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ANNUAL MEETING
April 28th
See back cover for details.
Repealing the 13th Amendment

With surprising rapidity a push for the return of the military draft has gained momentum in the last few months. Generally the proposals for the return of conscription have been coupled with plans for some form of universal compulsory national service. Under these various schemes all young men or all youth would be required to serve six months to two years in either the military or some alternative civilian service.

Several justifications have been advanced for the civilian service alternative. Politicians scared about the political repercussions of proposing a return of the draft hope to soften the resistance by providing some form of alternative youth service in hospitals, day care centers, VISTA projects, civilian conservation camps, Indian reservations, etc. Other proponents such as Kingman Brewster view an army of several million subsistence wage youth laboring on social service projects as the only way to achieve liberal goals now that a tax conscious public is not willing to pay the market cost of such services. The Washington Monthly, a normally sensible publication, has advanced an even more ingenious argument for compulsory national service in its recent “Platform for the Eighties”. After bemoaning the decline of voluntarism in modern society, this fountain of liberal chic proposes to beat this altruism back into our wayward youth. Quoth the Platform for 1984:

“Because the idea of volunteering is so foreign to young Americans today, we believe a universal service would have to be compulsory at first. Its chances of succeeding would otherwise be slim; for too many kids, the fear of being left behind by their peers in the race for credentials would prevent them from joining. But as our attitudes toward altruistic service changed, we believe that kind of paranoia would subside. If it were seen as a way of fulfilling a responsibility to the community, rather than as a mandatory shot of short-term drudgery, and if those beyond the age of service nevertheless set an example by volunteering their own time, it might not have to be compulsory for long. By instilling the spirit of altruism at a young age, universal service could also sustain in us a lifelong commitment to helping each other.”

Whether the aims of universal youth service proponents are
to sugarcoat a return of the draft, to eliminate black youth unemployment, to realize the Great Society on the cheap or to inoculate our youth against an epidemic of selfishness, their nostrum is far more monstrous than the military draft. Moreover, these universal service proposals, in the view of most learned constitutional experts, expressly violate the Thirteenth Amendment. While the military draft can arguably be sustained against a claim of involuntary servitude because of the breadth of the war power, no competing constitutional value exists to sustain a system of compulsory civilian service. Proponents are in effect seeking to piggyback on the war power to usher in a system of compulsory civilian service that could not stand constitutional scrutiny on its own merits.

Aside from its dubious constitutional base, a system of universal compulsory national service would prove profoundly detrimental both in its philosophy and in its economic impact. Aside from its coercive effect on American youth, universal service would enormously swell the powers of the central government. Whoever controlled the executive branch could determine which organizations could be rightful beneficiaries of a free labor supply paid subsistence wages by the state. The potential for partisan abuse and political corruption in such unbridled executive branch discretion could make the abuses of Watergate seem like small potatoes. Like the chain gangs of the Deep South these youth inductees could be placed at the service of local political bosses. Certainly the conditions of work would be far better than in earlier forms of peonage. Nevertheless, involuntary servitude with due process is still slavery. A system of universal service could reduce the seemingly intractable problem of youth unemployment to the levels of such nations as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or the People's Republic of China.

Ironically proponents of compulsory national service have gained impetus from arguments that the volunteer military is too expensive. Yet, even if youth inductees into the compulsory service system are paid only subsistence wages, the added cost of such a system would range in the tens of billions of dollars. The ballooning of military personnel costs as a portion of the Pentagon budget has caused some hardware-conscious conservatives to focus on the volunteer military as a scapegoat. Yet, on closer scrutiny we find that only a tiny percentage of the increase in military personnel costs is due to increased salaries for recruits. Nearly all of the increased salary expenses have gone to noncommissioned officers or to the officer corps. If the draft is brought back is anyone to suppose that these careerists will welcome a slash in their salaries to late nineteen sixties levels?

Critics of the volunteer military have seized with glee upon reports indicating our difficulty in mobilizing to fight a protracted conventional war on the European Continent. While contingency planning is useful for military war gamers and like-minded hobbyists on Capitol Hill this possibility seems to defy reality. The likelihood of a protracted conventional war across the European Continent seems only marginally more probable than a snowball fight across the Sahara Desert.

Another hobgoblin that has been raised to discredit the volunteer military is the specter of a predominantly black army. Such an army would be somewhat less than reliable, some critics seem to be insinuating. Would such troops mutiny, it is asked, if the U.S. intervened in favor of South Africa or against Uganda? Yet this question of the loyalty of black troops has already been put to the test. During the urban riots of the late sixties significantly black units such as the 82nd Airborne exhibited superb discipline when patrolling black neighborhoods. Moreover, the somewhat disproportionate percentage of blacks in the military is less a function of recruitment than of the relatively greater tendency of blacks in the military to reenlist. This is largely the result of a disparity in opportunities open to younger semiskilled blacks and whites in the private sector.

The weaknesses of today's military manpower system are generally concentrated in specific skill areas and are far better addressed by a rifle shot approach than by a shotgun method such as the draft or universal youth service. The military is experiencing difficulty recruiting and retaining doctors and it is having trouble retaining junior officers with training in such highly technical areas as nuclear engineering. There is no inherent reason why most of the doctors servicing the military, particularly those based in the U.S., must be in the uniformed service. At only a marginal increase in cost the military could staff its facilities with civilian doctors paid at competitive salaries. Stateside military dependents and retirees could obtain health care on the private market with government paying the full cost of health insurance. The military could increase its retention of essential technical specialists by adopting generous and more selectively targeted retention bonuses. Finally the troublesome future problem posed by the demographics of a shrinking supply of young adolescent males can be addressed by increasing opportunity for women in the military.

There is nothing inconsistent between a posture of military strength and the maintenance of a volunteer military. The failure of will of the Carter Administration is hardly reRESSED by stumbling into a system of universal youth service. As a nation built in large part by refugees from conscription and peonage in Europe and split apart by the issue of black slavery, we can hardly ignore the lessons of our history. With the death of Bill Steiger there is no one in Congress leading opposition to the increasingly well concerted fight to institute universal youth service. We can only hope that such leadership will come forward and that Congress will look before it leaps into an unknown chasm.

GOP Primary Winner Tim Petri
Faces Goyke in Wisconsin
Congressional Special Election

State Senator Thomas E. (Tim) Petri won a decisive victory February 20 in a seven way Republican primary for the Sixth District Congressional vacancy created by the death of Bill Steiger. Petri, a former Ripon Society executive director, carried half the counties in his district and ran well district-wide. His four serious opponents, two conservatives and two moderates, generally did well in their home areas but failed to mount strong campaigns else-
where. Garnering 35.3 per cent of the total GOP vote Petri nearly doubled the vote of his closest competitor.

Meanwhile Oshkosh State Senator Gary Goyke handily won the Democratic primary. Petri's surprisingly strong showing and the heavy GOP primary turnout (nearly three times the Democratic turnout) seem to augur well for the GOP in the April 3 special election. Democrat Goyke, however, is a strong campaigner and has run very well in normally Republican Oshkosh. The Petri campaign is gearing up for a tightly contested election in this district which President Ford narrowly carried in 1976. Citizens for Petri has headquarters at 43 South Main Street, Fond du Lac, Wisconsin 54935. Area Code (414) 923-4050.

**Power Seeks to Engineer Upset of Fulton Machine in Nashville**

Perhaps the most fascinating mayoralty campaign this year is centered in Nashville, Tennessee, a thriving metropolis that can claim to be "the music capital of the world." A classic confrontation is shaping up between a powerful old-style political machine headed by incumbent Mayor Richard Fulton and a young issue-oriented reformer in the person of 35 year old Daniel E. Power III.

Fulton is a long-time Nashville political fixture. A veteran Democratic Congressman from Nashville, Fulton won the mayoralty in a landslide in 1975 when Mayor Beverly Briley, the highly regarded father of consolidated city-county government, retired. Fulton apparently saw the mayoralty as the stepping stone to the 1978 Democratic gubernatorial nomination. Soon after Fulton took the reigns of power, Nashville's once textbook model of municipal government began to give way to a style of politics reminiscent of Dashiell Hammett's novel, *The Glass Key*. A local liquor dealer and political crony of Fulton soon gained de facto patronage control over the Nashville Police Department. As Fulton geared up for his gubernatorial campaign city contractors found themselves strong-armed to bankroll the mayor's campaign for higher office.

At this point Power, hitherto a political unknown, stepped forward. The same day in January, 1978 that Fulton declared for the governorship, Power announced for Fulton's job. Typically the young urban reformer who has tackled the old-line city machine has been a lawyer from a well-to-do family. In marked contrast Power is a civil engineer and city planner from a moderate income Nashville family. A civil engineering graduate of Nashville's highly regarded Vanderbilt University, Power has a Masters in City Planning from the University of Tennessee. Although Power has extensive experience in the administrations of both the late Democratic governor Frank Clement and the popular, moderate Republican former governor Winfield Dunn, he has never before run for public office. The tall engineer/planner has become an effective public speaker as he has pressed his "Power for the People" campaign for the past year on shoe-string financing.

Meanwhile Fulton's image of invincibility has begun to erode. The mayor finished a poor third in the August 1978 Democratic gubernatorial primary and barely carried Nashville. Moreover, Fulton has suffered by obvious similarities between his *modus operandi* and that of the recent Democratic Governor, Ray Blanton. "Fulton's a Blanton without the pardon power" remarked one veteran observer of Tennessee politics.

Given virtually no chance at the outset, Power has developed considerable momentum in the last few months. He has attracted the strong support of former Mayor Beverly Briley, still probably the most well respected political leader in Nashville and Davidson County. In this officially nonpartisan race Power has gained the lion's share of support of Nashville activists in both the Bob Clement and Lamar Alexander gubernatorial campaigns. Clement lost the Democratic gubernatorial primary by an eyelash and several million dollars to East Tennessee banker Jake Butcher. Clement, the son of a popular Democratic governor, nearly edged Fulton in Nashville. Exploiting resentments by both Fulton and Clement partisans against the free spending campaign of Butcher, Republican nominee Lamar Alexander carried heavily Democratic Nashville by a landslide. Although Alexander is staying out of the mayoralty race, many of his campaigners seem to be flocking to Power's banner.

Already 1979 has witnessed the defeat of mayoral incumbents in Chicago and Kansas City. Nashville may see a similar result in its August 2 election. Power's victory would be virtually unique in one respect. Despite the extensive body of knowledge that has grown up in this country in the fields of city planning and public administration, rarely do mayoral candidates have extensive backgrounds in these areas. Instead they seem clubhouse politicians, skilled in the art of compromise but often ignorant of the essentials of efficient municipal government, or lawyer/reformers in the mold of Richardson Dilworth or John Lindsay. High-minded in their objectives but often unfamiliar with the problems of everyday folk, the patrician reformers have tended to give reform a bad name.

A Power victory could spark candidacies in other big cities of a new sort of mayoral or city council aspirant - individuals trained in the disciplines of economic and responsive municipal government. The Power for Mayor campaign can be contacted at P.O. Box 1979, Nashville, Tennessee, 37202.

**Washington, Lincoln, FDR and Connally?**

In the last two months the star of the Republican presidential stage has been Texan John Connally. His crowd appeal is a spicy blend of constitutional radicalism, macho politics and chutzpah. The former Texas Governor and Secretary of the Treasury has embraced a staggering array of constitutional amendments and other radical departures. He favors electing Presidents to one six year term, distributing the proceeds of the corporate income tax equally to all
Americans who voted in the preceding election, subjecting American youth to a system of compulsory national service and adopting a constitutional requirement for a balanced budget.

There seem some inherent contradictions in Connally’s positions that might prove troublesome to an ordinary mortal but hardly to someone with Connally’s personality. Connally’s late January campaign kickoff at the National Press Club focused on the Carter Administration’s foreign policy weakness and alleged stinginess on defense spending. The dust had barely settled from his announcement when Connally was calling for an across-the-board five percent cut in all Federal spending including defense. Seemingly vulnerable to attack from conservatives favoring Reagan or Crane, John Connally managed to weather this flap with no apparent damage.

The appeal of the Connally campaign is, however, hardly a function of issues but rather of the Texan’s success in projecting his person as synonymous with strength and leadership. In launching his campaign John Connally stated that at three times of earlier national crisis, great leaders had come forward in the persons of Presidents George Washington, Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Now in its fourth great national crisis the country might, he suggested, be ready for another great leader.

Such modest humility would prove the undoing of many politicians but the silver-tongued Houston lawyer has served himself up to many Republican audiences as the prescription for the nation’s ills. His most successful response so far occurred at an early March gathering of Midwest Republican officials. Connally impressed the assemblage so much that he edged his closest competitors, Ronald Reagan and George Bush, in a straw poll of participants. Despite Connally's remarkable early progress, some observers believe that he should not soon anticipate seeing his face carved on Mount Rushmore. Stumbling blocks they cite to a Connally Presidency include:

Concern among many issue-oriented Republicans and other limited government voters over Connally’s strong statist philosophy. Not only is Connally a former Democratic officeholder, he remains, these critics suggest, a wholehearted believer in FDR and LBJ style big government approaches.

The belief among many Republican politicians that Connally is vulnerable to more damaging disclosures concerning his past activity in Texas or national politics.

The feeling that Connally’s close professional and financial ties to the domestic oil industry and to Arab petrodollar investors may not sit well in 1980 with American voters upset over a dollar per gallon gasoline.

Unfazed by such considerations, “Big John” Connally is pressing ahead full-steam. The former Texas governor is cashing in his chits with the LBJ wing of the Democratic Party, currently bereft of any other representative on the presidential scene. His triumphant campaign tour through Texas seemed like a reunion of the LBJ faithful. Among the sponsors of the events was former Lieutenant Governor Ben Barnes, a protege of the late President. Connally’s Democratic allies in Texas are meanwhile seeking to change the Texas presidential primary date. Tory Democrats suffered in 1976 when many normally Democratic conservative voters deserted their party’s primary to vote in the Reagan-Ford contest that same day. Liberal Democrats unexpectedly won many primaries for state and local offices. To head off a repetition of this event in 1980, conservative Democrats are seeking to move the presidential primary to March while leaving the state and local primary in May. Under Texas’ open registration system, voters could first vote in the Republican presidential primary and then a few weeks later vote in the Democratic primary for state offices. By most calculations this staggered election would benefit Connally who would be expected to reap a double bonus—the bulk of the additional crossover votes and the psychological boost of a strong Texas primary showing on later state primaries. Regardless of whether the attempt to stagger the primaries is successful, Connally confidently predicts that he will win.

Since his declaration of candidacy Connally has reportedly been showered by contributions from senior executives of major corporations. Although he lacks a strong base among elected Republicans, Connally seems the favorite of the Fortune 500 and the oil industry. This fact alone should ensure Connally financial staying power through the early primaries. It is unclear how well Connally will parlay this financial clout, but it seems certain that LBJ’s and Nixon’s favorite politician will mount a serious bid for the nation’s highest office.

Blanton Finale Propels Alexander to Strong Start

During his four years as Governor of Tennessee—and particularly during the last few weeks of his term—Democrat Ray Blanton accomplished for Tennessee Republicans approximately what General Sherman did for Georgia Democrats more than a century before. A widely shared view of Blanton’s tenure was advanced by The Memphis Commercial Appeal in an editorial two days after Blanton had been ousted from office:

Blanton has brought more shame to Tennessee than other governor in the state’s history. From the very beginning, his administration has been steeped in controversy and charges of wrongdoing. Some of his record has been ludicrous—like the telephone calls at state expense to a secretary in Washington or his letter to President Carter urging a ban on “negative” news. Some of it has been maddening—like the continuous interference of patronage and politics in the operation of state government or the jet trips to sunny climes when the temperature turned cold. Some of it has been frightening—like the clemency scandal.

In December 1978 two of Blanton’s top aides were indicted on federal charges of selling pardons to prison inmates. For the past year following Blanton’s declaration that he intended to free a political crony’s son who had been convicted of double murder the state’s clemency process has been the focus of sharp controversy. No matter how much they had come to expect the unexpected from Ray Blanton, few Ten-
nnesota voters were prepared for the performance of his final week in office. The governor began his last week in office by pardoning or paroling 52 inmates including 23 murderers. These included the son of a political crony as well as others believed to have bought their way to freedom. Citing as justification for his actions the overcrowding of Tennessee prisons, Blanton indicated his intention to sign more pardons and commutations.

At this point, amidst an incredible public furor, bipartisan-ship prevailed to frustrate Blanton’s plans. Traditionally Tennessee governors are inaugurated on January 20 and Republican Governor Elect Lamar Alexander was scheduled to take office on that date. The Tennessee Constitution, however, permits the new governor to be inaugurated as early as January 15 if the legislature concurs. Once Blanton had made known his intention to launch another spate of pardons, the Democratic controlled legislature moved with lightning speed to dislodge Blanton. Three days before his scheduled inauguration Lamar Alexander was ushered over to the state legislature to be sworn in as governor. This early inauguration was precipitated by U.S. Attorney Hal Hardin who told Alexander and the legislative leaders that he had “substantial reason to believe” Blanton would free prisoners who were suspects in Hardin’s probe of suspected pardon sales.

Alexander’s calm and down-to-earth approach to his office has proved welcome to Tennesseans of all political persuasions, who had during Blanton’s regime come to expect buffoonery from their chief executive. The governor’s unpretentious manner — he frequently places his own phone calls to state offices — contrasts with the imperial style of his predecessor. Alexander has attracted top-flight staff and some highly regarded department heads. He has indicated an intention to curb the patronage abuses that have traditionally plagued state hiring. While this change may trigger resentment among some Republicans who were licking their chops at evening scores, it seems quite popular.

As a result of a recent change in the state constitution Alexander may run to succeed himself as governor. If he can retain most of his remarkable current popularity, Alexander should be a strong favorite for reelection in 1982. Already Alexander has emerged as a standout among the newly elected governors and is foreseen as a leading national figure in the early nineteen eighties. At the same time that the most prominent Tennessee Democrat other than lightly regarded Senator William Sasser is former GSA Administrator Jay Solomon, Republicans can boast a popular governor, a Senate minority leader and likely Presidential candidate, and a national party chairman who has already produced a turnaround in his party’s psychology. Suffering from a Blanton-induced hangover, Volunteer State Democrats seem likely to remain on the defensive for a long time to come.

Dreyfus Powers GOP Upsurge in Wisconsin

Wisconsin’s new Republican governor, perhaps the most fascinating officeholder in America today, has jumped off to a spectacular start. Barely after being sworn in, Lee Sherman Dreyfus, a former college chancellor and political maverick, pushed a tax cut of more than nine hundred million dollars through the heavily Democratic Wisconsin legislature. Perhaps the finest extemperaneous political speaker in America today, the Wisconsin governor combines an unorthodox political style with a remarkable facility for communicating to the public. In his uphill primary campaign against Congressman Robert Kasten, Dreyfus ran his opponent’s spots in which Kasten kept referring to himself in the third person. Stating “Real people don’t talk that way” , Dreyfus demolished his heavily favored opponent.

While making a few apparent campaign gaffes such as expressing sympathy for right to work laws in strongly unionized Wisconsin, Dreyfus swept the general election and ran well in Democratic and labor districts. His openness and clever quips have made him a folk hero of sorts, much like his long-time friend, California Senator S.I. Hayakawa. Dreyfus has reinforced his position by an aggressive talent search. His administration is already heavily staffed by members of the New Republican Conference of Wisconsin, an organization of young moderate Republicans intent on revitalizing the once nearly moribund Wisconsin GOP.

Buoyed by Dreyfus’ victory, Republican strategists now see a reasonable chance of capturing control of the Assembly in the 1980 legislative elections. Gaylord Nelson, long considered invulnerable, is now believed to be susceptible to a strong Republican challenge to his U.S. Senate seat in 1980.

Long a key primary state, Wisconsin is becoming a favorite speaking site for many Republican presidential contenders. Some observers have begun to wonder whether Wisconsin’s feisty governor might himself emerge as a dark horse. The non-politician anti-establishment style that allowed him to romp to victory in Wisconsin might, they suggest, register well with a GOP electorate eager for an outspoken but commanding personality.

Reagan Lead Dwindling

armed with December, 1978 Gallup Poll figures showing him with a commanding lead among Republican voters, Ronald Reagan launched an intense blitz this January to sew up the GOP Presidential nomination. Meeting with scores of Senators and Representatives the former California governor sought to persuade them of his electability and his reasonableness. Meanwhile his skilled political operatives circulated at the Republican National Committee meeting in Washington’s Sheraton Park Hotel. The much vaunted blitz failed to live up to its advance billing; on all fronts there was evidence of Reagan’s slippage.

A number of Southern party officials who had supported Reagan in 1976 expressed misgivings that Reagan “had been around the track too often”. Staying uncommitted, many of these Reaganites were looking at John Connally, and some at Phil Crane, Jack Kemp or George Bush.

Reagan has already lost the support of many move-
ment conservatives to Illinois Congressman Philip Crane. The Viguier organization and its various appendages have moved en masse to Crane together with many 1976 Reagan delegates and leaders in New England.

Nelson Rockefeller's death was viewed by many party professionals as a blow to Reagan's candidacy. They reasoned that the untimely death of the seemingly hale and hearty Rockefeller could only underscore Reagan's mortality.

Press reports of squabbling in the Reagan organization have evaporated the mystique of invincibility that was central to Reagan's locking the nomination up well before the primaries. The friction in the Reagan camp reportedly contributed to the decision of David Keene, a skilled 1976 Reagan lieutenant, to become political director of George Bush's presidential campaign.

Although the announcement of a Reagan campaign committee contained many well known names, the list was fairly thin in several key areas Reagan secured the support of only one governor, Charles Thone of Nebraska (5 electoral votes). Other than retiring Pennsylvania Senator Richard Schweiker Reagan's U.S. Senate supporters were largely from small Western states.

The savage editorial attack March 8 on Congressman Philip Crane and his wife Arlene by pro-Reagan publisher William Loeb of the Manchester Union Leader has hardly strengthened Reagan's already vulnerable position in New Hampshire. The timing of this attack one day after the Reagan committee announcement played into Crane's hands. The Illinois Congressman immediately secured reams of publicity and a unanimous resolution of the New Hampshire House deploring the Loeb attack. Before the attack Reagan enjoyed a 37 to 21 percent lead among New Hampshire voters over second-place finisher Tennessee Senator Howard Baker with Crane several miles back. The apparent movement of Reagan supporters to Crane in the last few days has undoubtedly eroded the former California governor’s lead further.

Underscoring the Reagan slippage, Gallup Poll figures published in early March indicated that Reagan's support had dropped 9 points among Republican voters in less than three months. Reagan fell from 40 percent to 31 percent, while Gerald Ford rose slightly from 24 percent to 26 percent. Howard Baker, third place finisher in December at 9 percent, fell slightly to 8 percent. The big gainer was John Connally who was apparently buoyed by the publicity from his declaration of candidacy. Connally jumped from 6 percent to 13 percent in significant measure by peeling away Reagan supporters.

Despite increasing signs of vulnerability, Reagan's greatest strength seems to be the failure of any of his rivals to stand out. Should this situation change, the Reagan candidacy could decelerate rapidly. Already Reagan and Ford are hurt by national opinion polls showing both of them being trounced in matchups with an unpopular Jimmy Carter. Both may be caught up in the politics of deja vu in which the public is turning away from old standbys in search of new leaders.

BOOK REVIEW

Emerging Coalitions in American Politics
Edited by Seymour Martin Lipset
(Institute for Contemporary Studies, 519 pages, $6.95)

The New American Political System
Edited by Anthony King
(American Enterprise Institute, 407 pages, $6.75)

by L. Scott Miller

Much is being written these days about the state of the nation's political processes. The decline of the political parties and associated rise of independent campaigns by candidates, the emergence of media gurus to create the candidate as IMAGE, the metamorphosis of polling from applied social science to a quasi-religious process of revealing secular truth, voter apathy, the breakdown of the New Deal coalition, the possibility that the electorate has "shifted" to the right, the dominance of the policy-making process by a technocratic elite, the transformation of elected legislators from professional to a quasi-religious process of revealing secular
Emerging Coalitions is the work of 23 prominent political scientists, political commentators, and practicing politicians. Although the quality of the articles varies—which is almost inevitable in such a work—many are packed with insights. This is especially true of three pieces on the history of the major parties. Richard Jensen of the University of Illinois has written an analysis of the impact of "modern" economic and social values on party coalitions from Jackson to Carter which provides an excellent overview of how economic growth/industrialization issues have entered partisan debate during the last 150 years. Jerome Clubb of the University of Michigan has done a thoughtful analysis of how Republicans came to dominance with the election of 1896: The combination of the Democrats (under Cleveland) being tagged as the party of depression in 1894 and of Bryan taking the party toward the populist extreme during the campaign in 1896 allowed McKinley, with his calls for a protective tariff and pro-industrial growth policies, to lead the Republicans to victory. Everett Ladd has prepared a companion piece discussing the wresting of power by the Democrats from the Republicans in 1932, and the subsequent evolution of the New Deal coalition over the next 45 years. Taken together, these two articles offer a useful reminder that a major party's power derives from an ability to recognize and solve people's problems—usually those starting with the pocketbook—rather than to exhort the electorate to embrace a particular ideology. Once having been perceived as a better problem-solver than the opposition, the party may set the agenda for years to come.

Having discussed two major political turning points in our history, it is fitting that consideration is also given in the book to the question of whether another may be close at hand. In this regard, Gary Orren and William Schneider, both of Harvard, have written two relevant articles on voter behavior. Orren analyzes the 1976 presidential election in terms of the impact of candidates' styles. He provides a fascinating account of how candidate Carter was able to manipulate symbols in a fashion which appealed to many of the disparate groups which now make up the Democratic family, but in the process failed to build a genuine coalition. This is a subject often written about, but rarely with such scholarship. Schneider follows this piece with one on "liberalism" and "conservatism." He has examined these terms on two dimensions: economic views and social values. Schneider marshals much statistical evidence to demonstrate something that most of us recognize intuitively—in a time of serious economic problems, voters make their decisions more on these questions than those relating to social and cultural matters. But Schneider does not stop here. He goes on to provide a profile of each state on both dimensions, essentially indicating whether it is liberal or conservative on each.

Discussion of divisions within the Democratic party these days often focuses on the New Left's more permissive values and the more traditional ones of the ethnic groups of the New Deal coalition. Schneider's and Orren's articles address this question in broad terms, but Andrew Greeley of the University of Chicago has written what is in essence a case study on Catholics. Catholics remain committed to the economic policies and programs of the New Deal but are increasingly estranged from the New Left on issues such as abortion. On some social issues they have much more in common with most Republicans. Nonetheless, as long as economic issues remain salient and Republicans are in some measure guided by the New Right's economic philosophy, a shift in party allegiance by Catholics does not seem to Greeley to be in the cards.

Although The New American Political System also has much to say about parties, its best articles concern the process of governing and policy-making. For example, Fred Greenstein of Princeton has written a fine history of the development of the development of the modern presidency. In this chronicle, Truman and Eisenhower are the presidents who institutionalized the policy evaluation capability within the Executive Office of the President. (It was under Truman that the Bureau of the Budget—now the Office of Management and Budget—began to systematically review proposals from the departments to ensure their consistency with the Administration's agenda and overall policies.) Yet despite this new managerial and technical capability, presidents have generally neither been able to control the Executive Branch nor maintain the upper hand with the Congress. A consensus foreign policy arising from the "cold war" masked this situation until the Vietnam War. But the War and Watergate merely underlined the fundamental reality: A president's power rests on the ability to persuade. In an era of interrelated issues and special interest politics, such power is difficult to come by and inevitably fleeting.

With his extensive analysis of "issue networks" and "policy professionals," Hugh Heclo of Harvard has provided a useful companion piece to that of Greenstein. He cogently discusses the emergence of policy professionals in the Executive Branch departments, the Congress, state government, think tanks, consulting firms, universities, interest groups and corporations: A relatively small group of experts in a given field now dominate policy option development and decision-making. Because the experts possess knowledge that is not easily obtained, understood or challenged, they are to a significant degree beyond the control of elected officials and isolated from the public. The impact of this situation is profound, and it is to Heclo's credit that he is able to go beyond traditional Galbraithian discussion of technocrats. For example, he notes the benefit to the system that a group of individuals concerned with a particular problem "speak the same language". Interinstitutional communication is facilitated; problems are addressed using similar assumptions, analytical techniques and option ranges and, as non-politicians, they can make "independent" recommendations. At the same time the costs are high. Because such experts are independent, their recommendations often are difficult to "legitimatize" politically; such persons are not generally in regular touch with the general public—most of the time they mix among themselves; and, if a change is required, a leader such as a president must turn to the same pool for a replacement. (Regarding this latter point, remember that President-elect Carter promised to bring new blood to the cabinet. A quick review of who heads key departments such as State, Defense, the Treasury and HEW, HUD and DOE makes Heclo's point only too well.)

This review has been able to hit only a few of the highlights of these two books. For those who take the time, an invaluable short-course in American government awaits them.
Even with the advent of an American brokered Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, this country hardly appears in the driver's seat on the international stage.

America's current international difficulties stem from many sources, but the principal reason for our problems may momentarily lie beyond President Carter's control: the changing nature of the international system has created a situation where we can no longer define with precision the requirements of the international game in which we are playing.

Americans are inveterate game players. We probably play more games than any other nation and we probably think of life in the metaphor of a game more than any other people. Our concept of what constitutes a game, however, is relatively narrow. To most of us a game is uni-dimensional (one contest, one set of rules, one clearly defined measure of winning and losing), and usually a two person enterprise (or its logical equivalent) which pits one side or team against another.

Recent international events, however, have placed us in a situation where we are required to play games that do not fit this pattern. For the first time since John Adams' administration (with the possible exception of a few events during the secretaryship of John Hay) we are engaged in a genuine 3-person international game where the players (USA, USSR, China) have sets of interests that are so at odds with each other that no two countries can become fully aligned (or even realistically trustful of each other), yet also where none of these three countries can so disassociate its interests from the interests of the other two that it can pull out of the triangular game altogether. Simultaneously, for the first time since before World War II, we are in a situation where the four great international games (the military, diplomatic, economic, and ideological) are so out of phase with each other that our efforts to win one serve only to make us lose another. In this situation we are required to view some aspects of international relations not only as a multi-person game, but also as a multi-dimensional game and we find this a new and quite disturbing experience indeed.

We are in a situation where our conceptual tools do not match our strategic requirements and the result is extraordinary confusion.

It is remarkable the extent to which American contests are structured around the 2-person model. Games like baseball, football, chess, and bridge are obviously of this variety, but even games like poker and horse-racing generally reduce themselves either into a series of separate bilateral contests or into games in which the field, so to speak, is all in opposition to the player in the number one position. America's national pastimes do not tend to be triangular games where the players interact dynamically with each other in such a way that cooperation becomes the child of competi-

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tion and the ability to create and manipulate instability becomes the central source of success. Although some dimensions of our economic culture are studied in terms of a three-person model, most American institutions are structured as two-person games: the debate, the adversary process at law, and the two-party system are only a few examples. We are so committed to this image of reality that when three-party circumstances arise our tendency is immediately to simplify them as quickly as possible either by combining two legs of the triangle to form a temporary coalition of alliance, or by eliminating one of the parties to the triangle from the game altogether. So ingrained is this perception that when President Carter announced his recognition of China, some of the most sophisticated television commentators in the country began immediately to talk in terms of the anti-Soviet American-Chinese alliance.

If Americans have trouble thinking about and playing a multi-person game, we have even more trouble playing multi-dimensional games where several different kinds of games (some perhaps two-person, some perhaps multi-person) are being played simultaneously and in such a relationship to each other that they not only have winners and losers within themselves but also have a direct bearing on each other in such a way that losers in one game, by virtue of their loss, can become winners in another and vice versa (or that a player's standing in one game can be brought to bear positively or negatively upon a player's standing in another game).

Here is an example of a very simple multi-dimensional game. Suppose a husband and wife are playing chess and one partner is a better player than the other. This partner (A) would be expected to win the game since a proficiency edge is nearly always decisive in a game of chess. Suppose, however, that the other marriage partner (B) let it be known in ways, perhaps too subtle to suggest, that a loss in this chess game would be so infuriating that it would seriously endanger the marriage relationship. (Assume that partner B is a relatively insecure person, and also realizes that a loss in chess, as everyone knows, is a sure demonstration of a person's inherent inferiority.) Under these circumstances it is quite possible that partner A might play to lose the game for the sake of the marriage game, taking care, of course, to lose in such a way that it would seem to partner B that the loss was genuine (otherwise the effect on the marriage game might be even more devastating).

A chess expert observing this game and familiar with the skills of players A and B, but unaware of the marriage game, would find it very hard to explain the moves on the chess board other than to suggest, perhaps, that player A had had a bad night and was not playing up to par. (The observer, of course, would not be offering a valid explanation since player A to throw the game convincingly would probably have to play more than up to par.) The couple's non-chess-playing next door neighbor, on the other hand, might be aware of the marriage game, but could not explain what was happening on the chess board either. The neighbor might be able to interpret the significance of the outcome, but could not explain how the outcome was reached. Thus "experts" in each game played separately could not well interpret the totality of events of these games played jointly on a multi-dimensional level.

If a gambler, unbeknownst to the two players, wished to place a bet on the outcome of the game on the chess board itself, he would presumably consult with the chess expert, receive an accurate assessment of the proficiency of the two players, and confidently place his money on the wrong person. If he consulted the next door neighbor as well, he might have a better perspective on the situation, but he would still have some difficulty assessing whether or not the game was being played on a multi-dimensional level and, if it should be, how the interaction of the two games would affect the outcome of the board game.

This is an example of a simple 2-player two dimensional game in which it was possible for one player to "win" a game on one level and for the other player to translate a "loss" on one level into a "win" on the other.

Today the United States finds itself engaged in a number of games which can best be understood as if they were sub-games of a much larger multi-dimensional game. Unfortunately those who are responsible for playing these games tend to look upon them as if they were separate from each other and not dynamically related. Even those people who recognize the existence of several games that are relevant to America's overall security position tend to treat them separately: they view the larger picture like a decathlon where the object is to do the best in each and pile up as many points as possible overall. They often do not realize that success in one game can sometimes lead to failure in another, or that failure in one can be translated into success in another. When all games appear to be going well, such relationships are not considered important. When games begin to go badly, however, awareness of these relationships is absolutely necessary for an intelligent diagnosis of the problem.

America is now playing four important games of relevance to its security: game #1 is the weaponry game and because only the United States and the Soviet Union possess a wide range of state-of-the-art weapons systems together with the economic and technological bases to sustain these systems, game #1 is a 2-person game. Game #2 is a "high diplomacy" game and the recent emergence of China as a major player on the chess board has meant that most people who focus on this game today regard it as a 3-person game involving primarily the two super powers and the People's Republic though a Russian opening to Europe could make it still more complicated. Game #3 is the economic game played globally. This is a multi-person game in which Russia and China are less important players and Europe, the oil states, and Japan have a significance far greater than their significance in games 1 and 2. Game #4, the ideological "game," in many respects is not a game at all, but for our purposes we shall regard it as a multi-person game involving the Third World no less than the developed world. It is the realm of international morality, purpose, and commitment. Many rightly regard it as the most fundamental, as it is the most long range game of all.

When one looks at these games individually, it appears that America is not doing well. We are still ahead in game #1, but not as far as we are accustomed to being. We are at the moment doing poorly in game #2, while the Chinese, having seized the initiative in Asia, it seems are doing quite well. Game #3 is a disaster area from the standpoint of America; we
still have a large pile of economic chips, but that pile seems to diminish with each spin of the wheel. Game #4 is also going badly despite efforts by the Carter administration to re-emphasize America’s commitments to human rights. The only reason that we remain undisputedly number one in the overall picture is that we are the only country that is a major player in all games. China, Europe, and Japan cannot play game #1, Europe and Japan are only minor players in game #2. In game #4, the Russians have never done well, although their use of Cuba in recent years has enabled them to score points. China, an active game #4 player under Mao, has become so single-minded with respect to game #2, that she is now de-emphasizing game #4 (as the Vietnam invasion clearly shows).

The problem for America, however, is not simply to do better in these various games, it is also to do a better job of coordinating the games themselves. To do so, Americans must be able to perceive why their managers in each game tend to understand the world in a harmfully narrow way.

Game #1

To the people who focus their attention on military hardware, the world contains only two players of importance. Even though France may have a very sophisticated weapons industry and China may have a large army, the world of military might remains the monopoly of the two superpowers who have the advanced missile technology, the world’s only navies of account, and by far the largest and most advanced air forces. It is not surprising that military planners regard the rest of the world as peripheral: in the realm of hardware, Russia is not simply our principal antagonist, she is our only antagonist.

This perception of the world as a 2-person game is not only a legitimate inheritance of the high cold war, it is also a perception logically in line with traditional western views of warfare. Western wars have always been two sided. They may be fought with allies, and nations may refrain from joining, but the western conception of battle (a duel, as Clausewitz defined it) is eminently 2-person. We have had virtually no experience of a war where country A is attacking country B while country B is attacking country C and country C is attacking country A. (This is why American observers in China in the early 1940’s found it difficult to deal with a situation where Chiang focused primarily on Mao, Mao on the Japanese, and the Japanese on Chiang.)

In this perception of conflict, preparation for a showdown is simply additive—you pile up arms, you pile up allies, you develop better arms, you employ better generals, and you hope to end up with more of each than your antagonists. The dynamics of this kind of game are well known to Americans, and much intellectual effort over the last twenty years has been invested in working them out.

This perception embraces both “hawks” and “doves” in the arms community. The former see security as the product of arms superiority, the latter as a product of arms control: security thus comes either from “winning” the arms race by building up the stockpile of arms and deepening their sophistication, or from “regulating” the arms race through SALT agreements which provide the basis for mutual security. In the former case, to use a current example, we rescue Minuteman either by making it mobile or by concealing its location; in the latter case we rescue “assured destruction” and “crisis stability” by limiting the Soviet threat to our missiles (and ours to theirs) by mutual agreements on force levels.

The last decade has seen many developments in game #1: the multiple warhead, the cruise missile, the neutron bomb, the Trident submarine, the rapid development of lasers, and the deployment of “smart” devices, but American military planners now fear that America, despite these American achievements, is in a weaker position now vis-à-vis the Soviet Union than any time since the beginning of the Cold War. Players and observers of game #1 cite three disturbing developments. First, they warn that multiple warheads on Soviet missiles threaten our Minuteman land-based missiles and that by the early 1980’s, even with SALT or with most proposed “hardening” of our sites, a large percentage of these missiles will be vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. Although we will still have a submarine and aircraft nuclear capability, the increased vulnerability of our most sophisticated offensive weapons system is considered very damaging because it reduces the flexibility of our response capabilities and decreases “crisis stability” by increasing the incentive to fire these weapons “on assessment” of a Soviet attack before they were presumably destroyed on the ground. A second source of concern has been the rapid build-up of the Soviet navy with its threat to our supply lines not only to areas like Europe and Japan which we are obligated to defend, but also from countries upon whom we are increasingly dependent for our raw materials. Finally, the Soviet build-up of land forces in the last decade has been impressive. Although this may be in response to a perceived threat from China, western analysts cannot discount the possibility that such forces could be used elsewhere.

Because of these developments, game #1 “hawks” have been strenuously arguing for increased military preparedness on the part of the United States. Even those who support SALT can argue persuasively that those agreements do not cover conventional forces. Serious critics of this view, however, have argued with equal cogency that in the zero-sum atmosphere of a 2-person game, a build-up of arms generates a matching build-up by the other side and the situation spirals into what Henry Kissinger styled the “security dilemma” where one nation’s attempts to achieve security serves only to undercut the security position of its rival and vice versa. Thus increased military expenditures, by generating counter measures, may leave both countries worse off than before due to higher costs and little change in the overall position.

Thus to both the hawks and doves of game 1, the China breakthrough seemed to be a godsend. Although China was not a central player, it was a welcome—and seemingly costless—addition, a new ally to add to the pile. But here the narrowness of the game #1 perception begins to operate and harmfully detracts from our ability to play the international game in a flexible way. The fixation on Russia, put simply, limits our bargaining position with respect to other players in the game, and to the extent that we regard the China breakthrough through the prism of game #1, we are more or less committed blindly to support Chinese policies as long as they are executed in an anti-Soviet
context. Furthermore, to the degree that this occurs, we tend to deepen the antagonism between ourselves and the Soviets. Such a deepening, in turn, can increase the Chinese bargaining position vis-à-vis America. In this sense, the perceptions of game #1 when applied to the China breakthrough can force us into an increasingly weakened position in game #2 and, if we are not careful, actually detract from overall security position, as an analysis of game #2 will show.

Game #2

In game #2 weaponry may still be relevant, but politics takes precedence. This is the game of the balance of power, an old game to the British and to the Europeans, but a relatively new game to Americans, introduced to us by Henry Kissinger when he began to insert China into the calculations of big power diplomacy.

Although Europe and Japan play a more significant role in game #2 than they do in game 1 (where they are considered primarily as prizes to be defended or bases from which to operate), the main focus in this game is on the relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Big power politics today is the politics of triangularity.

Security is a central concern in this game no less than in game #1, but the players in this game find security first through the arrangement of the system, and only secondly through the absolute or relative levels of weaponry owned by the players. For example, in a triangular game, the weakest state in terms of weaponry may become the most powerful in terms of its bargaining position if it is accurately placed between two other very hostile powers, each of which is bidding for its support. This is not, however, a game in which the object is primarily to end up on the side that possesses the larger amount of military force in an emerging two-sided configuration. The object of the game, rather, is either to end up on the side that possesses the larger amount of military force after extorting the maximum price for your support from the other members of the larger side, or the object of the game is to be able to switch sides at the opportune moment in order to manipulate to your advantage the outcome of the contest. Most Americans find this kind of game to be ethically repulsive to play themselves and fundamentally infuriating when played against them.

Triangularity is, hence, a subtle game which we tend to dislike and we are playing badly. Power in this game is the result of positioning—and the key position in a triangle is the central position. That central position is defined by the level of antagonism that exists between each of the players. At present the United States remains in the key central position because the level of antagonism between Russia and China is greater than the level of antagonism between Russia and America and between America and China: both Russia and China to some extent are bidding for our support against the other. Should, however, the level of antagonism between America and Russia become deeper than that between Russia and China, then China would move into the central position of the triangle and our position would be severely circumscribed: we would be bidding for Chinese support, rather than the Chinese bidding for our support. In this circumstance the fact that China was militarily much less powerful than Russia and America would be beside the point—as would be our predictable sense of betrayal.

Triangularity, however, has more dimensions to it than this simple example illustrates. A strategy of playing for the central position, if misplayed, can lead to a condition where the erstwhile central player antagonizes both of the other players. Chamberlain in the 1930’s briefly held the central position between Russia and Germany. He refused to play at all with Russia (against the advice of Churchill) and created a situation where he ended up with a hot war against Germany and a cold war against Russia. In today’s situation it is quite possible to antagonize Russia by moving in the direction of China and to antagonize China by not moving far enough in the direction of China to be of use to China against Russia.

An awareness of this possibility can lead a central player to want to simplify the game by eliminating the triangularity altogether. Some suggest (especially those who are game #1 players) that we should align with China against Russia and by “playing the China card,” recreate the two-sided configuration. The problem with this suggestion is that it ignores the resultant bargaining relationships within what would be the emerging anti-Soviet Coalition. In the real world, China is not a card to be played, but a player with cards. The more we commit ourselves to China, the more cards China will have. Our recent commitments certainly have given her some cards to play in southern Asia. The basic triangularity might be eliminated by an American commitment to China, but a new game would quickly emerge. Many commentators on the Vietnam war described how our commitment to that struggle became stronger than the commitment to the struggle of the governments in South Vietnam. Under this circumstance, we were maneuvered by them more than we maneuvered them. (Remember all those anti-corruption drives we “forced” them so successfully to prosecute so resolutely?) But being maneuvered by the South Vietnam government was to the United States a situation of only local significance. Being maneuvered by China in a game involving Russia would be something else again.

Henry Kissinger was well aware of the dimensions of triangularity. Whatever else he might be criticized for, he cannot be faulted for misunderstanding the system he created. He understood it sufficiently well not to let the relationship between America and Russia deteriorate to the point where China threatened to move into the commanding central position in the triangular game. Whatever else detente may have been, it was a policy essential to the preservation of the centrality of the American position. In this respect Kissinger followed Bismarck whose reinsurance treaty preserved the centrality of Germany’s position between Russia and Austria, a position even more vital to Bismarck than to
Kissinger because of the existence of a hostile France.)

Kissinger's system, however, was not directed primarily towards playing the triangular game. His policy was sequentially to isolate every major player in the game from every other player—Russia was isolated from China, kept at arms length from Europe, shut out of the Middle East, and permitted to build relations with Japan; Europe was shut out of Mid-East politics, not encouraged to make closer ties to Japan, kept away from Russia, etc.; China was maintained in a condition of isolation, as was Japan.

With all of these countries, except for Japan (a tactical mistake), Kissinger forged special relationships, bringing them out of isolation, as it were, by creating an American connection. This system which could be diagrammed as a "wheel" with spokes and a hub, but no rim, was so successful (by its own terms) that no player could deal with any other player on an important question without reference to Washington.

The key element, however, that kept this system working was the nature of the American connection. To maintain a player in a condition of isolation without the American connection was to court disaster. A country completely isolated (and hence a loser) in game #2 would respond only by resorting to game #1. Thus a Soviet Union, isolated by the United States, would have to resort to an arms race if detente remained central to American policy makers, the Soviets would not be completely isolated and they would not perceive the arms race as their only road to security.

Kissinger's successors have been less aware of the relationship between the two games (otherwise they would not have jeopardized SALT by the timing of the China recognition) and they also have been playing game #2 rather poorly. Initiative is a key concept in any game of position and China has temporarily seized the initiative, despite our still central position in the triangle. Critics have rightly asked what America received in return for the recognition of China. What China received is more apparent: an end to isolation and encirclement and a free hand to deal with Vietnam.

The administration's reaction to the recent invasion is a striking example of policy paralysis in a dangerous triangular situation and of initiative surrender: we stated in one breath that we opposed the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam and of Vietnam by China. The implication of this policy presumably is that Vietnam should withdraw from Cambodia and China from Vietnam. Chinese policy, on the other hand, seems to be that Vietnam should withdraw from Cambodia and, in the same breath, China from Vietnam. Although Washington may not perceive its policy as identical to that of China, it would hardly be surprising if Moscow, Hanoi, and Peking perceive it that way. In any event, we are now responding to Chinese initiatives and clumsily tailoring our policies to follow theirs. To those who focus on game #2, this precedent does not bode well for the future of America's ability to play this game of bargaining position.

To be proficient in this game, we learn a new set of skills and focus upon our bargaining position at least as much as upon our force levels. But there are serious dangers in focusing exclusively on game #2. To the extent that we regard it as a substitute for game #1, we may neglect our military preparedness in the dangerous hope that dexterity can become the basis for our long range security.

Equally important, if we train ourselves to be flexible players in this game that is based so much on a player's ability to be flexible, we face serious consequences in game #4, the "ideological" game, whose central requirements seem to be a deep sense of purpose and commitment—the very antithesis of flexibility. Many observers have cogently questioned the wisdom of Carter's policy towards Taiwan on the grounds that our flexibility in this area has seriously called into question—to our disadvantage in other areas—the validity of American commitments.

**Game #3**

Game #3 is the economic game. It is the game of overseas investments and markets, of resources and dollar flows, of multi-national corporations and international finance, of world trade and domestic productivity. Whatever the shortrun artificialities of this game may be, it is essentially a game whose winners have either vast resources or highly efficient and organized domestic structures. In this game Russia and China play a much smaller role than in the previous game; countries in Europe, the Middle East and Far East play a much more important role. This is not a new one to America, although it has been prosecuted with much more determination in the last thirty years than ever before.

In many respects we have patterned our play on the British model of the first part of this century by sacrificing our domestic economic position in order to establish and solidify our world position. The problem at present is that our domestic position, thus weakened, is now imperiling our world position. Americans have established an elaborate imperial game during the post-war period as a result of which we can use our centrality in that game as a substitute for productive efficiency and mercantile prowess. This game can still be played because that centrality still persists: we have the world's largest economy and remain the world's largest market. We are the home of a large majority of the major multi-national corporations, our overseas portfolio is still impressive, the dollar, however weakened, is still the world currency, and New York remains the heart of the international
financial network.

Yet even the most casual observer knows that this game is not going well. The decline of the dollar, the oil situation, our increasing vulnerability to the pricing whims of other nations, the loss of our unquestioned technological edge, the serious crisis in domestic investment, and the universal recognition of our economic decline are all threatening the very structure that we in one sense sacrificed much at home to create. The British became so dependent on this sort of game that they failed to maintain a viable domestic productive base and their economy never recovered when the guns of August destroyed the basis of their imperial system. Today we face an attack on our system, perhaps less dramatic, but no less persistent than the one that ruined Britain. We should never forget that a serious setback in game #3 is no less threatening to our security than a setback in games 1 and 2. In many respects it is more threatening since success in game #1 depends in the long run on our ability to maintain an efficient productive and technologically advancing domestic economic power base.

The current mode of play in game #3 has had further implications for the other games. When the oil crisis hit, for example, and we were faced with a severely disruptive economic situation, we were able to translate a seeming loss in game #3 into a partial shortrun gain in game #1. We allowed the increases to occur on the condition that we could retain a major voice in the distribution of the surplus.

Since the price rises had more impact on the Europeans and Japanese than they did on us the net result was a setback in that game for the Europeans and the Japanese. We, however, encouraged the Shah to invest heavily in American arms, we thereby used the inflated oil prices as a means of propping up our position in game #1, and, in effect forced the Europeans and Japanese to subsidize this arrangement. Similar strategies occurred in Saudi Arabia in effect permitting us to “buy in” in a major way to the technological development of that country.

The American economy, instead of responding to the challenges posed by the price increases, (as did the economies of Germany and Japan), was permitted to proceed in its sluggish way in part by the external subsidies which poured back into the country from the oil producing states. Game #3 “well-played” in the international context, was thus poorly played in the domestic context, the context that provides the ultimate basis for a well played game #1. And the Shah, on the other hand, to some extent distracted from his own ideological problems in Iran by the exercise of buying our sophisticated aircraft, lost in a domestic context what we have called game #4. When Iran exploded in our face, partly because games #3 and #4 were badly out of phase, we lost heavily in our game #1 against the Soviet Union, and our handling of the crisis, together with our handling of Taiwan (as a result of a game #2 strategy), redounded to our disadvantage in Saudi Arabia which began seriously to question our ability to play game #4—the game of long range commitments—a game of great importance to Saudi Arabia, and also, we might add, to Israel.

Game #3 is also potentially at variance with game #4 in the rest of the Third World. Our Nicaraguan policy is but one example of this circumstance. The scramble for resources, of great concern to the American position in game #3, potentially puts us into a game where we are opposing the legitimate aspirations of developing countries—to the extent that we insist on establishing advantageous economic terms of trade with these countries—something that we should properly do from the standpoint of game #3, but something that embarrasses us from the perspective of game #4. It is of little consolation to the players of game #4 that we seem to be doing poorly in game #3 when our efforts in game #3, despite our poor performance, seem still to end up undercutting our position in game #4. We thus are rapidly becoming known as the not very effective exploiters of the Third World.

“[We are in a situation where our conceptual tools do not match our strategic requirements and the result is extraordinary confusion.]”

Game #4

Game #4 is not really a game at all and to be “successful” it cannot be thought of as a game. It is the ideological contest, the perception of international relations in terms of morality, justice, and purpose. This approach to international relations has a long and honorable history in America stretching back to the founding fathers. Ironically, it formed the basic perception of both the Wilsonian and isolationist traditions. Most Americans, before we were taught to be realistic, believed that there was a right and a wrong in the world. The Wilsonians shaped this perception into a policy of peace through law and international organization, relying upon such doctrines as commitment, rights, obligations, and duties. The isolationists, alternatively, believed that such attempts were doomed to failure and that efforts to involve America in world politics would inevitably lead America into the evils of a game #2 where we could neither succeed nor remain uncorrupted. The violence of World War II and the rise of the cold war shattered both these perceptions. An active game #4 emerged, however, as America entered a period of containing the Communist Threat. The war for man’s minds was not neglected during the Eisenhower period and most of its American combatants believed seriously in their mission. The 1960’s, however, brought about a fundamental change. We now know that many of the exhuberant game players of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were increasingly bored by game #4. Theirs was increasingly a world of winners and losers. Game #1 became the central focus and the fact of the cold war, not the reasons for it became the starting point for their calculations. A striking illustration of this attitude is contained in John McNaughton’s definition of American aims in Vietnam written in March, 1965, and printed in the Pentagon Papers:

70%—to avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to our reputation as guarantor)
20%—to keep SVN (and the adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.
10%—to permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, way of life.

ALSO—to emerge from crisis with—
out unacceptable taint from methods used.

This somewhat chilling assessment is not untypical of the language of that period and illustrates in its final point the lethal mistake of regarding game #4 merely as a game. Thus through their realism, the defense intellectuals created the moral justification for America to enter game #2, a move that would have raised the eyebrows of virtually every thoughtful American president from Washington to Eisenhower.

Kissinger did not believe in game #4, although he was certainly aware of the need for a substitute: the man who wrote a book about legitimacy could not be blind to the need for justifying his policies. Kissinger, however, found justification for playing game #1 and especially game #2, within the games themselves. Peace and security, goals above reproach, especially in the middle of a war, however limited, legitimized his actions and anything that contributed to their realization was hence justifiable. A successful game #2 to the degree that it contributed to our power, therefore to our security, and through both to the peace of the world, was a legitimate enterprise.

The circularity of this position became increasingly apparent as other countries refused to equate American power with international legitimacy. Justification for America's position in the world could not be found exclusively in America's international dexterity, nor merely in its peace-keeping role. Carter, therefore, commendably reintroduced game #4. Unfortunately, however, he did not play it well.

This is, of course, not an easy game to play and it is especially difficult if a nation is playing the other three games as well. The basic question to be answered in this game after all the calculations of power and imperatives of economics have been stripped away is: what does a nation stand for? Does it keep its commitments, does it support its allies, is it sensitive to human aspirations and human rights? Does it have a vision of the future, and is this vision of the future responsive to its world constituency? In an important sense, it is only on this level that a country like America can deal with questions such as Taiwan, Israel, Iran, and Southern Africa.

President Carter, at the start of his administration, defined America's return to game #4 in terms of human rights. The government, however, proceeded tactically, not strategically in this important area. The human rights campaign—which could have had a very wide appeal and could have restored to America a degree of international initiative—became too closely associated with anti-Soviet policies and soon appeared to be merely an extension of game #1. China's abuses in the area were overlooked in pursuit of game #2, and our efforts in the developing world often seemed subordinated to the requirements of the ill-played game #3.

Carter also neglected the importance of a second major component of game #4: commitment. Here game #4 and game #2 come directly into conflict. Commitment is the antithesis of flexibility and flexibility is the major requirement of game #2. This problem goes beyond Taiwan, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, however. The United States is at the center of a World Alliance system and is the point of reference for many countries who have no formal alliances with us. To a great degree, stability in the world depends on a consistent set of expectations about our shortrun behavior, and about our long range health and viability.

The most important component of a "successful" game #4 is the ability to convey to the world a sense of purpose and direction that is consistent with the aspirations of those peoples in the world who look to us for leadership. Here is where the current administration has failed most dramatically. The world is increasingly doubtful that the future is ours. Whatever our failures during the post-war era, the rest of the world looked on us not only as number one but as a safe bet to remain number one: the Soviets wanted to catch up; the Europeans rushed to copy our democratic institutions; the Japanese copied our industrial plant; the Third World, while doubting our good intentions, nevertheless wanted to import our managerial skill and the wonders of our technology.

These unstated attitudes became a major component of our power and our ability to lead and shape our international environment. Today assurance about America and the future has been replaced by doubt and hesitance. Although one should not view all world events in the light of world perceptions of America, it may just be possible that the seemingly anomalous return of Iran to traditional values is the result of a feeling that the American answer to the requirements of civilization is no longer unassailable. If this is correct and this view spreads, then America's world position will no longer be secure. To those who have followed us it will not simply be a question of whether America's commitments are good. It will be more a question of whether or not America's example is valid.

How, then, should America proceed? It is possible to devise a wide range of suggestions for dealing with the problems posed by multi-person and multi-dimensional games. For example, one might suggest that America's best court of action would be to start with game #3, firm up our domestic economic position, while consolidating our international economic position and thereby rely upon an improved game #3 to reinforce our position in game #1. Suggestions could be made about firming up our alliance structure in Europe and Asia so that we would not need to play a triangular game #2. First, especially in a mode inconsistent with our basic values and at odds with the more fundamental requirements of game #4. Many suggestions could be made about firming up game #4,, not simply in terms of human rights, but also in terms of national purpose and commitment.

It is, however, more important at the moment to focus on improving the conceptualization of decision making. The problem is not to observe that America is at a low ebb, nor merely to make new proposals for "policy coordination", rather it is to suggest the need for really fundamental breakthroughs. We must become aware of multi-dimensionality in a much more sophisticated way than we currently are and we must also become aware of the relationship between these games in a way that transcends the gaming mentality. We must put the games into a perspective that will enable us to have a deeper sense of priorities. Such analyses ultimately can occur only when we are fully aware of where we stand and where we are going in "game number four". It is only then that we can fathom the importance of understanding that at stake is not a series of games but the shape and mastery of our destiny as a nation.
Ripon Society
Annual Meeting

On Saturday, April 28, 1979 the annual meeting of the Ripon Society will be held in the Sheraton Philadelphia Hotel, 1725 JFK Boulevard, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103. All Ripon Society members, Forum subscribers and other interested individuals are welcome at the meeting. There is no admission charge to the event except for the cost of tickets to the luncheon and annual dinner.

The meeting will begin at 10:00 a.m. with a panel on "Politics: 1980 and Beyond".

The panelists include:
- John Deardourff, Political Consultant
- Victor Kamber, Special Assistant to the President AFL-CIO
- Tanya Melich, Director of Civic Affairs, CBS

At a luncheon beginning at noon, Pennsylvania Governor Richard Thornburgh will deliver a major address. Tickets to the luncheon are available at $15.00 each.

At 2:00 p.m. a panel will begin on "Election Finance: Unlocking the Advantages of Incumbency".

The panelists include:
- Prof. Herbert Alexander, Director, Citizens Research Foundation
- Dr. Clifford Brown, Professor, Union College
- D. Barton Doyle, Esq., author of Ripon study on campaign finance.

At 4:00 p.m. the Ripon Society's National Governing Board will meet. Its agenda will include the election of officers for the coming year and a discussion of the Society's program for the next twelve months.

Following the NGB Meeting the Ripon Society will hold a Reception and Annual Dinner, a "Salute to Republican Leaders of the Future". Honorees will include outstanding Republicans at the Federal, state and local level from a number of states. The cocktail reception will begin at 6:30 p.m. and the dinner at 7:30 p.m. Tickets are available at $25.00 each.

At 10:00 a.m. Sunday, April 29, 1979 the Society's National Executive Committee will meet at the Philadelphia Sheraton Hotel. The agenda will include a setting of budget priorities for the coming year, a review of plans for the Ripon Forum, and a discussion of issues and political strategy. The NEC meeting is open to all Society members.

Please make checks payable to The Ripon Society and mail them to 800 Eighteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Include $15.00 for each ticket to the luncheon with Governor Thornburgh and $25.00 for each ticket to the Annual Dinner.

Rooms are available at a reduced rate to Ripon meeting attendees Friday and Saturday night at the Philadelphia Sheraton (phone (215) 568-3300). Please mention the Ripon event when calling.