The Constitution never envisioned a dominant role for the executive branch of government in spending and taxing decisions (other than, of course, the veto). However, for nearly 200 years, Congress had no clear process to carry out its constitutional responsibilities. Specifically, there was no single congressional committee designated to create an overarching budget.
As a result, what amounted to a budget emerged from the normal legislative process. Authorizing committees decided what programs to create, continue, or eliminate. Appropriating committees would then review what the authorizing committees had approved and decide how much spending to allow for each program. Finally, the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee would come up with the revenue needed. After this drawn-out process, Congress would have a de facto budget.
This haphazard and ineffective process was exploited over time by presidential overreach – reflected in the executive refusing to spend what Congress had appropriated, or by spending on things not intended by Congress. But, fifty years ago, Congress took steps to restore its constitutional authority to tax and spend. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, enacted in 1974, limited these presidential encroachments and established a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Budget committees in both the House and the Senate.
Congress was back in charge – or so it thought.
Beginning in the 1990s, the House and then the Senate became increasingly tribal with partisan majorities abandoning any pretense of trying to find common ground. In this more partisan environment, members of Congress who belonged to the same partisan team as the President saw it as their role to be adjuncts to the Executive Branch.
Gradually, beginning in the 1990s, the House and then the Senate became increasingly tribal with partisan majorities abandoning any pretense of trying to find common ground. In this more partisan environment, members of Congress who belonged to the same partisan team as the President saw it as their role to be adjuncts to the Executive Branch, allowing many of the previous excesses of presidential overreach to return. President Trump’s reprogramming to fund the border wall and President Biden’s attempts to forgive student loans are just two of the more egregious examples. By giving in to Presidential prerogatives, Congress is abdicating its constitutional power over the purse.
In response to these developments, Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs created The Princeton Initiative on Reclaiming the Constitutional Powers of Congress. As part of this initiative, we serve as co-chairs of a Task Force focused on restoring to Congress the “power of the purse.” The Task Force is comprised of former members of Congress from both political parties and scholars from 19 universities. We believe it is time for Congress to consider additional steps to ensure that Congress meets its constitutional responsibilities. Our proposals are not dramatic. But they are in the spirit of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and are long overdue.
Our group’s recommendations fall into two categories. First, improvements to transparency and accountability. Second, expedited congressional review of executive spending.
Congress and the public deserve better access to information on the process of “apportionments” where the Office of Management and Budget in the Executive Branch allocates funds among various agencies involved in similar activities. We could achieve this transparency through a more user-friendly apportionment database and by mandating semi-annual reports by the Government Accountability Office on apportionments.
Congress also needs better access to information on expenditures made during government shutdowns. The Antideficiency Act is meant to protect against “coercive deficiencies,” or the rapid spending-down of funds to pressure Congress. Federal agencies should be required to provide program-by-program information on any money they spend during a lapse in appropriations.
By giving in to Presidential prerogatives, Congress is abdicating its constitutional power over the purse.
In addition, lawmakers must be able to more easily track when agencies and departments transfer or reprogram federal funds away from the purposes Congress intended. And Congress has a right to know how agencies are imposing and using fees, fines, and penalties. The bottom line is that this transparency is important in assuring that agencies follow congressional intent.
Historically, Congress has delegated substantial emergency powers to the president with only weak checks on their exercise. To enhance accountability, we recommend that national emergency declarations from any President should expire after 30 days unless Congress affirmatively authorizes an extension. This would give the legislative branch the ability to respond to abuses of emergency powers.
Our group also wants a fast-track congressional review procedure for executive-led spending decisions – using dollars appropriated for one purpose to be spent elsewhere. A president who wants to do so should be required to first submit messages to Congress announcing those plans. Congress would then have a certain period of time to overrule these executive actions.
Our Task Force also advocates for increased training of both incoming and returning members of Congress on budget and appropriation processes. These sessions should emphasize Congress’s constitutional role and authorities, as well as the importance of executive accountability to the legislative branch.
In our view, while these proposals are not revolutionary, they are essential and necessary if we want to restore the checks and balances envisioned in the Constitution.
Tim Penny represented the 1st District of Minnesota in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1982 – 1994, and currently serves as President & CEO of the Southern Minnesota Initiative Foundation. Nolan McCarty is the Susan Dod Brown Professor of Politics and Public Affairs at Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs. Together, they serve as Co-Chairs of the Task Force on the Power of the Purse, part of the Princeton Initiative on Restoring the Constitutional Powers of Congress.