John Connally and SMIC
Stephen Berkowitz

Nixon and Vietnam
Wes Michaelson

Plus: THE SOUTHERN STRATEGY AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY; LINDSAY AND THE GOP; GOVERNOR WILLIAM MILLIKEN; RIPON POLL RESULTS; 1970 ANNUAL REPORT
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THE RIPON SOCIETY, INC. is a Republican research and policy organization whose members are young business, academic and professional men and women. It has national headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts, chapters in eleven cities, National Associate members throughout the fifty states, and affiliated groups of subchapter status. The Society is supported by chapter dues, individual contributions and revenues from its publications and contract work. The Society offers the following options for annual contribution: Contributor $25 or more; Sustainer $100 or more. Inquiries about membership and chapter organization should be addressed to the National Executive Director.

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LINDSAY: FIGHT OR SWITCH?

February marks an important benchmark in John Lindsay's career. In addition to all his headaches in running New York City, the Mayor must decide whether he will switch registration to avoid possible legal complications to entering a key 1972 presidential primary as a Democrat. A failure to switch this month may mean a firm decision by Lindsay to build strength in the GOP. To help him make up his mind, a rash of articles has appeared in the press speculating on Lindsay's future. The usual trial balloons by his staff encouraging Democrats to make overtures to the Mayor have come up again. Two Young Republican Clubs have actually left the party in New York City. William Buckley has also entered the fray. In a column appearing when Lindsay's tough handling of the New York Police strike was creating new sympathies for him among heartland Republicans, Buckley taxed his forensic resources to demonstrate that all Republicans despised Lindsay. Buckley's outburst is comparable to John Kenneth Galbraith's asserting that the Democratic Party has no place for Southern committee chairmen. Buckley wants Lindsay to switch because conservatives would be immeasurably stronger in New York State and the nation with Lindsay out of the party.

In view of all this discussion, perhaps the most interesting result of this winter's Ripon Poll is the sharp drop in popularity of John Lindsay among FORUM subscribers. Last year Lindsay was far and away the first choice in the poll with about as many admirers as the next three men combined. This year, though the 200 respondents tabulated show him still number one, he is just a first among equals. The tables on pages 7, 8 and 9 break the results down into two categories — the 55% of respondents who voted for Nixon in 1968 and the 45% who voted against him or abstained. If we aggregate these totals and compare them with last year's, the contrast in Lindsay's standing becomes clear:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>This Year's Top Ten</th>
<th>Last Year's Top Ten</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lindsay 20%</td>
<td>Lindsay 36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardner 18</td>
<td>Muscle 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockefeller 13</td>
<td>Percy 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muskie 12</td>
<td>Nixon 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percy 11</td>
<td>Pinch 9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brooke 9</td>
<td>Hatfield 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seranton 8</td>
<td>Brooke 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nixon 6</td>
<td>Scott 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatfield 6</td>
<td>Rockefeller 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodell 5</td>
<td>Rumsfeld 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lindsay's drop does not seem to conform to the three patterns that explain the ratings of the other men. 1) All those leaders associated in the public mind with the Administration — Finch, Rumsfeld, Scott and the President himself — dropped sharply, even among erstwhile Nixon supporters. 2) Senators with a steady exposure in the public eye held about even — Percy, Hatfield, Brooke, Muskie. 3) Men who publicly identified themselves as Republicans but took positions independent from the Administration rose sharply — Gardner, Rockefeller, Scranton and Goodell (though Gardner has yet to take on significant Republican staffing for Common Cause). But Lindsay, publicly identified as Republican, independent of the Administration and commanding as much attention in the press as ever, fell. Why?

The message of the poll is clear. As John Lindsay, despite his disclaimers, takes public stands and allows private news leaks encouraging speculation that he will change parties, he loses the loyalty of progressive Republican activists around the country. Outside New York, progressive Republicans see no need to give up their stake in the party merely because the Mayor has been set back in the byzantine bargaining of the past two and a half years involving himself, Richard Nixon, Spiro Agnew and Nelson Rockefeller. It may be argued that he will pick up in Democratic loyalty what he loses among Republicans. If so, he has a long way to go. Those who were at the Miami Convention know that he was more popular among the delegates there than Nelson A. Rockefeller. At the convention, Jack Miller a conservative Republican Senator from Iowa, wanted to nominate Lindsay for the Vice Presidency even after Nixon chose Agnew. In the pre-convention period, Les Arends, the senior Republican member of the House, invited Lindsay to his district to speak. Even after Lindsay's loss to John Marchi in the 1969 New York Republican primary, about a third of his former Republican colleagues in the House endorsed him for Mayor. All this he got without doing anything for Republicans around the country.

When Carl Albert, Dan Rostenkowski or Hale Boggs invite Lindsay to their districts to speak, when Henry Jackson begs to nominate him for veep, when Democrats outside New York are willing to endorse him as an independent candidate against an official Democratic nominee, he will have made up as a national Democrat what he is in danger of throwing away as a national Republican.

Yet we venture to predict that he cannot quickly reach so accepted a position as a Democrat. For several months members of Lindsay's staff have used the press to test his national credibility as a Democrat.
The response from Democratic leaders has not been overwhelming. Such response as there has been may be explained by the desire of Kennedy supporters and unaffiliated reformers to dislodge Muskie with a stalking horse who would revive the emotionalism of Robert Kennedy at the expense of Republican sources of funding. Yet the Democratic party as a whole has less need of Lindsay than the Republicans. To Republicans he represents a unique asset — a tie to youth, to racial minorities, and to the in-city urban establishments that have been an important source of Republican funding. He represents, too, a reminder that these constituencies can be reached without being beholden to self-interested labor unions.

To Democrats, smug in their hold on the young and the black, and confident in their rapid gains among a growing class of college educated voters, Lindsay can offer only to pry loose dissident Republicans. But even here his appeal is not unique. The July 1970 Gallup Poll showed that while 9% of Republicans would vote for Lindsay over Nixon, Muskie was preferred by 7% of Republicans. Ramsey Clark and Eugene McCarthy also have appeal to the front-lash Republicans who regularly swing elections in California, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio and New York, and who judging by the 1970 results, may now also be prepared to vote Democratic in Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois and New Jersey. Lindsay’s appeal to this volatile swing group is counter balanced for Democrats by his presumed liability with Southern Protestants and Northern union Catholics who are the two most important pillars of the New Deal coalition. In sum, Lindsay remains the leading Republican who can give the Party access to groups with which it is now weak; as a national Democrat, he has no such cutting edge.

Liberal and conservative ideologues who would like to see the parties realigned, would no doubt applaud a Lindsay defection to the Democrats. But for those who believe it necessary to the health of our political system that both parties bid for alienated voters, a Lindsay defection from the GOP would simply create the need for another symbol of what Mr. Nixon has at last called the Republican Party’s “open door;” national Republicans would look more to others.

It is seldom realized the extent to which the so-called drift to the right in the Republican Party has been simply a failure of progressive Republicans to pay attention to the entire country in non-presidential years. Though Lindsay campaigned for Bob Dole and others in 1968, it was not until he fought for Goodell that the Mayor engaged in a real ideological battle, even in New York State. Nationally, like William Scranton and Nelson Rockefeller, he drew down, without replenishing it, an investment in national political organization made by Dewey, Brownell and others. Hence if he leaves the GOP now, he leaves virtually alone. If he stays — and if he revives the influence he had in Miami among heartland Republicans — he will have a strong national bargaining position over the next two years. Since the 1970 election, Richard Nixon has begun to borrow Lindsay's rhetoric on youth, crime, minorities, reconciliation and responsiveness of government. As a Republican, Lindsay could press the President to make good on this rhetoric, instead of competing with new phrases of his own.

Senator Saxbe of Ohio, campaigning in New York for Goodell, called the current factional disputes a "struggle for the very soul of the GOP." Republicans within the Administration and around the country have been fighting this battle, and their case is at last becoming more persuasive. If John Lindsay gives up — not because he has fought and lost, but because he has been temporarily outmaneuvered — his own soul will not rest easier.

**CONNALLY: OUTGROW SMIC**

John Connally has been nominated Secretary of the Treasury at a time when international confidence in the dollar is low, when the American role in the international financial system is in serious need of reappraisal, and the patchwork of props, regulations and taxes which hamstring the economy is in need of reform.

But this set of problems has little to do with President Nixon's reason for appointing him. As the President made clear in his interview with four television journalists, Governor Connally will be expected to salvage the President's relations with Democratic committee chairmen in the Congress (Russell Long take note).

John Connally, a capable executive and politician, has had a brilliant career in government, law and business. But as the signed piece on page 12 suggests, it has been a career largely limited to a very self-insulated set of regional institutions whose growth has depended heavily on a favorable climate in Washington. If he follows the natural bent of his past associations, he will certainly be of use to Mr. Nixon in the Congress, but he may also encourage trends which lead not only to the fracturing of the Republican Party but to an undermining of the long-term productivity and primacy of the U.S. economy.

That John Connally may rise above a parochial view of the nation's economic interests is of course possible. Men who are called to serve the nation are often harshest on the abuses they know best — witness Moynihan's critique of the welfare, educational and communications establishments, or Hickel's action against the plunderers of the environment. If John Connally is able to outgrow SMIC the country will be well served by him.
Political Notes

THE NATION: frontlash defection?

A recent Louis Harris poll demonstrates the danger of the "Southern strategy" to President Nixon's re-election chances. On December 29, 1970, Harris released the results of a new survey which asked:

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that public schools which are segregated must be integrated now without any further delay. In general, do you tend to approve or disapprove of this ruling for integration now by the U.S. Supreme Court?

The poll results broken down on the basis of whom the respondent voted for in 1968 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Disapprove</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humphrey</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Kevin Phillips has argued that the Wallace voter can be simply added to the Nixon total to build a Republican majority. This has led the White House to court the backlash voter by slowing down desegregation.

Unfortunately for the GOP, a slow-down in desegregation could cost Nixon dearly with his own "frontlash" support. After all, over half of those who voted for him in 1968 now approve of "integration without further delay." Inside the White House, the winning argument seems to have been that "These people (read liberals) were never with us anyway." The lesson of the Harris poll is that they are, or at least were in 1968.

IDAHO: rga at sun valley

The Republican Governors Conference met the weekend of December 12 in Sun Valley, Idaho. After two days of socializing, the formal meetings began on the morning of the 14th with most of the 30 governors and governors-elect in their places. The atmosphere was cordial as the governors visited with one another, though more strained as they congratulated the survivors and afforded condolences to the large number of lame ducks.

Muffled, with the exception of Oregon's Tom McCall, was much criticism of the fall campaign. Many of the huddled governors were hopeful of some employment with the Nixon team. At the outset, McCall had suggested that Agnew be dropped from the ticket. "We can't be driving a larger and deeper wedge between generations," sentiments generally endorsed by Milliken, Holton, Evans and Cargo.

The session's first speaker was Representative Rogers Morton. His opening announcement that John Connally of Texas had just been nominated to Treasury left the governors stunned and visibly disappointed that a Democrat had got the nod. Morton made general comments regarding his hopes for the Interior post and then sought to draw some of the political lightning away from the Administration by taking some of the blame for state house losses this fall.

The conference convened Tuesday morning for a panel discussion of "People and Issues" with Samuel Lubell and Kevin Phillips. At the close, Governor William Milliken was unable to remain silent any longer in the face of Phillips' opinions about the makeup of the emerging Republican majority. He remarked that he was opposed to narrow coalitions for the sole purpose of winning elections. "A national party must deal with the problems without regard to whether such issues are popular with the public. We must bring about a racial reconciliation. We cannot write off any segment of the population such as the blacks. To do so would be morally wrong and politically stupid." Governor Cargo echoed Milliken in asking rhetorically about Spanish-Americans: "They are not in Middle America. They are not conservative because they don't have anything to conserve. So how do you appeal to them?"

The closing official business saw Governor Louie Nunn of Kentucky elevated to chairman of the conference, and William Milliken elected vice chairman, after a close vote with McCall. McCall, however, was elected to the executive committee along with Francis Sargent and Robert Ray. All three are progressives.

The governors did not adopt their usual parcel of resolutions. They instead confined themselves to reaffirming their position on federal revenue sharing, putting a price tag of $10 billion annually on their project. They voted 14-2 to endorse Nixon's Family Assistance Program. Governor Russell W. Peterson fought vigorously for the proposal; just as vigorously opposing was Governor Ronald Reagan. Reagan was joined on the negative side by Jack Williams of Arizona. Governors Warren Knowles, Harold Levander and Governor-elect Winfield Dunn abstained.

The political highlight of the meeting was the entrance of Spiro T. Agnew on the scene. Having been publicly criticized by McCall and fearing an epidemic of criticism might develop, he decided he had better confront the governors.

Most were hopeful his remarks slated for the state dinner Tuesday night would be soothing and unifying, but they were to be disappointed. He was quick to give his orders: "Republican governors must close ranks solidly behind our leaders who remain in state houses and behind our President in the White House." For those who had expected the Vice President to be at all conciliatory, they were disappointed by his demurrer to any criticism of the last campaign, "even when it masquerades as constructive criticism."

The speech was not well received by most governors. McCall called it "that rotten bigoted little speech." Twenty-one governors stayed on to discuss it with the Vice President on Wednesday morning. When the governors and the Vice President emerged, not much seemed to be settled. Agnew insisted his speech had been misunderstood and that as a result of the meeting with the governors no changes in his approach were expected. On the other hand, the governors insisted there had been a frank and full exchange of views and that that they were hopeful of closer communication between the governors and the Administration. Agnew responded by pledging to attend future RGA meetings. He also indicated that liaison on key state matters would now be handled through his office instead of through White House staff.

The Republican governors, organized in 1963 to make a difference in the GOP's national posture, were not optimistic about their role today. The Connally appointment and the rumors about the new national chairman made them feel like a very minor "third force."

The only note of defiance came from a gubernatorial aide who told an Agnew staff member, "In 1972 you'll need us a lot more than we'll need you."
The White House begins the 92nd Congress with its third chief of Congressional relations in less than two years. Former Congressman Clark MacGregor has been moved in ahead of Bill Timmons in an effort to shore up what has been a near-disaster area since January 20, 1969.

But there is little reason to believe that the MacGregor appointment will solve the problem, since its roots are much deeper than individual abilities. It stems from the conviction of several key White House staff members, apparently shared by the President, that the Congress is of little value during the process of shaping legislation and that, in any event, the Congress should and will go along with Presidential programs because the President wants them.

While these beliefs have been somewhat modified in the past year, the ill will built up during 1969 continues. And, not surprisingly, many Republicans are the most bitter.

Almost 60 percent of the Republicans in office in 1969 had spent their entire congressional careers under Democratic Presidents. The pleasant thoughts of a close working relationship with a friendly Administration soon turned sour as even senior GOP members were cut out of legislative policy-making and tactical roles.

Hill expectations were unusually high for another reason — the President had selected Bryce Harlow, a member of Eisenhower’s White House staff and former chief lobbyist for Proctor & Gamble, to direct his congressional relations operation. Many members knew and respected Harlow, and were pleased they would have a man in the White House who was sensitive to their concerns.

But it didn’t work that way. Harlow spent much of his 11 months working on general policy matters as a Presidential adviser, and was not able to devote time to Hill relations. Phone calls were not returned, and Congressmen were not content to talk to Harlow’s staff. The unanswered phone calls, and the general unresponsiveness to congressional needs, were further exaggerated by the fact that previous Democratic Administrations had been tuned in to Congress. As the legislative aide to a Republican Congressman elected in 1964 said: “We received far better treatment from the Democrats than from the present crew.”

Harlow’s time problems existed in part because he was the only really experienced legislative hand on the top Nixon staff. His advice and counsel was sought by many White House staffers. His abilities were spread too thinly.

Relations with Senate Republicans became so strained that several meetings with dissatisfied Rep-
Ripon Poll Results

Balking the Second Time Around

The "Looking Ahead to 1972" poll results show a striking erosion of support of and confidence in President Nixon among those who voted for him in 1968:

1) While in last year’s poll a majority (68 percent) of those who voted for Mr. Nixon in 1968 rated his performance as President either good or excellent, this year 59 percent rated him fair or poor. The good to excellent ratings fell to a paltry 23 percent.

2) Only 35 percent of the same group plan to reaffirm their choice of the Nixon-Agnew ticket in 1972.

3) Only 40 percent of the ’68 supporters think President Nixon will be reelected. In 1969 fully 100 percent saw seven more years of a Nixon Presidency.

4) A mere 10 percent of the people who voted for him in 1968 believe that Nixon is a capable manager of the economy. (The figure in 1969 was 50 percent.)

WILLING TO RECONSIDER

Despite this overwhelmingly negative response, over half of those who indicated probable non-support of Nixon-Agnew in ’72 would reconsider if Agnew were dumped. Even among the ’68 non-supporters (of whom 97 percent said they felt no warmer towards Nixon-Agnew) 47 percent said that they might think again if a different man filled the second spot. This roughly equal willingness to reconsider on the part of both groups reflects a new low in Mr. Agnew’s rating among Nixon supporters. His average grade in 1969 was C; this year it is F+. Agnew now receives a grade of D or F from 78 percent of Nixon supporters and 83 percent of non-supporters. One might posit a sort of convergence theory, a narrowing of the gap, as those who voted for Nixon-Agnew in 1968 come round to realizing what the non-supporters always felt.

In the appraisal of the Cabinet, there is a similar, if not so dramatic convergence. In most cases, the gap between the opinions of 1968 Nixon supporters and non-supporters narrowed since last year. Only for Postmaster Blount and former Treasury Secretary Kennedy did the gap widen; in both cases Nixon non-supporters were more negative about the Cabinet member.

Also, for most members, the direction of change was the same for both groups; i.e., if one group became more favorable to the man, the other did also. The exception was Attorney General Mitchell, who is more popular among Nixon non-supporters than he was last year, and less popular among Nixon supporters.

PARTY DISLOYALIST?

Nixon’s image on Vietnam has not changed significantly. 58 percent of his 1968 supporters think he has extensive knowledge of and a well-defined position on the war. Only 37 percent of his supporters give him credit for understanding the causes of poverty and offering programs that will help the poor help themselves. 35 percent of the ’68 loyalists now refuse to call Mr. Nixon a loyal party man. Numerous comments such as “Ask Goodell!” or just “Goodell?” were added. As mentioned above, a tenth of Nixon voters felt he was a capable manager of the economy. The non-supporters gave him a rousing 5 percent vote of confidence in economic matters.

Nobody is sure at this point about who they want to lead them. Non-supporters still choose Lindsay first, but by a much reduced margin. Gardner leaps from nowhere into second place and Muskie falls from second to a poor third. Hatfield, the only one among these top four still active in Republican politics, comes in close to Muskie. After Hatfield the votes are scattered.

LOOKING FOR A LEADER

Nixon supporters are even more confused. Rockefeller, Gardner, Lindsay and Nixon are in a four-way photo finish. Both Lindsay and Nixon have lost half their previous support, and Finch has dropped to almost nothing. The big gainer is again John Gardner. Scranton also takes up some of the slack from the Nixon-Lindsay losses.

In choosing ideological labels, Riponites predictably favor "progressive” and "moderate” above all others. “Liberal” is still chosen number one by Nixon non-supporters, but “progressive” comes in a close second.

In conclusion, Republicans of the Ripon stripe have lost faith both in the Administration’s ability to deal with domestic issues and in its ability to get itself reelected. Unless the President is more successful in coping with the economy and unless Vice President Agnew is removed from the ticket, there will be a massive walkout by progressive Republicans in 1972.

EFE

Nixon Supporters in 1968

Rate Nixon’s overall performance as President so far

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1970 poll</th>
<th>1969 poll</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If he continues as he has, will the President be renominated?  
Yes 88%

Leaving aside the many “ifs” and giving just a “gut” reaction, do you think Nixon will be reelected?  
Yes 40% (1970)  
Yes 100% (1969)

Would you vote for the Nixon-Agnew ticket in 1972? (Assume Muskie and Southerner as the Democratic slate)  
Yes 35%

If no, might you reconsider if Mr. Nixon changed his running mate?  
Yes 56%

Of the national leaders of either party, which one do you personally view as the man most worthy of your enthusiasm and support?

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<td>Scranton</td>
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<td>Scott</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Percy</td>
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* Some ballots listed more than one “first” choice. In such instances each man named was given a vote; consequently, the percentages add to more than 100.

Which of the following ideological labels do you feel best describes your political position?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
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<td>Liberal</td>
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<td>Pragmatic</td>
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**Nixon Non-Supporters in 1968**

Rate Nixon’s overall performance as President so far

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<tr>
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<td>Excellent</td>
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<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>12%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>33%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>38%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
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THE CABINET

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<th>C</th>
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<tr>
<td>Blount</td>
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<td>Finch</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hardin</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hickel</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Kennedy</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laird</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mitchell</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>D—</td>
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<td>54</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Shultz</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>47</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<td>27.5</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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THE VICE PRESIDENT

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
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</table>

If he continues as he has, will the President be renominated?
Yes 79%

Leaving aside the many 'ifs' and giving just a 'gut' reaction, do you think Nixon will be reelected?
Yes 22% (1970)
Yes 76% (1969)

Would you vote for the Nixon-Agnew ticket in 1972? (Assume Muskie and Southerner as the Democratic slate)
Yes 3%

If no, might you reconsider if Mr. Nixon changed his running mate?
Yes 47%

Of the national leaders of either party, which one do you personally view as the man most worthy of your enthusiasm and support?

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Leader</th>
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<th>1969 Percentage</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Muskie</td>
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<td>Hatfield</td>
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<td>Rockefeller</td>
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<td>Brooke</td>
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<td>Mathias</td>
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<tr>
<td>McCarthy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Radical</td>
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<td>29</td>
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The Unpolarizing Strategy

I'm delighted to be here — and delighted that you thought enough of governors to invite two of us to talk about the state of the states on the national scene. There's a lot of talk these days that governors don't really count on the national political scene.

Governors, as public opinion analyst Samuel Lubell bluntly told us at the recent Republican Governors' Conference, are among the more expendable commodities in the political marketplace. "You are expendables," he said, "the GI's on the ground fighting to take Sales Tax Hill or Income Tax Hill. The voters are likely to turn against you if you take those hills, but they are also likely to turn against you if social deterioration spreads still further."

Voters did turn against Republican governors in 1970 and could turn against Republicans in 1972 by the millions unless we start a new and more positive approach. The net loss of 11 governorships in November was a serious setback for the Republican Party and underscores the need for a new national strategy in which we reconcile our differences, unite in common purpose to formulate workable solutions to mounting problems, and reject any attempt — however appealing it might be in the short run — to write off any section or any group within our country.

At your 1970 meeting, Congressman John Anderson noted that preservation of national unity has been an historic tenet of the Republican faith. He recalled that Republican Presidents — from Lincoln through Nixon — have long stressed reconciliation as a political creed. Whatever the words — "to bind up the nation's wounds" or to "bring us together" — the message is the same. As a party, we must adhere to what we advocate. As Congressman Anderson said a year ago, to become a party of sectional or special interest would be to betray the vision of the first Republicans.

Yet, despite such warnings and despite public repudiation of this strategy by our national leadership, we still hear suggestions that this is the winning formula. I have expressed belief that it is not only morally wrong but politically stupid to write off any segment of America for political expediency. We can't afford to write off — or to alienate — blacks, youth or any other group.

In our quest for the Emerging Republican Majority, let us not sacrifice our party's principles for any expediency. Let us unify — not divide. Let us be positive — not negative.

Lincoln told us the past is prologue. We can only hope that 1970 is not a prologue for 1972. One problem with our national campaigning for 1970 was that we blew the tuba so loudly nobody heard the trumpet. We had much to herald. But it wasn't heard. Many of the Administration's friendly critics, including your society, blame this on a misconceived strategy of "positive polarization." It should be emphasized that Republican campaigners of 1970 held no patent on polarization. This nation has had nearly a decade of divisiveness. We should not forget that it was during the Johnson Administration that this country became so divided, so polarized that the President had to restrict his public appearances. And his own party became so polarized between factions, between the young and the establishment, that he did not attend the 1968 Democratic National Convention.

EVERYONE LOSES

The memory of that convention, in this city, survives as a haunting reminder of what happens when youth is alienated and feels no one is listening. Alienation of youth — with all its despair and disenchancement — is a problem facing both parties. It leads to isolation and voluntary withdrawal of the young from the mainstream of the political system. This is a loss for Republicans. It is a loss for Democrats. Above all, it is a loss for the country.

The U.S. Supreme Court decision permitting 18-year-olds to vote in federal elections has added a new dimension to the question of youth and politics. The 18-year-old vote — which I strongly support for state and local as well as federal elections — makes it all the more important that the Party make a greater appeal to youth and give youth a greater voice in party affairs.

The Republican Party has much to offer. In Michigan, for example, a Republican administration has created a Special Commission on the Age of Majority, which, among other things, is developing a comprehensive state policy recognizing appropriate legal rights and responsibilities for young people.

I believe there is a strong similarity between the goals of many young people and the traditional goals of the Republican Party — a healthy skepticism about
the power of government to solve all our problems, a healthy dislike of bureaucracy, and a healthy faith in the dignity and potential of the individual. These are things we Republicans believe in, and these are views that are fervently shared by millions of young people in America today.

But the Republican Party doesn't always seem to recognize this. Too many Republicans allow the dress and life style of young people to obscure the fact that we might share the same goals.

The young should not only participate in the political process, but be made a part of the process of government, too. We are making a start in Michigan. So that the voice of youth may be better heard in state government, I have appointed eight people under 30 to major state boards and commissions, including the governing bodies of colleges and universities. And that is just a start.

A GREATER VOICE
There must also be a greater voice in government for blacks. In Michigan, more than 70 blacks have been named to important state boards and commissions during the past two years of my administration — more black appointments than were made by any previous state administration, regardless of time in office.

But consider what is happening elsewhere. In Virginia, Governor Linwood Holton, the first Republican governor of Virginia in the 20th Century, stands as a prime example of the kind of representation and appeal that the Republican Party must have if it is to have an effective national strategy. This governor, a southern governor, initiated a discussion at the recent Republican Governors' Conference on the folly of ignoring aspirations of blacks and called for new, sustained efforts nationally for racial reconciliation.

The effort involved in developing programs that meet long-denied black aspirations is worthwhile, no matter what vote results; but if the matter were considered in political terms alone, the results of the November 3rd election indicate that a responsible appeal for that vote also is good strategy.

In the large cities of Michigan, we made a highly creditable showing among blacks. In Virginia, Governor Holton received 55 percent of the black vote.

Whether we're talking about youth, or blacks, or other voters, perhaps the biggest lesson of the 1970 elections was that voters have arrived at a new level of sophistication and discrimination. Millions in every state split their tickets, proving that they weren't voting for parties, but for individuals.

The fact that this phenomenon — voter independence and individuality — is likely to grow and spread presents both a threat and an opportunity to the Republican Party. The election indicated, for example, that Republicans in Michigan can no longer believe in "safe" counties outstate and that the Democrats can no longer regard the Detroit area as an impenetrable fortress. For both parties, the door is wide open. New viewpoints, new circumstances have shattered old loyalties . . . .

I want tonight to emphasize my very strong belief that in many vital areas, President Nixon has served America well; that he is deserving of re-election; and that — if only the trumpets can be heard — he will be re-elected.

As Howard Gillette, Jr., Chairman of the Board of the Ripon Society, asked in the Ripon FORUM, what other President in recent memory has done as much to put the federal budgeting process on such a rational basis, open building trades to black Americans, and challenge an outmoded and degrading welfare system? What other President has been able to endorse a program that will provide a minimum income for all families in America with children? What other President has done as much to get us out of Vietnam?

And what other President has truly recognized the financial crisis facing state and local governments? His approach to revenue-sharing could lead to the first real effort by any President to enable the states and the cities to meet domestic needs of this nation. If he comes up with a significant amount of new money, revenue sharing could do for this nation what the Marshall Plan did for Europe. The states and cities are facing absolutely devastating budgetary problems caused in large measure by limitations on the resources that are available to meet responsibilities that are theirs under the federal system. We clearly face one of the most serious threats ever confronted by our federal system — a threat that can be eased by federal revenue-sharing. The states and cities share the burden and must now more equitably share the revenue they help produce.

PRESIDENTIAL COOPERATION
I'm particularly pleased that the President has indicated a willingness on this and other matters to work closely with governors, as he did several weeks ago when Governor Ogilvie led a delegation to the White House to discuss welfare reform.

As one governor in one state, and through the Republican Governors' Association, I'm absolutely determined to do everything I can during the next four years to revitalize the Republican Party, to build it, and, above all, to broaden its base.

Our most important job, our most immediate goal, should be to build our party into an active, vibrant political force that embraces people of all ages and all races. For unless we welcome new faces and encourage new points of view, we will never marshall the human strength that can win not only elections, but the future as well.
The Politico-Economic Past of the New Treasury Secretary

John Connally and SMIC

In February 1968, the FORUM first described the emergence of a new political-economic force — "SMIC," the Southwestern Military-Industrial Complex. This group, the FORUM argued, highly dependent on military expenditures and government largesse generally, has played a major role in distorting American domestic and international priorities and in encouraging a number of other undesirable social trends.

On December 14, 1970, President Nixon announced that he had selected John B. Connally, Jr. — who has played an important role within this group — to replace David M. Kennedy as Secretary of the Treasury. The article which follows seeks to examine the implications of this appointment.

In many ways, John Connally's personal history has fitted him out to be the ideal representative of the Southwestern Military-Industrial Complex (SMIC) within the Nixon administration. Although closely associated in the past with the Austin-based political and financial group dominated by Lyndon Johnson, Connally has had a wide and varied career which brought him into contact with most of the important men and institutional groupings within the region. While much of the impetus behind his meteoric rise can be traced to the New Deal and its aftermath, like Johnson, Connally has been embraced by ultra-conservative cattle barons, bankers, and oil magnates as one of their own.

As a result, Nixon's nomination of Connally for Secretary of the Treasury came as more of a shock in the East, than it did in East Texas. In the Houston financial community, where he sat on the boards of directors of two important banks, the news caused scarcely a ripple. Similarly, there was annoyance but little surprise among Texas' moderates. To some his nomination (in the words of the chief liberal spokesman, then-Senator Ralph Yarborough) can be seen as "another of this Administration's appointments which has been given to reward the party faithful." 1

As governor, Connally consistently supported Texas' predominantly-Anglo monied interests ("big land," "big oil," "big banking") against the demands of the Chicanos-Labor faction in his own party. 2 Only in one respect can he be credited with anything that smacks of a departure from this mold; during his three two-year terms as governor, the state budget rose from $1.3 billion to $2.5 billion. Although this earned Connally a reputation as a "big spender" in some quarters, much of this money was directed towards building up the state's system of higher education to the point where it could better service Texas' burgeoning aerospace industry. 3 In other areas — welfare, health, primary education, etc. — his image as a hard-nosed "fiscal conservative" remained unattenuated.

Thus, the enthusiasm with which some moderates greeted Connally's nomination — in the belief that it signalled a new direction in the Nixon administration's financial policies — seems to be misplaced. Throughout his political career, John Connally has shown an overwhelming willingness to serve some established interests — and there is no reason to assume that he will start acting independently now. If we are to understand the meaning and impact of Connally's nomination, we must look at what these interests were in the past — and what they are likely to be in the near future.

Connally's earliest ties were with the Austin-based grouping which grew up in the hothouse atmosphere of cost-plus contracting and political pork-barreling during and immediately after World War II. Spearheaded by political power in Congress — especially in the important House and Senate military appropriations committees — this grouping began to expand and develop strong interests in a number of areas: banking and land; large-scale construction; oil drilling and exploration; broadcasting; and insurance. Directly or indirectly each of these was dependent on federal largesse: construction on funds for building military bases, dams, and pipelines; broadcasting on federal licenses; and oil drilling, in many cases, on leases and direct subsidies. Insurance companies frequently grew up around military bases — selling

THE AUTHOR

Stephen D. Berkowitz, 27, received his A.B. in Political Science at the University of Michigan in 1965. He is currently writing a Ph.D. thesis at Brandeis University on the evolution of American elite groups, and a book on SMIC for Beacon Press.

3 In the last several years, there has been a concerted effort to remake the University of Texas along the lines of a high-powered knowledge-hoary model including the wooing of faculty from established academic conglomerates. Unfortunately, this has sometimes created cultural shock between the newcomers and their environment — as in the Carolinian case.
"G.I. insurance" to the soldiers and airmen stationed there — and the profits from these and other enterprises were parlayed into ownership of banks and land.

Connally's contact with Austin started while he was still in law school at the University of Texas — where he worked as "a campaign aide in one of Lyndon B. Johnson's earliest contests for election to the United States House of Representatives." During the war, among other duties, Connally was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; served as legal assistant to then Under Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal; and was a member of General Eisenhower's staff. He left active duty in 1946. He then joined an Austin law firm (Powell, Wirtz, and Rauhut) specializing in corporate law and lobbying, managed Johnson's Senatorial primary contest (1948), and helped set up KVET radio, in which Johnson has been involved. Connally continued as president and manager of KVET for three years, going to Washington as Johnson's administrative aide in 1949.

Several other important SMICers were associated with Connally at this time. Ed Clark, sometime lobbyist, bank executive, and ambassador; J. C. Kellam, one-time chairman of the Texas State Colleges Board of Regents, business executive with widespread connections, and president of the LBJ Corporation; Willard Deason, who later became a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission; Robert Phinney, who became director of the Internal Revenue Service, and so on. 

OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES

The activities of this group, of course, were not confined to Austin. In 1952, Connally moved to Fort Worth, joined the firm of Richardson and Bass, and became deeply involved in the activities of the late Sid W. Richardson, multimillionaire oil entrepreneur with vast industrial and financial interests all over the Southwest. At the time Connally was appointed Secretary of the Navy in 1961, he was secretary-treasurer of the Richardson Foundation (assets, at that time, around $400 million) and was one of the executors of Richardson's estate — valued at between $200 million and $1 billion. Connally at one time represented Richardson in various oil and gas associations. He was one of the chief lobbyists for the "fair market price" natural gas bill of 1956 which, in effect, would have handed the gas companies billions of dollars. Connally's activities on behalf of Richardson put him in a position where he was able to develop independent contacts of his own — especially with the powerful Murchison clan, which has substantial interests in railroads, steel, insurance, oil and other industries. John Mecom — millionaire oil magnate and rancher — and Robert B. Anderson — Texas lobbyist and one-time Secretary of the Treasury — were among Connally's associates at this time.

Connally's career up until this point, though unusually successful, was not unique. Throughout the Southwest at this time, men with strong political and financial ties in one city or area were joining together with others on state and federal commissions, in corporations, and on the boards of trustees of various foundations. The overall structural effect of these exchanges was to knit together what had previously been a series of disparate units into a coherent interest group. Old-timers (like the Klebergs of the King Ranch) and relative parvenus (like Ed Clark) began to appear together on boards of directors and to coordinate their activities with one another.

OUR KIND OF GOVERNOR

So when the time rolled around for someone to run for governor in 1962, John Connally seemed like a logical choice. Although close to Johnson politically, he had extensive economic contacts throughout the state. South Texas ranchers (Connally owns three ranches there himself) oilmen, and old-family financiers — all felt comfortable with Connally and were definitely uncomfortable with his liberal-labor opponent, Don Yarborough (no "kin" to Senator Ralph Yarborough). According to Robert Sherrill, only one of the 114 daily newspapers in the state endorsed Yarborough, who had "the entire financial and industrial community arrayed against him." 

Despite this solid backing from Texas' plutocrats, however, and despite a campaign reminiscent of Senator Joseph McCarthy ("Connally Go-Ahead vs. CIO Red"), Connally only managed to squeak by with a margin of 27,000 votes.

This was symptomatic of the instability of statewide electoral coalitions in Texas.

During his term as governor, Connally was able to use federal patronage and funding to consolidate the Johnson group in power. Spurred on by federal largesse (see the February 1968 Ripon FORUM) on an unprecedented scale, Texas and its economy boomed. Dallas-Fort Worth and the Austin area became fast-growing metropolitan areas — with Houston not far behind. Conglomerate corporations — many either based in Texas or with strong economic ties in the region — gobbled up old-established companies. Bank interest rates soared and financial corporations, both 

7 Current Biography, 1961, pp. 110-111.
8 Ibid., p. 110.
9 Some of the men in this circle are discussed in Sherrill, op. cit., p. 102. For an account of Ed Clark's role as ambassador to Australia, see Harry Gordon, "When a Texas-Style Diplomat Hits Australia," The New York Times Magazine, October 8, 1967.
10 The bill, in effect, allowed gas prices to be established by "the market" — without regard to the sorts of limits that are usually placed on public and semi-public utilities. Estimates ranged from $1 billion and $2 billion as the amount of money the bill would have been worth to the industry. According to reports at the time, the oil and gas lobby spent almost $2 million in trying to get the bill through. For a complete discussion of the controversy surrounding this bill, see Robert Poggi, The Politics of Oil, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1961, pp. 426-427.
12 Sherrill, op. cit., pp. 102-104.
banks and insurance companies, experienced extensive growth — including, but not limited, of course, to those with close ties to Connally and the Johnson family.

As people benefiting from the Texas boom became more numerous and well-heeled, Connally drew them into this coalition. Corporation executives — sometimes acting in their own names, but often through "fronts" of various kinds 11 — gave generously to Johnson-Connally campaign funds. Texans of all sorts — "liaison men" as well as plutocrats — were brought to Washington to staff key governmental positions. 12

Within Texas, Connally appointed his allies to governmental office — being careful to "balance" the membership of the important commissions among Austin, Dallas and Houston sub-groups.

**POST-LBJ**

After Johnson left office, the weight of power within SMIC shifted away from the Austin sub-group and towards the Dallas and Houston-based groups around Troy V. Post and Perry R. Bass — Sid Richardson's nephew and heir. While Johnson's political power has begun to wane outside of Austin — in part due to his semi-retirement — Connally remained strong. During the senatorial race last year, his handpicked candidate, Bentsen (South Texas ranching and banking), defeated liberal-labor incumbent Ralph Yarborough in the primary, and conservative-Republican George Bush in the general election.

After leaving office in 1969, Connally joined the board of directors of the First City National Bank of Houston, one of the largest in Texas and, in turn, owner of substantial stock in eight other major banks in Houston alone. 13 In addition, Connally sat on the boards of directors of the Gibraltar Savings Association (Houston) and the U.S. Trust Co. (New York) — linking SMIC with important New York financial groups.

Connally's board memberships are significant in understanding his present role. The First City National Bank of Houston occupies an interesting, pivotal position within SMIC as a whole. Its chief stockholders include representatives of the Houston and Dallas groups — as well as the Austin-Johnson crowd. George Brown of Brown and Root, perhaps Johnson's oldest major financial backer, in strongly involved, and links the bank with oil drilling (Haliburton) and land companies; steel (Armco); pipelines (Texas Eastern Transmission); airlines (TWA); and a major conglomerate (ITT). The bank's directors and officers extend many of these ties. James Elkins, Sr., the senior chairman of the board, is also a senior partner in the firm of Vinson, Elkins, Weems and Searls — a major corporate law firm in Houston of which Connally is now a partner. Elkins' son — chairman of the board of First City National — is a director of the Federal Reserve Bank of Houston and Eastern Airlines, among other concerns. The rest of First City National's officers and directors have a wide range of contacts both inside and outside SMIC.

Despite outside ties, SMIC, itself, however, remains a fairly separate entity. In contrast to several other banks in Houston, for instance, First City National (almost twice the size of its nearest competitor) did not list an outsider among its major stockholders in 1964. 13 This is characteristic of most Austin and Dallas-Fort Worth banks as well. Moreover, where they do occur, outsiders are invariably distinctly in the minority.

This is significant if one recognizes the fact that only the largest corporations within the region have any large outside stockholders. For the most part, economic linkages between smaller firms and the larger structure must be made through the banks, if at all.

When push comes to shove, links within SMIC seem to be more important than external ones. Thus the trans-Pacific route case — which pitted a SMIC-owned carrier (Braniff) against a primarily Eastern-owned one with SMIC ties (Eastern) — was resolved by Johnson in Braniff's favor.

**STILL CLOSE-KNIT**

It would be incorrect, however, to view SMIC as wholly distinct from other political and financial groups. Although corporations and banks are still substantially controlled by insiders, it has shown a simultaneous tendency towards (a) internal realignment, and (b) external expansion. Inevitably, this has engendered greater contact with other groups. As Sombart argued with respect to European commerce, however, the simple extension of economic networks does not necessarily suggest shifting of the nexus of control. SMIC remains strongly tied to the Southwest and its socio-economic base.

Within these financial and political circles, John Connally seems to be the man most likely to orchestrate SMIC’s relationship with the national power system. Financially, this is likely to be a critical role given the Southwest’s heavy reliance on federally-generated sources of income. If Connally follows form, he is likely to push for high levels of military spending, a hands-off attitude towards mergers and one-bank holding companies, and a certain degree of federal myopia regarding the practices of the oil and gas industry. Although this may or may not include supporting a continuation and/or expansion of the Indochina war.

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11 For federal expenditures in Texas during the Johnson era, see "The SMIC Bonddope" in the FORUM (February 1968), p. 3.
12 LTV executives, for instance, contributed money as the "Citizens for Good Government." 13
Applying the Southern Strategy to the Federal Judiciary

The Making of a Judgeship 1971

One undying legacy of the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower was the appointment of courageous and capable Republicans to the Southern federal judiciary. In the stormy years when the civil rights revolution reached its peak in the South, the calm and forceful rulings of judges like Elbert P. Tuttle of Georgia, John Minor Wisdom of Louisiana, John Brown of Texas, and Frank M. Johnson, Jr., of Alabama, vindicated the rights of Southern blacks and made a growing minority of party members proud to be Southerners and Republicans.

The record of the current administration, however, indicates a disinclination to follow in this distinguished tradition, if not a conscious intent to dilute or destroy the legacy of the Eisenhower years. The "Southern strategy," in its most cynical form, has been applied with a vengeance to all levels of the federal judiciary; the result, as with so many other administration stratagems, can only be to rekindle the spark of resistance to civil rights and other progressive advances, and to plunge the emerging New South back into another decade of uncertainty and socioeconomic stagnation.

CAST IN THE SAME MOLD The history of the Supreme Court nominations of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., and G. Harrold Carswell, and the boldly political machinations that led to them, are too well known to be recounted here. It is perhaps less well remembered that one of President Nixon's first major actions affecting the Southern judiciary, in the summer of 1969, was the elevation of the same Judge Carswell from the U.S. District Court in Florida to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. This was followed by another appointment that seemed likely to change the progressive character of the appeals court, that of Charles Clark of Mississippi, a long-time opponent of desegregation and a close associate of U.S. District Judge W. Harold Cox, a notorious segregationist. Meanwhile, the administration's appointments to the District Courts, the vital courts of first instance, appeared by and large to be in the same mold — segregationist corporate lawyers from country club backgrounds, with little interest in or sympathy for civil rights and related litigation (and all white, needless to say).

Since early in 1970, the administration has been trying to make such an appointment to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama (Montgomery), where Congress has created a new judgeship in addition to the one occupied with such distinction by Judge Frank Johnson. During Judge Johnson's 15-year tenure in the Middle District, an historic court order desegregated the Montgomery city buses, ending the Rev. Martin Luther King's famous boycott and launching one of the most significant movements of our time; the epic Lee v. Macon statewide school desegregation case, first of its kind, was fought and won; black Alabamians (with their Northern supporters) were given the right to march from Selma to Montgomery, to seek and finally to gain the right to vote; the rights of students to express their views and to hear the views of others have been consistently upheld; and more recently, Alabama state agencies receiving federal funds were ordered to put a halt to their traditional patterns of job discrimination. The district is not likely to decline in importance now that George C. Wallace has been sworn in for his second term as Governor (which may explain why the administration would like to have a less visible Republican on the bench).

BYARS AND MA BELL The administration's first choice for the new judgeship was Walter R. Byars, a rather junior member of a prestigious Montgomery law firm. Just how the administration arrived at this selection is hard to fathom, especially in view of Byars' almost total lack of courtroom experience. Most of his career since graduation from the University of Alabama in 1952 had been spent as an office lawyer for Southern Bell (now South Central Bell) in Atlanta and Birmingham. In his 1½ years in private practice, his trial experience had been extremely limited; few local lawyers could remember seeing him in court at all. Furthermore, as former Alabama Governor John Patterson described him, Byars was "a silk-stockling, country-club, ultra-conservative, segregationist lawyer."

His firm, Steiner, Crum & Baker, represented such powerful economic interests as South Central Bell, the Alabama Power Company, the Alabama Bankers Association, and a number of railroads. There were fears that Byars' background would affect his rulings, not only in civil rights suits, but also in consumer cases and in the area of environmental protection and industrial pollution, a growing concern in Alabama. Ultimately, the administration decided not to nominate Byars; subsequently, it began to look as if he had all along been merely a stalking horse for the man the President nominated in December, 1970, Robert E. Varner of Montgomery.

Varner, a friend of Postmaster General Winton
Blount, differed from Byars chiefly in that he had acquired a considerable amount of courtroom experience, although opinion in the legal community differed as to the quality of his work. People who knew him said he was a segregationist, who frequently referred to black people as “darkies.” Asked by a New York Times reporter whether this characterization was accurate, Varner replied that “a judge should not commit himself one way or the other on segregation. After all, it is a political philosophy, isn’t it? As I see the law, segregation is sometimes allowed, isn’t it?”

**THE BAN IN THE BAR**

In addition, at the time of his nomination, Varner was president of the all-white Montgomery County Bar Association, which still had a provision in its constitution excluding black lawyers. As a result of this anachronism, such capable attorneys as State Representative Fred D. Gray, civil rights lawyer Solomon S. Seay, Jr., Tuskegee City Judge Charles S. Conley, Assistant U.S. Attorney William H. Thomas, and U.S. Commissioner Calvin C. Pryor were deemed unfit to share the company of the man who would now, if confirmed, sit in judgment on their efforts. Of course, the same charge could be made against any number of Montgomery attorneys, but Varner, as president of the county bar, was peculiarly in a position to rectify the situation. In an interview with the Los Angeles Times, he claimed not to have known about the whites-only clause until recently, and said he had appointed a committee to study the matter. But would be recommend that the ban be repealed? “I don’t think the president [of the bar] ought to recommend a change,” Varner told Jack Nelson of the Los Angeles Times. “I may have something to say before it’s over, but let’s see what the committee has to say about it.” If Varner, as a leader of the local bar, was reluctant to recommend such a basic and long-overdue step to his friends and fellow lawyers, how, one might ask, could he bring himself as a judge to order a school board or a state agency to stop discriminating, or an industrial plant to stop polluting, or, as Judge Johnson has recently done, a segregated YMCA to admit black members?

**SOME KOOK LITIGATION**

Varner’s record also revealed a strain of personal and legal opposition to the government’s efforts in the field of civil rights enforcement. According to people who knew him in 1957, he resigned after three years as an Assistant U.S. Attorney because he objected to the Justice Department’s efforts to begin enforcing the mandate of Brown v. Board of Education. (Nineteen fifty-seven, it will be recalled, was the year of Little Rock.) And in 1962, Varner somehow got involved in the cases of three men from Pike County, Alabama, who just happened to be at Oxford, Mississippi, during the disturbance attending James H. Mere-

Varner, along with two other lawyers, whipped up lawsuits on their behalf against Deputy Attorney General Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Chief U.S. Marshal James P. McShane, and others; but as two federal courts ultimately held, the action flew squarely in the face of existing law. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in upholding dismissal of the actions, noted that the claims against federal officials were grounded in part on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which imposes civil liability upon persons who deprive others of their rights while acting under color of the laws “of any State or Territory.” This statute, the Court of Appeals remarked, “is so plainly limited to acts done under color of some state or territorial law or ordinance that no discussion can make it clearer than appears from its reading.” Even more distressing than the anti-civil rights tone of these actions (which collectively became known as Norton v. McShane) was the fact that they seemed so dangerously close to “kook” litigation.

Many of the allegations against Varner were aired in December at the hearing on his nomination before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee. Varner, a personable and genuinely likable man, made a poised appearance before the committee, and came up with some more responsive replies than he had given to the press. But enough doubts were raised that the full committee did not act on the nomination before the 91st Congress expired.

**SENIOR BAYH QUERIES**

When Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana asked Varner if he was a segregationist, the nominee first remarked, “Is this a question I can properly answer as a prospective judge? If I brand myself, am I then disqualified to sit on such cases as the question may arise?” Assured that he would not compromise himself, Varner finally stated flatly, “I am not a segregationist,” and quoted a “black friend” who had recently told him, “I know you are a member of some segregated organizations and some integrated organizations, because I’m on the board of the Boy Scouts with you.” As to the allegations about the bar association, Varner professed to have been “shocked” by two things when he recently read the group’s constitution — the whites-only clause and the fact that the county bar was not incorporated. Varner told the Committee he had made no recommendation on either of these matters — although “I may have said to consider incorporating.” Pressed for a recommendation on the ban on black attorneys, Varner said, “If I were to make a recommendation, I would recommend that it be changed.” Since the Judiciary Committee did not act after this hearing, a nomination for the Middle District vacancy will have to be submitted anew to
The Varner nomination, and the long struggle over filling this judgeship, have raised questions that transcend the disposition of cases in a single judicial district. The first is the trend away from the enlightened Republican judges of the Eisenhower years toward the generally less able, less progressive corporate lawyers appointed under Nixon. A federal district judge like Frank Johnson can perform an invaluable service for a Southern community simply by his willingness to accept the responsibility for the social changes that must be made. Every school board member, public official, and police officer in the Middle District knows that if his actions are questioned in court, Judge Johnson will force him to follow the law. As a result, the quality of life for every citizen of the district is measurably different from what it would have been under a less dedicated and capable judge — and from what it is today in some other communities in Alabama and the rest of the South, including some served by President Nixon's recent appointees. If the respect for law engendered by Judge Johnson's rulings is diluted by the appointment of a legal throwback, the people of the Middle District will pay the price — as will the people in other Southern districts similarly afflicted.

WHY NOT A BLACK? If, moreover, the roster of available Southern whites is nearly bare of distinguished judicial material, would this not be the time to appoint a black federal judge? Even Robert Varner's most passionate defenders make no great claims for his legal ability; yet the theory seems to be that any white lawyer is preferable to the most qualified black. It is a mark of shame, not only against the Nixon administration, but against all who have held power during the past decade, that none of the able black lawyers produced by the civil rights movement has been named to a Southern federal court. (Ironically, though there is no shortage of qualified black attorneys in the Middle District of Alabama, the candidate who probably commands the widest popular support is the administration's own U.S. Attorney, Ira DeMent, a young, white, Republican moderate who has had the backing of groups ranging from the Alabama NAACP to the Fraternal Order of Police, in addition to that of his Republican Congressman and the GOP chairman for his congressional district.)

Finally, the administration would do well to note the political and social forces set in motion by its attempts to fill the Alabama judgeship. The voices heard in opposition to Byars and Varner were not just those of blacks and liberals; they also included responsible Republicans and even populist-oriented segregationists like former Governor Patterson and (according to the New York Times) George Wallace himself. Patterson was suspicious of Byars, for example, because of "an intimate relationship with the 'big mules' — the big money interests, the banks, the utilities, and the railroads"; the Times reported that "Mr. Wallace and those in his camp believe Mr. Varner to be part of the industrial or commercial power structure of the state and thereby unsympathetic to their own populist thrusts." (Wallace, it should be noted, won reelection in 1970 by running against the industrial interests that had supported him in the past; his second term as Governor may be quite different from the first.)

Those pleased by the choices of Byars and Varner, then, would seem to be limited to the real beneficiaries of the Southern strategy, the white conservative elite, as embodied by the clients of the two men's law firms and by Postmaster General Blount, operator of a multimillion-dollar construction firm before he left Montgomery for Washington. Significantly, when Varner was challenged at his Senate hearing, he returned home and came up with telegrams of support from several black "leaders," including the president of a predominantly black state university, a high school principal, an owner of a funeral home, the retired editor of a daily newspaper's "Negro page," and an old-line black politician. Writing in the August, 1970, bulletin of the Selma (Alabama) Project, Jack Drake, a perceptive radical attorney, touched upon this phenomenon:

... I am troubled by the impending emergence of Alabama's middle class, the new "Progressives," whose long-range political objectives make them infinitely more dangerous than Wallace. The middle class needs a new standard bearer to protect their corporate power and ruling class position. They are interested in economic gain (exploitation) and thus will make only the reforms necessary to achieve maximum economic proficiency. Blacks will be appointed to governmental bodies (as they have been in Birmingham, Tuscaloosa, and other urban areas) and some Blacks will be openly supported for elective positions. The Blacks so chosen will be selected by White middle class professionals and not by Black people. Then a Black elite, made up of educated Black professionals, will be erected to serve as a buffer between the White elite and the oppressed.

Unless a number of moderate Republicans on the Judiciary Committee join the liberal Democrats already opposed to Varner, the President's rich friends will probably have their way on the Middle District nomination. But if the varied groups confronting them continue to be driven together by events, the white conservative elite will not have its way much longer.
Nixon and Vietnam:

As we enter into the second decade of the longest war in our history, it is worth asking how it will differ from the first.

If our present policy succeeds, violence and war will continue in Indochina well into this decade, with some type of American involvement.

Yet, I do not see the prospects for the second decade of the Indochina War as being that bleak, because I believe our present policy is destined to fail.

These were my impressions upon my return from a three-week trip to Vietnam and Southern Asia in December.

Delusions about the Vietnam war have frequently resulted from a policy that seems to make sense day to day, but ignores the questions of where it all will end. Today, as much as any time in the past, we must ask where our present policy is leading, what its intentions are, and what the future will hold for Indochina. I have become convinced that the future will bring not only more of the same brutal war to Vietnam, but also will create economic deterioration, intensified political repression, and drastic military vulnerability in that land. Long range, I can see no hope for our present course of action in Vietnam. We are not headed toward authentic American withdrawal; we are not ending the war. The present policy might even fail in its primary objective — keeping the Saigon regime in power. A combination of economic, political and military circumstances could eventually lead to the complete demise of “Vietnamization.”

ECONOMIC DETERIORATION

I wasn’t expecting to discover that Saigon’s most visible problems are traffic congestion, pollution, overcrowding and slums. But those are reflections of a basic change brought about by the war. A country that had been about 80% rural and 20% urban has become, in the space of a few years, about 50% urban and 50% rural. People have fied into the large urban areas in search of refuge from the war’s destruction.

I looked in vain for any sign that the South Vietnamese government was reaching and improving the lot of the city’s refugees. The total incapability of the government to meet these needs made their situation all the more desperate and forbidding.

The only chance for economic livelihood that many of these city-refugees have found is dependent upon American soldiers stationed nearby. G.I.’s provide opportunities for these Vietnamese to become maids, to be bar girls, to wash jeeps, to sell marijuana, or to work in other jobs associated with American bases. But the reductions of American troops have curtailed this one possible source for employment and enterprise.

For these Vietnamese, Vietnamization means their plight is becoming worse, while the war’s perpetuation keeps them hopelessly trapped in the city.

The Vietnamization of the war requires the further Americanization of South Vietnam’s economy. The life of the Saigon regime is totally dependent upon American dollars, and our current policy will only increase this dependency. Embassy officials reiterated to me the need for more economic assistance to the Thieu-Ky regime in the future.

As long as there is no basic political settlement to the conflict, any government of South Vietnam will have to be an economic parasite of the United States. But economic conditions may continue to deteriorate, and create serious social and political problems, in spite of how much we increase our economic assistance.

United States policy has been directed toward winning the war in the countryside, and supposed gains in pacification are frequently hailed by old and new optimists about Vietnam. Yet the future may depend as much upon the cities. Their vulnerability to economic deterioration that will lead to political instability is the dangerous factor.

POLITICAL REALITIES

Visiting a provincial political prison gave me some impression of South Vietnam’s political repression. About 1,200 people of all ages were crammed into this prison; 400 were women.

As far as I could determine, these people were suspected for some reason — almost any reason — of being sympathetic to the National Liberation Front.

In most cases, they were not proven as hard-core Viet Cong. Rather the authorities simply wanted to pull these people out of circulation from society. Most of those imprisoned were probably the victims of circumstance. No system of reasonable justice accompanies such procedures. In fact, one of the chief requests of groups in Vietnam who are protesting conditions in the prisons is that prisoners whose terms have expired should be released.

The character of this conflict has forced the South’s government and our allied armies to imprison and even kill almost indiscriminately. Yet the pattern of repression only increases animosity, eroding what little internal support the government might possess.

One evening I witnessed a student protest meeting that had been called over the killing of the young boy. A variety of people — intellectual leaders

THE AUTHOR

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and others as well as students — spoke about the tragedy of the war and its effect upon Vietnamese society. What I thought would end as a peaceful assembly was disrupted by a tear-gas attack by the Saigon police; a battle then ensued between the police and the demonstrators. It all was an example of the political predicament of the Saigon regime. The protest had been launched against the slaying of an innocent Vietnamese by an American. The demonstration was put down by Thieu’s riot-control police trained by the U.S. and wielding tear gas manufactured in Pennsylvania. That is not the sort of action likely to win over the population to the Thieu-Ky government or make the people appreciative of all we are doing for them.

Americans have always wanted to believe in the justice of the elections in South Vietnam. But in truth, the elections have done little more than preserve an arbitrary political situation. They cannot be regarded as any genuine test of the people’s will. Each province chief is still appointed by Thieu and Ky, and they in turn must produce the votes during the election. There is a constitutional provision requiring the election of province chiefs sometime this year, before the Presidential elections in September. However, Thieu could alter this provision and others before that time to solidify his position.

Looking ahead to September, attention in the United States has begun to focus around Big Minh, who has been given the general image of a “peace candidate.” Embassy officials, however, told me they would not expect him to “deal very differently with the Communists than Thieu.” The crucial factor is that any regime in South Vietnam under present circumstances would owe its existence to American support, and thus be suppliant to our policy. It would be a mistake and complete deception to look to the elections held by the Thieu government this September as any kind of expression of “self-determination” or the other goals we say we are fighting for.

The question for the future is whether American support and power will keep the South Vietnamese government in control despite political problems, as it has in the past. This assumes that the United States will continue to support the repugnant tactics the Saigon regime must employ to remain in power. Unrepresentative, repressive governments have survived in South Vietnam for years. But Saigon’s challenges in the future will grow from economic and military as well as political roots, which might be too much for anyone to handle, especially with our help.

**A VENEER OF SECURITY**

Those wishing to convince Americans about the gains in security and pacification are fond of driving on roads previously not safe for travel, and going into areas like the Mekong Delta, where dramatic, visible changes seem to have taken place. It is undeniable that the intensity of fighting has decreased almost everywhere. But the mistake is to assume this is the proof of pacification’s success, or evidence of the enemy’s weakness.

President Nixon’s policy has resulted in the withdrawal of about 10,000 to 12,000 troops per month, on the average, since June of 1969. In April of 1970, after having reduced troop strength from 549,000 to 434,000, Mr. Nixon announced that he would bring home another 150,000 by the spring of 1971. Ten days later he moved into Cambodia.

Each announcement about troops coming home, every claim about new troop reductions, the closing of Green Beret units, and the turning over of ships and helicopters to the Vietnamese, have merely been the implementation of the goal set by the President in April of 1970 rather than any new policy. There has been no certain word about the 284,000 troops who will still be in Vietnam after the spring of this year, although one might expect the withdrawals to continue at about the same rate for at least a few months.

But Vietnamization is not a way of ending the war; by its design, it is a formula for perpetuating the war, and only changing the tactics. The belief is that by taking some U.S. troops away, getting more of the Vietnamese to take the brunt of ground combat, relying heavily on air power (even increasing our bombing in some areas, such as Laos) and giving more money and aid to the Saigon government, we will be able to pursue our same objective — support the existence of a friendly non-Communist “Republic of Vietnam” — and pacify domestic opposition to the war in the United States.

Vietnamization depends largely on the ability of the South Vietnamese to stand up against the forces of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. The people who really seem to believe this is a reliable alternative live in Washington rather than Vietnam.

The Vietnamese are a brave, courageous and strong people. That is not the problem. But we should not expect ARVN (the South Vietnamese Army) to become a fully capable fighting force committed so fervently to the Thieu-Ky Government that they will rally to defeat the enemy. Too many of them see no cause for such commitment and cannot understand why the war must continue.

A Vietnamese and a long-time American observer, in discussing South Vietnam’s future, were looking for those forces in society that were the most likely to change the direction of policies inside South Vietnam. The students, while deeply committed, were only a small group. Another stronger element were the refugees in the cities. But the third they cited were the men in the South Vietnamese Army. They
were convinced that discontent and a lack of commitment were strong within the ranks of the ARVN, and eventually, by default or other means, they would aid in the cause of peace rather than prolong the war.

BRER FOX, HE LAY LOW

While Americans have been withdrawing troops, Hanoi and its allies have been doing little militarily. The level of fighting in Vietnam is still largely dependent upon what the other side chooses to do. It is spurious, therefore, to conclude that a relative reduction in fighting is a sign that our policy is succeeding, and that we have decisively undermined the strength of the enemy.

There may well come a time when Hanoi and the Front decide that they have lain low long enough — when, for instance, American troop reductions stop. Then they could choose to move militarily against ARVN forces left without the assistance of U.S. ground combat units. In such a case, decisive military gains could be won, particularly in northern and central South Vietnam.

Such military vulnerability alone would seem to indicate the improbability of our present policy achieving its stated aims. But the North Vietnamese and the NLF have the ability to combine such military offensives with the effects of economic deterioration and political instability.

There are two political events which might influence the timing and strategy of Hanoi and the NLF. First is the election in South Vietnam next September. The second is the beginning of our own Presidential primaries about a year from now. The other side is adroit in timing its military strategy to capitalize upon political developments, both in this country and South Vietnam. Either of these elections may be crucial factors in shaping their military strategy.

AVERTING CATASTROPHE

In December, in televised conversation with four newsmen, Mr. Nixon refused, when asked, to speculate about what he would do if it appeared that Vietnamization was not working. I only trust that the Administration's private councils are more open and realistic than the President's public statements. Not only does the future of war or peace in Indochina hinge on that question; the political future of Mr. Nixon could be affected by what happens when Vietnamization begins to fail.

Faced at some point, perhaps the end of the year, with a deteriorating situation in Indochina, it is my fear that Mr. Nixon would still try to save the situation. To do otherwise would be to admit his "plan" was not ending the war, and that his Vietnam policies since his election were a failure. Further, Mr. Nixon has always stated that he intends to win a "just peace" that will not encourage aggression," indicating a commitment to the myths about our security being affected by the political future of South Vietnam.

The President's most plausible military option in such a case would be to renew, continuous, and intense bombing of North Vietnam. Such a desperate escalation of the war, like the strike into Cambodia, would be rationalized and sold to the American people as a means of protecting troops and "ending the war."

Of course, bombing the North again would never solve a deteriorating political and military situation in the South — it never solved anything before, and will not in the future.

The tentative support Mr. Nixon has from the public for his Vietnam policies is based upon the impression that those policies are actually ending the war. Public opinion polls generally have indicated approval for the President's handling of the Vietnam situation. But they have also indicated that a majority of Americans are in favor of total American withdrawal by the end of this year.

One official in Vietnam admitted to me how surprised he was that the President had "gotten away with doing so little." What he did not realize is that most Americans believe the Administration has done far more than it has. Americans have heard only about troop withdrawals, lowered casualties, and an "end to the combat role," and believe, understandably, that we are leaving Vietnam and the war is about over. The Administration has encouraged such misconceptions about our policy in order to hold public support.

This Administration, like the one before, has maintained the fiction about negotiating to end the war. I have not even mentioned the subject previously, because any realistic assessment of what we are doing in Indochina must ignore negotiations as an important component of our policy. As long as we continue our present policy, they will not result in any solution.

The other side has been clear about its negotiating position. They have asked for a date for our total withdrawal and the removal of our support for Thieu and Ky; we have rejected those terms.

American officials have warned about giving the enemy at the negotiating table what we have denied him on the battlefield. But that assumes that we and the ARVN forces would be able to frustrate and eliminate the threat from the enemy for an indefinite period of time. In practical terms, it means that we would win the war and defeat the enemy. But to believe that is possible, especially with our present policy, is utter delusion. And, as Henry Kissinger has written, "The guerilla wins if he does not lose." So the case could be argued that with time the enemy may be able to win on the battlefield more than they are asking for at the negotiating table.

Embassy officials in Saigon as well as other long-
time observers and reporters in Vietnam all generally concur that negotiations are simply not being seriously considered as the solution to the war. Even the President has made this clear by stating his disappointment over the lack of progress at Paris and his increased reliance on "Vietnamization as an end to the war." It seems as if the peace talks have been perpetuated solely to discredit such time-tables as the Hatfield-McGovern Amendment, on the incredible grounds that it would "undermine negotiations."

LOCAL POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION
Some U.S. officials emphasize that the extent of polarization in Vietnam prohibits any chance for a political settlement between the two sides. Yet, some evidence of local political accommodation can be found to contradict that view. In the Mekong Delta, for instance, which is the current showcase of pacification, the state of relative calm has come not because the enemy has been obliterated, but because in many cases the NLF's forces and infrastructure have chosen to establish local, quiet accommodation.

A South Vietnamese army officer told me of how ARVN units have made secret agreements with the VC and North Vietnamese in their local areas. In such cases, ARVN commanders of outposts or units privately have worked out terms of how they will not attack if they are left free from attack. Apparently, this can only go on with ARVN combat units that are in positions on their own without American units. Nevertheless, I was told that the Americans have caught on to this game, and have responded by trying to arrange the frequent transfer of units or commanding officers in order to disrupt such a process.

I have no way of knowing whether such examples amount to anything more than a few isolated incidents. Certainly, accommodation of any sort is made extremely difficult by the attitudes of the Thieu-Ky regime, which has demonstrated a complete inability and unwillingness to accommodate with even many of the non-communist political forces within South Vietnam. Their public attitude and policy toward neutralists, to say nothing of the NLF, is that there can never be any compromise. Yet, localized examples of accommodation, taking place beyond U.S. or Saigon's control, indicate what might develop under different political circumstances.

The realistic and responsible alternative to our present policy is to propose a date for the withdrawal of all our forces, and to use this initiative as a means to enable a negotiated end to the destruction of Indochina. The nature of a government to replace Thieu and Ky, and procedures for setting it up, would then have to be established.

One cannot promise or predict what will eventuate under these circumstances. However, the strength of those Vietnamese who are neutralist, non-Communist, but anti-American — the so-called "third force" — would be tested in coalition with the NLF and other elements.

I was told of Vietnamese who use the expression that the "wind is too strong so no reeds can stand up," meaning that the corruption of the Thieu-Ky regime, its dependence on the U.S., and its policies toward the people are all such a strong force that a "good man" cannot stand up and cooperate with them without hopelessly compromising himself. It is impossible to say how strong such a "third force" would be; all that can be done is to provide the opportunity for them to stand up.

Any government in South Vietnam that would be authentically representative and responsive to the people is likely to adopt an anti-American point of view. The question, impossible for anyone to answer with certainty, is whether such a government would remain genuinely neutralist, in coalition with the NLF, or whether the NLF would gain increasing influence.

There is little doubt in my mind, however, that the southern half of Vietnam will eventually be governed by a coalition that will include the NLF in some important way and the other authentically indigenous political forces there. In time, that will take place; if not this year, then in 1972; or then after the election that year, or even later. But with time this will come about. Until then, there will only be more fighting, more bombing, more devastation, and more death in Indochina.

The President could still quietly determine to change his policy, make those concessions necessary for a political settlement, and declare that he had succeeded in ending the war. But by the end of this year or even sooner, his policy could be a total failure, and even force him into escalation that would jeopardize his political future. Further, the result of what eventually happens in Vietnam will be no different.

The Vietnamese people, above all else, want peace. Americans want all the troops home by the end of this year. And our opponents have asked that we set a date for our withdrawal as the first step to a settlement. There is no need for the President to prolong the tragedy of Vietnam. But he must stop selling and believing in Vietnamization as a "means of ending the war," before it becomes clear to all Americans that it is only perpetuating the war.

Washington still can shape the destiny of Indochina, and it is still within Mr. Nixon's power to end the fighting, without destroying the confidence he has attempted to build in his leadership. It is remarkable that he should still have such an opportunity. It is understandable that it will soon vanish.

For the sake of the people who live in Indochina, I pray that he will seize it.

WES MICHAELSON
Annual Report  from page 24

dedicated to one of the Ripon Society's principal goals: involving young people in the political process.

The purpose of the One Percent Club is to encourage young, progressive Republicans to seek new public office, by providing them with financial support early in their campaign. Each year, members of the Club contribute 1% of their income. Loans are made from the general revenues, thus establishing a revolving fund which grows every year. In its first trial run, the Club disbursed $7000.

The Open-Presidency Task Forces grew from a discussion Ripon members had with President Nixon in late 1969. They consist of young people of all political persuasions, who examine specific areas of public policy with the cooperation of the White House. The interim report of the first Task Force on the Volunteer Military was released in January. They received warm Presidential endorsement and are administered by an independent, tax-exempt foundation, the Sabre Foundation of Fond du Lac, Wisconsin.

FINANCES

The Ripon Society felt the impact of the 1970 national economic slump. A decline in contributions to the Society from 1969 was reflected most significantly in the Society's budget through a reduction in expenditures for staff salaries. However, volunteer manpower permitted the Society to maintain the quantity and quality of the FORUM and its research publications.

The budget for 1971 includes a significant increase in the expenditures for the FORUM; the objective is to publish the FORUM bi-weekly rather than monthly, thus permitting timely political commentary to complement the existing articles of long-range political analysis, and research and position papers on public policy. This will require additional funds for mailing and editorial support.

The other major budgetary increase is for travel, an essential element in building a national political network. Chapters need to be placed in personal contact with one another, and groups desiring to affiliate with the Society require personal attention from Ripon's national officers. Additional funds for staff support will be used to employ a full-time President (an objective for 1970 that we postponed) and to ensure adequate, part-time help to staff limited-duration special projects. Hopefully, in 1971, one such project will be to establish an annual "Ripon Prize" for an outstanding political research paper advocating a new public policy idea.

OUTLOOK

During the latter part of 1970, the Society invested a significant portion of its resources in attempting to broaden its financial base. And many of those who contributed to the Society in 1970 have pledged to renew their contribution in 1971. Thus it is anticipated that the Society can increase its budget from 1970 to 1971, independent of the state of the economy, by developing the fund-raising potential in five previously untapped cities: Chicago, Hartford, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Washington, D.C.

Since its founding eight years ago, the Ripon Society has spent less than $500,000 on all its activities and efforts including research and publication, the monthly magazine the FORUM, and travel and political action. Ripon's high benefit-to-cost ratio means that those wishing to invest in the future of the American political system should consider a contribution to the Society.

Financial Report

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| EXPENDITURES | | | | | | |
| FORUM Printing & Distribution | $1,136 | $4,068 | $8,784 | $16,479 | $17,950 | $23,937 | $37,000 | |
| FORUM Salaries and Materials | | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL FORUM | 1,136 | 4,068 | 11,906 | 32,547 | 34,065 | 36,600 | 65,000 | |
| Publications & Research | 5,895 | 4,241 | 4,855 | 20,701 | 15,523 | 12,280 | 15,000 | |
| Press Release & Communication | | | | | | | | |
| National Organization & Coordination | | | | | | | | |
| Fund Raising and Promotion | 3,222 | 3,137 | 3,493 | 3,573 | 3,401 | 1,273 | 15,000 | |
| Attendance at National Meetings | 241 | 954 | 759 | 2,363 | 2,640 | 245 | 5,000 | |
| and Conferences | 4,271 | 9,701 | 15,582 | 21,957 | 32,574 | 23,319 | 30,000 | |
| Staff Salaries | | | | | | | | |
| Payment to Chapters | 3,975 | 5,441 | 5,906 | 10,401 | 25,010 | 28,020 | 30,000 | |
| General Operating Expenses | 578 | 1,381 | | 7,307 | 7,926 | 10,875 | |
| Special Projects | | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL EXPENDITURES | $19,918 | $31,893 | $47,742 | $111,414 | $127,047 | $115,670 | $199,000 | |
The major Ripon event of January was the Societys' Eighth Anniversary Dinner held in Chicago on January 9. Governor Richard Ogilvie addressed the 360 people attending before dinner, with Governor William G. Milliken delivering the after-dinner address. Sponsors of the dinner were:


Special thanks go to Bruce Fraser who accepted the responsibility, as dinner chairman, of organizing Ripon's first annual dinner west of the Alleghenies; to Mary Anderson who undertook the dreary job of invitations chairman; and to Margot Adler who handled press relations.

The Societys' national governing board and representatives of Ripon cells from across the Midwest took advantage of the weekend in Chicago to hold a series of meetings and workshops on such issues as “New Issues for the GOP,” “Congressional Redistricting,” “Building Local Coalitions,” as well as on Ripon's finances and future.

Groups from Pittsburgh and Minneapolis were given provisional chapters status by the National Executive Committee.

LETTERS

BYRD NOT UNOPPOSED

Dear Madam:

On page 4 of the FORUM’s December issue, you listed U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) as being unopposed in the November elections. I would like to call your attention to the fact that Senator Byrd was opposed by Elmer Dodson, the Republican Mayor of West Virginia's capital city of Charleston. Mr. Dodson was named as candidate on September 4, after the Republican State Executive Committee voted 5-1 to leave the spot empty on the ballot. Senator Byrd won with 78 percent of the vote, which, incidentally, topped his 1964 winning percentage by 10 points.

JOHN E. GUINIVEN
Press Secretary to Senator Byrd

SMIC from page 14

it most certainly will involve stumping for increased military “preparedness” and domestic protectionism. In international economic policy his focus is apt to be on facilitating SMIC investment in Latin America and Australia, even if this means a continuing deterioration of American terms of trade with Europe.

Further, as heir to Johnson’s political power within Texas — and the master of some of his own — Connally seems to be in a position to drive a hard, but mutually beneficial bargain with either party. From the point of view of the Nixon administration, this would seem to be particularly desirable for three reasons.

First, if the economy continues along its present course or stagnates even further, and if they are not given representation on the ticket, Eastern moderates are likely to desert Nixon or remain neutral. This would make it necessary for Nixon to find additional financial backing elsewhere.

Second, given Texas’ growing power within the Southwest, a “Southern strategy” would seem to suggest stronger ties with the “conservative” wing of the Texas Democratic party. If Nixon wants to build a permanent electoral base in the region, however, it would be necessary for him to attract Connally to the Republican party — or to a fusion coalition. Unlike many Southern states, where joining the Republican party would mean a decisive loss of seniority for “conservatives,” Texas would lose virtually no seniority in the Senate and little in the House. This would suggest the possibility that Connally might be induced to join the Nixon ticket as a Republican — and bring much of his political coalition with him.

Finally, given its strong right-wing base in East Texas, and its heavy dependence on military contracting, Texas could be counted on to provide a firm base for authoritarian trends at home and “tough-minded” policies abroad. If the economy fails to improve substantially, Nixon is likely to lose the ethnic-labor support he picked up in 1968 in Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Southern California, but which Republicans lost in 1970.

For all these reasons, John Connally seems to be a logical choice for a Cabinet appointment in the Nixon administration, and possibly even...

STEPHEN D. BERKOWITZ

Washington Viewpoint from page 6

subcommittee, was the prime architect of the compromise.

After painfully working out the agreement, Widnall was undercut by a substitute bill which the White House developed and offered on the House floor. The compromise bill was narrowly passed, though the Republican leadership worked to defeat it. Despite passage, Widnall — a creative force in urban legislation and the acknowledged Republican spokesman on housing — was embarrassed and embittered. The episode put other senior Republicans on guard more than ever.

Such is the legacy Clark MacGregor inherits. Though liked and respected by his former colleagues, he is nonetheless unlikely to bring about meaningful change. The real solution rests higher up than the congressional relations staff; it rests with the President.

During his recent TV chat with newsmen, Mr. Nixon responded to a question about his relations with Congress by citing the statistic that he had met with far more Congressmen than had his predecessor in a comparable period of time. Unfortunately, the success of the congressional relations game is not measured on a scoreboard, but by the quality of legislation offered, the skill with which it is directed, and most importantly, by respect for the abilities of the legislators, and for the legislative process itself.

DANIEL J. SWILLINGER
Though the Ripon Society's budget was reduced slightly during 1970, the activities in which the Society and its members were involved during the year grew significantly. This reflects an increase in the Society's principal asset, the number of young people contributing, through Ripon, to the political process.

The Society's objectives continue to be 1) to provide a bridge between the Republican Party and young men and women of the academic, business and professional communities 2) to publish new ideas, positive proposals and independent criticism on a regular basis and 3) to reach out to new constituencies in cities where the Ripon Society maintains chapters.

RIPON CHAPTERS

During 1970, over two dozen groups around the country organized with the purpose of becoming a Ripon chapter. Budgetary restraints prevented personal contract with many of these groups. It is expected that during 1971 some of them will become Ripon chapters.

CONFERENCES AND SEMINARS

"Needed: a Republicanism for the 1980's" was the title of a conference at Airlie House, Virginia, over the weekend of March 13-15, 1970. Ripon provided the staff work and financial sponsorship for this gathering of 300 young Republicans from forty states.

The Boston Chapter of the Ripon Society sponsored a series of "Issues Seminars" for Republicans seeking a seat in the Massachusetts legislature for the first time.

The "Allenberry Assembly," a weekend get-together, similar to the Airlie House Conference, for young progressive Republicans from Pennsylvania was organized by the Ripon chapter in Philadelphia and the new Ripon group in Pittsburgh.

PUBLICATIONS AND RESEARCH

A follow-up to Ripon's book on Southern Republicanism was published in 1970 as a special double issue of the FORUM. Prepared by Ripon Fellow Michael S. Lottman, it studied the Republican Parties in the South. Its analyses were borne out with astonishing accuracy by the 1970 elections.

During 1970, the Society completed a book version of its Report to the President on Youth. Edited by Howard Reiter, instead of revolution will be published by Hawthorn Books in the spring of 1971.

Ripon Research Director William Rogers ran the 1970 Research Consortium for Republican Senatorial and Congressional candidates. This research service provided position and briefing papers, plus press releases on a contract basis. Thus GOP candidates were able to pool their research effort and to receive in-depth analysis and well thought-out proposals on a number of public policy issues.

PRESS

Newspaper, magazine and television appearances by leaders of the Ripon Society reached a new high, as did news coverage of the group. Of particular note was coverage of Ripon's Southern study, its post-election analysis, its new Congressional ratings and its position papers on a free market farm policy, the Carswell nomination, and civil rights activities of the Department of Justice and HEW.

Ripon's President, J. Lee Auspitz, contributed several political articles to the Washington Post syndicate, and Playboy magazine requested that he do a piece for them to articulate the Ripon philosophy of progressive Republicanism.

FORUM

The Society placed a special emphasis on expanding the size and quality of the Ripon FORUM during 1970. Though the direct expenditure for salaries for the editorial staff was reduced during the year, the FORUM's editors, Howard Reiter and Evelyn Ellis, have been able to draw on a growing pool of young writers as well as established academics and civic leaders who want their ideas published in a form that reaches decision and policy makers. Income from FORUM circulation grew only slightly in 1970 reflecting only natural growth, for the Society was unable to invest in promotional mailings.

RIPON "SPIN-OFFS"

Although the Society's total budget decreased slightly during 1970, the activities initiated by Ripon greatly expanded. During the year, Ripon members started two new organizations — one un-abashedly Republican, the other strictly non-partisan. Both are
As much as possible, it has been the object of the Ripon Society to compile an index capable of serving as a reference work in itself. We have attempted to make entries generous enough to give the researcher substantial information, in addition to a fully adequate idea of what information he can expect to find in the FORUM citations. For the user's further convenience, entries have been made by subject, author, and article.

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