

**White House: An End to the Silent Minority**

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**RIPON  
FORUM**

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MAY, 1973

Vol. IX, No. 9

ONE DOLLAR

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**SHAKE UP THE SALT**

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### Correction

A "Politics: People" note in the March FORUM magazine confused the identity of Robert F. Odell, Jr. and Robert C. Odle. Mr. Odell is the Finance Director of the Republican National Committee who spoke before the Massachusetts State Republican Finance Committee. Mr. Odle served as director of personnel and administration for the Committee to Re-elect the President. The FORUM sincerely regrets the error. And trying one more time, let's try to straighten out the ages of the under-26 crowd of Vermont Republican legislators: Thomas R. Haley, Jr., 23, Gregory E. Reed, 20, and James H. Douglas, 21. Omitted in the Correction in the April FORUM was Ripon National Associate Member Richard L. Cleveland, 25, who represents District 21.

**THE RIPON FORUM** is published semi-monthly by the Ripon Society, Inc., 14a Eliot Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138. Second class postage rates paid Boston, Massachusetts. Contents are copyrighted © 1972 by the Ripon Society, Inc. Correspondence to the Editor is welcomed.

In publishing this magazine the Ripon Society seeks to provide a forum for a spirit of criticism, innovation, and independent thinking within the Republican Party. Articles do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Ripon Society, unless they are explicitly so labelled.

**SUBSCRIPTION RATES** are \$10 a year, \$5 for students, servicemen, and for Peace Corps, Vista and other volunteers. Overseas air mail, \$10 extra. Advertising rates on request. \$10 of any contribution to the Ripon Society is credited for a subscription to the Ripon FORUM.

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# •Margin Release

BREED'S HILL — As one walks into the maximum security unit of the State School for Boys, one is not immediately depressed. It takes a minute or two.

Recently I visited Leggie (who was mentioned in the February Margin Release column) in his cell in the unit. Fifteen-year-old Leggie spends 23½ hours a day in his 6 x 10 foot cell in the middle of a 10-cell block. His cell is notably neater than most. His books are piled neatly by his bed. His mattress is on the concrete platform rather than torn into pieces and stuffed into the toilet to create a flood in the cell block. His blanket is on his bed rather than rolled, knotted and wet in order to knock the glass plate off the cell light. (Such are the diversions of juvenile cell life.) He lives alone (e.g., "solitary") so there is no overcrowding in his cell. But the unit, built for 10 kids, was holding 19 that night. The walls of Leggie's cell are even free from the usual pornographic drawings and scribbled initials. (In at least one other cell, racial epithets festoon the walls.) Only a few pinups adorn the wall and monthly calendars have been drawn laboriously along the side of the toilet.

If the label "incorrigible" was applied to any delinquent, it would probably fit Leggie. His record is stuffed with accusations ranging from breaking and entering, car theft, and mugging to arson, assault with a dangerous weapon (gun), and forcible escape. And yet, Leggie is a likable, industrious and bright "man." ("I'm not a kid; I've been a man ever since I was a baby," he says.)

Leggie has been locked up for about two months this year. Last year, he was locked up for periods of two months, two months, two months and three months. Some of it was in the comparative luxury of a cell with its own TV. But much of the time was spent in the depressing environment of the stark 6 x 10 foot cell.

Leggie stood by the door to his cell as I entered. He remained there, intent on the action and conversation in the cell corridor. During the next hour and a half, it became obvious that an escape plan had been formulated, weapons had been hidden and someone had squealed. Leggie, perhaps realizing that I am not as dumb as I look,

said, "You won't squeal on us, will you, Mr. Behn?" Depressed and annoyed, I mumbled that we would discuss the situation a little later. My tutoring session was cut short when Leggie was taken out for his daily break. We played ping pong while Leggie half-concentrated on the TV (although I was not convinced that the concentration was not an elaborate charade for overhearing the conversation of the guards on duty). A half hour later, Leggie was returned to his cell, having, as usual, completely obliterated me in Chinese torture.

I asked one guard what action had developed in the cell block. He unlocked a closet door and showed me two, foot-long sections of heavy-gauge angle-irons which had once been welded to the steel walls of the cell to keep them in place. Once welded, but now torn in pieces by the cell occupants, they had been torn clean off the walls and hidden in the cells. The potential for a crushed skull was evident.

"I can't get mad," said the guard. "I'd do the same thing if I were locked up." The cell block was full of familiar faces, juveniles who frequent the unit as often as some salesmen go to Holiday Inns. The guard mentioned his newest difficulties: the overcrowded cells; cell placements to minimize homosexuality, personality conflicts and racial antagonisms; and the most recent cell flooding. There was speculation that Leggie would be sent to an adult institution; at 15, he would be matriculated in a graduate school of crime. At 15.

A recent article in a *New York Times* series on juvenile justice quoted a juvenile judge as admitting that illegal acts are often committed by the family courts. Juvenile rights are rescinded without adult protections. The presumption of guilt is much stronger than in criminal courts. And far too often, the facilities for rehabilitation are no more effective than for adult offenders.

Pity the "squealer" if he is caught by his peers. Pity the peers who live in frustration and impotence. Pity the guards whose sensibilities are affronted by their own jobs. Pity the POW's. But these are not POW's. These are our own children. ■

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# Editorial Board COMMENTARY

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## The Suburban Middle Class Exodus

by *Ralph E. Thayer*

Throughout the 1950's and most of the 1960's, the great bulk of the American middle-class voiced a complete philosophical rejection of the city. Many had been raised in an atmosphere where it was instilled into them that their fortunes were inextricably related to the construction of barriers between "Urban Nirvana" and the inexorable tide of urban decay that their parents had only narrowly escaped. In such a climate, the building of bridges was almost impossible. But, something appears to be happening: young people are still living in suburban areas but a great many say that they do so only because they do not trust their children's educations

in city schools, or because they cannot secure financing to move into the urban center and create a different lifestyle. The city is not being rejected in the philosophical sense as it was a few years back. To highlight this trend, the Citizens' Advisory Committee on Environmental Quality in its Annual Report to the President and to the Council on Environmental Quality noted that . . . "in a number of cities many younger couples who could afford to move to suburbia are electing to stay and, in a voluntary rehabilitation effort of considerable magnitude, are converting the inner city blocks into healthy neighborhoods."

The impetus for much of this effort is dear to Republican hearts; it is emanating largely or totally from private resources. While it might be possible to attribute the sole source of the impetus to an ideological insistence on rejection of outside assistance which might profane a spiritual mission, such is not the case. Virtually all financial institutions have written off large areas of many cities as unsuitable for investment. A unique phenomenon often is noted in this regard; the chief official of the institution stands behind the banquet table proclaiming dedication to the urban cause while the middle-management loan officer rejects applications. And so the white, middle-class urban pioneer is forced to live the life of the lower income city dweller dependent for daily survival on his wits and pure luck.

Even such a rejection might be understandable. After all, financial institutions do not exercise their fiduciary responsibilities by propelling large amounts of cash willy nilly toward open urban windows. It is a luxury to live in a world of black and white (no pun intended) where it can be said with righteous certainty that money placed in Spot X will vanish without a productive trace. Past experience and present doubts have produced an abbreviated spectrum of urban investment alternatives at the precise time when many are craning their necks to see if the private sector fiscal work has yet settled in the chimney.

What private sector investment alternatives in the city remain to be

tried? Most of the private sector has been fiscally burned and as a result has drawn rather firm conclusions as to just how far they can or will go in urban programs. Their comfort and assurance emanates from the presence of urban "positives" . . . even the urban positives that say in effect, "we will lose here but at least we know that in advance and will bet accordingly." The proponent of this gambler spirit who will take all but the least chancy of urban investment alternatives is all too often the same one who is not above shading the returns in his favor or who will participate only if the stakes are set at artificially high levels of return. It is too easy to overlook the fact that HUD's Section 235 scandals were partially precipitated by private sector activity, or that the creation of large tax shelters to finance Section 236 constructions often resulted in "instant slums."

How this riverboat gambler syndrome can be trained to a shorter leash without deadening the inner city investment (incentives other than massive urban towers) is a serious question. One possible strategy would be to assist the smaller investor in acquiring and rehabilitating inner city housing. The presence of middle-class residents seems critical to urban rehabilitation. In such areas, investment is more likely. Just as the policy of cordoning multi-problem families in public housing was found to be folly, so the isolation of all lower income citizens is a serious mistake. Scatter-site housing does not work if the units are dispersed eighteen feet apart; other income groups must be present in the housing pattern.

Since there is already a growing trend to return and live in the city, this movement should be encouraged. Studies have indicated that the suburbs are opening their housing more frequently to low-income residents, although this process is more the result of the trickle-down of older, close-in housing than any evidence of good spirit. Were we to backfill and save many of the older areas, the dispersal of those now confined might well accelerate. There appears little hope for saving urban areas that have been completely abandoned to public housing; to define an area as being "saved"

in the absence of the middle-class generally is a serious delusion.

If we accept the return of the middle-class to the city as a major national goal, then we can dispense with much of the twaddle that seems to attend any incentives offered to middle-income citizens. Past investment incentives in the city benefitted the holder of large amounts of capital who could take advantage of the loopholes. What benefit did trickle down to the target groups could be, at best, characterized as grossly out of proportion to the input.

Several suggestions follow from the acceptance of such a goal.

First; if the powers of urban renewal agencies did not exist, then somebody would have to invent them. The fact is that inner city land is prohibitively expensive, thus causing architectural stalagmites to sprout skyward from launching pads surrounded by trivia and decay. If inner city investment could be dispersed more evenly, perhaps by using urban renewal powers on the basis of community improvement, a more even revitalization might be achieved by interspersing residential and commercial uses in a healthier mix.

Second; conservation and rehabilitation of existing housing stock should be made a prime national goal. (The introduction of the Administration's Environmental Protection Tax Act (HR 5584) with its provisions

for amortization of rehab properties is a step in the right direction.) In the heady rush to set housing production records, we have created many shoddy developments that have wasted valuable land and given rise to a burgeoning consumer move in housing. Urban sprawl has its limits, particularly if the increasingly serious fuel shortage forces limitations on automobile usage in the future.

Third; consideration should be given to adopting an idea originating with George Sternlieb of Rutgers and given prominence by former Assistant Secretary of HUD Samuel Jackson: the Urban Homestead Act. The gist of this idea is to make available at nominal cost to those willing to live in and improve the structure, housing which has been abandoned either formally or informally by non-resident owners. Foreclosure procedures would have to drastically be overhauled, tax abatements to generate owner investment created, and protection given these pioneers from capricious rezoning or highway intrusion. Commitment to this strategy would require a rethinking of our concept of property ownership even if the non-exercise of the responsibilities of ownership had created a worsening hazard to the public at large. We require flood insurance to protect the citizenry from foolish building practices for which we all must pay; there is no reason why we should permit another

group to pick the national pocket.

Naturally, this is not a complete and integrated housing policy; it represents some areas of significant concern. In general, the country has played to its strength: mass production. As a result the United States is the best housed nation in history. It is not, however, the most happily housed. Rather than tying up all ownership assistance funds in the somewhat aimless creation of one type of housing, a wider mix of ownership assistance should be made available in such a form as to be biased in favor of the recycling of our existing housing. The poor are certainly the most affected when the federal sluice gate controlling housing funds swings shut, or tapers off its flow. However, the limitations of most incentives to those in the very low or very high income categories has guaranteed that middle-class citizens devote their energies to erecting barriers to prevent the urban decay which they would be powerless to correct. A national housing strategy should place high priority on maintaining the quality of existing housing, thus assuaging current fears of a decline in the value of middle-class housing investments. When the middle-class blaze a trail back into areas of the city, it will trigger the strongest possible incentive for outside investment. This factor should not be overlooked any more than the needs of the ill-housed should be given a low priority. ■



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## Editorial Board COMMENTARY

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# The Third Nixon Adminis- tration

by *Robert D. Behn*

It has already been stated that the Watergate scandal, had it occurred in a European parliamentary democracy, would have brought down the government — the prime minister and his cabinet. But it will, in a sense, also bring down the Nixon government.

Certainly Richard Nixon will still be President, but the core of his staff, first assembled during the 1968 campaign, appears to be on the verge of collapse. The Constitution may have spared the President, but the scandal will have brought down the real cabinet.

Richard Nixon, like other Presidents before him, has been frustrated by his inability to make the executive branch responsive to his policies. John F. Kennedy attempted to circumvent the State Department's foreign policy bureaucracy by establishing, in the White House and directly under his control, an office where the nation's real foreign policy was made and carried out. Lyndon Johnson continued this tradition. During his first term, Nixon not only increased the influence and responsibilities of his White House foreign policy advisor, but established the Domestic Council under John Ehrlichman in an attempt to get a better grip on the civil service bureaucracies of those agencies with domestic responsibilities.

After four years, however, Nixon concluded that this was inadequate, particularly when many of the cabinet members heading the departments were former politicians with outside constituencies and independent proclivities. Thus, for the second term, the Nixon cabinet of faceless men contained only two secretaries, Elliot L. Richardson and Rogers C. B. Morton, who had previously held elective office and both had earned impeccable credentials as Nixon loyalists. In contrast, former Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson's independence — which included his refusal to acquiesce to the requests from White House aides that he attack Sen. George McGovern — was rewarded with an almost public dismissal. The lesson could not have been lost to others serving in the Administration.

Further, key sub-cabinet posts in various departments were filled with former White House aides who would maintain direct contact with Ehrlichman and White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman. From the Domestic Council staff, for example, went John C. Whitaker, an assistant Nixon campaign manager in 1968, to be undersecretary of Interior; Egil "Bud" Krogh, Jr., once a member of Ehrlichman's Seattle law firm, to be undersecretary of Transportation, and Edward L. Morgan to be assistant secretary of the Treasury.

White House control of departmental actions was also exercised through Ronald L. Ziegler, Nixon's press secretary, to whom all departmental press officers reported, and through William E. Timmons, Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs, who directed all departmental staff working on congressional relations. Last January, it was well understood in Washington that the key prerequisite for an important position in the second Nixon Administration was demonstrated loyalty, not demonstrated competence.

At the hub of this network of loyal, sub-cabinet officials was Haldeman, the man who most epitomized the loyalty complex. Now the Watergate scandal is being laid at Haldeman's doorstep — either because he knew about the espionage operation, or because he attempted to cover it up, or because he failed to investigate it —

and the result may be Haldeman's resignation.

Haldeman is now being compared with Sherman Adams, Dwight D. Eisenhower's chief-of-staff, and Watergate with the "influence peddling" Adams did for Boston textile manufacturer Bernard Goldfine. But the disappearance of Haldeman will be much more significant for Nixon's second term than Adams's resignation was for Eisenhower's. Haldeman has more power than Adams ever did, and Nixon is much more ambitious in his plans to change the government than Ike ever was.

Further, Adams resigned alone, while Haldeman, if he leaves, will be accompanied by many others. The result will be the decimation of the governing network so carefully constructed since last November.

Who will fill the void? Will loyalty or competence be the criterion for new policy makers and administrators? Will power and responsibility still be concentrated in the White House staff, with real administrative control exercised through a sub-cabinet network responsive directly to the President's chief-of-staff?

If the Nixon Administration is now to command a sense of legitimacy for its policy actions, the President must shift authority to a real *cabinet*. He will have to bring in people of recognized stature and competence to lead the Departments and permit them to choose their own undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. He must bring into his cabinet men and women who are dedicated to doing things, not being things.

The obsession with loyalty, which characterizes the staffs of elected chief executives of many municipal, state and national governments, has obvious liabilities. The Watergate espionage effort is only the latest example of what happens when internal staff competition and advancement reward those who are the most loyal.

The electoral mandate from President Nixon's November landslide has clearly been destroyed by the revelations about Watergate and its subsequent cover-up. The credibility and effectiveness of the third Nixon Administration now depends on the demonstrated competence of those whom the President selects to replace the super-loyalists. ■

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## COMMENTARY

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### In Re

# The Burger Court

by Robert G. Stewart

The Supreme Court decision upholding property tax financing of public schools is a prime example of what Burger Court judicial conservatism is all about: developed doctrine is adhered to and traditional values preserved; social progress, however, is thought to be the province of the legislature, not the Court.

In *San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez*, the Texas public education financing system came under attack as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Texas, the state provides funds for only a basic minimum level of education. Any additional funding must come at the district level through local property taxes. As a result, wealthy districts have better financed schools than poor districts, unless residents of the latter bear heavier tax burdens. This, it was argued, unconstitutionally discriminates against the poor in the distribution of an essential state service.

Traditional equal protection doctrine does not require that all public goods be distributed equally, only that any significant disparities be rationally related to effectuating a legitimate state policy.

Sensing, however, that traditional doctrine alone did not adequately deal with today's difficult racial and economic inequalities, and viewing itself as an instrument for social change, the Warren Court molded a stricter Fourteenth Amendment test which came to be known as the "New Equal Protection." Any statute which classi-

fied individuals for unequal treatment along "inherently suspect" lines, or any statute which unequally distributed burdens or benefits relating to "fundamental rights," was *presumptively invalid*. Only a strong justification for the unequal treatment, not mere rationality, would save the statute.

Because the Warren Court never defined "fundamental rights" or "suspect" classifications, except on a case by case basis, this doctrinal legacy was left open for development in accordance with a much more limited judicial philosophy.

In *Rodriguez*, the Burger Court majority found no "suspect" classification. Even if wealth might prove in some cases to be "suspect," wealth discrimination was not, in the view of the Court, an accurate description of the property tax system. Low tax base districts were not necessarily inhabited only by the poor, and it was only *individual* wealth, not community wealth, which even arguably could be a basis for a constitutional violation. The only positive correlation between educational expenditures and individual wealth could be found by contrasting the richest few districts with the poorest few and ignoring the middle 90 percent. While all children in all but the richest districts could be viewed as a class against whom the system discriminated, the Court felt that such a class had none of the traditional disabilities of a group needing "extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."

Of more doctrinal significance, the majority felt that education was not a "fundamental right" either, in spite of its enormous importance in a complex society, particularly for effective exercise of more traditional "fundamental rights" such as free speech or voting.

Rights are not to be judged "fundamental" in the constitutional sense, according to the majority, because of their *social importance*. Rather, the only "fundamental rights" of the citizenry are those written into the Constitution or readily implied therefrom. Effective exercise of these rights is a social *goal* which the Court would not "presume to possess either the ability or the authority" to implement by interfering with otherwise legitimate state activities.

Unable to fill either "New Equal Protection" criterion, the Court reverted to traditional doctrine, and upheld the property tax scheme as a rational way to assure local community participation in the process of education.

A more activist Court might have preferred dissenting Justice Thurgood Marshall's view of the role of the Court in equal protection cases. In his view, "equal protection of the laws" requires some judicial scrutiny of all statutory inequalities. Acceptable levels of justification for inequalities should depend on the importance of the rights involved and the nature of the discrimination. The importance of education *combined* with the undesirability of distributing such an essential service according to wealth requires, in Marshall's view, a higher standard of justification than Texas proffered in this case.

But the developed Warren Court doctrine did not say that, and the "New Equal Protection" allows for interpretation according to the more modest role of the Court seen by the Burger Court majority. In its view, traditional values only are to be guarded by the Court; the assertion of contemporary values is the function of the political process.

Practical factors buttressed the Court's conclusion. Revenue laws and educational policy are both complex balances of competing interests. Especially where, as here, a state appears to be doing its best to provide education fairly while effecting other legitimate policies, a Court might well tread lightly before it interferes by setting up rigid standards which might upset these balances. Furthermore, given research by Coleman, Jencks and others, it is no longer all that certain that educational expenditures are translated into significant social progress.

Thus, it is a combination of the Burger Court's limited view of its social role and an almost refreshing acknowledgment of its limitations in the area of policy which accounts for the *Rodriguez* result. It is the failure of the Warren Court to more precisely define its activist doctrine, however, which accounts for the ability of the new Court to effect a major shift in philosophy through that very same doctrine. ■

# POLITICS: REPORTS

## 1972 RIPON RATINGS

The 1972 Ripon Ratings for both the House of Representatives and the Senate are, as usual, dominated by Republicans. Eight representatives, all Republicans, scored 100 percent. They are U. S. Reps. John Anderson and Thomas Railsback of Illinois, Margaret Heckler of Massachusetts, Hamilton Fish, Jr. of New York, Gilbert Gude of Maryland, William Frenzel of Minnesota, and Paul McCloskey and William Mailliard of California. Other Republican representatives scoring 90 percent or more were Edward Biester, Jr. of Pennsylvania (94 percent), Silvio Conte of Massachusetts and H.J. (John) Heinz III of Pennsylvania (93), and Peter Peyser of New York (90). Three Democratic representatives scored 90 percent or above. They were U.S. Reps. Richard Hanna of California (93), Hugh Carey of New York (92) and Abner Mikva of Illinois (90).

Sen. Charles Percy of Illinois was the only member of the Senate to score 100 percent in the 1972 Ripon Ratings. The next eight positions were held by other Republican senators: Edward W. Brooke of Massachusetts (96), Jacob Javits of New York (92), Lowell Weicker, Jr. of Connecticut (90), Clifford Case of New Jersey, J. Caleb Boggs of Delaware, Mark O. Hatfield of Oregon, and James Pearson of Kansas (88). Sen. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R-Md.) scored 87 percent as did Democrat Fred Harris of Oklahoma. Sen. Robert Taft, Jr. (R-Ohio) followed with 86 percent.


In a form of amnesty to supporters of Administration Vietnam policy, the various end-the-war votes that loomed so large in the 1970 and 1971 Ripon Ratings were largely replaced by other votes indicating internationalism as opposed to isolationism or interventionism. In view of the termination of United States involvement in most Indo-china warfare that had been secured by the Nixon Administration by early 1973, it seems hard to argue persuasively that passage of the various 1972 end-the-war amendments would have materially hastened U.S. military disengagement from the disastrous Vietnam misadventure. The result of this deemphasis of 1972 Vietnam votes is to raise significantly the ratings of such persons as U.S. Rep. John Anderson of Illinois, and Senators Lowell Weicker of Connecticut and Robert Taft of Ohio, who had supported the Nixon Administration on anti-war votes but on other issues were usually identified with other moderate and progressive Republicans.

Votes were selected for inclusion in the determination of the Ripon Ratings if they met one or more of the following criteria:

- a) Expansion or preservation of civil liberties and individual autonomy against encroachment by government and by powerful quasi-governmental institutions such as corporations and labor unions.
- b) Attainment of equality of opportunity for Americans regardless of race, nationality, religious belief or sex.

- c) Devolution of governmental powers to governments closest to and most accountable to the individual citizen and privatization of policy execution as opposed to bureaucratization.
- d) Maintenance of sound fiscal policies in both the domestic and international economy and consistent opposition to wasteful spending.
- e) Resistance to excess concentrations of governmental powers in a single entity and a parallel insistence upon candor and openness throughout governmental and quasi-governmental institutions.
- f) Internationalism in foreign policy and consequent development of multilateral approaches as opposed to interventionism or isolationism.
- g) Preservation and improvement of the environment and development of policies concerning population growth and natural resource consumption that will insure the possibility of a decent existence to future generations of Americans and foreign nationals.
- h) Reliance upon and expansion of free market mechanisms and consequent opposition to producer subsidies, unnecessary regulatory mechanisms, and protectionist international trade policies.

The Republican leadership in both the House and the Senate scored significantly higher than the Democratic leadership. The three top House Republicans, Minority Leader Gerald Ford of Michigan, Minority Whip Leslie Arends of Illinois and Conference Chairman John Anderson of Illinois, scored respectively 62, 57, and 100 percent. The three leading House Democrats, Speaker Carl Albert



of Oklahoma, Majority Leader Hale Boggs of Louisiana, and Majority Whip Thomas (Tip) O'Neill of Massachusetts scored 50, 70 and 64 respectively. Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania scored 75 and Minority Whip Robert Griffin of Michigan scored 74, while their Democratic counterparts, Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana and Majority Whip Robert Byrd of West Virginia, received respectively 57 and 32.

The end of the U.S. involvement in Indo-chinese warfare would seem likely to unite in a working coalition both anti-war Republican progressives and other moderate Republicans who through conviction or through party loyalty to a Republican President continued to support Administration policies. Republican progressives, who have often felt like a beleaguered minority within a minority in Con-



gress, are likely to find their ranks swelled as moderate Republicans with similar views feel freer to identify with them. In addition, it is likely that the Watergate Scandal and the related activities that are working mightily to discredit the Nixon Administration may create a stampede of many regular Republican congressmen to manifest their independence from the Nixon Administration and to identify on a number of issues with congressional progressive Republicans. At the moment, the suggestion of such a trend is largely conjecture, yet it may be possible to validate this occurrence about a year from now when the Ripon Ratings for this year's congressional session have been prepared.

The values underlying the Ripon Ratings are intensely libertarian and opposed to the arbitrary exercise of power by government at any level or by extraordinarily powerful private institutions. This approach contrasts sharply

with the bureaucratic liberalism of most Northern Democrats and the hostility toward individual liberties and free market mechanisms held by most Southern Democrats. It also contrasts with the excess statism now supported by much of the Republican right wing and the policies of economic cartelization and an excessively powerful executive that have unfortunately characterized the Nixon Administration despite its persistent limited government and free market rhetoric.

Yet if these libertarian values which are shared to a large degree by both progressive Republicans and Taft-like conservatives are to become a major influence on national policy, it is essential that the proponents of such a philosophy begin to take their case to the public. Republicans who believe in maximizing the scope of individual freedom must assume the initiative, rather than commiserating on their beleaguered state.

## Senate Votes

- 32 — An amendment by Sen. Harry F. Byrd, Jr. (I-Va.) which would have reduced from \$261,760,000 to \$150,000,000 funds for U.S. contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank (Vote Nay).
- 35 — An amendment by Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) to the Foreign Operations Appropriation to reduce funds for development loans from \$150 million to \$110 million and for technical assistance from \$165 million to \$140 million (Vote Nay).
- 52 — Third cloture vote on the equal employment bill (Vote Yea).
- 79 — An amendment by Sen. Robert J. Dole (R-Kansas) to withdraw from federal courts the jurisdiction to issue orders to require school busing on the basis of race and to postpone the effectiveness of all court-ordered busing plans until all appeals have been exhausted (Vote Nay).
- 89 — An amendment by Sen. Frank E. Moss (D-Utah) to require the President to cut all controllable appropriations at a uniform rate to maintain the ceiling (Vote Nay). While this amendment has a laudable objective of curtailing arbitrary Presidential impoundment, its mandatory "meat-ax" approach would eliminate any executive discretion, undoubtedly aggravating budgetary waste.
- 122 — A joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment to provide equal rights for men and women (Vote Yea).
- 125 — A motion to table the amendment by Sen. Howard Baker, Jr. (R-Tenn.) to repeal the equal time provisions for all candidates for federal elective offices (Vote Nay).
- 127 — A bill to enable producers of commercial eggs to stabilize and develop orderly marketing conditions for eggs (Vote Nay).
- 150 — The War Powers Bill, a bill to limit the war powers of the President in the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress (Vote Yea).
- 152 — An amendment by the late Sen. Allen J. Ellender (D-La.) to strike out the provision of S-3462 to establish a Rural Development Bank (Vote Yea).
- 178 — An amendment by Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) to require that all members of the Foreign Service grievance board be selected from a list of 15 nominees submitted by the American Arbitration Association (Vote Nay). This partial delegation of nomination powers to a private group, even one so distinguished as the American Arbitration Association, is very questionable constitutionally.
- 208 — An amendment by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) to increase from \$50 million to \$100 million the funds in the foreign aid authorization bill for assistance to Bangladesh (Vote Yea).
- 215 — An amendment by Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wisc.) to delete the \$450,000 in funds for the Subversive Activities Control Board (Vote Yea).
- 217 — An amendment by Sen. Roman Hruska (R-Neb.) to extend from January 1, 1973 to December 31, 1973 the effective date of a provision to limit the U.S. contribution to the United Nations to 25 percent of the U.N.'s operating budget (Vote Yea).
- 223 — An amendment to the foreign aid authorization bill by Sen. John Sparkman (D-Ala.) to strike from the bill provisions barring the use of funds to carry out executive agreements with Portugal and Bahrain until the agreements are submitted to the Senate as treaties (Vote Nay).
- 247 — An amendment to the OEO extension bill by Sen. Howard Baker, Jr. (R-Tenn.) to strike from the bill provisions to establish an independent National Legal Services Corporation (Vote Nay).
- 308 — A bill to authorize Fiscal 1973 funds for foreign aid and to provide for the withdrawal of all U.S. Forces from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos within four months after enactment, subject to the release of U.S. Prisoners of War (Vote Yea).
- 318 — A Senate Commerce Committee amendment to require that at least 50 percent of all oil imports, other than fuel oil, be carried in U.S. flag vessels (Vote Nay).
- 320 — An amendment by Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) to limit payments under the price support program to \$20,000 per person per crop per year, excluding payments for sugar and wool (Vote Yea).
- 324 — An amendment by Sen. Mark O. Hatfield (R-Ore.) to provide for the termination of the Selective Service Act on December 31, 1972 (Vote Yea).
- 348 — An amendment by Sen. Robert Taft, Jr. (R-Ohio) to provide that the \$5,000 non-repayable "forgiveness" grants in the SBA disaster loan bill be extended to only those that earn less than \$10,000 a year and whose damage exceeds \$5,000 (Vote Yea).
- 358 — A motion by Sen. Roman Hruska (R-Neb.) to send the bill to require states' no-fault auto insurance plans under minimum federal standards to the Senate Judiciary Committee for consideration (Vote Nay).
- 458 — An amendment by Sen. Joffn Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) to the federal highway program's authorization bill to permit the use of up to \$800 million in urban system funds for rail and other public transportation (Vote Yea).
- 480 — An amendment by Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wisc.) to reduce funds for the Inter-American Development Bank and to delete provisions authorizing \$100 million for the U.S. contribution to the Asian Development Bank (Vote Nay).
- 514 — Motion to table a motion by Sen. Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn.) to recommit the bill to the Senate Finance Committee with instructions to include in the bill the Ribicoff Administration's compromise program (Vote Nay).





HOUSE DEMOCRATS

Table listing House Democrats with columns for name, state, and a grid of 'X' marks. Includes names like Long, La., Macdonald, Mass., and Hansen, Idaho.

HOUSE REPUBLICANS

Table listing House Republicans with columns for name, state, and a grid of 'X' marks. Includes names like Anderson, Ill., Archer, Tex., and Hansen, Idaho.

HOUSE REPUBLICANS

Table listing House Republicans with columns for name, state, and a grid of 'X' marks. Includes names like Harsha, Ohio, Harvery, Mich., and Young, Fla.

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## STEIGER COMMISSION

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WASHINGTON, D.C. — The composition of the Rule 29 Committee chaired by U.S. Rep. William A. Steiger of Wisconsin, was announced April 16 by GOP National Chairman George Bush.

The two vice-chairpersons are Gov. James E. Holshouser of North Carolina and Mrs. Elmer M. Smith, national committeewoman from Iowa. The committee is empowered to "review, study and work with the States and territories relating to the Rules adopted by the 1972 Republican National Convention."

Other members of the committee are: Joe Abate, chairman of the College Republican National Federation; Fred Agnich, national committeeman for Texas; Mrs. Harlan J. Anderson, national committeewoman for Washington; John S. Andrews, chairman of the Midwest Republican State Chairmen's Association; Mrs. Norman C. Armitage, president of the National Federation of Republican Women; Mrs. Harold Barton, national committeewoman for Kentucky; Mrs. Charles

Black, special assistant to the President's Council on Environmental Quality; Ray C. Bliss, national committeeman for Ohio; Mark Bloomfield, law student at the University of Pennsylvania; the Hon. Christopher S. Bond, governor of Missouri; Sen. Edward Brooke from Massachusetts; Robert J. Brown, former special assistant to the President; Ms. Mary Ann Butters, aide to Mayor Richard Lugar of Indianapolis; Mrs. Max Coray, chairwoman of the Western State Chairmen's Association; Miss Jo Ann Cullen, student member of the National Advisory Council on Vocational Education; Robert C. Davidson, national committeeman for New Mexico; Mrs. Olivia Delgado, active in party organization work in California; U.S. Rep. Ed Derwinski from Illinois; Dr. Donald Devine, professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland; Sen. Pete Domenici from New Mexico; Mrs. M. Stanley Ginn, national committeewoman for Missouri; John Haugh, national committeeman for Arizona; Mrs. Paula F. Hawkins, national committeewoman for Florida; U.S. Rep. Margaret Heckler from Massachusetts; Jack Hensler, precinct committeeman from Illinois; David B. Kennedy, state chairman

of Wyoming; Alexander M. Lankler, chairman of the Northeastern State Chairmen's Association; William F. McLaughlin, state chairman of Michigan; Gov. Thomas J. Meskill of Connecticut; Mrs. Gordon Miner, state chairwoman of Idaho; Mrs. Cynthia S. Newman, national committeewoman for Virginia; the Hon. Ralph Perk, mayor of Cleveland; Mrs. John S. Pfeifer, national committeewoman for Wisconsin; Ms. Donna Reddick, co-chairwoman of the Young Republican National Federation; Clarke Reed, chairman of the Southern State Chairmen's Association; the Hon. Jane Robinson, Florida state legislator; Richard M. Rosenbaum, state chairman of New York; Tony Salinas, Texas county chairman; the Hon. Sherry Shealy, South Carolina state legislator; Mrs. Michael Sotirhos, active in party organization work in New York; Mrs. Keith McCauley Spurrier, national committeewoman for Tennessee; Miss Cathy Swajian, member of the California Republican State Central Committee; Taras Szmagala, active in party organization work in Ohio; Joseph Townsley, active in party organization work in Maryland; and Mrs. Geridee Wheeler, national committeewoman for North Dakota. ■

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## POLITICS: PROFILES

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### CLARKE REED

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CAMBRIDGE — "He's a southern gentleman with beautiful blue eyes," is the way one southern Republican leader described Mississippi GOP Chairman Clarke Reed. "He's so good that he can't imagine everyone else not being that good as well."

The charm, the smile, the dedication and organizational ability of Clarke Reed are standard reference points for Republicans describing the man who is generally considered the tactical leader of southern Republican conservatives. Both inside and outside the state, both liberals and conservatives respect the Reed magic.

But occasionally, references to the famous Reed charm are coupled with allusions to the supposed Reed guile. Said one leading Republican who felt the tip of the Mississippi leader's

knife: "We speak of arrogance in politics, arrogance in government . . . he tops them all."

Another GOP leader who has felt the impact of Reed pressure also acknowledged Reed has charisma "when he wants to." As usual, Reed was described as "forthright." "He's not tricky enough not to tell you he's out to castrate you."

Reed is as famous, however, for his avowed conservative principles as for his smile. At the 1972 Republican National Convention, Reed was considered the leader of efforts to block reform of the Rule 30 delegate-allocation formula. Reed forged an alliance with western states to protect the size of their delegations. Though effective, Reed's tactics were not always considered in good taste. A rather scurrilous but anonymous publication pub-

lished by the "Republicans for an Open Party" was traced to a mimeograph machine in Reed's suite, but he denied any personal involvement in its publication. The group called efforts to improve the delegate-allocation formula a "Javits-Ripon-type plan for the McGovernization of the Republican Party."

Although Reed, who has been Mississippi chairman since 1966 and chairman of the Southern Association of Republican State Chairmen since 1969, is said to control the votes of some southern chairmen, some Republicans consider his power overrated.

As for the interest of Reed in preserving the overrepresentation of Rocky Mountain states at the convention, one Miami delegate commented, "He's no more a friend of the West than the man in the moon."

Reed, according to this delegate, is basically the front man for a larger group of southern Republicans. "That whole southern tier play awfully close . . . rough, tough ball."

Reed's power is often attributed to his clout at the White House. "He has no political party in his own state so he spends all his time in Washington, D.C.," said one northern Republican. He contended that Reed was not beloved, "even in his own camp." But if love is power, Reed is powerful; few Republicans speak ill of the Mississippi businessman.

Outgoing Arkansas State Chairman Charles Bernard called Reed a "moderate." Said Bernard, "He is in the mainstream of the thinking of the South. He's an eloquent spokesman for the South." Said Indiana National Committeeman L. Keith Bulen, "He's a colorful individual with a great deal of personality."

But as far as charm and acumen, one northeastern Republican had a different view: "You won't quote me when I call him an s.o.b.," he said. "He's one of the cleverest political minds of the 19th century."

According to one Mississippi Republican, Reed's Washington wheel-dealing is his strongest attribute. He is "not as strong at building local participation as he needs to be," said this Republican, who was critical of Reed's failure to emphasize precinct work.

Reed's opposition to the Ripon Society's suit challenging the constitutionality of the delegate-allocation formula has been forceful. He compares the Ripon suit to a family quarrel and feels that a family should be able to iron out its problems without taking them to court. The choice is "self-reform or self-destruction," according to Reed, who is "sure" that Ripon will lose the suit. (Asked about the Ripon Society, Reed said he had really never given much thought to the Society and that "some good may well come of Ripon's suit." He emphasized that he harbored no ill feeling toward Ripon.)

In any case, Reed is looking for an open convention in 1976 — open at least until six months before the convention. He says he has not developed a preference for John Connally, Spiro Agnew, Ronald Reagan or Bill Brock, but he is convinced that regardless of the nominee the *conservatives* will do the nominating.

Even those Mississippi Republicans with ideological differences with

Reed speak highly of his leadership. "He's not the rightwinger that he is pictured to be," says one leader.

Former GOP gubernatorial candidate, Rube Phillips, who annoyed some Republicans with the moderation of his campaign against John Bell Williams in 1967 and annoyed more Republicans when he endorsed Sen. James Eastland (D) for re-election in 1972, spoke highly of Reed as state chairman.

Laurel, Mississippi Mayor W.L. "Bill" Patrick called Reed "hard-working, dedicated, sincere and out only for the gains and welfare of the Republican Party and the United States of America. Mr. Reed certainly has no personal gains in mind."

U.S. Rep. Trent Lott, a converted Republican, called Reed "one of the most capable and aggressive state chairmen in the entire nation. He is a responsible conservative and a strong advocate of the Republican form of government."

Although Mississippi Republicans won two of the three targeted congressional seats in 1972, they lost their bid to unseat Sen. Eastland. Republican Gil Carmichael's effort to challenge White House ally Eastland was undercut by tacit presidential support for the incumbent. Although Reed is widely considered a White House intimate, the snub of his nominee hurt. Says Reed succinctly, "I disapproved of the Administration's actions regarding Carmichael."

Although Reed was annoyed by the appointment of Republican moderates to key positions in the first Nixon Administration, things in Washington have gone more his way of late. He is particularly pleased with the new Republican national chairman, George Bush. "I think he will do a good job for two reasons: 1) He is very able; and 2) He has the blessing of the President, which is very necessary in his position."

Clarke Reed has been pleased with Bush's appointment at RNC with one notable exception. He was considerably consternated by the appointment of U.S. Rep. William Steiger to head the Rule 29 commission seeking ways to broaden the party. Reed says he told Steiger that if he himself had been offered the job he would have

refused, realizing that his appointment would alienate 20 percent of the party and therefore be detrimental to the GOP. He feels that the Steiger appointment alienates 80 percent of the party. Says Reed: "Hell of a mistake to appoint him."

Several Republicans, when asked about Reed, went out of their way to explain that Reed was seeking greater black participation in the GOP. In an interview, Reed contended that blacks stand a better chance in the southern Republican Party than they do in the north. He claims that blacks and whites have open channels of communication in the South — channels that northerners have made no attempt to open. One of the reasons that the Republican Party has made progress in the South, according to Reed, is that "race is no longer an issue in the South. For the first time since the 1860's this is true. The door is now open for change."

However, Reed opposed the efforts of James Meredith to win the Republican senatorial nomination in Mississippi last year. Said Reed then, "Loyalty and party support are a two-way street. Meredith is right in saying that party support is low for him. He has not labored in the vineyards." The eventual GOP nominee did strikingly well in black precincts of Jackson; some of the same precincts where President Nixon was running far behind McGovern.

According to his biography, Reed "owns and is active in the management of a diversity of firms undertaking, in general, the following endeavors; construction and real estate development; barge lines operating on the Mississippi and other inland waterways; import, export, and sale of agriculture equipment; and rice, grain and cotton farming in Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas." The University of Missouri graduate thinks that his business interests help to keep his political perspective. He doubts that he will ever run for office, but says he hates to say that . . . since he often finds himself in the position of having to convince others not to follow his example.

Asked if it was true about his beautiful blue eyes, Reed said, "Any 44-year-old man would like to hear that said." ■

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## POLITICS: PEOPLE

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● "I'm not going to speculate on the outcome of any race until I make the determination whether I will run again," Sen. **Harold Hughes** (D-Iowa) has said about a possible race against Gov. **Robert Ray** (R) in 1974. But Hughes fundraising dinners have already been scheduled and the former governor is expected to run unless his popularity is shown to have slipped drastically. There are rumors, which Hughes has denied, that he exerted pressure on Democratic legislators to block Ray's effort to switch \$30 million in sales tax revenue from the road use fund to the general fund.

● New Hampshire Sen. **Norris Cotton** has decided to run for re-election, ending Republican speculation about a successor. The most likely Democratic candidate to oppose the 74-year-old Cotton is **Harry Spanos**, vice president of the state senate.

● Despite the enthusiasm for a presidential bid by Gov. **Ronald Reagan** which was expressed at a national leadership conference of the Young Republicans, Gov. Reagan remained deliberately vague about his presidential plans. Reagan contended that 1976 speculation weakened President Nixon and reminded him of "standing by a bedside talking about funeral arrangements before the patient dies."

● The Institute of Politics at Hendrix College in Conway, Arkansas reports that the number of registered voters in nine Arkansas counties last year was greater than the number of persons estimated to be of voting age.

● Former SDS organizer **Rennie Davis** has joined the followers of 15-year-old Indian guru **Satguru Maharaj-Ji**. Says Davis, "Each one of us holds truth consciousness and bliss — even Richard Nixon has truth consciousness and bliss."

● Among the candidates being mentioned for the 1974 Republican senatorial nomination in South Carolina is Gen. **William C. Westmoreland**. Westmoreland denies that Vice President **Spiro Agnew** has asked him to seek the seat of Sen. **Ernest F. Hollings** (D), but State GOP Chairman **Kenneth Powell** says, "There's little doubt that Westmoreland would be an extremely attractive candidate."

● **Ken Rietz**, appointed in March to direct the Republican National Committee's "new majority" campaign for the 1974 congressional elections, has resigned to go into private business. The surprise announcement was made in late April. Rietz's original appointment had reportedly come as the result of White House pressure, precipitating some unhappiness among other RNC staffers who were somewhat envious of the size of the "new majority" budget. Rietz headed the "Young Voters for the President" campaign last fall.

● **J. Glenn Beall** was one of the seven U.S. senators who met in Moscow with Communist Party Chairman **Leonid I. Brezhnev** last month. After the three-and-a-half hour meeting, the Maryland Republican commented that "President Nixon could take a lesson in how to handle Congress" from Brezhnev. Beall noted that the Soviet boss spent more time with the senators than the U.S. President usually does.

● **Augusta, Georgia** businessman **Frank Troutman, Jr.** is touted as the likely successor to Georgia Republican National Committeeman **Howard H. "Bo" Callaway**. Callaway's long-anticipated appointment as secretary of the Army is expected in May, and his successor would then be named at the Georgia GOP convention on June 1-2.

● Cold War Department: After **Pablo Picasso's** death, **John D. Lofton, Jr.**, editor of the RNC's **Monday** magazine, wrote the **Daily World** a letter: "Ah, at last. Pablo Picasso is now a good Communist." The communist **Daily World**, affronted, complained. Lofton, cornered, said he was "only parodying the style of the **Daily World** in the way it treats capitalists."

● Arkansas' sole Republican state senator, **Jim Caldwell** of Rogers, was elected to succeed GOP State Chairman **Charles Bernard** at a Republican State Central Committee meeting on April 14. Caldwell defeated two other announced candidates, former vice chairman **Everett Hamm** and Arkadelphia businessman **Tom Francis**. In another contest, **Odel Pollard**, a former state chairman, was elected to the post of national committeeman over Dr. **Wayne Babbitt**, the unsuccessful candidate against Sen. **John L. McClellan** last year. Pollard succeeds the late **Winthrop Rockefeller** who was considered the architect of modern Republican growth in the state. Rockefeller's 24-year-old son, **Winthrop Paul Rockefeller**, had been considered a possible successor.

● With U.S. Rep. **Michael J. Harrington** expected to seek the Democratic nomination for Massachusetts attorney general in 1974 (and maybe Sen. **Edward M. Kennedy's** Senate seat in 1976), a large field of candidates is developing. About a dozen Democrats are considered possible candidates, a situation which may aid House Minority Leader **Francis W. Hatch, Jr.** (R), who will probably seek to return the 6th C.D. seat to the GOP fold.

● Minor warfare continues in the New Hampshire GOP despite a truce session held under the direction of GOP National Chairman **George Bush**. Bush mediated a session between GOP State Chairman **David Gosselin**, Gov. **Meldrim Thomson, Jr.**, Sen. **Norris Cotton**, and U.S. Reps. **Louis C. Wyman** and **James C. Cleveland**. Gosselin agreed to moderate his opposition to Thomson and withdraw the appointment of **Stewart Lamprey** as state finance chairman. Lamprey, a former aide of Thomson's predecessor, **Walter Peterson**, was the subject of a tax investigation by Thomson. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has called the investigation illegal. Thomson has called the Supreme Court finding "advisory." Attorney General **Warren Rudman**, a Peterson appointee, has called the finding "law."

● Following his election, President Nixon predicted that 1973 would be the "Year of Europe." Entrusting one of his closest advisers, **Donald Rumsfeld** (formerly Counsellor to the President), with the sensitive position of United States Ambassador to NATO, it now appears that this forecast may be fulfilled. The Mutual Balanced Force Pullback (MBFP) talks, stimulated by increased presidential attention and the arrival of Donald Rumsfeld, have proceeded apace. It is probably no coincidence that Mr. Nixon announced plans for making "a grand tour of Europe" this fall, shortly after an extended meeting with Ambassador Rumsfeld on April 12.



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## **Municipal Decentralization**

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*President Nixon's moves to decentralize the power of the federal government have been accompanied by a similar movement in large urban centers. School districts were decentralized. Little city halls were established. Community Action Agencies were supposed to promote citizen participation. Dr. John Rehfuss, acting director of the Center for Government Studies at Northern Illinois University, contends that there is little empirical evidence to prove that urban decentralization has either improved the delivery of city services or expanded the role of the poor in urban political life. But, says Rehfuss, a new political elite has been developed as a result of decentralization and this elite is likely to have a continuing impact on city politics. Dr. Rehfuss has also served as associate director of the U.S. Civil Service Executive Seminar Center in Berkeley, California and as assistant city manager in Palm Springs, California. He is the author of the recent-published book, Public Administration as Political Process.*

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*by John Rehfuss*

Decentralization is a major policy issue now. The national mood seems to have swung away from centralized authority and toward more control at state and local levels. This is certainly the intent of revenue sharing, to take perhaps the most obvious example, but the national mood involves a rejection of centralized authority within large cities as well as at the national level. The present movement toward "community control" in these large cities has a host of supporters, ranging across the political spectrum.

The topic has been mentioned previously in the FORUM. In January 1971, Pat Lines argued that "this principle (decentralization), which, as enunciated by the President, calls for a reversal of the trends toward greater concentrations of power, should also require the creation of new, community-sized governments within large cities."<sup>1</sup> She also argued that community control in large cities is the functional equivalent of states rights at the expense of the federal government.

Community control and citizen participation is largely an attempt by citizens, particularly spokesmen of minority and disadvantaged groups, to gain control over their own communities and neighborhoods at the expense of City Hall's centralized authority. At its most generalized level, the demands for neighborhood control came from the same sense of national malaise and antagonism toward

large government institutions which made revenue sharing possible.

This new emphasis represents a "counter reformation" to the reforms of past decades. Early in this century, reformers, most notably the Progressives, tiring of corruption and inefficiency in City Hall, pushed through sweeping changes in urban government. Institutions such as the City Manager, the short ballot, Civil Service, and administrative centralization, achieved middle-class political reforms. The present day legacy of these reforms in the larger cities has been ponderous bureaucracies, such as police departments and school teachers' unions. Other reforms eliminated many ward elections or small electoral districts in favor of large constituencies and at-large elections, further diluting the influence of minority and ethnic groups. Democracy was to be united with efficiency by electing the visible chief executive with centralized power. However, many central cities now have power splits between competing bureaucracies, aldermen from large districts, and various elected officials of which the mayor may be only first among equals. Thus, centralized power has not been achieved while many groups have lost neighborhood control. No wonder many persons feel powerless and alienated, and cries for "reform" arise.

The direct antecedents of the new reform movement come from the intellectual and social turmoil of the 1960's,

beginning with the civil rights movement and moving through the anti-war demonstrations. The capstone of this ebullient and turbulent decade was the ill-fated War on Poverty's Community Action programs with their emphasis on local control and citizen participation. While this war was not won, its legacy was increased demands for citizen participation and community control.

A major element in designing federal programs of the 1960's that has left its mark on current demands for reform was an emphasis on helping the poor help themselves. The poor were to plan their own programs, create their own neighborhoods and *not* rely on professional social workers or planners.

In some cases, they were to rely on "advocacy" professionals, free from "establishment" control, who would forge alliances between independent liberals and the poor. Generally, however, there was a mistrust of professional "do-gooders." This anti-professionalism is based on a very strong feeling, shared by a wide range of people who are not all poor, that professionals and experts will not yield enough power for change to occur in client lives. Dependency "on the man" must be broken by direct citizen action.

The Theoretical Promises of Decentralization. Academics and practitioners argue that two major benefits will occur because of urban decentralization. First is an increase in flexibility and social efficiency of municipal expenditures. Second is the psychological health of local "elites" in communities and neighborhoods which will be improved by reducing alienation and increasing feelings of political and personal efficacy through increased participation in the process of governance.

Flexibility could be introduced by trying new methods and procedures and by smaller unit administrators getting more out of their machines and men. This is quite likely, since municipal diseconomies of scale often occur above the level of 100,000 residents, a population smaller than the constituency of one large city councilman in New York or Los Angeles. Flexibility includes the recognition of differential community preferences for municipal services, and by increasing social (though not always economic) efficiency varying service level outputs in deference to these community preferences.

When these efficiency arguments are linked with citizens' dissatisfaction over decisions which seem to them re-

lated to inadequate services, it is argued that the social efficiency of municipal expenditures should be increased in the following ways.<sup>2</sup>

First, it promotes contact between employee and consumer. This means that the consumer's needs are more likely to influence the employee. Responsibility for service delivery will be placed on locally visible executives and politicians, whose careers depend on local satisfaction.


Second, it increases the extent to which jobs go to local residents, or people similar to local residents. Again, this increases the likelihood that workers will care about the level of service.

The above are still basically "efficiency" arguments, at least in a loose sense. They are not the most powerful arguments for decentralization. The strongest, and most persuasive, arguments simply assert that neighborhood or community control is good because it reduces citizen feelings of powerlessness, apathy and alienation, and will increase political and social participation.

In effect, most decentralization benefits are ultimately psychological.<sup>3</sup> Alienation will be reduced, it is argued, by diminishing the scale and scope of city government at the neighborhood level. At this level, people can seize power and reduce political alienation through control of their own destiny and governments.

The trouble with this argument is that it cannot be proven at this date. The only empirical study I am aware of is a New York study of parent alienation from schools in the Brownsville-Ocean Hill experiment area. After the confrontation between the community and the school teachers' union, 80 percent of the parents believed they had more influence while 60 percent felt their schools were better or the same.<sup>4</sup> One case may or may not prove the point. However, even without proof, there can be little doubt that minority and disadvantaged citizens could well be overawed by large, urban, impersonal bureaucracies. This likelihood increases as income and education levels decrease and leads to proposals designed to combat the impersonality and social inefficiency of urban services.

One proposal in Berkeley, California sought to separate divergent lifestyles by setting up three separate police forces for blacks, students, and middle-class citizens. Policemen would have had to live in their areas. Had the proposal been approved in April 1971, it would have been an excellent laboratory in which to examine alienation



levels, before and after the change, but we are again left short of dramatic examples to prove any point.

It is a bit difficult to accept the claims of municipal social efficiency and resident psychological health at face value, unproven and largely untested as they are. In assessing the benefits of decentralization, one can predict more limited results which have already occurred in various places. New leaders with their roots in the neighborhood are emerging to challenge the present city-wide leaders of the existing parties, interests, and bureaucracies. Changes beneficial to city power relationships will occur through these power exchanges, but they will be political rather than purely administrative or psychological. Before examining this argument, however, it is necessary to consider the various forms of decentralization.

1. Political Decentralization. In theory, political decentralization is the most complete form of power devolution. Here political leaders or administrators are elected by, or are somehow directly responsible to, a specific group of constituents arranged around some neighborhood or community. In large cities, this involves devolving authority from city-wide institutions to a less than city-wide electoral or executive system.

There are few examples of political decentralization. This is not surprising since real power exchanges are won, not given away, and poor or disadvantaged persons have not yet won many political battles.

One common form of political decentralization is through ward or district elections of councilmen. Here, assuming that the districts represent real neighborhoods (usually they are gerrymandered or represent far too many persons), it is possible for citizens to relate to and control their representative. Without definite evidence, it seems clear that political alienation would be reduced, at least among politically attentive citizens.

A form of local control which provides for a measure of political decentralization is neighborhood corporations. Chartered as private nonprofit corporations under state law, they are controlled by resident boards and usually supported by Model Cities or OEO money. About 1,000 of these corporations exist, mostly in large Northeastern cities with a population over 100,000. They are generally responsible for services such as low-income housing, planning, rehabilitation, day care nurseries, credit unions, and youth programs.<sup>5</sup> In time, some corporations may gain sufficient political power to become, in effect, an independent arm of the city government. East Central Ohio Community Organization (Columbus), according to Milton Kotler, controlled in 1969 most youth programs, operated the public library and provided a range of other programs which made it potentially independent.<sup>6</sup> A major limit to the use of community corporations is the need for outside capital. With the cutbacks in OEO and Model Cities, aid from the federal government is highly unlikely.

Political decentralization in school districts is even more limited than in cities, with community control limited to a handful of cities in which neighborhoods may veto after-school programs for children and other community uses of school facilities.

Counties have not been particularly active in political

decentralization either, even though they are generally not as threatened by it as are cities and school districts. Some have taken initiative in establishing community development corporations. One county, San Mateo, California, has created a neighborhood subunit of government. The East Palo Alto Municipal Council has been constituted as the de facto "city government" for the unincorporated section of suburban, low-income, predominantly black residents of the area. Council members are elected, work with the county departments on projects, hold zoning hearings, and initiate community projects. California has since then given legal status to municipal advisory councils such as the one in East Palo Alto.

A few flowers, however, do not make a very large garden, and there has been little devolvement of real political power to smaller units. There is, however, a fair amount of activity in administrative decentralization. Spokesmen for neighborhood control generally consider this an antiseptic substitute for real power, but residents are more likely to see it as a long overdue improvement.

2. Administrative Decentralization. Improved communications is a common form of administrative decentralization. Complaint systems, both receiving and giving information, are fairly common. A recent survey indicated that about 29 percent of cities have a special number for registering complaints, about 34 percent have a special bureau for complaints, and about 25 percent have an ombudsman or neighborman who answers written complaints and usually obtains explanations from the department and relays them back to the citizen. Sometimes he may initiate investigations.<sup>7</sup> Complaint systems are fast, convenient, and process information in a positive way. These are not unimportant values, but a complaint system rarely deals with critical issues. They result in speedy pickups of dead animals, not in significant allocations of "power to the people."

Police-community relations units are also a rather popular innovation for administrative decentralization, although they are a form of tokenism which admits that city police protection has been oblivious to minorities at best, and antagonistic at worst. Since police have been generally unresponsive to minorities, particularly when de-

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partments are not well integrated, administrators and elected officials have sought a means of coping with the situation. Since civilian review boards are generally vetoed by policy groups, many cities have developed special community relations units of one sort or another, ranging from store front service centers manned by volunteer policemen in Houston and San Diego to a privately financed (initially) liaison unit between Model City area citizens and Winston-Salem police. In many cases, a form of "client representation" exists when neighborhood residents are placed on city-wide police advisory committees, but most of these cases were initiated by the city rather than

the citizens. They are a gesture of goodwill, not a power exchange. Most police departments regard community relations units as a "sop" to a troublemaking minority. These units, often walled off from the rest of the police department, provide little incentive for most policemen to modify their behavior or give more than lip service to the new unit.

Little city halls, also called neighborhood or municipal service centers, are also administrative responses. Designed to serve as an information network between citizens and city hall, they intendedly serve as a means of demonstrating that the "establishment" is responsive to citizen demands. The most successful examples appear to be in Boston and New York. Boston has 15 little city halls in operation, and 14 in New York are operating despite budget cuts and councilmanic objections to "neighborhood clubs" promoting the political fortunes of Mayor John Lindsay.<sup>8</sup>

Boston's little city halls stress aid to the elderly and miscellaneous other city functions such as voter registration and fire inspection. Most requests are routinely passed on to city hall departments, since any personal action on the 80,000 complaints a year is impossible. Most complaints concern heat, water and litter. There seem to be relatively few complaints from city councilmen about neighborhood city halls since the local manager cannot live in the area, reducing his opportunity to develop a power base. However, these managers have become citizen advocates who have on occasion led residents of the neighborhoods against city projects such as urban renewal and road construction.<sup>9</sup>

New York's little city halls have emphasized coordination of existing programs rather than a range of in-house services. New York has had severe political conflict over the city halls, springing from differences between the mayor and council. Mayor Lindsay admitted in his book, *The City*, that "... this whole program grew out of an initial decision to become a visible, accessible mayor whose administration was at work in the neighborhoods of New York..." Thus, little city halls represent a political strategy, the same as Lindsay's popular decision to "walk the streets" early in his mayoralty. The line here between political and administrative decentralization becomes very blurred. It is clear that there was no intention to devolve any significant power to citizens in the neighborhoods.

Neighborhood councils are another form of decentralization. Here citizens act as lay advisors to elected officials, sometimes actually determining fund allocations to neighborhood area programs. About 40 percent of these council members are elected, and about 40 percent are appointed by the chief executive upon neighborhood nomination. Larger cities are more likely to create them. Their commonest functions include citizen advocacy, program plan review, and some role in goal setting. Lack of staff and sporadic meeting dates have severely restricted their effectiveness, but they could be a major means of real-locating power.

3. Citizen Participation in Community Action Programs — A Case Study. Community Action Agencies (CAA's) were the early model for citizen participation, and thus merit a separate discussion. The experience of

these CAA's does not, in general, suggest that poor citizens are interested in, or capable of, significant political participation. Voter turnouts for election of representatives to CAA boards rarely exceeded 10 percent and were usually much lower. Voting in many suburbs is also very low, since little is at stake; but there the resident generally has a higher sense of political efficacy, feeling that he can control his government in league with like-minded neighbors, if he tries. Central city residents have a lower sense of political efficacy and could hardly have been expected to respond to new programs like CAA's by turning out in droves to cast votes for representatives they did not know, to serve in positions they did not understand.

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**Life is not easy in the central city, and ghetto area dwellers generally have little time or interest in political activity.**

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Perhaps this would have changed if CAA's had become stable institutions, but they were a short-lived phenomenon. They now rely on city hall support, since federal support has been cut back. This is not likely to make them significant sources of independent power. Participation may increase over time in other decentralized institutions. Kotler claims that from 10 to 25 percent of residents attend meetings of ECCO, the Columbus Community Corporation; but this seems extraordinarily high, and these levels are not reported elsewhere.

CAA board members did represent, perhaps for the first time in a federal program, general neighborhood characteristics. In cases where CAA's did exercise power over city hall and did participate significantly in political affairs, Lyndon Johnson's anti-poverty program did improve participation by a portion of the poor in the community. It was rare, since the effectiveness of CAA's was spasmodic and participation by the representatives of the poor spotty. A study of 20 agencies found only seven in which some type of adversary action by representatives of the poor against the "establishment," who held a two thirds majority on the Agency, or against city hall, actually took place. In this portion of cases, substantive demands on behalf of racial minorities took place, and the "power structure" of the city was confronted. Most of these cases were in cities of over 150,000 with over 10 percent of the population black. In the majority of cases, however, the representatives of the poor did not agitate for social change or merely made *ad hoc* bargains for specific personal or occasional area benefits.<sup>10</sup>

The failure of the poor to seize power through poverty agencies is not surprising. Middle-class ways of controlling governments are not learned overnight, even by emerging "elites" of the poor who did participate through representation on boards or as staff members of the CAA's. However, it seems rather clear that a participatory millennium is not here yet. Claims that feelings of alienation and powerlessness will be banished by the magic of participation remain to be proven.

Careful study is unlikely to reveal, even in neighborhoods with community action programs or some form of

political control, that poor persons participate in political activity to any considerable degree. Most suburbanites do not, and their social status and predilections to action are higher than central city residents. The poor, as a group, are the least likely to have the social, educational and psychic resources to support participatory behavior. Political participation even in upper-class suburbs is a luxury, with heavy time and energy costs if the citizen wishes to inform himself. Life is not easy in the central city, and ghetto area dwellers generally have little time or interest in political activity. This is not to say that participation is unimportant, but merely to stress that a modest goal of involving black, Chicano and other poverty groups should not start by insisting on an immediate high level of participation.

If it cannot yet be determined that decentralization will improve the delivery of urban services, and if it is unlikely that most urban dwellers, particularly the poor, will participate more fully in political life because of decentralization, then what benefits to the political system will occur? There will, I think, be at least one major effect if the present decentralizing trends continue.

A new set of civic and political leaders drawn from the "underclass" of central cities is likely to be created. The process has already begun in many places. Many will be upwardly mobile working-class persons, as was the case in the CAA's, even from poor and minority neighborhoods. Some will be true "ethnics" from areas populated by second or third generation immigrants. Some will be from racial minorities. These new elites will be drawn into leadership roles because they will be the ones who invest the time and energy in political activity. They are found among the five percent who vote for community corporations' directors, if they do not run themselves; who serve on neighborhood advisory commissions; and who take part in PTA and school affairs. Tremendously influential in their areas, this group will be the opinion leaders for their subcommunities.

Any political and social strategy for the future of large cities has to pay considerable attention to the development of these new elites. Continued municipal decentralization will increase their numbers and influence and is likely to completely fragment the city into areas controlled by subpublics, perhaps as Newark is now divided into black and working-class white "turfs." Any ability to hold the city together rests on the attitudes and cooperativeness of new leaders, who hold the key to their areas.

These new elites are not likely to be allied very heavily with any one party, although their parents and friends are heavily Democratic. For example, Charles Hurst, head of Chicago's black Malcolm X Junior College, endorsed Nixon in 1972. They will pick and choose their issue and candidates, based on relevance to their neighborhood. They will probably remain Democratic at the national level, but this will mean less and less at the local level. Local politics are likely to become less predictable and more exciting. A glimpse of this occurred recently in Chicago, where Democratic State's Attorney Edward Hanrahan was defeated by Republican Bernard Carey at least partly because a number of "machine" black wards voted for Carey, out

of anger over Hanrahan's role in the police slaying of two Black Panther leaders in 1969. One account alleges that some ward leaders had to counsel blacks how to "cut" Hanrahan and still vote Democratic, or many would simply have voted a straight Republican ticket. Municipal decentralization has not occurred to any significant degree in Chicago, but incidents similar to this are more and more likely to occur. In less centralized cities, the possibilities of electoral setbacks due to the intervention of the new leaders of the poor or working-class become very high.

This result is precisely what many political scientists and all politicians presently in power fear. They sense that it will further weaken the city vis-a-vis the suburbs and continue to weaken the mayor, whose role will degenerate to a broker between neighborhoods as he attempts to retain a modicum of power. This seems inevitable if further decentralization in large cities continues; and the development of these new elites will, of course, result in demands for increased decentralization and devolution of power.

Decentralization will by no means bring down the curtain on big city mayors. They will have to contend with neighborhoods and legislators, whose status may be considerably upgraded in the eyes of the new elites. However, the task of negotiating between neighborhoods is no worse than the present task of facing down intractable departmental bureaucracies. These powerful functional aristocracies of police, fire, garbage collection and teachers have carved out "functional turfs" in the same way that developing neighborhood leaders are likely to carve out "spatial turfs." They certainly will resist any type of client-centered decentralization recognizing real threats to their hegemony. Mayors may find that interests based on area present a source of countervailing power for the chief executive to use in dealing with city-wide bureaucratic and nonbureaucratic interests. I suspect that neighborhood-based interests will be more willing to compromise and take a city-wide view when necessary, than city-wide employee interests whose leaders are constrained by the bureaucratic poisons of pseudo-professionalism and self-interest have been to date. If this is true, mayors and those who are concerned with the viability of the city should welcome municipal decentralization with open arms. ■

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Pat Lines, "Why Decentralize?," *Ripon FORUM* (Cambridge: January 1971), pp. 15-22.
2. For a fuller discussion, see Steven Erie, et al., *Reform of Metropolitan Governments* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1972, distributed for Resources for the Future), pp. 43-49.
3. For a good discussion of the various benefits of decentralization, see Henry Schmandt, "Municipal Decentralization: An Overview," *Public Administration Review* (Special Issue, October 1972), pp. 576-577.
4. Marilyn Gittell, "Decentralization and Citizen Participation in Education," *op. cit.*, p. 360.
5. See *The New Grass Roots Government* (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations), pp. 14-20, for this and most of the following discussion of political decentralization.
6. Milton Kotler, *Neighborhood Government* (Bobbs Merrill, 1969).
7. *The New Grass Roots Government*, p. 49. For more information on administrative decentralization, see Joseph Zimmerman, *The Federated City* (St. Martins, 1972).
8. As of 1972 these figures were correct, but the number and their emphasis may change from year to year and between administrations.
9. George Washnis, *Neighborhood Facilities and Municipal Decentralization, Volume 1* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Governmental Studies).
10. These were the findings of the "Study of Community Representation in Community Action Agencies," by the Florence Heller Graduate School in Social Welfare, Brandeis University, as presented by David Austin in "Resident Participation: Political Mobilization or Organization Co-Optation," *Public Administration Review* (Special Issue, September 1972), pp. 402-420.

## Salt Talks

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*Misconceptions regarding a true "strategic balance" of nuclear weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States threaten to hamper the current SALT II talks. According to Richard Burt, a doctoral candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, an accurate reflection of "strategic balance" would have to include total megatonnage of U.S. and Soviet missiles and bombers as well as missile accuracy, reliability, and placement (eg., aboard submarines). The United States, should not, therefore, approach the SALT II talks locked into numerical formulas. Instead, the Nixon Administration should exercise technological restraint in the actual development of new missile systems, seek "package" ceilings rather than strict numerical parity for weapons systems, and attempt also to reach agreements in other, non-SALT areas of arms control. Burt also works as a staff aide to the Wednesday Group of progressive congressional Republicans.*

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*by Richard Burt*

The SALT accords, signed last May in Moscow, were the culmination of the most significant arms control effort in the history of the 25-year-old nuclear arms race. The accords — the result of three years of hard bargaining — ended the threat of heavy ABM deployment by both sides and put a five-year ceiling on the numbers of land-based missiles (ICBM's) and submarine-launched missiles (SLBM's) and did not include other strategic weapons such as bombers, the accords did create a major bureaucratic and diplomatic momentum in the direction of further arms control efforts — symbolized by an agreement by both sides to go further in arms limitation at a second round of SALT talks.

Much of the optimism expressed earlier over the prospects of SALT II has since been replaced by a growing confusion, contradiction and frustration in the American arms control effort. To a great extent, the momentum of the SALT I successes has been lost. While the talks have only been underway a few months, they seem increasingly endangered by four distinct thrusts of current American national security policy.

The first factor concerns present United States' plans for weapons system development and deployment. Using the philosophy of the "bargaining chip" and "negotiating from strength," the United States is currently building and threatening to build a wide array of new weapons — new strategic systems, warheads and defensive devices — that could not only damage further arms control agreements in SALT II, but could force the Soviets into reviving their massive strategic forces buildup of the late 1960's.

The second factor threatening SALT II is the current

reevaluation of U.S. strategic doctrine now underway in the White House. The reappraisal stresses the "flexibility" of U.S. strategic forces, stressing such weapon characteristics as warhead accuracy and size. The Administration has not made clear the purposes of this reappraisal, but the uncertainty caused for the Soviets by such an activity makes a SALT II agreement increasingly unlikely. Military planners, Soviet and American alike, plan for the worst contingency and an attempt by U.S. planners to increase the hard-target killing capability of U.S. forces might lead the Soviet military to suspect that the United States was entertaining notions of building "a first-strike" nuclear capability to use against the Soviet Union.

The third factor involves the Jackson amendment adopted last summer which urged that SALT II "not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the levels provided for the Soviet Union." While the amendment is ambiguous, it is symbolic of a growing concern over the SALT I accords, which allowed a greater number of ICBM's and SLBM's to be deployed by the Soviet Union. This concern, while partially justified, should not obscure other advantages enjoyed by the American forces. But more important, an insistence on a simplistic formula of numerical equality could stand in the way of an agreement that takes the strategic balance into account in a more sophisticated manner.

Fourth, the current management of the U.S. arms control effort has become confused and fragmented. Coordination of agency work in the area of arms control — the hallmark of the SALT I effort — has broken down and the agency charged with leadership responsibilities in the talks — the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency — has suffered a major budget cut and has lost its di-

rector, Gerard Smith. The selection of U. Alexis Johnson to head the SALT negotiating team is also seen as a sign that the military services will have a greater role in planning and setting the SALT negotiating position, creating a greater built-in resistance to accords limiting or banning weapons deployment.

Together, these four factors cast doubt on earlier expressed hopes that SALT II would result in a number of significant agreements. This is unfortunate, not only because future agreements will be more difficult to reach but also because what happens at SALT affects the whole gamut of United States-Soviet relations. The accords reached in Moscow in some ways were interdependent with expanded technical and economic relations between the two powers. Failure to continue the successes of SALT I could not only result in a new round in the arms race, but also could contribute to a weakening of United States - Soviet collaboration on a wide range of fronts. The ramifications of a failure to successfully pursue the opportunities for agreement in SALT II would be felt in almost every area of U.S. concern with the Soviet Union, the Middle East, trade relations, collaboration in space and the Vietnam settlement.

The nature of the U.S. arms control effort also to a great extent affects the Soviet approach to SALT. There is really no non-military constituency in the Soviet Union that supports arms control; arms control negotiations have traditionally been a province of the Soviet military. One of the most positive aspects of SALT I was that Soviet civilians — party leaders, scientists and government bureaucrats — became involved for the first time with national security issues. If momentum for further arms control is lost, these individuals will most likely lose whatever hold they possess over Soviet military policy. A failure by the United States to energetically pursue a SALT II agreement could, then, weaken a variety of arms control efforts — conventional force reductions in Europe, a comprehensive test ban and efforts to limit nuclear proliferation.

Another major obstacle to further arms limitation at SALT II results from the fear in some quarters that the United States came off second best in the first round of SALT. This concern stems from the terms of the Interim Agreement — the accord that limits the number of ICBM's, SLBM's and submarines allowed by each side. It has been argued that in allowing the Soviets a superiority in land-based missiles (1618 to 1054) and submarine-launched missiles (950 to 710, after both sides retire older ICBM's), the United States has been placed in a position of strategic inferiority. The fact that Soviet missiles generally carry heavier payloads than U.S. missiles is also viewed as a factor that further decreases U.S. security.

These concerns must be carefully examined because they so crucially affect the U.S. bargaining stance at SALT II. In analyzing the relative strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union, however, all the factors affecting the strategic balance must be taken into account.

As stated above, the Interim Agreement does not set ceilings on ICBM and SLBM launchers that provide for a superiority in numbers for the Soviet Union:


#### SALT I LAUNCHER CEILING<sup>1</sup>

	United States	Soviet Union
ICBM's	1054	1618
SLBM's	656	740
Submarines	41	56
With Replacements: <sup>2</sup>		
ICBM's	1000	1408
SLBM's	710	950
Submarines	44	62

<sup>1</sup> Figures for the tables in this section are taken from the International Institute for Strategic Studies' 1972-73 Military Balance. The London-based institute is viewed by experts to be a highly accurate and objective source of military statistics.

<sup>2</sup> Both sides can replace older ICBM's with new submarines and SLBM's.

But numbers of ICBM's and SLBM's alone do not provide an accurate overall picture of the strategic balance. The first notable aspect of the Interim Agreement is that it only concerns launcher vehicles — numbers of ICBM's, SLBM's and submarines. It does not restrict the modernization of these forces nor warhead technology and the





number of warheads allowed by each side — an area where the United States enjoys a clear superiority. In terms of separate targetable reentry vehicles — the number of different nuclear warheads that can be delivered to separate targets — the United States has a 2-1 advantage that will grow as the United States continues to deploy MIRV's (separately targetable multiple warheads) on its missiles. The United States is currently MIRVing missiles on 31 of the United States' missile-submarines and on 550 of the Minuteman land-based missiles. The effect of the U.S. MIRV program on the relative balance of deliverable warheads is shown below:

#### WARHEAD LEVELS<sup>1</sup>

In 1972:		
	United States	4,300
	Soviet Union	2,090
In 1977:		
	United States	7,700
	Soviet Union	2,420

<sup>1</sup> If Congress approves the FY 1974 request for funds to MIRV the remaining 450 Minutemen, the 1977 U.S. figure could rise above 8,500.

Also not included in the Interim Agreement are long-range strategic bombers, another area where the United States possesses a significant margin of superiority. The United States' bomber fleet of B-52's and FB-III's numbers over 450 aircraft. The Soviet Union possesses approximately 140 long-range bomber aircraft, which are generally older and slower than their U.S. counterparts. The U.S. bomber force is also capable of carrying substantially larger weapon loads than the Soviet Union's, and as the chart below indicates, this capacity will grow as the United States begins to deploy the SRAM (short-range attack missile) on its bomber force:

#### BOMBER WEAPONS<sup>1</sup>

In 1972:		
	United States	2,000
	Soviet Union	420
In 1977:		
	United States	7,500
	Soviet Union	420

<sup>1</sup> Based on current weapons size and aircraft payload capacity, including gravity bombs and stand-off missiles.

Another index of strategic power is megatonnage, or the total explosive power that both powers can hurl at each other. The majority of Soviet missiles carry larger payloads than U.S. missiles, while, as indicated above, American bombers carry heavier payloads than their Soviet counterparts. The total nuclear megatonnage capable of being delivered by missiles and bombers combined is roughly the same for both powers:

#### TOTAL MEGATONNAGE

	United States	Soviet Union
Missiles	2,400 MT	11,400 MT
Bombers	16,500 MT	3,600 MT
Total	18,900 MT	15,000 MT

It must be emphasized that megatonnage is a crude indicator of power because it does not take into account such factors as missile accuracy and reliability, which in many respects are more important than megatonnage in determining the damage capability of strategic forces.

Other factors must also be considered. The United

States, for instance, possesses hundreds of fighter aircraft based in Europe and aboard carriers capable of delivering nuclear weapons on the Soviet Union. Also, although the Interim Agreement allows the Soviet Union more ballistic missile submarines than the United States, a lack of foreign bases means the Soviets are unable to keep as high a proportion of their submarine force within missile range as the United States.

In conclusion, none of the indices discussed give a complete description of the strategic balance. Numbers of missiles, bombers or submarines alone cannot provide a sufficient basis for deciding whether or not the United States gained or lost in SALT I. But taken together, the indices do suggest that the United States and the Soviet Union currently possess roughly equal strategic nuclear capabilities — capabilities that make it impossible for either side to disarm the other.

Simple numerical formulas will not suffice for SALT II, for what one side lacks in one area of weaponry, it tends to make up for in another. Recognition of this fact seems essential in approaching future arms control agreements.

The methods and mechanisms for reaching agreements during SALT I should not necessarily be totally relied upon to produce results at SALT II. The "bargaining chip" strategy, for instance, of building new weapons in order to force the Soviets into agreeing to their limitation seemed a plausible strategy at a time when the Soviets were engaging in a massive arms buildup. But now that temporary limits have been placed on missile force levels, future agreements should attempt to build on the confidence created by SALT I instead of relying too heavily on the fear created by the threat of new arms developments.

At the same time, it is necessary to be realistic when discussing possible achievements of SALT II. Potential areas of agreement should most certainly be analyzed in terms of what the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency calls "negotiability" and "verifiability" — the ability to make an agreement and to enforce it. Possible areas of agreement at SALT II and problems associated with these areas include:

(A) Ceilings on Offensive Strategic Weapons — The SALT I Interim Agreement runs out in 1977 and unless the ceilings set on land-based and sea-based missiles are set by a permanent treaty, both sides will thereafter be free to add to their missile forces. It would certainly be in the interest of both countries to negotiate a permanent treaty limiting offensive strategic weapons, particularly if equal numerical terms could be worked out. The United States would also probably support the idea of cutting back on the mutual levels for ICBM's prescribed by the Interim Agreement and replacing them with the more invulnerable submarine-launched missiles. (It is generally believed that U.S. ICBM's would be vulnerable to MIRV-ed Soviet SS-9 rockets.) The Soviets, for bureaucratic reasons, are not as interested as the United States in reducing ceilings for ICBM's.

One way around this potential problem would be to design a permanent ceiling on offensive strategic weapons — in terms of launcher numbers, warhead numbers or



payload capacity — that would allow each side the freedom to determine what weapons it wished to emphasize within its respective forces. Under such a system, a general ceiling would be agreed to, and then each power could determine what proportion of its force would be made up of ICBM's and SLBM's — within the limits set by the ceiling. The Soviets would be unlikely to agree to a mutual ceiling with the United States, because under the present terms of the Interim Agreement they are allowed greater numbers of ICBM's and SLBM's. This problem could perhaps be solved by including long-range bombers in a mutual ceiling — where the American advantage in bombers would cancel out the Soviet advantage in numbers of ICBM's and SLBM's. Thus, both powers could agree to a similar ceiling and then would unilaterally decide what proportion of their forces would be made up of bombers, missiles and submarines.


(B) Ceiling on Bombers — Whether or not bombers could be included in a general ceiling on strategic weapons, the attempt to include long-range bombers in a SALT II agreement should be made. The United States' superiority in bombers could be used as an inducement for the Soviets to accept a more equitable balance in numbers of missiles, or if the Soviets insist on maintaining superior levels of missiles, the American numerical superiority in bombers could be ratified by treaty.

(C) Forward-Based System Controls — While the United States does not consider its forward-based land and carrier-based fighter aircraft to be strategic systems, the Soviets do. And while the Soviet ICBM and SLBM advantage may be a prime U.S. concern at SALT II, the Soviets are said to be most concerned about U.S. fighters stationed abroad that have the capability of striking their homeland with nuclear weapons. Up until now, the United States has not wanted to discuss these weapons in the context of SALT, and for good reasons. Bilateral United States-Soviet discussions over the future of European-based aircraft would upset the NATO allies and an agreement to limit U.S. aircraft in Europe might weaken the conventional capability of NATO. But some judicious concessions by the United States on this issue — which include advance consultation with U.S. allies — could bring about greater Soviet acquiescence in other areas of importance to the United States.

(D) Controls on Warhead Modernization — This is an area of strategic weaponry totally neglected during SALT I that could threaten, as feared earlier with the ABM, to upset the arms race. Recent United States efforts in the area of multiple warheads and improved missile accuracy tend to be destabilizing because they could ultimately give U.S. missiles the capability of destroying Soviet missiles on the ground. While the United States currently enjoys a lead in warhead technology (the Soviets have not tested a MIRV warhead yet), larger Soviet missile payloads mean that once the Soviets do perfect a MIRV system they too will possess a significant kill capability against U.S. missiles.

Controlling warhead modernization is difficult, owing to the difficulty of verifying compliance. One plausible means of controlling improvements in warhead technology

is to focus on limiting U.S. and Soviet development programs — primarily testing. While it is impossible, without on-site inspection, to determine the kinds of warheads each side is deploying, a limit on how many missile tests each side could hold would serve nearly the same purpose. A ceiling on missile tests would prevent both sides from developing sufficient confidence in new warhead devices to warrant wide-scale deployment. And a limit on numbers of missile tests would also have the advantage of being verifiable.



(E) Antisubmarine Warfare Controls — The oceans have become the newest arms race arena and submarine-launched missiles are increasingly becoming the primary instruments of strategic deterrence. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are, however, attempting to counteract each other's submarine forces by working on projects of submarine detection, tracking and destruction. Like accurate warheads, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) is destabilizing because a breakthrough in submarine detection and destruction could give one power the capability of destroying the ballistic missile submarine force of the other. There are a number of ways ASW could be controlled at SALT II. Suggestions have been to limit the number of hunter-killer submarines possessed by each side as well as banning certain kinds of underwater listening devices used to detect missile-carrying submarines. Another approach would be to create ocean "sanctuaries" for submarines of both sides to operate, free from attempts to locate and destroy them. While there are certain difficulties with all of these proposals, particularly the problem of distinguishing between ASW programs assigned a tactical mission from those designed to combat ballistic missile submarines, controls on ASW should be pursued at SALT II.

Although there are a number of political and tech-

nical problems attached to the possibilities presented by SALT II, the benefits stemming from potential agreements listed above provide powerful arguments for approaching the negotiations with as much flexibility as security interests permit. Several guidelines can be suggested to maximize the possibilities for success at SALT II. They embody a whole range of national security concerns — weapons system procurement, arms control leadership, and defense budget appropriations by Congress.

I. Procurement Restraint — While “negotiating from strength” seems a sensible guide to bargaining, too much strength introduces fear and uncertainty into arms control talks. The Soviets, for instance, were unwilling to seriously discuss strategic arms limitation until they possessed a weapons arsenal similar to that of the United States. The tendency of the United States to exploit every technological advance — multiple warheads, improved missile accuracy, ASW devices — to force agreements with the Soviets cannot always be depended upon to produce agreements. The decision to begin the Safeguard ABM program might have contributed to a successful ABM Treaty, but the Soviets had earlier deployed an ABM system of their own. In areas of U.S. technical advantage, such as warhead design, the decision to MIRV U.S. missiles has made a MIRV agreement difficult to achieve at SALT II because the Soviets are unlikely to accept any agreement that permanently places them in a technologically inferior position. This is not to suggest that the United States should not go forward with new research and development programs. Instead, careful consideration should be given to new weapons programs before procurement decisions are made. Deployment decisions over such weapons as the B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine, super-accurate missile warheads and advanced underwater listening devices should be carefully evaluated and in some cases deployment should be postponed pending the outcome of the talks.

An active R & D program is probably as good a bargaining chip as actual force deployments. Maintaining a strong R & D program would not only act as an effective bargaining ploy, but could also result in material savings in defense expenditures.

II. Strategic Numbers — In view of the complexity of determining the significance of relative strategic force levels, no attempt should be made to tie the hands of U.S. negotiators by insisting on strict formulas of strategic parity. As suggested earlier, a number of factors go into the determination of the United States-Soviet strategic balance. The United States should be willing to accept a numerical disadvantage in certain areas, if a U.S. advantage in other areas is recognized. Better yet, formulas that tie different weapons into overall package ceilings should be discussed at SALT II. Each power would then be able to select the weapons it favored without reference to ceilings on specific weapons categories. In constructing and negotiating such a general ceiling, an attempt should also be made to provide for the gradual reduction of strategic forces possessed by each side.

III. Arms Control Leadership — The SALT I accords were not only a result of hard-headed bargaining, but disciplined and efficient organization — within the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Pentagon,

the State Department, the CIA and the White House. A similar management effort should be directed toward SALT II. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) should again be put in charge of the day-by-day direction of the talks, and the agency should have a budget commensurate with this task. The ACDA budget has been slashed by almost a third and the agency's director no longer heads the SALT negotiating team.

Possibly more important in the long run, promises of new weapons made by the White House to the services to gain military support for arms control agreements should be restricted. When the Administration earlier linked the continuation of the B-1 and the speed-up of the Trident programs with support for the SALT I accords, future arms control possibilities could have been placed in jeopardy.

IV. Other Areas of Arms Control — While the SALT II talks now dominate arms control thinking, there are other areas where initiatives should be attempted. A verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban would, for example, constitute a significant achievement. A total ban on nuclear testing would not only eliminate certain environmental dangers, but would act as a check on new weapons development. Efforts to curb nuclear proliferation — a growing problem that has generally been ignored — is also an area where initiatives are necessary. An agreement by the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations on conventional force reductions in Europe (MBFR) is another arms control goal that should be vigorously pursued.

V. Congressional Initiatives — Congress has traditionally supported arms control and disarmament objectives. Congressional hearings in the late 1950's were partly responsible for the establishment of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Congress has supported, with few reservations, the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty, as well as the SALT I accords. Congress could play a larger role in this crucial area by both fostering a wider discussion of arms control issues and more closely examining the political and technological components of the arms race, thus honoring its responsibility to educate the public in this difficult area. Arms control, however, to a great extent is dependent upon the President's conduct of foreign policy and, even more importantly, upon defense spending. Congress, then, must make a determined effort to link arms control issues to the defense budget. Congressional committees concerned with defense spending should not only focus on fiscal and military issues, but these grounds should also examine the implications of new programs for the prospects of future agreement at SALT II.

SALT II has become a complex arena for discussion, where the political, strategic and technological factors involved demand a high degree of specialized talent. While recognizing that the executive possesses the bulk of expertise in this area, Congress does possess analytical capabilities — in the form of committee staffs, the Congressional Research Service, the General Accounting Office and the newly organized Office of Technology Assessment to contribute to the arms control debate. Each of these groups can provide some of the expertise necessary to deal with the complexities of strategic arms limitation. ■

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## BOOK REVIEW

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# The Bored of Education

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**BUSING AND BACKLASH: White Against White in an Urban School District**

by Lillian B. Rubin

University of California Press, 1973, 257 pages, \$2.45

**PLACES FOR LEARNING, PLACES FOR JOY: Speculations on American School Reform**

by Theodore R.Sizer

Harvard University Press, 1973, 167 pages, \$ 7.50

**CHILDREN IN THE LEARNING FACTORY: The Search for the Human Teacher**

by Irwin Flescher

Chilton Book Company, 1972, 180 pages, \$5.95

**EQUAL EDUCATION: A New National Strategy**

by John F. and Anne O. Hughes

Indiana University Press, 1972, 243 pages, \$7.95

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by Dick Behn

An acquaintance of mine, a principal by trade, recently asked what I had been reading lately. When I told him, "education books," he asked, "Don't you get tired of reading about education?" and proceeded to describe a frivolous little Irish novel which he was reading at the time.

The principal's attitude — though that of a dedicated professional — may be symptomatic of the state of American educational lethargy. An article by reporter Evelyn Keene in the Boston *Globe* cited a report by the Massachusetts Association of School Superintendents, which stated that, in the past year, 21 school superintendents had quit or resigned following disputes with local school boards. In the past five years, according to the Association, ". . . of the state's 261 superintendents, there have been 14 deaths due to heart failure, 14 cases of heart attacks resulting in forced early retirement or prolonged illness, eight cases of severe ulcer conditions requiring hospitalization and five cases of nervous breakdowns while on the job."

My friend, the principal, is not alone in his attitude toward the education controversy. As Theodore R. Sizer, former dean of the Harvard School of Education, writes in the opening of his book, *Places for Learning, Places for Joy*, "Americans are bored with being told that their educational system is a mess." It is perhaps understandable considering the myths and misconceptions and confusions of values which surround American perceptions of their school system.

In Sizer's opinion, American education has three prin-

iple purposes: first, to facilitate individual *power*, "the maximum use of his intellectual and physical faculties for personal and corporate ends." Second, to promote *agency*, "the personal style, assurance, and self-control that allow him to act in both socially acceptable and personally meaningful ways." And finally, the schools should promote *joy*, "the fruit of aesthetic discipline, of faith, and of commitment." But Sizer, now headmaster at Phillips Andover Academy, recognizes that "no single institution can provide all of a child's education. Many institutions teach, in varied, powerful ways." Therefore, Sizer proposes the bifurcation of the educational system into "places for learning, places for joy." "While we grant that power on one hand and agency and joy on the other overlap significantly, a practical division of institutional labor between them makes sense. Let us have academies primarily devoted to power. And let us have different kinds of activity — for the sake of simplicity I'll call them *collegia* — through which society may provide, deliberately and systematically, for agency and joy. Let us have, in sum, two kinds of 'schools,' with children expected to attend both, often concurrently." Thus Sizer answers demands of formalists who stress basic cognitive skills and humanists who stress the affective development of children. He does so thoughtfully and "politically," in the practical vein often rare among educationists.

School psychologist Irwin Flescher (*Children in the Learning Factory*) also has his own proposals for restructuring American education — but Flescher is more biting-cly critical. He begins his book with a bit of doggerel:

Schools teach facts,  
and the facts are these:  
schools are learning factories.

Flescher's perspective as a school psychologist is, he admits, a new one for educational debates, but he adds a further extra dimension. His book is hypothetically a "proxy address delivered before the Global League of Ultimate House Analyzers at Wash-DC on month 2, day 22, year 222." Flescher's penchant for such utopian new vocabulary as "house analyzer" (school psychologist), "priestess" (humanizing "good" teacher) and "kinderhinderer" (a baddie of a teacher) can be annoying, but beyond the occasionally distracting rhetoric come some interesting proposals. For instance, Flescher rejects remedial reading and math in favor of what he calls "remedial childhood." Such efforts at injecting "enthusiasm, wonder, gratification, and meaningfulness" into children with learning difficulties would of course be directed by the "Director of the Love of Learning," who in Flescher's complex vocabulary also should double as head of the "Department of Intrinsic Motivation" and therefore be a school psychologist. Obviously, *Children in the Learning Factory* requires certain foreign language skills, but the perspectives are unique — perhaps a subtle result of the impression that the author is analyzing the reader.

Irwin Flescher's ideas are not the sort which would be compatible with the conservative Board of Education members of the Richmond United School District on San Francisco Bay in California. As Lillian B. Rubin explains the attitudes of Richmond conservatives toward education in her book, *Busing and Backlash*, "When a conservative

is asked what he ideally expects from an educational system, the first phrases that almost invariably spring to his lips are 'the three Rs,' 'more discipline in the classroom,' 'end sex education,' and 'get rid of sensitivity training and of liberal teachers who are trying to brainwash my kids.' They want a no-frills, no-nonsense education, schools that will train their children to be moral and upright citizens, teach them to be patriotic, 'put some starch in their spines,' and avoid filling their heads with notions that parents do not understand." Although the Richmond anti-busing conservatives would find common ground with Flescher in their dislike of sensitivity training (Flescher prefers D-groups, for dialogue, to T-groups, for emotional catharsis) and the 3-Rs, agreement would probably end there. For whereas Flescher stresses "development of a wholesome, positive feeling toward school and learning" as a prime function of elementary schools, Richmond conservatives, after their ascent to power in 1969, seemed determined to impose their own dogmatic views on the district's schools. They not only banned ecology and peace symbols from the schools, but prohibited use of *The Learning Tree* as an English text, banned a chicken hatchery from an elementary classroom because it might be used for sex education and refused to honor Martin Luther King's birthday as a school holiday because King was not a "national leader."

Rubin's book, however, is not really about education, but about politics. It is the story of how a group of upper-class, liberal, elitist whites were deposed from the school board of the Richmond United School District when they bungled the issue of integration and busing. The liberals were well-intentioned, but wishy washy — too elitist to seek the active assistance of the working-class conservatives in the formulation of integration plans and too democratic to act decisively to integrate the school system over the objections of the conservatives. The approval of the unification proposal in 1964 consolidated the schools of Richmond, which were 40 percent black, and those of smaller white suburbs. The newly elected school board was completely white and completely liberal but when it began to show signs of moving to integrate the district's schools and perhaps, perish the thought, begin busing, the lower-middle-class conservatives in the suburbs revolted. Partly through their own political ineptitude and partly because they refused to effect a *fait accompli*, they fed the anxieties and organizational power of conservatives by talking integration to death, and the liberals were replaced by an all-conservative school board. Whereas the liberals vacillated, and conducted masochistic orgies of integration hearings, the new conservative board showed a strong intemperance to opposing views. The new board cancelled its own meetings on short notice, held extensive executive sessions without making public their decisions, limited public debate at board meetings and edited the minutes to eliminate any vestiges of dissension. Although Rubin admits her ideological preference for the positions taken by the liberals, she sympathizes with the anger of the conservatives. "The thrust of my argument here is that America's so-called silent majority has been left out of the political process far too long and that, in part, their present anger is a response to that political fact." Liberals cannot afford to

cavalierly ignore the aspirations and fears of working-class whites as "racist" any more than they can excuse delays in redressing ancient inequities to black school children on the grounds of compromise.

Chronicling a larger scenario of politics and politic education are John F. Hughes and Anne O. Hughes in *Equal Education: A New National Strategy*. They review the development of elementary and secondary education, particularly Title I for disadvantaged children, and conclude that the federal government must assume the "dominant role" in a new strategy for delivery of equal educational opportunity. In the Hughes' opinion, "The partial strategies embedded within ESEA — with their limited funds, incomplete mechanisms for renewal and reform, and uneasy mixture of mythology and reality — have fallen short of achieving their goals." Therefore, although they detail the failure of the U. S. Office of Education to adequately administer Title I, the authors propose a new and expanded aid formula which "assumes that the Federal Government has a special responsibility for filling in the gaps that now exist at every educational level, and especially those in preschool and adult education." They further propose an Education Bill of Rights and the assumption of school financing responsibility by state governments.

Implicit in the Hughes' assumptions is the ability of the federal government to react positively and efficiently to ensure the delivery of educational services to local "clients." Unfortunately, it seems doubtful that such faith in the federal government is justified — and even were it justified, whether the federal government is the most efficient mechanism for the redress of local educational or social problems. Admittedly, in recent years the federal government has become the primary agency for innovation in social problems; too often, however, there have been too many bureaucrats spending too much money to achieve too little. The poor and other short-changed groups have learned to look to Washington to redress their grievances . . . just as politicians tend to look to Washington as the focus of political power. Americans seem afflicted with the notion that if one goes high enough in the governmental structure (ultimately, the White House, the Congress or the Supreme Court) their problems will be solved. Perhaps the rationale is that if the buck is passed high enough, the politician will be sufficiently removed from the nitty-gritty to ignore the considerations of his opponents. Thus, Americans tend to expect that if Congress will not do it, the President will do it and if the President will not do it, the Supreme Court will do it . . . thus eliminating the necessity for communities to work through such difficult political questions as integration and compensatory education on their own. True, communities have too often been dominated by complacent majorities, have too long ignored the interests of politically impotent minorities. But neither conscience nor complacency are solely federal or local prerogatives; as the conservatives in Richmond learned, if they want something badly enough, they can do it themselves.

As Sizer writes in *Places for Learning, Places for Joy*, "And so American education stumbles on, not *mindless* really, but tangled in contradictions it dares not face." ■

## DULY NOTED: BOOKS

● **Dear Israelis, Dear Arabs: A Working Approach to Peace**, by Roger Fisher. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972, 166 pages, \$6.95) Professor Fisher of the Harvard Law School has written an imaginative, provocative and important work dealing specifically with the Arab-Israeli conflict and more generally with principles of conflict resolution in international politics. This brief book consists of letters Fisher sent to Egyptian, Israeli, Palestinian, Jordanian, American and United Nations officials in the summer of 1971, together with a general memorandum outlining his general approach. The approach itself is familiar to readers of Fisher's *International Conflict for Beginners* and his numerous articles, including "Fractionating Conflict." Fisher seeks to demonstrate how the Middle Eastern conflict might be carried on so as to advance the legitimate interests of each of the parties while avoiding needless violence. Contained in his letters are specific, operational suggestions as to what each party might do to pursue its own enlightened self-interest in a more civilized and constructive way. He urges avoidance of non-productive questions which fix blame or dwell on past events or on legalities, and suggests instead a focus on "what ought to happen" — what can be done to improve the situation, and how such developments can be made more likely. Central to his approach is the notion of "fractionating" the conflict in the Middle East. Rather than engage in fruitless attempts at a package settlement, the parties are urged to pursue specific separate agreements on a variety of issues — each involving different parties and capable of being negotiated at separate intervals. Each party is provided with a number of "yesable propositions" which it might offer to its adversaries — that is, propositions which are sufficiently specific so as to be answerable by a simple "yes," sufficiently palatable that an affirmative answer might reasonably be expected, and sufficiently operational that desired outcomes can be expected to occur. Included in the letters are the full texts of 35 proposed drafts of letters, resolutions, and proposals that each party might present to the others. In each case, the drafts are framed in such a way as to increase the political costs to the adversary of not making the desired decision. To the Egyptians, Fisher suggests cogent reasons why both the threat of deliberate war and the demand of complete Israeli withdrawal are counter-productive; rather, he argues, Egypt should identify for the Israeli people specific desirable consequences that will follow from partial Israeli concessions. To the Israelis, Professor Fisher demonstrates that the simultaneous maximization of territory, democracy, and the Jewish character of the Israeli state is most unlikely. He argues that the continued focus on short range security objectives and retention of all occupied territory can well lead Israel to a situation parallel with what the United States confronted in Vietnam. No reader is likely to agree with all that Fisher proposes. But such is not his purpose; rather, he urges his readers to take his side as a starting point, and to engage in formulating their own concrete suggestions to government officials about what might be done to bring about a just peace in the Middle East. As Philip C. Jessup states in the foreword, Fisher's approach is "unusual," but "no one interested in the Middle East — or in the process of coping with an international conflict — should ignore this book." Reviewed by Professor Robert H. Donaldson.

● **Arabs and Israelis: Life Together**, by Gideon Weigert. (Published by the author and the Jerusalem Post Press, 1973, 103 pages, 6.50 Israeli pounds) Jerusalem Post Arab Affairs correspondent Gideon Weigert has assembled a collection of positive impressions of Israeli-Palestinian relations spanning the period from summer 1967 to winter 1972. Weigert utilizes figures from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, public reports of the Israeli Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense (the latter being responsible for the administered territories), and the testimonials of Palestinian notables to show that the "five years of Israeli occupation of the West Bank have not solved any political issues in the area. But these areas have brought prosperity and with it a growing

sense of human dignity." Then the narrator takes his reader through the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and the Gaza Strip. He presents a number of achievements under Israeli administration; for example, the opening of 20 training centers for carpenters, electricians, dress-makers, beauticians, and textile workers. With regard to these last three fields, Weigert shows the changing roles played by women under Israeli occupation as contrasted with the reigns of Abdullah, Talal, and Hussein. The author asserts "daily contact with the Israelis in everyday life and business had made a strong positive impact on West Bankers." Turning to the Gaza Strip, Weigert reports 380,000 people in an arid 140 square miles. Formerly under Egyptian military administration (since 1948), most of the populace was unemployed. Weigert fallaciously attributes Arab participation in guerrilla movements to unemployment and overcrowded conditions. He also fails to enlighten the reader regarding Jerusalem's special situation, the strategically important Golan Heights, or the Sinai Peninsula. He ignores the recently settled Jewish religious colony in Hebron. What of reported Palestinian resentment bubbling under the surface? Ultimately, Weigert betrays the polemical nature of his own work, by, for example gauging the Palestinian Arabs rising standard of living by observing that on their roofs are now a mass of television antennas. However, this book serves as a springboard for discussing certain facets of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Regarding hopes for a future negotiated peace settlement, Weigert writes that movement toward a peace settlement "is based on the assumption that any agreements between the heads of the Arab states and the Israeli government will not lead to a final and lasting peace unless the Palestinian problem is first solved." It is in that light that **Arabs and Israelis: Life Together** should be approached. Reviewed by Stephen Rosen.

● **Cold War and Counter-Revolution. The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy**, by Richard J. Walton. (Pelican Books, 1972, 250 pages, \$1.45) Viewed in retrospect, it appears that the Kennedy era was something less than hoped for and anticipated by his friends and admirers; to borrow David Halberstam's phrase, the best and the brightest may be found wanting in the revision of history. In this respect, Richard Walton, using Kennedy's and the Kennedy team's own accounts, reflects the recent appraisal that Camelot was something less than advertised. In what has been called a "biting assessment," Walton suggests: "The record is clear. Whatever his achievements in less significant areas, whatever he might have done later, John F. Kennedy as President was Cold Warrior and counterrevolutionary. Cuba, Berlin, Vietnam — these are his monuments." In describing the momentous events of that time — Laos, the Bay of Pigs, the Missile Crisis, Berlin, Vienna and Vietnam — Walton finds no finest hour but rather an embarking on anti-communist crusades "much more dangerous than any policy Eisenhower ever permitted." In addition to believing that John Kennedy had an alarmist, dogmatic view of the world, Walton further speculates that the late President may perhaps have possessed "machismo," the need to assert masculinity. A dogmatic world-view coupled with "machismo," if Walton is correct, may well have been a volatile mix not beneficial for the making of foreign policy. While Kennedy is harshly assessed, his advisers fare little better, as Walton writes: "They were youngish but wedded to the old Cold War vision. They were intellectuals but understood the new world no better than the old businessmen of the Eisenhower years. They were liberal — by self-definition — but prosecuted the Cold War more vigorously than had the Eisenhower conservatives. They were realists, they thought, but their advice, during Kennedy's term and after, led to a series of disasters, each of which confirmed them in their wisdom." Analysts have recently revised their perceptions of the early 60's. What was thought to be, apparently is no longer. Writers have moved from an ideal of what they hoped was to a harsher reality as if they were somehow cheated by what might have been. By using the words of Kennedy and his publicists, Walton draws differing conclusions. He maintains that Kennedy's personality, not his lack of accomplishments, has been the subject of analysis. This is not a neutral book but one that lends perspective and is written in a most lucid, readable style. Reviewed by Dean L. Lapham.

● **Prisons, Protest and Politics**, edited by Burton M. Atkins and Henry R. Glick. (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972, 180 pages, \$5.95) Editors Atkins and Glick have put together a reasonably representative potpourri of prison protest writings . . . by authors ranging from former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and former Arkansas prison superintendent Tom Murton to Bobby Seale and Eldridge Cleaver. The book includes the usual citations of prison brutality, the usual explanations of the politicization of prisoners and the usual ideal compilations of basic prisoner rights. The road to penal reform is not easy; too many employees have a stake in blocking it. However, minimal reform involves a basic recognition of prisoner rights and it is in this area that legislatures and courts can move most forcefully. Because an inmate is incarcerated, does not require that he be dehumanized. **Prisons, Protest and Politics** says nothing new, but it says it well. Reviewed by Dick Behn.

● **An American Philosophy of Social Security**, by J. Douglas Brown. (Princeton University Press, 1972, 240 pages, \$8.50) Professor J. Douglas Brown's book is an immensely readable, concise, and factual account about the development of our Social Security system, in which he was intimately involved during the 1930's. He was himself a member of the first Council established in 1934 to draw up a plan. This Council rejected the European approach to social insurance which paid out fiat benefits by class of worker, and decided to regulate benefits by wages earned with 50 percent of premiums to be paid by the worker. This uniquely American plan maintained traditional self-reliance and incentive while merging them into a national scheme which offered both wide acceptability and adequacy of coverage. Professor Brown attributes the stability of the system to the crucial role played by the Advisory Councils in serving as a liaison between Congress and the President. One of the author's most important points is to warn against the temptation of succumbing to political pressures by joining the social security insurance system with any form of welfare payment. Brown rightly distinguishes between old age insurance, disability and medical coverages, and unemployment insurance (usually in error charged to employers 100 percent). Rather, Professor Brown urges the passage of a separate system as a mechanism for national employment protection. Moving to health insurance, the author discusses at length the failures of our 19th century medical care philosophy. He proposes a national health insurance system which will "rationalize the financing" of health care centers, charge understandable fees, and put an end to the doctors' *ex parte* charges. Some readers may disagree partially with Professor Brown's expansionist approach to social insurance, arguing that the use of progressive income taxes to support increases in benefits (because of direct government funding) will reduce the element of acceptability among the middle-class which receives a smaller proportional payment than the poor. However, all readers will surely agree that this book presents us with valuable information and ideas for future legislation dealing with poverty and employment security. Reviewed by Ferd LaBrunerie.

● **American Enterprise: Free and Not So Free**, by Clarence H. Cramer. (Little Brown and Company, 1972, 728 pages, \$17.50) For those who long to return to the days when a *laissez-faire* economy combined with individual initiative and enterprise to build America, Clarence Cramer's history of American business may provide an education. For it is the thesis of Dr. Cramer, professor of history at Case Western Reserve where he was once dean of the Business School, that every major breakthrough in this nation's economic development was supported by significant governmental subsidies. Consequently, Cramer organizes his history, not chronologically, but along the lines of separate economic factors — labor, both free and slave; transportation and the merchant marine; money; power (gas, oil and electric) and its control; land and tariffs — illustrated with copious anecdotes about individual businessmen and public officials. Unfortunately, all these asides hinder the development of Cramer's theme concerning subsidies. Though the book provides a string of well-researched stories and quotations — making it an excellent bible for the Secretary of Commerce's speech writer — it is devoid of the analy-

sis which is necessary to draw specific conclusions concerning the economic and social impact, the changing nature, and the relative merits of the different types of governmental subsidies. Reviewed by Robert D. Behn.

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## LETTERS

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### Gov. Meskill

I have been a member of the Ripon Society for a long, long time, and while I have frequently disagreed with Ripon policies, I have felt that it was a healthy influence in the party. However, I believe that it has the same responsibility for objective journalism when it is making reports as any other public medium. I am thoroughly staggered by the one-sided picture of the report on Connecticut in your March 15 newsletter. Without going into detail about the rather irresponsible comments that were made in the article, most of which could be refuted in whole or in part, it seems to me that it is hopelessly bad journalism to write only of negatives and overlook absolutely and completely the positive accomplishments of our current administration. The Governor took over a state which was operating on a deficit basis and without control, with prospect for ever more taxes and ever more deficits and ever less confidence in the state's future and its government. The Governor's worst detractors, possibly with the exception of your reporter, would admit that he has turned this around and we are now looking forward to tax reform and reduction, and the expectation that confidence in the state's economic future will return and expand with the prospect of more jobs, more public services better performed, and a stable and fair tax pattern. Gov. Meskill is a forthright and decisive man. Many people, including myself, disagree with him with respect to one or another of the positions that he has taken, but if the basic job of the governor is the maintenance and improvement of the overall economic health of the state, and the delivery of services in an efficient and effective manner, then his performance to date has been unusual and is highlighted by the sharp contrast with the past. Your report was unbalanced and unfair.

JOHN ALSOP

Republican National Committeeman  
State of Connecticut

### Reviewed

I applaud the large proportion of the March 1973 FORUM dedicated to book reviews and notes. I especially appreciate the inclusion of works reporting hard, empirical findings alongside examples of the more typical, chatty political journalism. But I regret the choice of Frederic R. Kellogg as the reviewer of Leonard Goodwin's *Do the Poor Want to Work?* What promises to be an interesting review, soon degenerates into a crude tirade against social science. Certainly, there is good social science and bad, and if the Coleman Report neglected crucial variables it is shoddy social science indeed. But Mr. Kellogg's more basic criticism is that social science is wasteful, telling us only what we already know. He offers as a case in point the conclusion of Mr. Goodwin's book: "the poor want to work, but they will not want to quite so much if they try it and do not succeed . . ." Well, that conclusion may be obvious to Mr. Kellogg, but it certainly is not obvious to, for example, Mr. Nixon, who persistently clucks about the "welfare ethic." I wish Mr. Kellogg luck when he goes to the White House to change opinion, armed with only his bluster and brilliance; were I assigned the task, I think I would take Mr. Goodwin's book along. But even if it were a conclusion obvious to all, it would still be worth investigating. All things obvious are not true, and sometimes the resulting errors matter for social policy. In short, I share the view that trees are valuable commodities, and the paper produced at such high social cost should be used judiciously, not for printing rubbish. And I think this principle comes down harder on the reviewer than on the reviewed.

R. E. GOODIN  
Oxford, England



# 14a ELIOT STREET

● **Jonathan Brown** has been elected president of the Washington, D.C. Chapter. Brown was elected at a chapter meeting on April 23 at which **Bob Monagan**, assistant secretary for congressional and intergovernmental affairs for the Department of Transportation, spoke. Other D.C. Chapter officers are vice presidents, **Willie Leftwich** and **Chris Topping**; secretary, **Sheldon Steinbeck**; treasurer, **Rick Carson**; and executive committee members, **Carol Abell**, **Larry Finkelstein**, and **Stan Sienkiewicz**. Under the leadership of **Wes Boles**, the D.C. Chapter recently completed a reassessment of the chapter activities.

● NGB member, **Mark Bloomfield**, has been appointed to the Steiger Commission.

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is a Republican research policy organization whose members are young business, academic and professional men and women. It has national headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts, chapters in sixteen cities, National Associate members throughout the fifty states, and several affiliated groups of subchapter status. The Society is supported by chapter dues, individual contributions and revenues from its publications and contract work. The Society offers the following options for annual contribution: Contributor \$25 or more; Sustainer \$100 or more; Founder \$1000 or more. Inquiries about membership and chapter organization should be addressed to the National Executive Director.

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- \*Peter V. Baugher
- Melvin Ditman
- Jeffrey Miller

#### New Jersey

- \*John Brotschol
- Harry Kline
- Nancy Miller

#### New York

- Martha Ferry
- \*Werner Kuhn
- Richard Scanlan

#### Philadelphia

- \*Robert J. Moss
- William Horton

#### Ex-Officio At Large

- \*Richard W. Rahn, Managing Director
- \*Michael F. MacLeod, National Director
- \*Robert Gulick, Counsel
- \*Clair W. Rodgers, Jr., Counsel
- \*National Executive Committee Member
- \*\*Past President, Chairman of the Board, or Chairman of the Executive Committee

#### Pittsburgh

- \*Murray Dickman
- James Groninger
- Bruce Guenther

#### Seattle

- \*Tom Alberg
- Mason D. Morisset

#### Washington

- \*Alice Tetelman
- Larry Finkelstein
- Willie Leftwich

#### At Large

- \*\*Josiah Lee Auspitz
- \*\*Christopher T. Bayley
- Christopher W. Beal
- Robert L. Beal
- Robert D. Behn
- Mark Bloomfield
- \*\*Michael Brewer
- Jan Bridges
- Ralph Caprio
- \*\*Bruce Chapman
- Pamela Curtis
- Robert W. Davidson
- Evelyn F. Ellis
- Al Felzenberg
- Glenn Gerstell
- \*\*Howard F. Gillette, Jr.
- Berna Gorenstein
- Ralph J. Heikkinen
- \*\*Lee W. Huebner
- Philip C. Johnston
- William J. Kilberg
- Ralph Loomis
- Judith R. Lumb
- \*\*J. Eugene Marans
- Tanya Melich
- Don Meyer
- \*\*John R. Price, Jr.
- \*\*John S. Saloma III
- Daniel J. Swillinger
- Leah Thayer
- Chris Topping
- \*\*Peter Wallison
- R. Quincy White
- Lyndon A.S. Wilson
- Richard Zimmer

● The Boston and Cambridge Chapters have bridged the Charles River to form the new, improved, economy size Boston-Cambridge Chapter. The action was taken at a meeting of the new chapter on March 29 in Boston at which discussion of Massachusetts politics with State Sen. **Robert Hall** and State Rep. **Barbara Gray** was featured. The new, improved officers are **Robert D. Behn**, president; **Pamela V. Ormsbee**, secretary; and **M. Victoria Golden**, treasurer and membership chairman. Other members of the executive committee are **Peter C. Berg**; **John K. Dirlam, Jr.**; **Joel P. Greene** (Worcester recruitment); **Mark C. Frazier** (campus recruitment); **E. Jackson Hall** (Boston recruitment); **Martin A. Linsky** (policy chairman and NGB member); **John F. Moffitt**, program chairman; **Martha A. Reardon** (NGB member); and **Robert G. Stewart** (special events and NGB member).

● It is not the function of 14a Eliot Street to publicize the socializing process of former FORUM editors, but it may be of some passing interest to FORUM devotees that **George Gilder** is to be married eventually, according to unusually reliable sources. These same sources say that Gilder's spouse-to-be is a successful screen-writer and that the wedding ceremony is likely to pre-date the publication of Gilder's opus magnus: **Sexual Suicide — The Deadly Fallacies of Feminism**.

● Memphis Ripon member **Bill Whitten** has been elected to the board of directors of the Memphis Young Republicans.

● The Minnesota Chapter held its annual Issues Conference on March 10-11 at Hudson, Wisconsin. About 60 Republicans and independents participated in the discussions and listened to addresses by journalist-author **Neal R. Pearce**; **Russ Hemenway** of the National Committee for an Effective Congress; University of Minnesota President **Malcolm Moos**; and White House Special Assistant **Lee Huebner**. Conference participants were particularly concerned that proposed HEW regulations for federally-assisted day care programs would cripple Minnesota centers.

● NGB member **William J. Kilberg** has been appointed solicitor for the Department of Labor. Kilberg was previously associate solicitor for the department. President Nixon has told the 26-year-old Kilberg that he is the youngest general counsel of a major department in the country's history.

## Delinquency Prevention

In an interview three years ago with CBS reporter David Schoumacher, former Attorney General John Mitchell had a few comments to make about the Ripon Society. They may bear repeating. Below is the complete transcript of the interview as it was aired on the CBS Evening News with Roger Mudd, January 17, 1970.

The Ripon Society, a group of liberal Republicans, charged through its magazine this week that Attorney General Mitchell has been playing politics for President Nixon and hampering and delaying civil rights progress. Mitchell was not readily available for comment . . . only he was literally cornered by CBS news correspondent David Schoumacher.

### Schoumacher:

What about this Ripon Society charge that you have permitted politics to play a part in your operation of the Justice Department?

### Mitchell:

As far as those little juvenile delinquents are concerned . . . I don't have any comment about them.

### Schoumacher:

Is it not true . . .

### Mitchell:

You must have been a blocking back . . .

### Schoumacher:

I learned that trying to chase you down . . . it's true . . . though . . . that you have asked the Supreme Court on occasion to delay school integration. Is that because of politics?

### Mitchell:

Not true at all . . . you must understand that the Justice Department are the lawyers for the Government. We carry out legal functions on behalf of the Government and in so acting we are acting on behalf of HEW. We are lawyers, not policy makers. Did you ever look at it that way?

# DULY NOTED: POLITICS

● **"Our Supererogatory President,"** by Stewart Alsop. *Newsweek*, April 9, 1973. "A President with a supererogatory impulse attracts around him people with a similar impulse to overdo, to press, to indulge in the superfluous . . . 'In the campaign, there were maybe a couple of hundred young guys in the White House or near it you and I never heard of,' says a Republican senator. 'They'd all walk over their grandmother to elect Nixon (a reference to Charles Colson's well-publicized pledge), and most of them think a liberal Democrat is next thing to a Communist.' The 'couple of hundred young guys' were strictly political amateurs, like the bell-bottomed McGovern youths, initially hailed as geniuses by the glib press. Like McGovern's bell-bottoms, Nixon's button-downs were essentially ideologues, with the tunnel vision that always leads ideologues to muck things up. President Nixon has always had curiously few true political pros in his inner circle. In campaign time, the only pro fairly close to the throne was Clark MacGregor, who wisely but futilely argued for a policy of lancing the Watergate boil by indignant full disclosure right away. The other old hands were amateurs. Like many men with long faces who smoke pipes and grunt a lot, John Mitchell acquired a reputation for political shrewdness, but the only thing he did to earn it was to follow his wife's advice to get away from 'all those dirty things that go on.'" Concludes Alsop, "the big things he (Nixon) has done may all be obscured by a silly, tawdry and purposeless exercise in political supererogation."

● **"Signal on Watergate?"** by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak. *Publishers-Hall Syndicate*, April 6, 1973. "The Republican Party is in a growing mood of independence from the White House on the Watergate and attendant scandals, with minimum concern about political damage to President Nixon and maximum concern about its own skin," write Evans and Novak. These two syndicated columnists report on the unusual appearance of the "haughty" H.R. Haldeman before the "Wednesday Group," an organization of progressive Republican congressmen, but indicate that "far more was needed to end the dangerous split which is putting the White House on one side of the Watergate scandal and the rest of the Republican Party on the other . . . As one key conservative Republican senator told us: 'The only way for the Republican Party to keep from getting badly hurt is for us to dig it all out.'"

● **"What in the world is wrong with Nixon?"** by James J. Kilpatrick. *The Boston Globe*, March 31, 1973. "It is time for those of us on the political right, drawn by instinct toward the Nixon Administration and the Republican Party, to face up squarely to the long-simmering issue that now threatens to boil over. The issue is corruption. For understandable reasons — rooted in human nature and in the partisan spirit — many of us have tended to avoid the issue. Since the first ITT case blew up a year ago, conservatives have been fighting defensive battles. These have been months of embarrassment, discomfort, bewilderment and shame. We have apologized, minimized, and justified. Both in public and in private life, Republicans have shown surpassing loyalty. But loyalty has its limit, and mine, at least, has been reached." Kilpatrick's column goes on to discuss ITT, Dita Beard, Vesco and Watergate and concludes: "It is late, but not too late, for Mr. Nixon to exert his personal leadership in clearing the air. If he fails to grasp the seriousness of the situation, and to respond effectively to it, he will yet forfeit much of the respect he has fought so long to earn."

● **"Can Brock Put It All Together,"** by Elaine Shannon. *Nashville Tennessean*, March 4, 1973. Not only has Sen. Bill Brock been elected chairman of the Senate GOP Campaign Committee, but his long-time associate Ken Rietz has now been named to direct 1974 congressional campaign activities for the Republican National Committee. Other Brock associates have also acquired key roles in RNC and White House organizations: former aide William Timmons in the White House, Nashville financier David K. "Pat" Wilson as chairman of the national GOP finance committee, Wilson protege Lewis Dale

to a key White House patronage post, and former Brock press secretary Bill Goodwin to a consultant's role with the Senate Republican Campaign Committee. Kevin Phillips's newsletter has commented that "clearly, 1974 GOP congressional nominees will be picked, groomed and managed by a close-knit group of people with ties to Senator Brock." Shannon reports that Brock himself joked that "I'm thinking of putting out a Sherman statement . . ." But she concludes that a "man of ambition who could deliver in 1974 might jump several steps ahead in the feverish fame of oneupmanship which precedes a presidential election with no incumbent. For Brock, pieces of the action are out there. Whether he will have the influence and ability to pull them together is another question."

● **"Beasley bunch' will control next session of state legislature,"** by Al Fox. *The Birmingham News*, April 1, 1973. By controlling the Alabama Finance and Taxation Committee, a group of legislators led by Lieutenant Gov. Jere Beasley (D) has taken the leadership position of the Alabama legislature away from Gov. George Wallace. Neither Beasley nor Wallace factions really control the legislature, Fox points out, but the pendulum has definitely swung away from Wallace and toward Beasley, himself a potential gubernatorial candidate next year.

● **"Waller Legal Aid Veto Another Blow at Poor,"** by A.B. Albritton. *The (Memphis) Commercial Appeal*, April 8, 1973. "Despite Gov. Bill Waller's populist approach to government which may one day make him a hero to the 'working man,' the Governor continues to show a callous attitude toward the poor people of Mississippi," writes Albritton. "His latest show of disregard for the poor came last week when he vetoed a non-controversial bill which gained overwhelming legislative approval to allow establishment of a public defender system in populous Hinds County." But according to Albritton, that action was only one of many cases of Waller's insensitivity to the poor. He cites the Governor's opposition to the Mound Bayou Community Health Program, his inaction on kindergarten legislation, and his veto of a community service program for Hinds County. Waller's opposition to "socialism" resulted in the veto of the public defender bill.

● **"Statement of Congressman John B. Anderson before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, Committee on the Judiciary and Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate,"** April 11, 1972. "Until the present I have not been inclined to take an overly restrictive view of executive privilege. It seemed to me quite reasonable to allow the President to enjoy confidential relations with his direct advisers regarding matters of national security. But I feel compelled to stress before this committee today in the strongest terms possible my utter shock and dismay at the testimony presented yesterday by Attorney General Kleindienst. His statement was not only unnecessarily provocative and contemptuous of the Congress, but, more importantly, it contained such an alarming and dangerous expansion of the notion of executive privilege, that I can see only one course of action: Congress must immediately pass legislation strictly limiting executive privilege lest the delicate balance of shared power between the two branches be ruptured permanently," said U.S. Rep. Anderson, chairman of the House Republican Caucus. "One would have hoped that the executive privilege issue could have been resolved only after very deliberate and searching examination by the Congress, and after some kind of communication and consultation with the Executive. But in my view there is no longer time for that. The Attorney General has thrown down the gauntlet; if this Congress is to preserve even a semblance of integrity and independence, it must act immediately to nullify the sweeping claim of executive power asserted by the Attorney General."

● **"With a New Leader, State Democrats Aim for a 1974 Comeback,"** by Null Adams. *(Memphis) Press-Scimitar*, March 28, 1973. "Book-writing professors, meeting recently in a seminar in North Carolina, were in agreement that the prophecy of a Republican majority in the South in 1976 would not come to pass." Emory University professor James Clotfelter said that Wallace supporters would never fully join the GOP because Republicans "are the embodiment of the establishment" that Wallace attacked in his campaigns."