going over to floating rates. I would agree with them that fixed rates are dangerous as between regions which do not (like regions within the United States) permit easy inter-regional movement of workers and have a common government to take responsibility for full employment and for structural economic problems. One reason that I want to see the United States and Great Britain get out of the key-currency business is that both these countries need more scope to adjust their exchange rates.

Yet for the United States at this point to let the dollar rate start to "float" would be seriously disruptive. It is tempting to say to the French and the Germans: "As from this moment, we cease to support the franc-price of the dollar by exporting gold; you can choose between letting the dollar depreciate and supporting it yourself." But the French reaction would be one we would not like. I could imagine the French replying: "We do not choose to let dollar-priced goods get cheaper on world markets relative to franc-priced goods; therefore we will if necessary buy dollars to keep it from devaluing to gaining what we consider an artificial advantage.

But we will not buy dollars to enable U.S. companies to acquire French companies, or to finance U.S. military activities, or to facilitate transfers of funds from U.S. dollars into third currencies which are used for purposes we might heartily disapprove of." In short, the French (and by the same logic a number of other countries) would be led to compartmentalize the foreign-exchange market—trying to prevent the dollar from devaluing so as it affects current goods-and-services transactions, but to let it deprecate insofar as it affects capital flows. This way lies a resurgence of the sort of economic warfare we experienced in the 1930's. For exchange controls to be into segments of a general floating basis, and into "quantitative controls" of imports (import quotas). The United States is already taking chances of setting off such a reaction with the attempt to control what we are not going to do, and with the threat (registered by a formidable legislative drive in Congress in 1967) of a great extension of the existing breaches in the international rules against import quotas. A total collapse of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") would very likely ensue if we started using massive depreciation of the dollar as a trade weapon.

If economists are to thrash out before non-economists issues of this sort, it should be stressed that there are a responsible proposal for a half-way house between fixed and floating exchange rates. This is the "band proposal" There is already room under the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund for a currency's foreign exchange value to fluctuate by 10% on each side of its parity. A strong body of opinion among economists urges that this band should be widened to 5% or 10% on each side of parity. Such an arrangement would leave room for substantial adjustments, but would set limits to the fears of other countries threatened by depreciation and to the hopes of speculators. It is conceivable—though far from certain, in my view—that a move to such a system might be feasible without setting off a great whole in national evils as I would predict from announcing a floating dollar rate without setting bounds.

ALBERT G. HART
New York, New York

VIETNAM CUSTOMER

Dear Sirs:

I have just received and read the September 1967 issue of the Riplon FORUM entitled "The Realities of Vietnam." I think this is the best proposal put forward by anyone to date on the war here. I say this both from first-hand experience of the war and from academic experience in Vietnam and from academic experience at Brown where I wrote my thesis on the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. I am very impressed with the scholarship and thought that went into this report. I have read so much on Vietnam that this report was refreshing at a difficult point, but this report was refreshing . . . and I even learned more about Vietnam.

I was surprised that I hadn't heard of the Riplon Society's proposals in International Voluntary Service by Senator Percy on his last visit here when he spoke to members of IVS.

I encourage a wider distribution of the report. On page 15 of the September 1967 issue it is stated that a fully footnoted version of the paper and appendix will be published separately . . . Has this been published yet? If not, when will it be published?

CARL THAYER
Saigon, South Vietnam

See page 20 for publication details — Ed. 

23
By Melvin R. Laird

Agenda for a GOP House

The house of Representatives very likely will be gavelled to order next January by Republican Speaker Jerry Ford of Michigan. If that happens, House Republicans will take power better prepared to use it than ever before in history.

To some, I suppose, it may seem odd that the best hope for innovation and effective problem-solving lies with the GOP; but that happens to be where most good ideas reside these days. To others who blindly accept the stereotyped image of Congressional Republicans as "obstructionists," it will seem odder still for me to claim that the best chance for enactment of innovative programs lies in a Republican Congress. But that happens to be what all the activity in the House of Representatives during the past three years has been about.

Under our Conference structure, we have held seminars and study groups ranging from balance of payments to the negative income tax. We have created task forces and issued papers, studied legislation and sometimes succeeded in restructuring it. An unmistakable Republican stamp is on such programs as the Comprehensive Health Act (which consolidated sixteen project and formula grants into a single bloc grant) and the anti-crime legislation that passed the House last year (another bloc grant).

These programs and others like them set forth for all who care to notice the shape and style of what a Republican Congress will set out to do next January.

Obviously, the specifics can only be outlined in the briefest of terms here but a much fuller discussion will shortly be available in book form. As the Editor and one of the 29 contributors to Republican Papers (Doubleday and Co., Summer, 1968), I would of course recommend it highly to the readers of the Ripon FORUM.

In briefest outline, the agenda for a GOP House as I see it would include three broad categories: reorganization; redirection; and innovation.

Reorganization—Here I'm talking about the Congress itself. The reorganization bill passed by the Senate has been bottled up by the Democratic majority for more than a year. A Republican House would shake it loose. We would seek to make Congress more than a bill factory and try to restructure its internal makeup to allow for much greater oversight and review of existing programs. Congress' neglect of its oversight function validates to some extent charges that Congress must bear a substantial part of the blame for domestic ills and inadequate programs.

Redirection — One of the greatest needs is to organize more logically some of the major programs administered by the Executive Branch. Many programs have outlived their original purpose; others actively compound the problems they were designed to relieve; still others are loosely administered and very wasteful. A Republican Congress would seek to squeeze as much effectiveness as they will yield from the ill-conceived and hastily enacted programs that are on the books until such time as many of them can be consolidated into functional grants, transferred to more proper locations, or replaced.

Examples would include transferring community health centers from OEO to the Public Health Service and merging Head Start now administered by OEO with the preschool program in the Office of Education. Another fertile area because of its direct cause-effect relationship to civil rights problems and the crisis in our cities would be the manpower programs. They now overlap and duplicate each other in such different departments as Labor, Defense, HEW, and the Poverty Program and should all be consolidated under a single administrative department.

In short, a Republican House would work to compress the hundreds of existing programs into a smaller, more sensible array of functional programs. This would not necessarily reduce the number of federal dollars expended; it might even increase it. But the potential of getting a much greater return on every dollar spent would be greatly enhanced.

Innovation — The most hopeful area — and the most promising—is the innovative. Clearly, our present array of programs with their reliance on the categorical technique, are not working. If we are going to meet the problems of the cities and the depressed rural areas, the problems of jobs and crime, the need for better education and housing, and the need for greater opportunities for all Americans, we clearly must strike out in new and different directions.

It has been said that it takes a Democrat to conceive a new and bold program but that it takes a Republican to run it properly. If that was ever true, I don't believe it is today. Republicans have always been better managers, certainly. But today at least we seem also to have a corner on the bold new programs. The more exciting concepts being bandied about today are mostly Republican-inspired—revenue-sharing, human investment, tax incentive programs, and the proper harnessing of the private sector, to mention a few.

In the field of welfare, I think we should give serious study to such programs as the Negative Income Tax. But the major first step of a Republican Congress, I would hope, would be to pave the way for the earliest possible enactment of a broad system of revenue-sharing. My own legislative package (H.R. 5450), which was followed in its major elements by the latest Coordinating Committee statement, contains the two crucial ingredients of tax rebates coupled with tax credits. We need both a return of a portion of federal income taxes to the states with no strings attached and tax credits for the costs of education and for state and local taxes paid.

I wish space permitted a fuller discussion of these proposals. Based on our record and our efforts in the past three years but especially in the last Session, I am fully convinced that a Republican House would follow the general pattern outlined here. I am convinced of this because my colleagues in the House and Republicans throughout the nation know both generally and specifically that Republicans have better ways for Americans to do things as we move into the last third of the 20th century.