ELECTION '70

Mankind, being for the most part incapable of politics, accepts vituperation as an easy and congenial substitute.

George Bernard Shaw
The Devil's Disciple

Analysis of the Senate, the House, the Governors, the State Legislatures, the South, GOP Fund-raising and what they all portend for 1972

ALSO THIS MONTH:

Reorganizing the Pentagon
The Real Majority
The Next Election

Edward L. King
Howard L. Reiter
A Ripon Society Poll
ELECTION '70
Ripon's analysis of last month's elections includes reports on the Senate, the Governors, the state legislatures, the House, the South and Republican fund-raising. Generously scattered with maps and charts, we hope it will give you more insight into the who, what, where, how and most of all why of November 3, 1970.

THE FITZHUGH COMMISSION
The Fitzhugh Commission was appointed in June 1969 to make a comprehensive review of the management and organization of the Department of Defense. It reported a year later. Has anything happened since? Not much. It seems as if the Pentagon and the military will go on and on, un molested, despite numerous studies, like Fitzhugh, that have recommended a slew of basic reforms. Edward L. King reports on the report and tries to explain the rule-like bureaucratic stubbornness that prevents change in the DOD.

THE BOOKSHELF
Howard L. Reiter, now Editor Emeritus, reviews Scammon and Wattenberg's The Real Majority. This book threatens to become the Democrats what The Emerging Republican Majority is to certain Republicans: a political Bible. Mr. Reiter finds that S&W's prescriptions closely match in worth the value of Mr. Phillips' advice to the GOP.

14a ELIOT STREET

WASHINGTON VIEWPOINT
President Nixon had election strategy to spare: what he needs now is a governing strategy. Howard Gillette prescribes a full dose of reform measures for this Administration and recommends the patient lay off the heady tonic of "social issueism." It has aftereffects that may become apparent in 1972.

ELLY PETERSON
The Ripon Society deeply regrets the retirement of Elly Peterson as vice-chairman of the Republican National Committee. Throughout her career, as the nation's first woman state chairman, as a candidate for the U.S. Senate and as RNC vice-chairman, Mrs. Peterson combined high idealism with practical political acumen. When other members of her party were willing to write off black Americans and young people, she worked tirelessly to bring party programs closer to their needs. Her warm and generous manner, her intelligence and her dedication to the best principles of the party will be missed by Republicans everywhere.

RIPON DINNER
The 8th anniversary Ripon Society dinner will be held in Chicago on January 9th. Since you may not receive another issue of the FORUM before then, please write to Bruce Fraser, 1000 Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60611 if you are interested in details.
Political Notes

THE NATION: a campaign retrospective

The White House participated in the Senatorial elections as no White House in history. Vice President Agnew had a staff doing research and speech material for candidates. Presidential speechwriters drafted speeches not only for the Vice President but for favored Senatorial candidates as well. But Republicans around the country are not unanimously grateful for assistance received. In Wyoming, John Wold, at Mr. Nixon's request, gave up a Senate seat to run against Gale McGee. The President, however, had promised McGee that he would not enter the state, in return for the Democrat's cooperation in progress reform. McGee forces then spread the word that Nixon was not really behind Wold and would not visit the state for him. Wold called the White House to have them scotch the rumor and was informed that it was true. He was offered Mrs. Nixon instead. A visit from her alone, he complained, would only confirm the rumors. But she was sent in anyway.

In Wisconsin, Republicans complain that the President's decision to horn in on a night honoring Green Bay Packer's star Bart Starr stirred up local animosity towards Republicans for trying to make political capital out of an authentic local hero.

In Florida, Vice President Agnew committed a major blunder by attacking Lawton Chiles walking tour around the state at a black tie dinner for fat cats. He only served to emphasize the GOP's distance from the common-man approach that Chiles was taking.

In Washington and Idaho, Republicans are blaming the White House for the defeat of Congressman Catherine May and Governor Don Samuelson. Opponents of both were greatly aided by Senator Henry Jackson who had added flexibility because of White House refusal to give even token support to Charles Elicker, the young progressive candidate of Republican State Chairman Gummy Johnson.

In North Dakota, where TV spots cost $32 each, Republicans raised a campaign kitty of more than $300,000 for Congressman Thomas S. Kleppe. President Nixon came in and announced "Kleppe is a Nixon man," as indeed he was, since the President had chosen him in preference to the more popular Congressman Mark Andrews (who supported Nelson Rockefeller in Miami), and since his campaign was run by out-of-staters. This offended many independent-minded North Dakotans, who returned the vulnerable Senator Quentin Burdick by a large margin.

The same sort of overkill was evident throughout the small states of the West, where voters were not impressed with the idea that if they voted Republican they would be a satrap of the White House for Senator.

But it was in New York and Virginia that the White House made its strongest intervention. From its point of view it appears to have been eminently successful since Agnew's statements helped to elect Buckley in New York and since Ray Garland was crushed in Virginia. But this ignores the response in the future of Governors Rockefeller and Holton. Rockefeller can be expected to get even for this intrusion into his preserve, against his expressed wishes.

In Arkansas, Winthrop Rockefeller can hardly have been helped by Spiro Agnew. Agnew's charge that Albert Gore was the "Southern chairman of the Eastern Liberal Establishment" was widely broadcast in Arkansas, where it served to undermine the man whom the epithet fits far more accurately.

Senator Hugh Scott told The National Journal after the election: "Aside from George Murphy there isn't a Republican Senator who isn't bitterly angry at Agnew. He has shaken some of the (GOP) liberals badly. Agnew should be written off as of no use (to the President) in the new Senate."

KENNEDY AS HEADLINE-GRABBER

Ted Kennedy was so anxious to be the first Senator claiming victory on national television that he didn't even wait for his opponent, Josiah A. Spaulding, to concede defeat. Spaulding, in his concession speech noted ruefully, "In this, too, I seem destined to follow Senator Kennedy."

But Kennedy's comfortable margin of victory was not of presidential quality. Unlike Muskie and Humphrey, he failed to carry the Democratic gubernatorial slate in with him, though he campaigned actively for Kevin White. Also, 10 percent of Massachusetts Democratic voters appear to have blanked Kennedy's name, so that his total vote was only 58.8 percent of the ballots cast.

REAGAN AS LOSER

Since he has been Governor of California, Ronald Reagan has led the California GOP to the loss of two important seats in the U.S. Senate. And his ideological compatriot, Max Rafferty, has finally been ousted from the non-partisan post of Superintendent of Education by a black, moderate Democrat.

Before November 3, Republicans expected to pick up ten congressional seats in California in 1972 — five new ones, plus five as the result of redistricting. (The Democrats controlled both the governorship and the state legislature when redistricting was last done in 1961.) However, Reagan's failure to win big, as all observers expected, cost the GOP control of both houses of the legislature. Consequently, Republicans will have to bargain with the Democrats in redrawing the congressional districts.

LOYALTY TEST

John Veneman, the Under Secretary of HEW, appeared at a fundraising cocktail party for Charles Goodell at the Washington, D.C. home of Nelson Rockefeller. The next day he got a strong rebuke from H. R. Haldeman, President Nixon's Sherman Adams. It seems it was "disloyal" to appear at the house of a Republican Governor to honor a Republican Senator. Hugh Scott, Gordon Allott and Robert Griffin — the three top men in the Senate GOP leadership — apparently did not receive reprimands from Haldeman for having attended, but no doubt their perfidy will show when they try to place a phone call to the President.

Other Senators who showed support for Goodell were:

Saxbe, Javits, Case, Percy, Cook, Boggs, Hatfield, Cotton, Dominick, Brooke, Young, Stevens, Mathias,
Packwood, Schweiker, Cooper, Jordan, Aiken. Thus, a total of 21 Republican Senators supported Goodell against Buckley. Of the five new Senators, one (Lowell Weicker) was accused by William F. Buckley of “creeping Goodellism” and two others — Taft and Beall — are regular, moderate Republicans. The box score on Haldeman’s loyalty test in the new Senate: 24 Republicans willing to defy the White House, 20 not, plus Buckley of course. Of the 20 Haldemanites, 5 were up for election themselves and therefore could be expected to abstain on Goodell. Assign three of these to Goodell (Prouty, Fong, and Stevens) and two (Fannin and Hruska) to Haldeman. Final total in the new Senate: 27 Goodell — 17 Haldeman, (plus Buckley, of course).

BAD INVESTMENTS

As of this writing, the final figures on the Senate Campaign Committee contributions had not been posted. But the figures for the first eight months, as published in the National Journal, yield some interesting results. Among incumbents, those Senators who supported Rockefeller or were favorite sons in 1968 received 35 percent less in funds during the first eight months of 1970, though they had the same chance of winning. Among non-incumbents, Romney, Danforth, Spaulding, Taft and Weicker were associated with the Rockefeller wing of the party. They received on the average half as much money as other challengers and, to judge by the final results, had more than double the percentage of winners. With such factional biases it is small wonder that Clement Stone expressed publicly what other contributors had said privately, that GOP money was put into some bad investments. The same criticism has been made of the President’s Phoenix speech. Jeremiah Milbank, the GOP National Finance Chairman has since been heard to remark that the nationwide television broadcast of it would make it much harder to raise money in the future. “It made the President sound like Donald Duck,” he said.

THE ALIENATION EFFECT

Had the GOP actually won six new seats in the Senate there would have been strong White House pressure on Harry Byrd, Jr. to switch. What the White House did not realize was that in the final bargaining a significant bloc of Republican Senators were prepared to withhold their votes from the Party until they were assured that they were getting just as much for their loyalty as the Southern Democrat was getting for switching over. This is a sign of the quiet alienation that has set in among some Senate Republicans. It is likely to be heightened by heavy-handed White House treatment over the next year.

MARGINAL SENATE SEATS

Herb Klein told reporters after the election that “the President had a major effect on making races closer than they were.” He seemed to imply that Republicans who lost would have done even worse without Mr. Nixon’s emphasis on law and order. But in fact most of the close races went to Republicans, and the most important GOP target seats were lost by healthy margins. Of the 8 Senators who can be considered marginal, having won by 5 points or less, only two are Democrats. The average GOP victory was by 8½ percentage points, as opposed to 19 points for the Democrats. The medians for the two parties were 5 and 14½ points respectively. In total popular vote 18.9 (40.6 percent of the total) million Americans voted for GOP Senators, 24.7 million (52.9 percent) voted for Democrats and 3 million (6.5 percent) voted for the three independents.

Most disturbing is the fact that of the hotly contested seats won by healthy margins of 11-20 points, Republican victories were in small states like Arizona, Delaware, Vermont and Alaska, whereas the Democrats swept Illinois, New Jersey and Minnesota.

A full table of the margins of victory of winning Senators follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GOP</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Independ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victory margin of 5 percentage points or less</td>
<td>Fong (3)</td>
<td>Hartke (0)</td>
<td>Buckley (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beall (3)</td>
<td>Symington (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hruska (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taft (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scott (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brock (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 percent margin</td>
<td>Weicker (8)</td>
<td>Montoya (6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chiles (8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bentsen (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tunney (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20 percent margin</td>
<td>Fannin (11)</td>
<td>Stevenson (14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roth (18)</td>
<td>Humphrey (16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prouty (18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stevens (20)</td>
<td>McGee (12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>null (20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-40 percent margin</td>
<td>null (12)</td>
<td>Byrd (22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mansfield (21)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kennedy (25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muskie (23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burdick (23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hart (35)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pastore (36)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more than 40 percent margin</td>
<td>null (43)</td>
<td>Proxmire (43)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>null (22)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unopposed</td>
<td>null (67)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stennis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Byrd (W.Va.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SMOOTH ADS

At least two Republican Senatorial candidates are furious with White House aides Chuck Colson and Harry Dent for not having given them advance notice of the smear ads which appeared in 70 newspapers under the sponsorship of the “Committee for a Responsible Congress.” The Committee (Carl Shipley, Treasurer, Mark Austad and Mrs. Jouett Shouse, members) charged “radicals,” “extremists,” and “peace at any price” groups with support of Democratic candidates. Among the groups and individuals cited were the ADA, the National Committee for an Effective Congress, the Council for a Livable World, and Senators George McGovern and Edmund Muskie and Sargeant Shriver. Colson personally approved the ads.

The White House promised that such ads would be cleared, and then sneaked them in without checking. They were repudiated when they appeared by the GOP Senatorial candidates who believe that they alienated
moderate suburban voters from the GOP. But the damage was already done.

THE WRONG LABEL

Mr. Nixon, who came into office describing himself as a "moderate," and even a "progressive" in the style of Woodrow Wilson, this fall began telling White House visitors that he is "basically a conservative." A pity, since had he kept calling himself a moderate he could have claimed an "ideological victory" in the electoral successes of such Southern victors as Lawton Chiles, Reubin Askew, John West, Jimmy Carter, Dale Bumpers and Winfield Dunn. He would have had a greater ideological victory this way than the comfort he now takes in Harry Byrd, Jr., Lloyd Bentsen and Bill Brock. He also would have just as many Republicans — one, Dunn of Tennessee. Also, as a middle-of-the-roader he could take credit for an ideological success in Senator Muskie's television performance. The Muskie speech explicitly rejected labels like liberal and conservative and espoused instead a politics of trust. Whether one was running a Southern strategy or a national one, this was not the year for being "basically a conservative."

D.C.: conservative influence?

Newsweek likes to brag about being the world's most oft-quoted news weekly. But not at the White House. There the honor must go to Human Events, which gives lively poison pen treatment to "liberals" and "radicals" and even rewrites recent history to assert, for instance, that Senator Charles Percy refused to support Goldwater in 1964 or that the Ripon Society opposed the Nixon-Agnew ticket in 1968. As a sign of favor, Tom Winter, editor of this publication, was invited to the White House for the state dinner in honor of Rumanian Premier Nicolae Ceausescu.

The conservative Newsweekly weekly, incidentally, takes public credit for Senate reverses of the President's "radical" welfare bill, though it claims to have had a little help from the inside: "Among those who fought hard against the proposal as both unworkable and monstrously expensive ... were White House aide Dr. Martin Anderson and Presidential Counselor Bryce Harlow. Also opposed were Dr. Arthur Burns ... and Attorney General John Mitchell." The stabs in the back for the Family Assistance Plan have not helped it; Monday, the official publication of the Republican National Committee, neglected to mention FAP in its review of unpassed Administration legislation in its issue of November 16, 1970. Et tu, Rogers Morton?

WISCONSIN: lessons of losing

In 1964 Warren Knowles overcame the Goldwater defeat and narrowly broke a six-year Democratic hold on the Wisconsin Governorship by defeating incumbent John Reynolds by a margin of 50.5 percent. A small Republican trend in the most populous, most urban counties of the state supplied the victory. For two years, Knowles and Republican State Chairman Ody Fish guided the Wisconsin Republican Party to the center of moderate-progressivism. In 1966 Governor Knowles beat Patrick Lucey with 53.4 percent of the vote and continued to increase the urban counties' Republican vote. In 1968 Knowles defeated Bronson LaFollette, 53 to 47 percent. The Republicans increased their margin in eight of the ten largest counties over 1964 while losing only six sparsely populated ones back to the Democrats.

In 1970 Governor Knowles announced that he would not run again; Ody Fish resigned as state chairman. The Republican Speaker of the state Assembly attacked Knowles' reformist legislative programs as too liberal and too expensive. In May the party endorsed Lieutenant Governor Jack Olson for Governor. Olson, a long-time party worker, was the overwhelming choice of the party conservatives. The Olson campaign developed along familiar lines: the late-August bombing at the University of Wisconsin provided a springboard for Olson's law-and-order, campus unrest appeals.

At the same time, the Democratic nominee, Patrick Lucey, a former Kennedy man whom Knowles had defeated in 1966, carefully molded party unity and assiduously courted both the labor interests and the leaders in the urban areas of the state. Lucey hoped to win a narrow victory by recapturing some of the lost urban vote. On election night the extent of his success and the size of the Republican disaster was revealed. Lucey had become Wisconsin's first four-year Governor, winning over 54 percent of the vote.

The chart below shows the damage. Of the state's 72 counties these ten provided 57 percent of the gubernatorial vote; Olson carried only one of them (Nixon managed five in 1968, Knowles, seven).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>41.8%</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dane</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waukesha</td>
<td>54.6%</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
<td>63.3%</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racine</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td>55.7%</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenosha</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheboygan</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marathon</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rock</td>
<td>57.2%</td>
<td>55.7%</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outagami</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As well as the clear gubernatorial victory, the Democrats also won control of the Assembly, taking 67 of 100 seats, reelected Senator Proxmire with 71 percent, and won the once-marginal 1st Congressional District 61 to 39 percent, defeating conservative incumbent Henry Schadeberg. Unemployment was above the national average in the 1st District, but not in the state as a whole.

The lesson is that, to win, the GOP must compete evenly for the urban counties of Wisconsin — especially since the same counties where the GOP lost most heavily are the fastest growing in the state. Nixon managed to do so in 1968 and squeaked through with 48 percent of the vote, aided perhaps by Knowles' coattails. There will be no complicating races in 1972 (Democratic Senator Gaylord Nelson is up in 1974 and Lucey serves a four-year term). Mr. Nixon had better shy away from Olson's example and find some programs to lure moderate urban-suburbanites back to the GOP.
**RIPON POLL – LOOKING AHEAD TO 1972**

WE THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO DEVELOP AN IDEA OF HOW RIPON REPUBLICANS HAVE REACTED TO ALMOST TWO YEARS OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND THE NIXON PRESIDENCY. THEREFORE, WE ASK YOU TO JOIN IN JUDGING AND PROGNOSTICATING. WE HAVE PREPARED THE FOLLOWING POLL WHICH WE HOPE YOU WILL PARTICIPATE IN. SIMPLY FILL OUT THE POLL AND MAIL IT (OR A XEROX COPY) IN THE INSERTED ENVELOPE BEFORE JANUARY 1, 1971. RESULTS WILL APPEAR IN THE FEBRUARY ISSUE OF THE FORUM.

1) Did you vote for Nixon - Agnew in 1968?  
   **Yes**  
   **No**

2) Rate Nixon's overall performance as President so far.  
   Exec.  
   Good  
   Ave.  
   Fair  
   Poor

3) Grade the performances of the Cabinet members.  
   Blount  
   Hickel  
   Mitchell  
   Finch  
   Rogers  
   Shultz  
   Kennedy  
   Richardson  
   Hardin  
   Laird  
   Romney  
   Volpe

4) Grade Vice President Agnew's performance so far.

5) If he continues as he has, will the President be re-nominated?  
   **Yes**  
   **No**

6) Leaving aside the many "ifs" and giving just a "gut" reaction, do you think Nixon will be re-elected?  
   **Yes**  
   **No**

7) Would you vote for the Nixon - Agnew ticket in 1972? (assume Muskie and Southerner as the Democratic slate)  
   **Yes**  
   **No**

8) If no, might you reconsider if Mr. Nixon changed his running mate?  
   **Yes**  
   **No**

9) Check the traits that you believe describe Mr. Nixon. Leave blank those that do not apply.
   - He has extensive knowledge of and a well-defined position on the war in Vietnam.
   - He is knowledgeable and competent in foreign affairs generally.
   - He understands the problems of the cities and has specific proposals to alleviate them.
   - He understands the problems of the American farmer and has specific proposals to alleviate them.
   - He understands the causes of poverty and has offered programs which will help the poor help themselves.
   - He is substantially helping the American Negro achieve social, economic and political equality.
   - He is a capable manager of the economy.
   - He has shown sufficient administrative ability as President.
   - He makes decisions only after careful deliberation.
   - The conduct of his Administration in Washington will help elect Republicans everywhere.
   - He is a loyal party man.
   - He has the confidence of young people.
   - He has the physical stamina required by the Presidency.
   - He has the confidence of the working man.
   - His personal life sets a good example for all citizens.
   - He has no clear-cut position on the war in Vietnam.
   - He is knowledgeable in his conduct of foreign affairs.
   - He does not understand the problems of the cities.
   - He does not appreciate the plight of the American farmer.
   - He does not have any proposals to eliminate poverty.
   - He does not understand the management of economy.
   - His Administration has further alienated the American Negro from the mainstream of American life.
   - He does not have the confidence of youth.
   - He does not have the confidence of the working man.
   - The conduct of his Administration in Washington will be a handicap to other Republicans running for election.
   - His personal life is not satisfactory.

10) Of the national leaders of either party, which one do you personally view as the man most worthy of your enthusiasm and support?
   - Scott
   - Nixon
   - Agnew
   - Rockefeller
   - Romney
   - Bush
   - Percy
   - Reagan
   - Brooke
   - Laird
   - Wallace
   - Lindsay
   - McCarthy
   - Humphrey
   - Scranton
   - Muskie
   - Edw. Kennedy
   - Hatfield
   - Rumsfeld
   - Richardson
   - McGovern
   - Goodell
   - Finch
   - Baker
   - John Gardner
   - Ramsey Clark
   - Rogers Morton
   - Other

11) Which of the following ideological labels do you feel best describes your political position?  
   - Conservative  
   - Moderate  
   - Liberal  
   - Radical  
   - Progressive  
   - Pragmatic  
   - Libertarian  
   - Other (specify) or none
The Senate: Excuses, Excuses

The Portland (Maine) Press-Herald once called the Ripon Society "the Republican Party's best friend and severest critic." It is in that spirit that we took to these pages before the elections to warn that the GOP was about to invest a lot of money in a misconceived strategy of "positive polarization." And it is in the same spirit that we must now characterize the party's performance in 1970 as the worst showing since 1964, and to warn that a continuation of the strategy on which it is based will make Mr. Nixon a one-term President.

Certainly 1970 was not so bad a Republican year as the Johnson landslide. Whereas in 1964 the party won only 26 per cent of the contested senatorial and gubernatorial races, the preliminary 1970 figure is 36 per cent. The nature of some of the victories — and some of the losses — provide considerable personal satisfaction to some conservative Republicans in their factional feuds with moderates and liberals. While militants in the party may be gratified, the party as a whole has been weakened.

Some face-saving explanations have already been heard to prove that the election was really a victory.

REVERSE COATTAILS

Excuse Number One: The party in power, it is said, usually loses off-year senatorial seats. This year the GOP gained two seats, hence a victory. Agnew has in fact said that party hopes for a Republican senatorial majority last spring was just loose fund-raising talk; no one, he implies, really expected GOP gains in an off-year. "If we go by past history," the Vice President said shortly before election day, "anything better than losing 30 House seats and breaking even in the Senate would mean success."

However, Agnew's historical perspective is slightly out of focus. In point of fact, the off-year rule at work in senatorial elections actually favored significant GOP gains (see chart on page 8.)

The logic of the off-year cycle is familiar: A victorious President often sweeps legislators in on his coattails. Some of those get swept out the next time they run. In the House the reverse-coattail effect comes two years later, but in the Senate it comes six years later. Thus 1970 was an "off year" for the Senate, but the base year was 1964, not 1968.

Since 1912, when senators first stood for direct election, there have been 10 elections in which presidential margins were big enough to play a significant role in statewide races (the exceptions are Wilson's, Truman's, Kennedy's and Nixon's victories). Six years after each of these elections the non-presidential party picked up seats, even if it subsequently controlled the presidency. Prior to 1970, the average pickup on the six-year cycle was 8-9 seats.

Republicans thus had every reason to believe that in the 1970 Senate races they could pick up seven seats needed for a Senate majority, since the Democrats who won in 1964 had had the advantage of the greatest coattail effect in recent history. Seven Democrats had won 55 per cent of the vote or less at a time when LBJ had received 61 per cent of the national vote.

MORE TO LOSE

This year the Democrats were forced to defend 25 seats, the Republicans only 10. This is why Agnew was able to raise unprecedented sums to help Republican senatorial committees outspend the Democrats 5-to-1. This is why, as a hedge in case the party fell below seven, some Republicans moved to form an alliance with Harry Byrd, Jr.

For Agnew now to excuse a gain of two seats as better than expected is simply to compound failure with

RACES FOR SENATOR AND GOVERNOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATIC SWEEPS</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPUBLICAN SWEEPS</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLIT</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THIRD-PARTY WINNERS**</td>
<td>XXXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO CONTEST**</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*New York elected a GOP Governor and an Independent Senator; Virginia elected an Independent Senator.
**Rhode Island's Governorship went Democratic after press time; no elections in Kentucky, North Carolina, and Louisiana; Democrats unopposed in W. Virginia, Mississippi, and Alabama.

Erratum: Massachusetts should be marked a split.
mendacity. There was a serious effort to win a GOP majority in the Senate because historical off-year patterns supported this prospect, just as they supported Richard Nixon’s calculation in 1966 that there would be a GOP rebound in the House of Representatives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Presidential elections</th>
<th>Senatorial Losses</th>
<th>President with Coattails six years earlier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>- 7 Republicans</td>
<td>Harding in 1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>- 8 Republicans</td>
<td>Coolidge in 1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>- 6 Democrats</td>
<td>Hoover in 1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>- 9 Democrats</td>
<td>F.D.R. in 1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>- 12 Democrats</td>
<td>F.D.R. in 1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>- 13 Republicans</td>
<td>Ike in 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>- 4 Republicans</td>
<td>Ike in 1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>- 2 Democrats</td>
<td>L.B.J. in 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>- 8 Seats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>- 15 Republicans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Excuse Number Two: The ideological balance of the Senate has been altered. Conservative ideology, we are now told, is really what was sought, not Republican seats, though this argument was made only after it became clear the GOP could not win a majority in the Senate. As Ron Ziegler put it at 11:30 a.m. on Tuesday, Oct. 27, the President would welcome changes “not on party lines but on ideological lines.”

UNLIKELY IDEOLOGUE

Spiro Agnew drew the line within the GOP as well. According to _Battle Lines_, the publication of the American Conservative Union, he told fund-raisers in New York that “the only good Republican is a conservative Republican.” If that is the test, then three of the new Republicans in the Senate — Lowell Weicker of Connecticut, Robert Taft of Ohio and J. Glenn Beall of Maryland — fall short. They outnumber the two new conservatives — William Brock of Tennessee and James Buckley of New York.

Among the Democrats, Lloyd Bentsen of Texas satisfies the President’s newly acquired ideological tastes, but Lawton Chiles of Florida does not. Of the dozen or so incumbent senators branded as “radicals,” only three were defeated: Charles Goodell of New York, Albert Gore of Tennessee and Joseph Tydings of Maryland. But two new “extremists” — John Tunney of California and Adlai Stevenson of Illinois — came in.

Chalk up a net loss, then, of only one radical, a net gain of one moderate Republican over conservative Republicans, and a cancelling-out of a conservative with a liberal Southern Democrat. Hardly a great shift, especially since at any moment a moderate Republican may be transformed by vice presidential edict into a radical.

For the President to take comfort in ideology is to compound failure with short-sighted dogmatism. To the degree he claims he now has a working ideological majority, he cannot use Congress as a scapegoat in 1972.

Excuse Number Three: 1970 tested a conservative national strategy that will bear full fruit in 1972. The Silent Majority, we are told, was clearing its throat this year and will speak out in 1972. There are three ways of propounding this conservative strategy, but unfortunately all of them are refuted by the 1970 election results.

First, one may look at it regionally, in terms of those “liberal” states written off by Kevin Phillips as “safe Democratic” (New England, New York, Michigan, West Virginia), the “battlegrounds” (the belt from New Jersey to Missouri plus the Pacific Coast), the “GOP bastions” (the “conservative” peripheral South and small Western Plains and Mountain states), and the Deep South which, it is thought, will be a Republican bastion in 1972 if George Wallace is not a presidential candidate.

PHILLIPS UPSIDE DOWN

In 1970 these regions behaved precisely the reverse of conservative predictions, despite the fact that the White House and the Senate Campaign Committee gave strongest emphasis to GOP bastions and battleground states. Of the statewide races in the “safe Democratic” states, the GOP won 53 per cent (60 per cent if we count Buckley). In the “battlegrounds” it won 36 per cent of the contests. In the “GOP bastions” it won only 28 per cent; in the contingent South it won zero.

Thus the election turned the conservative strategy on its head, producing results that went exactly contrary to its prediction. Since this strategy guided much national Republican planning for statewide races, it is small wonder that the GOP did worse than expected.

Another way of looking at the conservative strategy

NIXON AND AGNEW CAMPAIGN STOPS

Note: The President visited 21 Senate candidates, 8 of whom were elected. (38%)
The Vice-President visited 18 candidates, 6 of whom were elected. (33%)
is in terms of swing groups in the population. Two
target groups are thought to be good material for Mr.
Nixon — and hence for all Republicans: Northern blue
collar workers, especially Catholics (Protestant work-
ners already tend to vote Republican), and small-town
white Southerners.

Since Mr. Nixon and Agnew are neither Catholic
nor Southerners, they must make up in rhetoric what
they lack in blood ties. They thought that the way to
win these groups was by playing on anxieties about
blacks and students. They thought that backlash rhei-
toric would also go down well in the suburbs.

The Ripon Society warned that in fact backlash
appeal would have a revolving door effect. It would,
we argued, drive affluent suburbanites away from the
GOP and in an economic downturn there would not be
enough Southern Wallace voters or Northern union
members coming back in. The defeat of George Mur-
phy in California, Ralph Smith in Illinois and Nelson
Gross in New Jersey by suburbanite defections fully
confirms our warning.

Indeed, the only Protestant Republicans to make
significant inroads among Catholic voters campaigned
not on issues of backlash but on issues of sound, ef-
fective, moderate government. These two were Nelson
Rockefeller in New York and Francis Sargent in Mas-
sachusetts.

The prospects for major inroads among target
groups in 1972 will be even smaller if the Democrats
put up another Catholic-Southern ticket on the Ken-

Finally, one may argue a conservative strategy in
terms of national image. Conservatives insist, correctly
I think, that the country will move to the right on vio-
lence and that the Russians will push our foreign policy
rightward as well. By staking out a conservative posi-
tion it is thought that the President and the Vice Presi-
dent will have the country come to them.

STEALING THE CENTER

Many Republican senatorial candidates tried this,
but instead of the electorate coming to them, their
Democratic opponent did, and isolated them on the
right, much as Johnson did with Goldwater. Republi-
cans did not pick up a single Senate seat west of the
Mississippi River, though they had 10 shots. In every
Western vulnerable Democratic seat a similar pattern
emerged: The GOP staked out a firm law and order
position; the Democrat moved close to him, insinuating
all the while that Republicans were trying to profit from
violence.

Adlai Stevenson’s masterful campaign against
Ralph Smith in Illinois was a classic example of this
pattern. Stevenson won 65 per cent of the blue collar
vote, 64 per cent of Catholics, and made substantial
inroads into the Republican suburbs. Thus did Demo-


crats steal the center from the GOP.

This same pattern was repeated on a national
scale on election eve, as President Nixon tried to turn
a cheap profit on the San Jose incident. His staff, despite
warnings from CBS, screened a film that made the
President of the United States look like a candidate for
district attorney. Sen. Edmund Muskie followed with a
moderate presidential fireside chat that stole the center
from Nixon. To hope that the country will move right-
wards and will prefer D.A. Nixon to the Muskie who
talked about a sense of community, trust, moderation,
middle class virtue and law and order, is to compound
incompetence with wishful thinking.

Excuse Number Four: It is argued that Mr. Nixo-
son’s willingness to put his presidency on the line for
Republicans solidifies his position as a party leader, and
that his brutal purging of Goodell will assure him the
discipline he needs among Republicans in the Senate.
The 1970 campaign was really an investment in legisla-
tive leadership, it is asserted.

Just the opposite is the case. Mr. Nixon purged
Goodell on terms that apply also to seven other Repub-
lican senators (the “Traitorous Eight,” as they were
once called at the White House). Four of these are up
for reelection in 1972 (Percy, Hatfield, Brooke and
Case.) They represent states and constituencies crucial
to Mr. Nixon’s own re-election. They know it and are
not likely to be bludgeoned into submissiveness by an
unsolute White House staff.

Moreover, with the discrediting of Ronald Reagan,
the Republican right has no serious alternative to Mr.
Nixon. Reagan ran behind moderate Republicans on
his ticket; he also lost both houses of the legislature,
thus forfeiting the Republican Party’s golden oppor-
tunity for a pickup of six to eight U.S. House seats in
the decennial redistricting. He ran behind Tunney;
Max Rafferty lost despite a Robert Finch endorsement. Reagan is a threat to Nixon only if Nixon’s policies collapse, and they can collapse only if he is deserted by Republican moderates.

At the moment Republican moderates need to be reassured. Their memories of this campaign are not fond: The humiliation of Goodell and Gov. Linwood Holton of Virginia; the treachery by Agnew on Nelson Rockefeller’s turf, the characterization of Rogers Morton as a “party functionary,” the enthusiastic participation of all major White House aides in planning a campaign strategy that alienated progressive suburbanites from the GOP, the counter-productive smear ads inspired by the White House, the free ride for Democrats like Henry Jackson of Washington (who then went on to raise money and votes for the defeat of Republicans), the bias against former Rockefeller supporters in the distribution of campaign funds and in the selection of candidates. These add up to a bumbling and exclusionary political strategy reminiscent of 1964.

DEMONSTRATED WEAKNESS

If Mr. Nixon continues this approach into the next two years, he will not be able to correct the party’s demonstrated weakness in key swing states like New Jersey, Ohio, Illinois, Florida, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, California and Texas, not to mention the rout of the GOP in its bastions of strength in the Plains and Mountains.

Many Republican moderates, who guard the gate to a Nixon electoral majority, may have to dissociate themselves from him to assure their electoral survival. This is not a threat, it is simply a statement of fact. Now that the President has initiated a politics of exclusion within his party, he cannot assume unified Republican support for his re-election unless he earns it.

He has earned it with many of his policies. He has been the best foreign policy President of the 1960s and has an important, though as yet unfulfilled, program for domestic and administrative reform. Yet his politics have failed him. As Mark Hatfield put it, the day after the election, "A truly effective political strategy must be designed to win elections and successfully govern the country. The course taken by our party this year fails to adequately meet either of those tests." A few weeks before, the same criticism came from the Capitol Hill coordinator of the American Conservative Union, from some of the President’s own loyalists and from both conservative and liberal Republican senators.

Richard Nixon prides himself on having a foreign policy strategy, an economic strategy, a domestic strategy and a political strategy. What he lacks is a governing strategy. To develop one he will have to bring fresh air into the dogmatic, defensive, ivory tower atmosphere which H. R. Haldeman cultivates for him. He will have to reach out for advice to a wider circle and he will have to overcome the doctrine of presidential infallibility to admit that this campaign has threatened the very life of his administration.

Josiah Lee Auspitz

This article was syndicated nationally by the Washington Post and reported in-depth by the Associated Press, United Press International and the Armed Forces Network.

The House: A Discouraging Bright Spot

The truism that most incumbent congressmen win re-election, proved true again in 1970. Sixty-three seats were uncontested and of the remaining 372, only 27 changed parties. Republicans gave up 18 to the Democrats and in return gained nine for a net loss of nine.

The statistics of wins and losses in off-year elections vary considerably and, unlike the race in the Senate, there is no real historical trend that can serve as a convenient standard with which to measure deviation. For what it’s worth, the total of GOP gains in 1968 and losses in 1970 yield a net loss of five, considerably better than JFK’s record in 1962 and slightly worse (by one) than Ike’s in 1954.

The most significant thing about the results in the House elections is how closely they follow the rejection of conservative predictions shown in the Senate contests. Seven out of 18 losses occurred in the presumed

LOSSES AND GAINS IN HOUSE SEATS

heartland of the emerging Republican majority with six more coming in the battleground states of the Pacific, the Ohio valley and the upper Mississippi valley. The
Democratic stronghold of the Yankee Northeast resulted in a net gain of two, in contrast to the Deep South, where gains numbered, as in the Senate races, zero.

If there is a bright spot in the House races, it is that the economy (see Foley’s Law, April 1970 Ripon FORUM) and the loss of the three to four Nixon coattail seats from 1968 would normally have led to a loss of more than twenty seats. Other issues mitigated these losses. However, this relative success was batted out by the loss of houses of the state legislature in California, Pennsylvania and Illinois, of the redistricting commission in Ohio, and of the Republican Governor’s veto power in Massachusetts. These developments will cause the GOP to lose out in decennial redistricting and probably confine it to minority status in the House of Representatives throughout the 1970’s.

Nixon’s handpicked Ten and Change in Congressional Representation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Senate Candidate</th>
<th>Won</th>
<th>Lost</th>
<th>Change in Congressional Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Del.</td>
<td>Roth</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td></td>
<td>no change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fla.</td>
<td>Cramer</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
<td>no change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind.</td>
<td>Roudabush</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
<td>no change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Md.</td>
<td>Beall</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Byron (D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minn.</td>
<td>MacGregor</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bergland (D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Dak.</td>
<td>Kleppe</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Link (D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenn.</td>
<td>Brock</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td></td>
<td>no change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
<td>no change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>Burton</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
<td>McKay (D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyo.</td>
<td>Wold</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Roncalio (D.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 7 4 no change 6 Dem. gains

MARGINAL DISTRICTS
59 Representatives were elected this year under 55 percent of the vote. Of the 59 marginal seats, 31 are held by Republicans and 28 by Democrats.

The chart below shows that 42 of the closely contested districts are in the Northeast and the Midwest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dem.</th>
<th>GOP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 28 31 59

NEW REPUBLICANS IN THE HOUSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Incumbent</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V.V. Veysey</td>
<td>Tunney</td>
<td>CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike McKeveitt</td>
<td>Rogers</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.T. McKinney</td>
<td>Weicker</td>
<td>CT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.S. duPont</td>
<td>Roth</td>
<td>DE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.W. Young</td>
<td>Cramer</td>
<td>FL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H. Hillis</td>
<td>Roudebus</td>
<td>IN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Frenzel</td>
<td>MacGregor</td>
<td>MN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.G. Shoup</td>
<td>Olsen</td>
<td>MN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Thome</td>
<td>Denney</td>
<td>NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.Y. McCollister</td>
<td>Cunningham</td>
<td>NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.B. Forsythe</td>
<td>Cahill</td>
<td>NJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Lent</td>
<td>Lowenstein</td>
<td>NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Rangel</td>
<td>Powell</td>
<td>NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.A. Peysy</td>
<td>Ottinger</td>
<td>NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.H. Terry</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Kemp</td>
<td>McCarthy</td>
<td>NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. J. Keating</td>
<td>Taft</td>
<td>OH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. E. Powell</td>
<td>Lukens</td>
<td>OH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.H. Ware III</td>
<td>Watkins</td>
<td>PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.D. Spence</td>
<td>Watson</td>
<td>SC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LaMar Baker</td>
<td>Brock</td>
<td>TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.R. Archer</td>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.K. Robinson</td>
<td>Marsh</td>
<td>VA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a = incumbent defeated in primary
b = incumbent ran for higher office
w = incumbent did not seek reelection
x = incumbent died
z = incumbent defeated directly

CRAIG STEWART

The State Legislatures: A Democratic Lever

Democrats were the big winners in this year’s state legislative elections — a development with significant national impact.

Tabulations made by The Christian Science Monitor regional bureaus from the November 3 balloting indicate a net Democratic gain of 204 lawmaking seats across the nation.

And when the 50 state legislatures meet next year the already dominant Democrats will be in their strongest political position since 1965, holding at least 4,454 legislative seats, 58.5 percent of the nation’s total.

Fifty-three of the 99 state lawmaking chambers from Alaska to Florida will be Democratic controlled.

Republicans clearly are in their weakest position since the 1964 Democratic landslide cost them more than 500 legislative seats at state capitolts throughout America.

While the latest GOP setback was considerably less smashing than the one six years ago, it nevertheless wiped out the modest gains the Republicans had made in the intervening two state elections toward winning back lost ground.

Only 39 legislative chambers, in 20 states, will be Republican controlled. Currently they hold sway in 47 lawmaking houses in 27 states.

GOP legislators will have 2,916 seats, 38.3 percent of the nation’s total. At present they have 3,140, or 41.5 percent.

Another 250 state lawmakers — those from Minnesota and Nebraska — are nonpartisan. They comprise the remaining 3.2 percent of the more than 7,620
legislators. Involved are but three lawmaking chambers, however, since Nebraska has a unicameral, or single-house legislature.

All but five states elected at least some, and in most cases all, of their legislators. The exceptions were Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Virginia, where lawmakers were chosen last year.

Of the 23 states where Democrats will hold a majority of the lawmaking chairs in both legislative branches 16 also have governors of the same political persuasions.

These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas.

Similar one-party dominance, but on the Republican side, can be expected in 10 of the 17 states where both legislative branches will be GOP controlled.

These are Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, and Wyoming.

Prior to the election the Democrats had only 13 states in which they were in political command all the way, while the Republicans had 16.

Of the 87 state legislative chambers to which lawmakers were elected earlier this month, 9 changed political hands.

The California Senate, which was evenly divided after the 1968 election, was captured by the Democrats. The California and Wisconsin Houses and Pennsylvania Senate, which had been Republican controlled, were taken over by the Democrats. The Alaska and and Illinois Senates, and Nevada House, which were Republican held, now will be evenly shared by the two parties.

The New York Senate was the only chamber wrested from Democratic hands by the Republicans.

Besides the five states mentioned earlier that chose all members to both legislative branches last year, Kansas and South Carolina did not elect senators this year, since members in these lawmaking branches serve four-year terms and were chosen in 1968.

Democrats added strength in 26 senatorial and in 30 house of representatives assembles. And they held their own in nine other senates and four houses.

Republicans added to their strength in only 6 senates, and held their own in 9 others. GOP house gains, usually of modest proportions, were made in eight states. They held their own in only 4 others.

Chambers where Republicans increased their representation include the senates in Arizona, Connecticut, Maryland, New York, Oregon, and Wyoming; and houses in Alabama, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, New Hampshire, New York, South Carolina, and Texas.

There will be at least one Republican member in all but 3 of the 48 senates involved in partisan elections — Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi — and all but 2 of the 48 lower chambers — Louisiana and Mississippi.

Democrats are represented in both branches of all 48 partisan legislatures.

The biggest GOP mastery is 32 to 8 over the Democrats in the Kansas Senate and 22 to 8 in the Vermont Senate.

GEORGE B. MERRY

Abridged by permission from The Christian Science Monitor © 1970 The Christian Science Publishing Society. All rights reserved.

LEGISLATIVE LINEUP SINCE 1962

This table shows the comparative strengths of the two major political parties, in terms of state legislative seats held, after each biennial election starting in 1962.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Senates*</th>
<th>Houses*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1,121</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1,246</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,129</td>
<td>756</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes legislators elected in previous years whose terms overlap. The number of seats have changed somewhat as a result of legislative reapportionments.

McCLOSKEY BUTTONS

Paul N. McCloskey won re-election to Congress from California's 11th District. "McCloskey for Higher Public Office" buttons can be obtained for 50¢ (3 for $1) from CUCMHPOOKA (Completely Unauthorized Committee for McCloskey for Higher Public Office of One Kind or Another). Write c/o the Ripon office. This ad paid for by CUCMHPOOKA.
The Governors: A Dramatic Turnover

In terms of gubernatorial elections, 1970 was a Republican disaster. Since 1960, the party had registered no net gubernatorial losses, and by the end of the decade controlled 32 state houses.

This year, the Democrats made a net gain of 11 GOP governorships, the most dramatic party turnover of the decade. For the first time since the Goldwater debacle (in 1964, Republicans in fact registered a net gain of one governorship) Democrats will occupy a majority of state houses.

This new majority will give the Democrats the basis for a successful assault on the White House in 1972. Two years ago, states led by Republican Governors controlled 311 electoral votes, while those under Democrats accounted for 224. Following the results of this election and taking into account population gains and losses, states with Republican Governors now control 281 electoral votes, and those with Democrats 254. While this shift may not appear startling, the realignment of state control which it represents, if the new Governors develop strong party and patronage organizations, is far more critical. For example, three states crucial to Mr. Nixon’s reelection strategy — Florida, Ohio and Texas — will be governed by Democrats in 1972, as will Wisconsin, which added its votes to Mr. Nixon’s 1968 electoral count.

In terms of the Democratic nominating convention in 1972, Mayor Daley will be offset by power wielded by Governors such as Gilligan and Shapp and the united and victorious Smith-Bentsen-Connelly-Barnes-LBJ Texans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>GOP</th>
<th>DEMS.</th>
<th>Net GOP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>+1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>+1**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Louis Nunn elected Governor of Kentucky.
** Linwood Holton and William T. Cahill elected Republican governors of Virginia and New Jersey, and Marvin Mandel, Democrat, succeeded Spiro T. Agnew as governor of Maryland.

STEFAN LOPATKIEWICZ

Fund Raising: Missing Moderate Letter

Your mail has most likely been flooded with a record number of political fund raising letters. One subscriber to The National Review, for instance, received nine letters in one week soliciting funds for New York Conservative party Senate candidate James Buckley. But amidst the clutter one letter is strangely missing.

This is the first time in recent years that there has been no moderate or liberal Republican fund raising appeal by a group of Republican senators or a letterhead committee of prominent Republican citizens. The missing letter is especially significant when it is put into the context of the 1970 elections.

Moderate Republicans have used independent fund raising appeals effectively to help candidates hurt in their home states by a national Republican ticket or administration. Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pa.), for example, was able to hold his U.S. Senate seat in 1964 by building a million-vote margin over the Goldwater-Miller ticket. In 1958 Scott had to weather a Republican recession and the "right to work" issue.

Moderate Republican funds have also helped to balance the campaign contributions made by Republican Party fund raising committees which have usually favored more conservative Republicans.

This year there is a new handicap for the Republican moderates. Vice President Spiro Agnew has broken all the formal rules of party leadership in open attacks on the moderate wing of his own party. New York Republican Senator Charles Goodell was made a public example, apparently with the blessing of President Richard Nixon. The message to Republican moderates is unmistakable: "Stay in line or you'll get the same treatment when it's your turn."

Senators Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.), Edward W. Brooke (R-Mass.), Charles McC. Mathias (R-Md.)

(Turn page)
and Charles H. Percy (R.-III.) have suddenly “discovered” that official funds of the Senate Republican Campaign Committee are being channeled to conservative candidates instead of Goodell and other Republican moderates in tight Senate races. Their protest came much too late to have any significant effect this November.

If the Republican senators looked at the records of the Clerk of the House they might make an even more startling discovery. Independent fund raising groups are having a bumper year. Between June 1969, and the end of August 1970, the Committee for the Democratic Process, a fund-raising committee using a letter signed by Senator George McGovern (D.-S. Dak.), reported raising some $730,000. Between January, 1969, and September 10, 1970, the National Committee for an Effective Congress raised $586,000. All of the first group’s funds and the great bulk of the second group’s are going to liberal Democratic candidates. Independent groups are now raising more funds than the House and Senate Democratic campaign committees combined.

More than money is being lost by the moderate Republicans. The lack of non-party sources of money is forcing independent Republicans into the arms and discipline of the Nixon Administration.

The failure to build and update fund raising lists has ramifications well beyond this November. It can affect senatorial leadership fights. It can also help to decide whether there is any serious alternative to Nixon or Agnew in the 1972 Republican primaries or convention. It can influence whether or not independent-minded Republicans even seek office in the years ahead on Congressional, state, and local levels.

It only takes a sheet or two of paper, an envelope, some names, mailing lists and postage. The most telling comment on the moderate Republicans is that they won’t even miss their fund raising letter this year.

JOHN S. SALOMA

Reprinted by permission of the Boston Globe.

The South: Southern Strategy Flops

If the Nixon Administration has been engaging in a “Southern strategy” for the past two years — and despite the occasional tepid denials, there is little reason to believe otherwise — the 1970 elections strongly indicate that the South is not getting the message. To the contrary, in state after state, the groups whose interests have been ignored by the Southern strategy — urban moderates, liberals, blacks, poor whites, and Southerners of all persuasions who have had enough of racial and political polarization at the expense of economic progress — rose up to defeat Republican candidates, often by impressive margins. And by a process of guilt by association, the uprisings of voters dissatisfied with the Administration’s divisive policies swept away at least two prominent Republicans who stood in some degree for unity and moderation — Governor Winthrop Rockefeller of Arkansas and Senatorial candidate George Bush of Texas, the Great White Hope of Southern Republicanism, who was undercut for the second time in six years by a conservative national strategy.

SOMBER STATISTICS

On the surface, at least, the won-lost statistics of the November election paint a somber picture of the GOP’s current standing in the South. Democrats (including Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. of Virginia) won four out of five Senate contests; and though this tally still represented a net gain of one for the GOP (William E. Brock III in Tennessee), it also reflected two stunning disappointments — the defeats of Bush in Texas and Congressman William C. Cramer in Florida. Democrats also took six out of seven gubernatorial races, reducing the GOP’s statehouse holdings in the South from two to one. The GOP showed a net gain in the 11 Southern states of one Congressional seat (the Seventh District in Virginia), giving the party 27 of the region’s 106 House slots; but a more interesting statistic, perhaps, was the number of Democrats going unopposed by Republicans in Congressional races — 43 out of 106. Twelve Democrats out of 23 were untroubled by Republican opposition in Texas, as were three out of four in Arkansas, seven out of eight in Louisiana, and four out of five in Mississippi. In no state did the GOP score significant gains in the state legislature, but the party suffered significant losses in at least two, North Carolina and Tennessee. And in Alabama, where the GOP’s state legislative campaign was an almost total failure, George C. Wallace — whose absence from the presidential scene in 1972 is an integral part of the Southern strategy — won another term as Governor with 75 percent of the vote over two more-than-token independent candidates.

But in the face of whatever cumulative evidence can be produced, defenders of the Southern strategy will point to Tennessee as evidence of the strategy’s success, what with the victories of Brock and Winfield Dunn. Dunn, one of the truly attractive Republican campaigners to emerge from the 1970 election, topped liberal Democrat John Jay Hooker by 60,000 votes (out of slightly more than 1,000,000) to complete his rise.
from an unknown Memphis dentist to Tennessee’s first Republican Governor in 50 years. Dunn, conceding Hooker most of the state’s black and labor votes, avoided ideological confrontations and concentrated on Hooker’s fitness to be Governor, particularly as reflected by his spectacular $30,000,000 losses in the franchising business. In addition, Dunn had at least the passive assistance of many key followers of the present Governor, Buford Ellington, who defeated Hooker in a bitter primary four years ago. Dunn’s campaign, in other words, was not one in which the Southern strategy played a great part; nor was it one in which the Nixon administration showed much direct interest.

THEY GOT GORE

On the other hand, the full power of the White House went into the successful effort to dump Senator Albert Gore. It was true, as Brock and his legion of public relations men contended, that Gore, in his positions on the Vietnam war, the ABM, and the Haynsworth and Carswell nominations, was too “liberal” for the majority of Tennessee voters. But the real question — which Gore never succeeded in getting the voters to face — was whether Tennessee would better be served by a man who was against not only Albert Gore but also Medicare, anti-pollution legislation, Appalachian aid, and practically every other progressive social and economic measure presented to Congress during his four terms in the House. Both President Nixon and Vice President Agnew visited the state in Brock’s behalf, and Nixon’s men, the Harry Treleaven firm, directed the blitz that buried Gore under a hail of “charges” he could hardly hope to answer. The result was a curious — and tragic — campaign in which Senator Gore, a veteran of 32 years in Congress, tired and old, frantically criss-crossed the state, trying to get the voters to concentrate on their real interests, while a Brock strategist could sit back and calmly discuss “the four big issues we’ve saved for the last ten days — prayer, busing, gun control, and the judges (Haynsworth and Carswell).” There was no ounce of relevance in any of these issues, certainly not in the way Brock used them, but 52 percent of the voters bought them and sent Albert Gore into retirement.

But if the Administration can be said to have covered itself with glory in Tennessee (and GOP celebrations even there were dampened by the party’s loss of control of the state House of Representatives), it must also be said that it wallowed in the filth of racial hatred by embracing Albert Watson’s unsuccessful gubernatorial campaign in South Carolina. Watson, unlike the South’s more entertaining (and populist-oriented) segregationists such as George C. Wallace of Alabama and Lester G. Maddox of Georgia (both big winners in 1970), continued to indulge in unequivocally racist appeals. Witness his 1970 TV commercial showing blacks rioting in Watts and Washington, with Watson asking, “Are we going to be ruled by the bloc...

... See what happened in Watts and the nation’s capital.” This offering was sufficient to turn the stomachs of Greenville, South Carolina’s Republican newspaper, the News, and of the city’s Republican Mayor, R. Cooper White, who refused to support Watson or even attend a rally for him. But no similar qualms beset the Administration. Vice President Agnew visited Greenville in late October, and again using hometown Judge Clement F. Haynsworth as a totem, renewed President Nixon’s near-hysterical post-Carswell charge about the Senate’s “flagrant and inexcusable bias against the South.” Then he pulled out the standard Nixon-Agnew boilerplate regarding school integration: “We flatly oppose compulsory busing solely for racial balance. We wholeheartedly believe in the neighborhood school concept. And there we take our stand.” Closely analyzed, this statement says virtually nothing, but no one can doubt by now that it is taken by Southerners as a code for resistance to any form of meaningful integration. Even David Eisenhower got into the act in South Carolina, by praising Watson — who frequently predicted or exaggerated instances of disruption following desegregation — for his forthright stand on “discipline in schools.”

MODERATE MAJORITY

But the voters in South Carolina, as in other Southern states, are beginning to tire of outsiders’ using the race issue to divide them. By a 53-45 margin (with 2 percent going to independent candidates), they re-elected Watson, Nixon, Agnew, and Senator Strom Thurmond in favor of a known racial and political moderate, Lieutenant Governor John C. West. And though blacks comprise 24.5 percent of the South Carolina electorate, the election of West cannot be explained as simply a black-vs.-white affair. Blacks turned out in large numbers in Columbia and Charleston, where black legislative candidates were on the ballot, but elsewhere they were apathetic; West had only a narrow margin in Beaufort and Orangeburg counties and lost Colleton county, though all three have high percentages of black voters. Preliminary analysis showed that the Democrat fared well in many precincts that had gone heavily for Nixon in 1968, and that West managed to win many Wallace voters back into the Democratic fold. The state’s Democratic party further showed its growing political maturity by nominating and electing three black legislators — South Carolina’s first since 1901.

The South Carolina GOP did show a five-seat gain in the state House of Representatives — though it still fell six seats short of its 1964 high-water mark. But in neighboring North Carolina, which was favored by visits from both Nixon and Agnew, the party’s legislative hopes — previously among the most substantial in the South — were dealt a crushing blow on election day. Where the GOP had gone into the election with 41 seats out of 170, and hoped to come out with at
least 50, the party suffered a net loss of 11 seats, including five in the Eleventh Congressional District (Asheville and environs), where President Nixon had campaigned. (The district's GOP congressional candidate also lost by a surprising 2-to-1 margin, as the state's U.S. House delegation remained 7-4 Democratic.) Republican legislators had played politics with Governor Robert W. Scott's badly-needed tax package in 1969, but the backlash they were hoping for failed to materialize. Additionally, the Democrats in both congressional and legislative races were aided by generous and near-unanimous black support, a fact recognized after the balloting by State Democratic Chairman Eugene Simmons in a most untypical observation. "The blacks' loyalty and solidarity in voting made the difference in many races," Simmons said, "I hope those who gained directly from this support realize the contribution they made on election day." Again, a sign of new maturity among Southern Democrats.

NO LIBERALS TO BAIT

The GOP's reverses in the Carolinas, however, were as nothing compared to the grave defeats incurred in the South's two most populous states, Florida and Texas. Until November 1970, Florida appeared to be riding a tide of conservative Republicanism, having succumbed to the liberal-baiting tactics of Governor Claude R. Kirk, Jr., in 1966 and Senator Edward J. Gurney in 1968. But in 1970, Florida Democrats turned away from the Robert King High-Leroy Collins liberal stripe of candidate, without reverting to hardcore conservatives like Earl Faircloth and Farris Bryant. Instead, they nominated two men, Reubin Askew of Pensacola and Lawton Chiles of Lakeland who perceived and embodied both the traditional Southern individualism and the rising demand for social and economic justice.

Though Kirk had given Floridians four years of flamboyance, along with some substantive accomplishments, he had failed completely to undertake the tax reform that was needed if the state was ever to provide services commensurate with its considerable wealth. Askew's campaign was premised on just this need for tax reform, and his major proposal was enactment of a corporate income tax. This "liberal" position won the support of more than 960,000 Florida voters, including a number of "conservatives" who may have enjoyed Governor Kirk's jousts with the legislature and his anti-integration road shows but were tired of paying more than their share for the privilege of watching.

No one would expect the Republican party of Kirk, Gurney, and Cramer (and Nixon and Bebe Rebozo) to advocate new taxation of corporate profits. But what is the "Republican" principle involved? Is it refraining from taxing corporations, or is it putting state government on a sound fiscal basis?

Askew's fellow North Floridian, Chiles, has already received national attention for his 1,003-mile walk across Florida during the senatorial campaign, and the contrast has been drawn many times between his down-to-earth approach and the high-budget, Madison Avenue pitch employed by Cramer, his Republican opponent. A tongue-in-cheek Washington Post dispatch describing Chiles' campaign, evoking an image of an America of a different time, perhaps unintentionally indicated the depth of the difference, and the impact of Chiles' campaign:

We should have been here last March when Chiles started walking in Century, Florida, on his way down the state to Key West. What a package — happy crowds in the courthouse squares, ham and greens by the side of the road, sunrise in the Everglades, the earnest faces of worried Americans, and a man who came from nowhere with blisters on his feet and nothing to sell but himself.

And while Cramer railed against "the bombers and the burners and the rioters, the people who want to destroy our country," parroting the Nixon-Agnew rhetoric, Chiles may have come closer to the basic concerns of troubled Floridians and Americans. "I feel it is a matter of motivation," he said.

Are we going to continue motivating (the voters) to be against everything by playing on their fears? ... The people want to know what to do about their problems, not just to be frightened by playing on their fears and prejudices.

In Florida, at least, Chiles was proven correct; the strategy of fear was a dismal failure.

WHY BUSH LOST

George Bush, in Texas, tried to offer the voters something more than fear, but he was dragged down to defeat by a number of factors that have previously plagued the Republican party in Texas, plus the burden of his association with the Nixon administration. Bush and his opponent, former Congressman Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr., actually differed little on the issues. Bentsen, after running a right-wing campaign against Senator Ralph W. Yarborough in the Democratic primary, moderated his positions sufficiently to win over a number of prominent liberals and such minority leaders as black State Senator Barbara Jordan of Houston and Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez of San Antonio. Bush also carried his campaign into the black and Mexican-American communities and onto the college campuses, and sought to project a positive and concerned image. But as a conservative Republican facing a conservative Democrat, Bush was up against the Democrats' 4-to-1 edge in party strength; and his efforts to place himself to the left of Bentsen on any issue, or to appear to do so, were too timid to convince great numbers of liberal and minority voters. The economy was not an overriding issue in Texas, where the unemployment rate was well below the national average, but to the extent that
it was an issue, it was a plus for Bentsen, who accused the Administration of "dribbling away the economic prosperity of this country."

Bush's patrician background, closely matching the popular impression of the Texas GOP's constituency, undoubtedly hurt him among rural Wallaceites, particularly in East Texas, who returned in large numbers to the Democratic party. And the state GOP's traditional ineptitude was underscored by the Democrats' show of unity under fire, and their success in getting out the vote, particularly in minority neighborhoods.

UNENVIABLE ABILITY

Republican strategists were confident of victory if the total turnout was less than 1,600,000, but more than 2,000,000 Texans went to the polls on November 3, and Bush lost by 150,000. Moreover, if the GOP had chosen to contest more than 11 of the state's 23 House seats — or more than 74 of the 166 legislative spots — the resultant activity at the local level might have added thousands of votes to the totals of both Bush and gubernatorial candidate Paul Eggers. But the Texas Republican party has long been engaged in a fruitless attempt to build a party from the top down, and has traditionally disdained any activity below the senatorial or gubernatorial level. After a July, 1970, Ripon Society report on the South noted this failing, among others, columnist William F. Buckley, again among others, wrote that the results of this fall's election would demonstrate the power and potential of the Texas GOP. What the election demonstrated was the state party's undiminished ability to lose elections that cannot be lost, and its power to destroy promising candidates — first Eggers, who ever recovered from being abandoned by the party in 1968, and now Bush, who was being mentioned in the days before the 1970 election as a possible Vice-Presidential nominee in 1972. Thus Vice President Agnew's post-election assertion that Bentsen's victory represents "a philosophical win" for the Administration has to rank as the ultimate exaltation of conservative dogma over the best interests of the Republican party. (A close second, however, would be the GOP's performance in Virginia, where conservative Republicans shunned GOP senatorial candidate Ray L. Garland. GOP Congressman Joel Broyhill attended at least one joint rally with "independent" Harry Byrd, and the White House specifically declined to join in Agnew's lukewarm endorsement of Garland's candidacy. The result was the election of a man who will vote with the Democrats to organize the Senate, and the dismemberment of Republican Governor Linwood Holton's moderate coalition.)

Moreover, Texas is one state where appearances by Nixon and Agnew clearly damaged the Republican cause in a very concrete and identifiable manner. Bush's hopes for victory necessarily depended on appealing to moderates of both parties, and to disaffected Democrats who had supported Yarborough in the primary. The appearance of the President and Vice President may have been just what it took to drive these voters back into the Democratic camp. Nixon's and Agnew's appearances were aimed at Texans who were already going to vote for Bush, and the visits only served to remind the swing voters of their objections to voting for a Republican. (Perhaps the only state where an appearance by one of the Big Two made as little sense was Georgia, where Agnew, in Albany, hardly mentioned GOP gubernatorial nominee Hal Suit but unhesitatingly endorsed Senator Richard Russell — who not only is a Democrat, but also was not running for anything — as "one of the greatest Americans that the Senate of the United States has ever had.") The confident GOP analysts who have long counted Texas in the Nixon camp for 1972 might now be well advised to reassess the situation, in view of the fact that their projections have been askew in two consecutive elections. And Senator John Tower, who twice has been elected with the assistance of Democratic defectors, might begin to wonder what kind of majority he will be able to muster in 1972. Tower's predicament is emphasized by the continued prosperity of Democratic Lieutenant Governor Ben Barnes, who slaughtered another token GOP opponent by some 700,000 votes. The major factor in Tower's favor here is that Barnes would probably rather be Governor.

BUMPED OFF BY BUMPERS

Association with the Nixon administration also figured in the defeat of Winthrop Rockefeller in Arkansas. Rockefeller, whose two terms in office put Arkansas on the road to fiscal responsibility and political moderation, lost to young Dale Bumpers of tiny Charleston, Arkansas, a "new breed" Democrat from the same mold as Chiles and Askew of Florida, by a margin that was

- continued on page 24
Reorganizing a Bureaucratic Battleground

The Fitzhugh Commission Report

The Fitzhugh Commission was appointed June 30, 1969 to make a comprehensive review of the management and organization of the Department of Defense. The blue ribbon panel presented its report to President Nixon on July 13, 1970.

Head of the Commission was Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, Chairman of the Board, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. It included eight businessmen, three educators, two attorneys, a union official and a publisher (among these were two women).

The staff director of the Commission was J. Fred Bazbardt, Jr. On August 5, Bazbardt, 46, was nominated by President Nixon as general counsel for the Department of Defense. Bazbardt served as administrative assistant to Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina from 1958 to 1966.

The Fitzhugh Commission Report is an extraordinary document because it explains what is really wrong with Pentagon organization and management and offers many recommendations to reform the military services. Some of these recommendations are — in terms of contemporary in-house military attitudes — so drastic as to amount to a complete overhaul of our armed forces command structure. It is amazing that the Commission has been in a year to conduct such a thorough and accurate analysis of Pentagon operations. The succinctness of the comments and recommendations are more impressive when one considers that the study was made during the thawing period of the cold war waged between the civilian and military leaders throughout the McNamara years and after.

The bitterness of this struggle can best be summed up by the words of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to a group of officers reporting for duty with the Joint Staff in 1966, "Remember your enemy is upstairs" (the Office of the Secretary of Defense is located on the floor above the JCS offices). At least until June 1969, it was standing operating procedure in the JCS to forbid any internal Joint Staff paper being shown to any section of the Office of the Secretary of Defense without prior approval of the Director, Joint Staff.

In this paper-war battlefield the Army, Navy and Air Force have fought each other but usually united to fight the common "enemy" in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It is against this background that the findings and recommendations of the Fitzhugh Commission should be read.

Top Level Decision-Making

The Commission report makes clear that not only have the military services vigorously resisted civilian leadership, but frequently they have only partially informed these civilian leaders. An example is the recent off-the-record statements of Joint Staff officers proudly boasting of how they carefully "played their cards" on behalf of obtaining Executive approval for the Cambodian invasion. The report indicates the seriousness of this practice by saying, "The Secretary of Defense does not presently have the opportunity to consider all viable options as background for making major policy decisions because important options are often submerged or compromised at lower levels of the Department."

LOG ROLLING

A declaration of unanimity among the Joint Chiefs of Staff on options that are finally recommended to the Secretary of Defense is often misleading as to the true degree of agreement. The panel found the highly formalized decision-making process of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a laborious procedure which, "Is ponderous and slow, but its most serious deficiency is the incentive created for unanimity, compromise and mutual accommodation." 1

Such mutual accommodation is then oftentimes represented as expressing full agreement of the Joint Chiefs on a course of action having important national and international implications. More frequently agreement has represented avoidance of the potential conflict or a quid-pro-quo substitute solution. The pressures for unanimity are so strong that in 1969 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous on all but eight-tenths of one percent of the issues considered and in 1966, 1967, and 1968 they failed to agree publicly on only two-tenths of one percent of the issues considered. The Commission recommends that this decision-making procedure be eliminated because their findings show that it has precluded national viewpoints from prevailing service interests and in effect has long rendered the Joint Staff ineffectual as a unified body and made it little more than a coordinator of the services' individual views.

1 President Eisenhower referred to this process in his message to the Congress in 1958. He stated: "Those laborious processes exist because each military department feels obliged to judge independently each work product of the Joint Staff. Had I allowed my interservice and interfunctional staff to be similarly organized in the theaters I commanded during World War II the delays and resulting indecisiveness would have been unacceptable to my superiors."
The findings of the Commission reveal that because the services exist in an adverse relationship, large staffs (over 10,000 are employed in each of the service's Washington headquarters) and ever-increasing amounts of paper-work result, which, "Seriously degrades the decision-making process through obfuscation of issues and alternatives, and leads to attempts to circumvent decisions, repeated efforts to reopen issues that have already been decided, and slow unenthusiastic implementation of policies to which a service objects."

**Chain of Command**

In 1958 the Congress attempted to end interservice rivalry over the development and control of strategic weapons by enacting substantial changes in the military organization. The 1958 Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 redefined the authority of the Secretary of Defense as "direction, authority and control." Additionally, he was given power to reorganize the Department of Defense in logistic areas. The previous requirement that the military departments be "separately administered" was changed to "separately organized." The concept of unified and specified commands was established by law and the military departments were removed by statute from the chain of command over these operating forces in an effort to clarify and shorten the chain of command.  

**WEARING TWO HATS**

Despite this statute, the Secretary of Defense delegated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the duty to serve as advisors and as military staff in the chain of command. Since the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the same officers as the chiefs of the military departments, this meant that by wearing their "other hats" (as JCS members) the service chiefs were back into the operational chain of command.

It is in this vital area of operational command that the Commission makes what I feel are its most significant findings and recommendations. Although the Secretary of Defense is charged with the responsibility of acting as the link between the President and the unified and specified commanders, he must do so through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff. This anomalous situation means that although the Joint Chiefs of Staff were established by the National Security Act to serve as a planning and advisory body — not to exercise command — they are in fact in the operational command of the combat forces. This is not only a circumvention of the intent of the statute in the National Security Act of 1947 but also the expressed desires of the Congress.

As the Commission report states, "The National Security Act as amended, clearly contemplated a direct relationship between the Secretary and the Unified and Specified Commanders." Yet the Secretary of Defense does not have a staff element for military operations directly responsive to him. He must rely on the Joint Staff (which reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and until 1969 was prohibited from showing him internal JCS memoranda) for his operational direction. The Commission observes that the "absence of a staff element for military operations directly responsive to the Secretary of Defense constitutes a deficiency which can be tolerated only at high risk."

**CONFUSION IN CRISIS**

They might have also added that to continue to permit the National Military Command Center (NMCC) to report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while the secretary is totally dependent on it for control of our world-wide command structure is to encourage the possibility of delay or confusion in operational direction of combat forces. The attack on the Pueblo is the most recent publicized example of the breakdown and confusion of national effort that can result from the NMCC reporting through layers of commands to the JCS rather than directly to the Secretary of Defense and through him to the President.

The report indicates that the service staffs (each of which is larger than the entire Joint Staff) more than the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Staff actually are the ones who screen, analyze and shape the issues dealing with the military operations of our world-wide commands. It states, "If the secretary of Defense is to discharge effectively his responsibilities as a key element of the National Command Authority, — and the alternatives of removing him from the chain of command would, in practice, reduce 'civilian control' to a fiction — it is clear that he must have an adequate staff for the purpose." They find the present arrangement for providing staff support "awkward and unresponsive" which provides, "a forum for inter-service conflicts to be injected into the decision-making process and inhibits the flow of information to and from the combatant commands and the President and Secretary of Defense even in crisis situations."

The Secretary of Defense uses a system of directives and instructions in promulgating management policies and procedures through the chain of command. The panel found, "that the Department of Defense is also deluged with reports." It appeared to them that each echelon of the department initiate requirements for reports with no evidence of any effective

---

5 Congress passed the 1958 Amendments in response to a message from President Eisenhower which stated in part: "Because I have often seen the evils of diluted command, I emphasize that each unified Commander must have unquestioned authority over all units of his command... Today unified command is made up of component commands from each military department, each under a commander of that department. The commander's authority over these component commands is short of the full command required for maximum efficiency."

8 In the author's opinion it is by size, position in the chain of command (through Service Chiefs wearing their "JCS hats"), careful withholding of unfavorable information, meticulously prepared and controlled briefings of Congressional Committees, Secretary of Defense and JCS, while supplying an abundance of superficial data that the Services are able to advance their own interests regardless of the policies of the incumbent civilian Secretary of Defense.
effort to reduce or control these uncoordinated requirements. To their thinking, "It would be a major undertaking just to obtain a total inventory." The staggering impact of these requirements can be found in their finding "that an inventory compiled by the Navy in 1969 of recurring reports required by Washington Navy Headquarters Organizations revealed a total of 1,417 requirements which generated 1,461,607 submissions annually requiring 5,439 man years to prepare!"  

*World-Wide Command Structure*

U.S. combat forces are assigned to eight unified and specified commands, so-called because they consist of tri-service organization. These commands are:

- **Strategic Air Command** (only specified command) — charged with primary responsibility for the world-wide strategic mission. Headquartered in Omaha, Neb.
- **Alaskan Command** — ground and air defense of Alaska. Headquartered in Fairbanks, Alaska.
- **Atlantic Command** — general war maritime role in the North and South Atlantic. Headquartered in Norfolk Va.

Such requirements are not unique to the Navy Department.

---

**THE COMMAND STRUCTURE (Concentrating on the Pacific Command)**

![Diagram of the command structure]

---

European Command — responsible for contingencies in Europe (and NATO commitments), and Africa north of the Sahara. Headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany.


Strike Command — responsible for world-wide deployment of combat forces and contingencies in Middle East, Southern Asia and Africa south of the Sahara. Headquartered in Florida.

Southern Command — responsible for defending the Panama Canal and for contingency missions in Central and South America. Headquartered in the Panama Canal Zone.

---

**DIVIDING THE SPOILS**

Command of these forces is divided among the services as sort of the spoils of world military power:


These are important jobs for the services because each of these commanders is a four-star general or admiral (regardless of whether he has hundreds..."

*See October issue of the *Forum* "The U.S. Army In Europe" for a more detailed explanation of European Command.*
or thousands of combat troops under his command as in Europe and the Pacific, or a battalion handful as in Alaska and the Southern Command). He usually has a four-star deputy and each service provides a four-star officer as a component commander to control the forces that the service assigns to the unified command. The unified and specified command structure ensures slots for a large number of generals, admirals and colonels on active duty.

And it is through the component commanders that the services covertly control their own forces despite the theory of unified command. This is possible because the component commanders report directly to their service on supply, equipment, maintenance, administration and discipline and it is through them that the unified commander must exercise his "operational command." This situation has existed for some time despite the wording of the 1958 Amendment to the National Security Act enacted by the Congress. These are the same conditions that President Eisenhower denounced in his message to the Congress in 1958 and they continue unchanged today. Thus the advice of one of our greatest wartime leaders and the intent of the Congress goes unheeded by the military services and promises to continue unheeded. A recent example of the lack of responsiveness has been the organization of our forces in Vietnam. To avoid their forces coming under the command of a Navy admiral (Pacific Commander) the Army sought and obtained JCS agreement to form a sub-unified command (Military Assistance Command Vietnam — MACV) under the command of a four-star Army general. However, the Army, Navy and Air Force component commanders in MACV and Pacific Command receive supervisory direction directly from their respective military department in Washington. 6

ORGANIZATIONAL COVER UP

The Commission sums up this situation by saying, "The net result is an organizational structure in which "unification" of either command or of the forces is more cosmetic than substantive.

The Fitzhugh Commission recommends a reorganization of the existing command structure to improve the capability and effectiveness of the combat forces, "with commands that are mission-oriented and with operational command lines that are direct, clear and unambiguous." They recommend for example abolishing the Alaskan Command and the Southern Command and merging the Atlantic Command and the Strike Command. But they recommend creating three new major commands (1) Strategic Command (2) Tactical Command and (3) Logistics Command. And they believe the unified commanders should be given unfragmented command authority with component commanders designated as deputies to the unified commander.

The findings of the Commission which indicate that "The present combatant command structure does not facilitate the solution of many serious problems which materially affect the security of the nation" certainly justify the recommendations they have made. A few professional military officers such as General Ridgeway and Admiral Rickover have been trying to tell the nation and the Congress these same ominous facts for several years. The most conclusive indictment of the present command structure is contained in the panel statement that, "The present structure of eight unified and specified commands has proven cumbersome, imposes too broad a span of control for a single decision point in time of peace, is excessively layered, unwieldy and unworkable in crisis, and too fragmented to provide the best potential for coordinated response to a general war situation." (italics mine)

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

OVERSTUFFED STAFF

An important finding of the Commission concerns the size of the staffs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military department headquarters. They believe that these staffs are "so overstaffed as to reduce their capability." Few professional military officers who have served in the Pentagon would disagree with this finding. And most would heartily endorse the Commission's recommendation to limit the staff of the Secretary of Defense and each of the military departments no more than 2000 people. Many would even recommend reducing these staffs further. Most would also agree with the recommendation to limit the size of the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to include only a Joint Staff of 250 officers plus required civilian analysts, if the Joint Chiefs of Staff are removed from the operational chain of command. The Panel reports that a "functional analysis of these staffs reveals an astonishing lack of organizational focus and a highly excessive degree of "coordination," a substantial portion of which entails the writing of memoranda back and forth between lower echelons of parallel organizational elements which serves no apparent useful or productive purpose."

The Commission found that, "officers and enlisted men are rotated among assignments at much too frequent intervals and it is clear from the evidence that the rotation practices which have been followed result in (a) excessive and wasteful cost, (b) inefficiencies in management and (c) difficulty in fixing responsibility." Much of this personnel rotation is done to permit career development rather than in the best interests of the services. In my opinion the Commission should also have related these rotation policies to the problem of retaining qualified men in the Services. Because of

6 It is of interest to note that both General Westmoreland and General Abrams as Sub-Unified Commander in Vietnam, have chosen to be their own Army component commander.
Another problem revealed in the panel’s report is the favoritism and discrimination that exist in service advancement policies. The report finds that, “The Service Academies produce a relatively small proportion of the officers entering the services — in recent years less than 4%.” The Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) was found to produce “9 times as many [officers] as the Service Academies.” The Commission rationalizes the fact that for example out of 520 Army general officers on active duty in 1969, 366 were graduates of West Point while only 154 were from ROTC or other sources. Of these 154 general officers only 3 were serving in a grade higher than Major General! This indicates the degree to which the top command ranks are reserved for graduates of the Service Academies and is indicative of the discrimination which exists. And of this 520 total only one was a Negro officer despite the fact that Negroes comprised 8.7 percent (283,724 personnel) of the armed forces strength in 1969.

CLOSED SHOP

The Commission believes that a lesser number of ROTC officers were needed in the higher grades because the major thrust of the officers’ education was oriented toward a civilian career. In my judgment this is not the case. A more logical explanation of the higher retention rates of Service Academy graduates compared to ROTC graduates is that the Academy graduate knows from the day of his graduation that he has a better chance of attaining high rank in his service than the graduate of a civilian college or university. The ROTC graduate has but to look at the present Army command structure (where only one of 16 four-star generals is not a graduate of West Point) and consider the fact that in sixty-seven years only two non-West Pointers have served as Chief of Staff of the Army to realize what a “closed shop” he must serve in. In my 20 years experience it is this favoritism, more than the need for lesser numbers of ROTC graduates that cause them to reject a service career. In an nation which prides itself on civilian leadership of its armed forces it seems particularly incongruous that graduates of its civilian colleges are not considered as being needed to fill the high military ranks that command those same armed forces.

The civilian leadership of the services and the Armed Services Committees of the Congress should begin to take more than a perfunctory interest in the selection and approval of the promotion of officers to general and flag rank. Requiring them to appear before one of the sub-committees of the Armed Services Committees prior to confirmation would be a logical beginning.

POWER OF PROMOTION

The Fitzhugh Report also focuses on the influence which the chief of a military service exerts (without benefit of law or procedure) on the selection of officer promotion boards and on their decisions. Although by law this is the prerogative of the Secretary of the military service, in fact it has (with few exceptions such as Cyrus Vance as Secretary of the Army) been the function of the Chief of Staff. The knowledge that this parent service holds the exclusive authority to promote him does not cause an officer — even when assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff — to take positions which are unfavorable to his service’s cause. The Commission understates the case when it says, “There can be no question that many officers are convinced that any evidence of a deviation by them from their parent service’s official position will seriously jeopardize their chance for further promotion.”

There are other topics in the 237 page Fitzhugh Report worth separate critical articles; here are a few areas of concern:

Logistics — The findings show that the logistics system of the Department of Defense is too decentralized and fragmented in functional assignments. Despite years of ever-increasing growth of the size of the logistics forces, the panel reported: "The current inventory management, distribution, maintenance (about one-third of all Department of Defense personnel were found to be involved in the maintenance function), and the transportation systems are needlessly inefficient and wasteful, and even more important, fall far short of the potential for effectiveness of the support of combatant commanders."

UNCOORDINATED

One of the reasons for this lack of effectiveness is traced to the fact that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has permitted the services and the defense agencies to develop management systems unilaterally and independently without regard to inter-service compatibility or relationship of systems. For example it is revealed in the report that the Army is in the process of implementing an Automatic Data Processing system that is in some ways less advanced than the one the Air Force is attempting to replace!

This finding will probably come as a considerable surprise to the public which has been accustomed to thinking that their military services were equipping themselves with the most modern and sophisticated equipment available and hence the ever-spiraling defense costs. One cannot help but wonder where the money has gone if not for technology.

Civil Disturbance — On page 41 of the Report the Commission indicates that they consider the delegation of responsibility for contingency planning and command of forces in civil disturbances to the Department of the Army inconsistent with normal command arrangements and the spirit of the Defense Reorganization Amendments of 1958. They recommend this responsibility be transferred to the Tactical Command. I heartily disagree with this recommendation. I do not believe that such internal police power belongs to the Army even as an executive agent. The responsibility for planning for and controlling civil disturbances in the United States is to my thinking more naturally the function of the Department of Justice rather than any military department. Such internal control should not continue to be given to the military departments and should certainly not be delegated to a particular unified Commander. To make such a mistake is in my estimation to stretch dangerously the fabric of our free society.

Civic Action — I was also disappointed by the very brief notice which the panel gave to the possibilities of a domestic action role for the armed forces. Their recommendation that, "A study be made as to how the successful techniques developed by our armed forces in Vietnam could be applied to working with minority and other disadvantaged groups in this country" is much too cavalier treatment for a subject that holds such tremendous potential for both the armed forces and the country.

More attention should be given to the possibilities of putting this knowledge and experience to work helping Americans live better and in improving and protecting the ecology of our country.

Post - Fitzhugh Commission Developments.

After a review of Department of Defense organization in 1953 the Rockefeller Committee had this to say:

It is essential to keep in mind that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were established as a planning and advisory group, not to exercise command. The National Security Act emphasized their planning and advisory role. The committee considers it unfortunate that this concept of the National Security Act has always been obscured in actual practice . . .

JUST AS TRUE TODAY

The Fitzhugh Commission Report has this to say: "The recommendations of the Rockefeller Committee to eliminate the Joint Chiefs of Staff from duties involving operational command of combatant forces is as well taken today as in 1953, if not more so, but this time the change should be made in such a clear and unequivocal way that it cannot be circumvented."

A recent Associated Press news release published in the Washington Post announced that Defense Secretary Melvin Laird had approved a plan for a new national military chain of command. According to the release, "The new setup puts the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the top of the new operational command." It also states that, "Orders would come to Moorer (Chairman of JCS) from Laird or the President and he would execute them through the seven unified commands of the services." The change stems from a major recommendation of a blue ribbon panel which studied defense organization for a year. The panel also suggested a more reduced role for the joint chiefs. Laird's decision is seen as softening the blow in this area."

These actions by the Secretary of Defense do not appear to be in keeping with the intent of the Fitzhugh Commission recommendations of a reduced role for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a shortening of command lines to establish direct operational control from the Secretary of Defense to the unified Commanders. Neither do they appear consistent with statutory prohibitions against the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercising command functions or the repeated rejection by the Congress of the single chief of staff concept for the armed forces.

This latest announcement rather appears to in-
dicate that again the provisions of the National Security Act are going to be circumvented in the interest of placating military pride and desire to remain in the operational command channels.

Perhaps, as many have long suspected, the only way to remedy the many deficiencies within the Department of Defense is either by integrating or drastically restructuring the military services. The Commission, however, recommends against changes as drastic as elimination of the separate services at this time except "for the most crucial need." But they do recommend that the President and the Secretary of Defense reconsider this important matter after the Commission's recommendations for immediate actions have been observed and evaluated.

In any event the interest of national defense should be more important than the desires and parochial needs of the military services. Now is the time for civilian leadership to take strong action to implement those recommendations of the Fitzhugh Commission which will bring our defense establishment into a coordinated, harmonious effort at the highest efficiency and lowest possible cost. It serves no purpose to continue to search for scapegoats each time this foreordained organization fails in time of national crisis. Now is the time for reform.

The danger is that this report will be filed away like others and forgotten while the American people go on paying for a too costly, wasteful and inefficient defense establishment. This should not be allowed to happen again.  

EDWARD L. KING

---

The South - from page 17

dangerously close to 2 to 1. Rockefeller also suffered from the grievances accumulated during two terms of battling the state legislature and asking for new taxes, from his own awkwardness as a public speaker, and from a delayed and unexpectedly strong reaction to his personal wealth and his campaign spending. Bumpers, a cattle rancher and attorney of moderate means, took pains to emphasize the contrast between his station and Rockefeller's, and the liberal Arkansas Gazette, which had supported the Governor through most of his struggle to enact reform legislation, turned on him for the "fantastic level of spending" in his reelection effort. But the noticeable desertion of Rockefeller by liberals, moderates and blacks was due not to anything he had done or failed to do, but to the fact that he was a Republican at a time when "Republican" in most voters' minds was defined in terms of the prevailing Administration rhetoric. A final factor in Rockefeller's defeat was that the state's Democratic party, more than his own party, had understood the significance of his success. Before Rockefeller's victory over segregationist Jim Johnson in 1966, a young moderate like Dale Bumpers could never have won the Democratic nomination. But the more forward-looking of the state's Democratic leaders have tried to adapt to the changes in Arkansas, and Bumpers is only one of a number of promising new figures who have risen to leadership in the party and the state.

---

ANTI-SOUTHERN

All in all, the results of the 1970 election in the South indicated a massive disaffection with the Administration's economic policies and with the Republican party's increasing dependence on mindless media campaigns in place of reasoned discussions of relevant issues. Blacks, liberals, urban moderates, and the young continued to be driven away from even the more progressive Republican candidates, and in South Carolina, North Carolina, Florida, Texas, and Georgia (where Democrat Jimmy Carter trounced Hal Suit) there was hard evidence that rural and Wallace voters were continuing to vote Democratic. Perhaps above all, Southerners appeared to be recognizing the Administration's demagogy on the race issue, on law and order and on the Haynsworth and Carswell nominations as a continuation of the cynical attempts by corporate interests, largely Northern, to distract them from the social and economic issues that affect their lives. And though these appeals were unfailingly couched in terms of sympathy for the South, the voters also began to see them as an indication of contempt for all Southerners, black and white alike.

MICHAEL S. LOTTMAN
Un-Housewife, Un-Suburban, Un-Blue-Collar

The Real Majority, by Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, (Coward-McCann, New York, 1970. 305 pages, $7.95)

Every so often, a book is written that seems to capture a political mood; it is then credited with a tremendous impact on the political scene. Last year, that book was Kevin Phillips' The Emerging Republican Majority; this year, it is surely The Real Majority by Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg. President Nixon is said to have recommended it to all Republicans. Among other effects, The Real Majority is credited with causing the attempted excommunication of John Kenneth Galbraith from the Democratic Party; Adlai Stevenson III's addition of Chicago Eight prosecutor Thomas Foran to his campaign staff; Hubert Humphrey and Ted Kennedy shifting to the right; and an Oliphant cartoon captioned, "Sheriff, there's some liberal candidates wantin' to be deputized through the November elections!"

The book has more in common with Phillips' than its topicality: it is probably more a symptom than a cause of events; it relies heavily on statistics (often misused) to score its points; it urges its party (in this case, the Democrats) to get tough on law and order; and it has impressively composed politicians who wanted to hear its message and who are mesmerized by any argument punctuated with percentages. Above all, it is the clarion call of the Mayor Daley wing of the Democratic Party.

Perhaps the best thing that can be said about the book is that the authors — Scammon is director of the Elections Research Center and Wattenberg, a former Johnson aide, writes speeches for Humphrey — set forth their argument in clear, almost syllogistic form. It would not do them a great injustice to boil their case down to six propositions:

1. The American electorate is "unyoung, unpoor, unblack."
2. Most voters live in "Quadrali," which consists of the large industrial states of the Northeast and Great Lakes, plus California. "Carry Quadral — win the election. Lose Quadral — lose the election."
3. The average voter is therefore "a forty-seven year-old housewife from the outskirts of Dayton, Ohio, whose husband is a machinist."
4. Economic issues have been replaced in the voters' minds as the most salient issues by the Social Issue, which includes crime, race, the youth culture, morality, the Protestant ethic, and war protest. The Dayton housewife is worried about all of these.
5. To win elections, play for the middle of the road.
6. Ergo, the Democrats must neutralize law and order issues by getting tough, while preserving their liberalism on economic issues.

To take each point in turn:

1. The most serious proponents of a Kennedy/McCarthy coalition never claimed that the young, the poor, and the black equal a majority. Kennedy aimed for blue-collar workers (and won them), McCarthy's appeal was to suburban white-collarites. And Michael Rappaport argues convincingly in the September 1970 Washington Monthly that the behavior of the 18-year old voters in 1972 cannot be inferred from the behavior of 21-year old voters in 1968. For one thing, the new voters are of a different political generation, born seven years later: the youngest 1968 voters entered high school around 1961, the youngest 1972 voters in 1968. Quite a different set of formative experiences, reflected in polls showing more liberal attitudes. Second, their turnout rate (especially among collegians) will be higher, with lower residency requirements. And third, their impact will be concentrated, in Congressional districts that include colleges. All in all, 19 percent of the potential electorate of 1972 will have been too young to vote in 1968.

2. While no realistic politician would downgrade the importance of "Quadrali," the present incumbent of the White House — like Wilson and Truman before him — eked out a victory without sweeping the region. Surely they are the exceptions who prove the rule by doing inordinately well in the rest of the nation — but the rule is not as categorical as Scammon and Wattenberg claim.

3. The image of the Dayton housewife is probably the most famous — and the most unfortunate — of the book. For if the electorate is unyoung, unpoor, and unblack, is it not true that it is also un-forty-seven-year-old, un-housewife, un-suburban, un-Ohioan, and un-blue-collar? We can play this numbers game ad infinitum: if (as the authors show) 9 percent of the electorate is black, why is our housewife not 9 percent black? Why is she not a thirty-seven-year-old doctor's wife from Scarsdale who is concerned about getting us out of Vietnam? Or a fifty-two-year-old auto-worker's wife from Hamtramck who is worried about whether her husband will be laid off?

Indeed, the good lady from Dayton is like the proverbial fellow with his head in an oven and his feet in an icebox, who is, on the average, comfortable. By subtly portraying her characteristics — middle-aged and hence conservative, suburban and hence fearful for property values, blue-collar and hence "hard-hatted" — the authors lead us to conclude that the mass of voters — the 70 percent who are neither young nor poor nor black — fit our stereotypes of middle-aged, blue-collar, suburban Ohioans. She is, on the other hand, merely one type in millions, no more or less "typical" than the Scarsdale peacenik or the Hamtramck unemployed. But she has the advantage over her Scarsdale and Hamtramck peers in that she fits the author's prescriptions far better.

4. Surely law and order issues are more salient now than ever before, but to call them the dominant issues is stretching a point. Forty percent of Americans polled by the Survey Research Center in 1968 called the war the main issue, a total higher than all the law and order issues combined. And if the Dayton lady's machinist husband is laid off, you can bet that she'll find other things to worry about than the Black Panthers.
Law and order, I suspect, will go down in history with Prohibition, (Joe) McCarthyism, and getting tough with Castro — issues of national impact during a particular period, but of no lasting effect. It should be noted that law and order and the Supreme Court become salient political issues during times of great stress — the 1850's (bleeding Kansas, John Brown, Dred Scott), the 1890's (Haymarket, Pullman Strike, Coxey's Army), and the 1930's (industrial disputes, Milo Reno, the Nine Old Men). But as conditions stabilize, these issues subside.

Indeed, in research done for a forthcoming book by Sar A. Levitan (Blue Collar Blues: McGraw-Hill, 1971), I found that lower middle-income whites in blue-collar occupations were not much tougher on law-and-order issues than the rest of the white population; the big difference was that these workers were far more alienated from the political system (especially the parties). It may be this, and not the so-called Social Issue, that will be the greatest problem for government for years to come.

This seems to be borne out in one of Scammon and Wattenberg's statistical tables, showing the results of two Gallup polls in 1963 and 1969. From 1963 to 1969, the number of people who called themselves liberals dropped 16 percent, but the self-described conservatives rose only by 5 percent. The big gain (11 percent) was in the "no opinion" group, which the authors call "plain confused" — which I would prefer to call alienated from standard political categories.

(5) Like "Quadaki," the middle-of-the-road strategy is usually prudent, but not always. Anthony Downs, in An Economic Theory of Democracy, points out that in a polarized situation, playing for the center is the worst strategy. Certainly this was the experience in 1960, when the most anti-Southern candidate won the Presidency, and in 1969, when the most liberal candidate for mayor of New York emerged victorious. But particularly in a two-way race, the strategy is wise — if you can rank the candidates on a left-to-right spectrum. On different issues, they may diverge; this is perhaps why Humphrey (the middle candidate on economic issues) nearly beat Nixon (the middle candidate on law and order). All this is to say that Scammon and Wattenberg might have been more accurate to heed the post-election analysis by the unsuccessful candidate who explained his opponent's victory: "He got more votes." That, and not necessarily a play for the middle, is how elections are won.

(6) Much blood and thunder has been expended by the Loyal Opposition in their fratricidal warfare over Scammon and Wattenberg's advice to get tough on law and order. The columnists of the Democratic left — notably James Wechsler and Mankiewicz and Braden — accuse the authors of selling the soul of the Party down the river for a few votes. This is a matter for them to decide; we at Ripon have enough problems trying to keep the GOP faithful. But there are some secular observations to be made here.

One is that Democrats can win on other issues, as long as they don't come out foursquare for rape or miscegenation. Those issues include, of course, the war, the economy, ecology, and the personalities of the candidates. Once everybody proves that he is not in favor of crime — an easier matter than Scammon and Wattenberg seem to think — we can move on to other things.

Second, the Democrats are making a mistake if they think they can win elections by sawing off their Kennedy/McCarthy wing and letting it float out to sea. The young activists may not vote as plentifully as blue-collar workers, but they provide the party with manpower, which may be just as important. In a review of the book for the New York Times, Wilson Carey McWilliams points out that the black voters may not have stayed at home in 1968 if the Kennedy/McCarthy kids had gone out to urge them to the polls. Scammon and Wattenberg scoff at this, asking, who are the dissidents going to support, the Republicans? The answer is simple — they can, and did, stay home.

Third, Scammon and Wattenberg make a distinction between 'moderating" and "immoderating" elections; campaigns in which law and order issues take the candidates into the gutter fall into the latter category. Good citizens that they are, the authors plead for moderation. But if they are to encourage the parties to vie with each other for the tough-on-law-and-order crown, what safeguards are built into the system to prevent irresponsible rhetoric?

Finally, where does all this talk about law and order leave the Bill of Rights?

* * *

One major flaw in the book is the under-emphasis on the breakup of the New Deal coalition. Scammon and Wattenberg state categorically, "With only the one exception of the South, and despite all the hoopla about the 'breakup' of the FDR Democratic coalition, the voting results of 1968 were not terribly different from the voting results of 1944."

Let's look at the record — Gallup results of white voters outside the South in 1968 (as reproduced in Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab's The Politics of Unreason). Humphrey won 54 percent of manual workers, 44 percent of people earning under $3000, 58 percent of Catholics, and 53 percent of people living in cities of 1,000,000 or more. And these are percentages of the major-party vote; his share of the total vote was still lower. For a New Deal Democrat to net such minimal votes in these basic New Deal constituencies indicates that a lot has been happening outside the South, as well as in the South, since 1944. Why Scammon and Wattenberg do not relate the alleged decline of economic issues to a realignment of voters remains a puzzle.

Finally, their proposals for Republicans are the most sensible in the book. "There has been much talk of a Southern Strategy, a Border State Strategy, a Sun State Strategy," they note. "Those are excellent strategies to convince your opponents to use;" For the party to move right, they add, would be to invite a replay of 1964. Furthermore, if Democrats neutralize law and order by moving right, Republicans would be wise to neutralize economic issues by moving left.

And their best advice is to Mr. Agnew: "The Social Issue is a good issue until one goes too far with it. If carried to a point where pro-Social Issue becomes in itself a disrupting and chaotic influence, it can begin to be a vote loser, not a vote gainer." Too bad these sentences are in a footnote; if they were more prominent, the book might not be touted as a bible by the coy strategists who roam the White House corridors.

HOWARD L. REITER
LETTERS

14a ELIOT STREET

BAYLEY WINS

It took until November 12 for the absentee ballots to be counted and a recount may be forthcoming, but it appears that Christopher W. Bayley has been elected King County (Seattle) prosecuting attorney. The final margin, 3,150 votes, or slightly less than one-half of one percent, Bayley, who had expected a larger margin of victory, suffered from a last-minute ad campaign produced by his Democratic opponent, Edward Heaney. Heaney’s ads succeeded in linking Bayley with Republican Governor Dan Evans and Attorney General Slade Gorton. Evans is extremely unpopular in Washington State — plagued by unemployment and tax problems. His tax refund package was turned down by a vast majority of voters on November 3.

- The New York chapter met in September with Steve Hansen, who was at the time the only Republican Assemblyman from Manhattan. Hansen described the political maneuvering that had sprung his landmark judicial reform bill from committee and the political pressures that eventually killed it. (Hansen, an outstanding young legislator, was narrowly defeated for reelection in November. Now there are no Republican Assemblymen from Manhattan.)

Shortly after the New York prisons erupted in October, the chapter met with Michael J. Donzis, Mayor Lindsay’s chief counsel, who represented City Hall in the marathon negotiations with the inmates. Donzis was surprisingly pessimistic about negotiations as a method of dealing with prison riots. He foresaw little improvement in the city’s prison system until the whole criminal court system is overhauled.

Following the victory of Senator-Elect Buckley, chapter members drowned their sorrows at a Ripon-sponsored election night gala — a fitting prelude for a talk on “Alcohol and Politics” at the group’s November luncheon by Joel A. Benett, executive director of the New York Council on Alcoholism. Slated to meet with New York Ripon in December are Rep. Ogden Reid and Environmental Protection Administrator Jerome Kretchmer.

F. Clifton White, evil genius of the Right, who managed the Buckley Senate campaign, will be the guest of the chapter at a January meeting.

- Executive Director Bob Behm visited with Pennsylvania Ripon members and many interested guests at the Allenberry Assembly on September 19-20 in central Pennsylvania. The gathering of about 100 persons was patterned after the Airlie Conference last March. Sponsored by the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh chapters, the purpose of the affair was not only to deal with several important Pennsylvania issues (Education, Revenue for the Seventies, and the Criminal Justice System) but also to begin building a statewide moderate Republican network.

The Assembly was keynoted by Pennsylvania State Republican Chairman Cliff Jones and closed the next day with an address by Senator Hugh Scott. The group also met with Republican lieutenant governor candidate Judge Ralph F. Scalera and heard a telephoned message from the gubernatorial candidate Raymond J. Braddock. Speakers included District Attorney Art Spector (Philadelphia) Mitt Moss (Montgomery) and Bill Morgan (Warren), United States Attorney Dick Thornburgh, Special Assistant Attorney General Bob Gleason, Republican Platform Chairman H. John Heinz III, Elliot Curson, who did the Specter-Golds campaign advertising, and Bob Colonna, a Pittsburgh campaign consultant. In addition, many candidates and officeholders were in evidence, as were many political activists from every part of the state.

The Assembly Chairman was Steve Harmelin of Philadelphia; he was assisted by Chapter Presidents Dick Block and Jim Seif. Next Spring the two chapters plan to hold a series of local seminars centered on the same issues of the 1971 campaign year. Persons interested in the assembly idea for their state may get in touch with Steve Harmelin or Jim Seif through 14a Eliot St.

A MATTER OF DEFINITION

Dear Madam:

In the masthead of the Ripon FORUM is a description of The Ripon Society, Inc. as a “Republican research and policy organization whose members are young, business, academic and professional men and women” (emphasis added).

I have been asked several times if there were any maximum age for Riponites and have been asked what is “young.”

I am at a loss to define “young”. Several times in my life I have changed the definition.

At the time my first child was born, I considered everyone up to thirty years as being young.

Now that I am 40, I have pressed the definition of young up to 55 years.

It seems to me that the concept of “young” is relative. Perhaps some thought could be given to deleting that word. It has been my feeling that the desired connotation is one of vitality and activism.

H. GEORGE TAYLOR
Fonoma, California

NEW JERSEY POLITICS

Dear Madam:

Just a note to compliment the writer of your article concerning the New Jersey U.S. Senate race appearing in the Ripon FORUM for October, 1970.

He missed the spelling of my name and the name of the community in which I served as commissioner (Ridgewood), but did a remarkably fine job of succinctly stating my position on a number of issues which I discussed in the campaign. I had begun to despair that nobody paid any attention to these pronouncements and still wonder how your writer managed to be so well informed.

All in all, I thought the piece was a remarkably incisive analysis of the situation in New Jersey at the time it was written.

JAMES A. QUAREMBA
New York, New York

TEXAS POLITICS

Dear Madam:

I would like to take this opportunity to firstly congratulate you on your extremely accurate description and analysis of the Republican Party in Texas. As a past president of the University of Houston Young Republicans, a campaign worker for Misters Bush and Eggers, a delegate to the Harris County Republican Convention in 1968, an alternate delegate to the State Republican Convention in 1968, an organizer of the Harris County New Majority for Rockefeller in 1968 and as a member of the now, for all practical purposes, defunct New Republicans for Progress (a local group of moderate to liberal Republicans who sought to widen the base of support for the Republican Party here in Harris County), I have seen first hand many of the problems and mistakes that your article enumerated. The recent defeat of Mr. Bush and Mr. Eggers, was due in no small part, I believe, to the mistaken view of the Texas GOP that the way to win statewide elections in Texas is by trying to "out-conservatize the Democrats." It is just unfortunate that the Texas GOP and the National Party, thanks to ... Nixon and Agnew, are trying to make our Party the Party of fear and reaction. ...

F. RAYMOND BALCH
Houston, Texas
December may be a cold, cruel month for Republicans. After the din of the fall campaign subsides, this Administration will have to reconcile its politics with its policy for governing the nation. That may be more than the present leadership can bear.

President Nixon has publicly committed himself to an era of reform, dedicated not only to improving established domestic programs, but to fashioning new policies able to meet the challenge of a post-industrial society. What other President in recent memory has done as much to put the Federal budgeting process on such a rational basis, challenge an outdated and degrading welfare system and open building trades to black Americans? His eloquent address to Congress in September outlines his proposals for a new era of reform might well have offered a campaign platform for all Republican candidates this fall.

The politics of this Administration dictated, however, that the President leave this lofty vision of America behind him on the campaign trail to concentrate instead on the negative connotations of the already-oversold “social issue.” The family assistance and Philadelphia plans were pushed well into the background.

Symptomatic of the President’s dilemma was the Administration’s obvious displeasure when news of George Romney’s ambitious plans to promote scattered-site low-income housing in the suburbs leaked out before the elections. While providing an answer to the problem of rising unemployment in the inner city by getting workers out to jobs in new suburban industries, the obvious effect of integrating the suburbs was bound to evoke criticism from Nixon’s more conservative constituency. “We’ve been doing our thing quietly,” one HUD official told the National Journal, which broke the story October 17, “but we really plan to fly after the November elections.” Unfortunately the President now finds himself in the awkward position of having campaigned on the kind of back-lash appeal to suburbanites which will make acceptance of Romney’s plan within the party very difficult.

The Chotiner strategy to put Democrats on the defensive may reap short-term gains. But my guess is that the President will regret leaving reform at home. Staff members of John Gardner’s new organization, Common Cause, report that the most persistent theme in the 500-800 letters they receive daily is the desire for a positive approach to America’s problems, some way to bring the country back together. The President provided a basis for reconciliation in his September 11 address, noting that “if ours is not to be an age of revolution, it must be an age of reform...” Now he faces the task of getting the party he campaigned for and new conservative senators such as Brock and Buckley committed to the changes he himself has outlined for the Congress.

In his September 11 message to Congress, President Nixon committed himself to reordering national priorities with a particular emphasis on fiscal restraint. “Our priorities have changed,” he said in pointing out a relative decline in Defense-related activities. “But this change can be effective only in the context of disciplined and responsible fiscal policy.” Presumably his veto of the education bill August 11 after Congress authorized $453 million above administration requests met the criteria of “responsible fiscal policy.” No such veto followed passage, however, of a defense bill authorizing the Navy to spend $435 million more than the $27 billion budgeted by the President.

We can thank Senator Ellender for saving us from the Nixon farm bill mentioned in this column last month. After the high price supports for cotton and wheat written into the bill by Ellender had been dropped in conference committee, the Democratic leadership prevented passage in the Senate on the final day of the regular session. Majority Leader Mike Mansfield complained that Ellender had been “treated very shabbily by the House-Senate conference.” The Washington Post was more to the point in an editorial the following day. “When Senator Robert C. Byrd blocked the door of the Senate chamber so as to prevent a messenger from the House from delivering the farm bill conference report which the House had passed, his conduct was scarcely distinguishable from that of student agitators who occupy a building or fanatical demonstrators who stage a sitdown in the streets.”

The GOP seniority task force headed by Representative Barber Conable of New York is to be commended for recommending October 13 that House Republicans vote secretly to choose the top-ranking member of each committee. So far this needed reform to substitute leadership ability for seniority has only been a campaign issue. If adopted in January, however, it will rebound to the party’s credit. A similar Democratic task force would do well to follow the Republican lead.

HOWARD GILLETTE, JR.