The Nixon Record: An Appraisal
The Gilder Age

George Gilder's editorial and rhetorical talents are evident in this issue of the FORUM — as they have been for the past one and a half years. But for the next six months, FORUM readers will be deprived of his literary flourishes, as George is resigning as editor and devoting himself to another subject close to his heart — women's issues. When George completes his book on the subject and emerges from seclusion, FORUM readers will once again savor the style, the controversy and the logic that is pure Gilder.

— D.B.
Progressives and the President

Differences between the Ripon Society and the Nixon Administration during its first term of office have been frequent and severe. Generally speaking, our criticisms have focused on perpetuation of the divisive war policy in Vietnam and execution of a political strategy designed to co-opt George Wallace's 1968 supporters at the cost of sacrificing the Party's great tradition of civil rights and civil liberties. We have particularly deplored the Supreme Court nominations of Haynsworth, Carswell and Rehnquist, the effort to dilute the 1965 Voting Rights Act and the recent crusade against the essentially false demon of "forced busing to achieve racial balance."

On the other hand, we have supported progressive policies of this Administration. Except for Vietnam, American foreign policy is now based upon a philosophically consistent approach. It is designed to achieve world peace through realistic measures, rather than upon the ad hoc decisions of the Kennedy and Johnson eras. The President's carefully orchestrated initiatives for improved communication and negotiation with Communist countries, particularly the Soviet Union and China, his achievements in the Middle East, and the Berlin and SALT agreements are a record of historic dimensions.

In the domestic sphere, the President's 1971 State of the Union address offered an alternative to the negative Southern strategy with a positive program on which to build a new Republican majority. With his call for "a second American Revolution," the President moved away from the politics of polarization toward his great goal, announced September 19, 1968, to make the Presidency "a force for pulling our people back together once again, and for making our nation whole by making our people one."

There is no doubt in our minds that the Nixon Administration could have fashioned a more positive record over the last four years, as the papers in this issue indicate, particularly in the domestic sphere. But there is no doubt in our minds, either, that the President's statesmanship abroad and his goals for the new American Revolution can provide the foundations for a truly progressive second term.

We therefore urge progressive Republicans to put aside their past differences with the Administration and to work for the President's re-election.
**Six Goals for a “Peaceful American Revolution”**

**Keystones to a Progressive Republican Majority**

In these troubled years just past, America has been going through a long nightmare of war and division, of crime and inflation. Even more deeply, we have gone through a long, dark night of the American spirit. But now that night is ending. Now we must let our spirits soar again. Now we are ready for the lift of a driving dream.

Tonight I shall present to the Congress six great goals. I shall ask not simply for more new programs in the old framework. I shall ask to change the framework of government itself — to reform the entire structure of American Government so we can make it gainfully responsive to the needs and the wishes of the American people.

- The most important is welfare reform.

The present welfare system has become a monstrous, consuming outrage — an outrage against the community, against the taxpayer, and particularly against the children it is supposed to help.

Let us provide the means by which more can help themselves. This shall be our goal. Let us generously help those who are not able to help themselves. But let us stop helping those who are able to help themselves but refuse to do so.

- The second great goal is to achieve what Americans have not enjoyed since 1957 — full prosperity in peacetime.

But as we have moved from runaway inflation toward reasonable price stability, and at the same time as we have been moving from a wartime economy to a peacetime economy, we have paid a price in increased unemployment.

We should take no comfort from the fact that the level of unemployment in this transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy is lower than in any peacetime year of the 1960's.

- The third great goal is to continue the effort so dramatically begun last year: to restore and enhance our natural environment.

Building on the foundation laid up in the 37-point program that I submitted to Congress last year, I will propose a strong new set of initiatives to clean up our air and water, to combat noise, and to preserve and restore our surroundings.

I will propose programs to make better use of our land, to encourage a balanced national growth — growth that will revitalize our rural heartland and enhance the quality of life in America.

And not only to meet today's needs but to anticipate those of tomorrow, I will put forward the most extensive program ever proposed by a President of the United States to expand the nation's parks, recreation areas and open spaces in a way that truly brings parks to the people where the people are. For only if we leave a legacy of parks will the next generation have parks to enjoy.

- As a fourth great goal, I will offer a far-reaching set of proposals for improving America's health care and making it available more fairly to more people.

- The fifth great goal is to strengthen and to renew our state and local governments.

The time has now come in America to reverse the flow of power and resources from the States and communities to Washington, and start power and resources flowing back from Washington to the States and communities and, more important, to the people all across America.

The time has come for a new partnership between the Federal Government and the States and localities — a partnership in which we entrust the States and localities with a larger share of the nation's responsibilities, and in which we share our Federal revenues with them so that they can meet those responsibilities.

To achieve this goal, I propose to the Congress tonight that we enact a plan of revenue sharing historic in scope and bold in concept.

- The sixth great goal is a complete reform of the Federal Government itself.

Based on a long and intensive study with the aid of the best advice obtainable, I have concluded that a sweeping reorganization of the Executive Branch is needed if the Government is to keep up with the times and with the needs of the people.

Let us act with the willingness to work together and the vision and the boldness and the courage of those great Americans who met in Philadelphia almost 190 years ago to write a Constitution.

Let us leave a heritage as they did — not just for our children but for millions yet unborn — of a nation where every American will have a chance not only to live in peace and to enjoy prosperity and opportunity, but to participate in a system of government where he knows not only his votes but his ideas count — a system of government which will provide the means for America to reach heights of achievement undreamed of before.

Those men who met in Philadelphia left a great heritage because they had a vision — not only of what the nation was, but of what it could become.

As I think of that vision, I recall that America was founded as the land of the open door — as a haven for the oppressed, a land of opportunity, a place of refuge and hope.

But above all, what this Congress can be remembered for, is opening the way to a new American revolution — a peaceful revolution in which power was turned back to the people — in which Government at all levels was refreshed and renewed, and made truly responsive. This can be a revolution as profound, as far-reaching, as exciting, as that first revolution almost 200 years ago — and it can mean that just five years from now America will enter its third century as a young nation new in spirit, with all the vigor and the freshness with which it began its first century.

— RICHARD M. NIXON

Excerpts from his State of the Union Message, January 21, 1977.
The Nixon Administration Record: An Appraisal by the Ripon Society

This analysis of the Nixon Administration Record was prepared under the direction of Ripon Society President Howard Gillette. Among those who have contributed to this analysis are: Jodie Allen, Jonathan Archer, Linda Asay, Lee Auspitz, Peter Baugher, John Brotschol, James Butera, Malcolm Farmer III, Martha Ferry, Larry Finkelstein, Emil Frankel, Robert E. Hunter, Julie Jacobsen, Alan Lamb, Judy Lamb, James McCollum, Jr., Tanya Melich, Richard Rahn, James Rathlesberger, John A. Rebjuss, Samuel Sherer, Stan Sienkiewicz, James Vaupel, Sid Gardner and Peter Wallison.
I. THE WORLD: Foreign Policy

Swords and Plowshares

Though foreign policy is rarely a major electoral issue, the Administration's successes in promoting a "generation of peace" are a major theme in the Nixon-Agnew re-election campaign. President Nixon's televised election-year travels to the capitals of America's chief Cold War adversaries, and the considerable substantive and atmospheric results, linger in the minds of many voters as the most constructive and memorable achievements of Nixon's term in office. And indeed, to the extent that peace abroad is indispensable to domestic accomplishment, the President's foreign ventures may even contribute the most to his desire to reorder priorities at home.

A new theoretical framework for American foreign policy is a notable accomplishment in itself. The last such period of intensive rethinking of the American role was during the first months of the State Department's Policy Planning Council under George Kennan — fully a quarter-century ago. To Kennan's dismay, the containment doctrine developed at that time was mechanically applied, sometimes in situations where the U.S. had no clear strategic interest. The dominant rhetoric of the Cold War, depicting the United States as the leader of the "free world" in holding back the tide of "international communism," was at once simplistic and devoid of positive purpose. Both the interventionism which spawned the Vietnam adventure and the isolationism which began to take hold in the wake of its failure were the products of a sterile and outdated foreign policy badly in need of recasting.

It is one of our history's great ironies that a man schooled in the anti-communism of the past should preside over the quiet revolution which has produced a new, more forward-looking and purposeful global strategy for the United States. Richard Nixon has been greatly assisted in this task by a former Harvard professor whose scholarly achievements have included studies of the golden age of realpolitik and "balance of power" politics and its architects, Metternich and Bismarck. The President's three "State of the World" messages, which bear the strong imprint of Henry Kissinger's thinking, most fully express the new conceptual framework of American foreign policy.

As summarized in the latest of these volumes, the Administration's vision of the world of the 1970's prescribes for the U.S. "a more balanced alliance with our friends and a more creative connection with our adversaries." Proclaiming the end of rigid postwar bipolarity, the 1972 message cites the Administration's efforts to redirect the large American role toward helping to shape a new world order based on: 1) a greater responsibility for America's allies (Japan and West Europe); 2) a more determined effort to create through negotiation a sense of self-restraint and dedication to stability on the part of ourselves and our adversaries; and 3) a greater tolerance of the differing aspirations and national interests of third-world powers.

In the emerging multi-polar world of the 1970's and 1980's, the U.S. and the USSR will continue to play a leading role in their respective alliances and will be in political competition in many areas. But the breakup of the Sino-Soviet bloc and the greater "burden-sharing" in the Western alliance will entail greater responsibilities for other major powers than in the past. The Washington-Moscow duopoly is being replaced by a more complex, many-sided relationship involving, most prominently, Peking, Tokyo, New Delhi, Bonn, Paris and London.

In some of its essentials, the Administration's concept, based on global strategic parity and regional balances, resembles the 19th-century Concert of Europe. It assumes a willingness on the part of each member of the expanded great-power club to set limits on its own behavior aimed at: 1) avoiding unilateral "policing" actions; 2) jointly discouraging efforts by regional powers to upset balances by means of force or subversion; and 3) sponsoring more realistic channels for the negotiation of peaceful change.

Two arguments in Kissinger's book on the Congress of Vienna have particular relevance here. The first is that a stable order can be built only upon the "relative security — and thus the relative insecurity" of its members. Such stability implies not the absence of conflicting interests, but the absence of those large-scale grievances which might tempt states to overturn the system itself. Thus the 1969 State of the World message, in speaking of an "era of negotiation" with the Communist states, Nixon posited that these states should be regarded as nations pursuing their own interests — as they perceive them — and pledged to seek "realistic accommodation" of these interests which conflict with our own. Kissinger's second major point is that when peace — understood merely as the avoidance of war — has been the major aim, the international system has been at the mercy of the world's troublemakers. But "whenever the international order has acknowledged that certain principles could not be
compromised, even for the sake of peace, stability based on an equilibrium of forces was at least conceivable.” Thus, the insistence in the 1972 message that the object of the Presidential negotiations would not be agreements as an end in themselves, but only those agreements which would contribute to such a “stable structure of peace.”

In short, the basic premise of the new approach is that new balances based on behavioral norms of moderation can be shaped only if the two global powers exercise a “broad and mutual self-restraint,” refraining from exploitation of détente or Third World instability to gain an advantage over the other. The envisioned new order (the by-words of which are “restraint, prudence, tolerance and moderation” and the attendant premise of which is a “generation of peace”) thus clearly assumes a renunciation of crusading spirit by both Washington and Moscow which will not be easy to achieve. For the United States, the Administration has decreed that henceforth our interests will shape our commitments, rather than our commitments dictating our interests.

The efforts to stake out America’s new role and to construct the new international order began slowly and proceeded cautiously during the first 2½ years of Nixon’s term, with events gaining momentum and results becoming evident only during the past year.

**Nixon Doctrine**

The first public expression of the new posture, articulated by the President on Guam in 1969 and quickly dubbed the “Nixon Doctrine,” posited a continuing active role for the United States. But with the growing influence of America’s allies and the challenges and opportunities presented by communist polycentrism, the President said, the leadership of the United States in the 1970’s would have to be exercised in a more subtle and creative manner. Originally directed to post-Vietnam Asia, but later applied to the broader international context, the Nixon Doctrine stated that: 1) the U.S. would keep its existing treaty commitments while carefully weighing its interests before undertaking new ones; 2) the U.S. would provide a shield if a nation allied to it or vital to its security were threatened by a nuclear power — thus hopefully precluding nuclear blackmail while discouraging nuclear proliferation; and 3) other threats would be met with American economic and military assistance, though the threatened nation itself would be expected to provide the manpower to help with its own defense. As the 1970 State of the World message put it, the U.S. would participate against attempted future aggression, where its interests dictate, as “a weight, not the weight, in the scale.”

Concurrent with the Vietnamization program in Indochina, the U.S. effected a reduction of American forces in Korea and participated in the construction of regional defense and development organizations in Southeast Asia. The Japanese, who were encouraged to take a more active role in such regional efforts, were in part rewarded by the U.S. through the return of Okinawa to the Tokyo government.

In the application of the new doctrine to Europe, the President’s theme was the transformation of the American role “from dominance to partnership.” One month after his inauguration, Nixon visited Europe to re-affirm the U.S. commitment there and to reassure the allies that the new American role did not imply disengagement from European affairs. A second visit to Europe in the fall of 1970 dramatized the continuing effort to revitalize and reshape NATO; to coordinate allied positions concerning issues such as Berlin, the future of Germany, the proposed Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the related issue of mutual force reductions; and to extend America’s cooperative role beyond defense and diplomacy to cooperation on economic and environmental matters.

The redefinition of American interests and attention was evident in Africa and Latin America as well. In the latter area, long a special “sphere of influence” for the U.S., Gov. Nelson Rockefeller’s mission in 1969 resulted in recommendations concerning ways in which the U.S. could change its role from dominator to contributor. President Nixon stated his special concern for the area and for a more balanced participation in hemispheric affairs in an address to the Interamerican Press Association in October, 1969. At the same time, he announced the partial untying of American economic assistance to Latin America (allowing purchases with aid dollars to be made from Latin American as well as U.S. businesses). This move, together with the Administration’s greater reliance on multilateral channels for disbursement of developmental assistance and the separation within A.I.D. of the administration of economic and military aid, has opened

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*September, 1972*
the prospect of a more effective American foreign assistance program.

The Administration's concern for the stability and development of Africa was demonstrated in 1970 when the Secretary of State toured that continent, and by Mrs. Nixon's successful visit the following year. Roger's visit, with its theme of insulating the continent from great-power rivalries and providing it with assistance without interfering in the internal affairs of the American states, did much to help smooth relations which had become strained the previous year during the Biafran secession crisis. The Administration was widely criticized both at home and in Africa for its policy of non-involvement in this struggle, but it has defended its policy by stressing that its provision of $100 million in humanitarian assistance and its support of efforts to mediate the conflict demonstrated that the desire not to become involved did not imply an unconcern for the suffering generated by that tragic war.

An indicator of the extent to which the Administration efforts to carry out its new strategic conception have progressively focused attention on the building of "a more creative connection with our adversaries" is the organization of the State of the World messages themselves. Unlike the first two volumes, which consider first the policies toward European and Asian allies, the 1972 document opens with a lengthy consideration of the agenda for negotiation in Peking and Moscow. The reversal of the order was symbolic of what was perceived in some allied capitals as a larger reversal of priorities in U.S. foreign relations.

**Summit talks**

What did the President accomplish in his televised summits, and how close have the visits brought us to the dream of a stable world order? The foundations for the China trip were carefully laid from the early months of 1969. A series of incremental steps by the Administration to facilitate the opening of contacts, matched by continuing hostility and lack of negotiating progress between the Chinese and the Soviets, led the Chinese government to a decision to explore more closely its relations with Washington — a decision which apparently triggered an internal crisis within the Peking government. The carefully prepared agenda enabled the President to discuss with Mao and Chou the two governments' differing perceptions of the world and the Asian landscape. The delineation of areas of agreement and disagreement, enabling the two sides to lay out "their own interests — as they perceive them," and to agree on basic principles for pursuing their competing objectives, was in itself a substantial accomplishment. As Dr. Kissinger said, the talks themselves were only the beginning of a long process. But to make such a beginning, and to open the prospect of increased mutual understanding and greater American flexibility in dealing with its adversaries, was more than previous Administrations had dared to attempt.

The trip to the Soviet Union was also preceded by careful groundwork, but in this case the preparation consisted not of subtle signals of willingness to talk, but of months and even years of painstaking lower-level negotiations, preparing the basis for the solid substantive agreements announced at Moscow. The 1969 State of the World message had repeated Kissinger's long-standing belief that summits required careful preparation and progress toward a solution of a number of outstanding and inter-related issues. And so the road to Moscow had been marked, as well, by considerable forward momentum in the SALT conferences, by some signs of a mutual willingness to exercise self-restraint in the Middle Eastern situation, and by a long-awaited and highly significant agreement on Berlin.

The very fact that the Moscow summit was held, in the aftermath of the mining and stepped up bombing of the USSR's fraternal Vietnamese ally, indicated how badly Brezhnev needed the conference to bolster his own "peace program" — and here again, the decision to receive Mr. Nixon led to a minor internal Soviet shakeup. In addition to the highly significant SALT accords, agreements were sealed at Moscow to prepare the way for a Conference on European Security, to create a commission to explore possibilities of trade expansion, to set down rules to minimize incidents between naval vessels, to carry out a joint space flight, and to study common problems in environmental control, technological development, and medicine. Though no solutions of the Indochina or Middle Eastern conflicts were reached (or even possible) at the summit, subsequent developments have indicated that, at least with respect to the latter conflict, the discussions that were held encouraged a stronger mutual resolve to avoid direct confrontation in the area. Finally, Nixon and Brezhnev signed a Declaration of Principles concerning the basis on which relations between the two states would be conducted, and pledging the exercise of restraint, avoidance of confrontation, and practice of the principles of peaceful co-existence.

As the Administration is well aware, the mere existence of a hortatory document pledging responsible, restrained and peaceful behavior is no guarantee that an era of stability has arrived. The world may indeed be a less fearful and crisis-ridden place than it was a decade ago, but the habits of cooperative behavior are slow to develop and will not automatically replace years of distrust and hostility.

Some of the Administration's critics have found fault with its strategic conception, describing it as out
of touch with reality. A restoration of balance of power diplomacy on the model of 19th century Europe, they say, is not possible in today’s world in which only two states continue to have global involvement and strategic capability. China, Japan and Western Europe are not yet the equals of the U.S. and the USSR; indeed, the latter two remain militarily dependent on the U.S., and a united Europe is still a dream and not a reality. Were we to try to build up our allies so that they might share our burdens, the present détente with our adversaries, which may well be based on their assumption that the U.S. will reduce its global involvement without substituting the regional involvement of its allies, could well be shattered in the process.

Moreover, it is argued, continued concentration on creation of a new relationship with our adversaries might only reduce confidence among our allies. Rather than assuming the role we posit for them, Japan and the European States may be encouraged to make their own accommodations with the Soviet Union and China. Indeed, the Administration is vulnerable to a charge of having conducted its relations with these allies with occasional heavy-handedness or neglect in recent months. Japan presently shows signs of responding to the “Nixon shock” of last summer with a “Tanaka shock” of its own new relationship to Peking. And the Europeans have reportedly been upset with Nixon’s willingness to negotiate with Brezhnev a declaration of peaceful coexistence while previously counselling the NATO states to observe more caution in the allied dealings with Moscow. The Administration’s choice of Gov. Ronald Reagan as an emissary to some European capitals to explain the events in Moscow and smooth over allied relations seems an especially insensitive one.

Foreign Economic Policy

Moreover, in the conduct of its trade and monetary relations with its allies, the U.S. has seemed, as Professor Stanley Hoffmann has put it, to be playing the role of Samson in the temple. Former Secretary Connally has engaged in a game of confrontation, behaving as though our principal allies were already partial adversaries in a pentagonal world. A continuation of such action in pursuit of a new relationship with adversaries who may not in fact be willing to abide by the rules of self-restraint and moderation on which the projected future stability depends would be foolish indeed. In fact, the Administration itself has acknowledged that the Soviet Union has seem inclined to fish in the troubled waters of the Middle East and South Asia, and to take advantage of opportunities to exploit regional instabilities rather than to construct regional balances. In the Middle East especially, to stake Western interests and Israel’s survival on the unsubstantiated hopes of Soviet self-abnegation is a dangerous policy, and one which President Nixon has not yet been tempted to employ. Likewise, the Administration has not, as its critics imply, been so naive as to expect a fundamental and sudden post-summit change in the behavior of the Chinese with respect to their interests in Asia.

Thus, it is a useful exercise for critics to point out the possible pitfalls in the Administration’s new course of American foreign policy. But it is worth remembering that Professor Kissinger’s scholarly background cannot leave him unaware of the differences between the world of Metternich and that of Nixon, and that the President himself is an experienced enough

Profile

Roger T. Kelley and the Draft

America has a tradition of a volunteer military and minimum government interference in the private lives of its citizens. When the present draft expires on June 30, 1972, as President Nixon has announced it will, a large portion of the credit for this achievement will be due to Roger T. Kelley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Kelley is the man who reduced draft calls from approximately 300,000 in 1968 to 50,000 this year and engineered the switch to an all-volunteer force.

Kelley’s efforts met with substantial resistance from the military services and their lobbyists. He was faced with an almost insurmountable educational problem. The bureaucrats’ bureaucrats — the military — had become set in their ways after thirty years of pushing buttons to get more men. It made no difference that the draft was a costly, inefficient and ineffective means of maintaining national security. The draft permitted a larger slice of the defense budget to go to the careeists and the amenities while it avoided the need for continual modernization and professionalization of the services to attract capable volunteers, and justified an overabundance of senior positions. In addition to educating the military, Kelley had to overcome the rigidity of the Armed Services Committees of Congress.

But beyond education, Kelley had to make change. Because he was not in the direct line of military authority, he could not order the services to implement any specific change in manpower policy. What he could do, however, was to distribute all-volunteer funds, demand studies, lead, cajole, and if necessary go to the Secretary of Defense and ask for an order. The record of the services is replete with attempts to thwart Presidential initiatives in this area. In 1947-1948, for example, the services were successful in getting the draft re-implemented after “demonstrating” that they could not do without it.

Experts in the field now agree, however, that we can reach an all-volunteer force by the President’s goal of next June — and maintain the AVF. As the first assistant secretary for manpower with actual personnel experience, Kelley’s expertise has been the keystone to AVF’s success.

September, 1972
politician to be aware of the limitations, as well as the opportunities, involved in the practice of international realpolitik. The Administration is capable of steering a balanced and sensitive course in its relations with both allies and adversaries, and should it avoid future lapses, the prospects for a more flexible and creative American role in the international system are attractive indeed.

The targets of opportunity for Mr. Nixon’s critics appear to be not so much the course he has set as the tactics with which he carries it out and the rhetoric he uses to explain it to the American public. Scholarly critics attack the vastly oversimplified image of a pentagonal “balance of power” because Mr. Nixon himself has employed such terminology. In the previous era of American foreign policy, an uncompromising opposition to the “international communist conspiracy controlled and directed from Moscow” was a stance easily understood and widely applauded by the public. But the subtle maneuvers and cautious bargaining involved in turning a limited-adversary relationship into the foundation of a new international stability must make the President’s speechwriters groan as they seek the easily-remembered phrases with which to expound the new policy. Dr. Kissinger has demonstrated, in his briefings to the press, a facility in explaining the Administration’s actions in a way that avoids false hopes and simple conclusions, but Kissinger’s presently circumscribed position makes him virtually inaccessible not only to the public but to Congress as well.

Many of the President’s foreign policy speeches have been devoted to the theme of the necessity for a continuing American involvement — if a new, responsible brand of involvement — in world affairs. But Nixon’s quite credible fear of a mood of “new isolationism” in the American public has led him to oversimplify the choices and, occasionally, to oversell his policies. If the Administration seeks to capture public attention only by televised journeys to a moon-like China, or by surprise announcements of sudden departures, the result will be weariness, disillusionment and suspicion rather than the sophisticated, committed and broad public support which American foreign policy in the 1970’s requires and deserves.

The President would be well advised to stress communication: not only of understanding but also of a sense of purpose in foreign policy to the American people. All Kissinger’s sophisticated cultivation of leadership groups counts for little against a few ill-considered Presidential words. All the subtle and skillful maneuverings in the world of realpolitik will come to naught if the public has decided that it prefers the simpler and less burdensome course of non-involvement in the world’s affairs.

BOOK REVIEW

Ten-SHUN!

THE DEATH OF THE ARMY
by Edward L. King
Saturday Review Press, 244 pp., $6.95

Lt. Col. Edward L. King was a “mustang” — an officer who came up through the ranks. The author served as an infantry platoon leader in the Korean War, as an infantry company commander in Germany in the mid-Fifties, on the joint allied staffs in Europe, with the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Spain, and on the staff of the Joint Chiefs from 1966 to 1969. He never served in Vietnam — his decision to retire rather than to do so is the point of departure for Death of the Army.

As far as King is concerned, the Vietnam War is the same kind of folly that so distressed him as a young officer in Korea — fighting a “no win” war on the Asian periphery where the vital security interests of the United States are not at stake. But as he makes clear in the opening chapters, King’s view is more emotional and ethical than rational and realpolitik. His most damning and disturbing charge against the Army leadership is that in both Korea and Vietnam, Army commanders have pursued their career interests by planning unnecessary operations to make themselves look “aggressive.” The repeated charges up “Hamburger Hill,” King says, typify this kind of operation and reflect the unfeeling, careerist attitude of the officer corps. It is King’s contention that the Army is being led to its demise as an effective fighting force by an ambitious, self-seeking, narrow-minded group of senior officers, whose continued dominance, he suggests, could eventually threaten civilian control of the military.

King attempts to trace the growth of this self-serving attitude, and its allied doctrines of weaponry and warfare. As he sees it, a chief culprit was Maxwell Taylor, who as Chief of Staff sought to change the Army’s democratic Ike-jacket image of World War II to the Prussian-cap-with-gold-braid of the “Pentomic Army.” Taylor, says King, also encouraged the officer corps to be more elitist by stressing advanced degrees and business management techniques. (Hence, though King does not mention it, Westmoreland is a graduate of the Harvard Business School.) This policy led the officer corps to adopt an expansionist ethic, pushing for more new weapons and technologies, and seeking out new roles for the Army to play.

Therefore, in King’s view, the Army’s participation in the Lebanon landing in 1958 was merely a means of promoting the Army’s image and the careers of some generals — Westmoreland again. Soon thereafter the doctrine of brushfire wars and quick, limited response — such as the STRAC and STRIKE commands and talk of airlifting troops to the Congo — were developed. Then the Army came up with the doctrine of counterinsurgency as the answer to wars of national liberation. — and Vietnam developed. Thus, King
contends, the Army and the nation have been led astray by the "airborne club," the image builders and the "West Point Protective Association."

As King describes the baleful influence of the Military Academy, West Pointers serving as platoon, company, and battalion commanders got men needlessly killed in Korea, and many of these same men, as brigade, division and corps commanders in Vietnam, have been sacrificing their men as pawns in the promotion game. Choice assignments necessary for advanced promotion are reserved for Academy "ring knockers," and the Protective Association is dedicated to keeping the top command slots safe for members of the Long Gray Line.

Moreover, West Pointers like Taylor and Westmoreland are chiefly responsible for the post-Korea deterioration of the Army. They have been the technocrats who have wasted the taxpayers' money on overly complex weapons systems that either are scrapped or cannot be maintained, and who have created Army combat divisions which are two parts staff and logistics components to each combat component. Finally, charges King, these West Pointers, in seeking out comfortable overseas command and staff slots, have kept Army divisions tied up in Korea and Panama, where they are useless, and have concentrated USAEUR (Seventh Army Europe) in Southern Germany, where its lines of supply and communication from the North Sea are completely exposed to Warsaw Pact attack. King maintains all of the Pentagon's contingency plans for Europe are unrealistic because the NATO forces would be unable to stop a sudden massive Warsaw Pact attack without using so many tactical nuclear weapons that all of Germany and much of central Europe would be incinerated or contaminated with radiation beyond reclamation.

King's highly personalized account is far from authoritative or balanced, but it is disturbing and thought provoking, and justified in many of its criticisms. One can understand his bitterness, given his experiences in Korea and the treatment he received once he decided to retire and gave his superiors his reasons. (King was apparently a highly rated officer; upon voicing his reservations about Vietnam and deciding to retire, he was assigned a desk in an empty office, ostracized, and ordered to take a psychiatric examination.) Unfortunately, anyone who has served in the Army during the last eight years will have no trouble believing that senior officers can be every bit as narrow-minded and short-sighted as King describes. The emphasis on "looking good" and getting ahead has led to some inexcusable excesses and outrages in Vietnam — the infamous "body count" system being the most horrifying example of the "business management of violence" gone amok. Nor is there any doubt that the Army is inextricably tied up in Korea and Panama, where it is fighting an unwinnable war. Insofar as the "rear echelon bastards" get all the hot meals and cold beer and the front line units get none, King's point is valid. But then again, in Vietnam the Army's lavish use of helicopters did save many seriously wounded men. (To which King would reply that the Army sent men into battle without adequate protective body armor and helmets.)

As it reads, The Death of the Army will be regarded within the Army itself as the bitter attack of someone who felt he was not going to make general and so got out; it will therefore be dismissed. But, while it will provide some new ammunition to critics already hostile to anything military, it does not provide enough information for a concerned citizen to make a balanced judgment or criticism on the larger, more complex and important problems that the Army faces today.

A lack of understanding of the Army and its mission is a major problem in this country. Those who have an understanding of the military are its supporters and sympathizers who, with the generals, think that the Army is once again taking the rap for the politicians. Those who attack the Army often have no feeling or understanding of its problems. The number of right-thinking liberals who cheerfully admit that they have no detailed knowledge whatsoever about the Army is staggering. Those who want effective civilian control of the military must first understand it. The Death of the Army contributes to that goal, but it must not be quoted uncritically or read alone.
Selling Salt to Congress

The Nixon Administration's record on arms policy, impressive on its merits, is now being seriously impaired by a series of ill-considered concessions to election-year politics. Although the substantive damage may not yet be excessive, the continuation of current trends can well undermine many of the accomplishments.

The relative restraint over defense spending and new strategic systems, actually reducing total military outlays during the President's first term — an inflationary period when other federal spending increased by $64 billion — constitutes a commendable achievement even if it is substantially attributable to the Vietnam phaseout. The achievements of SALT, the Moscow and Peking visits, the impending mutual, balanced force reductions (MBFR) talks and the European Security Conference, represent a promising and comprehensive prologue to a possible "generation of peace."

The SALT agreements are a substantial step toward control of the arms race. The prohibition on extensive ABM deployment removes an important potential threat to each side's deterrent. The technical prohibitions against testing in the "ABM mode" provide an important model for future qualitative restraints, and some increased hope that they may be attainable.

The interim offensive weapons agreement does not, contrary to some of the critics, leave us in any potentially inferior or vulnerable stance. The larger numbers of launch vehicles conceded to the Soviet Union were clearly necessary to mollify reasonable Soviet fears about the large numbers of separately targetable warheads available to the U.S. today.

Nor will Soviet development of a MIRV system that might endanger the American land-based missiles in fact jeopardize our deterrent, since an important part of the U.S. retaliatory force is already afloat or based overseas. The agreement, moreover, initially applies for only five years. It is highly unlikely that even with a successful MIRV test within a year, the Soviet Union could deploy much of a system within the subsequent four years, even if they were willing to incur the huge expense and to take a large percentage of their missiles out of action during conversion.

Research and development, funded at nearly $9 billion this fiscal year, is more than adequate, given American scientific productivity, to give reasonable assurance that the strategic balance will not shift decisively against the U.S. in the foreseeable future. The problem in this area, quite to the contrary, is one of restraining and controlling our efforts in prototype development so that they are not perceived as seriously threatening the Soviet Union.

The SALT initiatives, then, are important achievements from both the standpoint of securing an adequate deterrent capability and thereby stabilizing the strategic balance, and from the standpoint of underpinning an ongoing and fruitful dialogue on a range of issues between the U.S. and the USSR.

On the domestic politics of SALT, however, the Administration gets decidedly mixed grades. The fumbling attempts at selling SALT to the Congress and the American people, have, as often as not, served to undermine confidence in the agreements. To argue in unrealistic terms about the consequences and benefits is inevitably to leave oneself open for pointed criticism and the suspicion that something is being covered up. To project probable Soviet strategic levels in the absence of SALT in terms of practically unlimited applications of resources seems blatantly self-serving when only months before it was being asserted that Soviet strategic deployments had slowed or halted.

A strong argument for the SALT agreements is that without them there was a significant likelihood that continued Soviet deployments, even at modest levels, would have induced new U.S. countermeasures and another major destabilizing acceleration of the arms race, not to mention another major enlargement of the defense budget. Thus the President's claim of $15 billion in long run SALT-generated saving may well be reasonable.

Less-than-competent salesmanship is also the most plausible explanation for the criticism provoked by the Administration when defense increases hard on the heels of the SALT agreements. There is understandable concern in the White House about keeping the support of the military and its Congressional allies. As it is, the Joint Chiefs' Congressional testimony for SALT was less-than-convincing, though it could clearly have been much worse. This political concern is responsible for the acceleration of ULMS/Trident, for several new funding requests related to SALT, and for the vigor with which the Administration has marshalled its forces in opposition to several relatively feeble Senate efforts to make defense reductions.

Nonetheless, these actions, however expedient, may have enduring and serious consequences. Defense spending tends to commit us into the future since money spent creates constituencies and incentives for ultimate procurement of the projected weapons systems.

These pressures may be especially acute for weapons systems with long lead time such as ULMS/Trident. This year's decision for ULMS commits us to a strategically questionable option (placing more of our submarine-based deterrent on fewer submarines) before any clear threat to its predecessor is apparent. The likely result is accelerated obsolescence, strategic redundancy, and greater technological problems and cost overruns. All of this chiefly to pacify the generals, Henry Jackson, and the American Security Council.
Vietnam

**Bombs aren’t Defused**

If Richard Nixon’s policy on Vietnam has been anything, it has been consistent. Not once in his term of office has he deviated from the goal he set in the 1968 primaries and general election to wind down the War without sacrificing any pro-Western government in Saigon. The President has followed, in detail, his analysis of the War as submitted to the Republican Committee on Resolutions in 1968 that “rather than further escalation on the military front, what it requires now is a dramatic escalation of our efforts on the economic, political, diplomatic and psychological fronts. It requires a new strategy, which recognizes that this is a new and different kind of war. And it requires a fuller enlistment of our Vietnamese allies in their own defense.” In President Nixon’s consistency lies both the strength and the weakness of Administration policy.

Originally, the President hoped to settle the War quickly through negotiations, primarily with the help of the Soviet Union. When efforts to enlist the Kremlin’s support failed, he fell back on a policy of Vietnamization, which it was hoped would give the opposition an incentive to negotiate through the prospect of a strengthened Saigon regime in the future.

For an already war-weary country, Vietnamization with its uncertain timing and results was not entirely appealing politically. As protests began to mount in the fall of 1969, the Administration was forced on the defensive, ultimately escalating the claims for America’s stake in Vietnam in order to meet public criticism of its open-ended war policy. Vice President Agnew, having previously carried a responsible burden for domestic reform, was enlisted as an Administration hatchetman, climaxing his attacks on anti-war leaders in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, October 30 by calling for “positive polarization” and separation of anti-war critics from society “with no more regret than we shall feel over discarding rotten apples from a barrel.” The President joined in November 3 with a speech equating anti-war opposition with aid to the enemy, saying “North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.” Humiliation was equated with defeat of the Thieu-Ky regime, at the same time it was under severe criticism from South Vietnamese including General Duong Van “Big” Minh, who was calling for an anti-Communist coalition or “People’s Congress” to replace Thieu.

Former Senator Charles Goodell’s first draft of an anti-war amendment to cut off funds for Vietnam (S-3000) signalled a new turn in Vietnam protest. For the first time, opposition to the War was able to be directed toward a specific goal in the Congress rather than toward the diffuse goal of affecting public opinion. Moratorium leaders failed to endorse the concept, however, and the bill languished in Congress until the Cambodian invasion, when a similar measure sponsored by Senator Mark O. Hatfield and George McGovern became the focal point for anti-war activity.

Once again, the President was unprepared for the adverse reaction to his policy and again he was put on the defensive. His 5 A.M. foray among demonstrators at the Lincoln Memorial was both the most human moment of the Nixon presidency, but also the most frustrating for a man who could not bridge the communications gap with his young opposition. Debate on anti-war legislation dragged out all summer, ending in September with the defeat of McGovern-Hatfield, but with a boost for Senator McGovern’s presidential hopes.

That summer, both the President and his critics missed a policy opportunity, suggested, somewhat belatedly, by Senator Clifford Case (R-N.J.), who was then a recent convert to end-the-war legislation. At one point in debate over deadlines Case suggested that withdrawal be tied to the 1971 election in South Viet-
Vietnam. What better way to dramatize Vietnamese self-determination than to withdraw the last American troops in time for the new election? The Case proposal had the advantage of giving anti-war Senators a meaningful rationale for setting a deadline, but that change in the McGovern-Hatfield language was never made. In the meantime, the President resisted all efforts to set a withdrawal deadline. In response to the original Goodell legislation he said on September 26, 1969: "It is my conclusion that if the Administration were to impose an arbitrary cutoff time, say the end of 1970, or the middle of 1971, for the complete withdrawal of American forces in Vietnam, that inevitably leads to perpetuating and continuing the War until that time and destroys any chance to reach the objective that I am trying to achieve, of ending the war before the end of 1970 or before the middle of 1971."

The South Vietnamese elections arrived without a settlement and without an opposition candidate to President Thieu, once his allies in the legislature had erected sufficient barriers to disqualify his opposition, including Vice President Ky. A U.S. Senate group attempted to establish a commission to oversee the election and insure American neutrality, but the Administration, having staked so much of its own prestige on Vietnamization, forsook both the election commission and neutrality by encouraging Thieu’s re-election, Instead of freeing itself from four additional years’ commitment to the ruling Saigon regime, the Administration locked itself further into equating its broad goal of self-determination for South Vietnam with the ruling clique of General Thieu.

Under such circumstances, the major Administration eight-point peace proposal announced this spring could only have been an admission of weakness, not strength, in the proposal to hold a new election. By continuing to insist, moreover, on a cease-fire before establishing a withdrawal date, our negotiators insured a negative response from the Viet Cong, who have repeatedly rejected such offers on the basis that such a condition gives an overwhelming advantage to the military and civilian forces under Thieu's control.

With negotiations at an impasse and American ground strength continuing to decline, the North Vietnamese spring offensive and the American bombing response were entirely predictable. As Senator Hatfield’s executive assistant, Wes Michaelson, wrote in the February 1971, FORUM on his return from South Vietnam:

There may come a time when Hanoi and the Front decide that they have lain low long enough — when, for instance, American troop reductions stop. Then they could choose to move military against ARVN forces left without the assistance of U.S. ground combat units. In such a case, decisive military gains could be won, particularly in northern and central South Vietnam . . . .

The President’s most plausible military option in such a case would (be) the renewed, continuous, and intensive bombing of North Vietnam. Such a desperate re-escalation of the War, like the strike into Cambodia, would be rationalized and sold to the American people as a means of protecting troops and 'ending the War.'

The North Vietnamese attack came, as predicted, but South Vietnamese losses were more severe than anyone before feared, drawing the President not just into heavy bombing but, ultimately, into the dangerous policy of mining the North Vietnamese harbors. Clearly the President was aided in laying the mines without severe international repercussions because of his careful diplomatic maneuvers in China and Russia. But once again, he was forced to raise the stakes of American involvement without achieving any compensating breakthrough in negotiations.

In his 1968 platform statement Mr. Nixon promised that a new Republican Administration would "accept nothing on faith, reputation or statistics. In waging the war and making the peace, it will come with a fresh eye and act with a free hand. And it will do what the present Administration has so signally failed to do: it will arm the American people with the truth."

As President, Nixon has taken a new approach on the negotiating front, particularly through his visits to China and Russia. But at the same time he has bent the truth both about America's stake in Vietnam and the generosity of America's peace offers. His rigid commitment to the Thieu regime has stymied negotiation and helped prolong the War.

So far, the President has softened criticism of his policy through progressive withdrawal of American troops. Now that only a few troops remain in Vietnam and the President has opposed halting the bombing or lifting the mines prior to a settlement, the Nixon policy faces its most severe test of public opinion. Already the Harris Poll shows a majority of the American people, by a 50-42 percent margin, believe President Nixon has not kept his pledge to end U.S. involvement in Vietnam. A campaign strategy focusing on reduced American casualties will minimize but not eliminate attention to the fact that 53 percent of all bombs and explosives used in the Indochina War fell during the Nixon presidency or that 57 percent of Vietnam War dead, including 20,000 Americans, and 50 percent of all war funding occurred since the President’s inauguration.

As of now, it appears the President will not be able to meet his campaign pledge of 1968 "to end the war and win the peace," short of serious new initiatives at the peace talks in Paris.

Ripon Forum
II. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS: Domestic Economics

The Nixon Phases

Ideally, and as affirmed in the Employment Act of 1946, the economic goals of our society are to offer meaningful employment to all, to provide steady economic growth with a minimum of inflation, and to promote a relatively equitable distribution of wealth. But there is little agreement among economists how to define these objectives.

If we look at our recent economic performance, we find that in only six of the last twenty years was the employment rate less than 4 percent, and that all of these six years were war years (1952-53, 1966-69). In eleven of the same twenty years, inflation was kept under two percent. However, in the last two years of the Johnson Administration, the rate of inflation began to accelerate rapidly — from 1.7 percent in 1965 to 4.2 percent in 1968 — and apparently peaked out at 1969’s level of 6.1 percent.

The low unemployment rates and rapidly increasing rate of inflation during the Johnson years were largely the result of the Federal Government’s over-stimulation of the economy through the Vietnam War and the domestic “Great Society” projects. During the last three years of the Johnson Administration, federal spending exceeded full employment revenues by some $42 billion.

As a result, the Nixon Administration was faced with a greatly overheated economy when it took office. In his original game plan Nixon continued the classic formula of fiscal and monetary restraint, generating surpluses in the full employment federal budget in both 1969 and 1970. Such action, coupled with monetary restraint on the part of the Federal Reserve System, sought to reduce inflationary pressures by slowing the rate of economic growth and by increasing unemployment slightly. Though fully aware of the dangers of such a policy, the Administration decided that the dangers of a highly inflationary economy were greater than the adverse effects on employment and economic growth.

Hence, there was a slight decline in real Gross National Product for 1970, the first such decline since 1967, and the rate of unemployment increased sharply, rising from 3.5 percent in 1969 to 4.9 percent in 1970, the highest rate since 1964. The decline in the rate of inflation envisaged in the game plan, however, failed to occur. Inflation for the year 1970 was 5.5 percent, down only slightly from the previous year’s 6.1 percent.

It was evident during this period of falling demand and rising unemployment that many firms continued to increase prices and many unions went out on strike for wages that were far in excess of proven productivity. This apparently irrational behavior was a prime example of the so-called fallacy of composition — what is good for the individual is not necessarily good for the whole or vice versa. As Arthur Burns had stated, the old rules of economics were no longer working.

By the middle of 1970 the Administration began pursuing a slightly expansionary policy and in January of 1971 set forth its conversion to the concept of the full employment budget. At that time it was estimated that the deficit in fiscal 1971 would be approximately $18.5 billion (the actual deficit was $23 billion). The stated purpose of these deficits, planned both for fiscal 1971 and fiscal 1972, was to encourage expansion by reducing unemployment and to increase economic growth without over-stimulating the economy.

By the end of the first half of 1971 it was apparent that the Administration’s hopes were not being realized: inflation had moderated only slightly; unemployment was still over 6 percent, a level that it had reached in December 1970; and the rapid increase in economic growth that had been forecast was not occurring. Given these facts, plus our serious international economic problems, plus the rising chorus of critics of the Administration’s policies, the President had little choice but to make a decisive change.

On August 15, 1971, the President announced his new economic policy which suspended the convertibility of the dollar into gold; imposed a temporary surcharge on imports; froze prices, wages and rents for 90 days; and proposed a number of tax deductions to stimulate economic expansion. At the end of the 90-day period, “Phase II” price and wage controls were instituted and have continued in force. As we have seen, the disappointing performance of his earlier policies left the President little choice but to take the action he did. But a limited price and wage control program by itself cannot control inflation over the long run.

Since the imposition of Phase II, the economy has shown considerable progress. Inflation has recently been held to near 3 percent on a year-to-year basis; unemployment is down to 5.5 percent and seems certain to continue to decline; and real G.N.P. rose at a rate of 8.4 percent during the second quarter of 1972.
Despite these indications that the economy is well on the road to recovery, there are still a number of serious problems on the horizon.

Inflation, though substantially mitigated, certainly has not been curbed. The budget deficit for fiscal 1972 was $23 billion and the deficit for fiscal 1973 may well be higher. Such massive deficits, well over the full employment budget, will continue to exert substantial inflationary pressures in the future. The current wage and price controls cannot be counted on to check inflationary pressures since, as time passes, they lose their psychological impact, become increasingly unfair to certain businesses and employees, seem increasingly difficult to administer, and begin to cause distortions in the proper allocation of resources and management of economic units.

Thus on the domestic front, the Nixon Administration has shown its ability to change its policies in an effort to meet persistent problems. These new policies seem to be working reasonably well, in that they have not so far introduced severe distortions into the country's market system. There are increasing questions, however, as to what the Administration's plans are for phasing out the current controls. An orderly transition will require careful planning and cooperation from many different sectors of the economy. In this area the time for introducing overnight change has passed; discussion of the best way to get back to a less controlled economy is now in order.

Federal Budget

Potentially the most serious economic problem now facing the nation is the runaway federal budget. The Brookings Institution Study, Setting National Priorities — The 1973 Budget, pointed out that two-thirds of the recent increases in federal spending were out of the President's control. Paul McCracken, former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, recently wrote:

Fiscal policy will be a particularly difficult problem because the federal budget is in a quite literal sense out of control. The aggregate cost of individually meritorious programs tends, of course, to exceed any viable total; yet the congressional budgetary process focuses only on the programs and includes no explicit consideration of the total budget. The result is federal commitments, by direct outlays and through credit guarantees, that are growing at a more rapid rate than the economy can accommodate.

A proposal for an information system to integrate spending and tax policy and force a clear judgment of priorities should be created for the use of both the Congress and the Office of Management and Budget. Although there is no guarantee that a Democratic Congress would be willing to work with any system proposed by a Republican Administration, if the Republicans do not come up with such a device, such a system will probably never be instituted.

Administration policies have been equally far-reaching in the world economy. Now that Nixon has shown the courage to admit the fundamental overvaluation of the U.S. dollar and has successfully negotiated a temporary realignment of the currencies of the major trading nations, attention has turned to maintaining our competitive position in world markets. Because the relative importance of foreign trade to the U.S. economy is so much lower than in most industrialized countries, international economic policy necessarily, and properly, takes second place to domestic policies. As it happens, we are now in the fortunate position that the current domestic policies designed to curb inflation will also enhance the country's competitive position vis-a-vis that of the rest of the world. Our
rate of increase in consumer prices has recently dipped below that of any other industrial nation, and the whole-sale price index is rising at a lower rate than in most such nations. This lessening in the rate of inflation, along with a general rise in wage levels in those countries that compete directly with the U.S., should work to increase the competitiveness of U.S. goods.

As stated in the 1972 Economic Report of the President, U.S. long-run policy continues to seek freer world markets: "For the long run the optimal policy toward exports, as well as toward imports, is one directed to achieving efficient resource allocation within a system of generally balanced international payments." This goal implies free movement of goods and services, with each area concentrating on production of those goods and services in which it has a comparative advantage, with ultimate benefit to all of the world's citizens. Recent trade policies, however, unfortunately appear to be moving in the opposite direction. In particular, negotiation of voluntary trade agreements and imposition of import quotas strike us as a step backward. Such measures are justifiable only if they are clearly meant to be temporary in nature, to be used by an industry's and area's economic planners to gain time in which to adjust their activities to the new realities of worldwide comparative advantage. In terms of pure economic efficiency, a society will tend to be better off if it performs those services which it can do best, and leaves to others those in which it has a comparative disadvantage. There are very few commodities which can be legitimately protected for the sake of national security.

In any case, existing trade agreements will give us ample time to work out transitional policies for industries of high political sensitivity. One such program could provide retraining or retirement grants for impacted workers. With a provision for automatic phase-out as workers were retrained or aged, these subsidies would constitute only a temporary transfer of the overall benefit received by all consumers from access to cheaper imports and increases in U.S. efficiency. Unless programs to alleviate the effects of world economic progress are adopted, however, quotas and agreements may be extended indefinitely, at increasing real cost to the U.S. people.

**Exports**

The Administration has implemented several additional programs to encourage exports, including the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) and a series of devices which have expanded the availability of export credit facilities. DISC is really a form of subsidy to those corporations which qualify, while easier export credit operates to remove some of the monetary risk associated with international trade.

The DISC legislation offers incentives for creation of special export corporations by providing for indefinite deferral of half of the taxes on their export income. To qualify, a corporation must derive 95 percent of its sales from and maintain 95 percent of its assets in export activities. The legislation has given tax lawyers and accountants an increased work load, and a large number of corporations have filed applications. But at present there is no indication that corporations have reduced their selling prices abroad to compensate for the tax deferral. Nor is there any indication that smaller businesses which had not been exporting before have set up DISCs; the legislation may be so complicated that corporations which have not been exporting do not have available the necessary professional talent. The legislation is a governmental subsidy of the type which this country has until recently deplored when applied by other countries. Indeed, there is some talk abroad of retaliation against U.S. exports, though it is unclear what form such action might take. Clearly, however, the legislation is a move away from freer international markets.

In contrast, the export credit facilities make it easier for the business which has done little or no exporting to go about it. There is an element of subsidy here also, in that a guaranteed credit facility is usually cause for a lower interest rate than would otherwise be available. However, the guarantees operate mainly to overcome fear of shipping goods into a less well-known market. They thus remove artificial psychological barriers to trade, rather than provide monetary subsidies. The goods must still compete on their own merits and prices, since the slight reduction in financing costs available because of the guarantee does not ordinarily affect the price significantly. Rather, the guarantee makes goods available in areas where they would otherwise not be exported and provides competition where otherwise there might be none. The export credit facilities therefore operate to enlarge world choice of goods and services, with minimal distortion of international markets.

Beyond these basic policy issues of domestic and international economic policies, there are two specific legislative issues on which we feel we should comment. The discussion surrounding them gives rise to an uneasy feeling of their being presented as ad hoc and quickly-devised responses to particular problems, with little thought given to the long-range economic implications.

1) Lockheed loan guarantee. From an economic point of view, a company which cannot produce at a level and at a price which is enough to earn a positive return on the sums invested in it should no longer exist. From that point of view, Lockheed should not have been shored up with a government guarantee, the provision of which was required by the company's
creditors before they would extend more credit. At a minimum, management should have been overhauled and a thorough, well-publicized, and on-going investigation and set of controls set up for all of the company's various projects. It is still not clear that the L-1011 is commercially viable, and most of the rest of Lockheed's business could have been distributed to other aerospace companies to be managed to completion. We feel that too little sacrifice was required from managers and stockholders, at the price of precedent-setting government action. The outcome will make it that much easier in the future to justify guarantees and loans to bail out other large companies. That a Republican Administration condoned the behavior of Lockheed Corporation does not auger well for the continuance of the bracing effects of "free" enterprise in our economy.

(2) Minimum wage legislation. Although it is apparently doing so with some reluctance, the Administration has sponsored a bill to raise the minimum wage in a series of steps over the next few years. This legislation was introduced in response to a Democratic-sponsored bill which greatly broadened and increased the coverage of minimum wage legislation. Nonetheless, we would have looked for something more creative in this area from the Administration, since every rise in the minimum wage not only removes from the work force those workers who are marginally employed, but also raises the wage level among the employed. Ultimately, these artificially-engendered wage rises (i.e., they are not a result of bargaining or labor supply and demand or productivity) raise the prices of goods and services, thereby raising our domestic cost of living and making our products less competitive in world markets. We would have hoped that instead of a counterproposal also raising wage rates, the Administration might have proposed a bold, new initiative in this area by offering to let wages find their own level in the labor market affected, while supplementing wages inadequate to support the wage earner and his dependents through the Family Assistance Plan.

In spite of our criticism, we feel that the Nixon economic policies as a whole stand up reasonably well. The Administration has succeeded in lowering the rate of inflation and in getting the international monetary situation off dead center. There has thus been significant movement in the right direction, particularly given the state of the economy left by the Johnson Administration. The major economic problems still facing us appear to be to lower the rate of unemployment and to establish control over the federal budget. We hope that the Administration will seek innovative solutions to these perplexing problems.

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### The 1973 Brookings Counter Budget

Setting National Priorities: The 1973 Budget  
By Charles L. Schultze, Edward R. Fried, Alice Riblin, and Nancy H. Teeters,  
Brookings Institution: $3.50.

The Brookings Institution's 1973 counter budget seeks to fathom where the Federal Government will get and spend its money for the next five years. The counter-budget paints a bleak future. The crux of the Brookings' message is that full employment revenues under existing tax laws are not likely to be sufficient in 1975 to cover the expenditures in that year from a continuation of the policies and programs contained in the 1973 Federal budget, and may fail to do so by a wide margin.

The Brookings' 1973 budget model includes a detailed and subtle analysis of proposed new policies and programs in nine domestic areas as well as military spending and foreign policy. The authors of the counter-budget have suggestions of both substantial increases (such as daycare services costing from $5 to $12 billion a year) and decreases (such as $126 billion to $14 billion reductions in military outlays by 1977), but concludes that in the short run the country's budget must essentially conform to the President's 1973 model.

The Brookings' crystal ball, unfortunately, has little interest in the experience of the recent past. The study casually describes the bulk of the Great Society programs as involving "built in" expenditures ($35.7 billion in the 1973 budget) that cannot easily be reversed. Yet the Brookings' authors seem reluctant to subject this gigantic spending budget of the last decade to the same thoughtful scrutiny they reserve for the next five years.

This resignation, even fatalism, in the counter-budget came as a great disappointment. Brookings would have been the logical one to come along and say, "Look, the emperor has no clothes!" Yet one rarely finds this welcome insight within the Brookings' budget. The billions of dollars thrown down the hole of manpower training illustrate the point. The tables in the President's 1973 budget show that outlays for manpower training and employment services have skyrocketed from $209 million in 1973 to close to $3.9 billion estimated for 1973, a twentyfold increase in ten years. This category has grown faster and bigger than any other federal educational program ($300 million higher than even elementary and secondary education in Nixon's 1973 budget).

Do manpower training and employment services work? Have they justified the 2000 percent increase in federal outlay since 1963? Brookings gives hardly a clue. The only allusion to this $3.9 billion program is a passing observation:

"In many programs, especially social service programs, it proved extremely difficult to measure results. It is not immediately obvious, for example, whether a particular manpower program is 'working' . . . . Moreover, it has become clear that in many of the new areas of federal concern, no one really knew what would work."

The insight is nearly as compelling as the jargon. Brookings' ho-hum attitude toward careful scrutiny
of past programs is also evidenced in their treatment of elementary and secondary education. The authors introduce the chapter on financing elementary and secondary education with the rather cavalier assertion that the 1973 education budget as originally presented by the President would not by itself justify a chapter in the book. "The budget rejects a continuation of the present limited federal role in education." Yet this federal role happens to be estimated at $3.6 billion for 1973, 50 percent higher than in 1969. Similarly, Brookings has hardly looked at priorities of farm income stabilization ($5 billion in the 1973 budget, up 25 percent since 1963) or manned space flight (coasting down but still a healthy $1.6 billion in the 1973 Budget, with the space shuttle yet a glimmer in NASA's eye). Brookings apparently has given up on farm subsidies on the basis of the unsuccessful experience of several Administrations in trying to reduce them.

If Brookings will not bear the embarrassment of a confrontation with the emperor, who will? George McGovern? Hardly. Each new tax and welfare program he introduces is fuzzier and less related to past reality than the one before. The Republicans in Congress? Not likely, since they generally feel obliged to follow their President's budgetary leadership.

Maybe the embarrassing news will yet come to the emperor from the heart of the President's own Administration. Remember the boost the tax reform movement received from Johnson's one-month Secretary of the Treasury, Joseph W. Barr, who sounded the clarion of the "taxpayers' revolt" and helped assure passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Now Charles E. Walker, Nixon's own Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, has had the temerity to start a mini-revolt against manpower training programs. He has reminded the taxpayer that these programs have cost the taxpayers about $40 billion since they began in 1961, were budgeted for $4 billion in the 1973 Budget ($700 million more than last year), and had succeeded in reducing the unemployment rate by less than one-half of one percentage point, a figure that he said represents only 400,000 persons. Even the .05 percent figure may overstate the success of the manpower programs, Mr. Walker adds, because it includes persons who are actually in the training program at any given time.

It would be nice if Brookings could give us some hard answers to nagging old budget problems along with probing questions about new initiatives. They might just find enough threads on the old emperor to swaddle child care, environmental protection or one of their other fiscal babes.

The Brookings' authors perceptively argue that both Congress and the executive branch need to view budget totals and major program decisions in a longer perspective; perhaps the Administration should present to Congress a five-year budgetary outlook. Maybe Congress can be persuaded to pass three-to-five-year budget authorizations and appropriations (notwithstanding the Constitution's biennial bias). This approach has already been shown to have some advantages. The Defense Department, and several others, already prepare confidential five-year budgetary outlooks for their own use. Yet again, however, Brookings is looking to the emperor's new clothes and seems to have little concern with his earlier folly. If one is to look forward five years in the budgetary process, why not invest equal effort to look back at what went wrong (or right) last year, or the year before.

— EUGENE MARANS

September, 1972
Trading For World Peace

When President Nixon was inaugurated in January 1969, international economic policy did not seem very important to most people in the U.S. outside of the narrow fraternity of economists and money men who traditionally worried about such things as trade and the balance of payments. Today, however, the international branch of our national economic life is a central concern of people interested less in the "dismal science" as much as in the broader sweep of international affairs. The reasons for this change are simple. International economic relations are in visible disarray; the impact of a big, competitive outside world on the United States is beginning to hurt in some localities even as it benefits U.S. consumers and retards inflation. We are reaching the end of an era of international politics dominated by issues of military security, and ushering in one shaped by the economic relations among states and large international corporations.

How have the President and his Administration fared during this transition? The domestic economy inherited by President Nixon in 1969 was anything but healthy. Inflation was about double the current rate; the favorable balance the U.S. had always enjoyed in its international trade account was already disappearing, as American purchasing power exerted its pull on lower-priced foreign goods still relatively untouched by inflation; and, of course, the U.S. balance of payments was persistently in deficit.

At the same time, American goods were becoming less competitive than before, not only because of inflation at home and an overvalued rate of exchange for the dollar, but also on account of the relative success of foreign manufacturers, especially in Western Europe and Japan. In effect, two decades of U.S. efforts for economic self-sufficiency on the Continent and in Asia had paid off; but one result was the ending of the American advantage in international trade.

Given these developments and President Johnson's resolute refusal to impose an adequate "war tax" to soak up some inflation-producing purchasing power, President Nixon would have had to work a minor miracle to prevent the mess that finally embroiled our economic relations with other states. Since President Nixon did not work such a miracle, the Johnson trade deficit deepened to historically unprecedented dimensions and capital continued to flow abroad either to escape American recession or to exploit new opportunities elsewhere; and dollars piled up in the central bank accounts of foreign states. But unlike the 1940's and 1950's — the time when dollars were desperately sought to fuel European recovery — these dollars were far less welcome. Under the impact of inflation, they were clearly overvalued — just as currencies like the Yen and the Deutschmark, set artificially at favorable parities as part of post-war Allied policy, were now undervalued. Furthermore, the flow of dollars began to impose severe difficulties on the money managers of Western Europe. In effect, decisions by individual purchasers and investors were diluting the control that Common Market governments were trying to assert over their own economic policy — or at least so it seemed to them.

At the same time, though the United States is far less dependent on foreign trade than any other major state outside of the Communist world, the flow of goods into our market began to impose hardships on selected domestic industries, such as textiles and shoes. It is arguable, of course, that the United States should not impose on consumers products uncompetitive with foreign goods or subsidize industries trying to use "cheap foreign labor" as a scapegoat for their own failures of management and innovation. Nevertheless, the President acted decisively on textiles to fulfill an election promise and to avoid the messiness, expense, and complexities of shifting workers from textiles to other, more competitive and better managed industries. Even accepting the argument that the U.S. should vastly reduce such inefficient production, one can still maintain that Japan, in particular, was excessively aggressive in exploiting its advantage and Japan had been particularly dilatory and obstructive before ultimately liberalizing its own practices in trade and investment. The major growth in exports, however, occurred in poorer East Asian countries, like South Korea and Taiwan, and it is these developing nations that were really hit by U.S. textile quotas.

Otherwise, the problem with the Long-Term Textile Agreement (LTA) that the U.S. negotiated with the major textile-exporting nations ("sanforizing" the U.S. domestic market against shrinkage) lay partly in political style and partly in economic substance. The United States allowed itself to be seen as the bully boy and at times did, indeed, act in ways that were peremptory and high-handed. It appears to be a classic case of overkill, where the occasional lack of cooperation on the part of, say, Japan, paled against the more overt actions of Administration officials. The offensive style of U.S. behavior was reflected in the famous measures of August 15, 1971 and in many subsequent actions.

The merits of the New Economic Policy can be debated. But it is clear that something had to give, and that the U.S. had not been receiving as much cooperation as it needed, especially from Western Europe, despite some currency realignments earlier in the year. The Japanese, by contrast, have not received enough credit for a number of steps, even if belated, that they have finally taken toward liberalizing trade and investment, partly because of their own failures at public relations. The burden that the Europeans' Common Agricultural Policy was beginning to place on U.S. farm exports threatened to be worsened by the expansion of the Common Market. There was the increasing exclusivity practiced by France, in particular, with
regard to African markets, and an uncooperative European position on further liberalization of trade. Again, there was French obstruction in the formation of the two-tiered gold market in 1968. But most important, there was a strong sense in Europe that the "dollar problem" was essentially something for the Americans to solve.

The chief economic criticisms that can be made of the international aspects of the New Economic Policy are 1) suspension of dollar convertibility came rather late in the day; 2) The NEP merely postponed the necessary devaluation of the dollar; 3) The NEP was to some extent an effort to make other industrial nations pick up part of the tab for our failure to bring inflation under control at home. These are substantial criticisms; yet it can still be said that the Administration handled the economic aspects of the crisis better than some European countries — notably Great Britain — had handled similar problems in the past few years. Furthermore, by December, the Administration did abandon, a bit belatedly, its insistence on preserving the par value of the dollar through the transparent fiction of upvaluing every other currency that was undervalued in terms of the dollar. On balance, the Smithsonian Agreement that finally devalued the dollar was a workmanlike effort and was a step forward toward full-scale monetary reform.

Again, the real deficiencies of the August 15 agreement lie in the politics of the matter. First, there was the indiscriminate nature of the 10 percent added-duty on U.S. imports, which punished cooperative (and poor) nations along with the less-cooperative rich countries. Secondly, the Administration went much too far in insisting that sweeping accommodations be made by the other rich countries before the surcharge could be lifted. Thirdly, the President included in his August 15 message a determination to cut foreign economic aid a further 10 percent, thus adding insult to the injury the U.S. had already done to the international cooperative effort on development and further penalizing the small players in the larger international economic game.

John Connally

There has been a long and sustained debate about U.S. actions during the period between August and December 1971, and especially about the role played by former Treasury Secretary John Connally. On the one hand, he did gain substantial agreements on currency realignments from the other Group of Ten countries, once he made clear U.S. willingness to abandon the $35 official price of gold. On the other hand, his methods fed what feelings of pique and bitterness already existed, especially in Europe. Indeed, it is arguable that Secretary Connally's aggressiveness has increased the desire and willingness of the European Community partners to rely less upon cooperation with the U.S. in international economic matters, and more upon their own economic strength. If so, then short-term U.S. gains — and gains in terms of abating a serious economic crisis — could be offset by an even faster growth of competitive mercantilism and retreat from liberal trade practices among the rich countries.

Just as important as these potential reactions by European economic managers are the implications of U.S. international economic policies on the political strength and cohesion of the Western Alliance itself. For a number of reasons, the emphasis in Alliance affairs is shifting away from the preoccupation with military security and the U.S. nuclear guarantee that dominated deliberations for many years. The effort to preserve European security has succeeded; détente rather than confrontation is the watchword; and the strains in the Alliance have virtually ceased to center on military issues, shifting rather to very real economic differences. European equality, long proclaimed as a tenet of Allied faith, is coming true, at least in the economic realm (the only one that matters very much any more in Europe). This growing equality is not particularly to U.S. liking, as strength breeds competition. It is still true that Allied disagreements are argued out largely within the military forum of NATO, and that the Allies seek agreement in the tried and true area of mutual security. But the real emphasis of the Alliance and its problems has already shifted. Thus the squabbling attendant on the NEP and the United States's hard sell pressure may have had a serious impact upon the Alliance as a whole, and upon Atlantic "security" in the broadest sense of that word. The timing was also unfortunate. Coming during the SALT talks (when many Europeans felt their interests to be jeopardized in bilateral negotiation over the arms race), the economic crisis underscored the slow separation of interests between the U.S. and its European Allies. Moreover, the U.S. was then resisting widespread European support for a European Security Conference — a subject seemingly far removed from international economic policy, but reflecting the same needs and problems of Atlantic understanding and cooperation. Unfortunately, consultation with our European Allies remains more theory than fact, as was also true under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

The implications of the style used by the U.S. in launching the NEP for our relations in Asia are as important. The reaction of Japan to the NEP is well known, as is the explanation given by the Administration for keeping Tokyo in the dark: that the U.S. had to act quickly and, as implied by the President's announcement on his China trip, the Japanese supposedly can't keep a secret. In addition, in the Administration's view, Japan had to be "shocked" into taking drastic action, including the up-valuing of the Yen (again, giving Japan little credit for positive acts taken during the months before August 15).

The economic arguments have some merit; as does the argument that Japan needed more stimulus to act. But for all that has been said about Japanese reaction to the "twin shocks" of July and August 15, 1971, it is still hard to exaggerate their potentially dangerous long-range impact. We are in danger, particularly, of forcing the Japanese once again toward intense economic nationalism, out of a sense (real or not) that Japan is being treated as a second-class nation. At a time when the U.S. needs Japanese economic cooperation throughout East Asia, both for its own sake and to forestall further military ventures there on the part of any major power, fostering this sense of isolation in Japan is remarkably shortsighted. Thus,

*September, 1972*
an international economic policy could have a decisive impact both on political relations and on Japan's decision on whether to become a major military power, going far beyond the growth of mercantilism or the limiting of U.S.-Japanese economic cooperation in the Western Pacific.

These observations are not new. What is striking, however, is that they have been made so often, yet without stirring the Administration to act forcefully to counteract them. It was more than a year before a U.S.-Japanese summit conference, and this on U.S. soil instead of in Tokyo (the one hour meeting between the President and the Emperor must be discounted almost entirely). Despite the Kissinger visit and the Nixon-Tanaka meeting, the U.S. has still not acknowledged in its policies that in the ways that most matter Japan will be the most important power in the area for at least the balance of this decade and should be our most cherished ally. The fate of Japan should be considered more important than a few votes in South Carolina.

This anomaly is only partly attributable to the much-discussed emphasis of the White House on a "new balance of power." In addition, the higher echelons of the Administration have been particularly slow to grasp the emerging importance of economics in international political relations. This is ironic, in that such a development is implicit in the President's own claims — quite likely justified — that Vietnam is America's last war. Furthermore, it is clearly in both Soviet and American interest that two of the so-called pentagon of power centers, namely Western Europe and Japan, be kept substantially disarmed. Yet to achieve this interest will require a basic change in attitudes — attitudes about what it takes to make a "great power," and how to respond to great powers that do not have the traditional military coin of importance. If we in the United States can demonstrate that Western Europe and Japan are just as important as, say, China, without going the traditional military route, then we may indeed be able to avoid this eventuality and order our relations primarily in the much safer (however competitive) area of economics.

Restructuring the international monetary and trading system is thus important in ways that go far beyond the need to expand international liquidity, find an alternative to gold and the dollar in international commerce, make necessary adjustments in currency exchange rates to reflect differentials of economic performance, create a code of conduct for multinational companies, and forestall the growth of protectionism and mercantilism, with regional north-south trading blocks. These reforms and efforts, as vital as they are in substantive economic terms, are necessary both as part of the growth of international economic relations and as a matter of international politics, hopefully supplanting some of the security politics of yesterday and today.

As a first priority, therefore, there needs to be greater effort put into international economic reform, as part of broader foreign policy. On this score, the Administration must share responsibility for the slow pace of progress beyond last December's Smithsonian Agreement. It must also bear a major share of the responsibility for the failure to create a sense among the developed countries that the international economic system must be seen as a whole, including poor countries as well as rich. It is true that the U.S. (through Secretary Connally) proposed that the Group of Ten be expanded to a group of twenty based on the Government of the International Monetary Fund. It remains to be seen whether this was more a tactical device designed to change the nature of bargaining with a united European Community than a genuine commitment to greater bargaining power for the poor nations.

**Poor Countries**

Yet it can be argued that, increasingly, a continuing and active role for the poor countries will be required in order to have an international economic system that works very well for anyone. There must be common action to preserve the environment, and there must be an orderly process for bargaining with poor countries processing raw materials, and possibly extending to other commodities as supplier countries learn to organize themselves better. These questions may not be urgent now; but they are likely to become so by the end of the decade.

Like its predecessor (and much of the Congress, for that matter), this Administration does not seem to recognize the problems and potential here. It has shifted somewhat on the question of providing poor countries with a slightly greater share of the IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) — the so-called "paper gold." Yet at the Third United National Conference on Trade and Development in Santiago this year, the Administration repeated the U.S. action of four years earlier at UNCTAD II, in obstructing efforts to increase the flow of resources to poor countries. Only at Stockholm at the U.N. Conference on the Environment were we more receptive to the interests of such poorer nations, but then our desire for cooperation from them in return was more apparent.

By executive action this Administration has promoted the disassociation of bilateral aid from purchases in this country (and actually has permitted poor countries to buy from one another with U.S. aid). And the President has given some support to the principle of granting preferential access to U.S. markets for products of poor countries. The Administration's record is not very laudable in the area of economic aid, however. Although the President has given some backing to the limited appropriations for the international lending institutions (like the World Bank's International Development Association), it has followed the trend set by the Johnson Administration in letting U.S. bilateral aid sink to a new low.

Thus the United States now ranks 12th out of the 16 OECD nations that belong to the Development Assistance Committee in terms of the percent of GNP provided in foreign aid. We are in default of our agreements with other donor nations — a poor harbinger of other forms of international economic cooperation. With regard to South Asia, in particular, our record is even worse: we have still not resumed economic aid to India, cut off in December 1971, and thus are threatening the entire
World Bank-led aid consortium for India. Meanwhile, the Administration continues to place emphasis on military assistance programs in the developing world, instead of experimenting with much more hopeful — and arguably more promising — economic methods. In Asia, this is most unfortunate, where we need new tools to replace discredited military ones. Japan's success in using economic aid to develop their markets in Asia should be instructive.

Our general attitude toward poor countries can be seen as a missed opportunity, both in attempting to help promote the development that so many countries want, and in working toward better forms of international economic (and hence, political) cooperation. This Administration, like the last, may be able to indulge in myopic practices, but for how long is questionable. Indeed, what is at stake here — with regard not just to poor countries but also to international economic relations in general — is a sense of U.S. commitment to cooperative internationalism. We have had this commitment a scant 30 years, and it is now seriously in jeopardy, not because we are withdrawing from over-involvement in security matters, but rather because at the same time we are losing a sense of leadership — or even of a shared leadership in ensuring the health of the international economic system.

In its formal declarations the Administration has shown some awareness of these problems and potentials. As Secretary Connally said to the Council on Foreign Relations on March 15:

**In the public sector, we must give to foreign economic policy that same intensive effort and emphasis which, until now, has been principally reserved for foreign military and political policies.**

But performance has not matched this bold and correct insight.

In part, this deficiency has been a matter of organization. During this Administration, the State Department has lost much of its influence on foreign policy. Its experience in economic matters has thus also been lost to a great extent. Some of the slack was picked up by the Treasury Department under Secretary Connally, but with notoriously mixed results. And in the White House itself, Dr. Kissinger is widely noted for having little interest in international economic policy, dealing instead with practices and concepts which may be becoming increasingly outmoded. With the departure of Fred Bergsten from the National Security Council last year, the White House effort was weakened even further. And during the crisis that preceded August 15, 1971, the international economic experts at Treasury, State and the National Security Council were hardly involved, and along with Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger were noticeably absent from the famous meeting at Camp David.

**White House Leadership**

Haplessly, the President instituted an International Economic Policy Council in 1970, designed to operate on a level with the Domestic Council and the National Security Council. Yet, when it was led by now Commerce Secretary Peter G. Peterson, the IEPC never was a rival for Dr. Kissinger in U.S. foreign policy, or for Treasury Secretary Connally. And now, under the direction of Peter Flanigan, the Council has little salutary impact at all, and is reputed to serve more as a link to business than as a clearinghouse for enlightened policy. Thus, there is no single place in the Administration where an overview of the international economic issues can be focused. The failure of the IEPC to represent a sophisticated view of international economic problems (even, at times, under Peterson) was illustrated by the President's statement last January 19 on the expropriation of U.S. business in foreign countries. In retaliation to such action the U.S. would "presumably" cut off further adequate compensation, and would not support loans from the multilateral development banks. The unilateral act, widely decried, especially in Latin America, is evidence of the Administration's inability to grasp the complexities of the problem posed by the multinational corporation, and the need to reconcile problems, not simply react in defense of U.S. business interests, narrowly conceived. The President's statements do not promise a more enlightened approach as these problems get worse, not just with respect to poor countries, but also with regard to the operations of U.S. multinational corporations in places like Western Europe.

The one bright spot in White House handling of international economic affairs is the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. William Eberle, and his new deputy, Harold Malmgren, are continuing in the elevated tradition maintained by Carl J. Gilbert. This office is now as talented and sophisticated as it has ever been and will hopefully exercise some counterweight to other forces acting within the White House.

Hopefully as well, the Special Representative's Office will have some impact on one trend in Administration attitudes in international economic relations; namely, the growth of protectionism. This sentiment has led American labor...
to oppose trade expansion in an ill-considered and ultimately self-destructive attempt to terminate the "export of jobs" to low-wage countries by encouraging inflation and inefficiency in American industry and thus, ultimately, retarding real economic growth and job creation. At the moment, the Burke-Hartke Bill, a monstrosity that would curb both trade and investment, is pending before the Congress as the top legislative priority of the AFL-CIO. The White House fortunately opposes the bill. (See March 1972 FORUM for a full discussion of the problems of multinational corporations.)

The problems of job losses is significant and will not evaporate even if the Burke-Hartke bill is defeated in its entirety. Again, the Administration has been slow to react to the problem — with the exception of its special efforts on behalf of industries like textiles. The correct approach to the problem is not to appease special interests, but to help U.S. workers who lose their jobs, regardless of the cause, to retain them, and assist them in finding new employment. (Ironically, the Government's largest adjustment assistance program is in the form of aid given to Turkey to discourage the cultivation of opium poppies.)

Conclusion

This problem, as well as the growing problem of the multinational corporation, illustrated a final point about the complexity of international economic policy. Not only is this area becoming inextricably part of broader international political issues, but there is also far less distinction than before between domestic economic issues and those in the international arena. For Americans, this will imply a major change in the way we view the outside world, and major requirements to coordinate policies in the two areas. Making the shift will not be particularly to our liking, but the changes are inevitable, as are the needs of the President and his Administration to pay far more attention in the future to international economic concerns, and to deal with them with a far greater sophistication and realization of the larger political framework within which they fit.

Consumer Affairs

Who’s Aware Now (In the Market)?

President Nixon established the standard for his Administration in consumer affairs in his Buyer’s Bill of Rights submitted to Congress on October 30, 1969.

"Consumerism in the America of the 70’s means that we have adopted the concept of "buyer’s rights."

I believe that the buyer in America today has the right to make an intelligent choice among products and services.

The buyer has the right to accurate information on which to make his free choice.

The buyer has the right to expect that his health and safety is taken into account by those who seek his patronage.

The buyer has the right to register his dissatisfaction, and have his complaint heard and weighed, when his interests are badly served.

This "Buyer’s Bill of Rights" will help provide greater personal freedom for individuals as well as better business for everyone engaged in trade.

The tone of the remarks and the selection of Virginia Knauer, a recognized consumer advocate, as Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs offered promise to the consumer movement. The lesson that consumers were a real political force was learned during the President’s abortive effort to name Willie Mae Rogers, of the commercially-oriented Good Housekeeping to the consumer post. Still, the promises of 1969 have not become realities.

The Nixon approach to consumer affairs has evolved as an uneven mixture of classical and Keynesian economics. The stated philosophy shows a great faith in recreating a fair and just marketplace for buyers and sellers.

The same faith shaped the anti-trust policies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, yet this Administration has not employed anti-trust or anti-monopoly actions as significant tools to aid consumers. Competition, theory says, will provide consumers better choices because sellers will have to produce new and improved products to woo consumer dollars. Neither consumer advocates — with the notable exception of Ralph Nader — nor the Administration, however, has given anti-trust efforts priority among consumer protection methods, although, as in the case of Theodore Roosevelt’s "trust busting," it stems logically from the free enterprise philosophy. The impetus for such anti-trust usage has come instead from state governments who have widely utilized such tactics. FTC’s new Bureau of Competition and former Justice Anti-trust Division Head, Richard McLaren, have not been able to establish anti-trust momentum during the first Nixon term.

Another key to an improved marketplace is to improve the consumer’s access to reliable product information. Consumer information and education programs are positive approaches which do not involve direct government action against business. By Executive Order, President Nixon has established the Consumer Product Information Coordinating Center and several million pamphlets listing government consumer publications have been issued. CPICC has stimulated increased publishing efforts on the part of federal agencies in line with the President’s statement on October 26, 1970, that “Government product information is acquired in the public interest, and it should be made available to the public and to other government agencies in a manner that is useful to consumers...."
Yet the commitment to preparing consumers through education has not been met with adequate funding for consumer education programs. The recently passed Higher Education Amendments of 1972 authorized $80 million for consumer education during a three-year period, but there has been no Administration indication that any significant funding is planned. (The initiative has been taken by state and local governments, however.) Consumer education projects will thus continue to be funded basically by borrowing or diverting limited funds from other grant and project programs—certainly not the coordinated effort that is needed to implement the President's February 25, 1971 statement which asked Secretary of HEW Elliot Richardson to "promote the establishment of consumer education as a national educational concern."

The Administration has principally backed a third alternative to either anti-trust action or education: consumer protection regulation through an administrative, regulatory agency, and congressional efforts. This is also the first choice of much of the consumer lobby and most Democratic spokesmen. It is a politically palatable and economically sound approach when practiced in moderation. As Food and Drug Commissioner Charles Edwards has pointed out, however, his agency requires an informed public to do its job. No foreseeable increase in FDA's resources is likely to be obviated that need.

Nixon Policy and the Congress

The Nixon Administration can take partial credit for stimulating congressional activity but the testimony of Administration officials has been primarily for mild forms of legislation that largely embody a philosophy of protective consumer legislation long recognized as needed by everyone except test tube classical economists. Support of the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, the most significant law to emerge so far, was largely bipartisan and economically sound approach when practiced in moderation. As Food and Drug Commissioner Charles Edwards has pointed out, however, his agency requires an informed public to do its job. No foreseeable increase in FDA's resources is likely to be obviated that need.

The Nixon Policy and Administration Change

The Administration has proven in the cases of the FDA and the FTC, that there is considerable authority lying unused in the existing statutes. The aggressive Miles Kirkpatrick-Robert Pitofskf FTC of 1972, a definite consumer success of the Administration, is essentially the same as the one of 1969 that was condemned by the American Banking Association's study as having been lax and inefficient since 1914 in consumer affairs. Increased FDA appropriations have helped Commissioner Edwards' traditionally industry-orientated agency to do an improved job. FDA has begun to listen to consumer leaders, is seriously reviewing the efficacy of over-the-counter drugs, and is developing better food labelling guidelines, but nonetheless still resists demands for a new independent Product Safety Agency and finds itself the perpetual target of more consumer criticism than any other federal agency.

The President's moves to upgrade the President's Committee on Consumer Interests to an Executive Office level Office of Consumer Affairs (OCA), to place his own consumer advocate, Mrs. Knauer, on the Cost of Living Council, to meet openly with consumer leaders in White House planning for Phase II of the economic stabilization program, and to give prominence to his voluntary business reform group, the National Business Council for Consumer Affairs (NBCCA), are positive steps. The final impact of these moves on the consumer is still cloudy.

OCA deserves special attention as the logical choice for the federal transition from uncoordinated programs affecting consumers to a statutory consumer agency. In the 1969 Buyer's Rights Message, the President urged Congress to establish such a permanent agency to "have central responsibility for coordinating all Federal activities in the consumer protection field, helping to establish priorities, to resolve conflicts, to initiate research, and to recommend improvements in a wide range of government programs." OCA has not yet been given the resources for planning the transition or for its current advocacy role and has concentrated mostly on short range, high visibility projects. More importantly, perhaps, Virginia Knauer's office has been unable to affect the major thrusts of established departments and has not used its prestige to criticize departments for failing to implement presidential policy directives.

September 1972
Nixon Policy and Private Actions

In the private sector the Administration has stressed volunteerism, non-legislative consumer actions. Virginia Knauer has successfully prodded some business reforms in life insurance price comparisons, bacon packaging visibility, cosmetic ingredient disclosures on labels, unit pricing, and open food dating. State governments have been encouraged by several agencies, with rather limited results, to regulate certain consumer frauds and to institute no-fault auto insurance. The Administration has steered its own course and done little to encourage organized voluntary consumer groups, being generally at loggerheads with Ralph Nader and the Consumer Federation of America, the two most prominent private advocates of consumer interests in Washington.

Action for the special consumer needs of the poor has been seriously neglected. Consumer programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity have been practically eliminated. Consumer complaint handling and education are essential to Model Cities projects, neighborhood services of the Community Action Agency, manpower training and a variety of other social service programs, but they are rarely identifiable components of currently funded projects. The President's high domestic priority, welfare reform, as well as existing welfare programs, should incorporate relatively inexpensive consumer counselling and family money management services to protect society's multi-billion dollar cash investment in these low-income families. There is, however, little indication that this is happening now, and no indication that such programs will be a part of welfare reform if it is enacted.

The future course of federal consumer policy is at a turning point. Corporate volunteerism — as an answer to Nader's calls for regulation and Administration internal reorganization — has little impact on the main concerns of consumers, however reassuring these policies may seem to some elements of business and industry who oppose all consumer legislation. Thoughtfully constructed legislation is bogged down in Congress and needs to be passed. Public opinion strongly supports consumer rights and further procrastination or opposition might be exploited by a skillful opposition leadership. A more apparent Administration concern for consumer problems and White House initiation of one or more major consumer bills in new fields would blunt criticism and re-establish the spirit of the 1969 consumer message in the public's mind.

Much could be accomplished by reforms that would improve competition in the marketplace while benefiting consumers in terms of prices, variety and quality. Two major possibilities include removal of import barriers for items such as steel and oil or increased anti-trust actions. The President's Hunt Commission Report would lift restrictions against certain financial institutions in granting loans and paying competitive interest rates, so that legislation now in preparation could incorporate these and other related consumer benefits. Beefed up regulatory agency powers and appropriations, particularly for the FDA, could meet the uncontested need to reduce deceptive and fraudulent practices so common in low-income areas while also moving to halt commercial use of questionable food and cosmetic ingredients and sale of dangerous toys, non-safety glasses, and a long list of similar hazards long overdue for restriction. The FTC has already moved in this direction. No-fault auto insurance is already endorsed in principle for state action, and the poor record of the states now calls for federal mandate.

The Nixon Administration's first term record on consumers is mixed. In a field with broad public interest and only minor impact on overall federal spending, accelerated federal action is now the only feasible course of action.

Ripon Suit Continued

The Ripon Society in a brief filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals on September 11, challenged the constitutionality of the delegate apportionment formula adopted at the Republican National Convention last month.

Citing unconstitutional factors which also were contained in the formula declared unconstitutional last April, the Society asked the court to remand the question of the new formula to the district court for a new ruling.
III. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS: Government Reorganization

Inertia in Reform

Although every President since FDR has made efforts to investigate and reform the structure of government, Richard M. Nixon went at the matter with special purposefulness. He appointed a small advisory committee of pragmatic businessmen, charged them with a review of virtually all of the Federal Government's domestic activities, and received and acted upon their extraordinarily bold proposals. Yet at the end of his first term he has achieved little more than the tinkering adjustments which (with few exceptions) were all that his predecessors had ever attempted.

What accounts for the strength of the reform impulse, and why did it fail? For Republicans, governmental reform is a particularly attractive issue. It appeals to the GOP's self-image as a capable, efficient manager; and Republicans feel more comfortable ascribing the unresponsiveness of government to problems in organization than to profound underlying deficiencies of the political system or society itself.

Richard Nixon brought these Republican attitudes to the White House and transmitted them to Congress in March 1971 in his principal reorganization proposals.

"At this moment in our history, most Americans have concluded that government is not performing well. It promises much, but it does not deliver what it promises. The great danger, in my judgment, is that this momentary disillusionment with government will turn into a more profound and lasting loss of faith. We must fight that danger. We must restore the confidence of the people in the capacities of their government. In my view, that obligation now requires us to give more profound and more critical attention to the question of government organization than any single group of American leaders has done since the Constitutional Convention adjourned in Philadelphia in September of 1787. As we strive to bring about a new American Revolution, we must recognize that central truth which those who led the original American Revolution so clearly understood: often it is how the government is put together that determines how well the government can do its job.

This is not a partisan matter, for there is no Republican way and no Democratic way to organize the government. This is not a matter for dogmatic dispute, for there is no single, ideal blueprint which will immediately bring good order to Federal affairs. Nor is this a matter to be dealt with once and then forgotten. For it is important that our political institutions remain constantly responsive to changing times and changing problems."

In this philosophy, and in the means used to apply it, lay the seeds of the failure of reform. If the system is fundamentally sound, the need for governmental reorganization may seem less urgent as the dissident clamor dies away; and by the end of the third year of the Nixon presidency, for quite independent reasons, much of the turbulence of the late 60's had quieted. This relative tranquility, coupled with an apparent lack of broad-based support for those of the President's specific proposals for reorganization which had either been presented to Congress or announced in the press, relegated the issue of governmental reform to one of the lower slots on the Administration's list of priorities.

To a great extent, of course, the President deserves credit for conducting his office in such a way as to relieve some of the pressures for governmental reform. But while adequate on a political level, it is not a satisfactory reason for the Administration's apparent abandonment of the issue. In effect, the President had gone to great lengths to demonstrate the need for reform, had moved others to propose reforms which he then presented to Congress, but when the political demands which underlay his original concern were met or turned aside, the President withdrew from the field. This lack of staying power on the issue was not, however, the real failure of the Administration. The principle of governmental reorganization, and even the specific proposals of the President, might have survived abandonment by the White House if the President and his advisers had been more foresighted in designing the apparatus which would advise him on the need for and nature of government reorganization. Fundamentally, it was the failure to create a constituency for reform outside the White House itself which defeated the President's most ambitious reform proposals: a failure of politics rather than of ideals.

Soon after taking office, the President appointed an Advisory Council on Executive Organization and
charged it with a mandate to consider the full range and scope of the Executive Branch of government:

"(1) the organization of the Executive Branch as a whole in light of today's changing requirements of government; (2) solutions to organizational problems which arise from among the 150 plus departments, offices, agencies, and other separate executive organizational units; and (3) the organizational relationships of the Federal Government to states and cities in carrying out the many domestic programs in which the Federal Government is involved."

As chairman of the six-man Council, the President chose Roy L. Ash, the President of Litton Industries; other members were George P. Baker, former Dean of Harvard Business School; John B. Connally, then with a Texas law firm and soon to come even more favorably to the President's attention; Frederick R. Kappell, former chairman of A. T. & T.; Richard M. Paget, president of a management consulting firm in New York; and Walter N. Thayer, president of Whitney Communications Corp.

The Ash Council, as it came to be known, did not contain a member of Congress, and John Connally — who proved invaluable for this reason — was its only Democrat. This peculiar one-dimensionality discarded the opportunity to achieve a political consensus on reorganization, and weakened the Ash Council politically before a Democratic Congress. At the same time, the absence of an academician either on the Council itself or in the highly visible Executive Directorship weakened the Council's credibility and appeal within the intellectual community, which would have been a natural constituency for an abstraction like governmental reorganization.

To be sure, these apparent weaknesses were the source of latent strengths. In choosing the members of the Council, the President may have consciously decided to select a homogeneous group who would approach their mandate with a businessman's respect for pragmatism and dispatch; in this, he had chosen well, for the Council was remarkably unimpressed with the political pitfalls of its advice, and it produced four far-reaching proposals in less than two years. In the end, the Council proved to be what the President had probably intended — an innovative, hard-headed and fast-moving body. As in all such cases, however, the trade-off was ready communication with groups whose support would have been useful, if not essential, to the success of the Council's recommendations.

The President acted in one way or another upon all the Council's proposals, and two quick reforms were actually achieved. The Council's first suggestion was for a reorganization of the Executive Office of the President, a haphazard structure in and around the White House itself. As the Council saw it, the two great needs of the President were orderly policy development and an effective management apparatus. For policy, the Council proposed the creation of a Domestic Council, a domestic-policy counterpart to the National Security Council, in which proposals were to be developed by cabinet department task forces with the assistance of the Domestic Council's professional staff. For management, the Ash Council revamped the Bureau of the Budget, emphasizing the agency's managerial as well as its budgetary responsibilities, and renaming it the Office of Management and Budget.

Mr. Nixon proposed this reform to Congress as a reorganization plan (which goes into effect automatically unless one House objects), and after a brief skirmish (during which John Connally distinguished himself by neutralizing the House Democratic leadership and mollifying concern within the Cabinet itself) the program went into effect. Both changes were sound in theory, but were subject to the reasonable objection that future Presidents might not want to run their executive offices in just this way. Indeed, there have been few indications that President Nixon himself is using the Domestic Council for formulating new policies or that OMB is functioning as anything more than a renamed Bureau of the Budget. Perhaps future Presidents will make greater use of these mechanisms created in the President's own office on the Ash Council's recommendation.

**Environmental Protection**

The Ash Council's next proposal was addressed to the Federal Government's environmental protection activities. Here the Council performed its greatest service to the President by serving as an impartial arbiter among the various agencies which were fighting either to retain or enlarge their responsibilities within the politically-appealing environmental field. Within six months after the commencement of its investigation, the Ash Council proposed the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency as an independent entity, consciously deciding not to submerge this important agency in any cabinet department. The Council's theory was that only independence from the line agencies such as Interior or Agriculture would enable the new agency to withstand the enormous pressures of the interest groups which are, in effect, the clients of these and other cabinet departments. This proposal too was presented to Congress by the President and eventually approved.

The going got considerably rougher — and the deficiencies of the Council as a reforming body became more apparent — as the Council moved into areas where existing interest groups were directly threatened by reorganization. In addressing itself to the Independent
Regulatory Agencies (ICC, CAB, FMC, FPC, SEC and FCC), the Ash Council proposed the elimination of the collegial (multi-member) form and its replacement with a single administrator and an administrative court. Apparently concerned that this very controversial recommendation would founder if presented to Congress, the President sought guidance, and perhaps some inkling of public support for the proposals, by making the Council’s report public in February 1971. At that time, Mr. Nixon requested public comment on the program by April 20, 1971, and suggested that he would be ready with a reform proposal of his own shortly thereafter. Neither the Ash Council’s recommendation nor the President’s own proposals has been heard of since. The presumption is that the expected adverse reaction from the regulated groups and their lawyers was not balanced by any substantial public support for reform, and it is unlikely that any but historians of such matters will see the Ash Council’s proposals in this area again.

Finally, the Council brought forth its most ambitious proposal — thorough restructuring of almost all the Federal Government’s activities along goal-oriented lines. The Council proposed four entirely new Cabinet departments — Human Resources, Community Development, Economic Affairs and Natural Resources — to replace and realign the functions of the existing Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, HEW, HUD, and certain independent agencies such as OEO. To this, the President’s own staff added a proposal to divide up the functions of the Department of Transportation, and the package was complete. The President regarded the recommendation as sound enough to include as part of the New American Revolution he called for in his State of the Union address to Congress in January 1971. In March 1971, legislation was presented to Congress, and a committee of prominent citizens was set up to raise money for a massive public education effort in behalf of the program.

Despite all the hoopla, a year and a half has now passed without any significant public follow-up by the Administration. The committee of prominent citizens has disbanded, with the public as innocent of the proposals as it was before the committee was created, and the legislation which was to be part of the New American Revolution languishes in committees of the House and Senate.

**Credibility**

Although this program had its deficiencies, most objections might have been overcome if the Ash Council had had more credibility in Congress or academe. As with most programs for reorganization, the ultimate benefits are necessarily conjectural and theoretical. The Administration’s program, which differed only slightly from the Ash Council’s recommendations, promised a massive restructuring of the Federal establishment, but it is difficult to convince a skeptical Congress that a particular change means progress. Thus, while it may make some sense to place national transportation policy-making in the new Department of Economic Affairs and mass transit and highway administration in the new Department of Community Development, who can argue conclusively that this dismemberment of transportation policy-making is really an improvement? This particular suggestion is especially difficult for Congress to digest, since only a few years ago Lyndon Johnson successfully importuned Congress to create a single Department of Transportation on the theory that it was vital to centralize transportation policy-making.

To move Congress on the issue of massive governmental reform, more is required than a presidential message and the familiar and much disputed rhetoric of organizational theory. What is required, if presidential support is weak, is an advisory commission which Congress and the opposing political party participated in creating or on which these two entities are fairly represented. Alternatively, the creation of an advisory council may be depoliticized entirely by the appointment of well-known public figures and academics, formation of a large and more or less permanent professional staff, and the eventual production of a convincingly thorough independent study. Neither of these alternatives was adopted by the President in deciding on the nature of his own advisory council, and when the time came to summon the troops, nobody came.

All this suggests that government reorganization is not a beanbag, and that if you want to bring it about you must prepare your constituencies well before you make your proposals. This, the President and his advisers did not do. In the end, the failure of the Nixon Administration to achieve significant reform of government — despite an initially forceful attack — must be attributed to a political misjudgment of the President and his advisers and not to the inertia of Congress or to defects in the reform proposals themselves.
Civil Rights

The Politics of Backtracking

Prior to the 1968 election campaign, Richard Nixon had never made an anti-civil rights statement of any moment. In fact, in the 1960 campaign, his credentials in the area were easily as impressive as those of his opponent, John F. Kennedy. As a private citizen, Nixon even endorsed the open housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. But in September of 1968, in Charlotte, North Carolina, Nixon made a stridently anti-school integration campaign speech which shocked many of his supporters and marked the beginning of four years of official backtracking. Those four years saw the deliberate promotion of “forced busing” as an emotional, divisive, and essentially false issue. In late August, 1972, moreover, the President appeared to undercut much of the progress his Administration had made in the area of equal employment opportunities by raising and denouncing the spectre of job “quotas” for minorities and women. Despite the undeniable accomplishments of the Nixon Administration in other areas, the President’s first-term record on civil rights leaves many moderate Republicans deeply troubled as the 1972 elections approach.

Even though school desegregation was dead or dying as an issue in 1968, it was perhaps naive to expect the party then out of power to ignore the question during the campaign, or to expect the new Republican Administration to refrain from making fuzzy statements designed to encourage the white South in early 1969. But with the Administration’s infamous retreat on desegregation plans for 33 Mississippi districts before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in August, 1969, the problem grew increasingly serious, until it threatened to plunge the entire nation, not just the South, into a moral crisis and a possible Constitutional confrontation.

The Administration’s anti-busing offensive began in earnest in August, 1971 — a time when, again, the school desegregation issue had been defused by the definiteness of the Supreme Court’s decision in *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education* and by widespread acceptance of the Court’s pronouncement. With no advance warning and no apparent provocation, the President, in announcing the Justice Department’s appeal of a clearly inadequate Federal District Court desegregation order for Austin, Texas, went out of his way to condemn a HEW plan for Austin which the District Court had rejected but which had been previously approved by HEW Secretary Elliot Richardson, Attorney General John Mitchell, and the White House.

In his August outburst, the President also re-iterated his personal opposition to busing, despite the Supreme Court’s ruling three and a half months earlier that transportation was a permissible, and often necessary, device for desegregation and he announced a number of measures designed to frustrate the Court’s decision by executive and legislative action. First, the President decreed that none of the $75 million which the Administration had requested for districts under Swann-type busing orders could be used for transportation of students. This decision meant that large urban districts like Nashville, Tampa, and Jacksonville were forced to carry out transportation orders without the full assistance of the Federal funds which could have paid for buses (and related needs) and which could have eased the process of desegregation for countless children, parents, and local school authorities.

Second, the President proposed an amendment to the $2 billion Emergency School Aid Act, prohibiting the use of any funds under that Act for transportation of students. This proposal set off a round of increasingly dangerous and irresponsible legislative tinkering with the Constitution, which has not yet run its course.

After a harrowing series of close votes over amendments which could have thrown the school-desegregation situation into total confusion, the Emergency School Aid Act emerged in June, 1972, with a minimum of anti-busing baggage. But the President was not content with this exercise in Congressional moderation, and continues to push for his own antibusing bills (sent to Congress in March, 1972), especially the so-called Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1972. As passed by the House (but not the Senate), this legislation would severely limit, if not absolutely forbid, transportation of any elementary or secondary students for purposes of desegregation (even the Administration proposal would have permitted transportation, as a last resort, for the upper six grades), and it would permit re-opening of past court orders, which may have been in effect without controversy for years, to conform them to the bill’s limitations. (The EEOA would also redirect for compensatory education $500 million of the annual $1 billion authorized by the Emergency School Aid Act for purposes of desegregation; hence, it was designated by detractors as the “Separate but Equal Education Act of 1972.”) The fact that the EEOA is almost certainly unconstitutional does not minimize the harm its passage could cause, in terms of communities being uprooted once again, this time not to bring the races together but to tear them apart. And always in the
background is the President’s threat to “go to the people” this fall for a constitutional amendment against busing, which would be an even graver strain on the fabric of our society.

It would not be fair to lay all the blame for the deteriorating school situation at the Administration’s doorstep. Since 1968, the legal attack on desegregation has moved North, resulting in court orders affecting cities like Pasadena, San Francisco, Las Vegas, Indianapolis, Pontiac, and Detroit. Now many northern liberals, have suddenly decided that busing is a bad idea. The Detroit case, in particular, has produced near-hysterical reactions from within the Michigan congressional delegation, ranging from Democratic liberals like Congressmen James O’Hara and William Ford to Republican moderate-conservatives like Senator Robert Griffin, House Minority Leader Gerald Ford, and Congressman William Broomfield. (After nearly a year of emotionalism and dire predictions, nothing happened in Detroit this fall; as should have been expected, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stayed implementation of the trial court’s desegregation order pending full appellate review.) Clearly, desegregation efforts ought now to be emphasized in the North, where minority children are more isolated and more cruelly deprived than their Southern counterparts; but the traditional sources of political support for such efforts, North or South, have dried up. Seeking nationwide school desegregation at this point would be an act of political courage for any administration; but this kind of moral leadership in this area is to be expected from the White House.

Equal Employment

Meanwhile, behind the smokescreen provided by the busing furor, the Administration appears to be making some progress on the equal employment front. The Administration’s key legal weapon in this endeavor, little utilized by previous Democratic Administrations, is Executive Order 11246, which bans employment discrimination on the part of government contractors, including construction contractors on projects supported with Federal funds, and further requires such contractors to take “affirmative action” to recruit, hire, and promote qualified members of minority groups (including women).

Employment goals and timetables, of necessity, have been a part of many affirmative action plans required under the Executive Order. Generally, a contractor is required to make a good faith effort to bring the proportion of minority employees in his work force up to a level reflecting their availability in the population, and to set numerical milestones and a time schedule for meeting them. Officials of Federal agencies concerned have been at pains to explain that these goals are not “quotas,” that they are not rigid requirements which must be met regardless of the circumstances. What is required is a reasonable effort to increase minority representation — and a plan for doing so which does not include goals or timetables is likely to be an exercise in meaningless abstractions, whose success or failure is impossible to measure.

Nor do “affirmative action” plans, properly administered, require hiring less qualified or underqualified minority applicants over eligible whites, as has frequently been alleged. Employers, of course, may hire according to merit, but they are required to seek out and recruit minority applicants, and to scrutinize employment and promotion criteria in order to determine whether tests or other devices which have the effect of excluding minorities are essential indicators of on-the-job performance.

Under the authority of the Executive Order, the Department of Labor has imposed minority-hiring plans on the construction industry through the so-called Philadelphia Plan and similar arrangements in cities like St. Louis, San Francisco, and Washington. Likewise, HEW’s Office for Civil Rights has made some progress in combating race and sex discrimination by colleges and universities holding Federal contracts. The Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, have also registered gains in securing equal job opportunities for minorities; in these cases, when actual discrimination is shown on the part of an employer, firm quotas are a standard remedy. (The EEOC’s authority was recently extended by Congress to educational institutions and State and Local governments, and the Justice Department recently filed equal employment suits in Los Angeles and Montgomery, Alabama. However, the Administration did not support legislation to give the EEOC the authority to issue cease-and-desist orders, and has so far failed to provide the Commission with the staff it needs.) Finally, the Federal Government itself, which had a notoriously poor record in hiring and promoting minorities and women, has improved its record under the Nixon Administration to a significant degree, if not to the extent the Administration now claims. In so doing, the Administration has made use of rather specific hiring objectives in the Departments of Labor, Agriculture, HEW, the Office of Economic Opportunity, and several other agencies.

Now all this has been called into question by

September, 1972
the President's August 17 denunciation of quotas — which followed on the heels of a Republican National Convention at which the merest mention of quotas in any connection was drowned in boos. What Mr. Nixon actually did was to ban the use of binding quotas or proportional representation systems by Federal departments and agencies; but as with his statements on busing (many of which, if one reads the fine print, are technically correct), his directive on quotas threatens to cripple not only equal employment efforts at the Federal level, but Federal enforcement activities at all levels. It intensified the emotional and confused goals-vs.quotas debate, and yanked the rug out from under enforcement officers who had been insisting, in confrontations with contractors, that they were not requiring quotas. A spokesman for the Associated General Contractors of America said the President "should have the same standard for contractors as he does for himself," and expressed confidence that Federal enforcement officials would be "more reasonable" in the future. Whether you call the employment standards in question goals or quotas, the fact is that neither Federal agencies, the construction trades, nor university facilities have been overrun by minority group members or women; and now the Government has apparently abdicated any leadership role (if not its legal responsibilities) in this area.

Once again, however, the President is not alone in his retreat; he has been joined, once again, by erstwhile liberals who now fear their own oxen may soon be gored. Jewish groups, in particular, have been vehement in their criticisms of Federal enforcement efforts with respect to colleges and universities; and it was an inquiry from the American Jewish Committee which occasioned the President's August 17 directive. When a storm followed Mr. Nixon's response, the AJC said it was "distressed" to learn that its complaints might lead to a reduction in minority recruitment. Black Congressman Louis Stokes commented that the AJC "believes that by crossing our fingers, closing our eyes, and hoping for the best, minority, poor, and disadvantaged Americans will receive a fair share of opportunity. I would have thought that Jewish Americans, more than any other group, would be aware of the importance of getting guarantees of equality in writing." It may, unfortunately, be relevant to this exchange that the President is avidly seeking Jewish votes in the November election, and that black, Chicano, and other minority group Americans, having been the victims of a Southern strategy for most of Mr. Nixon's tenure, now seem likely to be victimized by a Jewish strategy.

**Inconsistency**

In other civil rights areas, the Administration's record has been inconsistent at best. Much of the first 18 months of the Administration, for example, was devoted to an effort to strike from the Voting Rights Act of 1965 the section which requires States covered by the Act to obtain prior clearance of changes in their election laws from either the Attorney General or a Federal court in Washington. The attempt was finally abandoned, and the Act, as renewed in 1970, may even have been improved. Then, however, there followed a period of rather lax enforcement of the prior clearance provision. For example, the Justice Department said it could not make the statutorily-required determination with respect to a Mississippi law which would have kept black candidates from running as independents and thus made it almost impossible for them to win general elections. A three-judge Federal court, all Mississippians, finally enjoined enforcement of the law and blasted the Department for its "obtuse, patronizing failure" to discharge its legal responsibilities. On the other hand, Justice did object to reapportionment and annexation schemes in other cases, notably two involving the City of Richmond and the State of Virginia.

Similarly, in the area of housing, the President's major statement on the issue, in June of 1971, is best remembered for its pledge not to impose "economic integration" on the suburbs, and for its extremely narrow reading of the grant of authority to the Federal Government under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 ("It does not mean that housing officials in Federal agencies should dictate local land use policies"). But two days after this statement, the Department of Justice, after months of debate within the Administration, intervened in the Black Jack, Missouri case, where a municipality was allegedly created by white residents for the purpose of banning an integrated housing development. Skeptics may have felt that this was another example of a standard Administration technique in the civil rights field — trying to temper an outrageous policy pronouncement by knocking off a sitting duck shortly afterward. But other steps announced by HUD Secretary George Romney at the time of the Black Jack intervention, including the conditioning of HUD grants so that many applicant suburbs would be forced to accept low and moderate income housing, were more substantial, and were a tribute to Romney's persistence.

The Administration has made much of its appointments of minorities and women to policy-making and leadership positions — 105 women at Grade 16 ($28,000) and above; 17 black Federal judges; the first black judge on the U.S. Court of Military Appeals, first black judge on the U.S. Court of Military Appeals for example. Some of these appointments — such as Samuel Jackson as Assistant Secretary of HUD, Elizabeth Koontz (a black and a woman) as Deputy As-

Ripon Forum
sistant Secretary of Labor, Helen Delich Bentley as chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission, and William Brown III as chairman of the EEOC — are considered to have produced praiseworthy results. Even if the President plans to put thousands more minorities and women in high-paying Federal positions, this is a relatively inefficient way of addressing their problems. The Administration’s employment of high-level minorities and women, like much of what has been done in the name of minority business enterprise, tends to help those who have the best chance of making it on their own. For the great majority of minority group members, policies are more important than personnel.

Civil Liberties

Remaking the Supreme Court

To moderate Republicans the portion of the Nixon Administration performance that has been most distressing is that in the field of civil liberties and the criminal justice system. While Nixon is a lawyer of considerable ability, his Administration has ironically made its worst blunders in matters pertaining to the criminal justice system.

The Nixon campaign in 1968 was well attuned to the great public resentment at the rising tide of street crime lapping at many of our cities and suburbs. Candidate Nixon’s strong language about eliminating the coddling of criminals and strengthening the powers of the police has remained a constant theme of his Presidency.

There is little doubt that such a policy is politically advantageous when millions of Americans fear that they run serious risk of being victims of burglary, armed robbery, mugging or rape. Moreover, the reduction of street crime must rank from even the most detached perspective as one of the highest national priorities. Repeatedly, however, the Nixon Administration has pursued the popular path of law and order politics with such crudity and overkill that it has offended millions of Americans needlessly, including a large portion of the legal profession.

The chief architect of this Administration strategy was Attorney General John Mitchell, the strong man of the first three years of the Nixon Presidency. A very knowledgeable bond lawyer and Nixon’s law partner, the dour Mitchell, as Nixon’s 1968 campaign manager, succeeded in turning a probable Nixon landslide into a hair’s breadth victory. Strangely, Mitchell emerged with a reputation as a political wizard. Mitchell continued to play a leading role in each of the major embarrassments of the Nixon Administration. Yet following each such stumble Mitchell’s influence with the President seemed to increase.

Nowhere has the Administration’s handling of the criminal justice issue been clumsier than in dealing with Supreme Court nominations. Richard Nixon has had a virtually unprecedented opportunity to fill four seats on the U.S. Supreme Court. He has placed four quite conservative Justices on the Court and has already transformed that body for at least the next decade. Yet while delivering on his campaign promise to remake the Court, Nixon has often made the nominations in such an unconscionable way that even the most conservative members of the legal profession have been deeply offended.

The second Nixon Supreme Court nominee was Clement Haynsworth, a U. S. Court of Appeals Judge from South Carolina. Haynsworth, despite pronounced conservative leanings in labor and civil rights cases, could ordinarily have sailed through to Senate confirmation. However, Abe Fortas, whom in the previous session of Congress had been blocked from becoming Chief Justice by a Republican-led filibuster, had just been pressured off the Court for alleged financial improprieties while serving as a Supreme Court Justice. Democrats were prepared to be especially vigilant in applying similarly stringent standards to Nixon appointees and Republican Senators who had haphazardly Fortas on the ethics issues were at pains to display their impartial devotion to such high principles. The Justice Department, performing a cursory check, missed the Haynsworth stock investments which raised a sufficient cloud of impropriety to defeat the gentlemanly South Carolina.

Yet rather than learning to use circumspection in making the next nomination, Nixon, in tandem with John Mitchell, plunged forward with the nomination of an obscure Floridian, G. Harrold Carswell. Aside from earning a reputation while a Federal Judge for active hostility to civil rights enforcement, Carswell had no particular distinction. Carswell’s anti-black prejudices became more manifest as more evidence was uncovered. Carswell’s lack of ability became so apparent that Senator Hruska, one of the Floridian’s strongest advocates, tried to turn it into a virtue by arguing that there were many mediocre lawyers and they were entitled to some representation on the Supreme Court. The outrage in the legal community at the Carswell nomination was thunderous. Accordingly, the Senate, with many members summoning great political courage to resist White House pressure, administered a second consecutive rebuff to a Nixon Supreme Court nominee.

Sandwiched on either side of the Haynsworth and Carswell nominations were the choice of Warren Burger as Chief Justice and Harry Blackmun as Associate Justice. Both were judicial conservatives but neither was open to charges of ethicial shortcomings or racial bias.

In the fall of 1971 two of the greatest Supreme Court Justices of this century, Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan, both mortally ill, resigned from the Court. President Nixon then had an ideal opportunity to elevate to the Supreme Court two great legal scholars,
even if he chose only from those who accepted his conservative judicial philosophy.

Instead, the White House floated for serious consideration a list of six names that resembled a Mad Magazine parody. The two top names, Herschel Friday and Mildred Lillie, were so undistinguished that even the normally compliant Judiciary Committee of the American Bar Association turned thumbs down. The list of names prepared by Nixon and Mitchell for High Court consideration was roughly equivalent to sending forth a lineup of .130 hitters in the World Series.

The nominees whom Nixon eventually sent forth, Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist, were not deficient in legal scholarship. Yet, Rehnquist's record stamped him as a right-wing ideologue who would sanction almost any accretion of state power so long as it came under the rubric of national security.

Yet, the extreme statism advocated by Rehnquist has been in many ways a mirror of the most objectionable aspects of Nixon-Mitchell policies. The Nixon Administration made full use of the wiretapping authority provided by federal law in its fight against organized crime. This wiretapping, performed under court order, did help significantly to cut away the veils of terror shielding mobsters from prosecution. Not content to rely on this court-sanctioned wiretapping, the Administration asserted a right in national security cases to wiretap without court supervision. Who would determine whether the Justice Department was acting reasonably? The Justice Department, naturally. Not even Nixon's Court appointees could swallow this theory as the Court, by an 8-0 margin, held this non-judicially supervised wiretapping unconstitutional.

The Administration scored another temporary first in expanding the powers of the state when it secured for a few days prior restraint over newspaper publication of the Pentagon Papers. This needless confrontation seemed at least as much motivated by hostility toward the newspapers involved as it was over the fear that the largely historical data ultimately published would endanger national security.

**Assertions**

In some civil liberties areas the Administration's assertions of authority were worse than the trend of its actions. In the very odious area of public surveillance by both the military and the FBI the Administration has generally curtailed many of the more flagrant practices that flourished in the Johnson Administration. Yet, by spending inordinate energy justifying the constitutionality of such practices, the Administration has succeeded in identifying itself in the public mind with the worst abuses. The ventilation of the FBI by L. Patrick Gray has, however, somewhat improved the Administration's image.

Much Administration rhetoric and effort were devoted to the passage of the D. C. Crime Bill. The most controversial aspects of the bill were the preventive detention and no-knock provision. These practices, abhorrent to civil libertarians, were in fact in standard use in Washington before the passage of the bill. The court reform and other provisions of the D. C. Crime Bill have made a significant dent in the city crime rate. Ironically the preventive detention and no-knock provisions, much ballyhooed by the Nixon Administration and much rived by civil libertarians, have been virtual dead letters. In fact, now that these practices are under court supervision they are probably less prevalent than they were in the past.

The Administration's civil liberties record has been worse in First Amendment matters. Vice President Agnew has repeatedly saliled forth to battle the network newscasters and the Eastern liberal press. Administration spokesmen have repeatedly dropped hints threatening license non-renewals of unsympathetic stations or anti-trust action against the networks. These hints, which may be no more than feints, must be regarded seriously in an Administration where the chairman of the Federal Communications Commission is a former Republican National Committee chairman and the Justice Department is staffed at its highest levels by the 1968 Nixon national campaign team.

The most surprising aspects of the Administration's civil liberties record have been certain public comments by President Nixon, a man well schooled in the law. Nixon's "lawyer's brief" style is usually evident in his logical, tightly reasoned, public speeches. Yet amazingly, he has on several occasions abandoned his respect for the legal proprieties to a degree that would be astonishing in even a first-year law student. His televised comments during the height of the Manson trial about Manson's guilt were incomprehensible from a lawyer-President. The handling of the Calley case, where Nixon seemed for a while to be a cheerleader for the lieutenant who had been convicted of murdering over a score of Vietnamese civilians seemed a bid for ephemeral public approval. This bid by Nixon indeed backfired as the public began to have sober second thoughts about lionizing a man for murdering innocent civilians.

Aside from the one area of reducing significantly the threat of the draft for young men, the record of the Nixon Administration on civil liberties has generally been regressive. This Administration, which has at least rhetorically decried the accumulation of excessive power by government, has succeeded in pressing executive and federal power to new heights in areas most vital to individual liberties.
The Quality of the Environment is Strained

President Nixon, on the first day of this decade, warned that the "1970's absolutely must be the years when America pays its debt to the past by reclaiming the purity of its air, its waters, and our living environment. It is literally now or never." Calling for "a total mobilization" to head off "the prospect of ecological disaster," Nixon set up the tough-minded Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and appointed widely respected Russell Train as chairman of the new White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). And having announced environmental quality as the "third great goal" of his "New American Revolution," the President saw his clean-up orders cause several unprecedented and controversial actions. DDT was banned. The Cross Florida Barge Canal and the Everglades Jetport — both favorites with Floridian boosters and developers — were stopped. Even the sacrosant highway lobby was not untouched; Nixon proposed diversion of Highway Trust Fund money for construction of mass transit systems.

These and other actions — such as the President's order terminating use of predator control poisons on federal land, and EPA's refusal to give Detroit an extra year to clean its engines — certainly will present a strong looking case to the voters; and Republican campaigners certainly can argue that the President has done more for the environment than any of his White House predecessors.

But such comparisons are flawed, and shouldn't lull anyone to sleep. It wasn't until the late 1960's, as Richard Nixon was moving from New York to Washington, that environmental problems grew so obvious that the public became aroused. The President naturally responded to this concern; and if he's done more than Johnson, Kennedy or Eisenhower, those Presidents saw little need to do anything at all.

Air Pollution

When it came time in 1970 to update and expand the existing clean air statute, President Nixon proposed amendments generally considered stronger. But the White House soon found itself opposing much tougher proposals from Senator Edmund Muskie, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Air & Water Pollution. Specifically, the Administration fought Muskie's 1975 deadline for 90 percent reductions in automobile pollution.

Ruckelshaus and EPA have performed creditably in implementing the Clean Air Act of 1970 since its passage. Winning his reputation as "the best friend of private enterprise since Karl Marx," Ruckelshaus gets a high score for refusing Detroit's request for a one-year extension. But the real test will come after the election and as the 1975 deadline approaches.

The Administration opposes the Clean Air Act's mandate for non-degradation of existing air quality. EPA was overruled, and unless conservation groups are successful in the courts, air cleaner than existing federal standards may be polluted up to those limits. Significantly, the Administration estimated $320 million would be needed to implement the Clean Air Act in fiscal 1973, but only $159 million was requested in the President's budget.

Water Pollution

The enforcement pace under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act has been massively stepped up by EPA, but the Administration's record is otherwise undistinguished. The national permit program, initiated in 1971 under the 1899 Refuse Act — discovered in recent years as potentially a powerful, if arbitrary and inadequate, clean-up tool — is snarled by court decisions.

In addition, the Administration is now leading the opposition to Muskie's legislation to toughen up the existing law. Passing the Senate 86-0 in 1971, it would require big industrial polluters to recycle their wastes or to use the "best available" treatment technology. White House lobbying secured revisions in the House-passed bill, and its future is much in doubt. Although the case against the legislation — which is said expensively to repeat the failures of the past — is supported by some experts, the Administration would have a stronger position if it had developed suitably far-reaching proposals of its own.

The Administration is also charged with whitewashing phosphate detergents. Environmentalists point to the skillful influence of Procter & Gamble's Bryce Harlow, President Nixon's former chief lobbyist on Capitol Hill.

Solid Wastes

The Resource Recovery Act of 1970 has barely been implemented. Again partly the work of Muskie with the help of an Administration proposal, the law authorized $409 million for EPA but the White House has requested only $67 million. Of $220 million authorized for recycling, not a penny has yet been spent on the grounds that cost-effective methods have not been proposed. But the President did order the General Services Administration to begin buying some recycling paper, and the EPA has initiated a program to convert 5'000 open dumps into sanitary landfills.

The Administration's policy is to exploit those fossil fuel resources which remain, and to accelerate development of nuclear power (especially the controversial "breeder" reactor) despite lingering questions about reactor safety. The Nixon Administration pushed for vast strip mining in the western states for oil shale and coal, accelerated off-shore drilling on the outer continental shelf and for construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. Virtually no efforts are being made to slow down huge increases in energy consumption, and the White House prefers leaving energy research to private industry while potential clean energy sources lack the necessary funding. Vice President Agnew has denounced critics of the Administration's energy policy as leading an "anti-progress campaign."

September, 1972
Water Resources Development

Beyond such conspicuous actions as Nixon's stopping of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal (and his support for the still more destructive Tennessee-Tombigbee), many "pork barrel" projects damaging to the environment are being funded in the President's budget. Outlays for the Corps of Engineers and other water development agencies totaled $2.4 billion in fiscal 1971, $2.9 billion in fiscal 1972, and $3.1 billion in fiscal 1973. EPA has played a constructive role by pushing for reform. The big issue now will be water resources development standards proposed by the Water Resources Council. Conservationists hope the President will approve standards with a high rate, i.e., 10 percent for discounting supposed future benefits. In this case, OMB agrees with the conservationists.

Public Lands

President Nixon proposes to "bring parks to the people," and leave a "Legacy of Parks" for future generations, but, meanwhile, the National Park Service has been so inept and cozy with developers that Friends of the Earth and others have called for Park Service Director George B. Hartzog, Jr. to resign. The President's personal commitment, however, has meant the full $300 million annual authorization, three times LBJ's, for the Land and Water Conservation Fund, the basic funding source for federal and state park acquisition and maintenance, and Nixon has been spending the full amounts available since conservationists fought budget cuts in fiscal 1970. The President also indicated proposals for the Gateway and Golden Gate National Recreation Areas, and he gratified conservationists by taking strong measures to protect the Everglades National Park.

But protection of other public lands has been sadly lacking. Though commendable in entering an area which Congress has sorely neglected, Interior Secretary Rogers C.B. Morton's proposal for reforming the Mining Law of 1872 retains the historic domination of mining over other land uses, and Nixon has occasionally pushed for increased timber cutting in the National Forests. According to the Wall Street Journal, sources within the Administration indicate that a proposed executive order...

Book Review

Nixon and Environment

Edited by James Rathlesberger
Taurus Communications $2.45

Nixon and the Environment, the Politics of Devastation is a 13-chapter compendium of current environmental topics, each presumably written by an expert and advocate for that issue. Since this method is basically discontinuous, only careful direction by the editor can reveal coherence in Nixon's policy. Unfortunately, Rathlesberger failed to include any overview, failed to supply historical perspective and even failed to include any bibliography. Therefore, the lack of coherence in the Nixon policy indicated in this volume may simply be an editorial fault.

Belaboring the Nixon Administration's progress in environmental areas were the dirth of previous governmental experience in the area and the necessity for public participation is in establishing environmental standards. Regardless of the willingness of this Administration in 1968 to establish a coherent, comprehensive environmental policy, it is unlikely any Administration could have achieved what advocates in each of these 13 fields in 1968 would have listed as their minimum goals.

Numerous details from the Rathlesberger book provided clues with which to judge the willingness of this Administration to achieve these goals:

— Vice President Agnew's apparent belief that environmentalists are little more than a new breed of radicals determined to destroy the system.

— Public commitments by Administrators who should have been making judgements, such as Environmental Protection Administrator William Ruckelshaus, the Council on Environmental Quality's Russell Train and former Interior Secretary Walter Hickel, that were regularly preempted during the private decision-making process by Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans and the Office of Management and Budget.

— The decision to stop the Cross-Florida Barge Canal even while the more destructive Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway was approved.

Perhaps the major theme of Nixon and the Environment is that this Administration's response has been traditional toward problems that require innovation. The Nixon Administration does not appear willing to even restrain the current level of pollution, much less begin the arduous task of repaying the environmental debt accumulated during the previous thirty years.

— BRUCE GUENTHER

Ripon Forum
controlling clear cutting was scrapped because of "top Nixon aides concerned about its possible impact on timber company profits, timber supplies, and support for GOP candidates, like Mr. Nixon, in an election year." The President has proposed some new wilderness areas, and last year the review procedure under the Wilderness Act of 1964 was finally brought up to schedule for the first time.

**Wildlife Protection**

President Nixon won warm praise for proposing much needed reforms of the Endangered Species Act and for terminating the use of predator control poisons on federal lands. The eight great whales were also put on the endangered list, an action which stopped their killing and the importing of whale products by Americans. The Administration also led efforts to convince the International Whaling Commission to accept a ten year moratorium on whale killing by other nations. But the Commission only reduced some of the quotas, and some argue that the U.S. could have exerted more pressure. Although better than most other countries, the Administration has been sheepish in efforts to stop such countries from over-harvesting Antarctic seals.

**Pesticides**

Ruckelshaus is opening the government's pesticide review procedures to the public, and has acknowledged environmentalists, farm workers and the like as legitimate constituents of his agency. Previously a function of the Agriculture Department, pesticide control was thoroughly dominated by agricultural interests. DDT has finally been banned, but Ruckelshaus approved the Agriculture Department's use of Mirex against the fire ant in southern states. Action in this area is hindered by a recalcitrant Congress, in particular Congressman Jamie Whitten, heat of the Agricultural Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee.

National Industrial Pollution Control Council, and told its members that, "The Government — this Administration, I can assure you — is not here to beat industry over the head." Speaking before the Detroit Economic Club in 1971, Nixon assured the auto executives that he wouldn't let environmental concern "to be used sometimes falsely and sometimes in a demagogic way basically to destroy the system." And now, in 1972, White House staffers are out campaigning against "organized environmentalists."

Is Nixon saving the environment? Intelligent men and women will disagree. But even the President's environmental personnel are realizing that if he continues pushing projects like the SST and the Alaska Pipeline, and legislation like that undermining the National Environmental Policy Act, relations between the White House and large segments of the conservation community could be strained in the next few years.

Nonetheless, it should be recognized that Congress is a principal obstacle to decisive action in this field. If a comprehensive effort is to be sustained, the President will have to prosecute it more tenaciously than he has to date. For all his praiseworthy initiatives, he will ultimately have to face a real test of leadership in mobilizing the legislature and the people.

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**Urban Policy**

**A Decentralized Retreat**

The Nixon Administration has a mixed record in dealing with the problems of our cities and metropolitan areas. On the one hand, the revenue-sharing proposals and the emphasis on the decentralization of federal power to the regional and area office level, begun at HUD and now beginning in HEW and Transportation, have started a process of combining local decision-making authority with improved efficiency in the delivery of federal programs. On the other hand, this philosophy of local control has not been developed into a coherent policy. This is due both to the subordination of urban policy to foreign policy and macro-economic policy and to a critical ideological ambivalence with regard to the nature of such a policy.

The long-run viability of revenue-sharing as a federal policy requires that state and local governments develop adequate administrative structures to handle revenue-sharing funds in an efficient manner. The Administration has stressed the doctrine of business-like efficiency in the administration of existing federal programs. However, its distaste for imposing federal regulations on broad grants has led it to spend too little time applying this principle on that level. Yet the basic forces operating in our urban areas today can be altered only by a strategy that centers around efficient management and an emphasis on areawide and regional planning.

The 1970 Census indicates that the forces which operated in the 1950's and 1960's are likely to continue into the 1970's and 1980's. The financial base and quality of public services in our largest cities will continue to deteriorate. The backbone of earlier urban economic stability — the middle-class and blue collar families — are fleeing via federally-subsidized highways to federally-guaranteed single family houses in suburbs which now have the political power to avoid annexation by the larger central city. The place of these families is being taken by poor blacks, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, and Appalachian whites. While this migration is slowing, it is likely to continue. The black population of our central cities grew by 3.2 million persons in the decade between 1960 and 1970 while the white population in these cities declined by 600,000. Welfare rolls and crime rates increased. Abandoned housing became a major blight in the largest cities.

At the same time the metropolitan area has become the focal point for economic and population growth. Density of population in metropolitan areas dropped from 5408 persons per square mile in 1950 to 3376 persons...
per square mile in 1970 as a result of the increasing suburbanization. The rural population continued to decline. In 1970, 69 percent of the total U.S. population lived in standard metropolitan areas. The population in these SMSAs increased by 16.6 percent in the last decade. In addition, the percentage of the population in the megalopolises along the West and East Coast and around the Great Lakes continued to increase.

These twin forces of urbanization and suburbanization are the dynamics that must be confronted in developing a policy toward our urban metropolitan areas. Such a policy must consider whether these forces are positive ones and whether the federal government should construct a policy to alleviate or channel them. It must consider at what level of government these forces should be dealt with, what types of federal aid should be given to such governments and what incentives, if any, should be provided so that the money is spent efficiently at that level. Economic forces, such as the heavy space-defense spending in the Houston area, often determine the growth of an area. And it must consciously determine how the government should control its own spending in order to create coherent urban growth. The Nixon Administration has wanted private and local government forces to provide answers to these questions. Unfortunately the very scope of federal operations creates distortions that must be coordinated.

On one level, the lack of a conscious urban policy at the national level is a matter of choice, reflecting the traditional Republican concern for restoring the powers of government to state and local levels. The 1972 Report on National Growth prepared by the Domestic Affairs Council states specifically that its purpose is to develop an approach, not enunciate a policy. Policy can only come through the process of trying a number of solutions, preferably at the state and local levels. States and localities should work out their own solutions while the federal government concentrates on using fiscal and monetary policies that establish a favorable economic climate and on providing incentives to private enterprise to aid in these solutions. Thus, three of the major policy issues stressed in the 1968 campaign were revenue-sharing, aid to black businesses, and tax credits to businesses that establish plants in inner city areas.

**Revenue-Sharing**

Revenue-sharing is the cornerstone of this federal philosophy. In his 1971 State of the Union Message the President proposed two major revenue-sharing plans. Under the general revenue-sharing proposal $5 billion a year would be distributed to the states to be spent as they wished. In addition, six special revenue-sharing funds would combine a number of programs in the general areas of community development, rural development, education, transportation, law enforcement and manpower training with an initial annual total of $11 billion.

The weakness of these proposals is that they do not have adequate provision that the state and local communities improve their own governmental structure to be better able to use the funds nor do they provide a method by which priority is given to areawide projects. The general revenue-sharing proposal that emerged from the House Ways and Means Committee would allocate a large proportion of the aid to local governments for specific types of projects. This is partly a result of the lack of planning requirements in the original Nixon proposal. While there is some money available for planning and technical assistance there is no plan by which such planning and assistance aid would be tied to specific changes in the operation of state and local governments themselves. Such proposals would have strengthened the Nixon plan.

State governments are not well-organized. They have not been able to attract the best people due to a lack of resources and concern for establishing urban programs. Their situation has worsened financially as they were bypassed by most large federal programs at the same time that their welfare burden was increased. With the exception of larger states, such as New York, California, Illinois and Massachusetts, there has been no major effort to modernize state governments so that new federal funds could be used efficiently. The 1970 Report on State Legislatures found that few legislators were paid an adequate full-time salary. Few legislators have an efficient committee structure or review of executive functions. Thus before a general revenue-sharing plan could be put into operation efficiently, it will be necessary to encourage state and local governments to increase their administrative capabilities.

An even more critical failure of the revenue-sharing proposals is the lack of a provision giving priority to areawide projects and areawide planning. Though both the President and HUD Secretary George Romney have stressed the need to aid local communities as a part of the larger metropolitan area or region, there has been reluctance to enforce specific measures. This ambivalence is best exemplified by the issues of the provision of low income housing in the suburbs, the delay of action in the Black Jack, Missouri case and the controversy over HUD guidelines for water and sewer and other community facilities grants and loans. As initially proposed by Romney in 1970, grants for water and sewer facilities and loans and later other forms of community development aid would not be made to communities which did not show some affirmative effort to provide low income housing. In June 1971 in his message on equal housing opportunity, the President rejected a policy of "forced integration." In the end HUD guidelines for these programs stress low income housing as a part of a complicated point system for evaluation of applications. However, the total effect was to weaken any commitment to areawide planning.

The same failure is found in the national land use planning legislation proposed by the Administration as a counter to legislation originally introduced by Sen. Henry Jackson. The legislation offers planning funds to states and requires a statewide plan for areas of critical environmental concern, areas impacted by key facilities, and large scale development of more than local significance. However, there are only limited sanctions, in the form of reduction of other federal aid, if such plans are not submitted or did not meet the specified requirements. The failure to give creative thought to the use of carrots and sticks has been a failure of the Nixon federal policy. Only such sanc-
tions can force states to re-evaluate their situations. A strong consistent policy would likely incur enough political benefit to overcome the short-run political liabilities.

Besides the ideological ambivalence involved in a revenue-sharing approach there has been a lack of coordination with regard to urban problems within the Administration. For example, the National Advisory Commission on Minority Enterprise met several times after it was first formed and submitted a detailed report in 1971. Certain of its proposals have been submitted as legislation but the Commission itself is now without a chairman and has been inactive for over seven months. The few instances of presidential interest have not been followed up. The establishment of the Domestic Council provided a vehicle that might have served this purpose. For the first two years of the Administration it appeared that Daniel P. Moynihan might find a way to use the Council as a policy forum. However, since his departure in the fall of 1970 there has been no articulate spokesman for urban problems. Policy-making has been left to the initiative of individual Cabinet members, with coordination and a final veto at the White House level. This veto was used most notably in the message on equal housing opportunity in June 1971. As in that case, most vetoes have been used, not to articulate a different general policy but rather to avoid immediate political pressures. However, the effect of this policy is to weaken the public perception of what the policy is and to create the impression of a negative and political White House staff thwarting the progressive Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. From some perspectives this is an accurate picture. However, the conflict need not occur if there were clear lines of command. This lack of direct White House coordination is in direct contrast with the policy of the preceding Democratic Administrations. It can be traced to the lack of general policy initiatives in this area by the White House.

Despite this ambivalence, the Nixon Administration has made major achievements in the mechanics of administration. Most of the advances have been made in the administrative structure of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, though changes are also beginning in HEW and Transportation. The changes are of three types: 1) better coordination of different agencies within a department; 2) emphasis on aid to specific cities or metropolitan areas as opposed to categorical grant programs; 3) decentralization of authority within the Department to the local level. Each of these changes has meant better delivery of existing services. HUD has increased the total number of subsidized production and rehabilitation units from 155,263 in fiscal year 1969 to an estimated 565,800 units in 1973. The rapid increase of the Section 235 Homeownership program has brought a series of well-publicized frauds. This problem is a carry-over from past FHA practices, however, rather than a recent innovation. The gradual integration of FHA into the Department of Housing and Urban Development has been a major achievement of Romney. The decentralization of the Department to the Area Office level should reduce the power of local FHA Insuring Offices in the future, as well as provide better service to local communities. The establishment of uniform guidelines for all community development programs and the first steps in coordinating policy with other departments are major achievements.

These achievements of administrative efficiency do not hide the lack of substantive proposals. Structure is important but structure in and of itself is a tool, not an end. The problem with the proposals of this Administration in the urban area is that they do not seem to recognize that reality. The use of management techniques and computers can never go very far in assessing a complex and not necessarily rationally structured reality. Proposals of this type are bloodless. They do not telegraph warmth and intent. When one is dealing with human problems that are difficult to alleviate, hope is a major component. This Administration has not radiated that hope.

A classic example of the problem is research priorities of HUD. Operation Breakthrough is a businessman's approach to an essentially "assembly line problem." It is more difficult to deal with the problems of reducing the costs of financing mortgages and eliminating "red-line districts." The 1971 Housing Goals Report dwells on the tremendous costs of subsidizing mortgages. This priority has been partially righted by the recent emphasis on housing allowances, but the gap in expenditures is still great. Breakthrough can also be justified as a means for lessening the time required to build a house but it can not be justified on cost.

Reactions

The Administration's attitude is partly a justifiable reaction to the flood of urban programs passed by the Johnson Administration. A larger reason was the fear and distaste of involvement in the central city. One consistent line of Administration policy has been a reduction of aid to community groups and agencies, with the exception in certain cases of groups engaged in running economic programs under the Special Impact Grants program. On one level such a policy is consistent with the new federal strategy to pass aid through states and local bodies. The community action programs and Model Cities programs were creating power structures apart from the elected city-wide officials. Legal services offices spent much of their time suing local and state agencies. Special impact grants were often given to local political leaders. The existing city may, however, be too large a unit to deal with from within a truly federal structure. The possibility that existing cities should be subdivided into smaller communities has not been adequately considered.

At its best, the Nixon Administration has begun the process of governmental decentralization — both through increased block grant aid to the states and local governments and through decentralization of federal departments. It rejected the cornucopia approach of the Johnson Administration in which the response to every problem seemed to be a new federal aid program. However, it has not formulated a basic philosophy to answer the basic issues.

The tension between policy needs and reluctance to prescribe a policy is one that the Nixon Administration will have to resolve in its second term if it is to be remembered as other than a group of reasonably good administrators who led the country to oblivion in sprawling megalopolises.
Needed: A Bobby Fischer

The proposals of the Nixon Administration in the human resources area comprise over $114 billion of expenditures in the 1973 budget. This vast total suggests one of the most important features of the Nixon record in this realm: how much the totals have continued to grow during the past two years, even beyond the huge increase in "uncontrollables" like social security and Vietnam veterans payments. Income maintenance programs have grown from $49.8 billion to $114 billion from 1970 to 1973, but even more notably, "Great Society programs," as defined by the Brookings Institution, have risen from $21.2 to $35.7 billion. For all the congressional battles over HEW appropriations, the fate of OEO, and cuts in urban programs, the actual expenditures show that continuity, regardless of the reasons, has been one of the most important characteristics of the Nixon record in social programs. Benign neglect, despite its other connotations, seems to have also meant leaving large areas of the Great Society alone.

Of course, a second term of the Administration may well bring new attempts to reduce those totals. The White House staff, in particular, has expressed anger and frustration over how much they feel their own Cabinet and a hostile Congress have forced them to retain. But while privately deploring the growth, they have publicly sought credit for some of it. Each year the relative increase of human resources over defense-related spending is solemnly touted by Administration spokesmen as an example of "real" re-allocation of priorities. A broad range of social issues, relatively dormant during previous Administrations, rose to prominence during the Nixon term. Health and welfare reform are probably the two best examples. The increasing expense and the continuing failure of current systems had become so obvious that Nixon was prompted to introduce comprehensive new programs in both areas and make them priority goals of his Administration. Neither proposal is without significant flaws and neither has been enacted or received the media attention it deserves. Nonetheless, both are valuable and praiseworthy initiatives and their ultimate fate will be an important index of the Administration's accomplishment in a second term.

Even beyond these unfulfilled goals, however, the Administration's human resources effort is impressive in the aggregate. Over two and a half times as many children are now receiving federally-assisted school lunches as were three years ago, and the food stamp program has grown from $229 million in 1969 to $2.239 billion in 1973. Expenditures for health services delivery have nearly tripled since 1969. The number of children in federally-supported day care programs has increased nearly 50 percent in two years, and undergraduates receiving federal support rose from 3.7 million in 1971 to nearly five million in 1973. Social Security payments had risen by one-third between 1969 and mid-1972. And total federal benefits to low-income persons have risen from $17.5 billion in 1969 to $31.5 billion in 1973.

But in each of these areas, the Administration actively opposed some portion of the expansion of benefits. While that opposition may have been sometimes justifiable in terms of total budgetary priorities, there never really was an over-all approach to a human resources program by which one could tell what the priorities were. The management agenda of OMB was mistaken for policy direction and the establishment of ten common regional boundaries among the domestic agencies was heralded without recognition of the obvious fact that no one knew what he was supposed to do once he got out there in the regional office.

It all came down to the uniquely "adversary" view of the Administration toward human resources programs. Congress was the enemy, state and local officials were suspect if they were of the opposite party, national interest groups were all assumed to be out to break the federal budget wide open, and in time, the Cabinet itself was to be mistrusted for "going native" in Erlichman's revealing phrase of a recent interview.

It was never understood that Congress was far more likely to engage in runaway budgeting games in the absence of Administration mechanisms which cut across departmental lines to make human resources policy consistent. Coordination became a bad word in the Administration at the same time that Congress was under fire from the White House for its own lapses of coordination among committees busily engaged in raising appropriation levels without regard for the total impact.

The Administration often seemed to need a Bobby Fischer in residence, who could think at least one move ahead of the opposition. Time after time, the pattern seemed to be praiseworthy willingness to consider new initiatives and their full implications, followed by nervous shying away once public debate made clear the possible political or budgetary costs of gen-
une change. In each case, when the heat turned up and some risk to the strategy of the suburban heartland appeared, the Administration chose to leave the kitchen. This was seen in the Family Assistance Plan, educational finance, open housing, child development, and other areas as well. This style of politics interrupted generated obvious credibility costs which, in turn, worsened the "adversary" world-view of the Administration.

The integrating theme was supposed to be the "income strategy," but it fell victim to extremes of dogma. Although most service programs in the end survived despite Administration hostility, there was an almost total denial of the need for them, notable in the back-tracking on public employment programs (which despite Nixon opposition appear to be the only successful domestic initiatives of the last four years). The possibility that such services as consumer education and legal aid would be needed to make the income strategy effective was never understood by White House strategists.

In the final analysis, however, so much of it all goes back to the President-elect's candor with Theodore White late in 1968. Richard Nixon told us all a good deal about what the next four years of social policy would bring when he confessed that he believed that "this country could run itself domestically without a President . . ." Nothing he has done in the past four years as President suggests that he would repudiate that extraordinary idea.

Welfare Reform

The enigmatic key of the Administration's social policies was the Family Assistance Plan. For all the debate over whether or not the program really was a presidential priority, it has been clear since early 1969 that no other domestic measures — with the possible exception of civil rights policies — have received as much attention from mid- and top-level appointees in the human resources agencies. And whether or not it is "the most important piece of social legislation in 35 years," as Moynihan and the President claim, it is surely the most important domestic legislation introduced by this Administration. Few Democrats were willing to break, and its principal sponsors — Moynihan, Patricelli, Nathan, Finch, Veneman, and Shultz — deserve credit for a venture of policy worthy of most of the Administration's rhetoric.

FAP also represented the high point of Administration teamwork, in that its preparation involved extensive circulation and re-circulation of position papers, consultation of outsiders, and the deliberate encouragement of internal debate on the issues and future implications of the program. The current antipathy to interdepartmental discussion and cynicism about the Cabinet are a far cry from the initial discussions of FAP.

Child Care

One of the shortest and saddest journeys on the trail of Nixon's social policy has been from the noble Presidential messages of 1969 on "the first five years of life" to the near-dissolution of the Office of Child Development and to the veto message of last December. Dogma prevailed, and the Democrats, at all levels, were handed an issue they are certain to exploit this fall.

There has been no serious effort to strengthen the very arrangements of "administrative unworkability" which the veto message deplored; regional offices of OCD are among the weakest sections of HEW's notoriously under-staffed and poorly coordinated regional administration. Nor does the paltry $4 million devoted to OCD's research and demonstration programs represent even a shadow of the rhetorical commitment to the first five years. There has also been no effort made to fill the needs for day care centers sought by parents of all economic levels. Allowing for inflation, federal funds for early childhood education, in contrast with day care, have remained nearly constant for three years.

Health Care

The Nixon Administration has treated health care in America as a systems problem — recognizing that a $75 billion "industry" requires a more comprehensive diagnosis than the piecemeal approaches of the Great Society. Having taken the broad look, however, the Administration appropriately retreated into more limited prescriptions.

Internally, health options were developed in enormous detail. There was an honest admission — so lacking in more comprehensive proposals than the Administration's — that substantial gaps in knowledge of "what works" were prevalent. In some respects, in fact, health was the area where Republican principles, the New Federalism, and pragmatic politics appear for the moment to have combined most successfully in Nixon policy. The Administration commendably op-
posed expansion of the federal bureaucracy and budget by the huge amount entailed in Kennedy-Griffiths proposals. By pouring money into the demand site of the problem, this plan, like Medicaid, would have heavily benefitted the most resourceful doctors, but unlike Medicaid, would not have significantly enlarged service for the poor.

The Administration, on the other hand, has staked our responsibility on progressive and politically defensible ground in its health legislation. The Family Health Insurance Plan, the initial emphasis upon health maintenance organizations, and development of area health education centers respond to many of our worst problems in health care provision and distribution.

OEO

The Office of Economic Opportunity, it will be recalled, was to become the "incubator" for new human services programs under the Nixon Administration. The retreat from the polemics of the war on poverty to new concern with policy-oriented research and demonstration was highly defensible, and if it had been accompanied by a real effort to convert the 900 community action agencies into more effective local components of policy change, OEO could have been one of the Administration's success stories.

But the Nixon Administration has failed in both goals for OEO: it has neither shifted community action into new Federalist channels nor created an effective experimental thrust into new strategies for anti-poverty efforts. Community action funds have declined for three straight years, and no more demoralized public agencies exist anywhere on the American governmental landscape than the CAA's. OEO has been unwilling or unable to provide either clear directions or hard-line instructions on defining some of the worst CAA, and they continue their downward spiral.

Poverty-related research in OEO may be called a priority by the Nixon Administration, but it is not funded as such by Congress, despite the extraordinary quality of the OEO research staff under director Tom Glennan. Nor have OEO appointees been any more successful in securing White House and OMB support in interagency negotiations than their predecessors in the Johnson Administration. OEO has succeeded in bailing some research efforts in other departments, but their initiating role across department lines has been a less effective and only recently underway to draw up a common R and D agenda between OEO and the human services departments.

OEO officials have claimed that their field of inquiry has been expanded to include the entire domestic anti-poverty effort, rather than OEO's alone, but beyond research and experimentation in income maintenance and health care their efforts are inconspicuous to the line program manager in other agencies. Programmatic changes made or attempted in Title I ESEA programs, child development, and neighborhood health centers came from outside pressure groups, not OEO evaluation offices.

Profile

HEW and Jack Veneman

Californian Jack Veneman, HEW's soft-spoken Under Secretary, has a clientele matching the national census and a budget surpassing that of Defense.

HEW's number-two man stepped into the job nearly four years ago when President Nixon tapped him for the post at the urging of Veneman's long-time friend, Robert H. Finch, Finch, the former Lieutenant Governor of California, had worked closely with Veneman in Sacramento and knew him as an Assembly leader with an astute grasp of the legislative process. When Finch later left the helm at HEW to move on as Counselor to the President, his successor, Elliot Richardson, asked Veneman to stay on. He has proven himself in several vital directions — as an able inside administrator and a talented, energetic missionary for HEW programs and legislation.

One of Veneman's continuing assignments has been welfare reform legislation, a task he tackles with zest and imagination despite years of frustration from a stubbornly-divided Congress. When not dealing with legislative or administrative problems, he was usually out stumping the country for welfare reform, health legislation or other social programs.

Veneman has had a key role in developing and selling Congress on three legislative packages — National Health Insurance Standard Act, Family Health Insurance Plan and Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). Veneman's talents in pleading his case before Congress and ability to judge what arguments will appeal to which Congressman, has earned him an Associated Press description as "the man with the golden touch" in moving legislation along in Congress.

In the administrative arena, Veneman's talents have exercised in directing the sparkling HEW empire. History, law and precedent have spun a sticky bureaucratic web around HEW that threatens at times to entangle grantmaking and regulatory decisions in ponderous delays. With an acronymic program called FAST, (Federal Assistance Streamlining Task Force), Veneman began shipping away at HEW's redtape in 1969. The program led to a government-wide program based on similar objectives. Veneman, in concert with another California colleague, Patricia Reilly Hitt, also was instrumental in launching HEW's decentralization program by giving more authority to the agency's 10 Regional Directors around the country and placing much more decision-making power in the field and away from the Potomac.
OEO's drift toward state control has been predictably one-sided, cutting the states into federal and local policy functions without bargaining in return for any more effective performance from some patronage-ridden state agencies. There has been no attempt to penetrate state operations with advocates, in the way at least partially enabled by HUD's Model Cities Administration. The Administration's emphasis has been to remove the federal government from the community action business, rather than affecting state budget and policy decisions which could impact upon low income neighborhoods.

Youth and Elderly

Programs for the young and the elderly have been subject to a good deal of predictable buffeting under the Nixon Administration. The early months of program reviews in HEW were marked by the skeptical realization of the incoming appointees that well over half the Department's total resources were devoted to the elderly. But the nearer the Administration came to election year, the more important became that other statistic about the elderly - their 75-85 percent voting participation. HEW's top staff were assigned to the aging "package," Arthur Flemming was brought in to spearhead lagging attempts to follow up the recommendations of the White House Conference on Aging, and discretionary funding for aging programs rose substantially.

Juvenile delinquency programs, however, are obviously at the other end of the spectrum of political appeal. Steady incursion from the Justice Department has been permitted to subvert the Office of Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Development in HEW. Well-intentioned attempts to developed new outreach to campuses and street gangs were tolerated by the White House but never allowed to receive either top-level publicity or support.

Addiction treatment programs have been given high priority under the Administration, with totals for treatment and rehabilitation rising from $28 million in 1959 to $230 million in 1973. Although $90 million of the increase is unfortunately needed for addicted veterans, a commitment to improve coverage of the entire urban addict population is discernible. But there remain petty disputes between the White House and operating agencies, uncertainty over private operation of treatment clinics, and a relative decline in the use of LEAA funds for both treatment and educational programs. And local governments, notably New York City, still lead federal agencies in their willingness to experiment with different treatment modalities and their commitment to long-range manpower programs for former addicts.

Personalities

Among the personalities who have sought to provide leadership for the Administration's social policies, there seems to have been a roughly normal amount of turnover in the four years. There have been two Secretaries of HEW and Labor, three Directors for OEO, and two domestic chiefs of staff in the White House over the Urban Affairs Council and the Domestic Council. Predictions of an influx of hard-hearted businessmen and Reagan-trained opponents of social programs have generally been disproven, and the beginnings of a mid-level cadre of social program managers and theorists have been evident. The turnover between the first and second term, of course, could well determine the emphasis given to human resources programs during the next four years.

Four Administration appointees deserve particular mention in a review of the Nixon record - all on the positive side. Martin Linsky's recent FORUM commentary on Elliot Richardson summarized well the current Secretary's contributions of reasoned advocacy and disciplined organization in the midst of HEW's programmatic battlegrounds. Richardson's role in the busing and other controversies has been as painful to watch as his efforts have been outstanding in the continuing struggle for health legislation, the elderly, and internal department organization and operations. His efforts to develop the Allied Services Act of 1972 have been a nearly single-handed tour de force, embodying the best of Republican principles in a massive rationalization of the Department's two hundred-odd programs. Richardson has been the only Administration spokesman to reveal an understanding of the future
No review of the four years should ignore the vital role played by a compassionate Republican, Robert H. Finch, who deserves far more credit than he receives for the initiatives and the best appointments of the first year of the Administration’s social program efforts. Placed in an untenable position between the White House and the constituencies most opposed to the President, his role in starting the Administration on the course to welfare reform and the abortive steps toward child development made a critical difference during events that another Secretary from another wing of the Party with other appointees could have affected profoundly and harmfully. Nor should his single most important personnel decision be overlooked — the choice of John G. Veneman as Under Secretary, giving HEW the single best Republican strategist in legislative arenas and one of the most iconoclastic opponents of ideological cant issuing from the West Wing. The White House epithet of early 1970 — “Finch’s crowd” — meant something that ought not to be overlooked in a review of the Administration’s social policies. Finally, Moynihan’s legacy was strikingly significant in retrospect. Its range is extraordinary, from near-pathological mistrust of community action to healthy skepticism concerning compensatory education, from inexplicable confusion and hopeless administrative bungling in Model Cities to a wonderful irreverence in the face of the management pontificators of OMB. His staff, when it overcame its schizophrenia about being “just another bunch of Californios,” formed an effective set of links between the White House and the human resource agencies until succeeded by the gatekeepers and advance men from the Advertising Firms. These four leaders — Richardson, Finch, Veneman, and Moynihan — collectively represent the best group assigned to this field in any recent Administration. One hopes that in the end the Administration vindicates their services in it.

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**Profile**

**Drug Abuse Prevention**

In the fall of 1970, President Nixon asked a special task force of non-government consultants to prepare a report on how the Federal Government could best focus its resources to cope with the many problems of drug abuse. To chair this task force, the President selected Dr. Jerome H. Jaffe, a nationally-known expert in the drug abuse field, who at that time was serving as director of the Illinois Drug Abuse Program, and as associate professor in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Chicago.

Acting on the recommendations of this group, the President decided to develop a coordinating mechanism at the highest Federal level. The Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention was established by an Executive Order on June 17, 1971. Dr. Jaffe was appointed by President Nixon to serve as director of the Office and as Special Consultant to the President for Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

As director of the Illinois Drug Abuse Program, Jaffe had pioneered innovative techniques for the treatment of heroin addiction, including the use of new substances to reduce the use of heroin and comprehensive, multi-modality programs combining methadone maintenance and therapeutic community treatment approaches.

The basic mission of the Special Action Office is twofold. First, it is directed to take immediate steps to reduce drug abuse in the United States within the shortest possible time. Second, it has the responsibility for developing a comprehensive, long-term Federal strategy to combat drug abuse.

Although the Special Action Office is one of the youngest branches of the White House, it has already made an impressive start:

- The Office has scrutinized the budgets and evaluated the policies of all civilian Federal agencies engaged in drug abuse prevention activities.
- Increased Federal funds have been approved to fight drug abuse; the budget for research has increased fourfold since 1969, sixfold for treatment and rehabilitation, and thirtyfold for education and training.
- Emergency steps have been taken to arrest drug abuse among GI’s in Vietnam, and military policy has shifted to treat drug abuse as a medical rather than as a disciplinary problem.
- With the help of the National Bureau of Standards, the Special Action Office has developed a “footprint” system to check the flow of methadone to illicit channels, yet protect the anonymity of those under treatment.

To plan future drug abuse strategies, the Special Action Office is working with the Strategy Council, established along with the Special Action Office under the 1972 Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act. The Council is a permanent group made up of directors of the key Federal agencies responsible for drug abuse programs. It will aid the Special Action Office in the development of long-range Federal policy on drug abuse.

Congress also created two additional groups to ensure that the public has a voice in the Federal effort against drugs. The first is the National Advisory Council for Drug Abuse Prevention. The President appoints 12 members, four of whom are to be officials of State or local governments, and the remainder persons with training or experience in the drug abuse area. The second is the National Advisory Council on Drug Abuse with 12 members — outstanding professionals and paraprofessionals in the fields of medicine, education, science, and the social sciences.

All of these groups will assist in shaping the new National Institute on Drug Abuse which will take over the functions of the Special Action Office shortly before the Office is abolished in 1975.

*Ripon Forum*
The Administration’s record on education has been typified by a high level of commitment to new initiatives and to continued support for those existing programs of proven value. Its strongest efforts — when passed — promise to change the many faces of our educational system to make it fit more closely the needs of a changing student population.

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act, grandfather of categorical efforts in federal aid to education, comes up for revision next year. It comes at a time when our educational system is on the verge of some basic programming and financing changes. Although the number of students in elementary and secondary schools will actually decrease by 4 percent by 1980, there will be a continuation of three major trends in education which have surfaced in the past few years. First, parents of students with learning disabilities, whether those from economically or culturally disadvantaged backgrounds or those with physical and mental handicaps, have started to demand equalization of services for their children. The Serrano decision in California which required that “education cannot be a function of wealth,” will have a profound impact on intrastate equalization of per pupil expenditures. Suits based on the Serrano principle have been filed in twenty or more states. Some national education experts have postulated that the Serrano principle will be extended to interstate equalization of per pupil expenditures. The eventual impact of Serrano will be a diminished reliance on the property tax for financing the local share of educational expenditures where local units of government rely on the property tax to finance 84 percent of their share of the cost of education. Similar suits based on the equal protection clause have also been filed on behalf of physically handicapped students and students with other learning disabilities.

The second force for change has been the diminished resources available in our school districts. Some of our major urban system projects are now running completely out of money two or three months into the school year. Many others have been forced to switch to split sessions and reduced services to stay open. Part of these shortages result from the inelasticity of the property tax and part stem from taxpayer hostility. Ten years ago, property tax measures were approved at a rate of 75-80 percent. Their passage rate last year was just over 40 percent. Although the percentage of the Gross National Product paid to property taxes has not increased in proportion to other individual taxes, school districts have been faced with a growing incidence of taxpayer rebellions. The President’s Commission on School Finance has completed an excellent study of finance alternatives which should prove useful when Congress begins to consider the quality school bills which school districts will probably be duplicated nation-wide in the next few years: they required district school systems to equalize expenditures between schools. Hobson found that schools in one area of the city had significantly more funds available and higher paid (more experienced) teachers than other areas in the city school system.

These pressures are likely to produce dramatic changes similar to the ones which occurred after the turn of the century. Those changes created our unified school systems and a more standardized curriculum. Delivery of services may now become very much less institutionalized. The Administration is initiating one experiment during this school year in the Alum Rock School District (California) using a modified voucher plan. The idea, first proposed by economist Milton Friedman several years ago, is to allow students and their parents ultimate freedom of choice in learning styles. Each student is given a voucher worth the per pupil expenditure in the district for one year. The student may then cash the voucher in at any school in the district. If the parents find that the school does not meet their child’s needs, transfers to alternative learning centers are available. In the original proposal all schools, public and private, would be included. The Alum Rock program, in which only six of the district’s public elementary schools participated should provide some preliminary data on the concept. The Administration has established a fine record in education research and innovation. The voucher experiment, and the school finance commission are two of the most visible.

In line with the voucher idea, the Administration has championed the concept of aid to non-public schools. The President has given strong support to the cause of “parochiaid” without proposing a specific measure. His greatest dilemma here is that the several states which have proposed general aid to parochial schools and have passed enabling measures have found their statutes struck down as violating the first amendment protections. A system of
tax credits, as proposed by Congressmen Hugh I. Carey and William Mills may also be unconstitutional. The President’s harshest critics on this issue question his support of aid to non-public education when our nation’s public schools are in desperate condition. He has been accused of churning up the issue for partisan advantage. His supporters would say that this is only an expression of his concern for the 5.5 million students who would be thrown into the public system if the non-public one were to price itself out of the market. The truth may well lie somewhere in between.

The Right to Read Program was introduced two years ago with the expressed goal of insuring that by 1980, 99 percent of all Americans 17 or older would be “functionally literate.” Critics of this “war on poverty” approach for reading comment that the $12 million program has been a showcase without many results. One example they cite is the distribution of McGuffy’s readers in leather and suede presentation binders to persons interested in the program. One critic quipped, “Why bother to send them McGuffy’s Readers? Most of them can already read.”

The Administration’s record on aid to our citizens who wish to learn English as a second language shows a genuine commitment of resources and energy. The bilingual education program initiated at $7½ million in 1969 has been expanded to a $41 million program for 1973. The recently enacted Emergency School Aid Act contains an additional $40 million authorization for bilingual programs. Bilingual assistance is also provided for in the Indian Education Act which authorizes $164 million to assist native Americans in bilingual programs, adult education and training of teachers for Indians.

The thrust of the President’s 1970 education message embodied principles which became the basis of the Education Amendments of 1972. The President urged revisions in our Higher Education legislation which would insure that “no qualified student who wants to go on to college be barred by lack of money.” The Administration should be applauded for several of its initiatives in the final bill as well as its persistence in lobbying. These efforts had a major impact on getting any bill through Congress this year. The Conference Committee which worked out the final bill between the Senate and House version had a monumental task in just negotiating the 240 odd items of disagreement. The Conferences were hardly united along party lines. During a break after one particularly strenuous session the House Conferences were broken up into party caucuses to discuss strategy. Senator Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Senate Conferences, indicated some of the forces in the conference in the following exchange. During the break Pell had to use the phone which was located next to the House Republican caucus. The Republicans were talking and Pell quipped as he walked by, “I’m not sure I should be over here.” Representative Albert Quie, who was leader of the House Republicans said, “I don’t know, after our first few sessions, maybe you should.”

Three areas in the bill were Republican initiatives. They were revisions in the student aid provisions which will target more money to those who most need it. Republicans also proposed creation of a new emphasis in post-secondary aid to Occupational Education. Finally, Republicans can be credited with the creation of the National Institute for Education.

**Student Aid**

The student aid revisions will probably have the most significant impact on students directly. The Administration has placed its emphasis in grant categories on work-study programs. This year there are 438,000 more grants than the 1971 level of 1,280,000. The student aid system has been redesigned so that our grants are targeted to those who need them most. Other aid categories are also redefined. Creation of the Student Loan Marketing Association will act on the student loan market in the same way the Federal National Mortgage Association acts to increase liquidity in the housing market. The revisions in the eligibility requirements, when implemented, also promise to target loan money to those in need.

The National Institute for Education is designed to function in much the same way as the National Institute of Health. Here federal research efforts in educational reform and innovation will be centered. If in fact it can operate as a beacon of research by serving as a catalyst and disseminator for research efforts it will truly have performed a service for the education community.

Two previously-initiated research efforts by the Administration fared less well. The Scranton Commission of 1970 did a well-publicized review of the problems of student unrest in a time when student unrest was on everyone’s minds. This report was virtually ignored. Public disinterest in the Commission’s report was due in part to the fact that student unrest has been greatly diminished in the two years since the Commission finished its work and in part to the limitation necessarily imposed on the Commission’s ability to gather adequate data in the center of the public spotlight. The changing student motivations for college attendance have brought about an increased involvement of students in those segments which influence the quality of university life. The Scranton Commission’s Report produced several good conclusions which could have been followed. The extent to which they were ignored by the Administration is unfortunate.

A less-publicized and longer range report was made by the Newman Task Force on Higher Education. Although perhaps neither immediate nor federal in their application, the recommendations of the task force were far-reaching and significant. Its criticisms affect the core of higher education: the limited student access to institutions which discriminate by age, occupation, and income level; the lack of diversity in educational course content and structure; the rigidity in attendance structures which preclude more fluid access by many would-be students; and the instability of the whole higher education system in responding to diverse student learning styles.

In the last few years we have heard a great deal about study commissions which have been created to be ignored. The National Institute for Education may be a focal point for research which may provide the necessary inertia to utilization of research rather than commission gamesmanship.
The Department of Labor estimates that by 1980 one job in five will require a college education. Probably the longest range impact which the Education Amendments of 1972 will have on post-secondary education programs is the occupational education section of the bill. The bill authorizes a total of $1 billion for the program. For the first time in the history of federal aid to higher education there will be a program for the student who wants or needs additional training, but who does not care to spend several years in academic training. Career education has been a major thrust of Commissioner Sidney P. Marlin and the Administration. Their efforts in this area have been far-sighted. The final product envisaged by the Administration would be an educational system which is an integral part of our labor market allowing persons to gain employable skills and offering the opportunity for periodic skills upgrading. The education system today too often finds itself apart from those who need its resources most. If it is possible, the career education idea may cause a de-institutionalization of education.

Although the House has considered “full funding” amendments for $824 million (1971 and unsuccessful) and $363 million (1972 and successful) and the President has vetoed two Labor-HEW appropriations bills, the Administration's record on funding of education is a good one. This year's request of $15.7 billion for federal education efforts represents a 65 percent increase over the last Johnson budget. Several sections of our education acts have never been funded. This only re-emphasizes the need for authorizing committees to study budget as well as programming goals in establishing programs. The full amendments derive their name from the disparity which exists between education authorizations and appropriations. One estimate fixes the level of authorizations at almost three times the level of appropriations. This disparity results from a deficiency in the Congressional budgeting process which requires little relationship between careful thought about program development and budgeting. In consideration of this year's Quality Education Amendment Representative Quie raised a serious objection to this type of block amendment. He asked why Congress should raise money for all programs in education regardless of their proven value. In this instance he was speaking about impact aid, but his remarks could center on the entire amendment. Although there were reviews this year of the higher education programs and some excellent revisions, there is still a great deal of rhetoric used on the authorizations established by the bill.

During the 93rd Congress a similar review of elementary and secondary programs will hopefully take place. It seems certain that the “quality school” bills which significantly raise federal contributions from the present 6-7 percent to as high as 30 percent will come into serious consideration. Hopefully some of the 440 education programs in 31 major agencies and 53 bureaus will be consolidated. The President’s education revenue-sharing proposal deserves serious consideration. It moves to de-categorize 33 education programs and to distribute funds to accomplish five goals: 1) education of the disadvantaged, 2) education of the handicapped, 3) vocational education, 4) support for educational materials and services, and 5) aid to federally impacted areas. The special revenue sharing proposal will shape financial aid to fit local needs.

**Conclusion**

The Nixon Record on changing priorities in the last four years has been dramatic. In four years the budget categories have changed so that in the 1973 budget Human Resources Programs account for 45 percent of the budget. The growth in real spending and in spending as a proportion of the budget for education has been substantial.

The deficiencies in the Nixon Record are in some ways related to style, but in the case of busing the matter of style is at the “guts” of the issue. Reform initiatives in Higher Education followed by a well-orchestrated lobbying campaign for the bill show a thoughtful and determined effort to improve educational opportunities for all students at the post-secondary level. Proposals for education revenue sharing and other efforts should help schools begin to meet the needs of all their students.
Book Review

O Congress
By Donald Riegle with Trevor Armbister
Doubleday and Co., Inc. $7.95

Congressman Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (R-Mich.) is a puzzling man. How does one balance the boyish, preppie looks and his kind words for House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford with his sharp attacks on the Vietnam War and his landslide victories in an overwhelmingly Democratic, blue-collar district around Flint, Michigan.

Two years ago, when I first used a desk in Congressman Riegle’s office and worked with him on a conference on the future of the GOP, I was convinced that he and his staff were ambitious — and compromising — in their politics. They talked about the “right” issues, but didn’t seem (and sometimes weren’t) honest in their approach to these issues.

Riegle had changed when I next spoke to him during a two-hour drive to New Hampshire. Riegle was on his way to the Granite State to be on hand for the New Hampshire primary returns from Congressman’s Pete McCloskey’s presidential quest. Riegle was now older and more serious. While he was happy about his new marriage, he was disgusted with what he believed was the Nixon Administration’s involvement in the Dita Beard-ITT scandal, unsure of the merits of his frenetic activity as a Congressman and quite pessimistic about the prospects for moderating the Republican Party. He spoke of his forthcoming book, O Congress; how he enjoyed writing the book and how it seemed to tie together so many elements of his life. He thought it was essential for the general public to realize how these 435 men and women work to legislate for a nation despite their human frailties. He was concerned, however, that his description might make him unpopular with some of his colleagues.

O Congress does pinpoint many of the idiosyncrasies and shenanigans of some of these colleagues. Riegle uses a diary form to present short capsules of congressional life. He jumps from a quite bitter, and perhaps unfair, character sketch of Congressman Bill Steiger (R-Wisc.) to a fascinating description of the backroom politics which led up to his own fluke assignment to the powerful House Appropriations Committee.

It was 1967 and the Democrats lost their “oil interest” seat on the House Ways and Means Committee because the Alabama delegation had to attend the inauguration of the late Gov. Lurleen Wallace and therefore couldn’t be present on Capitol Hill for the committee assignments vote. Congressman Charles Chamberlain (R-Mich.) yielded an opportunity for the committee slot to then Congressman George Bush (R-Texas).

The Michigan congressional delegation was then owed a favor by the House leadership. Chamberlain gave up a chance for a seat on the Appropriations Committee in return for the next available seat on Ways and Means. The two remaining Michigan Congressmen without assignments were Guy Vander Jagt and Riegle. The slot on Appropriations was awarded to Riegle, who commented that he really owed his assignment to Lurleen Wallace’s inauguration.

Riegle’s vignettes offer insight into the tools which the conservative and elderly House leadership use to maintain their legislative control. His notes describe how the leaders use mechanisms — seniority, committee referrals and reports, and parliamentary maneuvering — to check the efforts of younger, generally more liberal, Congressmen to effect reform. The nature of the book, however, mitigates against a detailed analysis of possible modernization of Congressional rules.

Riegle uses his book effectively to explain times when he had been embarrassed or criticized for his actions. He describes the ugly episodes that surrounded his 1970 convention nomination battle with Lenore Romney for Michigan’s GOP senate nomination.

In early 1970 the Michigan GOP was searching for a candidate to run against Sen. Philip Hart. HUD Secretary George Romney decided not to run and although many state officials viewed Lenore Romney as the best alternative, Mrs. Romney seemed to lack Republican support. Riegle took a cautious position. His supporters tested his popularity when Gov. William G. Milliken asked potential candidates to speak before a “consensus” meeting in February. Riegle’s speech was well-received even though he declared he would not run if Mrs. Romney remained in the race. Mrs. Romney fell short of a majority on the first convention ballot and Riegle came in second. Riegle realized that he should withdraw because Mrs. Romney was the favorite of party leaders. He sent a statement to Gov. Milliken to be read before the second ballot. Milliken did not announce the Riegle withdrawal until after the second ballot, during which Riegle’s share of the vote had grown. Mrs. Romney’s supporters were angry with Riegle for not dropping out sooner and Riegle supporters were angry that he withdrew when he was gaining.

Most politicians write boring, egocentric books that dive into obscurity two months after their campaigns. O Congress is different. It provides an very human and unusual picture of the workings and personalities of the House of Representatives. Those who need or seek to understand Congress should be familiar with O Congress. Those who have followed or want to understand Don Riegle, will be more sympathetic to the Michigan maverick after reading his congressional diary. And for those poor souls who want to serve their country and party as Congressmen, O Congress is an abject lesson in frantic activity and personal dilemmas.

— MARTHA McCAHILL
Duly Noted

“The Political Odyssey of Spiro T. Agnew,” by M. Stanton Evans. National Review, Aug. 18, 1972. “... the ’70 election with its rather ambiguous outcome was not a defeat for conservatism or, in so far as Agnew was carrying the conservative banner, for the Vice President ... The problem for Republicans was that they did not project an economic position that could appeal to public anxieties on taxes, welfare, big government and inflation. The lesson for the Republican future is thus not less conservatism, but a good deal more.” And other strange lessons of American history.

Fat Cats and Democrats: The role of the big rich in the party of the common man,” by G. William Domhoff. (Prentice-Hall, 1972, $5.95.) Having dismissed the GOP as a “coterie of grim public relations men and overly smooth salesmen (who) merely go through the motions of the democratic process,” the author proceeds to dissect the Democratic party ... “a leadership coalition of wealthy Jewish businessmen, reactionary Southerners, clever corporation lawyers, and wealthy Protestant mavericks (who) clumsily embrace each other while at the same time mollifying a constituency of blacks, browns, Catholics, middle-class Jews, Southerners and well-educated do-gooders.” (Labor is apparently unworthy of mention.) Domhoff, the author of Who Rules America?, is so thorough that the Democrats seem dismembered rather than dissected. The book is worth reading despite its built-in bias, e.g., “Policy formation is the province of a bipartisan power elite of corporate rich and their career hirings who work through an interlocking and overlapping maze of foundations, universities, institutes, discussion groups, associations, and commissions. Political parties are only for finding interesting and genial people (usually ambitious middle-class lawyers) to ratify and implement these policies in such a way that the under classes feel themselves to be somehow a part of the government process.” A good book if you like bull fights; all America’s sacred cows get gored.

“Can a Nice Jewish Boy Named Nelson Save Us from Father Drinan,” by David Brudnoy and “The Case for Curtis,” by Daniel J. Rea, Jr. New Guard, September, 1972. Two former leaders of Massachusetts’ Conservative Party state the cases for their conservative favorites for the Republican nomination in the seat now held by Congressman Robert Drinan. Both Brudnoy and Rea agree on the merits of both former Congressman Laurence Curtis and Harvard doctoral candidate Avi Nelson. Both writers for the YAF monthly also agree that State Rep. Martin Linsky, a Ripon member, is the Republican to beat. Brudnoy’s plea for the 30-year-old Nelson (“If sheer integrity and attractiveness could win elections, Avi Nelson would be sure to send Linsky back to the State House and Drinan back to the Society of Jesus.”) is combined with a candid assessment of the Conservative Party he formerly chaired and now “headed by an incompetent and supported, evidently, mainly by the woolier fringe of the Tennis Shoe Ladies Brigade ...” While discounting Curtis’s age, 75, as a drawback, Rea points out that Nelson is trying to portray an image as a moderate. “While (his supporters) all believe that the streets should be sold, none are saying it publicly,” writes Rea. The primary is September 19.

“Can GOP Make Winning a Habit?” by Vermont Royster. Wall Street Journal, August 24, 1972. The former Wall Street Journal editor maintains the old FDR Democratic coalition has collapsed, but to replace it the GOP must develop a political image which fits “the political image the country has of itself.” But whether the GOP can make that transition is questionable, according to Royster. He contends that the GOP’s “almost neurotic compulsion” to appear unified at Miami was unnecessary. “To build a future, a party must acquire a broad enough view of society and government to pull together men of many different walks and interests. It must, that is, have an unpinning of an accepted political philosophy,” wrote Royster, but such a “consensus achieved only through debt” otherwise it is illusory.

“Nixon’s Party Feast,” by David S. Broder. Washington Post, August 22, 1972. “Richard M. Nixon has achieved something rather remarkable in the last four years. He has managed to shift the program and policies of the Republican Party vast distances in both the foreign and domestic fields, while reducing the challenge from the GOP’s liberal and conservative wings to a series of feeble and futile squawks. He has managed this feat by being progressive in his policies and conservative in his politics — which is a neat trick even for one as nimble as Mr. Nixon.” Nixon’s actions, Broder maintains, were dictated because he believed the conservatives were devoid of ideas and the liberals were devoid of political muscle.

“The White House Watch over TV and the Press,” by Julius Duscha. New York Times Magazine, August 20, 1972. Patrick J. Buchanan, Special Assistant to the President in charge of media-watching and author of most of the Administration’s press releases, is an editorial writer for the St. Louis Globe-Democrat back in 1964 while he was working in Sen. Barry Goldwater’s presidential campaign in the St. Louis area. Perhaps not unusual — except that Buchanan is the Administration’s resident critic of the objectivity of the national media.

“A Mellower Goldwater Reminisces About ’64, Now Feels ‘Out of It’,” by Norman C. Miller. Wall Street Journal, August 21, 1972. “My rating with the Americans for Constitutional Action is still the highest in Congress but people at Human Events (a conservative weekly) think I’m now somewhat of a Socialist,” Goldwater was quoted as saying. “It’s a strange thing about conservatives. They are the most anti-Communist group in America, and yet they practice the same thing for which they criticize the Communists — namely, if you don’t agree with them 100 percent, then you’re wrong.” The Arizona Senator also bluntly expressed his feelings that he shouldn’t have run for the Senate again in 1968, that the staff of the Committee to Re-elect the President is filled with inexperienced people, and that he’d like to teach at Arizona State University if he decides not to run for re-election in 1974.

The Political Marketplace: edited by David L. Rosenbloom. Published by Campaign Communications Institute for Politics, Inc. 1972. $25.00. A reference guide to politicians, office-holders, media and campaign consultants, and a preview to the 1972 elections. Unfortunately, it’s the kind of book which can be quickly dated. Nor is it directed to the home library. The advertisements may be the best part.
LETTERS

Education

I have read, at least in part, with interest the Ripon Society Platform Proposals in the August issue of the Forum. The section on Youth, which includes discussion on education, was of particular interest to me.

For the past three years, I have been a member of the school committee in Newport, R.I., a city of some 35,000 people. Six thousand of those people are in the public school system. Looking at many of the larger surrounding systems, I guess one would say our system is not too large. However, as a school committee member in a smaller school system, I am painfully aware of how little those of us who are supposed to be in control of the system are able to learn of its operations and problems. Lower echelon employees are understandably reluctant to take positions at variance with those who control their promotions and assignments. Upper echelon people are understandably reluctant to criticize what they have wrought. And the parents of the children are often frustrated in their attempts to have some control over those they are trying to raise.

If these are the problems of a small system, I shudder to think what the problems must be in the larger school systems of these United States.

I found the Society's proposals concerning education completely lacking on the issue of private education and the government's role in either subsidizing such education directly by grants or indirectly through tax credits for the deductions of any position. The subject stands out even more clearly against the progress of the Nixon Administration to find a solution that will pass muster with the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the issue of parental control is often confused with the church-state issue. The presence of church-state extremists in the liberal wings of both parties does not aid in finding a solution. However, I think it is time our society studied the subject in light of the breakdown in communications and control in the school systems which are run by governmental units.

ANDRE D'ANDREA
Newport, Rhode Island

President Nixon

This note is written due to my firm belief that President Nixon should not receive an endorsement from the Ripon Society. As a worker in Nixon's campaign in 1968, I felt he would be able to bring the Vietnam War to a quick end, since he was not shackled by four years of incompetency in the Johnson Administration. I also believed he was equipped to unify the nation after the disastrous Democratic Convention of '68.

However, much to my amazement, he has not fulfilled his pledge to end the Vietnam War. Instead he has invaded Cambodia, increased the bombing of the North and inflicted innumerable casualties and hardships upon the Vietnamese people. While American troops are virtually gone from the South, their presence is certainly felt in the North (i.e., Naval and Air Force bombardment).

I have a firm commitment to the Republican Party, particularly those ideals which the Ripon Society embraces. However, I am actively working for Senator McGovern. This is because I feel totally alienated by the type of America which Richard Nixon promotes. McGovern is the first Democrat I have ever supported, because I hear people shout at the Convention, "Four More Years!" I answer, "Hell, no!" Richard Nixon has had four years already to end the Vietnam War ("Those who have had a chance for four years and could not produce should not be given another chance," RMN -- October 9, 1968). We, and the rest of the world, can't afford to have Richard Nixon in office for four more years.

I would hope the Ripon Society would remain a progressive element within American society by supporting George McGovern for President. If this is not feasible because of its Republican connections, I think it would be perfectly justifiable for the Society to remain neutral in the election for President. (Just like Nixon's "neutral­ity" in Goodell's election bid in 1970.)

Thank you for your publications and healthy influence in guiding the more progressive elements of our party.

JOHN R. KIRK
Athena, Georgia

Civilian Congress

"Generals and admirals..." ARE "...the country's thinking." Not to mention Colonels like Carl Albert and Navy Capt. Hugh Scott with plenty of influence. ("Gaining Civilian Control," by Peter Welch, July FORUM.)

All of this I'm prohibited, as you know, by the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 6 (2), whose sole intent was, and is, to civilianize the legislative branch.

How can this intent be realized when Ripon and other publishers continue to address all the erring politicians by their non-military titles? What's wrong with using their executive branch titles, e.g., Air Force General (Barry) Goldwater?

Why not a sequel... "Gaining Civilian Control of Congress?"

JACQUES FITCH
Coalition for a Civilian Congress.
San Francisco, California

Election '72

Your Election '72 survey July FORUM was admirable in most respects, but the table at the beginning for some reason downplays President Nixon's prospects:

While your correspondent wrote Minnesota "will be a tossup," its 10 electoral votes are placed in the Democratic, rather than tossup, column.

In New Jersey, you write that the President will "probably do so again" (carry the state), but you put the 17 electoral votes in the tossup column.

In other cases, your table agrees with the text, but both give McGovern too much hope. Michigan is ceded to the Democrats, but even Attorney General, in his New York Times Magazine piece on how McGovern will win, concedes that Nixon will probably take that state.

Washington state is placed in the tossup column, but it is hard to believe that McGovern has much chance in that state where defense contracts play such a large role in the economy and Scoop Jackson is so popular. As for New York and Illinois, they may properly be in the tossup column, but few people beside yourselves give McGovern much chance in the latter state, at least. Can he do better than Humphrey did when Daley was actively working for him? A recent New York Times article says that Democratic leaders in Hawaii are skeptical about McGovern's chances in that state, but you call it solid for McGovern. Maybe tossup status is more appropriate. Perhaps Nixon will again fritter away his advantage, as you suggest, but right now (after the Eagleton affair which apparently won't happen for quite some time) Nixon: 367 McGovern: 25 Tossup: 146

JONATHAN B. DUBITZKY
Chesnut Hill, Massachusetts

Ripon Corrected

In your July edition of the Ripon FORUM on page 25 under the general heading of "Politics '72" my name appears in the analysis of the Missouri Congressional Races.

I am not certain that I have been the victim of "sloppy" research by the editor of the article, Dick Behn, or that the writer was unable to make a judg­ment by referring to me as a "Bircher." The fact is, that I am not a member of the John Birch Society nor have I ever been. I can only deduce, therefore, that the afore­mentioned writer was deliberately lying in an attempt to profile me for the few readers of your publication who might be curious about my association with that Millington. He is undoubtedly the same kind of reporter who cries "repression" when members of the news media are attacked for irresponsible reporting.

It is my view, that in the next edition of your publication a retraction of the comment should be made, and the writer reprimanded for failure to check his facts.

Duward G. Hall
Member of Congress

Editor's Note: The FORUM regrets the inaccurate characterization of Congressman Hall's affiliations. We apologize.

Ripon Forum
Republican Progressives

The gallant but unsuccessful, almost ridiculous, attempt of Rep. Pete McCloskey and Rep. Don Riegel to express their views before the Platform and Rules Committee of the Republican National Convention typifies the frustrations of many progressive Republicans. Progressive Republicans are laughed off by the "regulars." Progressive Republicans are considered unimportant, annoying, embarrassing nuisances. Progressive Republicans are definitely out of style in 1972.

The Committee to Re-Elect the President has a sure winner.

By 1974 or 1976, if the present leadership of the Republican Party persists in excluding progressive Republicans from party council, progressive Republicans will be faced with very hard choices: withdraw altogether from political participation; switch parties as has been so often suggested by the "regulars;" remain in the party as "hyphenated" Republican-Independents; make the ultimate hard choice and abandon the GOP as a lost cause and form a new party that will earnestly address itself to the traditional concepts of the Republican Party — concern for individual and civil rights and government by law.

None of these options make sense. To survive as a democracy the nation needs two strong political parties to engage in vigorous competition. The party with the most talent, the most imaginative ideas; the party that makes the fewest mistakes deserves to win — and does.

Out of continuing dialogue between diverse elements of the party comes practical, workable, social and economic policies and the possibility of building a majority coalition.

Winning an election is an exhilarating experience for everyone from the candidate to the doorbell ringers. However, the election victory will strengthen the nation only if the elected leader does his best to unify the people, and if he does his best to make the United States more free, more just, and more worker with persistence to assure all citizens a better chance to a fair opportunity to lead a life of dignity.

CLARA LINK
Pasadena, California

Transportation

In his 1972 Highway Needs Report, Secretary of Transportation John Volpe proposed the transfer, annually, of up to 39 percent of the money in the Federal Highway Trust Fund to support a Single Urban Fund. This money is to be used exclusively for mass transit on a 30 to 70 matching basis; that is, the Federal Government contributes 70 cents on every dollar of acquisition and construction costs.

Why is it that the States must contribute 30 percent of the capital costs for mass transit, yet they need only contribute 10 percent of the capital costs for highways? Why the 20 percent discrimination against mass transit?

The Federal Highway Trust Fund was created in 1956, in the name of national defense, for the construction of highways connecting certain key points in the United States. The excise taxes collected on gasoline, oil, automobiles and auto-parts are paid into the fund to finance this construction. The money is available to the States on a 10 to 90 percent matching basis; that is, the Federal Government contributes 90 cents for every dollar of construction cost. If the match is received, there was to be construction of a network of 41,000 miles of roads to be completed in 1972 at an estimated cost of $27 billion. This vast project is nearing completion, but the fund has been stretched to 42,500 miles of road and $75 billion. While urban areas fell within these designated points, the cities had, and still have, no option to use the funds for mass transit in their area rather than for highways. The unfairness of the rules is apparent as is the aesthetic, ecological, and financial waste paved by many of these highways.

Thereafter, Congress passed the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1970, which declares a federal commitment for the expenditure of at least $10 billion over a 12 year period. The Act specifically authorizes over $3 billion for the fiscal years 1971 to 1976 inclusive. The newly proposed Single Urban Fund would implement the 1970 Act by providing the primary source of funding.

There is no sound reason given to date for requiring a larger state matching for mass transit than for highways. The source of funding (excise taxes) is the same for both. Thus, while the proposal is the first encouragement on the horizon, it may very well be a mirage. Past suburban taxpayer reluctance to approve of any special funding for the cities makes it unlikely that they will approve an urban transportation plan which costs the State 20 percent more than that for highways. Moreover, the 39 percent to be allocated to the Single Urban Fund represents approximately $1.2 billion annually, which is far short of the $75 billion used for highways.

The solution would be to transfer at least 50 percent of the excise tax revenue to the Single Urban Fund, and require a matching of no more than 10 percent by the States.

The attention of the Subcommittee on Roads of the House Public Works Committee should be directed to the now-mooted Kennedy-Welcker bill (S. 3852) considered by the Senate, which will leave existing federal environmental regulations intact and keep the Urban Mass Transportation Act fund intact.

It is not too late to urge your representatives in Congress to seek a more realistic and balanced transportation plan.

RICHARD SCANLAN
Research Director
New York Chapter

14a ELIOT STREET

The Cambridge Chapter has just completed a series of Issues Seminars for non-incumbent Massachusetts Republican legislative candidates. Six early morning sessions held weekly from late July through August featured experts in state government who spoke and fielded questions on current issues in welfare, prison and drug reform, taxes, unemployment, legislative reform and the environment. Out of thirty-five (35) State Senate and House candidates, including an occasional incumbent, attended the sessions, a better turnout than expected. The Issues Seminars, initiated in 1970, attempt to bring non-incumbent Republicans abreast of the major issues in order to mitigate the inherent advantage incumbent legislators have in discussing them in the campaign. Seminars seems to have become a campaign issue in at least one ongoing candidate's bid, won by his opponent of attending only two sessions, scammed to the Hipon files to verify by attendance sheets that he had indeed attended five.

Carolyn Stewart, wife of Cambridge President Bob Stewart, is campaign manager for the re-election bid of Sen. Edward Brooke (R-Mass.). Senator Brooke, in an effort to bring youth into the Republican fold, has staffed his campaign almost exclusively with young, moderate Republicans. Other key figures include Boston Chapter members Jaye Whittier and Tom Feld. Carolyn was press aide to liberal Republican Josiah Spaulding in 1970, and is a former staff assistant to Senator Howard Baker (R-Tenn.).

Two of Minnesota's three NGB members are legislative candidates. John Calms is running for the State Senate in Minneapolis' 57th Senate District and Kati Sasseville is running for the Minnesota House in Bloomington's 37th District.

Mark Bloomfield has resigned his position at the Committee to Re-elect the President to enter law school at the University of Pennsylvania.

September, 1972
A Psychobiographical Inquiry

In Search of Nixon

By Bruce Mazlish
Basic Books, $6.95

Bruce Mazlish's title tellingly echoes that of Erik Erikson's brilliant and influential 1968 essay, "On the Nature of Psycho-Historical Evidence: In Search of Ghandi." Erikson has dominated recent efforts to dovetail historical and psycho-analytic explanations, but Mazlish's final chapter, with its recognition of psycho-analytic explanation's necessary "density," its "supplementary" character and his healthy skepticism of its predictive power, demonstrates the author's sophisticated understanding of psycho-history's difficulties. Mazlish's choice of subject, while giving his book immediate interest, redoubles these complexities, for he must search through the seemingly perennial re-emergences of "new" Richard Nixons.

Psycho-histories must earn the reader's confidence. Mazlish proceeds with caution, recognizes the importance of his own motivation for writing such a book and scrupulously points as often to strengths in Nixon's character as to weaknesses.

The very scarcity of hard information on Nixon and his renowned "opaqueness," which complicated Mazlish's task, becomes an important factor itself requiring explanation. Mazlish offers two explanations. First, he points to Nixon's adolescent fondness for acting and his penchant for theatrical metaphors and goes on to suggest that for Nixon, his role substitutes for an insecurely held self. If one is not sure of what one is, one can at least be one's role." This ability or necessity allows his role of the moment to define him, Mazlish suggests, both submerges the private within the public man and makes others vaguely uncomfortable, fostering that search for the "real" Richard M. Nixon. Later Mazlish details Nixon's apparent inability to acknowledge to himself "some of his innermost desires," particularly his occasional longings for passivity or dependency. Defending against these, Nixon must publicly "appear solely as strong and independent, a man of lonely but forceful decisions. Alas, his ambivalent feelings break through in reality and in speeches; his denial of them only adds to the vague feelings of distrust that he induces in many people." Thus in the very contradictions which manifestly obscure the "real" Nixon, the author locates the ambivalent core of his personality.

The book's discussion of Nixon's "crisis behavior," both the earlier events of Six Crises and the more recent ones of Nixon's presidency, are most convincing. According to Mazlish, Nixon feels extreme ambivalence about his aggressive impulses and "tends to deal with them by projection onto others;" his adversaries thus becoming the repositories of his own, rejected worst impulses. Simultaneously, "he identifies himself with the nation and denies any aggressive desires in either."

What is right for Nixon, therefore, is right for the nation. And this without hypocrisy, for Nixon lacks self-reflexiveness, he is an "uncritical man," who "does not really examine and weigh the validity of his statements." Perceiving adversaries in this way short-circuits the possibilities for reconciliation: to acquiesce to one's opponents is to give in to one's already rejected worst self.

Nixon, then, lives in a world partially defined by what he rejects within himself. From this fact arises, says Mazlish, the President's passion for preparedness, his dogged, even courageous, persistence, the resistance to any sort of outside controls by a most self-controlled man, his obsession with strength and his sincere belief that only strength can produce peace. Indecision wracks Mazlish's Nixon, but once a decision is reached, he refuses to admit the possibility of error which might represent another kind of surrender. Thus in the Haynsworth-Carswell controversy Nixon stubbornly insisted upon his nominees' worthiness, sought "to deny his role in the failure and to accuse his opponents of malicious and unfair behavior." The Carswell nomination almost seemed motivated by his desire to punish the Senate. Again, in the introduction of the New Economic Policy, the President never conceded that his previous policies might have been in error. Rather, he took the offensive by proclaiming a bold new program (weakened by his abhorrence for "outside" controls) and blaming inflation and the "weakness" of the dollar on others — Democrats, foreign countries and "international speculators." Thus once a decision or policy is reached, Nixon clings to it stubbornly and resists even friendly modifications, all the while blaming others for resultant failures or ineffectualities.

But no matter how revealing and informative readers may find In Search of Nixon, they may doubt the ethics of subjecting a living person, much less our President, to this sort of public analysis. Therapists, after all, are professionally bound to protect the anonymity of their clients. Mazlish, however, is not doing therapy. What Mazlish has done, is at once to rely upon a recognized theory of human behavior and to allow the reader a clear view of his premises. The results, whether we like them or not, are subject to independent confirmation. Thus we do not have a question of ethics, since Mazlish's recourse to psychological assumptions is nothing that Gary Wills, Earl Mazo or Nixon's other commentators and biographers have not at least covertly done. We can only question the adequacy of Mazlish's constructions and perhaps, since psycho-history assumes a fit between the personalities of elected officials and the electorate, ponder what In Search of Nixon reveals about ourselves. — BRUCE CHABOT

Ripon Forum