EDITORIAL

Frankly, Nixon-Agnew was not our dream ticket. But presidential tickets do not come into being merely because one dreams about them. They require hard work and careful organization over a long period.

Mr. Nixon, after all, has been at the game for some time. He began laying the groundwork for his comeback in 1964, when he was the leading Republican to campaign nationally for the Goldwater-Miller ticket. He began building in earnest in 1966, when he toured the whole country for minor Republican candidates and won good will that was essential to his presidential ambitions. For two solid years thereafter he worked unremittingly, building a capable organization, reformulating his positions and submitting to six primary campaigns.

In his slow and steady progress towards the nomination, he ran the uninspiring race of the tortoise. But hares seldom win presidential nominations. Even Eisenhower and Willkie were beneficiaries of long-standing networks of influence that went into operation on their behalf well in advance of the nominating conventions. These two men were “clean” candidates because others did the demeaning political work for them. Mr. Nixon is much more the self-made man.

He can count on all other men on the make within the Republican Party to support his campaign. For the lesson of his nomination will not be lost on either the left or right wing of the GOP. As Mr. Nixon’s participation in the campaigns of others has extended his influence within the Party, so will others now participate in his campaign to advance their own style of Republicanism. If Nixon wins, the fight for influence will be carried on within his administration. If he loses, it will manifest itself in a prolonged struggle for control of the Party in 1972. But in
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EDITORIAL
Mr. Nixon has the support of all the leading Republican politicians and the sympathy of many backlash voters. It is the frontlash he must worry about in the weeks ahead, and he must act boldly to win it. —1, 3

NOTES FROM MIAMI BEACH

1960 REVISITED
A revisionist view of the Nixon-Kennedy election shows that Nixon probably won both a popular and an electoral majority. —6

1968 ELECTION STRATEGY
Christopher W. Bay, refining his analysis of the swing votes that appeared in our last issue, shows that Mr. Nixon will have a hard time keeping both frontlash and backlash support in line. If he persists with a sit tight strategy, he may find Humphrey cutting into his frontlash in the North while Wallace eats away at the backlash in the border states. A careful table (see page 10) gives a profile of what the swing votes are in different regions of the country. —7

THE CITIES
John M. McAlhany, the legislative technician who worked on the Human Investment Act and the Home Ownership Act, now tells about a new bill introduced in Congress, the Community Self-Determination Act, which aims at giving poor people a stake in business enterprise in their neighborhoods. —13

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BOOK CLUB ORDER FORM

THE RIPON SOCIETY, INC. is a reputable research and policy organization whose members are young business, academic and professional men and women. It has national headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts, chapters in seven cities, National Associate members throughout the fifty states, and several affiliated groups of sub-chapter status. The Society is supported by chapter dues, individual contributions, and revenue from its publications and contract work. The Society offers the following options for annual contributions: Contributor $25 or more; Sustainer $100 or more. Inquiries about membership and chapter organization should be addressed to the National Executive Director, NATIONAL GOVERNING BOARD

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THE RIPON INTELLIGENCE UNIT provides political research to Republican office holders and candidates and to non-partisan community leaders. All inquiries are kept strictly confidential. Write the National Research Director.
either case his effect on the way Republicans view their Party will have been lasting and salutary.

Mr. Nixon has done what neither Eisenhower nor Goldwater could do. He has stripped the nominating process of its mystique. The rise of Eisenhower gave many Republicans the impression that one could rely on the personal popularity of a "sure winner" to win a nomination. Goldwater's rise left others with an abiding faith in "ideology" as the key to the hearts of Republican delegates. But Mr. Nixon has dispelled these notions. For him organization alone was sufficient, and organization will accordingly be the focus both of the ideologues on the Republican right and the personality-oriented problem-solvers on the left.

Both defeated factions will adopt as their maxim the advice Barry Goldwater gave his disappointed supporters at the 1960 convention. "Grow up conservatives," he told them in advising support of Nixon-Lodge. "If we're going to take this party back some day — and I think we will — then let's get to work."

The exhortation is especially important for progressive Republicans who seek now to reverse the rightward drift of their party. Heeding it, they can hope for increased effectiveness as Mr. Nixon seeks to assemble an alliance that can govern the country as well as win the election. Ignoring it, they risk the preeminence of a Tower-Thurmond-Goldwater axis in a victorious GOP, the dominance of Ronald Reagan in a defeated one.

For its part, the Ripon Society believes that the struggle for the future of the Republican Party is more important now than ever. Progressives can maximize their long-term influence by working within the Party this year and supporting its national candidates.

* * *

THE NEGLECTED FRONTLASH

The quiet, cautious organizational techniques by which Mr. Nixon has unified a minority party may not be sufficient to win the presidency. The Wallace candidacy will prevent him from gaining a majority of the popular vote. A majority of the Electoral College is within his reach, but to get it he must have the support of both major groups of swing voters, the frontlash and the backlash. Since the convention he has pitched his appeal to the backlash alone. The grooming of Agnew as a "law and order" candidate, the use of the Supreme Court and the Attorney General as whipping boys for the rise in the crime rate, the emphasis on the negative themes of inflation, high taxes and (with a bow to William Graham Sumner) the Forgotten Man — all these gratify the frustrated backlash voter.

At first glance this may seem to be shrewd politics for 1968, a year in which the alienated lower-middle class voter has been mobilized as never before. But though the Wallace candidacy has focused attention on the backlash vote, it has, paradoxically, also neutralized it as a strategic target. The real battleground for swing votes will be for the frontlash — the voters who were willing to switch parties to vote for McCarthy and Rockefeller this year and the Republicans who bolted Goldwater-Miller in 1964. The reason for this is so simple that it has escaped the notice of many politicians.

In most states, the race for a plurality is between Humphrey and Nixon, not between Wallace and one of the two major candidates. Any vote that Humphrey and Nixon take away from each other is worth two votes that either may take from Wallace. If Nixon loses one frontlash vote to Humphrey, he must pick up two backlash ones from Wallace to stay even.

Outside the South, moreover, the frontlash vote is not only strategically twice as important as the backlash but also more numerous in absolute terms. As the table on page 10 shows, 17% of the electorate outside the South are frontlash swing voters, of whom 11% lean to Nixon and 6% to Humphrey. The backlash swing is only 15%, of whom 11% are for Wallace, 3% for Nixon and 1% for Humphrey.

The backlash looms larger than life to some politicians because of the many non-swing voters who respond enthusiastically to law and order rhetoric, but seize on it only to confirm their old voting habits. The Rockefeller, McCarthy, anti-Goldwater swing voters, on the other hand, are proven switchers who, in the absence of a vigorous Fourth Party, will choose between the two major party candidates. The man who seems the best hope for peace or the most willing to commit himself to issues that imply change and fair-dealing at home will gain their sympathies.

The situation is admittedly different in many southern states, where Wallace is a major candidate in his own right. Even if Nixon concedes Wallace the Deep South, he will have to win redneck votes to gain a plurality over him in much of the Perimeter South. Humphrey has taken a different course. He will aim at Nixon's 5% frontlash in this area and hope that Nixon and Wallace divide the redneck vote evenly enough to allow him to squeak through.

Mr. Humphrey thus has the advantage of aiming at similar swing votes in all parts of the country — at Nixon's 5% frontlash in the Perimeter South and his 11% frontlash outside the South. His only handicap to pursuing a vigorous frontlash campaign is his desire not to offend George Meany, Richard Daley and Lyndon Johnson, whose support has put him
NOTES FROM MIAMI BEACH

• The man whose reputation suffered most from Nixon's victory at Miami Beach was F. Clifton White, whose book *Suite 3505* advertised his wizardry in bringing off the Goldwater nomination in 1964. This time White was retained at a salary that some have estimated at $150,000 to "advise" Ronald Reagan's California delegation in the months before the convention. His convention hall headquarters was a trailer with the words "Suite 3505 A" stencilled on the door.

White and his associates counted on Rockefeller to hold back 400 first ballot votes from Nixon. Rockefeller more than fulfilled his quota, with 282 votes of his own and about 150 favorite-son votes that held firm at his urging.

That left 250 votes for Reagan to hold if he was to stop Nixon. For a few exciting hours before the voting it looked as if he might get them. Florida and Mississippi, both unit-rule states, seemed about to tie voting it looked as if he might get them. Florida and Mississippi caucuses, and Cliff White could only lament wards that he had come within nine votes of turning the South around.

White had counted on such old Goldwater stalwarts as Clark Reed (Mississippi), Roger Millikan (South Carolina) and Tom Stagg (Louisiana) to provide a little last-minute good will. But they stayed behind Nixon. And then there was Strom Thurmond who held firm to Nixon despite a five-hour session with White's lieutenants on the weekend before the convention.

• Since Strom Thurmond's role in Nixon's nomination is apt to become a campaign issue, particular attention will be paid to a copyrighted interview that appeared in the Knight Newspapers on the Sunday following the convention. The taped interview was conducted by Remer Tyson of the Atlanta *Journal-Constitution* and Jack Bass of the Charlotte *Observer* with Harry Dent and Fred Buzhardt, Jr., two Thurmond aides who attended the emergency discussion between Nixon and Thurmond on the Monday night before the Wednesday balloting.

Thurmond asked for the meeting because of the "pandemonium" that was breaking out in Southern delegations over the rumor that Nixon was about to choose John Lindsay as his running mate. A New York *Times* story immortalizing the rumor was being used by Reagan forces to stampede Southern delegates. "The double cross is on," Reagan agents told Southerners.

Thurmond, who had pledged himself to Nixon many weeks before the convention, had no thought of switching to Reagan, but he did, according to his aides, need "to have his batteries charged up a little."

No specific deal was made, Buzhardt and Dent contend: "All the Senator wanted to do was look in Nixon's eyes, tell him he was going to tear his shirt off for him, and go to the end."

This was not done to extract a specific promise, but, Dent acknowledged, it was done "with the idea of persuasion somewhere." Nixon had to know that "Thurmond was placing his political life pretty much at his fancy and that if he did something at least to know darn well what the consequences were because somebody stuck their neck out."

Dent and Buzhardt recount that Nixon informed Thurmond that he was for civil rights in principle. But they note that "Strom Thurmond knew . . . when he left there that night this was the kind of man he wanted to tear his shirt for even more so."

Was there some last-minute deal? Most probably not. Whatever Nixon may have promised Thurmond, he promised early. Thurmond entered the conference not to threaten a defection but to impress Nixon with the difficulty of holding the South. The interview shook Nixon so badly that when the Southern votes held, he felt he had to give more weight than necessary to Southern preferences in choosing his running mate.

The strong public impression that there was a deal, however, will probably have an effect on the Nixon campaign. Among redneck voters in the South it will enhance Strom Thurmond's credibility when he argues that his bargaining power with Nixon will be greater than Wallace's. Why waste a vote on Wallace, his supporters will say, when Strom will oversee Nixon's appointments to the judiciary and the attorney general's office?

In the North, the Democrats will use Thurmond as a bloody shirt to draw "frontlash" votes away from Nixon. Like Thurmond's aides, they will inflate the role of the South Carolina Dixiecrat. Independent-minded voters will have to balance Thurmond's public role against that of Connally in the Democratic convention. They will have to decide whether they prefer giving Thurmond the kind of veto over Southern judge ships that John F. Kennedy accorded to Senator Eastland or whether they want John Connally to name the Secretary of Defense. This much is sure: if there is to be a powerful conservative Southern *eminence grise* in the Nixon administration it will not be Thurmond, whom Nixon will have to handle like poison ivy from now on; it will be Senator John Tower of Texas, whose early withdrawal as a favorite son put Nixon very much in his debt.

• The man who lost out in the "pandemonium" that panicked Nixon men in the South was Senator Mark O. Hatfield of Oregon. Hatfield was careful in Miami to emphasize his acceptability to Southern audiences. He had, he told people, spoken in nearly every Southern state. His mother was born in Tennessee. He was a devout Baptist, and thus shared a common religious outlook with many southerners. What is more, Hatfield had proved his reliability as a party man by backing Goldwater in 1964 and endorsing Nixon before the convention.
Small wonder that he was thought to be on the verge of getting the vice presidential nomination. On the night of the presidential balloting the Miami Herald ran an authoritative report that Hatfield had virtually been chosen. Reagan and Rockefeller forces flooded the convention with clippings of the story. The South rose in anger, only to be quieted by Thurmond who averred that Nixon would not choose a man with a Vietnam stance so disagreeable to the redneck vote.

Even so, at Nixon's last-minute consultations on his vice-presidential choice, Billy Graham made a fresh case for Hatfield. Graham is said to have told Nixon that "what America desperately needs is moral and spiritual leadership." Hatfield, he said, is "not only young and charismatic, but a real man of God" and a "fundamentalist pacifist." But for Thurmond as for John Tower, Spiro T. Agnew seemed to have more to recommend him.

- Ray Bliss, who has long claimed to have his finger on the pulse of the GOP, proved it when he heard that after consulting 100 GOP leaders Nixon had chosen Spiro Agnew as his running mate. "You're kidding," he said.

But Florida delegate B. B. Nelson, a director of the Cape Canaveral Board of Realtors, had a different opinion. "At no time in our history have we needed a man more like Spiro T. Agnew," he told the press. Ambitious young Nelson Gross, the New Jersey Bergen County leader who took five votes from Clifford Case's favorite son candidacy in New Jersey, called the selection of Agnew "superb."

Mike Fiveash, a recent Harvard graduate, reacted in an even grander manner. In a fury of excitement he wrote an ode to Agnew that won fourth prize, a blueberry muffin, in the Harvard Summer School Poetry Competition:

Hail to thee, glorious scion of the Hellenic land,
you who rule in glory over the mother of cities,
violet-crowned Baltimore,
gleaming pride of your fatherland,
soon to ride in triumph on your great pachyderm
to the fabled palace of shining white.
The glades and groves of Helias now sing your praises
as soon our own land, with joyous tumult,
will raise the paeon of victory
to the lofty stars:
DUM SPIRO, SPERO.*

- Translation of the Latin in the last line: "Where there's life, there's hope."

- The quick branding of Agnew as a racist has been challenged by the Maryland correspondent for the FORUM. He writes that Agnew has "unquestionably been a progressive governor in almost all ways."

His report says that Agnew's racial policies until last spring were by far the most liberal the state had seen, with the single exception of those of Republican Governor Theodore McKeldin. Unfortunately, the report continues, the Vice Presidential nominee is blunt to the point of tactlessness. He has so aroused the sensitivities of Maryland Negroes that they have formed a committee to campaign against him.

But, the correspondent's report concludes, "The 'racist' image circulated by Democratic campaigners is a bad rap if the record is checked." Agnew has recently been prone to rash and damaging statements, but his record on civil rights is good. Moreover, his first policy plank as Vice Presidential nominee — a recommendation for national standards for welfare — attempts to point him back in the progressive direction with which he began his governorship.

- Padding through the lobby of the Hotel Fountainbleu was a cheery, pink-faced old man trying to sell a book called Alpaca that describes an ideal commonwealth where every dollar has one vote. A Tass reporter recognized him as H. L. Hunt and interviewed him on the spot. Hunt extolled the virtues of plutocracy, named his candidate for President (Congressman Gerald R. Ford), but refused to give the Russian a free copy of his book. If the Communist wanted a book, he would have to buy it, thus forfeiting four votes in Alpaca.

- Ripon's pioneer book, Who's Who at Convention '68 has yielded a group portrait of the GOP. A tabulation of 700 biographies of the 1333 delegates listed reveals the following characteristics. They suggest that the Party is still narrowly based and Babbity.

EDUCATION — 96% of the delegates are high school graduates, 17% of them attended private schools. 85% of the delegates attended college, 15% of them hold a degree from an Ivy League School. 43% of the delegates hold graduate degrees, about two-thirds of these are lawyers. 4% of those who attended college were elected to Phi Beta Kappa.

OCCUPATION — 29% of the delegates are lawyers; 48% are employed in business; 8% are housewives; 4% are doctors; 4% are teachers. 2% are non-lawyers employed in politics.

SEX — 211 of the delegates are women, 1122 men.

NUMBER OF CHILDREN — The average family size is 2.8 children.

RELIGION — 82% of the delegates are Protestant, 15% Catholic, 2% Jewish. The leading Protestant denominations are Episcopalian (16% of all delegates), Presbyterian (13%), Methodist (15%), Congregational (8%), Baptist (7%) and Lutheran (7%).

MILITARY SERVICE — 81% of the male delegates served in the military. Of these 35% saw duty in the Air Force or have been air personnel in other services; 31% were in the Army; 28% in the Navy; 4% in the Marines and 2% in the Coast Guard.

CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS — The most frequently mentioned civic organizations in delegate biographies were the Chamber of Commerce (mentioned by 46%), followed by the American Legion (30%), Masons (25%), Elks (23%) and Rotary (14%).

PUBLIC OFFICE — 42% of the delegates have held public office at some time in their lives.

RACE — 2% of the delegates were black.

In addition, the Society has done a complete count of all delegates who are repeaters from the 1964 convention. It has been found that 276 delegates in 1968 were also delegates in 1964 and an additional 131 '68 delegates were alternates four years ago. Thus, 31% of the 1968 delegates were accredited to the 1964 convention, 21% as delegates and 10% as alternates.
Mr. Nixon’s image as a loser from the 1960 election stems from his tactical mistakes during the campaign and his dissipation of a six percentage-point lead over Kennedy between August and the election day. Even with these factors, however, it now appears that Nixon had a higher popular vote than Kennedy and should have beaten him in the electoral college as well.

The changed view of the election comes from a close study of the frauds in Texas and Illinois and the anomaly in the Alabama voting contained in Nixon, a new biography by Earl Mazo and Stephen Hess (a hardback edition of which is available at a reduced price through the Ripon FORUM Book Club).

The 1960 national popular vote is usually totaled with a plurality of 110,000 to 120,000 for Kennedy. The Information Please Almanac 1968, for example, gives Kennedy a margin of victory of 119,450. All such totals credit the Kennedy-Johnson ticket with 324,000 votes in Alabama, but only 147,295 votes, less than half of the widely cited total, were actually cast for the official Democratic ticket. The remainder, 176,755 votes, were cast for “unpledged electors” who voted for Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia in the Electoral College. When bonus votes were awarded for the 1964 Democratic National Convention, Alabama was credited with only 147,295 votes, not with the 324,000 needed to give Kennedy-Johnson a national victory over Nixon-Lodge.

**ELECTION FRAUDS**

In the Electoral College, Kennedy outpolled Nixon by 303 to 219 (15 votes going to Senator Byrd). Though Kennedy’s official margin looks impressive to the casual eye, 51 of his votes were decisively obtained by fraud, and a just allocation of those 51 votes would have won for Nixon, by 270 to 252.

In Texas, the official tally shows a 46,000 margin for Kennedy-Johnson, but by comparing registration and voting statistics Mazo and Hess show that the Democratic ticket received at least 100,000 non-existent votes from precincts where the total vote vastly exceeded the number who were eligible to vote. In addition, many more Republican ballots were disqualified than Democratic ones. Providentially for “Landslide Lyndon,” there is no recount procedure in Texas, so the blatant Presidential fraud of 1960 survived even more easily than the apparent Senatorial fraud of 1948.

In Illinois, Nixon officially lost by just under 9,000 votes, but the number of phony Democratic votes was much higher, thanks to Mayor Daley’s all-out effort against a Republican prosecuting attorney. There was plenty of evidence to overturn the result in Illinois, but it would have taken one and a half years of litigation.

In sum, Nixon should be credited with at least a 50,000 vote plurality in political reference books. In fact, Nixon should have won a narrow victory in the Electoral College and a national plurality well over 100,000.

**NIXON’S RESPONSE**

As soon as he was apprised of the fraudulent nature of Kennedy’s victory, several days after election day, Nixon ordered local Republican Party leaders not to file for recounts and not even to collect more evidence which would discredit Kennedy’s victory. In December 1960, Nixon persuaded the most prestigious Republican newspaper in the country, The New York Herald-Tribune, from publishing a 12-part series of articles detailing the frauds behind Kennedy’s majority. (No one has ever implied that Kennedy was personally involved in Johnson’s and Daley’s activities.)

Nixon’s response in 1960 should lend credence to his promises not to make a deal with George Wallace to

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**1960 RERUN: How Many Electoral Votes Can Nixon and Humphrey Inherit From 1960?**

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<th></th>
<th>Nixon’s Total Electoral Vote</th>
<th>Nixon’s “Safe” Inheritance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy’s Overall Vote</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>(219 minus 98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Repeating Pro-Kennedy Factors</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Deep South</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pro-Catholic Shifts*</td>
<td>105</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Conn., New York, New Jersey) (New Mexico, Penna.)</td>
<td>98</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humphrey’s “Safe” Inheritance (303 minus 191)</td>
<td>112</td>
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<td>Humphrey’s Figure Corrected for Census Changes</td>
<td>109</td>
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avoid a constitutional crisis. Even though he lacked any legal recourse to implement his potential claims, Nixon could have permanently discredited Kennedy's victory, kept himself on the national stage until 1964 without having to run for the governorship of California, and wrung political concessions from Kennedy like those exacted by Tilden from Hayes in 1876.

INHERITED SUPPORT

It does not, of course, follow that because Nixon won in the revisionist version of the 1960 election, he will inherit all his strength from that year. Changes in the political temper of the country, the Wallace candidacy and the fact that the Democratic nominee is not a Catholic must all be figured in any election analysis. In 1960 pro- and anti-Catholic swing votes resulted in a transfer of 105 electoral votes to Kennedy that would have otherwise gone Republican and in a shift of 98 electoral votes to Nixon that would have otherwise gone Democratic. The table accompanying this article summarizes the non-repeating factors in the 1960 election and concludes that Humphrey can inherit 109 electoral votes from Kennedy's totals, Nixon only 102 votes from his own previous showing.

— C. W., B.

1968 ELECTION PROSPECTS

Nixon on the Tightrope

This article focuses on the possibility that Nixon may again dissipate an initial winning margin in the polls, as he did in the Presidential campaign of 1960 and in the California gubernatorial campaign of 1962. The accompanying map, to be explained later, traces the state-by-state consequences and the narrow Electoral College victory implied by a 3-5% national popular margin for Nixon over Humphrey.

Nixon certainly had a 5% lead by the time of the Democratic Convention, but Humphrey has several favorable factors which have not yet come into play.

But if Humphrey begins to cut down Nixon's present lead, Nixon must consider counter moves on two fronts, the tactical and the ideological. Only through active tactics, unlike his selection of Agnew, can Nixon maintain his potential coalition of Northern decentralizers, Southern states' righters, black militants, and the inarticulate backlash. In most closely fought Northern states, the most important swing group for Nixon to defend will be the "frontlash," voters who went for Johnson in 1964 or who would have voted for McCarthy in preference to Nixon this year. In a two-way race, every "frontlash" voter Humphrey takes from Nixon is worth two backlash voters that Nixon wins from Wallace. Nixon can hold this group by active tactics where possible, by ideological shifts where necessary.

Tactically, if Humphrey is outmaneuvered by Nixon, President Johnson always can seize the initiative. He can completely shift public attention from the campaign by going to Moscow, stopping the bombing of North Vietnam or seeming to change our negotiating terms in Paris. Moreover, the traditional pillars of the Democratic Party have not yet started to run scared at the prospect of a Republican President, a Republican House and a Democratic Party shattered by pro-war and anti-war, backlash and frontlash factions. Organized labor has not yet competed with Wallace, though a successful Wallace campaign in the North, drawn from lower middle class and ethnic voters, will destroy the special influence big labor unions have had on the national Democratic Party. Big labor will soon run scared — and work hard for Humphrey.

Ideologically, Humphrey has an unambiguous position which he has not yet begun to exploit. Having written off the redneck South, his only bow to the Northern backlash will be repeated emphasis on "law and order," for he can count on labor unions and regular Democratic machines to hold some backlash voters. At the same time, Wallace will prevent backlash voters from favoring Nixon merely because he leads the "out's." Nixon meanwhile, is treading a carefully balanced ideological path, trying to please both frontlash and backlash voters. Humphrey can respond by concentrating aggressively on winning the frontlash. The Northern voters who vote for liberal Republican governors and senators may prefer a humane, problem-solving image of Humphrey to an ambivalent image of Nixon. Humphrey's association with Johnson may seem diminished to this group by Humphrey's greater emphasis on expensive domestic programs which can begin only when the war is over. Humphrey will unquestionably try to snatch these swing groups from Nixon by appealing to their preference for change oriented rhetoric and positive programs.

SIT TIGHT STRATEGY

As things now stand, of course, Nixon has a good chance for a narrow victory. Even before the Democratic Convention, Nixon certainly had a big enough lead over Humphrey in the national polls to win a majority in the Electoral College without dealing with Wallace. The August 24 Harris Poll showed Nixon 6% ahead, an 11% improvement on the 5%
TABLE I: Nixon's Sit-tight Strategy — How it Can Win

- J. S. B.

NIXON'S 22 STRONG SMALL STATES — 119 ELECTORAL VOTES.

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<thead>
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<th>EAST</th>
<th>SOUTH</th>
<th>MIDWEST</th>
<th>WEST</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Del.*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ky.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Okla.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. H.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tenn.*</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vt.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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*denotes states which are likely but not easy for Nixon. They total 42 electoral votes.

NIXON'S EAST BEST TARGETS — 174 ELECTORAL VOTES.

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<tr>
<th>EAST</th>
<th>MIDWEST</th>
<th>WEST</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N. J.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Fla.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Y.</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Tex.</td>
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</table>

'denotes 3 states not targetted by the Nixon camp. They total 73 electoral votes.

NIXON'S BEST TARGETS — 179 ELECTORAL VOTES.

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<th>EAST</th>
<th>MIDWEST</th>
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HUMPHREY'S 8 STRONG SMALL STATES — 68 ELECTORAL VOTES.

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<th>EAST</th>
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<td>D. C.</td>
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HUMPHREY - WALLACE CONTESTS — 51 ELECTORAL VOTES.

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<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
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WALLACE'S SAFE STATES — 27 ELECTORAL VOTES.

<table>
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<th>Ala.</th>
<th>La.</th>
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CAN NIXON REACH 270 ELECTORAL VOTES?

77 from 16 easy small states + 106 from 6 top priority target states = 183.
183 + 42 from 6 likely small states = 225.
225 + 73 from 3 neglected target states = 298.
deficit Harris had given Nixon just before the Republican Convention. Gallup and Crossley gave Nixon narrow leads of 2% and 3% in mid-July, and Gallup reported a landslide lead of 16% in mid-August. The question is whether Mr. Nixon can hold his present advantage with a 'sit tight,' non-ideological campaign.

The map in Table I of this article traces the state-by-state consequences of a successful non-ideological campaign for Nixon, one stressing his experience and shunning issues. It assumes that he can win several important states in the "perimeter South" where the Republican Party is strong — and that he can simultaneously get a 4-5% advantage over Humphrey in the North.

Last month's FORUM presented a map which grouped the states into marginal areas in terms of past election results and of Republican Governors and Senators. This month's map incorporates three important refinements: the results of the most detailed poll yet published in 1968, adjustments in Nixon's 1960 performance reflecting pro-Catholic and anti-Catholic shifts in voting behavior, and the expectations and targets of Nixon's staff right after the Republican Convention.

The Crossley Poll of July 1968, commissioned by Governor Rockefeller and released to the press on August 1, tested four possible trial heats in nine states and in five regions of the country. All parts of the country were polled at least in proportion to a national sample of registered voters of 2000, above the Gallup and Harris standards of 1500. The South was divided into two regions and polled more intensively in order to get more accuracy in both parts. The largest eight Northern states and Maryland were surveyed on a level of at least 500 respondents. The results of the Nixon-Humphrey-Wallace trial heat appear in Table II. The Crossley polls give the only detailed picture of the pre-convention equilibrium of the candidates. In addition, they permit a calculation of 'frontlash' and 'backlash' swing groups by comparing Nixon and Humphrey with Rockefeller and McCarthy.

For complete comparisons of Nixon's state-by-state prospects, his 1960 results were used, with adjustments to eliminate the pro-Catholic and anti-Catholic shifts estimated in Pool's Candidates, Issues and Strategies: A Computer Simulation of the 1960 Presidential Election. Another state-by-state estimate, especially useful for the South, was published in U.S. News & World Report, August 19, 1968, based on extensive interviews with Nixon and his staff. (Nixon's nomination took up over half of the magazine's non-advertising space.)

SMALL STATES FOR NIXON

The group of 22 small states listed on the map as strong for Nixon is very close to the group of 21 traditional Republican states in last month's FORUM, the 18 smaller states regarded as sure by Nixon's staff, and to the 24 small states Nixon won in 1960. Nixon's real bastion this year is the small Western states. In 1960, Nixon lost Hawaii and Nevada, lost in New Mexico on a pro-Catholic shift, and won California, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah and Washington on anti-Catholic shifts. But the July 1968 Crossley Poll put Nixon 17% ahead of Humphrey in the West as a whole. Since Humphrey was almost even in California, which casts well over half of the region's popular vote, Nixon must have an overwhelming margin in most small Western states. Hawaii has always voted Democratic (except for Senator Fong), so it is listed with California as a minimum target for Humphrey. Alaska has several times voted for statewide Republicans, but never by big margins, so it is regarded in the map as a target for Nixon.

In the Midwest, the map regards Nixon as strong in the four plains states from North Dakota to Kansas and in Iowa, though the Nixon staff apparently does not expect to win the latter state. The four small Eastern states and the three Southern states also listed as strong for Nixon are definitely more Republican than other states in their regions. The map was made before Senator Muskie was put on the Democratic ticket, so it is listed as "likely but not easy" rather than a Humphrey "must" target.

BATTLEGROUND STATES

Nixon's best targets are four states which Nixon leads by at least 2% in the Crossley Poll, four others claimed by the Nixon staff as minimal targets and Indiana, New York and New Jersey both went against Nixon in 1960 on pro-Catholic shifts, and they gave Nixon his second and third best statewide margins in the Crossley Poll, 5% and 4% respectively. Since they have 60 electoral votes and many marginal Congressional seats from recent redistrictings, it is extraordinary that Nixon's staff did not mention them as targets to the U.S. News. The omission of New York and New Jersey is the more surprising because Nixon's staff regarded Michigan and Maryland as targets, despite their 7% margins for Humphrey and lack of marginal Democratic Congressional seats whose capture might provide a Republican House.

Humphrey's "must" targets include the closest two states in the Crossley Poll: California, which favors Nixon by 1%, and Pennsylvania, which favors Humphrey by 1%. Michigan will probably be easy for Humphrey, for it ranks with Maryland and Massachusetts as Nixon's worst states in the Crossley Poll and as states Kennedy could have won without a pro-Catholic shift in 1960. Since Governor Romney has pledged all-out support for Nixon and was able to recover five Congressional seats in 1966, Romney's coattails may force Humphrey to work for a victory in Michigan.

Humphrey's eight small states include Minnesota, his home state, and Missouri in the Midwest, two strong pro-Humphrey Crossley Polls in Massachusetts and Maryland, and four strongly Democratic small states (including Washington, D.C.),

Wallace is conceded only three Deep South states on the map, though the Crossley Poll gives him an overwhelming majority in a five-state Deep South region. Arkansas, North Carolina and Virginia were not claimed as good Nixon targets in the U.S. News, presumably because Wallace's appeal is too strong for the Republican organizations to withstand.

Nixon's position on the map can be quickly simplified. As long as he is conservative enough in domestic
# TABLE II: Should Nixon Court the Frontlash or Backlash? — A Profile of the 1968 Swing Votes

**HOW TO READ THIS TABLE**

**MARGIN OF VICTORY** — Column A indicates Nixon's lead or deficit over his closest rival, Wallace in the South and Humphrey in the North and in the national average.

**NET FRONTLASH POTENTIAL** — Column B estimates the improvement Nixon could make on his margin in Column A by imitating Rockefeller, allowing for a loss in conservative support.

**NET BACKLASH POTENTIAL** — Column C estimates the improvement Nixon could make by imitating Wallace and Goldwater, allowing for loss in liberal support.

**PROFILE OF EACH CANDIDATES’ SUPPORT** — Columns D through K provide the basis for calculating Columns A, B and C and are explained at right.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nixon's Options</th>
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<th>Nixon's Total</th>
<th>Humphrey's Total</th>
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<td></td>
<td>MARGIN OF VICTORY</td>
<td>NET FRONTLASH</td>
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<td>for Nixon with his</td>
<td>POTENTIAL</td>
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<td>July 30 mix of frontlash appeal</td>
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<td>(B)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>538 AVERAGE FOR TOTAL U.S.</strong></td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>2 to +7</td>
<td>2 to —5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>47 AVERAGE FOR DEEP SOUTH</strong> (Ala., Ga., La., Miss., S. C.)</td>
<td>—40</td>
<td>—7 to —15</td>
<td>29 to +58</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td><strong>98 AVERAGE FOR PERIMETER SOUTH</strong> (Ky., Okla. and six remaining states of the Confederacy)</td>
<td>—1</td>
<td>—4 to —8</td>
<td>11 to +22</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>398 AVERAGE FOR NON-SOUTH</strong></td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>3 to +9</td>
<td>—7 to —18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>149 AVERAGE FOR EAST</strong> (13 states, incl. Dela., D. C., Md., W. Va.)</td>
<td>—4</td>
<td>5 to +13</td>
<td>—9 to —21</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>149 AVERAGE FOR MIDWEST</strong> (12 states, incl. Mo.)</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>4 to +10</td>
<td>—3 to —11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td><strong>95 AVERAGE FOR WEST</strong> (13 states)</td>
<td>+17</td>
<td>6 to +12</td>
<td>—10 to —23</td>
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| **NINE NON-SOUTHERN STATES** GOP PRO-FRONTLASH: 4 states where a gain in frontlash support would clinch a Nixon victory.
|                      |                |                      |                      |                |
| **40 CALIFORNIA** | +1            | 13 to +25            | —1 to —6             | 8              | 4                | 3                 | 33                | 5                 | 12               | 38               | 0                |
| **29 PENNSYLVANIA** | —1            | 6 to +13             | —1 to —6             | 14             | 4                | 1                 | 30                | 5                 | 7                | 27               | 3                |
| **26 OHIO** | +2            | 3 to +9              | 0 to —6              | 16             | 6                | 3                 | 28                | 6                 | 6                | 29               | 0                |
| **17 NEW JERSEY** | +2            | 4 to +11             | —6 to —14            | 8              | 2                | 3                 | 29                | 8                 | 7                | 26               | 5                |
| **DEMOCRATIC PRO-FRONTLASH: 3 states which Rockefeller's frontlash appeal could win but in which Nixon is unlikely to get it.**
|                      |                |                      |                      |                |
| **21 MICHIGAN** | —7            | 9 to +18             | 0 to —3              | 11             | 3                | 0                 | 30                | 3                 | 9                | 30               | 1                |
| **10 MARYLAND** | —7            | 8 to +21             | 1 to —4              | 17             | 6                | 3                 | 25                | 5                 | 11               | 23               | 6                |
| **14 MASSACHUSETTS** | —19         | 18 to +32            | —6 to —15            | 9              | 3                | 0                 | 20                | 9                 | 14               | 34               | 0                |
| **NON-IDEOLOGICAL: backlash-frontlash shifts will not decide.**
|                      |                |                      |                      |                |
| **26 ILLINOIS** | +12           | 1 to +4              | 1 to —1              | 12             | 3                | 5                 | 32                | 2                 | 3                | 24               | 0                |
| **ANTI-BACKLASH: Rockefeller's frontlash already supports Nixon, but a pro-backlash campaign would lose it.**
|                      |                |                      |                      |                |
| **45 NEW YORK** | +5            | 0 to +4              | —12 to —26           | 7              | 2                | 6                 | 23                | 14                | 4                | 34               | 0                |
EXPLANATION OF TABLE II

The swing votes in Table II are estimated from the four Crossley trial heats of July 1968 and the Presidential election of 1964.

Column A gives Nixon's margin of victory or neut. It is obtained by subtracting the percentage of his stronger opponent, Humphrey in the North (and in the national average) and Wallace in the South, from Nixon's total in a three-way race.

B & C Nixon's potential net gains from a frontlash campaign and from a backlash campaign are given upper and lower estimates in columns B and C. The lower estimate assumes that frontlash and backlash people influenced by a Nixon shift will divide evenly between him and their former favorite, or will not vote at all. The higher estimate assumes that people attracted or repelled by Nixon's position will shift their votes entirely, the frontlash to or from Humphrey and the backlash to or from Wallace.

The remaining columns show the distribution of frontlash and backlash in the total vote of the candidates.

D & E Columns D and E give the Wallace vote and the portion of it which could ever turn to Nixon. Nixon's potential gain from the backlash is estimated from the response of Wallace supporters when they were asked to choose between Nixon and Humphrey. Crossley gave the results for only the national average and for the nine Northern states. The regional breakdowns are arrived at as follows.

In part of the Northern states, the Wallace supporters divided evenly among Nixon, Humphrey, and undecided. For the three Northern regions, one-third of the Wallace vote is estimated as Nixon's backlash potential, following the pattern in the nine Northern states. For the two Southern regions, half of Wallace's vote is put in this category.

F, G & H Columns F, G and H give a profile of Nixon's present support. Nixon's backlash support (Column F) is estimated from the number of Nixon supporters who would have switched to Wallace or would have been undecided in a Wallace-Rockefeller-Humphrey race.

Nixon's frontlash support is estimated by subtracting Goldwater's 1964 percentage (E, F & G) from the sum of Nixon's potential backlash support (E) and Nixon's total vote. This estimate of Nixon's current frontlash is a minimum, because it assumes that Goldwater received only the Wallace supporters who actively prefer Nixon to Humphrey. Especially in the two Southern regions, there must have been many Democrats who switched to Goldwater but who would not vote for a moderate Republican like Nixon.

I, J & K Humphrey's frontlash support (Column I) consists of Humphrey supporters who would have been undecided between the two men. His present backlash (K), which is negligible, consists of defections from the Democrats if McCarthy had been nominated.

The figures in columns B and C can thus be calculated from those in D to K. For example, in the national average a Nixon pro-frontlash campaign would lose his backlash supporters, who compose 5% of the total vote (F), and would get at the lower limit of Humphrey's frontlash supporters, 5% (I), for a net gain of +2% (B). The upper estimate in B counts Humphrey's former frontlash supporters as new voters for Nixon, for a net gain of +7%.

The most complicated calculations are for the perimeter South, where Nixon's frontlash and backlash net gains have to treat both Wallace and Humphrey as possible winners.

In the state breakdowns, there is an undecided frontlash group. They refuse to choose between Nixon-Humphrey but would have voted for either Rockefeller or McCarthy. This undecided frontlash group is regarded as potential Nixon support with a mild frontlash campaign. The group is important in four states: California (4%), Illinois (3%), Mass. (4%), and New York (2%).

TACTICAL OPTIONS

Policy to win all but one of the Southern states he won in 1960 and can approach a 5% lead in the North, he will win in the Electoral College.

Tactically, several potential running mates could have made it easier for Nixon to put the new Republican coalition in a positive light. Last month's Forum emphasized that Nixon should make up for his lack of real appeal in close fought states, North and South, by choosing a running mate with active supporters in one area and with no enemies in the other.

At the Republican Convention, Nixon found this kind of choice difficult. He felt himself indebted to Strom Thurmond, Barry Goldwater and others for holding Southern delegations against Reagan's last-minute blitz. In the sleepless early morning hours after the nomination, Agnew looked safe because, like Nixon, he was free of close association with either of the feuding factions. He was not known as a Northerner or a Southerner, a liberal or a conservative, a city man or a farmer, a Goldwater boleter or a supporter. In short, Nixon hoped Agnew would be free of criticism because he was the best qualified man nobody ever heard of.

As the hostile reaction in the East, Midwest and West to Agnew's selection demonstrated, Nixon can't hold the coalition together merely by avoiding offense. Each compromise must have positive appeal for at least one element in the coalition.

If Nixon does not give positive content to the new coalition, he will lose as he did in 1960 and 1962, as Democrats attack the coalition and Humphrey and Wallace make competing offers to Nixon's frontlash and backlash supporters. Nixon has already staked out the middle ground. When he is not trapped into making difficult choices, he should build up his coalition as a positive response to our domestic disunity. When he is trapped, by circumstances, by Presidential actions or by actions of his two opponents, Nixon should take the offensive in a way which diverts public attention from the fragility of his coalition. He should combine strengths instead of just trying to avoid weaknesses.

On the Vice Presidential decision, for instance, Senator Baker of Tennessee would, by being the first Southerner ever on a Republican ticket, have satisfied Nixon's Deep South supporters at the Convention, have been more attractive than Nixon-Agnew in the New South, and could have been made acceptable in the North with emphasis on Baker's role in reapportionment. Nixon probably cannot afford a repetition of his first overcautious decision if he is to prevent frontlash defections.

In addition to improving his national coalition-building tactics, Nixon has the spectrum of ideological choice profiled in the adjoining table. He can sit tight on dead center, trying to maintain his present support depicted on our map and in columns F, G and H of the table; or he can strike out for more support from the backlash or from the frontlash. But events may force him to take the latter course.

IDEOLOGICAL OPTIONS

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choices in the largest two states in the country. In New York, where Nixon gets a higher Presidential poll than Rockefeller, the Conservative Party has threatened to mislead voters by putting Nixon’s name at the top of a separate ticket of electors. By September 9, Nixon will have to choose whether to knuckle under to their threat by allowing them to use his Republican electors at the head of their ticket or to defy them. The former course will forfeit the strong frontlash backing of Rockefeller, the latter may divert a decisive margin of the backlash vote away from Nixon’s Republican electors to the Conservative Party slate.

In California, Nixon has not gained a large proportion of the frontlash voters, and the 5% frontlash support he does have would according to the Crossley Polls have entirely defected if the Democrats had nominated McCarthy. A dramatic peace move in October, with or without any ensuing results, or maybe just a vigorous McCarthy campaign for Cranston in the California Senatorial election, may seriously hurt Nixon. To keep what he has in California he will have to convince voters that he is the “one best hope for peace.”

On the other hand, Table II shows, a pro-backlash campaign would help Nixon in the “perimeter” South, notably in the marginal states of Florida and Texas. At the same time, Nixon would lose much frontlash support in New York and New Jersey — and with the frontlash gone, he would lose his good margins over Humphrey. He would lose smaller percentages of frontlash support in California, Pennsylvania and Ohio, but even small losses would be decisive because of his small margins in those states.

In terms of electoral votes, a pro-backlash move would help Nixon win 39 votes, would irrevocably lose 60 votes, and would seriously endanger another potential 95 votes. Therefore, though Nixon will surely need to win several Southern states, he cannot risk national positions which would endanger his chances in even more important Northern states. His best course is probably to localize his backlash appeal in the South.

If Nixon moves toward frontlash, toward Rockefeller supporters who now prefer Humphrey to Nixon, he would be decisively helped in the four close states in the Crossley Poll: California, New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania. Since most of the frontlash in New York already supports Nixon, he would not gain much there by imitating Rockefeller (though a bow to the backlash would be fatal). Texas and Florida, of course, would be badly hurt if Nixon shifts toward the frontlash.

Thus Nixon is very much on a tightrope. He won’t need an overwhelming national margin over Humphrey, but he must turn aside pressure on his new, still shaky Republican coalition, from a well organized Humphrey campaign concentrated ideologically on the frontlash. Domestically, Nixon must stay on the conservative side of Humphrey to win five Southern states. In the North, he must neutralize Wallace’s ideology and Humphrey’s labor union support with an emphasis on his experience and on law and order. At the same time, the frontlash in the North must be convinced that Nixon is the best hope for peace. His disadvantage is that unlike Humphrey he must appeal to ideologically different swing groups in different regions of the country.

A NEW VISION

Much of Nixon’s problem can be alleviated by more active tactics. His potential winning coalition is no more difficult to handle than Kennedy’s in 1960. Kennedy offered higher food prices to farmers and a better living standard to the urban lower middle classes, yet he seemed consistent by using “New Frontier” rhetoric which diverted public attention from his contradictions in the North and from the contradiction between his courtship of Northern Negroes and Johnson’s courtship of racist local Southern politicians. Within two years after his election Kennedy’s popularity was astounding, considering the precariousness of his popular and electoral majorities. Kennedy did it by appearing to fulfill his rhetoric and promoting faster economic growth which increased the incomes of all but the worst poverty areas. Nixon, too, can win a clear election victory with a stance that promotes a vision of a healthy, vigorous America. He can turn this into a reality in office by ending the war, limiting military spending, reducing taxes and devaluing the dollar.

But he can also follow a course that emphasizes unlimited military spending, an unimaginative approach to economic policy and a consequent need for repressive gestures at home. If he wants to keep his Republican frontlash he had better provide signals that he intends to follow the former vision.

—CHRISTOPHER W. BEAL
Community Self-Determination Act

Readers of the Washington Post were greeted by an unusual sight on the morning of July 12. There, spread across the front page, were, in order: Republican Congressman Bob Taft Jr., the son of Mr. Conservative himself; Elijah Turner, black militant from Harlem; Roy Innis, bearded chief of the Congress on Racial Equality; Republican Congressman Charles Goodell, chairman of a key GOP platform subcommittee; heavyset Kermit Scott, a product of San Francisco’s black ghetto; conservative GOP Senate candidate Tom Curtis of Missouri; and the ranking Republican member of the House Banking and Currency Committee, William B. Widnall of New Jersey. The occasion: unveiling of a major Republican initiative to empower the people of poor communities to advance toward ownership, economic security, human dignity and community self-determination.

The Community Self-Determination Act is a fundamentally new approach to the problems of lower income communities. It is based not on governmental paternalism, but on local self-help, ownership and decision-making. Instead of creating new government agencies, the Act creates a new institutional structure through which the people of poor communities can achieve economic development and the ownership of productive resources through their own efforts and under their own control.

The basic element in the program is the Community Development Corporation (CDC), a stock business corporation formed by the residents of an area which is substantially below national norms in income or employment. Every over-16 resident may become a stockholder by buying a $5 share or by earning it through contributed labor. The formation process, supervised by a Community Corporation Certification Board, involves pledge cards, escrow deposits and community referendums, so that competition is preserved and the will of the community freely expressed. The CDC owns and manages subsidiary businesses in the community and conducts a broad range of social service programs as desired by its stockholders. It thus resembles both a modern conglomerate corporation and a charitable foundation. Its subsidiaries channel their profits to the CDC to finance additional investment and the service programs.

Financing business requires capital and credit. The Act creates a system of CDC-owned Community Development Banks (CDBs) for this purpose. The CDBs resemble the National Land Bank Associations which for fifty years have been an important part of the national Farm Credit System. They are capitalized and owned by the CDCs themselves, and their initial capital is multiplied by the sale of income bonds backed by a special Federal Reserve escrow fund. A national CDB is also created to serve as a secondary financial institution similar to the Federal Home Loan Banks.

The plan contains a number of tax incentives to encourage outside companies like GE, Safeway Stores or Xerox to come into the area, establish a new plant, train local people to manage it properly, then sell it at a profit to the CDC as a new subsidiary. An important provision authorizes Small Business Administration grants to CDCs to enable them to contract for competent management training.

Experiments are already under way in many parts of the country which embody some or all of the aspects of the proposed program. Notable are ECCO in Columbus, Ohio; Rev. Leon Sullivan’s PAE enterprise in Philadelphia; Republican Lt. Governor candidate Arthur Fletcher’s Self-Help Cooperative in East Pasco, Washington; Randy Blackwell’s silk screen factory in Crawfordville, Georgia; EG&G-Roxbury in Boston; and the Xerox-backed Fighton Company in Rochester. The program is adaptable to urban ghettos, depressed rural areas and Indian reservations alike.

The Act has now received strong Republican support. Led by Goodell, Taft, Curtis, and Widnall, 36 Republican Congressmen introduced HR 18715 on July 18. A week later, Senator Charles Percy, along with Democrat Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin, led 26 Senators—13 from each party—in introducing companion measures in the Senate. Richard Nixon issued a statement urging full and careful consideration by Congress, noting that the approach was identical to that contained in his two radio addresses entitled “Bridges to Human Dignity.” Southerners like Senators John Tower and Howard Baker and Congressmen William Brock and Fletcher Thompson are listed among the sponsors.

At the GOP convention support for the approach burst out in several places. Through Goodell’s leadership, the 1968 Platform put the party on record in favor of community self-determination along the lines put forth in the Act. Governor Daniel Evans sounded the theme in his keynote address. Barry Goldwater told delegates that “(Black people) want a piece of the ac-
tion. They must have it!" And in his acceptance speech, Richard Nixon returned to the theme and reiterated his commitment to it.

On the Democratic side, Vice President Humphrey has worked hard to mobilize his supporters in the cause. Senator Eugene McCarthy, surprisingly not a sponsor of the legislation, came out for it in mid-August. A number of Democratic Congressmen are planning to introduce the bill when the initial splash has died down.

Thus a national consensus seems to be forming behind a remarkable piece of legislation, and several important results are already evident. A major black militant organization has apparently come to understand that there is a genuine opportunity for black men to gain their goals through the American political system, instead of through sinister threats of violence. It has enlisted the support of legislative experts to produce a sophisticated 180-page bill. It made the unprecedented decision to work with Republicans to build an initial base of support. Major Republican leaders have thrown their weight and resources behind the effort, both at the Congressional level and in the national platform. Democrats are hastening to get in on the action. And — provided Republicans consciously pursue the splendid opportunity presented — black Americans and other minority groups may well begin to renounce a slavish adherence to the party of FDR in favor of pragmatic support of their friends of whatever political party. The theme of similar interests between black power advocates and Republicans, particularly conservatives, has frequently been sounded from these pages. Now, with the Community Self Determination Act, a concrete embodiment of those similar interests has moved to center stage.

—JOHN McC LAUGHRY

FOREIGN POLICY

NAFTA vs the Common Market

Mr. Douglas Jay, Labor Member of Parliament and former President of the British Board of Trade, presented an interesting and timely argument in the July issue of the FORUM in favor of a North Atlantic Free Trade Area. But it is not the whole story, and the importance of the matter for policy-making on both sides of the Atlantic is too great for the rest of it not to be told.

Mr. Jay did not talk about politics, and it is politics which makes the difference between the European Economic Community and the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA).

The Common Market is frankly political. Its aims include the achievement of political unity through economic union. The Common Market is probably the ultimate gesture in the direction of functionalism as an approach to political unity. Two British governments have voted for this unity by applying for membership and have thereby testified to their willingness to accept the short-term disadvantages — shocks to British industry and higher food prices caused by the Community’s agricultural arrangements — in return for the longer term economic and political advantages of belonging to a vital, growing community.

If Britain were to join the Common Market, the rest of the European Free Trade Area would inevitably follow; and a united Europe, roughly equal in economic and political strength to the United States — and to the Soviet Union — would result.

Britain would be a leader of the Community. Indeed, that is the major reason that the President of France has so resisted British membership: with Britain in, France’s European supremacy is reduced. With Britain a member, the Community would have the advantage of Britain’s political stability, global viewpoint and democratic traditions. For the United States, the desirability of having a strong, united Europe, led by America’s closest ally, is too obvious to belabor.

The fact that the President de Gaulle has thus far prevented British entry does not mean that British membership in the Community will always be barred, or that because of present problems Britain should look elsewhere for a new trade grouping. Nor does it mean that the United States should encourage such a turning away from the logical and compelling desirability of British membership in the Common Market. Time alone changes many things and makes possible much that seems now to be impossible.

Mr. Jay, however, has assured us that the economic arguments for the creation of a North Atlantic Free Trade Area are more imperative than the political arguments for British entry into the Common Market. There are those who disagree with him.

Michael Shanks, a former economics writer for the Times, London, wrote in the newspaper’s issue of December 4, 1967, that in an arrangement such as NAFTA, Britain’s competitiveness vis à vis the United States would rest in industries where there was a high labor-capital ratio; in other words, in industries which were less sophisticated and more labor-intensive. In effect, NAFTA would throw British industry back several decades, Shanks maintained, into specialization in products which are not viable in the long term and under conditions (such as low-cost labor) which cannot last.

Edward Heath, leader of Britain’s Conservative Party, in his Godkin Lectures at Harvard in 1967, suggested to his audience that Britain, as a member of NAFTA, would be swamped by the magnitude of American industry and, instead of being a primus inter paros
against NAFTA, although suggesting that the statistics used both for and against the new grouping were too muddy to be relied on. But the Economist did point out that the basic political dynamic of the NAFTA idea is anti-Europeanism and the creation of an "English-speaking club," with the Scandinavian countries as "honorary members."

The Economist, then, very rightly reminded its readers that the creation of a North Atlantic Free Trade Area would quickly divide the West into two economic blocs and ultimately into two political blocs which would mean divisiveness and weakness for the entire free world.

The fact is that the idea of a free trade area is appealing to those in both the United States and Great Britain who resent the current attitude of General de Gaulle, who fear any slow-down in the drive for trade liberalization and who dislike the supra-national aspects of the Common Market and its Commission in Brussels. But these persons are sacrificing very considerable long-term economic and political gains for short-term satisfactions.

What Britain should work for in the short run is a reformed, sound economy, fully ready to take its part in a European Economic Community of which it must some day become a member.

The United States should strive for British entry into a Community which will be stable, strong, united, and outward looking, fully the ally and partner of the United States.

Neither country should waste its resources and effort in attempts to achieve less fruitful undertakings.

——THOMAS A. SARGENT

Douglas Jay replies

Mr. Sargent's argument suffers, I think, from some serious misconceptions about the British situation.

He first makes one major mis-statement of fact: that the injury done to Britain by the Common Market's high food prices, if Britain joined the EEC, would be "short-term." It would not be. It would be permanent. It would last as long as the Common Agricultural Policy of the Common Market; and this in all human probability will last as long as the EEC itself. This is the most important of all the issues involved, and the main reason why Britain cannot join on these terms without permanently and disastrously undermining her economic strength and her whole influence in the world.

Mr. Sargent then says that if Britain joined, the rest of EFTA would "inevitably" do so. They would not. Switzerland, Austria, Finland and Sweden all value their neutrality and probably could not ever get reasonable terms accepted. Mr. Sargent forgets that Austria has been trying to join the Common Market for five years and has entirely failed. Portugal is strongly opposed to joining in almost any circumstance.

Mr. Sargent then says that if Britain joined the Common Market, she "would be a leader of the Community." Unhappily she would not. The effect of the Common Market's dear food policy, and the severance of Commonwealth free trade, would have such a damaging effect on Britain's balance of payments as to weaken permanently British economic and political influence. West Germany, which already has a larger population than Britain, and certainly no less industrial or military capacity, would certainly become the leader. This inescapable fact really ought to be grasped in the United States. The idea that British membership would assure the US of a "strong united Europe led by America's closest ally" is a facile illusion. It would, in fact, before long depress America's closest ally to the level of a second-class power, and hand over the leadership of Europe to Germany. Similarly to suggest that "NAFTA would throw British industry back several decades" is, frankly, without all substance. In fact, as British wages are much lower than American, and American technology often more advanced, it would be highly stimulating for British industry, as most British industrialists believe.

Mr. Sargent also says that "the Common Market is frankly political." Here he is right. This is precisely why the great majority of the British public do not want to join, as frequent opinion polls have shown. As soon as the Conservative Government of 1961 applied to join, it lost electoral support heavily and was defeated. As soon as the present Labour Government started to do the same in 1966, it lost electoral support quicker than any British government in the present century.

The British public do not want political involvement with unstable regimes on the continent of Europe. They want co-operation with the US and Canada. They want a policy that will expand trade, keep living costs low and maintain democratic control over their own fortunes. This is why EFTA suits Britain both economically and politically; and why a widening of the EFTA conception to include North America and, if possible, others would be far the best method of strengthening Britain's influence in Europe and outside. There would then be no reason why the Common Market itself should not join such a free trade group if it chose.

Though Mr. Sargent says what he thinks Britain should work for, I will not presume to prescribe for the US. But if the US wants to see expanding world trade, as well as an economically and politically strong Britain, the best way of achieving it would be for the two countries to cooperate in forming the sort of worldwide, open-ended free trade group I suggested in my first article. It would also enable real negotiations to take place eventually with the Common Market on reasonable terms.

In any case, to be "frankly political" in Mr. Sargent's words, there is no realistic possibility of Britain joining the Common Market in the foreseeable future. Let us therefore make some progress where we can in the years immediately ahead.
And now a Song
for Little Richard and the Goons,
from One Who Cares . . .

Chicago, Chicago,
The Democrat town,
Chicago, Chicago,
Get hit when you're down
   (by a copper).
There's a friendly spirit
   pervades the streets of Chicago, Chicago
Of course it goes thin
   if you've got a skin that's brown.
   (That's human nature).

Chicago, Chicago
The mayor's a pip
A great man, a straight man
Who shoots from the hip.
He's got a heart and he's got a soul —
And a cute little trick called riot control,
Chicago, Chicago,
Freedom Town.

Quoth bluecoat obstructed
By peace-loving crowd,
"It's not that they're violent,
"But, gee, they're so loud.
"I broke a few heads, but I feel no shame —
"Why, one of those pinkoes called me a name!
Chicago, Chicago,
Freedom Town.

Said Hubert elected
"We've settled a score,
"The Party's united, so call off the war.
"Dick Daley's support was touching, oh my,
"But frankly that gas brought a tear to my eye."
That's Democracy —
Chicago style.

And now it's all over,
The crowds are all gone,
But somehow the sweet smell
Of hatred lives on.
McGovern and Gene will suffer their loss,
But are billy-club bruises paid by the Blue Cross?
Chicago, Chicago,
Freedom Town.
MINNESOTA: looking to 1970

Minnesota, the long-time liberal bastion of midwest, is one state where the presidential race is not number one priority. Republicans realize their chances of carrying the state are as good as John Lindsay's were of being Dick Nixon's running mate; hence the party's attention is turned to the state legislature and the Congressional races. But the overriding question, since late 1966, is who will win the party's senatorial nomination in 1970.

That battle began shortly after the state party convention in June of 1966. At that time the party was left without a candidate to face interim US Senator Walter F. Mondale in November. The lone hope for many years, Congressman Clark MacGregor, had announced his intention to seek another term in the House, to the chagrin of party leaders. At a July meeting of the State Central Committee, former party chairman Robert A. Forsythe was persuaded to accept the nomination. A progressive, Forsythe had done much to build a viable political organization during his four and a half years as chairman. It was under his leadership that Minnesota was able to withstand the Goldwater onslaught and cast 18 of their 26 votes for favorite-son Walter H. Judd in San Francisco.

Forsythe's tremendously aggressive campaign and surprisingly close finish gained him support from practically every corner of the state; something he had failed to achieve while serving as party chairman. Outstate conservatives, once his greatest adversaries, now strongly supported Forsythe for a genuine Senate bid.

The election had barely been concluded when word was leaked that Clark MacGregor would make a bid for the 1970 Senate nomination. Moderate party leaders, who had urged him in early 1966 to make the race, where now caught in a cross-fire; their loyalty to Forsythe for his fine showing versus MacGregor's insistence on seeking the party nod in '70.

As a party moderate and metropolitan Congressman, MacGregor did not inspire the confidence of outstate conservatives. After all, this was the same MacGregor who had had Nelson Rockefeller campaign for him in an early House bid. Because of his need for conservative support, MacGregor's move to join the Nixon team last fall was not unexpected. What better way to gain outstate support for a later date than to endorse outstate's choice for the presidential nomination? MacGregor's announcement for the former vice-president did not win him friends among the party's dominant moderate wing, but it did for the time being neutralize Forsythe's support from the conservatives. Liberal Republicans openly talked of MacGregor's "sell-out" to gain support for his Senate attempt in 1970.

Party liberals had first been angered by the suburban Congressman after his vehement and uncalled for attacks on former Governor Elmer L. Andersen, during the latter's attempt at re-nomination. The Nixon endorsement cut off MacGregor's last hope of support from the small but influential liberal minority.

The race for Eugene McCarthy's seat is by no means limited to MacGregor and Forsythe. Ambitious Lieutenant Governor James B. Goetz, 31, is considered by many to have his eye on the same race. Congressman Albert H. Quie, Minnesota's most effective Republican member of the House, is considered by most to be the strongest candidate the party could muster, but he may not wish to give up his tenure and power in the House or his safe congressional district for a freshman Senate seat. Attorney General Douglas M. Head, who racked up the largest state-wide plurality in 1966, has been mentioned by some, but informed observers expect the able Head to wait for the Governorship or for a shot at Senator Mondale in 1972.

Further complicating the situation is speculation that MacGregor, now a close Nixon confidant, will accept the Attorney General's post in a Nixon cabinet; or that Forsythe will shrewdly withdraw from the Senate contest giving MacGregor the go ahead, thereby having a clear field for the latter's House seat.

Possibly the most important consideration is the vulnerability of Eugene J. McCarthy. Once considered an easy victim in the general election, McCarthy's campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination has given him the image of a "fighter", something Minnesota voters have long supported. He is by no means as vulnerable as he seemed in 1966, but his internal battle goes on for the right to oppose Minnesota's leading dove.

NEW JERSEY: Gross bid for power

The embarrassingly public split of the New Jersey delegation in Miami Beach may be only the beginning of a battle for control of the New Jersey GOP. Liberal Senator Clifford Case's inability to hold 18 of his 40 member delegation to his favorite son candidacy really shows the weakness of the senator's position in his own state.

New Jersey, the only key favorite-son state to collapse under the Nixon bandwagon pressure, swung back and forth as the Nixon forces found and lost allies within the delegation. Case and State Chairman Webster B. Todd, both Rockefeller supporters, had hoped that the favorite-son tactic would help prevent Nixon's first ballot nomination, but they had no weapons to use on defectors.

The back-room engineer of the Nixon breakthrough was Atlantic County's conservative Senator Frank S. Farley, the head of the powerful County Chairman Association. But it was Bergen County Chairman Nelson G. Gross who was the real key. Gross, who was a Rockefeller supporter for two years and who had been
scheduled to second Case’s nomination, said he had become convinced that Nixon was unstoppable and that there was no point in New Jersey’s opposing him. He joined Farley in trying to reopen the question of Case’s favorite-son candidacy, and when Case refused to back out, he took his five delegates to Nixon.

Gross’s desertion so affected the delegation that someone hanged him in effigy the night after the nomination. Young and politically ambitious, Gross has restored his county to its old position as a party stronghold in New Jersey. But by joining Farley in defecting to Nixon, he has taken an all or nothing gamble. He has undoubtedly lost the support of Case, who had been pushing him for State Chairman, but a Nixon win should leave him in good shape. He has been mentioned as a candidate for governor next year, and he still has an excellent shot at State Chairman if one of the several other potential gubernatorial candidates from his county is selected.

Of course, if Nixon loses, Gross will face the wrath of the Case faction alone. And even if Nixon wins, Case retains some political power. As one of the most popular office-holders in the state’s history, Case will have both his own prestige and the traditional control of federal patronage given to senators. At a convention caucus he reportedly threatened to use this power against any deserters.

Yet a Senator simply does not have the power a governor has, and the New Jersey Republicans have been shut out of the state house for the past 15 years. Case has always had difficulty — some of it caused by his own reluctance — in exerting real statewide leadership. He does not have the state patronage a governor would have to use as a club to keep the party bosses in line. His demonstrated ability as a vote-getter is not enough to give him control of the party.

The Farley forces, now joined by Gross, thus seem safe from retribution — and in a strong position for the gubernatorial primary which might establish their control of the state party.

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RHODE ISLAND: Russell and Almond

Rhode Island Republicans, led by dynamic Governor John H. Chafee, who is seeking a fourth term, are mounting their strongest challenge on the Congressional level in many years. Not since the middle 1930’s has a Republican from Rhode Island served in Congress. However, in the spring of 1967, in a special election called to fill the second district vacancy created by the tragic death of long-time Congressman John Fogarty, the Republican nominee (Cranston Mayor James Di Prete) was defeated by less than three hundred votes. This year, Howard E. Russell, Jr., Chairman of the Republican State Central Committee, has resigned his post in order to oppose freshman Democratic Congressman, Robert O. Tiernan.

A one-time marine officer and successful insurance executive, Russell first became involved in Republican politics as military aide to former Governor Christopher DelSesto. Rapidly thereafter, he served as East Greenwich Republican Town Chairman, as an Administrative Assistant to Governor Chafee, following the Governor’s upset win over a Democratic incumbent in 1962, and was elected in 1965 as Rhode Island GOP Chairman.

In that position, he has labored tirelessly to build a strong, viable Republican party. The by-laws of the State Central Committee have been completely revised under his auspices, and the composition of that Committee has been made much more responsive to the distribution of population within the state. Moreover, the State Central Committee has become a more potent political force, both in terms of assistance to auxiliary groups (e.g., the State Federation of Republican Women) and direct aid to local Republican committees. Perhaps most significantly, Russell has personally been responsible for infusing the State Republican organization with new faces and with “young blood.” In addition, he has served on the Republican National Committee by virtue of his office as a State Chairman in a state having a Republican governor. His impact has been felt in those circles as well, as witness his service on the Site Selection Committee for the recent National Convention.

Russell’s tenure as State Chairman has been marked by his ability to work in harmony with all party factions. Problem-solving rather than ideology is his stock in trade, and he is generally rated at least an even-money bet to unseat Tiernan.

- In the First Congressional District, Lincoln C. Almond, a 32-year-old lawyer, is the party’s nominee after a heated convention battle with Arthur D. Levin, Governor Chafee’s press secretary.

Almond has had a meteoric rise in Rhode Island politics. First elected to his present position as Town Administrator (municipal chief executive) of the Town of Lincoln at age 26, he is currently in his third term in that office. His administration has been marked by a rapid growth in new industry in the town, unmatched elsewhere in the state. His term of office has also witnessed the first airport-oriented industrial park in Rhode Island, a vastly improved school system, and a generally stable tax base and tax rate. During his tenure Almond has become recognized throughout the state as an expert on home rule. Under his leadership, the Town of Lincoln has updated its charter, and is without question the model for home rule government in the state of Rhode Island.

A recognized moderate, Almond should attract support from both the liberal and conservative wings of the party, as well as from independents and dissident Democrats. Nevertheless, he has an uphill fight on his hands in his effort to deny incumbent Congressman Fernand St. Germain a fifth consecutive term.

Although neither of the Congressional candidates had endorsed Mr. Nixon in advance of the Convention, both of them have since endorsed the Nixon-Agnew ticket and no problems of intra-party strife are foreseen in the coming campaign.
WASHINGTON: Evans forces in the ascendent

One of the nation's top Ripon-phobes, Mrs. Fran Cooper of Seattle, has retired as Republican National Committeewoman in the face of a moderate sweep of the Washington GOP convention in June. Mrs. Cooper, who once suggested that the Ripon Society was a communist front, gave up plans to seek re-election when it became clear that Mrs. Gwen Anderson, a moderate Committeewoman in the face of a moderate sweep of the state party than at any time in the past four years. There is even some chance that Ken Rogstad, the King County (Seattle) GOP Chairman and the Right's major domo, may not seek re-election next winter. Meanwhile, Evans appears close enough to a shoo-in for his own re-election that other candidates for state office are lining up to run with him as a slate, a rarity in personality-oriented Washington. Besides A. Ludlow Kramer, the incumbent Secretary of State who is now heading a "Little Kerner Commission" on the Cause and Prevention of Civil Disorders (Seattle had its first mini-riot a month ago), the ticket will include the most intellectual politician in the state, House Majority Leader Slade Gorton, running for Attorney General, and Arthur Fletcher, a Negro Councilman from Pasco campaigning for Lieutenant Governor.

Fletcher is in some ways the most interesting of the candidates from a national standpoint, for he seeks election in a state with less than 2% Negro population; what's more, Fletcher is as popular with black-militants as with the Negro establishment. The self-help cooperative he started in the Negro area of East Pasco is a model of black capitalism and perhaps the only one of its kind in the country organized consciously on Republican principles, as Fletcher never fails to point out to his GOP audiences.

The innovative progressives in Washington once more seem to have risen above the unpopularity of the national party and the sniping of local rightist rebels, and, as in 1964, may provide a "bright spot" on an otherwise largely undistinguished election map.

MAINE: Hildreth for Congress

Horace A. Hildreth, Jr., learns from experience, which is more than you can say for some Republicans. A Goldwater backer in 1964, Hildreth has retooled as a Republican progressive. This year he hopes to use a liberal platform to bring one Maine Congressional seat back to the Republicans. Running against Peter Kyros, a highly intelligent first-term Democrat, Hildreth plans to attack strongly his opponent's slavish support of the present administration.

Hildreth, 36, is a state senator from Falmouth, outside Portland. His father, governor in the middle '40's, was indistinguishable from any one of a number of faceless conservative governors of that time. He lost to Margaret Chase Smith in the 1948 primary, and after serving as ambassador to Pakistan under Ike, lost badly in a 1958 comeback bid.

Armed with this background, Hildreth, Jr. entered the political scene in 1964 as a moderate to conservative candidate for the state senate. Trounced that year, he ran again in '66, this time as a liberal to moderate, won and established a record as an innovative and progressive young legislator. His most publicized cause was an attempt to get a wildlands zoning bill through, against the opposition of some private interests which he had represented as a lobbyist a scant year before.

Hildreth has a tough race in a nominally Republican district which will not accept conservative representation. Kyros, his opponent, comes over well on TV, is good on constituent errands and has gained publicity through a contract investigation.

In response, Hildreth aims to be as liberal as he can be without alienating conservative Republicans. As part of this campaign he endorsed Rockefeller in July. He thus hopes to give the independent and liberal but historically Republican Maine electorate the best of all worlds. If necessary he can keep the national candidates at arm's length, but in the absence of state-wide contests, the success of the national ticket will be crucial to Hildreth's attempt.

NEW YORK: can Javits keep the Jewish vote?

Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York may face a surprisingly tough fight this November from the Democratic nominee Paul O'Dwyer. O'Dwyer was a surprise winner in the June Democratic primary when he beat both Eugene Nickerson, the State Democratic convention's choice, and Joseph Y. Resnick, the free spending Congressman from Ellenville. O'Dwyer hitched his campaign wagon squarely behind the candidacy of Eugene McCarthy. Both of his opponents were better known in the state, and both outspent him during the primary campaign; but McCarthy followers throughout the state turned out the vote for him nonetheless.

Since his primary win, O'Dwyer has continued his uncompromising support of McCarthy — going so far as to say that if Hubert Humphrey is nominated, he will be unable to support the national ticket. Despite the fact that this should create fissions within the state Democratic Party come fall, O'Dwyer is still causing fear amongst GOP leaders throughout the state. One reason for this fear is the unabashed enthusiasm common among so many of the McCarthy-O'Dwyer supporters. They are vocal, and they are willing to expend
huge amounts of time and intellectual energy to back a man like O'Dwyer. A second reason is the national Republican ticket, which is hardly good news for Javits.

A third reason is that O'Dwyer has already begun to cut into the deep reservoir of Jewish support for Javits in the New York City area. This support, which teamed with the traditionally Republican upstate support, has made Javits previously unbeatable. But it may be in danger of drifting away because of O'Dwyer's strong comments during the Senate hearings on the appointment of Abe Fortas. O'Dwyer termed the opposition of some Southern Senators as out-and-out antisemitism, while Javits cautioned against making such inflammatory conclusions without facts upon which to base them. O'Dwyer immediately countered that Javits had lost touch with the dangers surrounding the Jewish community in this country and around the world. Regardless of the relative merits of their positions, O'Dwyer picked up ground in the exchange.

An indication that Javits may be beginning to realize that he has a fight on his hands came soon after the Republican convention. Javits came home from Miami disappointed at Nixon's nomination and irritated at Agnew's selection. He told newsmen that he wanted "some time" to think about whether or not he would endorse the national ticket this year. (He did not in 1964). This caused an instant reaction from many upstate GOP leaders. Jefferson County's Party Chairman, Clinton Marsh, declared that he would withhold backing from Javits, and would urge other county chairmen to follow suit, unless Javits got back into line. State Chairman Charles Schoeneck dropped quick hints that Javits would soon voice full support of the national ticket and Schoeneck himself flew to San Diego to confer with Nixon and his aides on presidential campaign strategy. Faced with this dissension within his own party, Javits quickly backed off his earlier hesitation and endorsed the national ticket. One of the reasons he did so was surely that he could not risk erosion of his upstate support when his New York City base is being newly threatened by the fiery O'Dwyer.

**GEORGIA: first GOP primary**

Democracy has come to Georgia, or at least to the Georgia Republican party. Republicans, finding that costs can be held low enough ($25,000 through the use of volunteers) to satisfy even National Committeeman Bo Callaway, will hold their first statewide primary Sept. 11.

Previously, any candidate wanting to run for state office could get on the ballot only by the costly and difficult petition route.

Although the primary might be used as a battle-ground by hard-core conservatives, it should also speed the end of the strictly local party and give Republicans a better chance to capture state office.

Highlight of the first primary will be a vigorous contest for the right to oppose US Senator Herman Talmadge in November. First to offer himself as a candidate was State Senator Jack Sells of Atlanta. Sells, one of the state's most active and capable moderates, thought a combination of the votes of youth, Negroes, urban voters, moderate Democrats and the growing Republican block would give him a chance. He planned to build on his moderate voting record and his membership on Atlanta's commission to bridge the gap between Negroes and whites.

Sells, however, was immediately challenged by Earl Patton, a former county Republican chairman previously considered a moderate, who apparently was encouraged to enter the primary by a horrified conservative wing of the party. The only certain result is the promise of some Republican opposition to Talmadge.

On the local level, prospects are good that Dr. William Holmes Borders, an Atlanta minister, will be the first Negro Republican elected to the Georgia legislature since reconstruction.

Borders, long an active Republican, has earned a national reputation for his civil rights work. His church was recently awarded an extensive federal grant to assist in building a large housing project to serve the needs of the people in the church neighborhood.

**MARYLAND: Mathias' prospects**

Republican prospects for taking a Senate seat from incumbent Daniel Brewster are bright. Charles "Mac" Mathias, Congressmen from southern and western Maryland, a member of the "Wednesday" Group, is expected to have an easy time winning the Republican nomination and is favored at the moment in a three-way race against Brewster and perennial candidate George ("your home is your castle") Mahoney, who is running as an independent this year after losing the governorship race to Agnew in 1966. Mathias is expected to draw more votes from lower-income Democrats than from Republicans, and could be the crucial factor in the race. Mathias has an established record as a liberal, progressive Republican. He has the support of all factors of the party. He had extensive discussions with Rogers Morton, Congressmen from the Eastern Shore and the other potential senatorial candidate, before making the run. Morton seems to have found another spot in the limelight as Nixon's floor manager. Mathias' major liabilities are the heavy Democratic lead in registration, his lack of a reputation outside his district and the Agnew candidacy, which is taking Maryland money out of the state. Republicans should retain the House seat being given up by Mathias, and possibly pick up another.

Brewster has no major political liabilities at the present time, other than his support of the administration record; his biggest problem is the widespread feeling among the populace that he has done nothing in six years in Washington.
14a ELIOT STREET

- Lee W. Huebner, Ripon’s President, joined the Society’s full-time staff on September 1st. Huebner, who received his Ph.D. in American History from Harvard in June, will concentrate on new chapter formation. For his first months on the job, however, he has been seconded to the Nixon for President organization. He campaigned in 30 states as a Nixon speechwriter in 1964.

- This month’s book club selection is The Republican Papers, a collection of policy essays edited by Congressman Melvin R. Laird. In addition we are substituting the recent Mazo-Hess biography of Richard M. Nixon for The Republican Establishment. This month both books can be ordered autographed by one of the authors. Next month only the Nixon books will be offered. Use the order form on page 16.

- November is the month in which most Ripon Chapter memberships and FORUM subscriptions expire. Chapter members will save the Society considerable billing expenses by sending their $15.00 ($5.00 dues plus $10.00 FORUM) to the national office before October 15.

LETTERS

EAGER TO DEFECT

Dear Sirs:

The letter from Dan Tobias in the August FORUM touched a responsive chord. Here is a man who is defecting to the Democrats because he can’t take the Republicans in California. I’ve tried to defect to the Democrats because I can’t take that step for just about the same reasons. Welcome aboard, Dan.

CLAY BERLING
Berkeley, California

DE GUSTIBUS

Dear Sirs:

The July 7th issue of the Washington Evening Star carried an item concerning the Ripon Society’s remarks about plans for new party headquarters for the Republican National Committee to be built on Capitol Hill. The news item quoted the FORUM to the effect that the planned headquarters “looks like an outdated mental institution.”

Assuming that you will be interested in knowing some of the background on the plans for this building, as well as two other buildings Capitol Hill Associates plan to build and remodel, we would like to bring to your attention the following facts:

Due to the fact that the prospective building and remodeling sites face and are contiguous to Federal property, any building plans come under the authority not only of the District of Columbia Government, but also of the Architect of the Capitol and the Fine Arts Commission. The height and facade are of particular interest to the Capitol Architect and Fine Arts Commission.

Furthermore, the Capitol Hill Restoration Society has a sustaining interest in the plans for the facade, since these buildings are being remodeled and erected in a “restoration” area where a great deal of thought, money and effort on a private initiative basis has gone into bringing back a slum area to a fine residential community. Our organization has made its views known to the Government authorities concerned and has approved the architect’s final renderings. The homes in the area adjacent are early Victorian, flat-front and simple. A structure with a modern facade in this neighborhood would be out of keeping with the traditional character of the area.

Many people living on Capitol Hill believe the RNC headquarters to be in good taste as well as compatible with our homes and the existing Cannon House Office Building.

H. CURLEY BOSWELL
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Boswell is Vice President and Chairman of the Zoning Commission of the Capitol Hill Restoration Society.

QUOTE OF THE MONTH

YOU CAN’T PLEASE EVERYBODY

“Sure Agnew says he’ll shoot looters in the back, but how do we know he’ll really do it?”

Leander Perez,
Wallace for President Chairman, New Orleans
Television Interview, Aug. 13, 1968

THE CASE FOR SHAFER

Dear Sirs:

Your June and July issues call attention to Governor Shafer’s constitutional reform program in Pennsylvania — the most successful program of its kind among the 50 states.

I am writing to call your attention to a minor reporting error in the July issue and to disagree with your reporter’s assessment of the Shafer legislative record in the June issue.

The reporting error occurred in your breakdown of what Pennsylvania’s recent Constitutional Convention produced. It is stated: “But no change was made in the (constitutional) provision which limits governors to one term, so Republican Raymond Shafer will not be able to succeed himself.”

In April, 1967, the voters of Pennsylvania approved nine major constitutional amendments as part of the Governor’s total reform program. Among the changes approved at that time was one which permits Pennsylvania governors, lieutenant governors, treasurers and auditor generals (all elective offices) to succeed themselves, except for the incumbents. So, the governor elected after Governor Shafer’s term ends will be able to succeed himself.

The fact that the voters so overwhelmingly approved the entire Shafer constitutional reform package (the nine amendments in May, 1967 and the work of the Constitutional Convention in April, 1966) is itself an answer to the question asked in the FORUM in June in the article titled: “Pennsylvania: Has Constitutional Reform Ruined Ray Shafer?”

The answer is a resounding “No.”

Your reporter implied that the Shafer Legislative record suffered because the Governor made constitutional revision his first priority.

The facts are that Governor Shafer has accomplished more in the first year and a half than any Governor in modern Pennsylvania history.

More than 85% of the progressive Republican Platform, on which the Governor ran in 1966, has been accomplished through legislative and administrative acts.

One reporter wrote after the Governor’s first State of the Commonwealth Message in 1967 that the programs called for would take a quarter of a century to enact. The fact is that out of the 43 specific recommendations in that message, only two have not been acted on. Since that message there have been many other major recommendations that the Governor proposed which have been accomplished.

The successes include:

- The strongest civil rights legislation, especially in housing, in the Commonwealth’s modern history.
- An expanded industrial development program that is producing new jobs at the rate of about 4,000 a month.
- The nation’s first program to give tax incentive to industry for involvement in solving urban problems known as the Pennsylvania Neighborhood Assistance Act.
- A broad program of both legislative and administrative reform through the State Insurance Department, which was under heavy attack before Governor Shafer took office.
- Establishment of the State’s first Crime Commission.

(turn to page 22)
Editorial (from page 3)

where he is.

Mr. Nixon, on the other hand, faces a real ideological division in the swing votes he needs for victory. Outside the South he must defend his frontlash support from Humphrey. In most of the Perimeter South he must hold the redneck vote that went to him eight years ago because of Kennedy’s Catholicism. (In Texas, the largest perimeter state, he would probably be best advised to court the liberal Democratic swing vote that first elected John Tower to the Senate and then supported McCarthy this year. But Tower himself may object to any Nixon appeal which reminds him of his own political debts to left wing, dissident, Yarborough Democrats.)

Nixon’s position is thus unenviable but challenging. In appealing to two often antagonistic groups, he will enable Democratic campaigners to revive the image of “tricky Dick.” Yet if he can draw both alienated groups into a new alignment in which they are able to talk to each other again, he will have gone far towards unifying the country.

His response to this challenge since his nomination has been lopsided: he has thrown an issue and a running mate to the backlash but nothing to the other side. Spiro Agnew, despite his progressive record as governor, sounds every day more like Ronald Reagan, while Mr. Nixon himself depends on “surrogate” campaigners and advertising men to market for him a variety of ambiguous images in different regions of the country. If Humphrey and Wallace prove inept campaigners, this sit tight, backlash-tinged approach may win.

But it is more likely that Mr. Nixon will have to be a bit bolder. If he wants frontlash voters in his coalition, he will have to give them the clear signal that has thus far been lacking.

The signal should come on Vietnam. The war, after all, will be the first major problem on the next President’s agenda. Any man who wants to lead the country during the next four years should have a position on it. It is also the major issue working in favor of a Republican administration, since the electorate’s only positive association with the GOP is that of a “peace party.” It is an issue that works in favor of Mr. Nixon, who wins disproportionate support among women because he is regarded as a prudent negotiator. The peace issue, moreover, no longer offends the backlash, at least not in the judgement of George Wallace, who now rejects “victory” as a goal in Vietnam. It is an issue that greatly discomfits Hubert Humphrey, who would prefer to have the campaign waged on grounds where he is not so implicated in past failures. And finally, it is an issue on which Mr. Nixon’s private assurances to men like Romney and Hatfield have not been matched with public statements from his own mouth.

Is Mr. Nixon willing to espouse on a national forum the interpretation of the war contained in the Republican platform? Does he still hold to the plans for “Asia After Vietnam” set forth in his article printed in Foreign Affairs a full year ago. Does he think the gains of disengagement are worth taking political risks in South Vietnam? Are his remarks about “new diplomacy” backed up by more than the slogan itself. These are questions that can be answered fully in major addresses without changing one iota the position of the American negotiators in Paris and without inhibiting Mr. Nixon’s own freedom of action should he become President.

But they cannot be answered if Mr. Nixon has been permanently affected by the habits of overcaution and indifference that stood him in good stead in winning the Republican nomination. Let the “frontlash issue” be Vietnam or some other, the real issue is whether Mr. Nixon is capable of the bold and forthright public gestures that will cement his precarious coalition and convince swing voters that he has what it takes to be President in a time of turbulent change.

Letters (from page 21)

sion and one of the most aggressive consumer protection programs in the nation through the Bureau of Consumer Protection.

- A ten-year environmental — conservation program anchored by a new $500 million, voter-approved program to eliminate mining blight, air, land and water pollution.
- A legislative program that provides extensive penal reform and modernization of Pennsylvania’s correctional system.
- The fastest growing scholarship and loan program in the nation to help educate those students who can’t afford to go to college, in addition to a new program to assist private colleges and universities in building needed facilities and the enactment of the broadest plan among the states to assist non-public school students get a quality education.
- A transportation plan that includes the first state program to provide high-speed intercity lines and the establishment of a high-speed corridor through Pennsylvania to link the industrial might of the Great Lakes Region with the East Coast megalopolis.

These are just some of the successes. They are used here to dispove your reporter’s conclusion in June that “By mortgaging his future on charter revision, [Shaffer] exhausted his legislative credit.”

HUGH E. FLAHERTY
Harriogburg, Pennsylvania

Mr. Flaherty is secretary to the Governor for legislation and public affairs — Ed.

READERS CLASSIFIEDS

NOTE: The Table on page 10 contains a typographical error; the figure in Column J on the first line of the table should be 30 instead of 31.
A Vital Question for Winning Candidates:

ARE YOU A MAN? OR AN IMAGE?

All of us know the legend of the first image-maker, Narcissus. He became so enamoured of his image that he drowned in the deceptive depths of his own reflection.

It is constantly surprising to find so many otherwise sophisticated campaigners still being seduced by this myth — succumbing to the blandishments of expensive, professional "image-makers" and drowning in a sea of mass mirage.

Some of the best brains and talents in America shy away from running for government office — largely because of the brutal demands, uncertainties and penalties of political life — the difficult problem of getting elected. The cost of campaigning frequently becomes a major factor in these sometimes reluctant decisions.

To make political campaigning less harrassing — less expensive — and more effective has been the challenge confronting the Campaign Communications Institute of America. It is a challenge we have taken up undaunted in the face of professional "image-makers."

Men are elected to political office — not "images." People are moved to go to the polls and vote for them. Two simple, obvious statements — but they imply overcoming the Law of Inertia which is not so simple.

Voting requires action.

Voting for you must be strongly motivated.

The strongest motivation is person-to-person communication.

Every voter wants to know why he should vote for you! If you tell him quickly, convincingly, clearly, what you are for — what you plan to do — how you will cope with the things that worry him. If you answer every question — if you anticipate every objection — if you spell out every benefit and policy in your platform — if you reach him man-to-man or (woman), he will want to vote for you.

Getting your message across is the name of the game that wins elections.

This is the strongest motivation you can generate!

Because you have conveyed your message to him, he knows you are able to project his voice, as well as your own, through the halls of government.

Will modern "mass" communications create this personal action and interaction for you? We say, "NO!". There is no two-way communication with an "image" on TV. "Mass" is, by definition, impersonal. To reach the voter personally, modern economical tools exist today that can turn your campaign into a direct person-to-person experience — and for as little as a penny a person!

We firmly believe the price of good government, and election costs, need not increase astronomically year after year.

For example, in just ten 8-hour days, almost 20,000 voters can hear your personal views on crucial campaign issues — first hand — in your own words — speaking to each one individually for just $200.*

A small volunteer staff of four — working at home, using their own telephones and four TELO/PLAY/TALK units — makes as many as 240 calls an hour on any subject you wish to discuss. No expensive wiring or special installations are necessary. Your voice, your personal dynamism is transmitted electronically — directly through the telephone instrument to the voter.

To revolutionize your door-to-door canvassing and give your message the dramatic impact of personal contact, simply unplug the TELO/PLAY, leave the TELO/TALK attachments at home, and your volunteers carry your voice to every doorstep — speaking in the voter's language — giving him the information he needs to vote for you — personally!

With this kind of imaginative know-how — and your touch of political genius, today's advanced communications techniques will stretch your campaign budget — bring in the most votes for your dollars . . . whether you need to recruit volunteers . . . get (or give) information . . . solicit contributions . . . promote rallies . . . follow-up direct mail . . . reach special ethnic or language groups . . . or get out those winning votes!

These are just a few of the interesting techniques for winning elections we have developed.

Write, phone or wire if you would like to learn more about our complete, one-stop, single-source campaign services. If you still insist on imagery, be sure to ask about our electronic billboard — a baby projector that you can hold in the palm of your hand. It will project your picture on the side of any building in town — even from your car window.

Our business is keeping candidates happy by helping them win elections.

CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATION INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, INC.

Campaign Office: 52 Vanderbilt Avenue
Telephone: (212) 758-8680 New York, N.Y. 10017

4 TELO/PLAY Machines @ $19.95=$79.80
8 Recorded Tapes @ 2.25=18.00
1 Master Recording Tape 10.00
4 TELO/TALK Earphones @ 12.95=51.80
4 A/C Adapters @ 7.75=31.00

190.60
9.55
$200.15

Shipping East of Mississippi (5%)
Guaranteed Jobs Will Not Cure Poverty

There is a mistaken idea that "jobs" are the solution to poverty, and that poverty essentially is unemployment, especially "hard-core" unemployment. But the evidence tends to make me, at least, believe that the availability of jobs today has very little to do with poverty and that "hard-core" unemployment is almost a myth as an explanation of the plight of poor people. Guaranteed employment, in particular, is so ill-designed to challenge the culture of poverty that it is positively dangerous, while other job-creation must be designed very shrewdly with an eye to the reality of marginal labor markets if it is to have any impact.

Why does the availability of jobs have almost nothing to do with poverty? First, because so many poor people find themselves in situations which make it unfeasible for them to support themselves entirely by working. We do not expect old people, for example, to be able to pull themselves out of poverty by hard work. Yet many of our poor are old. We do not require young children to support themselves by working, but we also expect their mothers to spend so much time caring for and bringing up the children that full-time direct participation in a job is impossible for them as well. For many poor people jobs are more or less irrelevant because of these factors.

Another very large group of poor, so large that together with the groups just mentioned they exhaust practically the entire poverty population, live in families with a working man at the head. For these families job availability and unemployment are not crucial issues except during recessions. Their difficulty is that the heads of these families cannot sell their sweat and skills for enough to pay the price of a decent life in America. These people are particularly important when we think about the government guaranteeing employment at a wage above the poverty level. This very substantial group of working poor will also move to government guaranteed work in addition to the already unemployed. Like the price supports for wheat, guaranteed employment will generate government-owned surpluses of labor attracted away from the private sector by higher wages.

But, how should we interpret the very high unemployment rates in the ghettos? Are they primarily due to lack of skills and education? Recent work in this area indicates that the problem is much more complicated than that. Long-term unemployment in the ghettos appears to be actually lower in relation to total unemployment than in prosperous areas. The key to understanding the paradox is to understand the entire way of life in the ghetto and how jobs fit in.

For men in the ghetto who have not formed a permanent attachment to a family and job (the plight of many who have been discussed above), life revolves around "the street," and especially around groups which hang out together. Everything that happens comes out of the group or has meaning only in relation to the group, which lives an extremely unstable, sporadic, and drifting collective life. An individual used to this life of insecurity, persecution, violence and rapid change is clearly not a good candidate for a strictly supervised, highly organized, self-disciplined job which pays well. He drifts instead into jobs which have no permanence and in which stability and conformity count for little. He attends "shape ups," morning hiring sessions in which firms fill simply and badly-paid jobs off the street. In these jobs he can work three days a week, if he finds it convenient to skip two.

When large, highly organized firms try to hire and train people who have lived on the street they find that skills and intelligence are not the chief obstacles to success. The big problems are the inability of the street oriented individual to conform to the rules of the plants —such as regular and prompt attendance—and the resentment of other workers if the rules are relaxed for the trainees, especially if the trainees are black. These difficulties have been ignored by programs based on theories of skill-deficiencies and long-term unemployment. The poor are very familiar with work; they probably work harder than anybody else because their jobs, although they are not in the prime, corporate sector, involve so much effort and unpleasantness. They do find, however, alien and uncomfortable the tremendous change in style and way of life that participation in large industrial corporations enforces.

Over time, over a generation, of course, amazing change is possible as individuals in particular situations find the motivation and strength to get off the street and assume the ultra-conformist and super-conservative personality of the lower-middle class, which rejects violently every aspect of street life. It is very important that we not interfere with this process, painful as it is for the individuals involved, because it is a proven and effective engine of social progress for the poor. We should try to make the transformation less painful and increase the incentives for people to make it.

This very brief account may show how irrelevant and even harmful are some present proposals based on the idea that "more millions on payrolls" is the solution to the problem of poverty. Most of those millions are either unsuited to earning their whole income or are already on some kind of payroll some of the time. We risk a social explosion if we neglect the first group and a boondoggle of fantastic proportions if we insist on treating the second group as "hard-core" unemployed for whom the government must make work.

We need to expand the variety of jobs open to poor people. We need to recognize the social value of their effort and turn it into market value. We need to accelerate the natural movement of people out of street patterns of existence. These are the challenges practical proposals must meet. The Negative Income Tax meets them (see the Ripon FORUM, April 1967), but so far it's a rather lonely occupant of the charmed circle.

—DUNCAN K. FOLEY