Sentinel Without A Cause?

Also

Roger Fisher:
Memo to the State Department

William J. Kilberg:
The Job-Skill Mismatch

William D. Phelan, Jr.:
Complex Society - Part II

Howard L. Reiter:
Conservative Dream House
EDITORIAL
A discussion of the family allowance concept currently floating around in the upper reaches of the political atmosphere and why aid to the needy is not really such a good idea, even if it might be easier to get through Congress.

GUEST EDITORIAL
This month's guest editorial takes the form of a memo from Harvard Law School professor Roger Fisher to the middle level of the State Department. Fisher suggests a few pertinent questions that might be asked in the process of de-ossifying Department policies around the globe.

POLITICAL NOTES

THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE
Now that President Nixon has returned from his European tour, he must decide what to do about the proposed anti-ballistic missile. Edward Byron Smith, Jr., who has been studying the political effect of the proposed system for over a year, argues that giving in to pressure to build the system will just add to the country's long run defense problems.

THE JOB SCARCITY
Futurist Robert Theobald has argued that in the future, automation may make work so scarce that people will be willing to pay employers. For the present, however, America has a serious shortage of skilled personnel to fill skilled jobs. But for those without substantial education or a powerful union umbrella, there are not enough jobs to go around. Government efforts to solve this job-skill mismatch have failed and now the ball has been passed to business, which seems to be the last hope.

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William J. Kilberg attempts to describe the best strategy for government action to help business do its new job.

THE COMPLEX SOCIETY — Part II
In January, Ripon Contributor William D. Phelan, Jr., sought to describe the tremendous strength that has accrued to the Defense Department in the last 30 years and show how that strength is increasing in many non-defense areas. In Part two of his mind-opening series on where America may be heading in the next 15 years, he tackles the implications of automation and the middle-generation gap.

BOOK REVIEW
Howard L. Reiter examines the latest Weltanschauung offering from our conservative friends: The Future of Conservatism, by M. Stanton Evans, including Evan's remarkable exegesis on the power of negative thinking.

LETTERS
14a ELIOT STREET

THE BALANCE SHEET
Michael J. Pflot examines precisely how much progress Negroes have made in the last 15 years and describes just how irrelevant government programs have been to it. Optimistically, he concludes that the present offers a wondrous opportunity for relevant programs.

QUOTE OF THE MONTH
A little rebellion now and then is a good thing . . . this truth should render Republican governors so mild in their punishment of rebellions as to discourage them.
—Thomas Jefferson to James Madison after Shays' Rebellion
EDITORIAL

It is obvious that the country needs a new method of making social welfare transfer payments to families in need. Existing welfare programs are in a state of collapse, under attack both from burdened local taxpayers and humiliated recipients. The new Administration is bound to come up with some dramatic proposals in this area. As the present welfare system shows, careless choices in designing transfer programs can be very dangerous for the society. We do not need new programs which are expensive, ineffectual, promise more than they can deliver or create economic incentives toward anti-social behavior.

There are signs that the Administration is planning to meet this challenge with a proposal for universal child allowances. Under this scheme the federal government would pay all families with children a certain amount per month per child. Since there are over 70 million children below the age of 18 in the US, a payment of $10 a month ($120 a year) per child will cost over $8 billion each year. These payments, since they would be universal, would have no stigma attached to them, nor do they affect incentives for families to work and save. The chief attraction about the plan, however, is that because it pays everyone, it is a large-scale transfer which seems to be politically feasible.

We feel that it will be a tragic mistake for the Administration to invest its own fragile political influence or the taxpayers money in this plan just because it might pass the Congress. A little calm thought will convince most people that, even if politically feasible, child allowances are socially unwise and wasteful.

First, the real rationale behind transfer plans is to raise the incomes of poor people. While the poor have slightly more children on the average than the rest of the society, this plan is an extremely inefficient way to make transfers. Of the $8 billion cost to the taxpayer for the program described above, less than $2 billion would go to poor people. Most of the money will go to families who don’t need it, so that a small fraction can be given to those in need.

Second, no child allowance scheme can replace present welfare programs, which should be a chief aim of reform. To provide a livable minimum income to the poor, a family allowance also requires the same payments to the well-off, and the cost becomes prohibitive. To provide $3,000 a year for families with three children will require a payment of $1,000 per child, which would cost over $70 billion dollars a year nationally. No matter how attractive it may be politically no sane Congress will expand the program to that size. But at the $8 billion level proposed, the payments are a drop in the bucket for poor families and irrelevant to well-off families. $120 a year does not begin to provide adequately for a child.

Third, although child allowances do not affect incentives to work and save, they do marginally increase the incentive to have children. This effect will be small because the program proposed is small, but many people will think it is in the wrong direction. In fact the “political feasibility” of the idea may dissolve in the outrage of the population control lobby.

Fourth, Congress, if it can be cajoled into accepting this fairly massive plan, will in fact have made no dent in the critical problems of poverty and welfare, but will believe that it has. The welfare crisis will continue and President Nixon will have fallen into the trap he has himself often warned against, of seeming to provide something that will never be delivered. The political wisdom of these large programs should be judged not on the likelihood of their getting through Congress but on the effect they will have on the mood and temper of the country. The child allowance scheme fails the test.

If we are going to get rid of the welfare system and its desperate consequences we will have to think bigger, both in terms of the size of the program and the novelty of approach. The soundest plans proposed are variants of the Negative Income Tax described in the FORUM in 1967. These plans cost between the $8 billion proposed for child allowances and $70 billion. They will eliminate welfare, retain incentives to work and save, and emphasize individual decisions and the market. If we can raise $8 billion let’s not waste it on child allowances when better options for the society are available.
MEMORANDUM

TO: Assistant Secretaries of State
FROM: Roger Fisher, Professor of Law, Harvard
RE: What are we doing and why?

As Henry Kissinger and William Rogers review all the things that the United States is doing around the world they will no doubt frequently ask those in the Department of State, "Why are we doing this?" We can count on them to ask the question. But will they get a good answer? The temptation will be to give them an historical explanation of what led up to our present posture. To do so is to miss a great opportunity.

(This month's guest editorial takes the form of a memorandum. Roger Fisher has been a long-time consultant to the State Department.)

The word "why" is ambiguous. It asks either for cause or for a purpose. It is not difficult to explain the events which led up to the various positions which the United States is taking in different parts of the world, such as our non-recognition of China, our embargo on Cuba, our sanctions in Rhodesia and our insistence on the right to use nuclear weapons first. But when one asks what is the purpose which we hope to accomplish by pursuing a present policy the answer will become a good deal more difficult.

A change of administration is an ideal time to re-examine what we are doing and to ask in each case for a clear explanation of what we are trying to accomplish and how what we are doing is expected to lead to that result.

Staying away from Vietnam and other controversial areas, the economic sanctions which the United States is imposing on Rhodesia can be used to illustrate the point. If the Secretary asks why we are imposing such sanctions the answer will run something like this: The white government in Rhodesia declared its independence of Britain in November, 1965 in a move which Britain, and most of the world, regard as illegal. The Ian Smith regime continues to deny to the black majority of the Rhodesian population anything which could be fairly considered a democratic voice in government affairs. Last year the Security Council of the United Nations, at the request of Britain, voted mandatory economic...
close contests, thereby necessitating a heavy turn-out of right-wing voters. In this context, the future AIP candidates pose as possible spoilers whose presence could split the rightist vote and hand a default victory to the Democrats.

Samuelson, however, is believed more vulnerable than Reagan. In rock-ribbed conservative Idaho, where political tradition is more narrow and steadfast than California, the need for even limited moderation and cross-sectional appeal has never been apparent to many Idaho politicians. Which is not surprising for a state listed as one of the five in which John Birch Society membership is the strongest, and whose governor (Samuelson) has been listed (Newsweek, January 31, 1966) as a member of the JBS. As such Samuelson, who was elected by a razor-thin margin two years ago and has done almost nothing to broaden his appeal since taking office, may be on the downhill skids in a state which gave Wallace 13 per cent of its vote in 1968. Reagan on the other hand, though a flaming liberal compared to Samuelson and despite a limited degree of cross-sectional appeal he has managed to manipulate, is by no means invulnerable. Should his Democratic opponent be the popular State Assembly minority leader Jesse Unruh, thereby making it a neck-to-neck race, a splintering of AIP votes could deprive Reagan of a second term.

For the moment, the man most widely mentioned for the AIP gubernatorial nomination in California is Wallace running mate General Curtis LeMay. In Idaho, there are several possibilities, including state chairman Joseph K. Stumph, Jr., party treasurer Mrs. Alice Jackson, and Theron Roberts, a Boise lawyer who is the AIP's legal attorney. Another prospective candidate is Joel Anderson, unsuccessful AIP congressional candidate in 1968 from Idaho's 2nd Congressional District. (Joel's brother, Mark, is a part of the John Birch Society hierarchy, presently involved in Birch activities in Utah. He is a former Idaho co-ordinator of the JBS.)

The AIP's pique against both Reagan and Samuelson stems in large part from the contemptuous attitudes each displayed towards Wallace's candidacy in the Presidential election. In addition to obvious hostility against Wallace, Reagan had recommended the firing of LeMay as an advisor to the state Department of Education at the time the ex-Air Force general accepted second spot on the AIP ticket. This has prompted speculation that LeMay may have a personal grudge to settle, should he accept the AIP gubernatorial endorsement. AIP displeasure with Samuelson is partly from the belief he has not pushed conservative programs hard enough, a rather amazing assertion once the record is reviewed. Mostly, though, the AIP is still boiling over Samuelson's un-tactful snubbing of Wallace during a campaign visit by the latter to Boise. As the governor of the state, Samuelson had been invited to officially welcome Wallace as a candidate. Samuelson had replied that he would be happy to do so, except that "important business" required his presence elsewhere on the day of Wallace's appearance. A few days before th Alabaman's appearance Samuelson announced, with tongue in cheek, that this "important business" was that he planned to go "deer hunting." AIP leaders in response, appear to have taken out a license on Samuelson.

**CALIFORNIA: the Finch vacuum**

The remark of one of freshman Democratic Senator Alan Cranston's aides that all of the good Republicans are going to Washington with Finch is hardly entirely accurate but not without merit either. Who will fill the center-spectrum vacuum caused by the defeat of former Senator Thomas Kuchel and the Washington exodus engendered by HEW Secretary Robert Finch remains to be seen.

At last count, among the moderates who are leaving California for Washington are:

— New HEW Undersecretary John G. Veneman of Modesto. Veneman has been a close ally of Finch, knew more about the MEDI-CAL program than anyone else in the legislature, was chairman of the important Revenue and Taxation Committee, and led efforts to improve programs involving welfare, job training, and placement for the hard-core unemployed. He was also the strongest advocate of payroll withholding for state personal income taxes, which has thus far been opposed by Governor Ronald Reagan. Veneman is extremely popular with moderates and liberals of both parties; his departure sheds doubt on GOP ability to maintain control of the Assembly (formerly 41-39), as his district is 3-2 Democratic.

— William "Bill" Bagley of San Rafael, another liberal assemblyman, who is rumored packing for either the Justice Department or HEW. Also close to Finch, he was chairman of the Judiciary Committee and coasted to victory in the general election after easily surviving a right wing challenge. One assauging factor in his departure is that his bedroom county of Marin, although virtually even in registration, consistently elects Republicans and would be a safer bet for the GOP to hold.

— State Human Relations Secretary Spencer Williams, who is reliably reported to be negotiating for a position on the Potomac, probably in HEW or Justice. He was the unsuccessful candidate for State Attorney General in 1966 and formerly county counsel for fast-growing Santa Clara County (metropolitan San Jose).

From a group once known as the "Young turks" (isn't everybody?), this leaves only State Controller Houston I. Flournoy, new Assembly Speaker Bob Mogan, Finance Director Caspar (Cap) Weinberger (who reportedly was vetoed for lieutenant governor by power-
ful Reagan advisor Henry Salvatore), and a sparse few others behind in the Golden State. Finch’s place as lieutenant governor was filled by 45-year-old Southern California Congressman Ed Reinecke, distinctly more conservative than his predecessor. Flourney, a liberal, articulate former assemblyman and professor of political science, ousted Alan Cranston in 1966, and may have another chance in 1974. Speaker Monagan, while more middle-of-the-road, can be expected to be a strong party man and should hardly be timid if the GOP maintains control of the lower house. He has already reorganized the committee structure, while calling for a new Science Advisory Council to the Assembly to keep the legislators better informed on current thoughts of educators, as well as on the capabilities of industry.

There are other adherents of non-Reaganesque government besides Flourney, Weinberger, and Monagan around, of course. Some of the current officeholders, including Assemblyman George Milias of Gilroy and Senator Don Grunsky of Watsonville, have promise. Still, this would seem to be an excellent time for vigorous, progressive new leadership to emerge. On the Northern California scene, a typical example would be Ray Bright, San Francisco Attorney and head of the moderate California Assembly from San Francisco’s Mission District in 1966 in the grossly gerrymandered 20th district. Despite the obvious handicaps, he ran well against the incumbent, and was well received by the Mexican-American community there. Since San Francisco’s County Central Committee Chairman Putnam Livermore was recently elected state committee vice-chairman, someone like Ray Bright or attorney Alan Nichols, County Committee Vice-Chairman, may now assume the county responsibility. Although essentially moderate to liberal, Livermore’s impeccable party loyalty may have been accumulated at the expense of building an effective organization in San Francisco, according to some observers. All four of San Francisco’s Assemblymen are Democrats, and Judge Milton Marks had to come off the Bench to win one of the two State Senate seats for the GOP in a special election in 1967.

Nichols possesses a “folksy” and appealing manner, and has gained wider repute and respect while serving on the Board of Education. But whether Nichols or Bright or someone else succeeds as San Francisco County GOP Chairman, it is clear that more has to be done in the heterogeneous City by the Bay to attract minority participation, than displaying the one token black on the Central Committee. Particularly is this apparent when fast moving Mayor Joseph Alioto has delivered on promises to the Mexican-American community with appointments to the Board of Education, Board of Supervisors and a special assistant to the Mayor. In addition, Alioto’s Hunter’s Point swimming pool successes may have been legerdemain, but whether spectacular or substantive they still provide long overdue recreational facilities for black youngsters.

Other local Republican office holders are scarce as well. Besides Assessor Tinney, last of the old guard, there is only Supervisor James Maillard, the brother of Moderate Congressman William Maillard, but regrettably somewhat less progressive. Having one Republican out of 11 supervisors does not deserve a merit badge. Since there are supervisioral elections this year and five Democrats are up, one or two progressive Republicans could bolster the party’s sagging local image. It seems at least two of the incumbents in particular might be vulnerable. Supervisor Blake has appeared at times to be on all sides of all issues and Mrs. von Beroldingen has taken some rather questionable and unpopular stands. The liberal and able Tom Ross, with significant support in certain minority communities ran well last time, and representative of the Chinese-American and black communities ran as Republicans for Supervisor and Sheriff all within the last two years. Where there is life, perhaps, there is a Pete McCloskey or an Arthur Fletcher.

AND: sad to see...

California Superintendent of Public Instruction Max Rafferty writing for Gerald L. K. Smith’s anti-everything newsletter “The Cross and the Flag.” Smith, a notorious figure on the around-the-bend right since his days as an active member in William Dudley Pelley’s American fascist pro-Hitler organization, the Silver Shirts Legion, makes little effort to sugar coat his anti-semitism (“the Jew propaganda machine is now running full blast and there is no telling what they will do to public sentiment within the days that lie immediately ahead,” one recent fund raising letter revealed).

Rafferty’s article itself is a fairly harmless nonsensical litany in which he pleads “not guilty” to a series of what he describes as crimes falsely alleged against the US “It’s not my fault,” he opens, “that there is mass starvation in Asia. Neither do I blame myself or my country for the ghastly civilian suffering in the Vietnam ordeal . . . I don’t feel guilty about mounting crime in our big cities because I’m not committing any of it.” And so on and on against the current “orgy of abasement” in the United States. While his piece is filled with none of the crude hate-mongering in the rest of the magazine, it runs side by side in complementary fashion with it.

Rafferty is currently a leading crusader against the “subversion” currently “rampant” on state university campuses and is calling for a crackdown on student rebels who threaten the “democratic atmosphere,” presumably the same democratic atmosphere which Smith and his ilk are struggling to keep pure.
$100 Billion Misunderstanding?

ABM: Sentinel without a Cause?

Four aspects of modern technology have gravely complicated the decision making process concerning the deployment of nuclear weapons. The first two aspects are primarily technological but have strong political overtones; the latter two aspects are mainly political.

The first problem is one of available resources. Although technology may have enabled several weapons systems to have been developed at the same time, cost limitations force the Government to choose only the most useful of them. Secondly, nuclear weapons, while of tremendous importance for deterrence and defense, are not very useful for delicate diplomatic procedures or for action in the local political and economic levels. On the other hand, it is absolutely essential to possess a selection of nuclear weapons which complement and reinforce political purposes, or at least do not detract from them. Technological effectiveness must be united with political usefulness. Finally, the choice is further complicated because many of the most advanced weapons cannot be completely tested without abrogating the partial test ban treaty, and because the time span between the decision to deploy a weapon and the deployment itself is so long that many weapons become obsolete by the time they are actually deployed.

Although there has been much debate concerning the technological effectiveness of the proposed antiballistic missile (ABM) Sentinel deployment, the political effectiveness of a small ABM development has not been considered in great detail. Precisely what, in other words, is the political influence of Sentinel as considered apart from its pure technical effectiveness? This problem can be approached by posing three broad questions.

1) Will the ABM enhance the stability of the international political system, and particularly will it increase United States security?

2) Is the ABM the best choice among technological alternatives now available? Could the money allocated for Sentinel be better allocated toward political or economic ends?

3) How will the ABM affect other alternatives for decreasing international tension and improving U. S. relations abroad?

ACTION AND REACTION Since the beginning of the missile age there has been a definite action-reaction pattern between Soviet deployments and US responses, and vice-versa. For example, the US deployment of submarine-launched missiles was a response to the vulnerability of first generation ICBM systems. As the United States began to make its missile sites more invulnerable (hardening them), the Soviets responded by deploying more destructive warheads on their own ICBM's and by hardening their own missile sites. The United States in recent years has attempted to counter Soviet defenses by improving missile accuracy and penetrability, and by developing multiple warheads for each missile.

The Sentinel deployment could affect the action-reaction pattern by beginning a new level of the arms race. Although Sentinel is officially intended "only for the Chinese," it will be deployed in such a manner that it could be expanded into an anti-Soviet system.

There are many forces within the US government which want to expand Sentinel to a full ABM system. The Soviets, knowing this, might deploy a heavy ABM system in response to the light US ABM, even though their ABM technology is as uncertain as ours. At the very least, the Soviets will have to plan ahead for increased numbers of offensive ICBM's with more sophisticated penetrability, and there is grave uncertainty as to whether Moscow will actually deploy these missiles as well. The Soviet military force has been expanding at a rate of about 150 to 200 missiles per year and may attempt to continue at this pace even past the level of parity with US nuclear weapons whether or not in response to a light US ABM deployment.

TWO POSSIBLE SPIRALSA light ABM (with the possibility of being expanded into a full ABM system) could be destabilizing because it could lead to a defense-defense or offense-offense arms race. An offense-defense arms race would be particularly unstable because there is not enough similarity between offensive and defensive system accurately to measure the balance between them consequently the tendency will be for each side to make conservative estimates of enemy capabilities and overbuild its own offensive forces. During a nuclear exchange — even against an allegedly effective ABM system — destruction could be even greater because one side might have dramatically increased its offensive forces in response to the other side's ABM.

A defense-defense arms race (with a freeze on offensive forces) could also be unstable because a point could be reached when defenses were so strong that one side would fear that its offensive forces would not
provide an adequate deterrent against hostile actions; the result would be the breaking of the offensive freeze and the deployment of more offensive missiles—a offense-defense arms race would begin anew. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the ABM’s would only further increase the instability of the new arms race.

Soviet fear of Chinese expansionism also would come into play in their decision of how to respond to a US ABM. The combination of US ABM deployment and the development of nuclear weapons in China could lead the Kremlin to deploy enough weapons to deal with both threats simultaneously. There can be no certainty about the outcome of a three-sided arms race except that it would lead to a situation vastly more unstable than would have occurred if the United States had refrained from escalating the arms race to an offense-defense dimension by deploying a light ABM.

Other Soviet domestic pressures are contributing factors. Within the Soviet Union the military, while subservient to the Party, is a major political force. Since 1964 tensions between the military and the Party, partially sublimated in the common effort to oust Khrushchev, have become active factors once again. The military, being dissatisfied with policies which threaten its basic institutional interests, can be expected to demonstrate increased hostility toward detente-oriented foreign policies and domestic policies which favor the consumer. A light US ABM deployment which could be expanded to a heavier system will appear to confirm the military’s distorted image of US intentions, weakening the position of Russian “liberals” and injuring other opportunities for arms control and détente.

**EFFECT ON NEGOTIATIONS** Arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union present one of the most encouraging prospects for peace of the entire post-war-period. The negotiations will be an opportunity not only to halt the runaway of military technology but also to initiate a new era of Great Power co-operation. Sentinel could be harmful to both of these prospects.

The idea of arms control negotiations is not to debate from an militant a stance as possible, but to seek an accord grounded in mutual self-interest, trust, and confidence in the control arrangements. The Kremlin is fully aware of the US strength and ability to deploy an ABM system; an ABM deployment itself is not necessary to convince them of US capabilities. Sentinel will not necessarily strengthen the US bargaining position, and it may well weaken confidence in the control arrangements.

There would probably be small hope of dismantling an existing light ABM system, particularly if it had just recently been deployed; therefore, the agreement would have to set a limit on further expansion of either side’s ABM. An agreement not to deploy a full ABM system will not be as stable if a light ABM is deployed as if no ABM were deployed. The existence of an ABM however small means not only that there would be less warning time if the opposing side’s ABM were to be expanded because much of the basic ABM equipment would already have been deployed, but also that the foreign policy postures would still be strongly militarist. Furthermore, technological improvements may permit a small system to be upgraded so that its alleged effectiveness would be near that of a full ABM—rendering superfluous part of the arms control agreement.

Additional uncertainty would arise as to whether an ABM was directed at Russia, China, the United States or other nuclear powers. Finally, the decision to deploy a light ABM, with considerable talk within the US Congress about expanding that system, may antagonize groups within the Soviet hierarchy (particularly the military) who will oppose arms control negotiations altogether.

**EFFECT ON CREDIBILITY** Sentinel are that the ABM will enhance the credibility of US commitments abroad and that the US ABM will make it easier for other nations to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Taking these in reverse order, there is some truth in the statement that an allegedly invulnerable US homeland (at least against Chinese weapons) will enable the nuclear “have-not” nations to rely on US commitments and not feel obliged to build their own nuclear arsenals; but these nations may be even more interested in limiting damage to themselves rather than to the United States.

At one extreme they might demand their own ABM system. This would be destabilizing because an ABM system without an offensive counterpart might be an incentive to complete the defense with an offense. The proximity of enemy weapons in Asia and Europe would also undermine the value of an ABM there. High costs and problems of control would complicate the matter even further, particularly since field commanders may have to make the final decision about firing the ABM’s.

Other problems of the NPT lie at an even deeper level than US credibility. The nuclear have-not nations refused to consider signing the NPT without an agreement that the nuclear powers would attempt to halt the arms race; the US and Soviet ABM deployments would be a flagrant violation of this commitment, and would indicate that the gap between the have’s and the have-not’s is increasing. Whether the NPT is only a stop-gap measure in regional and global arms races, or whether it is a permanent gesture in the direction of world stability, will depend on the extent to which the Great Powers are able to work...
Aspects of ABM Technology

Spartan Anti-Ballistic Missile

Spartan is an interceptor missile with a range of several hundred miles. It is a three-stage solid propellant rocket with a thermonuclear warhead in the megaton range. Such a long range interceptor permits a few batteries to defend the entire country against a light inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack. For heavier attacks, or for a concentration of ICBM's on a few important targets such as missile sites or large cities, additional short-range SPRINT interceptors are used.

SPRINT Anti-Ballistic Missile

SPRINT is a high speed short range interceptor designed to be fired when the offensive missile has entered the atmosphere and is only seconds away from detonating on target. It is a two-stage solid propellant missile that can travel tens of thousands of feet in a few seconds — and will have to, since it must destroy the incoming missile at an altitude of only 30,000 to 70,000 feet. SPRINT carries a relatively small warhead in the kiloton range because its interceptions will be within the atmosphere.

There are two main advantages in being able to wait this long before firing the missile. First, the defense could now have a second shot if the missile had not already been destroyed outside the atmosphere by a previously fired long-range ABM; second, radar could better discriminate between the actual missile and penetration aids such as chaff and balloons because the latter would be slowed down by the atmosphere sooner than the missile.

Radar

Two kinds of radar would guide the Sentinel light ABM system. If an ICBM were launched from China, the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) situated in the northern part of the United States would detect the incoming missile as it came over the horizon about 1500 miles away. The trajectory of an ICBM is a huge arc with its apex several hundred miles above the earth; once the arc is determined, it is possible to predict the location of the missile at any given time. The second kind of radar, the missile site radar (MSR), comes into use after PAR has detected incoming missiles. MSR launches the Spartans and SPRINTS and guides them to impact. This higher-frequency missile site radar is used to handle heavy incoming traffic and to provide precise guidance commands. Obviously, the two radars must be highly co-ordinated systems able to respond in a very short time: the time between recognition of the missile and impact is only about fifteen minutes. This means that the time of human decision must be at a minimum, and that the success of an ABM will depend on the information previously programmed into computers. All parts must be functioning perfectly.

Defensive Interception

The incoming warhead need not be blown to pieces to be rendered harmless. Thermal radiation from the ABM could affect the warhead's heat shield so it burns up on re-entry. Thermal radiation effects on the surface of the warhead could also produce sudden and high electric surface changes, and the accompanying electromagnetic shock wave could penetrate into the warhead and disrupt the detonating mechanism. A third possible means of disarming the missile would be for high-energy neutrons prematurely to fuse the core of the warhead, or reduce its critical mass below that required for explosion.

Offensive Penetration

There are a number of penetration devices to circumvent the effectiveness of an ABM that would not require major breakthroughs in the existing technology. Decoys in certain circumstances could be effective above the atmosphere, but they can be readily distinguished after re-entry: the characteristic radar signal from a decoy differs from that of a missile; the lighter decoy begins to slow down at a higher altitude within the atmosphere than does the missile; and although heavier decoys could be distinguished only later, at a range of about twenty miles, their use is limited by the total weight an ICBM can carry and still maintain its maximum destructive power. A second means of disrupting the ABM would be to utilize chaff (radar reflecting foils) and other electronic jamming devices with electronic noise-generating equipment in the frequency range of the ABM radar guidance system. Third, the warheads themselves could be redesigned to resist radiation or to explode upon receiving radiation from the ABM; in the latter case the ABM would actually detonate the ICBM. Fourth, and most difficult for the defense to overcome, would be the blacking out of radar by nuclear explosions, including those of the ABM itself; the defense might be rendered totally ineffective by its own anti-ballistic missiles. Finally, and most obvious, is that the offense could devastate the defense by saturation attack (more offensive missiles than defensive ones). This would be possible because offense is generally less expensive than defense.
together in constructing a positive basis for co-existence.

The light ABM deployments — and potential heavy ABM deployments — inject a new note of uncertainty into the picture. An allegedly successful ABM by itself will not determine whether the United States will become aggressive or more isolationist, but it will appear to provide the US with greater capacity to move in either direction. To lessen this uncertainty the United States should concentrate on conferring more with its allies. Washington should also review its conventional and political capabilities because developments on the nuclear level will tend toward strategic stalemate in the future, and because there will probably never be a situation when the winning of a single battle with tactical nuclear weapons will outweigh the disadvantages that will accompany the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have become increasingly useless as instruments of flexible diplomacy, and are even less effective on the local economic and political levels where most of the flux will take place during the latter third of this century.

The Europeans have considered the American ABM somewhat bizarre and have feared that it will lead to a full ABM in the future. A heavy ABM would downgrade European nuclear forces even more, and it would also place in question the future of the US commitment to Western Europe. It is regrettable that the US did not adequately consult with Europe about Sentinel in the NATO planning committees which had been organized specifically to avoid the kind of confusion that has arisen from Sentinel.

**EFFECT ON CHINA**

The Chinese outlook is strategic, ideological, and historical. Geography dictated a lack of natural demarcation lines for borders, and made the Chinese naturally insecure about losing any part of their traditional territory. The ideological component of the Chinese outlook encouraged an expansionist element, redirected the traditional xenophobia in intensified form against the "capitalist-imperialist" United States but in lesser degree against "bourgeois-revisionist" Soviet Russia, and discouraged any notion of compromise because of the belief that time was inevitably on the communist side. Historically, the Party has been isolated from foreign affairs since 1920, and has therefore encountered little evidence to change these assumptions. What it has encountered (e.g. US aid to Chaing Kai-Shek, and only Soviet aid against Japan before the War) seemed only to confirm CCP propaganda. The possibility of negotiations between the US and China represents a major departure from this hostile isolationism.

The Sentinel decision will aggravate Chinese hostility to the United States and may even stimulate the Chinese nuclear program. Although the United States asserts that Sentinel is intended for defensive purposes only, Peking will view it as preparation for a possible first strike attack on the Chinese mainland. Since one of China's main purposes in developing nuclear weapons is deterring a US (or Soviet) attack, Sentinel can only act as a catalyst in stimulating further Chinese nuclear development. China has first rate scientists (many of whom were trained in Russia or the United States) and large deposits of uranium, and its capacity as a first rate nuclear power by the late 1970's and 1980's is virtually assured. Sentinel will be obsolete when China attains the status of a first rate nuclear power. US security will depend on its own huge offensive deterrent combined with political gestures to bring a peacefully oriented China into the world community of nations. Sentinel is not a move in this direction.

A final factor of uncertainty is the eventual outcome of the Sino-Soviet split. One possibility is that China is a long-term Soviet ally which has temporarily gone off the track but which will return to the true course after Mao's death. The United States will miss a golden opportunity if Washington ignores the possibilities latent in Sino-American negotiations and the Sino-Soviet split. The US should attempt new relations with Peking to enable her to strike a middle course between the US and Russia in the future. Sentinel is a step backward from this opportunity.

Unlike most new weapons the ABM does not replace other weapons which are being phased out; the ABM is a new expense, almost completely a net addition to existing expenses. Indications are that the Sentinel deployment may exceed by as much as 100 per cent its estimated expense of $5 billion, and may run to $60 to $100 billion if the deployment is expanded. These costs will cut deeply into funds which could have been allocated to other foreign and domestic purposes.

One of the main pillars of US security is a strong domestic economy and united political structure. The refusal to allocate sufficient funds to badly needed domestic programs could gravely weaken the country's unity at home and political influence abroad.

**NEW KINDS OF DANGER**

Other dangers arise when nuclear missiles are placed near large cities. If one of the main purposes of Sentinel is to guard against the possibility of an accidental missile launch from another country, this possibility must be weighed against the possibility that an ABM may accidentally explode at its site, thereby killing millions of people in the heavily populated vicinity. Another problem appears with the possibility that for the first time in the missile age the decision to fire a large nuclear weapon may reside in the authority of a field commander rather than the President of the United States. Existing ICBM forces are invulnerable enough to absorb an enemy attack and still fire back with tre-
mendous force; but an ABM's warning time of 15 minutes would not allow much time for consultation before the ABM would have to be fired. Even longer range over-the-horizon radars might not substantially increase warning time. An ABM could be accidentally fired because of a mistake on the radar screen. An ABM could also misfire at its site, again endangering the lives of people within the vicinity. All of these uncertainties must be gravely considered before a light ABM is to be placed near a city, and alternatives to these urban missile sites must be sought because there can never be absolute certainty against an accidental explosion.

From the preceding discussion, one can draw these conclusions about the ABM:

1. The ABM is destabilizing and does not add to US security. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of an ABM system is itself a destabilizing element. An ABM deployment also threatens to unleash aggressive dynamics by setting off an offense-defense arms race with no natural or visible stopping point and by encouraging independent militant forces within the Soviet military and Communist Party. The capacity for irrational acts may be increased rather than decreased. An ABM will complicate the possibility of avoiding a three-sided arms race between Russia, China and the US because it will aggravate hostile forces within all three nations and will escalate the arms race with a new defensive dimension. The only way an ABM system could be stabilizing is by deploying ABM's only at missile sites as a complement to hardening our strategic forces, but not as a defense for the entire country.

The ABM will also weaken the country's domestic strength by depriving domestic programs of badly needed funds and by risking millions of deaths through an accidental nuclear explosion. Further defense costs at a time when the government is trying to combat inflation could damage the dollar and cause repercussions throughout the economy.

2. The ABM is not the best technological alternative. The enormous costs of an ABM system are themselves a reason to question the deployment of an ABM. The ABM will also encourage other costs such as perfecting penetrability of ICBM's to overcome the other side's ABM, and total expenses will be enormous if a light ABM stimulates deployment of a heavy ABM or a new level of the arms race. Escalation of the arms race would result in little additional security from missiles and probably less overall security.

Such large costs would also constrain other possibilities such as expanding development of anti-submarine warfare, hardening missile sites, improving offensive weapons, continuing further ABM development (without actually deploying it) and political capacities. An anti-ballistic missile will have almost no influence on guerrilla warfare or on economic and political development, which is the main area where US resources must be allocated if the US is to be able to influence the chief areas of change for the next several decades.

Finally, if Sentinel will be obsolete by the mid-1970's when China obtains more sophisticated nuclear weapons, and if a heavy ABM is ineffective against sophisticated nuclear weapons (as the Government asserts it is), should not the United States be allocating such large amounts of funds toward more stable and long-term programs?

3. The ABM constrains other alternatives for seeking world stability. The ABM will hinder arms control because the agreements will be more stable if no ABM exists, an ABM is destabilizing, and limitations on ABM's may be circumvented by upgrading existing ABM forces. The ABM threatens the viability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty because it indicates that the Great Powers are not willing to control their own nuclear expansion. US credibility is endangered because an ABM makes the US appear even more qualitatively different from other powers, and an allegedly effective. ABM will cause uncertainty about US commitments because it will appear to provide the United States with a greater capacity to be either more aggressive or more isolationist. An ABM will lessen opportunities for expanding relations with Communist China, and may stimulate Peking's own nuclear program, thereby encouraging a three-sided arms race even more. Finally, nuclear weapons do not necessarily enhance our political capacity because they are not very effective on the local political and economic levels where most of the flux will take place during the last third of this century.

—EDWARD BYRON SMITH, JR.

THE AUTHOR
Edward Byron Smith, Jr., is a student at Columbia Business School and has been researching the problem of the ABM for some months. The above article is the author's revised and updated version of "The Anti-Ballistic Missile" from Columbia Essays in International Affairs, The Dean's Papers 1968, Volume IV, Andrew Cordier, ed., (copyright 1969 Columbia University Press) by gracious permission of the publishers.

VOW OF THE MONTH
(By Daniel Patrick Moynihan in a speech to the Congressional Bull, a group of GOP staff assistants on Capitol Hill, after an introduction referring to a magazine quote that "smart money" was betting he wouldn't last six months in his present White House position):

"I'll last six months and one week if it kills me just to see those S.O.B.'s lose their bets—not that their the kind who pay anyway."
sanctions against Rhodesia, and the United States, respecting the decision of the United Nations, is currently prohibiting purchases from and sales to Rhodesia of most goods.

The historical explanation of our current policy is straightforward and convincing. That is "why" we are imposing sanctions on Rhodesia.

But if the Secretary requires purpose for our conduct as well as an excuse, the question "why?" is more troublesome. Presumably economic sanctions are designed to apply pressure on Rhodesia so that something over there will be better than it otherwise would be. But what is the theory of how this is going to happen? We cannot expect that a drop in the gross national product of Rhodesia will automatically lead to a betterment of the position of the blacks, most of whom are at the bottom of the economic ladder. The theory must rather be that a reduction in the economy of Rhodesia will cause somebody to make decisions which will improve the lot of the blacks in Rhodesia. Let us look more carefully at this theory.

There is a preliminary question about who it is that we expect to make the decision we want made. Certainly we are not trying to impose hardship on the blacks until they decide to do something. As outsiders we could hardly justify worsening the lot of those whose interests we have at heart until they are driven to desperate measures. We are presumably trying through sanctions to influence the decisions of the present white government of Rhodesia or those in the white establishment who have it in their power to become that government.

What is the decision which the present or a future government of Rhodesia is supposed to make? Presumably it is being asked by the United Nations to make some kind of a decision to return to constitutional government. But sanctions would make such a decision more likely only if the Rhodesian government could expect that upon making the decision sanctions would come to an end. But there is no basis for any Rhodesian government to expect sanctions to be called off as a result of anything less than complete capitulation and the prompt turning over of the reigns of government to the black majority. Sanctions have been voted by a unanimous Security Council without any provision for termination. The Rhodesian Government, with its views about the United Nations and about the influence of the Afro-Asian bloc, must see no prospect of a UN reversal until there is an all-black government in Salisbury, a prospect far worse in their eyes than economic sanctions. If there is no reasonable prospect of sanctions being terminated, sanctions exert no political influence. They are like a drought or some other unavoidable hardship, which one tolerates, and to which one adapts.

If sanctions on Rhodesia have any rational purpose it is not to help the black people of Rhodesia, but rather to keep the spectators happy. Sanctions are designed to appease an irrational constituency which is unhappy and wants to do something, even if it does no good.

Faced with policies like this — and there are many of them — which can be justified only by looking backwards rather than forwards, what should a new Secretary of State do?

The first task is to get the various desk officers to ask themselves the question: What is it we are trying to accomplish during the next year or six months? They will soon discover that the State Department is not usually the one which makes the operative decision. State is largely a lobbying organization concerned with affecting the decisions of other governments. Foreign affairs differ from domestic affairs in that most of the important decisions about what takes place in a foreign country are decisions of their government, not ours. We may have some impact on those decisions but it is their decisions that count. We should start by identifying some decisions we would like their government to make, and then consider how we might help bring them about.

With respect to any country, then—France, Peru, Japan, Saudi Arabia or any other—the State Department desk officer should be prepared to answer at least one set of questions along the following lines:

1. What decisions would we like that government to make during the next year?

2. Which of these are both within the realm of the possible and of sufficient interest to us to justify our trying to exert some influence upon them?

3. As to each of these decisions, what are the considerations pro and con as they probably look to that government?

4. Which of those considerations is it in our power to affect in a way which would make the decision we want more likely?

5. What is a recommended program for trying to exert such influence?

6. What are we doing now?

7. How do we get from here to there?

8. What are short term and long term costs of trying to exert such influence?

9. Do the potential benefits of the other government's making the decision we want justify these costs?

No memorandum from the new Secretary, no set of questions, is going to overcome the habits of mind of the existing bureaucracy. But they might help. The essential task is to direct our eyes to where we want to go, not to where we have been. We should focus on the decisions we want other governments to make. It is far more important to justify those future decisions in the eyes of their people rather than to justify our own past decisions in the eyes of our own people. Our actions should not have simply a good excuse, but a good purpose.
Solving the Job-Skill Mismatch

Fortune's 500: If They Can't Do It...

I. Government Efforts

As the Nixon Administration begins surveying the domestic scene, it is certain that they are discovering the hidden costs reaped by eight years of what certain Conservatives have dubbed "adventure abroad and reformation at home."

The picture on the home front is one of a dangerous rate of inflation and record levels of national employment; it is also one of a great "employment gap" which is erupting in a welfare crisis throughout the nation. The cost-of-living index rose by 4.7 per cent this past year, all but negating the wage gains of 45 million workers. This was the largest inflationary increase since the Truman Administration left office. Unemployment in the United States is at its lowest in decades, but there is a great deal of unemployment among the young and the black. While white unemployment rate was 3.2 per cent for the second quarter of 1968, the black unemployment rate was 6.8 per cent; and in the slums of East and West Baltimore, the black rate was 13.4 per cent. The ghetto jobless rate in Cleveland was at 15 per cent, in New York and Los Angeles, it hovers at 10 per cent. The unemployment rate for black teenagers averaged 25 per cent last year; it was 11 per cent for whites.

This is the minimum measurable unemployment rate—there are many out-of-work whom the Bureau of Labor Statistics cannot find and there are those who have given up the search of active employment and are, therefore, not included in these statistics.

KEYNESIAN We have a high level of inflation, but most people are employed. The theory that underlies much of macro-economics is that if we can just keep aggregate demand high, jobs will be created, unemployment will decrease and prosperity will spread. The failure inherent in this reasoning which does not immediately appear is subtly suggested by a headline in the New York TIMES for May 6, 1968: "20,000 Jobs Go Begging in City While 135,000 are Unemployed."

The unemployment currently existing in the economy is of a "frictional" or "structural" nature. It is due to a mismatching of skills available and skills desired, not to a lack of aggregate demand. It is an overdose of demand, in fact, that causes this type of unemployment. When demand is high and supply of labor is low, because of defense or other significant national expenditures, an inflationary spiral sets in. Employers look for means to lower their wage costs by automation or by the elimination of marginal jobs. The end result is a dearth of skilled labor and an overdose of the unskilled. Skilled labor works overtime and the unskilled move onto the welfare rolls.

Aggregate demand can be controlled from Washington, but can aggregate supply of the skilled and educated? This is the question to which we must address ourselves for this is where the crunch is—we can create the economic conditions which yield jobs but can we create the work force able to fill those jobs? And can we do both at the same time?

Our current attempts are missing the mark. There are no fewer than fifteen Federal manpower programs. Starting simply in 1962 with the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA), an offshoot of a Republican-sponsored recommendation, and the Area Redevelopment Act (ARA), the concept of manpower training has mushroomed so that former Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz has testified that there is "duplication of efforts," "serious gaps," "coordination problems," and that prospective trainees are "confused."

LOFTY OBJECTIVES For the first two years of its existence, the MDTA program had expenditures averaging $100 million per year. Its appropriation for fiscal year 1968 was $386,207,000, the program has requested $413,096,000 for fiscal year 1969. The original aim of MDTA was as a retraining program for unemployed blue collar and clerical workers. Coupled with remedial education in the classroom, it was also designed to aid individuals who are unemployed because of lack of literacy and experience with the work world. The overall objective of MDTA was to enable selected unemployed persons to undertake short-term training by providing facilities, instruction and subsistence allowances for trainees.

MDTA has been amended three times since its passage in 1962. Special youth programs were developed in order to provide young people with market-entry skills. Basic literacy training was increased. The entire program was revamped so that approximately 65 per cent of it would be oriented to reclaiming the hard-core unemployed and 35 per cent focusing on the need for trained personnel in skill shortage functions. While its budget went up the numbers to be trained under MDTA auspices went down, from 275,000 in
1966 to 250,000 in 1967. The 65 per cent of its pro-
gram aimed at the hard-core unemployed focuses on no 
specific training but rather on the broad concept of 
"employability"—whether or not jobs exist for that 
category or not, a highly dubious strategy considering 
the realities of the coming job economy. (See box)

MDTA is a Labor Department Program. The 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) 
and the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) also 
aminister a number of official federal manpower pro-
grams. The word "official" is to be stressed, because 
there are a number of other poverty programs which 
also do some manpower retraining, although that is not 
their official capacity. As of 1967, there were nine 
federal agencies administering twenty-one different 
programs which, in one way or another, were concerned 
with manpower training or retraining. This 
complexity of programs has caused the Labor Department 
to institute a government-wide manpower-planning 
system known as "CAMPS" to coordinate these pro-
grams. HEW has begun a Congressionally-ordered 
study of all manpower training programs, designed to 
detect administrative weakness and recommend rem-
edies. Greenleigh Associates, a respected private 
management consultant firm, last year submitted a head-
shaking report to HEW detailing the "waste, inefficiency 
. . . and to a much more limited extent duplication of 
current programs."

Robert Schrank, director of New York's Neighbor-
hood Youth Corps program, has stated, in the Spring, 
1967 edition of AMERICAN CHILD magazine, that 
concern with program quality is obliterated by what 
he refers to as the "Washington numbers game"—the 
inevitable political preoccupation with quotas and bud-
gets. Very often, enrollees get assignments in categories 
like nurse's aides, where "basically all they do is bedpan-
carrying which doesn't lead anywhere except to the 
ladies' or men's room."

And Adam Walinski, former speechwriter and 
legislative assistant for Senator Robert F. Kennedy, has 
had this to say:

"But by January of 1966, the battle (for job train-
ing programs) was already lost. First, the develop-
ment of manpower and job programs were largely 
delegated to the Labor Department . . . which never came up with more than a few palliatives —new acronyms for the same old programs and 
bureaucracies. Second was the rivalry that had 
sprung up between Labor and the O.E.O.; a 
weakening of government efforts further aggra-
vated by Sargent Shriver's complete inattention to 
employment problems while he pursued high-
visibility national programs like legal services 
and Headstart."

The Johnson Administration in its public pro-
grams opted for a let's-stop-the-riots, get-'em-off-the-

streets-now approach to the problems of structural 
unemployment. It is an approach which in nature, 
includes a myriad of programs and agencies and calls 
for huge expenditures. These expenditures are rarely 
given as requested but tend to be grossly inflationary 
nonetheless. In terms of long-range results and proper 
training, they are woefully inadequate. Jonathan 
Spivak, writing in the Wall Street Journal, described 
the "Manpower Morass":

"The Labor Department demands dominant juris-
diction because it's the nation's basic manpower 
agency, already operating many of the programs 
and possessing much of the expertise. The Wel-
fare Administration insists on training its own 
impoverished clients, arguing it has special knowl-
edge of the needs of relief recipients. The Office 
of Economic Opportunity wants to mesh man-
power programs with its health, education and 
other uplift efforts, to enhance their effectiveness. 
The Office of Education jealously guards the public 
schools' jurisdiction over classroom job training; 
the Vocational Rehabilitation Administration sup-
ports its own sheltered workshops for the handi-
capped."

It is still too early to judge all the successes and 
failures of the public training programs. It is clear, 
however, that these programs, or not enough of them, 
are aimed at long-range training of the hard-core unem-
ployed. It is also clear that we are enmeshed in a 
bureaucratic bottleneck. It is doubtful, moreover, that 
we shall be able to untangle this bureaucracy—Congress 
is not about to consent to wholesale consolidation of 
all these programs into the Labor Department because 
key committees would lose their jurisdiction; even if 
we could consolidate, we would still face the problem 
of local level coordination. A look at private sector 
programs may be less dispiriting.
II. Private Sector Programs

"The Federal Government after years of tinkering with training programs that yielded indifferent success and failure, has turned in near desperation to the nation's business community for help in a modern American dilemma—how to employ the hard-core unemployed."


Joseph Loftus

American business has begun a widespread campaign to recruit and train the "unemployables" in the economy. In October, 1967 Ford Motor Company sent recruiters into Detroit slum areas with instructions to hire unskilled workers on the spot to fill 6,500 job openings. Those hired have gone through a lengthy period of orientation, at full pay, to get accustomed to the fast pace of factory work. General Electric has hired more than 3,000 workers from Chicago's poverty-stricken areas for production-line jobs at its Hotpoint appliance plant. GE provides on-the-job-training and also sponsors high school courses at the plant after working hours. In Los Angeles, a group of more than 1,000 firms has hired and trained 20,000 residents from the Watts area. Aerojet-General has built a plant in the heart of Watts employing 400. A special program at Lockheed Missiles and Space in San Francisco is tailored to applicants who are dropouts, have been out of work at least a year, and have spotty employment records.

Perhaps the two most successful programs with large support in the private sector, are the Urban Coalition and the National Alliance of Businessmen. The Urban Coalition, chaired by John W. Gardner, is a combination of leaders from business, labor, education, religion and local government. It began its work over a year and a half ago without White House support—President Johnson feared competition with the work of his Special Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. With a projected annual budget of about $6 million, the Coalition has built a staff of sixty and adopted a three-pronged program: lobbying for more federal aid to cities; rounding up new ideas about employment, housing, race relations, and education to offer the thirty some odd local coalitions; and bringing business, labor, and other civic leaders into fuller and more regular contact with each other and with their communities' disadvantaged citizens.

The National Alliance of Businessmen, headed by Henry Ford II, placed 125,000 hard-core unemployed, 85 per cent of whom are black, in jobs during 1968—boasting of job retention rate of 68 per cent. 12,500 firms in the nation's 50 largest cities are involved in the NAB program. NAB is a joint venture, heavily dependent upon federal funding. The federal government has contributed $158 million to date, with an additional $25 million coming from business; the cost of services and facilities provided by the private sector are not included in this figure. President Johnson set a goal of 500,000 hard core unemployed to be placed by mid-1971 through NAB, projecting a total federal outlay of $350 million. President Nixon is believed to be enthusiastic about the NAB program and is trying hard to keep Democrat-activist Heanry Ford as head of NAB.

In a recent speech in Detroit, Virgil E. Boyd, President of the Chrysler Corporation, gave an illuminating account of his company's experience with a training program:

"These people who have been pushed into the backwaters of our society can't read simple words such as 'in' and 'out' signs on a door. . . . So, we showed these people one by one, how to recognize the right bus to take, and in some cases, how and when to transfer to another necessary route. At this point, they all knew how to get there, but a significant number of them continued to be late. It didn't take long to establish another fact—only one in five owned an alarm clock. Why? Because they'd never had to be any particular place at any particular time before. . . . We are allotted 23 weeks to train these hard-core people for useful work. It hasn't been an easy job. In addition to bus routes and alarm clocks, we have had to overcome fear and resentment, hostility and a history of failure."

(Chrysler, incidently had originally been working with the MDTA on its training program, but terminated this association on December 23, 1967 because of "federal red tape" and a lack of flexibility in the federal program.)

It is hardly a wonder, then, that seven years of government programs have brought us no closer to a feasible mode of manpower training and forced the government to pass the ball (and the buck) to business (although inertia will probably guarantee the continued expenditure of over two billion dollars a year to train people for a role in the 1949 economy.)
Job-Skill Mismatch: it's going to get worse

It is easy to underestimate the seriousness of the job-skill mismatch problem. It is, after all, only a small percentage of the population which is so unskilled as to be genuinely unemployable, and surely the skill level of the work force is increasing. Would not equalizing the burden of welfare payments (a task most agree needs doing anyway) hold off the tide for the present so that the work force could “catch up to” the available jobs by increasing their aggregate education?

The skill level of the work force is increasing and can be expected to continue doing so, but human progress does not appear to be a match for technological advance. A glance at the future reveals the inadequacy of our current method of doing things.

Calculations of the make-up of the work force of the mid-1970's are not difficult to make. Since age fourteen is a generally agreed upon age to determine labor force entry, all persons projected for the labor force (5-10) years hence are already alive. American history from 1929 to 1969, colored as it has been by depression, war and peace followed by prosperity, has shown a bulge in birthrates centered at the period immediately following World War II. As there will be one million fewer persons in the (35-44) age bracket in 1975 than there was in 1965, there will be eight and three-quarter million more persons in the (25-34) age bracket. Teenagers will make up half as much of the work force as they do now. The shift in emphasis will be to those permanent, full-time, married members of the work force in the early stages of career development — people we cannot shut up in a classroom during the school year, people who will need jobs which will enable them to support families.

The racial make-up of our “work force” is going to be increasingly black in the 1970's. The number of black persons participating in America's work force will be 25 per cent higher in 1975 than it was in 1965; this compared to a 16 per cent increase for whites. The black increase includes a more than 50 per cent upturn in the number of blacks in their early 20's. These figures, too, are not difficult to compute, knowing what we do about current unemployment and underemployment among our black population, and knowing that there is a near perfect inverse correlation between income and fecundity. There will be 15 million more workers in 1975 than there were in 1965 — this means that we must average 1.5 million more jobs each year just to absorb our increased labor supply. The immense wealth which the United States possesses bodes well for our ability to create jobs. The question remains, however, whether the skill level of our work force will be up to the demands of those jobs.

It is reasonable to predict, moreover, that the skill level of the jobs created will continue to increase. We are the only nation in the world which can boast of having a majority of its work force in the production of services rather than goods, and that majority has increased at a steady pace since the early 1930’s. Service-oriented employment demands, generally, a greater amount of skill and a higher level of education than employment in manufacturing or agriculture. Fewer than 5 per cent of available job openings in 1975 will be for unskilled workers. One-seventh of all job opportunities will be filled by technical and professional personnel. Agricultural employment will fall below 5 per cent of the entire work economy and nearly 30 per cent of all workers will be in white collar occupations. The young people we fail to train and educate now will make up the welfare rolls of the 1970’s; they will be the unemployables and a great percentage of them will be black.

The geography of employment is another indicator which bears watching. One out of every six jobs currently held in the United States is filled by a worker in California, Texas or Florida. The Southeast is presently our fastest growing job market. Employment opportunities are greatest in that region, followed closely by the Southwest, decreasing only slightly in the Pacific States and then veering downward in the Mountain States, the Northwest and lowest in New England and the Middle Atlantic States. If one can safely presume that the military-industrial complex is now firmly ensconced, then the percentage of black workers entering the job market will be highest in just those regions where job openings are projected to be lowest — the Middle Atlantic region of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut and New England.

The emphasis here has been on black workers, this because they are a clearly identifiable group and one for whom national concern has been expressed most often. Rural whites fare as poorly as blacks. Unskilled whites in the cities are, at this juncture, better off than black workers because they at least do not face a discrimination barrier. But in the future discrimination will not be the issue, training and skill will be.
III. Redefined Government Role

Though the public sector of the new Industrial State has admitted that it has been unable to make room for a significant number of its citizens, however, doesn't mean it's all up to Fortune's 500. The shift in emphasis is not an abnegation of responsibility, and government still has an important role to play as business grapples with the main problems.

The government's role in a coordinated effort to develop jobs can conveniently be divided into "handmaiden" and "orchestral," i.e., using its resources to give business what it needs to do the job and using its power over the economy to set the climate for success.

Handmaidenwise, to begin with we do not really have the proper job vacancy statistics to guide our manpower programs. This is one reason why the present programs appear so inept—they have short-range objectives and are not prepared to plan wisely for the long-run. The Republican Coordinating Committee has recommended a continuing National Job Opportunity Survey. The Survey would involve:

a. A nationwide collection of data on job market conditions, unfilled jobs, developing job needs, labor supply, regional and local patterns and the skills needed to meet the demands.

b. A nationwide communications system making this data available to vocational educators, counselors, placement personnel, the Armed Services, labor unions, business enterprises.

The Computer Job Bank proposed by President Nixon in the recent campaign would go a long way toward filling these objectives.

Federal aid to cities and metropolitan communities to help them improve their transportation facilities out of the central city and to the burgeoning job market of the suburbs is another imperative.

Another approach which deserves consideration is the concept of relocation allowances. The concept of investing in human capital, which lies behind all training programs, includes all things which increase the productivity of labor. Important among these are policies to increase the occupational and geographical mobility of labor.

But trying to solve the problem of structural unemployment immediately runs into the dilemma of having to fight the Johnson inflation. Slowdowns mean that people get laid off, not that new jobs are created. This is where the "orchestral" role comes in.

The answer is to have a certain kind of temporary slowdown, one which will affect overtime pay rather than workers, and to provide a temporary shelter for the ghetto jobless at the same time. The first step in reducing the inflation is to cut down on the Johnson figures on the spending side and increase the surplus—in combination with a strong monetary policy. By all indications, the Nixon administration has begun to move in these directions.

At the same time, the National Alliance for Businessmen's JOBS program must be greatly expanded. Providing direct subsidies (many economists believe they are easier to control than a system of tax credits, and they are, at the moment, more feasible politically), can induce employers to train the hard-core unemployed for the jobs which will be in demand as soon as the economic slowdown is ended—with a reversal of fiscal and monetary policies. When the cooling-off period—say, one year—is ended, we can return to a normal rate of economic growth and be able to fill the expected job vacancies.

I am recommending a slowdown in the economy not a recession. A slowdown will normally force employers to cut down on their hiring, it need not mean an increase in lay-offs. By providing a subsidy for employers to continue training programs during the slowdown period, we would be insuring that unemployment among "new entries" in the labor force would not increase. These subsidies, moreover, need not themselves be inflationary. Many of the hard-core trainees would be forgoing public assistance income by participation in these job programs. Increased tax levies and reduction in other areas of government spending—the ABM is a tempting target, as well as a big chunk of the money spent on some of our present "training" programs—would mean less money coming into the economy. At the end of the slowdown, we would continue, and hopefully increase, this private sector government-sponsored job training program.

Nothing is certain in the field of economics, that "dismal science." If a proposed slowdown were to develop into a full-blown recession, abetted by a market slump, for example, rates of national unemployment would fall greatly, with the strongest impact among the hard-core unemployed. Even with a slowdown, and not a recession, there is the risk that employers will run scared and lay workers off. It is imperative, therefore, that the President carefully outline precisely what the brakes on the economy are designed to do and the temporary nature of the slowdown. This proposal makes the additional assumption that our workforce is flexible—that many female and young workers are tempted to begin lay-offs, subsidies can induce them to recycle these employees for retraining.

There are, therefore, risks to be incurred in my proposal. But these risks are far outweighed by those we face if we fail to tackle both inflation and the job-skill mismatch. If we succeed, and I believe we can, we might then move into the 1970's with a healthy economy unbeset by depression-level rates of employment among our urban and rural poor.

—William J. Kilberg
Complex Society - Part II

Automation and the Middle Generation Gap

I. The Fifteen Year Perspective

How can the concerned citizen prepare for the future in a rapidly changing society? To what extent is it possible to understand the prime factors that will shape the United States of the 1970's and early 1980's? Can one refine the terms of contemporary social criticism to create a comprehensive, yet conceptually manageable, guide?

In Part I it was shown that the Defense Department is both extraordinarily strong and rapidly increasing its power. Charts chronicling the performance of the major defense contractors indicate how highly dynamic they have been under President Nixon’s four predecessors. During the period since 1937 the military-industrial complex has become a quasi-autonomous political-economic system.

Following the implicit lead of President Eisenhower, we would do well to accord it the highest priority. Much of the social impact of the other important factors will be profoundly affected by their relation to the military-industrial complex. It is essential to keep in mind that this means both the relation to the Defense Department—a federal bureaucratic institution that appears to be evolving into a technocratic "control" apparatus—and the relation to the major military contractors.

PREDICTIVE It is not especially difficult to enumerate other factors that will play key roles during the next fifteen years. What exacts the most severe demands is the task of treating each factor in a manner that avoids distortion of its likely social effects. Once one has isolated a variable, it is easy to exaggerate its importance. Even the most distinguished observers often succumb unwittingly to the temptation to over-emphasize the significance of hopeful factors, political movements that have moral appeal, or phenomena accorded extensive coverage in the mass media.

Equal caution must be taken with regard to "counter-cult" experts, though. Some writers tend to fixate on anything ominous, appalling, or contrary to the general opinion. Helpful though they may be as antidotes to the Pollyannas, their biases also prevent them from achieving a balanced presentation.

A final danger in social prediction is the tendency to treat all factors as similar in form. When a word like "factor" is applied to a collection of organizations, trends, technological developments, and so forth, it can easily lead to a crude abstraction of the manner in which "factors" operate in society. There is no single mechanical way in which one can usefully represent the operation of a comprehensive set of social variables. Efforts to construct factors of the same order of generality and susceptible to the same kind of structural analysis, will—almost without question—result in gross over-simplification.

FIVE FACTORS Accordingly, the scheme outlined here deliberately seeks to include factors of quite disparate status. Simple extrapolation of trends is inappropriate in every case. Each factor must be examined in its total social context.

Psychologists have observed that the human mind can comfortably retain and manipulate no more than five to nine items in a given set of words or ideas. To preserve manageability it is wise to limit the number of terms in an explanatory scheme to about five. Without denying the possibility of worthwhile alternative formulations, we shall focus on the following topics (in addition to the military-industrial complex): (2) Computers and Automated Processes, (3) Generations and Gaps, (4) Mergers, and (5) Social Instability.

An interval of fifteen years, like the restriction to five factors, also imposes discipline upon conjecture. Projections for periods of from one to ten years inescapably must concentrate on simple extrapolation and the plans of large institutions. The monetary policy of the Nixon Administration will be extremely important during the next year or two. Current Pentagon appropriations involve effects that can readily be expected to be significant even seven or eight years from now. Over the intermediate term, specific political decisions and specific events loom particularly large.

On the other hand, thirty year projections are plagued by the possibility of radical changes in family structure, the emergence and extensive development of major unanticipated technologies, and various other drastic alterations in social organization. This is not to claim that such changes may not occur in fifteen years—or sooner. Nevertheless, the probability of such thoroughgoing transformation is much lower than for the thirty or thirty-five year period.
PREDICTION AS SECURITY When one reflects on the various possible purposes of conjecture about the future, the practical consequences of choosing a thirty-year period become clear. Almost everyone in the top three or four levels of powerful organizations is likely to be long since retired by the end of the century. Thirty years comprise an interval longer than a chronological generation. In a world buffeted by numerous destabilizing forces the principal function of very long-range prediction may be psychological support for policy-makers and academics alike.

A society that can commit the energies of many of its most eminent scholar-experts to very long-range prediction may be thought confident of its invulnerability. The first session of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Commission on the Year 2000 (the Daedalus group) began just months after the Dominican Republic intervention and a major escalation in US troop commitments to Viet Nam. Against the backdrop of a third of a century such events may seem trivial. But, of course, the selection of a thirty-five year period as the interval of concern was not compulsory.

Suppose the renowned academics and "action-intellectuals" had sought to discover the major problems confronting the United States over the next fifteen years. Such a strategy would have avoided both the deficiencies of one-to-ten-year projections and the grandiosity of millenial reveries. Moreover, it would have proved pertinent to a large number of influential and still-rising middle-aged men—including themselves. The median age of the Daedalus group was forty-seven—in fifteen years, half will be under 65; at the turn of the century, most will be dead.

However "objective" the form of an inquiry may seem, decisions about the time interval to be covered, the number of factors to be designated, and so forth, have profound political implications. The turn of the millennium is a striking point in time. Given George Orwell, 1984 also has a peculiarly charged status. The number of the Daedalus group was forty-seven—in fifteen years, half will be under 65; at the turn of the century, most will be dead.

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II. Computers: We ain't seen nothing yet

The probable future impact of computers and automated processes is often derived by simple extrapolation. A relatively low rate of unemployment since the first major Vietnam escalation has led to a diminished interest in the effects of automation on the job market. As Herman Kahn has noted, the status of computers "seems to be one of those quite common situations in which early in the innovation period many exaggerated claims are made; then there is disillusionment and a swing to overconservative prediction and a general pessimism and skepticism; then finally when a reason-
pointed out, computer performance has improved by a factor of ten approximately every two years. Extrapo-
lated out to 1984, this rate of advance would produce a fantastic gain in capability: in fact, an improvement by a factor of 30 million. Simple extrapolations are notoriously unreliable. One must clearly demonstrate the likelihood of this trend being sustained.

Experimental models presently incorporate features that afford them great superiority over production-line computers. For example, the parallel-processing ILLIAC IV, under development by the Burroughs Corporation for the past two years, offers a data processing speed 500 times faster than that of the fastest 1967 computer. Parallel processing entails the simultaneous solution of individual components of a complex problem—instead of treating them in serial fashion.

**STORAGE BY LASER** Other relatively short-term possibilities for significant improvement include new time-sharing techniques, major advances in the quality of computer programming languages, sophisticated procedures for the segmentation of programs (to enhance flexibility), and the use of fundamental computation units based on matrices rather than single numbers. Over the intermediate term a method of storing and retrieving information that employs lasers offers tremendous potential. The term “laser” is an acronym for light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation. Essentially, a laser produces an intense, highly focused beam of light.

In experimental work at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, two engineers, Dr. Dimitar I. Tchernev and Dr. George W. Lewicki, have recorded information with a pulsed ruby laser. A laser beam focused through a microscope momentarily heats a tiny area of a magnetized film almost to the melting point, thereby demagnetizing it. As it cools, the area becomes magnetized again—in the opposite direction. This effect permits the registration of “bits” of information.

A numerical code controls the movement of the laser beam. The scanning process, analogous to that of television tubes, is used to retrieve information as well as to register it. In retrieval, however, the intensity of the beam is reduced to protect the data from obliteration. The film is only 30 millionths of an inch thick, and “bits” with diameters smaller than 40 millionths of an inch have been successfully recorded. Miniaturization on this scale permits the storage of over a trillion bits of information in a cubic inch of film.

Still requiring much experimental work, another even more advanced process involving lasers is widely regarded to be technically feasible. The effect relied upon is photochromism, molecule-by-molecule change in color in reaction to the laser beam. Its employment could enable a scanner to register information on single molecules.

Conceivably, the photochromic technique could provide a billion or trillion-fold expansion in storage capacity relative to the “magnetic spot” process. At this level, only molecule size and the speed of light appear to impose rigid limitations. However astonishing, it would seem that methods currently under investigation could achieve a 15-year advance far in excess of the 30-million fold figure warranted by simple extrapolation. In a highly dynamic technology, though, wholly unanticipated developments can be expected to make an impact within fifteen years. Thus the initial extrapolative estimate—almost preposterous to “sound” 1969 thinkers—may appear comically conservative in retrospect.

Around 1960 publicity concerning the impending automation of basic industrial production approached its peak. As usual, the predicted social revolution proved initially much less spectacular than the press reports. By 1964 the subject was becoming passé.

Yet during the period of subsiding interest major advances were quietly being made. In large part, automated production relies upon process-control computers. These devices receive information directly from measuring and monitoring instruments and use it to regulate the industrial processes being monitored (sampling and “feed-back”). They operate in “real time,” intervening to make adjustments in on-going activities.

**650% IN FOUR YEARS** At the beginning of 1968 over 3000 process-control computers (out of a total computer population of approximately 50,000) were in operation, compared to 400 in 1964. The annual sales volume in dollars has increased over twenty-fold since 1960. Moreover, Bart Hodge of IBM has predicted that by 1975 some sensing or measuring instrument will be attached to between two-thirds and three-quarters of all installed computers.

In interpreting trends in automatic processing, one lacks a readily quantifiable standard comparable to the index for general improvement in computer capability. Of course, technological achievements in process control depend upon the basic capacity of the computer components. But each application of computers to an industrial process involves distinctive problems, distinctive developments, and a distinctive rate of diffusion.

Industries in which both materials input and production can be readily adapted to continuous-process operations were the first to undergo automation during the ’50’s. Examples include oil refining, the production of chemicals, power generation, and to some extent steel manufacturing. In the ’60’s computers have been applied increasingly to the production of discrete units.

Substantial developments have occurred in the electronics industry. Typically, the production of miniaturized components is highly automated. In the machine tool industry numerical control of the drill press or milling machine by a computer is the most spectacular innovation. But a variety of other advances
amplify its effects: new, much more efficient abrasive cutting techniques; cold forming and extension of parts; laser and maser welding; chipless production.

Great savings in engineering labor for design variation are also achievable with computers. Methods of design can be stored and then applied to the new data when an order for equipment is received. The computer furnishes both the design plans and the directions necessary to begin the manufacturing process. Very precise and rapid sketching of complex components (through the use of a computer attached to a mechanized pen) has been feasible for several years.

**EVEN SERVICE INDUSTRIES**

In addition to new techniques at factories, substantial advances in automation have been accomplished in such diverse fields as printing, coal mining, banking, and retailing. As a major sources of employment in human services, retailing deserves special attention. It is a standard argument that the service sector will absorb people displaced from manufacturing jobs.

Automation in retailing principally involves new techniques of packaging and handling materials. Large chains of variety stores are developing systems that identify each item for ordering purposes. In the mail-order business, computers are used to draw up selection sheets and store invoices and to control warehouse inventories. Highly automated processes for transmitting stock from truck to shelf are being introduced by various sorts of retailers. Automatic wrapping machinery and scales that automatically print prices on packages are beginning to diffuse widely through the economy.

General Telephone and Electronics has developed a machine for placement at check-out counters that scans fluorescent stickers on items as they pass along a conveyor belt. A computer then uses this information to provide an instantaneous total for the customer's purchases. Another device, developmentally well-advanced, can pack customers' orders automatically at the check-out counter.

Change-making machines that handle paper money and universal bank credit cards complete the picture. It is technically feasible with currently available equipment to automate the whole retail process, from distributor's truck to customer's shopping bag. Although the rate of diffusion of this equipment is difficult to predict, one should note that the automatization of one step in a process tends to lead to a relatively rapid extension to the other steps. The constraints imposed by the "systems approach" at one stage facilitate its application elsewhere.

Effects upon service employment in retailing are presently being felt. In other areas—such as medical testing and diagnosis, library management, and teaching—radical change will take a longer time. Projecting ahead ten years, one can even anticipate the possibility of a major impact upon so conservative a profession as law. Legal reference works can be translated into a form suitable for storage by computers. An elaborate system of rules for the preparation of legal arguments can then be encoded in a program or set of programs. Given further substantial improvements in computer technology, the automatic drawing up of most legal briefs—as well as of wills, contracts, and income and estate tax returns, will probably be feasible in the not-too-distant future.

**MISLEADING FIGURES**

Although but few major, fully automated systems are now functioning either in manufacturing or in the service sector, dramatic innovations appear almost inevitable in the '70's. Skeptics are entitled to ask why productivity and unemployment figures do not provide convincing preliminary evidence for this prediction. First, output per man-hour in the past decade has, in fact, been rising faster than the long-range trend. Second, the Viet Nam War has created a large number of jobs. Armed Forces troop levels have risen by 700,000. Defense-related employment has increased by possibly as much as 1.1 million. Finally, the multiplier effects attributable to a sharply higher amount of military procurement may provide the economic basis for up to a million and a half additional jobs.

A third important factor is the cost of installing automatic-processing equipment. Most installations entail rather high labor expenses. Preparations for change-over also consume many man-hours. Thus, the practice of charging initial labor costs against current output conceivably produces a systematic underestimate of productivity increases.

Fourth, one should be attentive to the "multiplier effects" of automation. The introduction of computers and automated processes compels administrators to perceive their functions differently. Systems analysis, cost-benefit accounting, and related management techniques demonstrate their usefulness. A radical transformation eventually occurs.

Modern management strives for total organizational control to achieve success as determined by various financial criteria. The adoption of the new idea about organizational process requires time. Executives are gradually converted. "Bugs" are slowly removed from the new data-processing and production techniques. Confidence in the potential of the new way of doing business supplants the initial skepticism.

Similar transformations are occurring in most large bureaucratic organizations—and in many small ones. We are witnessing not simply a revolution in technology, but also revolutions in managerial techniques and the ideology of organizational administration. These developments reinforce one another, thereby fostering the prospect of ever more rapid change.
During the next fifteen years American leaders will be confronted with the economic and social dislocations produced by large-scale automation. At the same time advanced computers and other technological innovations will greatly enhance their power relative to that of the rest of society.

Who will the men in the "control positions" be? Depression era New Dealers? New Left radicals? Such questions give the notion of the generation gap a special urgency.

III. The Ages of Man in America

On most issues public opinion polls, as yet, show relatively few significant systematic differences between the old and the young. The sex gap is much wider on some key topics (e.g., women are much more hostile to war than are men). The race gap is far wider on others, with the education gap, the income gap, and the geographical region gap also occasionally of paramount importance.

Gap proliferation presages gap ridicule. Though it is necessary to deflate extravagant commentators, one must recognize that generational differences play a part on the present social scene. They are only relevant, however, to the extent that they entail substantial differences in the formative experiences of groups of people of different ages. One should bear in mind that there is conflict between generations even in exceptionally stable societies. The young have more energy; the old are more prudent - a long list of characteristics of all societies. They may exacerbate conflicts unique to late twentieth-century America, but they certainly do not deserve special attention.

Once one discounts constant cross-cultural differences in roles and attitudes for different ages, it is necessary to resort to comparative history. Many gap theorists rush through this part of the exposition at full throttle. Perhaps inadvertently, the historical component is subordinated to a superficial discussion of presumed personality differences. The young are impetuous, we are told, because their mothers reared them according to the permissive theories of Dr. Spock or because their fathers were off at war during their infancy. The old are corrupt because they were traumatized by the Depression and have been obsessed by money ever since. This sort of analysis should put one immediately on guard. Such hypotheses hardly do more than rationalize the attitudes the young and old usually hold about each other.

LIFE CYCLE DISPARITIES

One cannot talk about the unique features of the present generation gap unless one distinguishes periods during which experience at particular stages of the life cycle was markedly different from what it is now. One has the option of focusing on infancy: then, of course, one can separate the Spocks from the pre-Spocks. But this is deceptively simple. How many parents actually employed the Spock book in a serious, thorough fashion? Among those who did, how many were drastically departing from the practices of their parents? Were not the more flexible, non-authoritarian parents the ones most likely to accept the permissive approach? Even if the Spock thesis survives these questions, one can argue that the mass adoption of permissive child-rearing practices depended on more fundamental social changes.

It is easy to become involved in endless argument about which class of factors is critical in producing social change. The purpose of employing the concept of a generation gap is to explain differences in social and political attitudes. One can best avoid unwarranted reductionism by basing the generation gap primarily on differences in social and political experience. If one can find no significant age-graded differences in political experience, one may be forced to turn to other levels. But if major differences in political and macro-social experience exist, the burden is on the reductionist to show that changes in, say, child-rearing practices are more important than the changes in social and political conditions.

In the lives of Americans now living we can conveniently discriminate eight major attitude-shaping phases: (1) Pre-World War I (before 1916), (2) The First World War and the Red Scare (1916-1922), (3) The Roaring Twenties (1923-1929), (4) The Depression (1930-1938), (5) World War II (1939-1946), (6) The Cold War with the Soviet Union (1947-1959), (7) The Civil Rights Movement (1960-1964), (8) The Era of Civil Disorders (1965- ). Though a transition to a new phase may affect every citizen, the new experience is likely to have the greatest impact upon adolescents and young adults. Children are usually not equipped to assimilate the experience in a manner than can directly influence their social and political attitudes. Older people have a set of ideas and attitudes that has been formed in an earlier phase.

Suppose that we now concentrate on the period of youth. One could begin as early as age twelve and end as late as thirty. Most secondary school students live at home, however, and are greatly influenced by parents and teachers, while most people over twenty-four are married and have been employed several years. A reasonable interval for the period of highest political flexibility is age 18 to 24, the years of higher education, the first years of work and/or most military service.

We are looking for tendencies rather than inflexible historical or psychological rules. The virtue of dis-
tistinguishing eight phases lies in the elimination of the "young vs. the old" dichotomy. It would be absurd to expect everyone of a given age to exhibit the characteristics of the typical person of "his" era.

One reason why some observers see the generation gap simply as young against old may be due to the nature of the two phases prior to 1960. The era of World War II was characterized by fervent patriotism, internationalism, and reliance on "military solutions." Though the enemy changed and military conflict was markedly reduced, a similar political configuration prevailed during the Cold War phase.

In the last year of Kennedy's administration and during the first year under LBJ, benign interventionism could still seem generally credible. From 1965, however, the Vietnam War not only called into question various assumptions about American benignity, but also it blocked appropriations for social welfare purposes. As the war in Vietnam escalated, it was easy for people who had come of age as civil rights supporters to shift away from the New Frontier perspective.

**WIDEST GAP** An alignment of active youth at 1960 from the two historical phases since 1960 has produced what looks like a distinctive younger generation much different in attitudes from older Americans. Yet the "break" at 1960 only seems plausible in retrospect. The jolt that jarred the youth of 1960 loose from the smooth transition occurred after the escalation of 1965.

In large part, the intensity of the effects of youthful experience upon the political and social attitudes of a "generation" depends upon the nature of the prevailing shared roles and institutional affiliations. Over sixteen million Americans served in the armed forces during World War II. The mass media were dominated by war news, and patriotic pro-war fervor stayed at a high level most of the time throughout most of the society. Over twelve million people were unem-
employed in 1932, and many others experienced intermit-tent unemployment and constant "underemployment" throughout the '30's. A jobless man lacks the means of securing his family's livelihood and a major source of self-respect. Surely for many people over twenty-four in 1929, their "unemployed" role in the '30's was more intensely experienced and influential than what they had done before.

Major wars and depressions can readily be seen as intense mass experiences. Higher education may initially seem not at all comparable. Yet in the decade of the '60's over twelve million Americans have enrolled at some time in a college or university. Enrollment doubled between 1955 and 1965 and will probably double again before 1975. The mass media devote considerable space to the colleges, emphasizing and exaggerating those features of university life that involve a rejection of established customs. Graduate enrollment is increasing even faster than that of undergraduates. For ever larger numbers of people the student role has been extended into the late twenties.

MODERN EPHEBE As universities become progressively more important for society, the college experience of successive "generations" will grow in social significance. Communal living with peers for a protracted period of time tends to intensify age-related differences. The larger the student population, the more socially distinctive the student role, and the longer people retain the status of student, the more likely is higher education to have a major influence on political beliefs in a society. Thus, as time has passed, the potential social impact of changes in the political experience of students has increased.

One method for enhancing comprehension of the transformation of the nation's university students is to prepare capsule biographies of non-overlapping college classes. Consider, for example, the groups that have entered college since 1955 — at four year intervals through 1965. The first group was born in 1935 and the last, in 1947. Dates of graduation from college are, successively, 1957 (thus, wholly pre-"gap"), 1961 (first cracks), 1965 (well along) and 1969 ("gap" full-blown). (See Chart I.)

It is obvious that the political experience of the group graduating from college in 1957 differed greatly from that of the Class of 1969 during its undergraduate years. The first group in some senses, had more in common with J. Edgar Hoover and his "generation" than with the last group. In discussing the generation gap, one must therefore be careful to avoid lumping all groups under thirty-five together.

Often those who typify their "generation" are a small but ultimately very influential minority. Observers who devoted much attention to civil rights workers in the early '60's were justified by subsequent social developments. Writers need not apologize for emphasizing an atypical minority if that minority is either a bellwether or a catalyst of significant change.

A similar line of argument can excuse disproportionate concern with a particular "generation." All one need show is that the given generation possesses paramount influence within the society. As the century has unfolded, the United States has become, increasingly, a nation dominated by large organizations. Men commonly reach the top positions in these organizations in their late '50's, having arrived at the next highest level earlier in the '50's. If the key posts are dominated by men between ages 45 and 65, it is clear that the younger groups will not wield much power during the next fifteen years. Men now under 45 who will be at least 60 in fifteen years deserve at least as much scrutiny.

PAYCHECK VS. SHEEPSKIN When one turns to this age group, the existence of another "generation gap" becomes evident. Previously it was argued that the Depression had a jolting social psychological effect upon the labor force (including managers). Men in their '30's and older underwent a formative — or deformative — experience as their assumption about society, their careers, and the possibility of controlling their own social and economic destinies were shattered. The job market, rather than the university, was the major institutional influence on the younger generation.

In some respects people who were still in school during the Depression were less affected than their older brothers with jobs. By the time they left high school or college, their expectations had adjusted to the economic collapse. No violent transformation of assumptions and goals was necessary (though one should not underestimate the hardships of the disruption of tentative career plans).

World War I involved relatively few American troops, and they only fought for about a year and a half. The Roaring Twenties produced little that was both distinctively its own and broadly significant. One cannot cavalierly dismiss the generational effects of these phases. Nevertheless, it is fair to attach more importance to the Depression, the Second World War — Cold War, and the post-1960 era as mass experiences. Among the generational cohorts still active in American life these are the critical formative periods. To simplify reference to people whose attitudes were molded in these various periods, they can be designated respectively the Old, the Middle, and the New Generations. (This scheme is a modified version of the one based on the eight historical phases.)

As Chart One suggests, the New Generation developed gradually: a good range in terms of date of birth is 1943 ± 4. For the Second World War Cold War group the analogous range is 1913 ± 4
### Chart II - SOME LEADERS OF THE MIDDLE GENERATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRE-WAR, WAR</th>
<th>1946-1952</th>
<th>EISENHOWER ERA</th>
<th>1961-1969</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEAN RUSK, 1909</strong>&lt;br&gt;Rhodes Scholar; assoc. prof. of gov’t.; dean of faculty (Mills College); served with US Army in Southeast Asia.</td>
<td>Special asst. to the Sec. of War; asst. sec. of State for Far Eastern Affairs.</td>
<td>President, the Rockefeller Foundation.</td>
<td>Secretary of State; distinguished fellow, Rockefeller Foundation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHARLES HITCH, 1910</strong>&lt;br&gt;Rhodes Scholar; Oxford tutor; Staff economist, War Production Board; Chief, Stabilization Controls, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.</td>
<td>Editor. Oxford Economics Papers; Visiting Professor, UCLA; Rand Corporation.</td>
<td>Chief, Economics Division of the Rand Corp.; visiting professor, Yale.</td>
<td>Comptroller of the Defense Dept.; President, the Univ. of California.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RICHARD NIXON, 1913</strong>&lt;br&gt;Lawyer; Attorney, Office of Emergency Management; Lt. Commander, US Navy.</td>
<td>Congressman; Senator.</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
<td>Lawyer and candidate, California and New York City, President of the US.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JOHN MITCHELL, 1913</strong>&lt;br&gt;Lawyer; Commander of motor torpedo boats in the Pacific (US Navy).</td>
<td>Lawyer.</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>Lawyer; 1968 Nixon campaign manager; US Attorney General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WILLIAM ROGERS, 1913</strong>&lt;br&gt;Asst. District Attorney, N.Y. County; Lt. Commander, US Navy.</td>
<td>Counsel, Senate War Investigating Committee; lawyer.</td>
<td>Deputy Attorney General; Attorney General.</td>
<td>Lawyer; UN representative; Secretary of State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RICHARD HELMS, 1913</strong>&lt;br&gt;European correspondent; United Press; Indianapolis Times; OSS, USNR.</td>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Director of the CIA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHARLES THORNTON, 1913</strong>&lt;br&gt;Clerk, Dept. of Interior; Col. USAAF, statistical control.</td>
<td>Dir. Planning, Ford; Exec., various Howard Hughes corps.; consultant to Undersec. of State.</td>
<td>President, Litton Industries.</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer, Litton; Dir. TWA, Lehman Corp.; member DIAC, Kerner Commission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Pre-War, War</td>
<td>1946-1952</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEN BARNES, 1938</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Elected to the Texas House of Representatives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(very few typical members were born as early as 1909 but by the time one reaches 1917 the "generation" is well-established). During the period in which the New Generation begins, of course, the Middle Generation gradually comes to an end (1939-1947). The leading figures of the Middle Generation are both prime beneficiaries and victims of the post-Depression system of power. Many of them have acquired great wealth, influence, and prestige through vigorous and skillful activity within one or another of the major "complexes."

No analysis of the Middle Generation can detract from the heroism of those who fought purely against fascism or genuinely sought to save people from Stalinism. But Hiroshima and Dresden in the one case and McCarthyism in the other arouse great doubt concerning the social psychological health of the American system in the Nazi and Stalinist periods.

**THEOLOGICAL DIPLOMACY**  The United States of the 40's and 50's perceived itself in mortal conflict with one or another foreign political system. Since the struggle was viewed absolutistically, it provided an excellent stage on which to act out other, lesser conflicts. Most scholars now view McCarthyism as not essentially an anti-Communist crusade but rather a domestic battle involving a complex set of political, economic, regional and ethnic factors.

In a somewhat similar sense, the Munich analogy, which conjures up the satanic specter of Nazi expansionism, cannot be taken as a serious statement about the role of North Vietnam in international affairs. When statesmen at high levels advance arguments that border on the preposterous, listeners should pay especial attention. Mr. Rusk was probably no more than a trifle disingenuous in frequently invoking Munich. During 1934, he attended the University of Berlin after two years as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford. He has spoken on several occasions of the strong impact the Nazi movement made upon him.

Rusk is perhaps the first major figure from the Middle Generation. The years of the Depression he spent at college — a few of them even outside the country. One can readily understand why he was gripped both very early and very strongly by the European crisis. In a sense, he was several years ahead of his contemporaries.

The former Secretary of State also exemplifies well a mode of thought and action that is typical of the Middle Generation: rationalistic aggressiveness. This pattern of response derives not only from the political atmosphere of the '40's and '50's but also from the special character of World War II and of the post-war economy. The American involvement in the Second World War was massive in quantity — hundreds of billions of dollars, global in extent, highly mobile in action, dependent upon a complex procurement and deployment system, and reliant on the tactical judgment and flexibility of scores of thousands of young junior officers.

To a considerable extent, those young men whose economic or educational background made them potential leaders experienced World War II as their most intense initiation rite into fully adult social status. The tale of the band of stout-hearted men and their intrepid skipper JFK on board the PT-109 could be re-told innumerable times with only slight variation for other young officers. Nothing was more evocative of this heroic camaraderie in the 1960's than the cult of the Cuban missile crisis.

Politically, World War II promoted the growth of centralized power. Economically, it primed the pump and gave the South a subsidy for development. Socially, it increased social cohesion and consensus. And finally, psychologically, it offered the young a "cause," a shared élan, a destiny.

Any serious assessment of generations in American society must recognize the following limitations: (1) Generational differences are not absolute; there is much overlapping, anticipation, and atavistic fixation; extraordinarily flexible, detached, or empathetic people commonly transcend generational boundaries; (2) Not simply the factors, but the kinds of factors most influential in creating modal attitudes vary from generation to generation. (3) The nature of the relevant social and political events and the character of the institutions (e.g. W.P.A., the Army, college) in which they are experienced profoundly affect the intensity of the response — some "generations" are far more deeply touched by their "formative" experiences than are others. We have argued that World War II was a particularly intense experience, especially for young leaders. Analogously, though in a far more restricted manner, the Korean War affected a somewhat younger group. Perhaps the most critical events for instilling and maintaining a high level of anti-Soviet feeling were the Berlin Airlift and the Hungarian Invasion. But we must resist thinking of the "rationalistic-aggressive" syndrome as merely a somewhat unfortunate concomitant of a firm stance against Soviet belligerence.

"Rationalistic" does not refer to the philosophy of rationalism, but rather is used roughly as the German sociologist Max Weber employed it in his work on bureaucracy. We are concerned with procedural rationality — with technique, systematization, meritocratic selection, and a narrowly instrumentalist code of conduct. This, of course, is precisely the kind of value system that permits facile adaptation to political-economic "complexes."

It is, therefore, the formal, received ideology of leaders from the Middle Generation. In asserting this
we do not deny the presence of other ideological strains or even the possibility of such strains playing a significant role in the political thought of some representative figures. Among the men included in Chart Four, for example, William Buckley often departs quite sharply from procedural rationality. His conception of political conservatism and Catholic Christianity directly influence his conduct—though less frequently than he thinks.

MONEY-MAKING AS "WAR GAME" Rationalistic instrumentalism is the prevailing ideological tendency among the influential and powerful, taken as a group. For the leaders of the Middle Generation it also typically provides a mask and a justification for their intense ambition. Total entrepreneurial absorption in the amassing of a fortune has long been socially acceptable in America. One of the most successful post-war tycoons, James Ling commonly characterizes corporate policy-making as "war-gaming it." When asked about the effect of a deep cutback in defense spending on his business, he described it as "a karate chop to the neck." His company's motto captures the aggressive self-assertion of the most dynamic members of his generation: "Make tomorrow obsolete."

Entrepreneurs are accorded considerable license in the expression of ambition. Still, at the turn of the century one would probably not have heard either the military metaphors or the highly personal fantasy of combat suggested by karate. Ling's language does not imply rigid fixation on his war experiences. Rather, the environment in which he competes is so highly militarized and politicized that the metaphors are magnificently apt.

It is his fundamental refusal to discharge or to deceive himself that makes Ling such an attractive representative of his breed. In a similar expression of insight Robert Kennedy declared admiringly that his brother possessed "the guts of a burglar." Men like Ling and Kennedy are the aristocrats of the Middle Generation: behind all the incrustation of PR and the sanctimonious prattle of their courtiers, they remain basically free from self-delusion.

SECOND WORLD American success in World War II derived from massive defense production, large-scale organization, and flexible, aggressive, middle-level leadership. American economic "success" since World War II has derived from massive defense production, large-scale organization, and flexible, aggressive, middle-level leadership. It is erroneous to ascribe the disasters of the Johnson administration to a failure of the New Deal. The New Deal was never developed fully (except as a political coalition) and never solved the basic economic problems of the Depression. More accurately, the failure of LBJ was the failure of the World War II model.

Out of this failure emerges the great leadership problem of the next fifteen years. In terms of money, power, and prestige the success of the Middle Generation rests heavily upon the World War II model. And many of the deepest psychological needs of the Middle Generation are satisfied by conditions in large part dependent upon this model.

Americans can expect a protracted period of turbulence and vexation. Given the experience of the Second World War and the Cold War, it will be easy to blame trouble on external or internal enemies. Resisting the temptation will provide the best measure of the quality of the Middle Generation. It is no crime to possess the characteristic limitations of one's generation. But for American leaders in the next fifteen years, insensitivity to their limitations may be catastrophic.

The future belongs to the young—only if the middle-aged do not "make tomorrow obsolete." Government officials, academics, businessmen, and journalists often wax eloquent on the failings of the young, the black, and the poor. They could do worse than subject the real wielders of power to as thorough an examination.

—WILLIAM D. PHELAN, JR.

(In Part III of this series Mr. Phelan will continue his discussion of social trends and factors likely to play a major role in the United States during the next fifteen years. His principal topics will be conglomerate corporations and the merger phenomenon.)

FOOTNOTES

1 For the first published report of the Commission see Daedalus, The Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 96, No. 3 (Summer, 1967)
3 Ibid., p. 93.
4 Ibid., p. 88.

ERRATA FOR PART I

On p. 17, Chart 1, the total percentage gain in assets, 1949-67, for the Top 52 contractors should read 401%; also, the note at the foot of the page should read *Deficit.

On p. 18, Chart 2, the first column of assets refers to 1960; the correct name of the company listed twenty-first on this chart is Maxson Electronics; the correct name of the twenty-sixth is Ryan Aeronautical.
Mr. Evans Builds His Dream House


Time was when the right wing spent all its literary energies expounding conservative principles. Now our Tory friends are concentrating not on the argument that it is wise and just to be conservative, but on the theory that it is becoming politically expedient. Anyway, expediency is the theme of the latest tome from the National Review crowd, M. Stanton Evans' *The Future of Conservatism*.

Evans reads the Nixon victory as a harbinger of a brand new and conservative era in American politics. The movement of the bulk of the American people into the middle class has started to break down the welfare coalition and eroded the power of labor to deliver a solidly democratic vote. Voting strength in the South, the West and the suburbs is increasing and this growing bloc typically weighs issues as taxpayers rather than as beneficiaries of government handouts. Thus, they oppose inflation and rises in government expenditures, which, the theory goes, makes this new and crucial bloc susceptible to a conservative appeal. A modified Goldwater strategy is what is needed to take advantage of these ongoing chances in political demography and voter attitudes: eschewing the wooden generalities of Barry Goldwater and the cute forensic posturing of William Buckley, Evans thus offers a more serious and more solidly written tract than either of the others has presented.

Unfortunately, the book is poorly organized, giving one the impression that Evans dropped the manuscript on the way to the publisher and a semiliterate copy boy rearranged the chapters. Discussions of the Republican Party are scattered about, helter-skelter, and an account of Goldwater's pre-nomination drive is followed by an assessment of the subsequent election campaign—five chapters later.

Perhaps Evans purposely mangled the continuity to obscure his many inconsistencies and contradiction. In chapter six, for example, he assures us that the Republican Party has long been composed primarily of conservatives. Ten chapters later, he blames the declining strength of the GOP on its liberal presidential candidates. Surely the group which is alleged to comprise the mainstream of the party shares some of the blame for its present state. And Evans should do his intramural homework: he claims that Buckley thought that he "probably aided Lindsay rather than hurting him" in the 1965 New York mayoralty race. Buckley, in *The Unmaking of a Mayor*, wrote that "it is virtually certain that the Buckley vote came to a very large degree from Republicans and not from Democrats as has so often been suggested."

A more significant issue is Evans' account of the sources of the new conservatism. The country is moving west, he reveals with a plethora of statistics, and Eastern liberal hegemony will soon be an unpleasant memory. Setting aside the matter of the fate of Eastern liberalism, it is worthy of comment that the Far West continues to be represented in Congress by many legislators as progressive as their Eastern counterparts. The suburbs are said to be another bastion of right-wing sentiment, surely a revelation to Eugene McCarthy. Union members are upset about taxes and inflation, we are told, but we are not told that this very concern makes the old bread-and-butter issues salient enough to doom a right-winger's appeals to this group. The middle class is upset about its unfair share of the tax burden; significantly, Evans fails to propose, as a remedy, closing higher-bracket loopholes and reducing the oil depletion allowance. Finally, to endorse "artificial economic rights" such as open housing and fair employment is dismissed by Evans as "ideological hygiene."

The heart of the matter is Evans' proud disclosure of several (carefully chosen, one suspects) opinion polls in which more Americans identified themselves as conservatives than as liberals or middle-of-the-roaders. The author then goes on to undercut the significance of this fact by stating that Goldwater was seen as a radical and not a conservative in 1964, and by recalling Samuel Lubell's depiction of Dewey as the perceived threat to the status quo in 1948. One may well ask how meaningful the term "conservative" is when what is to be conserved is liberal! A great many of those self-styled conservatives, in other words, may want to conserve social security, the minimum wage and foreign aid.

Haven satisfied himself that the nation is swerving to the right, Evans assumes (as Goldwater did) that this means that the voters are looking for a full-fledged right-winger to lead the nation. In what is surely the most amazing part of his discourse, he espouses "the power of negative thinking":

"To date there is no evidence that the constructive approach has done the party any good, and a great deal of evidence that it has worked the party harm. If constructiveness is pushed much further and become established deeply enough in the thinking of enough Republicans, it could easily cancel the gains the GOP stand to inherit from the suburban revolution, the shifts of American population, and the growth of popular resentments against the burgeoning costs of the welfare state. . . ."
For Republicans, the indicated guidelines to success should be relatively clear: If they are going to win elections, they will have to make their negative presentation superior to that of the Democrats; they must make their version of the bad things that will happen to the country under Democratic rule prevail over the Democrats’ version of the bad things that will happen to the country under Republican rule.”

The fact that Republicans have had a hard time at that game ever since 1929 does not seem to bother Evans, and he blithely presents his champion of negativism—you guessed it—Ronald Reagan.

It is interesting to consider his advice in light of recent events. Richard Nixon, far from unacceptable to Republican conservatives, waged an essentially negative campaign of attacking the incumbents and offering few proposals of his own (although Humphrey and Wallace were no more constructive). But as soon as the votes were counted and the decisions of governing had to be made, the President-elect apparently forgot the campaign. It has gradually become clear (at least as of the second week in February) that the new President is moving in a moderately progressive direction, even to the point of contradicting his own campaign statements. Evans may have presented a recipe for combatting unpopular incumbents (a recipe that almost failed in 1968), but negativism is still no program for a President. And the tenor of Nixon’s campaign in 1972 may not rest well with the denizens of the far right.

Finally, one feels impelled to comment on the jacket design, a work of art by Mr. Don Ivan Punchatz. It depicts what appears to be Mount Rushmore, with the likeness of Messrs. Nixon, Goldwater, Reagan, and Buckley carved into the rock. Such an irreverent and unpatriotic parody of one of our most cherished national landmarks should not go unnoticed by the Congressional committee which concerns itself with internal security. I hope the body will live up to its reputation by investigating.

—HOWARD L. REITER

Mr. Reiter, a member of the Executive Board of the Cambridge Chapter, is a Ph.D., candidate in Government at Harvard and has written frequently for the FORUM and for THE NATION. He is the author of the widely cited study on Party realignment in the November, 1968 FORUM.

LETTERS

UNCONVINCED ON MIC

Dear Sirs:

After reading Mr. William Phelan’s recent twelve-page FORUM article entitled “The Complex Society Marches On.” I still remain unconvinced that the time has come for me to man the barricade in an effort to stop an accelerating onrush toward a “Great Armored Society.”

Central to Mr. Phelan’s thesis appears to be the position that major defense contractors are unjustifiably obtaining more influence over the nation’s economy and, hence, its politics. However, Mr. Phelan’s own statistical data goes far to belie much of his fear. Thus, while his data shows that annual sales of the 50 prime defense contractors have increased by about 47% between 1963 and 1967, he neglects to mention that the gross national product has increased by about 35% in that same time period. A difference in increase rates of about 12% in these two areas spread out over four years does not strike me as particularly alarming given the existence of a war in Viet Nam and the fact that defense being a major consumer of advanced technology will always have occasion to deal largely with companies in that major growth sector of the economy.

A similar lack of perspective and balance pervades the remainder of Mr. Phelan’s article. Little heed is paid to the widespread dispersion and differences of opinion within the so-called “military-industrial” complex—much of which would naturally increase if elements of the “Complex” found greater roles for their capabilities in poverty, education and other non-military activities. The influence of the “Complex” also is not balanced against the influence of other minorities. The “Complex” has never brought down a President—a deed which has been rather recently accomplished largely by strident minorities of Vietnam protestors and black arsonists and looters. It would be a tragedy, indeed, if our defense posture, foreign policy, governmental and private efficiency, and opportunities for new imaginative attacks on the problems of our times were to be handcuffed by an irrational and unsubstantiated fear that the “Complex” is moving feared the domestic Communist bogeyman. Let us not now suffer because we unreasonably fear the “Great Armored Society” bogeyman.

Duane R. Batista

Cambridge

REPLY

My article apparently failed to make clear to Mr. Batista my point about the apparent importance of political influence in corporate success since 1963. The list of companies he chooses to cite includes such stalwarts as GM, Standard Oil (New Jersey), AT&T, and Ford, which derive less than four percent of their revenues from sales to the Defense Department, yet account for nearly 40 percent of the total sales of all companies listed in Chart I. During the same 1963-1967 period, 37 major contractors listed in Chart II expanded sales by a total of 179 percent—over five times the exceptionally high GNP increase recorded in that interval. And the large companies that did best had allies at very high levels in the government.

If Batista has chosen to treat only the last and most tentative of the 15 trends toward the expansion of the influence of the Pentagon. I did not seek simply to frighten him with Clark Clifford’s dreams; rather, the principal attempt of the article was to describe the extraordinary dynamism of the Defense Department and some disturbing evidence of the politicization of the weapons industry. It is conceivable that a Pentagon-sponsored entry of large defense contractors into education, housing, etc., would have beneficial consequences; but even granting this possibility, how can one dismiss the other 14 points?

William D. Phelan, Jr.

NOT QUITE RIGHT

Dear Sirs:

The first item under “Political Notes” in the February issue of The Ripon FORUM is only partially correct.

Conservative Republicans like myself are indeed planning to provide opposition for Mr. Lindsay if he so incautious as to attempt to run again for the Republican nomination for Mayor of New York City. And it is quite true that my friends in the Conservative Party tell me they will have a candidate of their own on Election Day, if by some fluke Mr. Lindsay wins the Republican primary. But it is not correct to say that the “Conservative Party will run a candidate . . . in the Republican primary.” That would not be legal, and we conservatives are famous for our support of law and order.

William A. Rusher

New York City

(Mr. Rusher is publisher of the National Review.)

CIVIL RIGHTS PAPER

Dear Sirs:

Messrs. Macdonald, Marans, and Stone, authors of Nixon at the Crossroads: Presidential Action for Human Rights, must have had 100 cc’s of novocaine shot in their
frontal lobes when they wrote that part of the article reading: "Of great importance, the new Department would help shift the major burden of civil rights enforcement from the courts and motley tribunals in various federal agencies to a single administrative agency designed especially for this purpose. . . . A Bureau of Hearing Examiners in the Department would be charged with hearings on complaints referred to it by the Complaint Bureau and other federal departments and agencies."

After viewing what has happened in the National Labor Relations Board with union-oriented Trial Examiners, and seeing how an employer has to get justice, is any, in a Circuit Court of Appeals, why should one think the proposed agency dreamed up in a state of "human rights euphoria" would function any differently? We need less bureaus, less bureaucrats, less "agencies," not more. The new commission would be a dumping ground for party hacks, do-gooders, sobsisters, and an open field for attorneys of the ACLU.

The Measure be some objective standard or the subjective feeling of deprivation experienced by the neighborhood's older residents. What evidently has changed is the perception of the role of politics and policy in the generation of the problems, and the expectation about what government can do to solve them. This has led people to seek redress through the political process for things which in the past they thought to be either inevitable or capable of redress only through individual effort.

Everyone will no doubt draw his own lessons from these developments. Some will conclude that we must slow the pursuit of racial justice, rely upon endogenous economic processes, avoid special governmental efforts to aid the disadvantaged and seek to restore the belief that conflicts between social and economic groups are beyond the reach of government.

But this is not the lesson I would draw. I am not personally impressed either by the current relationship between black and white income or by the rate of progress. The six percentage point jump in nonwhite income relative to white income represents not only the gain in the last four years, but the whole of the gain since 1953. The gain can in very large measure be attributed to the nation's return to intense levels of economic activity, and thus future progress may be considerably more dependent upon special governmental efforts. And I am very dubious about the reversibility of beliefs about what government can and cannot accomplish.

I would draw a narrower lesson; that we must seek programs that will spread the burden of achieving racial equality more evenly throughout the society and operate in a manner more consistent with the conventional work ethic — such measures as the negative income tax, which maintains income in a manner that prevents the living standards of non-working families from exceeding the standards of those who work; vigorous equal opportunity enforcement, which concentrates on job access for qualified blacks rather than those requiring preferential treatment; and tax reforms on all levels of government, which place more of the burden at the upper end of the income distribution.

These were not high priority programs in the Great Society. Such programs in fact have yet to be really tried. In a way this is encouraging. It suggests that it is possible to progress toward racial equality without the conflict progress has engendered in the past few years.

—MICHAEL J. PIORI

(Mr. Piori is Assistant Professor of Economics at MIT.)
The vocal support which the Wallace candidacy attracted in the North many have been largely an expression of racism and bigotry among urban ethnic groups, but it was certainly not dampened by recent economic trends. The much heralded expansion of the Johnson Administration has not been generous to the blue-collar work force. Advances in earnings have been undercut by inflation, on the one hand, and by increases in taxes and social security contributions on the other. Since 1964, the constant dollar value of average spendable weekly earnings for production workers on private payrolls has fluctuated around a horizontal trend.

Although blacks remain far behind, they have significantly improved their position relative to blue-collar workers as a whole during the same period. Nonwhite median family income rose from 56% of white median income in 1964 to 62% in 1967. Moreover, relative gains for nonwhites were recorded in every section of the country. This indicates that the gains were not simply the result of migration from the South to the better paying North or West. Blacks appear to have gained relative to their neighbors even when they stayed at home.

The last major shift in the racial distribution of income occurred in the Korean period, a period which resembles that of the moment in many of its other economic characteristics as well. The resemblance suggests that the trend in the distribution of income is to be understood largely in terms which economists call "endogenous" processes. That is to say: at the intense levels of activity which have characterized the period, the structure of the American economy and the income tax and social security systems acted automatically to produce the kind of income shifts which we have experienced.

Beside these endogenous processes, special programs "in aid of the disadvantaged" have been of decidedly secondary importance. Such programs have, however, undoubtedly influenced the public's perception of the role of governmental policy in producing these shifts. This is especially true of the rapid expansion in coverage and in the level of payments under the Aid For Dependent Children program (AFDC). Between March 1967 and March 1968 AFDC payments nationally rose 24%; the number of recipients, 19%; the average payment per family, 7%. In some of the Northern urban centers, the increases have been even more dramatic. AFDC payments for a standard family of four in New York City last summer reached $4100, a level which compares to the $3200 annual earnings of a full-time worker at the minimum wage. The upper middle class reads of these trends in the newspapers. But blue-collar workers, many of whom live in close physical proximity to welfare recipients, observe them directly. Black people are by no means the only beneficiaries of these trends, but their color heightens visibility and facilities generalization. Ironically, the expansion of AFDC is not policy: it has been unplanned, and largely uncontrolled.

Also highly visible to the blue-collar labor force — but in this case deliberately planned — have been manpower programs, particularly the latest series of MA-programs. These have attempted to open high paying blue-collar jobs to disadvantaged workers through large subsidies to employers. They have resulted in the application of special standards in hiring and in discipline on the job to a group of workers who are largely black. These workers are hired in preference to better qualified white competition, and they are retained on the job despite offenses against work rules for which white workers continue to be discharged. The blue-collar labor force sees this in their own places of work and feels the injustice keenly. Thus, while programs of this type account, at best, for only a small fraction of the improvement in the Negroes' relative position, their existence makes the whole of the shift in income distribution appear to be the product of policies designed to distort the impartiality of the market place.

More broadly, this implies that the crisis posed by the race problem in the political sphere is not a function of the amount of redistribution which has actually occurred. The process through which racial and ethnic groups progress in our society, whatever its net effect in the aggregate, has always been accomplished on the neighborhood level at the expense of some other group. The rising crime rates, changes in housing values, competition for jobs and for control of community institutions which Negroes now generate for urban ethnic minorities are not qualitatively different from the threats these ethnic minorities themselves posed to those who preceded them in these same neighborhoods. Nor is it clear that the threat is quantitatively different, whether